UCLA
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title
Economy vs. Ethnicity: Patterns of Partisan Competition in African Democracies

Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/07c1d53h

Author
Kim, Eun Kyung

Publication Date
2016

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

Los Angeles

Economy vs. Ethnicity: Patterns of Partisan Competition

in African Democracies

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

in Political Science

by

Eun Kyung Kim

2016

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Economy vs. Ethnicity: Patterns of Partisan Competition

in African Democracies

by

Eun Kyung Kim

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Los Angeles, 2016

Professor Michael F. Thies, Chair

This dissertation examines the nature of party competition in the African democracies. Political parties are an integral part of contemporary democracy where their choices of favored policies create winners and losers and therefore supporters and opponents. Yet the role of parties vis-à-vis policy choice remains poorly understood in Africa. I scrutinize economic interests, whose policy preferences are collective but also exclusive, that form the bases of political support for parties. I argue that industrial sectors shape the basis of party support.

I examine case studies of African democracies that have experienced partisan alternation in power to learn how parties have strategically transformed the sizes and the dimensionality of their support bases and how they vary over time and across countries. My first case is Ghana where the two major parties have managed to develop stable, multiethnic support bases. While each party has its stronghold, economically and ethnically defined, a candidate cannot win the presidency without appealing to the unattached voters. The example of Zambia shows how parties can and do adapt the "shapes" of their support bases by shifting the dimension of political

competition from ethnic cleavages to policy issues and by narrowing the range of a targeted support base. While a largest voting bloc on any dimension is often sufficiently large to set the basis of a winning coalition, if politicians are successful in reducing its size to a smallest winning, they gain most benefits possible. But if they overshoot, they can lose everything. In my third empirical chapter, I examine how economic interests based on agricultural subsectors account for seemingly ethnic coalitions in Kenya. The case study highlights voting behavior of cross-pressured voters whose ethnicity and economic stakes pull them in different directions. The vote decisions by the co-ethnics of the third place presidential candidates reveal that the sector-based voting provides a powerful explanation of the political coalitions even in ethnically divided countries. The main argument is that African parties are "normal," in that they do not exclusively trade in clientelistic favors for ethnic kin, but also offer policy promises to attract broader support.

The dissertation of Eun Kyung Kim is approved.

Michael F. Lofchie

Dominic Thomas

Michael F. Thies, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2016

For from him and through him and to him are all things. To him be glory forever (Rom. 11:36).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF MAPS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While the journey of my dissertation was not just for the accumulation of knowledge but also the process of learning how to live, I, first and foremost, thank my heavenly father who teaches me what is best for me, and who directs me in the way I should go.

My committee chair, Michael Thies's intellectual and moral support undoubtedly has made me seek to be more thorough and excelling in research and helped my dissertation come along. It was unthinkable for me to produce the three empirical case chapters without his encouragement and passion that helped me to find a generalizable theory and its broader implications rather than stand-alone claims. Through a number of on- and off-line meetings with Mike, I have obtained valuable support for research, career advice, and publication, which I will pay back to my future students. Many question marks I got from his written comments and his sleepless enthusiasm towards his students and research in general also deserve a great deal of my appreciation and respect.

I would like to thank my other committee members for their guidance that has made my dissertation much stronger. Michael Lofchie has been very supportive of my project and career, and his in-depth experience and expertise in African politics and political economy helped me not to stop seeking for the economic policy approach to African politics. Kathleen Bawn always provided me with sensible and credible feedback on my work. Her comprehensive knowledge of comparative politics and methodology has helped me refine the logic of my arguments, find better ways to organize the ideas, and improve my quantitative analyses. I am also thankful to Dominic Thomas for his feedback on my case studies of the Francophone African countries since before my dissertation proposal was approved.

There are many others who made my time at UCLA more rewarding. Barbara Geddes

deserves my thanks for her guidance and insights on my first and second field papers. Much of Daniel Posner's modernization approach to ethnic politics inspired my own interest in African parties' coalition formation, and I thank him for his guidance as well. I am also grateful to Jeffrey Lewis, Edmond Keller, and Miriam Golden for their teaching throughout invaluable coursework. Joseph Brown's excellent support and sense of humor have let me survive throughout the program even during the financially dark period.

I also owed much for the friendship and useful advice of Julia Lee, Joseph Asunka, Safia Farole, Marika Csapo, Anita Kellogg, Amanda Rizkallah, Sarah Brierley, and George Ofosu.

I give my special thanks to my friends and the officials I met during the field research overseas. In Zambia, where I had my first fieldwork, I am grateful to Chipasha Luchembe who facilitated all the seed contacts, Daniel and Charity Nyirenda for research assistance and friendship, Chipango Lukungu at the Ministry of Agriculture for her help with data collection, and especially for Bupe Chanda's generous hosting. During my Ghana trip, I am thankful for Deborah Afulani's hospitality and help with settling in and to Horlu Godwin at the International Food and Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) for his continuous help for my endless inquiries. Also in Kenya, a number of people supported me with contacts and access to research resources. These included Rupando Aluchio, Benjamin Washiali, Bernard Gichovi at the Coffee Directorate, Timothy Ogwang at the Ministry of Agriculture, Patrick and other Oyugi family members, and many others. I am grateful to the UCLA International Institute Fieldwork Fellowship and the UCLA Graduate Division Research Travel Grant that financed my fieldwork.

Finally, I would like to give many thanks to my family for their love and trust in me. My parents, Sungsub and Chunhwa, and brother, Woohyun, encouraged me to explore new worlds and to conceive big dreams. They have always supported all of my endeavors and endured

difficult times with me, even when I think it was hard for them to do so. Fellowship with my church members certainly has made me grow in strong character and faith. I am thankful for their prayers. Most of all, I thank my soul mate, David. Throughout the dissertation process, he has been extremely supportive of my work and career, and empathized with my excitement and agony. I thank his overseas calls when I was far away for fieldwork, his tolerance of me most of the time not stylish, and his love that supports me to be myself.

VITA

2006	B.A. (Political Science)
	Sookmyung Women's University, Seoul, Korea
2006	Research Assistant
	Mark DeLancey, Dept. of Political Science, Sookmyung Women's University
2008	M.A. (Political Science)
	Ohio University, Athens, OH
2006-2008	Research Assistant
	Takaaki Suzuki, Department of Political Science, Ohio University
2011-2015	Teaching Assistant
	Department of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles
	Department of Statistics, University of California, Los Angeles
2013	Research Travel Grant
	Graduate Division, University of California, Los Angeles
2014, 2015	International Fieldwork Fellowship
	International Institute, University of California, Los Angeles

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

1. Introduction

In most of Africa's relatively new democracies, opposition parties have not fared well. But in a few cases, opposition parties, either alone or in coalition, have managed to break through and take control of government through multi-party elections. These victories necessarily imply that opposition parties obtained at least a plurality of the presidential vote (and/or legislative seats). Finishing in first place, in turn, means that minority parties had to do one or more of the following: ally with other parties, mobilize new voters (Przeworski & Sprague 1986), or induce at least some supporters of the (erstwhile) ruling party to switch sides. The reality of democratic partisan turnover raises some very basic but critical questions about African parties that have not been answered to date. How are parties configured at the mass and elite level? What factors create the kind of groups a party chooses to organize into a coalition? Do the party systems mirror cleavages within a national community or even create them? These are questions about representation, accountability, and power. They have implications for how we understand Africa's political development, for unraveling politically salient cleavages as foundations of power relations in the new democracies, and for identifying determinants of successful party building.

Existing explanations of electoral mobilization in democratic Africa display weaknesses or limitations in showing a complete picture of political imperatives. Ethnic voting is often taken to be the most prevalent electoral behavior, but it cannot explain everything. In particular, whereas voters might support a co-ethnic politician irrespective of any direct benefits they receive (Kasara 2007, Ferree 2010, Posner & Kramon 2011), how do voters without a co-ethnic

candidate or with more than one candidate from the same birthplace vote? In many cases, politicians from the same ethnic group often join different political parties, and co-ethnics do not necessarily vote for their closer kin. Also, political leaders in poor democracies use ethnic networks of patronage to funnel central resources to co-ethnic supporters (Berman 1998, Wantchekon 2003, Chandra 2007, Stokes et al. 2013). But exclusively ethnic networks are typically insufficient in size. Parties and presidential candidates must attract support beyond their own ethnic kin in order to attract their support that is needed to win enough votes or parliamentary seats to have any influence on government decision-making. How do they choose whom to target for transfers and patronage? For example, in Ghana the two major parties are both multiethnic, in which various ethnic groups residing near presidential candidates' home bases team up with the co-ethnics. Why those non-ethnic votes are targeted and pursued by a certain party rather than another party cannot be explained by ethnic patronage theories.

Moreover, recent studies have found evidence of economic voting, arguing that (at least some) citizens assess governments based on their overall performance and accountability, which are usually attested by economic growth, inflation, and unemployment (Lindberg 2008, Bratton et al. 2012). However, tying party support to good government performance is not as simple as the ethnic explanation, in part because "performance" has distributive implications as well. Parties often shape their policies to serve the interests of "core" voters who remain loyal to the party as long as they get policy advantage from it (Bratton & Bhavnani 2008). Such voters may appear to be "core voters" in that they consistently support a single party, but that consistency may be conditional upon a steady stream of policy advantages. Therefore, the search for economic voting cannot stop at correlations of overall vote share and macro-indicators of policy "success" (e.g., low inflation and unemployment, or fast growth); this account requires that we

2

describe specific partisan attributes, the policy differences among parties.

In the study of African politics, the main politically salient grouping that has been examined is the urban-rural divide in public sentiment towards the governments. Unlike the set of policies established under the authoritarian regime in the 1970s and the early 1980s that tended to assist urban growth at the expense of the rural sector (Bates 1981, Varshney 1998), democratic electoral competition has induced policies that favor rural interests at the expense of urban interests (van de Walle 2001, Bates and Humphrey 2002, Harding 2010). Because a majority of Africans are engaged in agriculture, democratization reversed political elites' incentives in policy making to be more farmer-friendly, swapping urban bias for rural bias. But precisely because agriculture so dominates African economies, a pan-rural coalition should be too big and heterogeneous to be a useful base for a single party if any other option for a smaller winnable coalition is available.

Especially if the agricultural sector is itself diversified, across different crops, for example, there will be varying policy factors splitting rural voters into different interest groups. Workers in the same industry, possibly sorted into production of crops, fishing, and mining, are likely to vote correspondingly. Although studies of industry-government relationship in democratic regimes have made progress in establishing plausible theories of "commerce and coalitions," (Rogowski 1989), the issue has not gained much attention in the context of Africa. I argue that this omission stems, in part, from the fact that economic interests often overlap ethnic divisions—people living in close proximity are likely co-ethnics and endowed with similar environmental resources and jobs. For example, in Ghana, export crops such as cocoa, coffee, and oil palm are grown in the regions of the Ashanti ethnic group, in contrast to the Ewe dominant areas where farmers mostly rely on staple crop production. The Ashanti constitute a

free trade coalition against the Ewe who favor of protection. Thus, what may appear to be ethnic alliances might in fact reflect geographically concentrated coalitions built around policy demands that just happen to mirror ethnic group boundaries.

Importantly, recent research tells us that there is more than one identity dimension that matters when voters select parties. Accordingly, there are many potential ways for a party to build and serve a support coalition. In this study, I examine cases of African democracies that have experienced partisan alternation in power in order to find patterns of how parties have transformed the sizes and identities of their support bases. Stepping forward from the existing literature, I argue that socio-economic variation cultivated in a society provides the basic structure of partisan competition, in which parties opt for various coalition-building strategies pondered over a multidimensional space.

2. My Argument

Although there are several success stories of opposition parties in Africa, the circumstances and their strategies vary across countries. There is no single best way for a party to combine societal groups into a coalition. To address the problem of identifying feasible coalitions, I offer a conceptual framework to study multiple dimensions of potential party base to see what cleavages become politically salient in electoral competition.[1] At this point, we need to explicate what factors shape cleavage dimensions and how parties choose social cleavages or issue dimensions around which to structure their platforms. The categories of issues and identities as bases for parties are consistent with those of vote intentions. There are largely two factors that determine

---

[1] The idea of integrating factors of vote choice has been used by numerous scholars of party politics in advanced democracies to account for party's policy positions (Stokes 1963, Strom 1990, Coughlin 1992, Adams, Merrill, and Grofman 2005). As a modified version of their approach, my model unites policy and non-policy factors of vote choice as the key determinants of dimensions that party coalition contains.

whether voters would support or oppose candidates or parties: 1) identity-based patronage such as local goods provision on the basis of descended identities including ethnicity, language, religion, and class, and 2) policy considerations that divide individuals into groups, some of which benefit from implemented policies and others of which suffer. Here, a policy attribute does not necessarily mean a coherent ideology, as often assumed by spatial models of electoral politics, but it is more about policies that determine who gets what. In that way, policies implemented by the incumbent government divide voters into groups of supporters and groups of opponents. Eventually, both factors provide a list of options, from which parties find the building blocks of partisan coalitions. By bringing narrowly targetable "pork barrel" projects to co-ethnic districts, parties are able to reward and maintain their political support. By contrast, party's constant and distinctive policy stands attract voters, who sympathize with the party's issue preferences, across ethnic identities.

The main argument is that African parties are "normal," in that they do not exclusively trade in clientelistic favors for ethnic kin, but also offer policy promises to attract broader support. Patronage used to gain electoral advantage is certainly prevalent in poor democracies, and it might well favor co-ethnics (e.g., van de Walle 2007). But especially as Africa's economies grow and become more diversified and complex, and middle classes emerge, governmental economic policies (regulations, prices, exchange rates, subsidies, taxes, tariffs) create winners and losers and therefore supporters and opponents. Parties use policy (or, for oppositions, policy promises) to build coalitions of interests that may or may not correspond to ethnic identities.

The multidimensionality of partisan coalition building implies that there may be, for each party, several distinguishable groups whose demands they champion. In that way, my research

question is framed as a problem of a party's strategic choice of groups sharing common attitudes and concerns. I argue that parties choose member groups based on variation in cleavage structure in a society, and simultaneously, that cleavages are made *politically* salient by the parties' strategic choices following their electoral incentives. To form a coalition, I propose that parties first select categories of "core" voters, and then decide on how to expand the party base to those "outsider" groups who are potentially convincible. Here, what determines the extent of party loyalty is parties' and voters' need for one another. Voters are loyal to the party that supports their concerns, while the party emphasizes those issues or identity dimensions that are crucial to win an election.

For each of the cases that I study, I identify the policy dimensions of political competition that explain why a party's core voters are core voters. Most of the time, a party's effort to construct a support base larger than just an ethnic group, centers on the key industrial sector of the party president's co-ethnic region. Given that a leader's co-ethnics are not numerous enough to deliver victory, the first step is typically to appeal with policy favoritism to the "co-industrialists" of the leader's co-ethnics. This doubly pleases co-ethnics, who help the party set a strong baseline of backing, and simultaneously attracts different people with the same economic concern, thereby creating a bond between voters and the non-co-ethnic leader.

Naturally, the core groups of opposition parties are those who disagree with the government's policies or goals. Considering the contents of opposition coalition, I argue opposition parties mobilize groups to support them in response to ruling parties' own coalitional choices. After beginning with these natural supporters of regime opponents, an opposition coalition may take positions on minor issues that appeal to unattached groups, in the hope that the addition of these might be enough to secure a win over the incumbent government. If a

6

coalition of sincere (if disparate) groups meets the required number of votes needed to win, it need not seek out additional support from voters expected to be less loyal (i.e., those in groups currently attached to the incumbent regime), that is, voters whose loyalty to the incumbent is weaker. A broader party, expanding its support base, may sway some of the sincere incumbent-opposing voters to find or create another party.

On the one hand, different configurations of societal groups have consequences for modern party-building trajectories, with implications for the number of ways to build a coalition, the feasibility of alliance, and the accountability of the parties. On the other hand, possibilities for regional development and political power balance between regions are affected decisively by coalition alignment. Therefore, social cleavages and party formation are endogenous to a model of coalition-building strategy, which has significant effects on party politics as well as the political construction of identities.

3. Research Cases and Design

Political parties strategically target voting blocs to form a winning coalition. For elements of a coalition, regional variation in development and interests of various groups produce predictable differences in voting intentions and in the extent of loyalty to a political party. Voting blocs differentiated by their specific policy concerns and non-policy attributes come to be potential components of an electoral coalition. So the puzzle is to find what mix and match of identity units a party will aim to incorporate into its coalition. This section describes properties of voting blocs that affect the emergence of politically salient social cleavages and explains patterns of parties' strategic choice across three African countries: Ghana, Zambia, and Kenya. The case studies are three of the still small number of African democracies that have experienced

alternation of parties in power at the ballot box. (Three additional cases that satisfy the criteria will be briefly explored in Chapter 6.) The three countries selected for study provide a variety of contexts, in terms of the sizes and identities of available voting blocs, in which parties' coalition-building strategies can be investigated. The time frame is the 1990s through the present, the period during which many African states (re-)established and consolidated democratic institutions after decades of authoritarian rule.

My first step is to find crucial ethnic and industrial blocs that constitute socio-economic cleavages in a society. Individuals in a bloc share political or economic interests, and their common cause often generates partisanship to secure those interests. Table 1.1 presents the important voting blocs in the selected case countries. In Ghana, the Akan located in southwestern part of the country form the largest ethnolinguistic group with 47.5 percent of the population including its subgroups of Asante and Fante (who often vote at cross-purposes with one another). In northern Ghana, the Mole-Dagbani people comprise 16.6 percent of the national population. The Ewe live mostly in eastern Ghana along the border with Togo, with around 14 percent of the country's population. Ga-Dangme people, constituting 7.4 percent of the population, are based in the capital Accra. In terms of economic sectors, important export crops such as cocoa are grown in the South, closely associated with the Akan ethnic group, whereas rice production is dominant in eastern and northern regions and groundnuts in the North. While rice and groundnuts production tends to focus on domestic consumption, in contrast to cocoa, which is mostly exported, eastern and northern ethnic groups consistently band together politically to oppose the southern groups.

In Zambia, the largest ethnic group, the Bemba, with 33.5 percent of the national population, is politically salient in that politicians use the ethnic cue for electoral mobilization,

calling for ethnic solidarity on the ballot. But Bemba people work in several different industrial sectors, thus dividing their economic interests. The main divide occurs between maize farming and copper mining. The Nyanja and Tonga are economically unitary groups both engaged in mostly maize plantation, whereas they are politically distinctive each other. Lozi people live in scarcely populated Western Province with marginalized small farm communities.

Table 1.1. Ethnic group compositions and industrial subsectors in the case countries

Country	Ghana	Zambia	Kenya
Ethnic groups	Akan (47.5%) - *Asante (16%)* - *Fante (12%)* Mole-Dagbani (16.6%) Ewe (13.9%) Ga-Dangme (7.4%)	Bemba (33.5%) Nyanja (14.8%) Tonga (11.4%) Lozi (5.5%)	Kikuyu (17.2%) Luhya (13.8%) Kalenjin (12.9%) Luo (10.5%) Kamba (10.1%)
Industrial (sub)sectors	Agriculture/Manufacturing - *Cocoa* - *Oil Palm* - *Rice* - *Groundnuts*	Agriculture/Manufacturing - *Maize* Mining	Agriculture/Manufacturing - *Tea* - *Coffee* - *Sugar* - *Maize* - *Fishing* - *Livestock* - *Horticulture*

Kenya's agricultural sector is diverse and complex. There are the highlands across Central and Rift Valley regions where tea and coffee production and dairy farming are common, and also the grain belt in western regions of Kenya, especially in part of the Rift Valley referred to as the country's food basket that produces nearly 50 percent of national maize output (USAID 2013). The western region is known as the traditional sugar-producing zone. With respect to ethnic groups, however, the Kikuyu, Kenya's largest ethnic group, are concentrated most heavily in central region with 17.2 percent of the total population. Luhya and Luo people dwell in the western part of the country, while the Kalenjin are concentrated in the Rift Valley, which is located in between the central and western regions. The Kamba are placed the fifth with 10.1 percent of the national population, living in areas where livestock and maize farming form the

foundation of the group's economy though not as significant as in the Rift Valley.

Varying social cleavages are the dynamic of party strategies. Once identifying the units of possible coalition building in a society, we can predict how political coalitions will form. The first is Ghana with two large opposing voting blocs and pivotal unattached voters. The two existing groups are incompatible in a sense of regionally important agricultural subsectors (cocoa versus rice) so that they shape a sharp division. Ethnically speaking, each camp is heterogeneous with multiple ethnic groups, which are regionally distinguishable: One party is strongly supported within southern groups including the Akan and the other party finds its strong backing in northern and eastern regions of Ewe, Mole-Dagbani, and Ga-Dangme people. This coalition structure is stable in that there are somewhat consolidated party platforms of the two parties. But neither can form a winning coalition without winning over unattached voters. Though in overlapping multi-dimensions in the case of Ghana, each party's base is identified by ethnicity and type of crop production and other related factors such as income and education level.

The second case study of Zambia exhibits two types of cleavage, which produce two different sets of possible coalitions. For example, where there are 'urban versus rural' and 'Bemba versus non-Bemba' cleavages, we can have coalition formations with urban-Bemba v. rural-non-Bemba and the other with urban-non-Bemba v. rural-Bemba arrangement. Since they are fairly large blocs in economic and ethnic dimensions, strategic coalitions tend to be built around either of the axes, shifting the main space of political competition from time to time.

Kenya, for the third case study, has several large ethnic groups relatively similar in their sizes, and the geographically concentrated ethnic groups are generally represented by agricultural outputs they produce. While the agricultural and ethnic cleavages often overlap, ethnic identity is considered as the most important cue for voting because parties bid for the support of ethnic

10

elites in order to induce whole ethnic segments to switch partners, instead of convincing atomized voters to join the opposition. Nevertheless, the parties' strategy of alternating partners shows that the possible options of cross-ethnic alliance are restricted by policy preferences. For instance, Kalenjin people who are engaged in various agricultural subsectors from maize to tea have critical leverage over alliance formation, and can choose whether to join grain-growing Luo or tea-planting Kikuyu, two groups of which do not share industrial and agricultural interests with one another. Also importantly, the analysis of cross-pressured voters whose ethnic and economic interests create crosscutting allegiances to different parties finds that multiple ethnic groups with shared policy preferences can congeal into an enduring coalition.

The outcome that I seek to account for through case studies is the coalitional configurations that parties find most advantageous. Understanding what the cleavage structure looks like, now we can understand the choices that political actors make. Careful study of cases allows one to appreciate the complex map of (potentially) politically salient units as sources of electoral coalition than does "big-N" quantitative comparison, which must necessarily abstract away from many details. They also reveal the different strategies that opposition parties have taken to defeat ruling parties in different contexts. The recipes for success vary according to the local ingredients.

4. Plan of the Dissertation

I organize the remainder of the dissertation into five chapters. In Chapter 2, I examine the essential theoretical issues that must be addressed in order to understand the formation of a democratic party in Africa. After introducing the previously studied sources of building-blocks for Africa's democratic parties, I suggest a new economic component of the party coalitions:

industrial sectors shape the basis of party support. In Chapter 3, I examine patterns of close competition between two major parties in Ghana and I ask what swings the swing voters and brings one party or the other a win. In particular, I compare the characteristics of voters who have shown consistent allegiance to one or the other of the two main parties (core voters) with the characteristics of those voters who frequently have changed their preference of parties. In Chapter 4, I discuss Zambia, a case in which an opposition party built its coalition over several elections, until it took control of government. To do this, it shifted its platform from the ethnic dimension to a policy dimension whose appeal crossed ethnic lines. In Chapter 5, I introduce another African democracy, Kenya, which is interesting because existing voting blocs have "switched teams" to enjoy policy payouts for playing the pivot in the coalition-formation contest. In Kenya, ethnic and industrial boundaries often coincide, so that ethnic coalitions represent their inherent economic interests, and vice versa.

In the final section of each case study chapter, I also show that the economic interests of ruling coalitions are reflected in government policy. Supporters of winners see their agricultural subsectors benefit and groups who backed the losers pay a policy price. This is evidence that, for better or worse, African parties are responsive to their core supporters' policy demands and held accountable for their platform promises.

Before concluding in Chapter 6, I look briefly at two additional cases: in Benin, though with several poles of politically salient ethno-regional groups, the patterns of coalition formation persistently appear as the south-north divide on the basis of differing policy interests; and Malawi as a case of non-existence of salient economic cleavage shows that ethnicity remains likely the most convenient basis for coalition building.

CHAPTER 2. LOCAL INGREDIENTS OF NEW POLITICAL COALITIONS

1. Introduction

Most African societies are rich in natural resources such as minerals, timber, and oil and suitable for variable agricultural products. Most countries are also ethnically heterogeneous, with a number of cultures and groups speaking different languages. As groups within each country engage in greatly varying social and economic activities, the interests and values of citizens also vary. While many socio-economic groupings are geographically concentrated and segregated from one another, the increased international and intra-Africa trades and fast urbanization process promote diversification as well as economic competition within countries. If these differing interests are aggregated and represented by political parties, the parties emerge as political actors that supply pubic policies demanded by the electorate. From the parties' perspective that they should be responsive to the interest of voters whose electoral support is required to sustain themselves in power, it is critical to understand what motivates voters. By implication, the multidimensional and complex political landscape is more complex than conventional unidimensional models of electoral politics typically assume.

2. Factors of a Party Base

Even though any party has many important features that shape its support base, the chief focus of this dissertation is on two of those features—ethnic voting as a descent-related factor and economic voting as a non-descent-based consideration for voters. There are two schools of ethnic politics theories, regarding the source of ethnic salience in political events: primordialist approaches view ethnicity as an inherited cultural identity that is automatically politicized, while

instrumentalists or constructivists consider ethnic voting as a rational calculation of self-interest. However, economic voting, regarded as a political demand for economic prosperity, can be specified by three different kinds of objectives: non-excludable valence issues such as economic growth, anti-corruption, and security; targetable private/community goods; and non-valence policy issues that separate advocates and opponents according to ideological preferences or sectoral interests.

Instrumentalist theories of ethnic voting share with theories of economic voting the hypothesis that constituents select a candidate/party who is expected to provide supporters with rewards made available by power. Ethnic models focus on patronage and individual-level clientelistic exchanges, and argue that ethnic identity is an efficient basis on which to identify supporters and exclude outsiders. Economic models focus instead on industry-level or even macro-economic policy goods, and predict that the productive sectors dominated by supporters of political winners will benefit from favorable regulatory, tax, and spending policies. Voters, in turn, will choose which party to support by assessing which party is inclined to favor their parts of the economy. In both models, political cleavages are driven by the logic of coalition building, and parties, for their part, try to manipulate the lens through which voters view politics (whether ethnic or economic) in order to grab the biggest slice of the electorate for themselves.

2.1. Ethnic voting

Ethnicity, as past literatures have emphasized, is a significant factor in shaping party systems in ethnically divided societies. Manifestation of ethnic voting entails an affinity for one party by members of an ethnic group and a vote decision for or against a candidate based on an ethnic group he belongs to (Wolfinger 1965). This pattern of voting is reinforced by ethnic

consciousness that defines "us" against "them," which also may lead to ethnic conflicts (Glazer and Moynihan 1963, Dahl 1991).

Early studies viewed that ethnic affiliations are so deeply genetically ingrained in human history and experience that their existence cannot be denied, and that they define the relations between individuals and the societies they are kin to. These strong intrinsic bonds, thus, naturally emerge as determinative to structure the political game, offering a secure and cost-effective approach to political competition (Shils 1957, Rabushka and Shepsle 1972, Geertz 1973, Horowitz 1985, Connor 1994). By appealing to ethnic sentiments, political elites can easily mobilize poor and illiterate people towards their reelection. Also, political objectives are clearer and political executives can be more responsive if the demands and the interests are mainly based on ethnicity. The differentiated, ethnic-group order in turn shapes privileged and communal identity by which the rights of citizens are defined (Herbst 2000). But this primordialist perspective fails to explain the politically salient units of ethnicity that vary within countries over time and across countries. Also, for them, it is difficult to make clear why and how people choose or accentuate the scope and the dimension of one ethnic category among many layers of defining features. For example, people living in the Rift Valley in Kenya can be classified as Kalenjin, or according to subdivisions of the Kalenjin such as Nandi and Kipsigi. Which one should be politically salient cannot be answered by primordialist arguments.

Seeking to account for such variation, instrumentalists tend to view ethnic identity as boundaries of group of people constructed for the competition for goods and prestigious positions (Gellner 1983, Olzak 1992, Bates 1983). In the influential work of Robert Bates (p.152), he clearly exhibits this view: "ethnic groups represent, in essence, coalitions which have been formed as part of rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of

modernization—benefits which are desired but scarce." This rationality premise gives ground for the pursuit of (re)forming ethnic identity and for the choice of the concept and the formation. For co-ethnics who often live in proximity, possess shared natural assets, and have similar opportunities for modernization, it makes sense to ally in order to compete for political and economic benefits. Furthermore, having administrative divisions coincide with ethnic groups may reinforce the significance of ethnic ties, because it makes the ethnic boundaries official, through which the people elect a leader, and central government revenues are distributed (Bates 1983).

In addition, Bates argues that the fact that members of an ethnic group share a common language and culture assists in mobilizing the support of ethnic political coalitions because the costs bonding are lower for co-ethnics than for other groups. Similar to Bates in this sense is Fearon and Laitin's (1996) argument that because an intact social structure is developed within an ethnic group, and co-ethnics have frequent interactions, ethnic affiliation becomes a substantial source of information.[2]

Taking an instrumentalist approach, Fearon (1999) particularly accounts for why ethnic coalitions are more likely than other kinds of coalitions. He finds a correlated phenomenon that occurs with and as often as ethnic politics, namely pork-barrel politics. Political strategies to allocate pork goods that everybody wants but that, if shared with more people, reduce one's portion are all about how much to whom, in contrast to policy goods whose winners and losers are may vary by policy issue. In the meantime, ethnic groupings, which are mostly marked by attributes associated with ancestry, cannot be easily changed. Fearon's argument maintains that

---

[2] This seems to remain true, but it may not be as critical as before, when there were constrained media, little media coverage, and poor transportation.

due to its characteristics of "stickiness" (not easily changing),[3] ethnic identity is useful to delineate and vindicate beneficiaries of patronage opportunities. Therefore, where pork-barrel spending is common, coalition-building along ethnic lines is more likely to occur than along partisanship or ideological differences.

Consistent with this idea of constructed identity, Chandra (2004) and Posner (2005) provide accounts as to how ethnic identity becomes salient among all possible options. Posner shows in his case study of Zambia that the broadening domain of electoral competition from the district-level in a single-party regime to the national-level after the reform that allowed multiparty competition changed the salient unit of social identity from tribe to language group. That is, in winning a national election, small units of social cleavages like tribes become less important, and party electoral strategies turn toward larger groupings to mobilize support. Chandra presents similar dynamics of the production and reproduction of social cleavages in India, by showing that variation in salience of ethnicity across states depending on how parties use it. These two studies argue that any given set of ethnic cleavages is likely not the only conceivable basis for voting, that alternatives are often available. Furthermore, Chandra also emphasizes the role parties play in constructing politically credible identities in a patronage democracy.

2.2. Economic voting

Recent political science work reveals the tendency that elections are influenced by economic concerns as an alternative to the idea of ethnic voting: citizens base their vote decisions on their assessment of incumbent governments' economic performance (e.g., Lindberg 2008, Bratton et

---

[3] The term is from Kanchan Chandra's article (2006), "Why is ethnic identity and does it matter?," where the definition of ethnicity is similar to Fearon's use, though her study shows ethnicity in this definition of descent-based association does not matter to most political outcomes, including patronage and violence.

al. 2012). I identify three different categories depending on the economic policy goals: non-excludable public goods, targetable patronage goods, and non-valence policies. The identification is important because the characteristics of voters or a group of voters may vary by the policy objectives they pursue.

Some voters support or oppose incumbents based on their evaluations of general government performance that affects everybody's well-being such as higher economic growth, low inflation and employment, anti-corruption, law and order: they vote for the incumbent government if its performance is good; and they punish it for if bad (Logan 2008, Young 2009, Lindberg 2012, Bratton et al. 2012). Because these voters are not co-ethnics of government leaders, or because they value private transfers less than overall performance, such voters are less tied to specific (ethno-political) patrons, and may be willing to swing their support from one party to another if unimpressed with incumbent accomplishments. Moreover, positive assessments of government performance sometimes can explain why one party predominates. Mattes and Piombo (2001) contend the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa has lasted long in power not because black voters, the majority of the electorate, operate as a unified ethnic support base for the party, but rather because they do not see an opposition party that could perform better than the ANC. Thus, evaluation of government performance can drive party choice in places where the other economic or noneconomic motivations do not emerge as politically salient in electoral decisions. But most voters perhaps place this type of concern below private transfers in their decisions about which parties to support.

Clientelistic local goods provision is another mechanism for assessing the government for reelection (Banful 2010, Morjaria 2011, Burgess et al. 2013, Ichino and Nathan 2013, Weghorst and Lindberg 2013). Experiments by Ichino and Nathan (2013) show that voters do not

necessarily support the party of their own ethnic group when the community they belong to benefits from resource allocation by a party of another group. Weghorst and Lindberg's (2013) research in Ghana also shows the importance of club goods allocation (such as constituency development funds) in convincing unattached voters to support incumbents even in contexts in which the targeting of private goods is prevalent. More obvious is allocation decisions that express ethnic favoritism (Kimenyi 2006, Habyarimana et al. 2007). In the study of Kenya, Burgess and his co-authors (2013) find that the government builds more roads in home districts of president and minister of public works than they deserve according to the criteria of economic efficiency, equity, and long-term development.

Unlike general concerns such as public goods provision and macroeconomic policies, which might be thought of as "valence" issues (everybody wants more), many policies favor one economic sector or industry over another, targeting investment, taxes and subsidies, trade protections, or regulations toward some parts of the economy and not others.[4] But studies of democratic Africa tend to ignore the politicization of policy, especially the question of how it might impact partisan competition. This is surprising, as some of the most influential work on pre-democratic Africa, in the 1970s and the early 1980s, demonstrated that government policies tended to assist urban growth at the expense of the rural sector in developing countries because politicians found urban dwellers to be more dangerous to their survival than the politically impotent countryside (Bates 1981). Urban constituents could be mobilized more easily against policies that, for example, raised the price of food than the more numerous but more atomized farmers could be mobilized to advocate for higher food prices (Olson 1965). If the adopted

---

[4] Bleck and van de Walle (2013) examining campaign messages in newspaper archives for the 6 months leading up to the elections in 7 countries (Kenya 2007, Zambia 2008, Nigeria 2007, Ghana 2008, Uganda 2005, Benin 2011), find that the African parties tend to only appeal to the valence issues because unstable government (or party) revenues and a lack of parties' credibility to pursue particular issues put politicians and parties at risk to stand on one side of an issue.

policies were inimical to the urban interests, the urban sector could become a potent force to oust incumbents in a popular uprising. Bates's logic of policies driven by considerations of political survival is equally applicable to democracies. Of course in democracies, more than minimizing the threat of riots, strikes, or insurrection, the key to political survival is winning votes, and so political elites produce policies to please the politically significant groups whose support, votes, and money they need to keep winning elections. Following this logic, the introduction of democratic competition in Africa made governments more responsive to rural areas. Because a majority of Africans are engaged in agriculture in countryside, democratization reverses political elites' incentives in policy making to be more farmer-friendly, swapping urban bias for rural bias.

Recent research has produced a good deal of evidence for this reversal of urban bias in new African democracies. Not surprisingly, electoral competition reduces the tendency of extracting from rural areas in African countries (Bates and Humphreys 2002, Kasara 2007, Bates and Block 2009). Kasara (2007) also argues this logic for thirty cash-crop-growing African countries. Coding for the onset of competitive multi-candidate elections for the parliament, her study shows that democracies impose lower taxes on agricultural products. Moreover, several studies have found evidence that electoral incentives motivate policies that assist rural at the expense of urban interests. Van de Walle (2001) notes that output prices of maize, Kenya's major food crop, rose sharply in the election years of 1992 and 1997, while consumer prices had been liberalized more than producer prices. As this increase benefited maize producers just before the elections, it worked perfectly for electoral victory. Development policies are another tool with which incumbents seek the support of rural voters. Expanding the provision of primary education into the countryside is a nice example of ruling parties' need of rural votes, as shown in case studies of Uganda, Malawi, and Botswana (Stasavage 2005, Al-Samarrai 2005,

Avenstrup, Liang and Nellemann 2004).

Such distorted policies favoring rural interests, in turn, render urbanites less likely to support democratic incumbents. Harding (2010) argues that urban-rural locality is a key determinant of vote choice in African countries, where urban dwellers are more prone than the rural population to back opposition parties. Harding agrees that this cleavage deepens precisely because incumbents have incentives for biased distribution in favor of rural areas, where a larger population resides. Similarly, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar (2010) find in their analysis of the 2008 Zambian presidential elections that densely populated constituencies were more likely to vote for the opposition party than low-density constituencies. As governments sought to alter distributions of resources between urban and rural areas, preferences for party attachment diverged across the urban-rural divide.

In terms of building a partisan base, however, a pan-rural coalition should be too big and too heterogeneous to be useful for a single party if any other option for a smaller winnable coalition is available. When individuals in an interest group share political or economic interests, and their common cause often generates partisanship to secure those interests, a large number of interest groups in a party imply diverse goals and interests that are competing. The more differing values there are within a coalition, the more difficult it will be to reach a united decision for collective interests (Cox 1997, Haspel et al. 1998, Hix et al. 2005). For the same reason, multi-ethnic coalitions are often "clashing and fluid" (Horowitz 1993, Mozaffar et al. 2003). A farmers' coalition, which may consist of numerous agricultural sub-sectors, could be often clashing and fluid as well. Noting that African parties and voters are rational, utility-maximizing actors (Mattes 1995, Gyimah-Boadi 2004), we should be able to identify varying policy factors that split the rural political economy into competing interest groups.

3. Ethnic Politics in Africa, Hindrance to Issue-Based Party Development?

The seemingly persistent power of ethnic appeals as instant mobilizers for political collective action may hinder the advent of other sorts of political alignments. Yet, in a democratic setting in which a candidate wins so long as he obtains a plurality of votes by any means, ethnic votes should not be deemed at all times sufficient for victory.[5] In this section, I examine the enduring factors of ethnic politicization in Africa, and verify whether such factors always shape an environment in which politics along ethnic lines is carried out. I argue that for political scientists, viewing the politics of ethnic patronage as the general culture of an African country or of the region is a mistake. Most studies on politics and political economy of Africa have been ambiguous about which domain of political practice is or is not explained by ethnicity and through which mechanisms ethnic maneuvering most clearly shows its effect on political activities. I aim to find ways, rather than accepting the communal effect of ethnic politics as a whole, to address specific political domains little influenced by identity-based clientelism.

The preceding analysis suggests four types of fertile grounds for ethnic political coalitions in Africa, though not unique to the continent. First, political coalitions are likely to form along the ethnic lines when most voters are poor. It is not surprising that poor voters are easily targeted by ethno-clientelist appeals because they benefit more from instant cash, as an alternative to public goods provision, than the wealthy (Dixit and Londregan 1996, Brusco et al. 2004, Vicente and Wantchekon 2009). Less educated, the poor also primarily vote via ethnicity (Wantchekon 2002, Schedler 2002, Jensen and Justesen 2013). The second, related argument is that political coalitions are likely to form along ethnic lines when politics is preoccupied with the partition of the political spoils, which often involves widespread corruption. Ethnic clientelism is

---

[5] This is most likely to true in an ethnically diverse setting, such as in a national presidential election. Of course, legislative candidates running in ethnically homogeneous constituencies might find that ethnicity is of no help for the opposite reason – if all voters are co-ethnics, then some other basis of competition must be found.

often an efficient mechanism through which politicians reward their backers whose electoral support is necessary to ensure access to the state's resources. Public spending is therefore diverted to programs or sectors where politicians can easily pocket a large amount of resources for their own use to secure the office (Fox 1994, Della Porta and Vannucci 1997, Kurer 2001). Thus, corruption creates and entrenches poverty. By its very divisive and exclusionary nature, ethnic politics, however, is prone to go hand in hand with poverty, corruption, and an absence of collective identities based on class and economic interests (Lemarchand 1972, Chabal and Daloz 1999).

This approach, however, limits the viable mechanism for coalition-building to patronage goods. Although patronage practices are still so pervasive that they may outshine the efforts to achieve public policy goals, that does not mean the policy aspect should be underrated. Highlighting the importance of individuals' diverse interests to be taken into account, Thandika Mkandawire (2015) in his recent critical review of the literature on neopatrimonialism in Africa notes:

> *Questions about loyalty and support—why would patrons believe that their clients will continue to be loyal after they have gained from the patronage and why would clients believe that their support will be rewarded—are often skirted to sustain the logic of neopatrimonialsim… But such appeals reduce the issue of policy-making to ethnic politics and tribalism, an entirely different dynamic in which passions and ancient solidarities rather than simple self-interest take charge, and what parsimony the logic of neopatrimonialism may have provided simply disappears (p.7).*

An analysis can be extended to demonstrate the potential base of a political coalition posed by interest groups if individuals are motivated to influence the policy-making process to protect their own interests.

In the last two decades, many African societies have committed to political and economic liberalization. In efforts to restore growth, the governments have made the formal changes in

trade, regulatory, and finance policies as well as with respect to privatization, though with variations across the countries (Boone 2005). The extent of actual economic growth and the expansion pace of private sector, as the outcomes of the reforms, vary as well.[6] However, the adoption of the liberal institutions designed to create and manage a market economy shapes new preferences and bargaining structure, and also affects politicians' strategies (Steinmo and Thelen 1992, Campbell and Pedersen 2001). Especially with democratic institutions, such as multiparty elections and stable party systems, established, the majority's preference comes more frequently to fruition (Stasavage 2005, Lindberg 2006, Pitcher 2012). And yet, the ethnic argument falls short of explaining the change.

While ethno-clientelism often operates at the local and corporate level where jobs and material benefits are funneled to political supporters, interest-group politics occurs when there is structured competition among groups represented by political parties (Wantchekon 2003). Thus, if it is not at the local level, voters' economic preferences would be reflected in the national-level elections to the extent that nationwide coalition building is needed. In order to win the presidential election, political parties or candidates must obtain at least a plurality of vote, which means that they have to expand their bases by allying with other parties or by mobilizing new voters (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). In accounting for how parties build a winning alliance especially in presidential politics (a national, winner-take-all contest), the ethnic account is not sufficient, for one ethnic group is rarely large enough to form a majority party. Meanwhile, most cross-national studies attempting to demonstrate the political salience of ethnic identity in Africa rely for their measure of the association between political behavior and ethnicity on a simple

---

[6] Also, the debate about the degree of the commitment the African states have made and could have made during the period of economic reform is controversial. Despite their articulated goals in the economic crisis, the governments continued state intervention in the largest, richest, and most influential sectors and firms and sold firms to close allies of the governments (Rothchild 1991, Olukoshi 1993, Sandbrook 1993, Widner 1994, van de Walle 2001).

24

indicator of whether the survey respondent is a co-ethnic of the president (Kasara 2007, Fearon et al. 2007, Eifert et al. 2010, Franck and Rainer 2012). Unless there are only two ethnic groups in a country (in which case one must be a majority group), knowing that someone is not co-ethnic with the president does not help us to predict her behavior – even if we can predict she will not vote for the incumbent, for whom will she vote? Hence, assessing efforts to assemble minimal-winning coalitions in presidential elections may help understand the non-ethnic elements of party platform (Riker 1962, Posner 2005).

Third, another circumstance in which ethnic politics could thrive is when access to media or information is limited. Low rates of formal education or limited media access restrict voters from information about government's decision-making, and reduce their ability to assess the quality of governance, which voters, if knowledgeable, might consider for voting. In low information contexts, therefore, people are more likely to rely on ethnic cues in pursuit of patronage (Chandra 2007).

Theories of the ethnic-voting-information relation generally focus on access to news media or formal education with respect to what influences vote choice and how well they digest the information (Mattes and Shenga 2007, Bratton et al. 2012). But in developing communities with little mass communication, the most important mechanism for sharing valued information is local opinion leaders. Emphasizing the role of local elites in politics, Baldwin (2013) argues for Zambia that voters tend to prefer the candidate backed by a local leader because they expect their local leader to know which candidate will deliver more pork when in office. She calls those local elites "patrons" to denote unelected leaders, who are socio-economically leading figures in the region. As members of the community, they have similar interests with the people in the local economy. For their own benefit, they lobby on behalf of the community, mobilize people to

support a particular politician, and evaluate government performances. If the community elects the candidate for whom the local elites organize popular support, they also benefit from the material resources delivered by the elected politician. Akin to this rational behavior approach, I extend the role of local elites from seeking to acquire targeted goods to promoting policies favored by the community. Opinion leaders, namely chiefs or self-identified leaders with larger farms and some business skills, are knowledgeable about how their MPs perform in the parliament and well aware of the changes of relevant policies.

Fourth, what aggravates the situation in which political cleavages occur along ethnic lines may be diverging preferences across ethnic groups because it is costly to establish a new dimension of substantial political appeal besides the existing, ethnic ties (Fearon 1999). Resources have to be used to organize a formal group and it takes time to convince supporters of the political effectiveness of the new coalition for competing against ethnic interests. According to the logic of self-interest, if preferences of individuals are polarized, a political party may find it difficult to capture a particular interest to shore up the support base. For example, if a farmer grows more than one crop, say, vanilla to export and cassava for sale at a local market, she has interests in both a liberal international trade regime for the export crop (vanilla) and protection of domestic markets for the staple food (cassava). In this case, a party's choice among plausible trade policy platforms is not straightforward.

While the divided preferences could be a hindrance to the appearance of partisan economic platforms in Africa, I gain leverage by focusing on both the regions of single-crop production where voters' economic policy preferences are predictable and on ethnic groups whose leaders do not bid for election and thereby deny their co-ethnics the easy ethnic voting cue. One attractive feature of this approach is that economic interests often overlap ethnic divisions—

people living in close proximity are likely co-ethnics and endowed with similar environmental resources and jobs (Bates 1989). Having a common interest in economic policies perhaps underlies the political salience of ethnic cleavages. When there is no co-ethnic candidate as the second criterion points out, it is interesting to examine what else can be cues for voting.

Therefore, politicization of economic interests is not impossible in African democracies where ethnicity is known to be the most influential factor of political coalition formation. The remaining task is to examine cases and mechanisms that fit for the economic account: coalition-building at the national-level, local elites' policy concerns and mobilization strategy, an ethnic group identified with the same economic fate, and non-co-ethnics of presidential candidates. I do not argue against the significance of ethnicity for political coalition building, nor do I pretend to cover all probable cases of issue-based coalition-building. But research on these areas is more likely to show strong effects of economic appeals on shaping political alliances.

4. New Ingredients of Coalition Formation

In this section, I suggest an alternative explanation for the base of political competition in Africa. Explaining party identities by reference to industrial (sub-)sectors, as an economic dimension of the party basis, may prove fruitful. Although studies of industry-government relationship in democratic regimes have made progress in establishing plausible theories (Rogowski 1989, Frieden 1992), the politics of sectoral interests has not gained much attention in the context of Africa. Nevertheless, parties are likely to maintain support from workers in an industry if they produce public policies supporting the industry. I show how the sector-based political mobilization is ideal for parties to strategically make up for their support bases. Interestingly, the attributes of distribution of industries are analogous to some of the features of ethnic affiliation

as a socio-political category.

Geographic proximity. While agriculture, mining, and agro-based manufacturing are the essential sectors for many African countries' economy, these natural-resource-dependent industries tend to be more geographically concentrated. Just as an ethnic group exhibits particular traits of the culture cultivated in a concentrated area, so too can categories of production be found in close proximity to segregated neighborhoods. Also, the ease of communication within a territorially concentrated industry makes it easier to coordinate productive activities effectively. This same spatial force could account for group industrial niches.

Exclusive membership. Due to the ecological or soil biological constraints, the location and the capacity of production are limited to a larger extent for certain sectors such as agriculture and mining. Limited are not just the physical production sites but also the number of workers preferable for the operations. In this sense, this restricted membership is consistent with the limited affiliation determined by ethnic identity. However, sometimes it is a matter for political and economic choice of whether to promote or obstruct an industrial sector depending on a state's strategic development plan or by political control to serve politically influential clients.

The size factor. Consider a minimal winning coalition, which comprises of the smallest possible number of people that is required for success. An obvious incentive to form this type of coalition is that any larger membership would reduce the share that each member can obtain from the limited resources achieved. If too small, its members would get nothing. For political entrepreneurs formed along some major industries or their subsectors, there is an advantage over other socio-economic cleavages because of their ideal sizes to optimize each winning member's share of the benefits. Some food production, export-oriented cash crops, and mining sectors are

often large enough for each sector to form a crucial voting block with those who agree to vote together for their collective interest. If cross-cutting linkages between ethnic groups and industry groups are strong, meaning that labor force or the economic interest is somewhat ethnically divided, it could be easier to mobilize around a policy interest that supports most ethnic members' living.

Anecdotes abound that tie industrial features of ethnic leaders' home regions to policy choices. Bates (1981) argues that Daniel arap Moi, former president of Kenya, extracted tax income from the tea industry, which was mostly grown in non-co-ethnic regions, and used the revenue to assist food crop farmers in the Rift Valley, where he was from. Leonardo Arriola (2012) examines the impact of autonomy of business on the likelihood of building successful opposition coalitions in Cameroon and Kenya, and he too shows that presidents can control the influence of policies on the main industries of their home regions. Similar observations of benefits flowing to industries in presidents' home areas have been made in other countries including Benin (Decalo 1995) and Cameroon (van de Walle 1989). These examples suggest that the economic interests of presidents' homelands are likely to be incorporated into policy-based identities of ruling parties, while showing the possibility that non-co-ethnics in the same industry also can support the party from which they receive economic benefits.

Also, countries' most important industries are politically influential, and in democracies the groups engaging in these industries form the backbones of political parties. For example, in the United States, campaign contributions from pharmaceuticals, defense aerospace, tobacco, cellphone, and computer industries are enormously influential in election results and policy choices (e.g. Milyo et al. 2000). Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) also sustained in power relying on a coalition of steel and rice under the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system

through 1993. Heavy industry played an important political role as a good financial source to the party which made it possible to subsidize farmers to buy their votes (Rosenbluth and Thies 2010). Reversal of the urban bias in developing countries follows the same logic that the rural population, who outnumber any other groups become the main client of the ruling parties (Bates and Humphrey 2002, Bates and Block 2009). As a notable example of the nationally important industry-based party in Africa, Zambia's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) was established by the prominent role of trade union leaders and copper-mine workers while defeating the United National Independence Party (UNIP)'s single-party rule. Drawing on these insights and illustrations, I expect that policy preferences with respect to major industrial sub-sectors affect parties' alliance choice and voters' candidate choice because some specific characteristics of industrial divisions provide incentives to establish political associations based on sectoral interests.

5. Core and Swing Voters in an African Context

Each party gains electoral support from both loyal voters and swing voters, which are distinguished by their different voting patterns and preferences. With respect to the differences between core and swing voters, there is considerable debate as to how political parties develop strategies to attract them in order to optimize their electoral prospects. I want to identify the two types of voters and consider the debate in an African context where ethnic voting seems the most prevalent electoral behavior, but no longer exclusively.

Cox and McCubbins (1986) argue that "risk-averse" candidates, who maximize vote returns, will offer policy favors and distributive benefits to their core supporters to maintain existing political loyalty. Accordingly, responsive voter groups inevitably will receive more

resources than unresponsive ones as long as distributing benefits to them guarantees their votes. In contrast, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Stokes (2005) argue that governments will distribute the most benefits to voters cheapest to buy. The voters are, for the scholars making this argument, those who are indifferent to party ideology, so called "swing voters."

The debate is applicable only when we know what makes the core "core," which refers to constituencies showing strong electoral support, because once the party panders to what the core voters want, giving them additional benefits no longer produces an effective outcome. Although these models are often understood in advanced democracies where ideology is the most important factor in shaping party bases, they are also needed to be interpreted in the context where non-ideological factors are to be concerned as ingredients of a party formation. In developing democracies like in Africa the strong backing can be built upon either policy lines or identity cleavages. The supporters will remain loyal to the party as long as they get policy advantage from it, or as long as their co-ethnic leaders stay in power (Bratton and Bhavnani 2008).[7] So, once such demands are satisfied, targeting swing voters will be more profitable.

The logic of swing voter has to do with the extent to which voters compensate politicians for resource allocations they receive. That is, the swing model suggests that candidates should invest in districts where they get greater return of votes per their spending. The efficiency rate may vary even among swing districts according to their characteristics, and the parties have to understand these elasticities in order to hone their campaign strategies.

Aggregating upward from the individual level, the characteristics of the swing *regions* could be either ideologically moderate, electorally competitive, or filled with cross-pressured voters. Interpreting these characteristics in terms of ethnic voting, non-co-ethnics of party leaders,

---

[7] Instrumentalist theories of ethnic voting argue, of course, voters prefer co-ethnic candidates precisely because they expect to benefit materially from one of their own having access to power.

could be understood as moderate voters who are not attached to a particular party (Kasara 2007, Kramon and Posner 2012). Meanwhile, ethnically heterogeneous communities such as those in Kenya and Tanzania examined by Edward Miguel (2004) can be treated as analogous to competitive districts, where there are several competing interests and parties, for which groups of voters intensely compete.

Another possible source of swing voters is the cross-pressured group whose policy interest differs from the rest of members of the same ethnic group (Chandra 2005, Posner 2005, Dunning and Harrison 2010).[8] For example, tea growers from the Luo, Luhya, and Kisii ethnic groups in Kenya face a difficult choice between their conflicting interests, whether to depart from co-ethnic non-tea growers in order to join the dominant tea-growing Kikuyu party. The difficulty in disentangling the overlapping factors gives importance to examine cross-pressured groups to tease out the stronger vote motive. The groups could have a difficult choice between ethnic and policy interests or between two different economic concerns.

To summarize, the sector-based economic account is essential to capture the dynamics influencing the support-building strategies of African political parties that cannot be fully described by existing explanations that focus on either ethnicity or valence-type governmental performance. Ethnic constituencies often vote ethnically, expecting the politician they elect to deliver local goods and services in return for their political support. And yet, it is also possible that what looks like ethnic voting is actually motivated by the policy preferences that happen to be shared with co-ethnics. The existing economic considerations of vote choice have only partial answers to the sources of party's electoral strategies, for they fail to account for the party's role as a coalition required for the realization of policy goals. Notwithstanding corruption prevalent in

---

[8] This interaction of two different politically used dimensions is often called, cross-cutting cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Lijphart 1975, Dahl 1982).

many African states, policy making is the daily business in the legislative body, which is often on a range of issues divided into its supporters and opponents. Parties may have an interest in instituting the policy demands of the electorate because when successful in managing their support, it might lead them to winning and retaining office.

In the subsequent chapters, I compare strategies of parties' coalition formation with three case studies and discuss what factors affect the variation in the strategies across the countries. In Chapter 2, I explore the case of Ghana where the two major parties have managed to develop stable, multiethnic support bases. While each party has its stronghold, economically and ethnically defined, a candidate cannot win the presidency without appealing to the unattached voters. The example of Zambia presented in Chapter 3 shows how parties can and do adapt the "shapes" of their support bases by shifting the dimension of political competition from ethnic cleavages to policy issues and by narrowing the range of a targeted support base. While a largest voting bloc on any dimension is often sufficiently large to set the basis of a winning coalition, if politicians are successful in reducing its size to a smallest winning, they gain most benefits possible. But if they overshoot, they can lose everything. In Chapter 5, I examine how economic interests based on agricultural subsectors account for seemingly ethnic coalitions in Kenya. The case study highlights voting behavior of cross-pressured voters whose ethnicity and economic stakes pull them in different directions. The vote decisions by the co-ethnics of the third place presidential candidates reveal that the sector-based voting provides a powerful explanation of the political coalitions even in ethnically divided countries.

CHAPTER 3. CORE VOTERS AND SWING VOTERS IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL COMPETITION – THE EXAMPLE OF GHANA

1. Introduction

Since the launch of multiparty elections in 1992, Ghana has featured a de-facto two-party system, in which power has alternated between the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC). While each party has its own stronghold, elections have been extremely competitive since 1996, leaving neither party capable of forming a winning coalition without winning over independent voters. Who are the core voters for each of Ghana's two main political parties (that is, voters who continue to choose the same parties for support) and who are the swing voters (who sometimes revise their preference on parties)? The parties need to know in order to develop a strategy to gain swing voters' support while maintaining their strongholds. Also, identifying their characteristics would reveal the nature of parties and partisanship. Some research on Ghanaian politics has found that each party is linked to particular ethnic groups—the Akan people living in southern regions have backed the NPP, in contrast to the Ewe and northerners' intense loyalty to the NDC (e.g., Nugent 2001; Asante & Gyimah-Boadi 2004). But their majority-seeking coalitions are not simply cross-ethnic alliances that divvy up the patronage and pork spending that comes with winning.

Some recent studies of Ghana and other African democracies, however, reveal evidence that some voters support or oppose incumbents based on their evaluations of economic outcomes such as macroeconomic performance and public goods distribution (Logan 2008; Young 2009; Bratton et al. 2012; Weghorst & Lindberg 2013; Ichino & Nathan 2013). Because these voters are not co-ethnics of government leaders, or because they value private transfers less than overall performance, such voters are less tied to specific (ethno-political) patrons, and may be willing to

34

swing their support from one party to another if unimpressed with incumbent accomplishments. In a sense, these are "valence voters," who prioritize outcomes (higher economic growth, low inflation and unemployment, anti-corruption, law and order) that everybody wants, but that most voters place below private transfers or other types of direct self-interest in their decisions about which parties to support. Thus, even the work demonstrating the existence of some economic voting fails to consider that economic interests, whose policy preferences are collective, but also exclusive, might form the bases of political support for African political parties.

Most government policies create winners and losers. They direct significant economic benefits to some sectors or industries over others, targeting investment, taxes and subsidies, trade protections or regulations. Thus, if parties have distinctive platforms along policy lines, workers in the same industry are likely to vote similarly because they benefit from public policies supporting the sectors or suffer similarly from the tax burden of supporting sectors other than their own.

In this chapter, I investigate the underlying socio-economic cleavages that separate the parties and thus shape party platforms in Ghana. While looking for non-ethnic attributes of party formation (Whitfield 2009), I suggest that economic sector might be an essential part of the non-ethnic features to be examined. Using a data set that merges the Afrobarometer Survey Round V for the Ghanaian case—which contains questions about respondents' histories of partisan choices—with district-level ethnic and industrial population data and agricultural production data, I estimate models that identify the traits of core and swing voters. The data analysis shows the significance of the core voters' interests in certain sub-sectors of agriculture as an element of party building. The sectors are found to be cocoa, which is the country's top agricultural export commodity, and rice, which is an important income source for many Ghanaians as well as the

most imported food crop. Each crop has its own regional centers of production, dictated by climate and soil conditions, with cocoa the main product in the south, and rice grown primarily in the east and the north. The ethnically heterogeneous political coalitions are able to create strong cohesion among their members by sharing such policy interests.

In contrast, swing voters do not have a common interest with any party's ethnic leaders or policy platforms. They are more likely to vote on the basis of general performance of the government (Morrison & Lindberg 2008; Bratton et al. 2012) and occasional policy benefits or promises offered by one or the other of the two main parties.

Consistent with the existing literature, the results also confirm that local goods distribution and assessment of general government performance affect voting as well. Therefore, voters follow their economic interests with their ballots because the parties provide them with ethno-clientelistic and policy-based platforms (and when in power, policies) that give these voters a reason to remain loyal or disloyal.

The particular merit of this chapter is its contribution to the core-swing debate (Cox & McCubbins 1986; Lindbeck & Weibull 1987; Miguel & Zaidi 2003; Lindberg & Morrison 2005; Bratton et al. 2012) by re-interpreting who core and swing voters are in terms of ethnicity, benefits from the government distribution, and industrial policies. This chapter finds that both types of voters are concerned about economic interests while only core voters care about ethnic alignment. Furthermore, it provides a clue to the discussion of how the stable two-party system is maintained without a great deal of a party transformation. Unless the sector-based coalitions, which show distinct economic policy preferences, do not hold the multiethnic supporters together, strategies of party formation and change might have been contingent on any choice politicians can make. And yet, party systems appear subject to the constraints of social and

36

economic structures.

In accounting for the factors affecting party choice, I start by describing how the two parties historically have come to shape their support bases and how they affect the structure of multi-party competition. I then suggest a new approach to explain differences between parties' support bases: sector-based platforms. Next, I test the determinants of party choice associated with ethnic and economic interests of core and swing voters expressed on the ballot. With an analysis of data on production, trade, and price policies, the following section shows that the parties, when in office, adopt policies favoring the interests of their core voters to reward them and also to strengthen party identity. I conclude by discussing broader implications and the possibility of generalizing the lessons from the Ghanaian case to other settings.

2. The Legacies of Party Traditions in Multiparty Ghana

The history of two-party competition in Ghana can be traced back to the liberation movement by the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), two factions of which split off to form two parties distinctive in their policy goals. On August 4, 1947, J. B. Danquah founded the UGCC with the united leadership in the country that demanded self-government. However, Kwame Nkrumah and his followers split off from the UGCC to form the Convention People's Party (CPP) in 1949, and Nkrumah became the first Prime Minister of independent Ghana in 1957 and the first president in 1960. He was populist and statist in pursuit of the political ideal of 'concern for common man.' Including the Nkrumah administration, Ghana was governed mostly by authoritarian regimes with socialist ideology, until the arrival of multiparty elections in 1992. The military regimes of Colonel I. K. Acheampong and Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, both influenced by Nkrumah's ideas, sought to promote the rural economy, especially food-crop

farming, and favored small-scale entrepreneurs and public sector (Mikell 1989). This legacy of

Nkrumah also formed the base of what became National Democratic Congress (NDC), still one

of the two current parties in Ghana (Morrison 2004).

As the major opponent to the NDC today, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) also has a long

tradition and firm social and economic bases. Founded in 1992 on the political ideas of J. B.

Danquah and K. A. Busia, who sought the liberal democratic tradition as opposition leaders to

the British colony and to the authoritarian regimes, the NPP seeks to represent the interests of

intellectuals, business elites, the private sector, and cash crop farmers in the south, whose

interests to some extent coincide with one other (Jeffries and Thomas 1993, Osei 2013). Despite

a series of military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s, the Danquah-Busia tradition of the NPP

survived because of their measurable income advantage from cocoa and coffee production and of

the intense engagement of the intellectuals and export orientation farmers.

In the aftermath of the Nkrumah's rule, each administration's tendency to favor the

economic policies of its leaders' co-partisans have lasted even until today. Until the multiparty

elections became settled in 1992, the civilian governments of the Danquah- Busia tradition and

the military rulers with nationalist ideals had taken turns for power and for adopting their favored

policies, though the latter took office for a much longer period. When Kofi Busia became Prime

Minister and his party, the People's National Party (PNP), gained a majority in the parliament in

1969, the Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti regions of cocoa-growers enjoyed the benefits of

government support in the form of infrastructure development and building in the regions' major

cities, while others part of the country were neglected (Mikell 1989).

The military governments of Acheampong and Rawlings are both characterized by their

nationalist and food-farmer-friendly policies. From 1972 to 1978, Acheampong led both the

38

National Redemption Council (NRC) that he formed after a coup and the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which was built following the NRC's failed governance. The NRC government criticized the free-market policies of the PNP administration while strengthening state enterprises in timber, mining, and oil and improving strict control on import and price. In addition, through a program called Operation Feed Yourself, the achievement of food self-sufficiency was strongly emphasized (Killick 2010). Particularly, during the SMC rule, Acheampong encouraged rice farming in Northern Ghana, which gave the regime strong support from constituencies of the North and urban areas of large rice consumption. Meanwhile, cocoa farmers were neglected and its production and export declined (Mikell 1989). Policies in Rawlings' earlier years of his government (1982-3) were similar to the ones adopted by the Acheampong regimes as being harmful to the interests of private sector, trade, cocoa industry (Kraus 2002).

Although after the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) in 1983, Rawlings' PNDC and NDC governments made efforts to reform its economy, the peasants and the small-business people were the only supporters of the parties and the beneficiaries of the policies (Mikell 1989). But the sharp devaluation, low credit availability, and trade liberalization under the SAP hurt the investors' interests by making them heavily indebted and less competitive. Especially, pressured by multiparty competition after 1992, the NDC disadvantaged the NPP businesspeople. For example, a state cocoa company dismissed a long-term contract with an influential private businessman who was the president of the Association of Ghanaian Industries (AGI) and a NPP backer. Also, the divestiture process under the SAP disadvantaged NPP-sponsored businessmen in bidding for shares in the state assets (Kraus 2002). In sum, the party founders' ideologies and the socio-economic interests of their supporters have been relatively consistent over time.

3. Identifying Core-Swing Voters in Multiparty Ghana

What determines the party platforms and who shares the exclusive interests? Does each party's support basis differ along with the long distinctive traditions of the parties? This section examines the patterns of party competition and matches them with characteristics of core and swing voters. Core partisan voters show electoral support for a party as long as the party offers what they want, and so these interests become the most important factors in shaping party bases (Cox & McCubbins 1986). By contrast, non-partisan voters are those who are unattached to any party or indifferent to party identity so often switch parties they support, so called swing voters (Lindbeck & Weibull 1987; Stokes 2005).

Since the launch of multi-party elections in 1992 in Ghana, two alternations of parties in power allow us to identify how the platforms of the two parties have transformed or consolidated. The rise of the NPP as an opposition party since 1992 finally resulted in its victory in the 2000 elections. The NPP presidential candidate, John Kufuor, performed best in his home region of Ashanti, obtaining 79.9% of the second round vote there, and also performed strongly in the Brong-Ahafo, Eastern, Greater Accra, and Western Regions. Kufuor also performed surprisingly well in Northern Region, almost splitting the vote with the NDC's John Atta Mills, who won the region. Mills won majorities by large margins in the NDC's strongholds of Volta (88.5%), Upper West (62%), and Upper East (57.2%) (Smith 2002).

In the 2004 presidential election, Kufuor was reelected without a run-off. The main changes in the results compared to the 2000 election were that though Kufuor won in the Greater Accra and Brong-Ahafo regions, the two parties had more competitive races than before and that the NDC obtained stronger support in Northern region, consolidating it as a stronghold.

The NDC won back the presidency in the 2008 elections when Mills's defeat in the first round against the NPP's Nana Akufo-Addo was reversed in the second round by a tiny margin of 0.5%. In contrast to the repeated landslide wins of each party in its regional strongholds, party preferences of the majorities in three regions (Central, Greater Accra, and Western) were reversed from NPP to NDC, which sufficed to return the NDC to power. Map 1 in Appendix 3A depicts district-level party supports in the 2008 presidential election. The 2012 election results represented an outcome similar to the 2008 run-off results. The NDC's John Mahama won a narrow victory, with 50.6% to 47.8% of vote, with all the regions' vote shares essentially unchanged from 2008. It turns out that each of the parties dominates certain regions, where electorates face similar configurations of economic challenges and benefits, while the unattached regions are the key factor of swaying the election results.

The stronghold of each party is clearly identified by ethnic concentration: the NPP has gained consistent and strong support from Asante voters in the eponymous region, while the NDC has dominates in the eastern Volta region, the homeland of the Ewe people (Chazan 1983; Nugent 2001; Arthur 2009). Other socio-economic factors corresponding to each party's tradition also help explain the difference between the interests of its loyal party supporters. NDC's core voters are less likely to be well educated, trained workers, or high-income earners in comparison to NPP's loyal supporters (Morrison and Lindberg 2005).[9]

In the meantime, voters who frequently change their party choices are likely not Asante or Ewe people. Besides ethnicity, no systematic difference between core and swing voters on measures of education, occupation, or income (Morrison and Lindberg 2005; Fridy 2007). What

---

[9] Although Morrison and Lindberg (2004)'s study of the 1996 and 2000 elections shows urban support once appeared significant as the NPP's major base by contrast to the NDC's dominance in rural areas, the recent research of the 2004 and 2008 elections found no evidence of a rural-urban divide between the parties (Fridy 2007, Whitfield 2009).

we know about swing voters is that they assess governments based on their performance and accountability, which are usually attested by such outcomes as economic growth, inflation, and unemployment (Logan 2008; Young 2009; Lindberg 2012; Bratton et al. 2012) and also by public/local goods provision (Banful 2011; Morjaria 2011; Ichino and Nathan 2013; Weghorst and Lindberg 2013).

Even the core voters, however, do not blindly choose a party because of its political tradition or co-ethnicity unless they benefit from it. Experiments by Ichino and Nathan (2013) show that voters do not necessarily support the party of their own ethnic group when the community they belong to benefits from resource allocation by a party of another group. Thus, voters' loyal support should be seen as an instrumental action that is part of an exchange between politicians and citizens. Appealing to ethnic sentiments with promises for public policy and state resources delivery makes political objectives clearer and political executives more responsive (Bates 1983; Fearon 1999; Posner 2005; Ferree 2006). Consistent with this instrumental view, I argue that voters support parties that promise (and deliver) economic policies they favor, and parties maintain their electoral support by adopting policies favoring their core voters' interests when in office.

4. Feasible Options of Non-Ethnic Party Bases

This study focuses on industrial sectors and subsectors as non-ethnic party bases. I propose geographic locations of industries in addition to ethnic group residence should correspond to party preferences. Furthermore, the size and the geographic concentration of interest groups might matter.

Table 3.1 shows the percentage of the population employed in the four major sectors in

the country by region as a summary of relative importance of the industrial sectors.[10] Listed in

the second row from the bottom of the table are the national counts. Any regional share for a

certain sector exceptionally deviating from the national mean may indicate its excessive or

meager influence to the sector in comparison to the other regions. In the sense, agriculture in

Greater Accra and mining in Western region seem to be outliers, which have much less and more

impacts on these sectors, respectively.[11]

Table 3.1. Employment by industrial sector and region

	Agriculture, forestry & fishing	Wholesale & Retail	Manufacturing	Mining & quarrying
Ashanti	30.9	25.2	10.5	1.5
Brong Ahafo	61.3	11.7	7.0	0.7
Central	42.6	17.3	11.6	0.9
Eastern	52.2	17.6	10.3	2.2
Gt. Accra	5.3*	31.6	14.7	0.5
Northern	73.5	9.2	6.2	0.3
Upper East	70.5	9.6	8.8	1.0
Upper West	72.2	6.1	8.9	0.5
Volta	50.3	20.8	14.1	0.2
Western	47.5	14.8	10.5	3.7*
Ghana	44.7%	19.5%	9.1%	1.6%
Skewness	-0.23	0.68	0.27	1.26

Note: Asterisked are outliers, which are excluded from the skewness calculation.
Source: Ghana Statistical Service, 2010 Population and Housing Census

To interpret how balanced is the regional contribution to a sector, I use the skewness[12] of

each sector's employment distribution, which describes the degree of asymmetry of a

distribution around its mean. Where a value close to zero means a less skewed distribution, the

---

[10] Construction is another big industrial sector, but is not considered here to test partisanship because with government as an important client whose policy determines where the sector grows, it creates an endogeneity problem.
[11] The outliers are calculated based on the 1.5xIQR (interquartile range) rule, which finds an observation that falls more than $1.5 \times (Q_3 - Q_1)$, the distance between the first and third quartiles, either above Q_3 or below Q_1.
[12] The skewness equation is set out as: $\frac{n}{(n-1)(n-2)} \sum (\frac{x_i - \bar{x}}{s})^3$. Positive and negative values indicate the direction toward which an asymmetric tail extends.

43

agriculture sector with the skewness of -0.23, without counting the outlier of Greater Accra, has the most balanced distribution across the country, followed by manufacturing (0.27), sales (0.68), and mining excluding the Western region (1.26). This implies that sales and mining sectors are significant in a relatively small number of regions.

I also use crop production, as another grouping of common economic interest, whose employment size and location count in shaping party identification. Map 2 in Appendix 3A shows the zones of the key agricultural crop farming, by intensity of production. Maize is the largest crop sector in terms of the number of households involved (2.5 million), followed by cassava (1,800,510), cocoa (725,480), groundnuts (698,905), oil palm (583,313), beans (501,484), and rice (306,153) (SRID 2008).[13] As the sizes of their employed population suggest, maize and cassava are planted very widely in comparison to the other crops. With regard to trade, cocoa is Ghana's main agricultural export commodity, generating about 30% of total export revenue, while rice is the top agricultural import. Many cocoa-growing households also cultivate oil palm during the cocoa off-season. These major economic sectors of the Ghanaian industries will be tested as to whether they constitute interests of each party's core voters in the subsequent section.[14]

5. Empirical Analysis

I base my analysis on the Afrobarometer survey Round V for the Ghanaian case conducted in

---

[13] A good number of households (848,527) grow sorghum, millet, or guinea corn. But the breakdown of the figure by each crop is not available. The population whose living is affected by each crop production is greater than the numbers listed since the produce requires to be processed and marketed as well as cultivated.
Data source is production estimates in 2008 offered by Statistics, Research, and Information Directorate (SRID) of Ghana.
[14] Map 3 in Appendix 3A displays the regions of the major ethnic groups. According to the 2010 census, the results make Akan, the largest group (47.5%), with its two largest subgroups being Asante (16%) and Fante (12%), Mole-Dagbani is the second largest group (16.6%), and Ewe, the third (13.9%). The next largest ethnic groups are Ga-Dangme (7.4%) and Gurma (5.7%).

2012, which contains questions about respondents' histories of partisan choices in the 2004 and

2008 elections and their voting intentions in December, 2012 election. These data make it

possible to code respondents as NDC core voters, NPP core voters, or swing voters. Merging the

data set with the district-level ethnicity and industry data and agricultural production data, which

entail explanatory variables,[15] I estimate what characteristics or interests of voters actually

account for being a core voter in Ghana. The collective socio-economic attributes of each party's

core voters would indicate party identity.

5.1. Model Specification

Dependent variables. My first dependent variable (*Partisan)* is the pattern of voter's party choice

in presidential elections. That is, I create an ordinal variable that measures intensity of party

preferences over three consecutive elections as coded in the manner presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Coding rules of the dependent variable, *Partisan*

3	NPP-NPP-NPP
2	NPP-NPP-ABS
1	NPP-ABS-ABS or NPP-NPP-OTHER
0	NPP-OTHER-ABS or NDC-OTHER-ABS
-1	NDC-ABS-ABS or NDC-NDC-OTHER
-2	NDC-NDC-ABS
-3	NDC-NDC-NDC

The three entries represent a voter's vote choice (reported for 2004 and 2008, intended for 2012)

in presidential elections.[16] The ordering across elections is not considered in the coding because

---

[15] Ethnicity and industry data are from the 2010 Population and Housing Census, which is the most recent count available. For agriculture, cocoa production in 2010-11 is used and production in 2012 is used for food crops.

[16] The questions asked are "If a presidential election was held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?," "Which party's candidate did you vote for in 2004?," and the same question for 2008. To those questions, the answers of "Would not vote," "Did not register," "Did not vote, even though was a registered voter" in the survey are coded as ABS for "abstain." Meanwhile, those who responded as "Refused to answer," "Don't know," "Undecided," "Did not vote (under age 18 by then)," and "Other" are treated as missing data. However, in case one indicated a preferred party even though her reported age when she took survey was under 27, which implies she was

45

the effect of the order of one's party choice cannot be analyzed with the information given in the survey. Thus, for example, a voter is coded "2" if she chose the NPP candidate twice and abstained the third time, in any order. This ordinal-level scale ranges from -3 (an NDC core voter) to 3 (NPP core).[17] A voter coded "0" reported a string of choices (NPP-NDC-abstention (ABS), NPP-3rd party-ABS, or NDC-3rd party-ABS) that reveals no strong party preference. If a voter is coded "1" or "-1," it means that she has voted for one or the other of the big parties more than she did for any other party. Voting twice for a particular party and abstaining once is coded as "2" or "-2," and of course voters coded as "3" or "-3" have actively supported the same party three times in a row. Including reports of past (or planned) abstention in the coding scheme allows me to avoid dropping a number of observations.[18] The summary statistics of the dependent variable, presented in Figure 3.1, show 60% of voters as strong loyalists and a near-symmetric distribution of party preferences, overall.

---

not eligible to vote two elections ago with the voting age of 18, this is not coded as missing because it could be a strong indication of her party preference. The 42 respondents (from a sample of 2400) who have voted for any of the tiny third parties more than once are also dropped from the analysis.

[17] OTHER indicates that in a given election, a voter chose any other party than an identified one that she chose in another election. If Ghana featured two and only two parties, then OTHER would be replaced by NDC for voters coded "1" and NPP for voters coded "-1," and of course "0" would always indicate one NDC vote, one NPP vote, and one abstention. Although the two main parties do dominate the political landscape, there are several minor parties that take a small share of the vote in each election.

[18] This is desirable because dropping respondents who did not vote every time would skew the sample in favor of core voters. Abstention is a legitimate choice and may be easier for a disgruntled voter than swinging affirmatively to another party.

Figure 3.1. Summary statistics of *Partisan*

Next, I create second dependent variable, *Swing*, that measures changes of party preference at each of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. *Swing* is coded as "1" if a voter switches to the NPP from any other party or abstention, "-1," if from another party or abstention to the NDC, and "0," otherwise. All the observations with a switch to one of the third parties or with no answer are treated as missing data.[19] Figure 3.2 shows the summary statistics for *Swing*, depicting an electorate dominated by core voters, but with enough swing voters to determine winners in what have been very closely run presidential elections (the national margins of victory in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential elections were 7.8%, 0.5%, and 3%, respectively).

---

[19] The 56 third party switchers for the 2008 elections and the 92 switchers for the 2012 elections are dropped from a sample of 2400. The rest of the missing data are caused by answers of "Refused to answer," "Don't know," "Undecided," "Did not vote (under age 18 by then)," and "Other."

Figure 3.2. Summary statistics of *Swing*

Independent variables. The independent variables measure two sets of characteristics at the district level: ethnicity and economic production profile, and two sets at the individual level: ascriptive traits of respondents and respondents' evaluations of overall government performance. Although measuring all variables at the individual level would have been ideal, individual-level ethnicity and industry data are unavailable. [20]

Ethnicity variables represent the six biggest ethnic groups in the country, who together constitute 80% of Ghanaians: *Mole-Dagbani* (16.6% of the population), *Asante* (16%), *Ewe* (13.9%), *Fante* (12%), *Ga-Dangme* (7.4%), and *Gurma* (5.7%) (See Map 3). I use data from the 2010 Population and Housing Census that measure district-level ethnic breakdowns.[21] These

---

[20] To be accurate, the Afrobarometer survey does code individual ethnicity, but it codes both *Asante* and *Fante* respondents as *Akan*, a broader identity of which the two are the most important sub-groups, As I will show below, the two sub-groups vote differently, so it is important to distinguish between them.

[21] Districts in Ghana are administrative subunits of regions. Since 110 districts were created in 1988/9, the country had used the administrative boundaries until 2006 when 28 districts were added by splitting some of the old districts. Thirty-two new districts were carved out in 2008 and 46 more were created by June 2012. The Afrobarometer

measures capture both the likelihood that a voter is from a particular ethnic group and overall ethnic environment in a district.

I test the impact of significance of **industrial sectors** on shaping party identification, which is measured by the percentage of a district's labor force 15 years and older by sector. I use four variables in this category, which are the four major sectors in Ghana as mentioned in the preceding section:

- *Agriculture*, including agriculture, fishing, and forestry, that comprises of 44.7% of the country's labor force whose interests may vary by kinds and mode of production and is most widely spread;

- *Sales*, as a reference to wholesale and retail, which is the second largest industry constituting 19.5% of the employed mostly in the south including Accra, the capital city;

- *Manufacturing*, an industry relatively spread out throughout the country, in which 9.1% of workers are involved and operate its different types—e.g., food-processing, carpentry, metal products manufacturing; and

- *Mining*, which takes up 1.6% of the employment and clusters in Eastern and Western regions.

Sales and *Mining* are geographically concentrated economic sectors, which should make them amenable to partisan mobilization. But because of their small sizes, they are not suitable as core support bases for parties. By contrast, *Agriculture* and *Manufacturing* employ much larger number of voters, but their geographic dispersion and sub-sector heterogeneity (containing often competing interests) should make them too unwieldy as party bases.

Instead, it is more likely that farmers and agro-manufacturers and business people form

---

survey Round V that had been completed by June 2012 used the divisions developed in 2008. Therefore, all the variables are calibrated to the 2008 standard.

political identities around different sub-sectors. I use district-level measures of production (in log of tons per capita) of *Maize_pc*, *Cassava_pc*, *Cocoa_pc, Groundnut_pc*, *Rice_pc*, and *OilPalm*. Maize and cassava are the main staple foods in Ghana; cassava is a southern-grown crop, while maize is the most widely planted agricultural product in the country, absent only in the dry North. Cocoa is Ghana's most exported commodity, and rice is its largest food import. Given the lack of oil palm production data by district, I create *OilPalm* just to indicate the intensity of its farming by reading descriptions on agricultural sector of districts. It is coded "3" if a district is a well-known epicenter of oil palm production, "2" if the Ministry of Agriculture description emphasizes its importance in the district, "1" if its production is mentioned but without emphasis, and "0" otherwise.[22] I also include the indicator variable *Coast*, which proxies for the significance of ocean fishing in coastal districts in the South. It is coded "1" if a district is adjacent to the coast or if marine fishing is one of the major economic sectors, and "0" otherwise. Appendix 3B shows the pairwise correlation coefficients for the ethnicity, industrial sector, and subsector variables.

Government performance evaluation. For the analysis of 2012 vote swings, I also include respondents' assessments of how the *President* is performing, and of how the government overall is performing in the areas of *Jobs*, *Prices*, and *Electricity* and *Water distribution*. The evaluation measures range from "1" (very badly) to "5" (very well).[23] I expect that the higher rating makes a voter more likely to support the incumbent party in the 2012 election, the NDC.

Other control variables include demographic factors (*Age* and *Female*), locality (*Urban*), and *Education* status at the individual level. *Age* is a continuous variable, and *Female* and

---

[22] Detailed description on district-level agricultural trends is available at GHANADISTRICTS.COM and Ministry of Food and Agriculture website.
[23] "Don't know" answers are coded "3" not to lose many observations. The measures of the government approval rating are only available for 2012 in the dataset.

Urban[24] are dummy variables. *Education* is coded "1" if the highest level of education a

respondent has completed is higher than primary school completed, and "0" otherwise.

5.2. Method and Results

I estimate a series of ordered probit models for the ordinal outcome variables with random

effects for data clustered at the district level (Greene & Hensher 2010). The models predict a

voter's pattern of party choices across three consecutive presidential elections. Given that a party

takes consistent policy positions, a voter continues to pick the party that maximizes her policy

interest. The same is true for party's ethnic identity. Table 3.3, using the main dependent variable

of *Partisan* as described above, presents five core voter models that are specified by different

combinations of explanatory variables. A positive coefficient means that an explanatory variable

has a positive relationship with the NPP support and a negative relationship with the NDC.

---

[24] *Urban* is coded on the basis of respondent's answer as to whether she lives in a rural or urban area.

Table 3.3. Core voters and their ethnic and industrial interests (*Partisan*: -3(NDC) to 3(NPP))

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Individual Level					
Age (Continuous)	0.00319	0.00305	0.00311	0.00315	0.00293
	(0.00196)	(0.00196)	(0.00196)	(0.00196)	(0.00196)
Female (Female=1)	0.187***	0.182**	0.185***	0.188***	0.187***
	(0.0562)	(0.0562)	(0.0562)	(0.0562)	(0.0562)
Education (Educated=1)	0.312***	0.310***	0.325***	0.327***	0.335***
	(0.0649)	(0.0648)	(0.0643)	(0.0646)	(0.0644)
Urban (Urban=1)	0.118	0.117			
	(0.0646)	(0.0677)			
Ethnicity					
Mole-Dagbani (%)	-1.128***	-0.546*	-0.535*	-0.761***	-0.313
	(0.178)	(0.241)	(0.243)	(0.227)	(0.263)
Asante (%)	0.787***	0.744***	0.735***	0.804***	0.896***
	(0.182)	(0.177)	(0.189)	(0.192)	(0.188)
Ewe (%)	-1.619***	-1.326***	-1.350***	-1.371***	-1.259***
	(0.201)	(0.211)	(0.239)	(0.241)	(0.237)
Fante (%)	-0.609**	-0.454*	-0.460	-0.374	-0.402
	(0.222)	(0.229)	(0.244)	(0.247)	(0.239)
Ga-Dangme (%)	-1.189***	-0.999***	-0.996***	-0.848**	-0.898**
	(0.277)	(0.286)	(0.295)	(0.301)	(0.291)
Gurma (%)	-0.861***	-0.386	-0.398	-0.635*	-0.308
	(0.243)	(0.270)	(0.280)	(0.264)	(0.272)
Industrial sector					
Sales (%)			0.00259	0.00828	0.00107
			(0.00545)	(0.00567)	(0.00539)
Manufacturing (%)			-0.000664	-0.0150	-0.00522
			(0.0143)	(0.0140)	(0.0139)
Mining (%)			-0.00709	-0.0131	-0.0115
			(0.0112)	(0.0115)	(0.0112)
Agricultural sub-sector					
Cocoa (log(ton per capita))		0.0318**	0.0317**		
		(0.0102)	(0.0109)		
Rice (log(ton per capita))		-0.0470**	-0.0476**		-0.0558***
		(0.0145)	(0.0155)		(0.0156)
Groundnut (log(ton per capita))		-0.576	-0.658	-0.640	-0.721
		(0.626)	(0.647)	(0.649)	(0.635)
Coast (Coast=1)		-0.181	-0.172	-0.0862	-0.143
		(0.105)	(0.113)	(0.115)	(0.111)
Maize (log(ton per capita))				0.00538	
				(0.0219)	
OilPalm (0-3 scale)				0.128*	0.204***
				(0.0551)	(0.0579)
Cassava (log(ton per capita))					0.0127
					(0.0130)
N	1701	1701	1701	1701	1701
chi2	237.5	265.9	261.4	254.2	277.2
p > chi2	2.31e-45	1.45e-48	2.40e-46	7.00e-45	5.47e-49

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results in Table 3.3 show that my policy-based party identity model fits the Ghanaian case well. Both pairs of *Cocoa_pc* and *Rice_pc* in Model (2) and (3) and *OilPalm* and *Rice_pc* in Model (5) are statistically significant in the expected direction. Cocoa and oil palm farming are positive predictors of NPP core status, and rice is a positive indicator of NDC core status. Cocoa and rice production are relatively large in terms of their labor force and both are significant traded goods. Moreover, the regions in which the two crops grow are mostly segregated from one another. In contrast to these important agricultural sub-sector effects, however, no sector-wide variable (namely, *Urban* (for *non-Agriculture*)*, Sales, Manufacturing, or Mining*) has a statistically significant effect on *Partisan*.

Measures of ethnic affiliation also have significant effects on patterns of party choice. Of six variables, *Asante, Ewe*, and *Ga-Dangme* remain statistically significant across all five specifications. Asante districts are significantly more likely to feature NPP core voters, while respondents living in districts with heavy *Ewe* and *Ga-Dangme* populations are more likely to be NDC core voters. *Mole-Dagbani* is another positive predictor of NDC core voters that is statistically significant in Model (1)-(4). The smallest ethnic group, *Gurma*, is statistically significant only in two models and its coefficients are positive for NDC core. *Fante* has an unexpected negative relationship to the NPP in most of the models, the opposite of the *Asante*, despite the fact that both are sub-identities within the umbrella *Akan* ethnic group.

In addition, the results in Table 3.3 show that female and more educated voters are more likely to be core voters of the NPP rather than the NDC. The result of the education status is consistent with the established traditions of the parties.

To interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients, I present in Appendix 3C the marginal

effects of Model (3) in Table 3.3 as an example.[25] The marginal effects of changes in cocoa and rice production are presented in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. The figures present the probabilities of responses of strong NDC (at -3), independent voters (at 0), and strong NPP (at 3) associated with cocoa and rice production in a district with all the other variables at mean. More cocoa production should increase the probability of reporting NPP core. By contrast, rice production is negatively related to support for NPP and positively related to NDC support. In both figures, the probability of reporting "independent" is not affected by cocoa or rice production.

Figure 3.3. Predictive margins of <u>cocoa production</u>

95% confidence intervals

Figure 3.4. Predictive margins of rice production

95% confidence intervals

Turning to the models that predict swing voters' party choice (*Swing* = -1 if swing to NDC, 1 if to NPP), we see that the characteristics of party supporters in the 2008 and 2012 elections are different (Table 3.4). Voters in mining areas were more likely to switch to the NDC between 2004 and 2008. A voter in a cocoa-farming constituency was more likely to swing to the NPP.[26] In Models (2) and (3), the results show that only government performance evaluation has effects on the change in voters' party preferences in the 2012 elections.[27] Assessments of the president himself, and of government performance in the areas of jobs, prices, and electricity and water distribution are examined.[28] As expected, positive ratings of government performance are correlated with support for the then-incumbent NDC. Interestingly, the coefficients of general outcomes (jobs and prices) appear greater than those of local goods (water and electricity). For

---

[26] They are probably latecomers who jumped on the NPP bandwagon just as it rolled back into opposition.
[27] Unfortunately, performance assessment data are available only for the 2012 election.
[28] Due to the high co-linearity among the government assessment variables, the analysis of prices and electricity distribution is done separately (not shown).

the 2012 elections, when the NDC won again without shifting its platform, it makes sense that

there was no change in voters' party preferences based on ethnic or industrial concern.

Table 3.4. Swing voters' party choice (NDC:-1, partisan:0, NPP:-1)

	(1) Swing08	(2) Swing12	(3) Swing12
Individual Level			
Age	-0.00426	-0.00102	-0.00126
(Continuous)	(0.00229)	(0.00218)	(0.00221)
Female	0.0761	0.104	0.0476
(Female=1)	(0.0664)	(0.0635)	(0.0646)
Education	0.104	-0.0145	-0.0723
(Educated=1)	(0.0739)	(0.0698)	(0.0711)
Ethnicity			
Mole-Dagbani	-0.110	-0.175	0.0175
(%)	(0.254)	(0.232)	(0.236)
Asante	0.374	0.275	-0.00113
(%)	(0.194)	(0.171)	(0.177)
Ewe	-0.178	-0.359	-0.169
(%)	(0.246)	(0.214)	(0.217)
Fante	0.0278	-0.125	-0.211
(%)	(0.268)	(0.228)	(0.231)
Ga-Dangme	-0.351	-0.303	-0.180
(%)	(0.324)	(0.279)	(0.281)
Gurma	0.167	-0.0130	0.171
(%)	(0.296)	(0.260)	(0.264)
Industrial sector			
Sales	0.00174	0.00467	0.00262
(%)	(0.00595)	(0.00505)	(0.00510)
Manufacturing	0.0107	-0.0159	-0.00760
(%)	(0.0156)	(0.0135)	(0.0137)
Mining	-0.0267*	-0.0137	-0.0137
(%)	(0.0118)	(0.0105)	(0.0106)
Agricultural sub-sector			
Cocoa	0.0320**	0.00950	0.00288
(log(ton per capita))	(0.0116)	(0.0101)	(0.0102)
Rice	-0.0233	-0.00663	-0.00232
(log(ton per capita))	(0.0162)	(0.0141)	(0.0142)
Groundnut	0.175	-0.104	-0.379
(log(ton per capita))	(0.663)	(0.613)	(0.622)
Coast	-0.114	-0.0549	-0.0228
(Coast=1)	(0.121)	(0.106)	(0.107)
Gov't performance evaluation			
President			-0.173***
(1-5 scale)			(0.0269)
Jobs			-0.106***
(1-5 scale)			(0.0277)
Water			0.0346
(1-5 scale)			(0.0250)
N	1610	1613	1613
chi2	46.32	39.35	119.2
p > chi2	0.0000869	0.000968	1.56e-16

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

All told, these results support both the conventional wisdom about African politics that ethnic identity matters (at least for some ethnic groups) and my own hypotheses about economic voting and industry-based party platforms. Industrial sectors have an impact on party affiliation and its stability, as expected given the significance of cocoa and rice production and geographical segregation of one from the other in Ghana. Cocoa farmers stay with the NPP and rice growers are stay with the NDC. On the other hand, swing voters do not have any shared ethnic or industrial interests with the parties, but to note, they may also vote along policy lines.

6. Party Platforms and Policy Choices

As examined, a fundamental difference between the parties' economic bases exists. For NPP, high profits from cocoa production and exports are what its core voters most care about. The loyal supporters of NDC favor protection of the rice sector from imports and opt for increasing marginal benefits from input supports and high prices. My final empirical investigation in this study, then, is to look for evidence that parties in government did in fact implement policies that favored their core voters—do voters get the policies they vote for? Of course, any party in government intent on favoring one sector will often impose costs on other sectors. Directing a larger share of cocoa earnings to farmers, for example, may imply a decrease in export tax revenues, which in turn will result in a smaller pool of resources available for redistribution to voters not engaged in the cocoa industry. Similarly, high protection for rice in the form of import tariffs obliges consumers to pay more for rice.

Accelerating cocoa farmers' welfare was a priority during John Kufuor's NPP administration, which took power in 2001. Right at the start of its turn in government, the NPP administration established the Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) and began setting

aside a share of the cocoa revenue for service deliveries to cocoa producers, so-called

"development funds." The fund financed infrastructure, input subsidies, and technical and

business training programs for cocoa production. The committee members appointed by the

government were mostly the NPP officials who were merchants, intellectuals, and professionals

having strong connections with the Akan-dominant regions in the southwestern Ghana (Kolavalli

et al. 2012). Figure 3.5 shows how the institutional change brought about the increase in cocoa

farmers' stake in the sector.

Figure 3.5. Farmers' share of cocoa export earnings (1996-2010)

Source: Cocobod, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ghana

The figure displays the share of producer price plus development funds, which is given

by the government proportional to the f.o.b. prices. Noticeably, the farmers' portion increased to

65% in 2001 and further to over 80% by 2005 (both after the elections that the NPP won). The

NPP government's efforts to launch the development funds and to increase producer prices

significantly improved productivity and farmer's well-being in the cocoa sector. After the NDC

regained power in 2009, NPP politicians continued to claim that cocoa industry is the party's

high priority policy area, emphasizing the enormous improvement in the sector made during the

NPP administration and demanding that the NDC government raises cocoa producer prices.[29]

In contrast to the pattern for the cocoa industry, Ghana's protection and assistance for the

rice industry suffered during the NPP tenure, but has grown during the most recent NDC

administration (2009-present). The administrations of both NDC presidents, John Atta Mills and

John Mahama, have emphasized the need to increase local rice production under several rice-

related projects. The government projects including the Inland Valley Rice Development Project

and the Rice Sector Support Project aimed at food security, reduction of rice importation, and

serving smallholder rice farmers. Also, to realize food self-sufficiency and benefit local rice

farmers, the NDC government has imposed heavier tariffs on rice imports. An import duty of

20%, which had been removed by the NPP government in 2008, was restored in 2009 and

increased to 37% in 2014. This is substantial protection of the industry in comparison with a

tariff of 12.5% in neighboring Cote d'Ivoire, where rice production and consumption are

equivalent to Ghana's. Figure 3.6 shows the impact of the government policies on rice

production and imports throughout the four most recent administrations of Ghana. Prior to the

2000 elections, the NDC government dropped the import levels of rice below what they had been

in the authoritarian PNDC regime.[30] During the NPP turn in power, rice imports surged (from

only 69 thousand tons in 2000 to 793 thousand tons by 2005). Rice imports are again much lower

---

[29] (2009, October 9). "NPP calls for upward adjustment of cocoa producer prices." *The Chronicle*. Retrieved from
http://allafrica.com/stories/200910090611.html;
(2011, May 23). "MPP commends cocoa farmers over record years." *GhanaWeb*. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=208810;
(2014, February 27). "NPP calls for a 50.4% increase in the producer price of cocoa." *GhanaWeb*. Retrieved from
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=301963
[30] This is consistent with Bates' argument that authoritarian regimes exploit rural areas to favor urban ones because
in the absence of democratic elections, they are more concerned riots in the concentrated urban areas than in the
more populous but dispersed rural areas. So plentiful cheap food for the cities meant emphasis on imports. When
Ghana transitioned to democracy, Rawlings became more interested in appealing to majority *voters*, and so he
protected local rice and other food crop farmers, at the expense of higher consumer prices.

since the NDC's return to power, allowing the well-protected domestic rice producers to increase

output in 2009-2011.

The government's assistance intended to encourage certain industries reinforces the party

platforms that appeal to those who benefit from the policies, and they are likely to stay as loyal

supporters of the party that favors their interests. Voters vote for the party whose policy promises

would benefit them the most, and parties follow through—once in government, they change

policies to reward their loyal supporters.

Figure 3.6. Production and imports of rice in Ghana (1988-2011)

Source: FAOSTAT

7. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have analyzed the characteristics of electorates sorted by their partisan

preferences over the last three elections and looked for party identity in an African democracy

that is based on economic policy platforms. While political scientists commonly argue that

African parties have no distinct issue-based party platforms (Young 2009; Bleck & van de Walle

60

2013), I have argued that in a society where individuals' socio-economic interests diverge from one another, parties shape effective support bases that reflect "their" voters' policy demands. Using a merged data set that makes it possible to classify core and swing voters and match them with their socio-economic interests, I find statistically significant support for my argument.

The results of the research suggest a powerful interaction between principal industry of core members of the party and the party's preferred policy base. I focus on the two politically most important agricultural products in Ghana: cocoa and rice. Cocoa farmers' support for the NPP and rice growers' allegiance to the NDC lead each party to serve its economic clients when in office. Of course, consistent with the long traditions of the parties, each party's base is more complex than industrial clients alone; intellectuals and businesspeople tend to favor the NPP, while less-educated voters and small-scale farmers plump for the NDC. And of course ethnic allegiances, at least for some voters, remain significant as predictors of partisanship, even controlling for economic interests. Future research should focus on the policy implications of those differences: how do the two parties' policies manifest different treatments of small/large-scale businesses and private/public sectors?

In search of how voters reflect their evaluations of government administrations in elections, consistent with the existing research, the results suggest that many Ghanaian voters make party choices based on their assessment of government performance.[31]

But what is also interesting is that the mix of economic sectors in a respondent's district also contributes to the likelihood and direction of a swing vote. If swing voters were all "valence" voters, rewarding or punishing overall government performance on such universally desired

---

[31] As long as their evaluation is made based on the actual benefits they receive, it likewise tells us the incumbent party rewards its loyal supporters through resource distribution. But it is also likely that core members have biased opinions in favor of the party they support. The assessment of government performance has a greater effect on core voters' party preference than on swing voters' choice, but it is not presented in the paper.

outcomes as employment, growth, price stability and even anti-corruption, we would not expect

to find any relationship to economic factors. But in addition to their macro (or sociotropic)

effects, government policies create winners and losers, and even non-core voters may determine

that incumbents' industrial policies have helped or hurt them, and vote their "pocketbooks." In

the case of Ghana, mining is a significant predictor of NDC support by non-partisan voters. The

relatively small size of the sector gives a party little incentive to incorporate them into its

permanent base, however.

The labels of the Ghanaian parties, having been consolidated over six democratic

electoral cycles, serve better to inform voters and scholars alike about the composition of party

support bases than is possible in most other African cases. Ethnic appeals and local club/public

goods allocation, however, cannot explain the distinct and coherent party platforms that have

drawn ethnically heterogeneous groups of supporters. My theory of partisan identification around

industrial policy adds an important account to the analyses of what politicians and parties use to

convince African voters and to shape party's identity: the major industries of party membership

that could be distinguished from the interests of the opposition parties are likely the core bases of

party support.

Appendix 3A. Maps of Ghana

Map 1. The 2008 presidential election results (run-off)

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana

Map 2. Crop production by district

(a) Maize

(b) Cassava

(c) Cocoa

(d) Oil Palm

(e) Rice

(f) Groundnut

Map 3. Ethnic groups by district

(a) Mole-Dagbani

(b) Asante

(c) Ewe

(d) Fante

(e) Ga-Dangme

(f) Gurma

Appendix 3B. Correlation of Variables

Table 3B.1. Correlation of ethnicity, industrial sectors, and agricultural subsectors

	Mole-Dagbani	Asante	Ewe	Fante	Ga-Dangme	Gurma	Agriculture	Mining
Asante	-0.16							
Ewe	-0.33	-0.23						
Fante	-0.29	-0.16	-0.13					
Ga-Dangme	-0.26	-0.17	0.06	-0.03				
Gurma	-0.01	-0.14	-0.10	-0.18	-0.14			
Agriculture	0.37	-0.23	-0.17	-0.22	-0.30	0.36		
Mining	-0.09	0.07	-0.08	0.04	-0.01	-0.12	-0.01	
Manufacturing	-0.29	-0.04	0.44	0.31	0.27	-0.30	-0.74	-0.12
Sales	-0.30	0.30	0.09	0.16	0.23	-0.30	-0.96	-0.11
Maize_pc	0.23	-0.18	-0.07	-0.10	-0.38	0.13	0.71	0.05
Cassava_pc	-0.27	0.01	0.07	0.04	-0.26	0.12	0.42	0.12
Cocoa_pc	-0.22	0.18	-0.15	0.08	-0.23	-0.14	0.27	0.32
Oil Palm	-0.30	0.06	-0.08	0.16	-0.11	-0.20	0.06	0.38
Rice_pc	0.43	-0.08	-0.07	-0.26	-0.39	0.26	0.63	0.10
Groundnut_pc	0.68	-0.18	-0.21	-0.20	-0.17	0.10	0.38	-0.11
Coast	-0.23	-0.22	0.09	0.42	0.24	-0.16	-0.32	0.09

	Manufac-turing	Sales	Maize pc	Cassva pc	Cocoa pc	OilPalm	Rice_pc	Groundnut pc
Sales	0.64							
Maize_pc	-0.51	-0.71						
Cassva_pc	-0.30	-0.42	0.76					
Cocoa_pc	-0.33	-0.32	0.54	0.60				
OilPalm	-0.12	-0.12	0.28	0.44	0.77			
Rice_pc	-0.39	-0.61	0.61	0.37	0.32	0.21		
G.nut_pc	-0.19	-0.35	0.24	-0.13	-0.19	-0.23	0.36	
Coast	0.43	0.20	-0.32	-0.17	-0.04	0.04	-0.31	-0.18

Appendix 3C. Marginal Effects

To interpret the magnitudes of the coefficients, I present in Table 3C.1 the marginal effects of Model (3) in Table 3.3 as an example. Margins (1) is calculated at -3 of the outcome variable, and Margins (2) at 3. According to the results in Margins (1), females are 5.2 percentage points less likely to have supported the NDC consistently since the 2004 elections, while more educated respondents are 9.2 percentage points less likely to have done so. Regarding ethnicity, measured by the percentage rate from 0 to 1, each percentage-point increase of Mole-Dagbani population increases the chance of a voter being an NDC core supporter by 0.15 percentage points, and those of Ewe and Ga-Dangme increase the chance by 0.38 and 0.28 percentage points, respectively. By contrast, each percentage increase in the Asante share of a district's population decreases the probability that a voter will be an NDC core supporter by 0.21 percentage points. For agricultural production, I use the logarithm of the volume produced in tons per capita. Considering the unit used for production data, the results show that each ton of cocoa production per capita decreases the probability of choosing the NDC three times at the polls by 8.9 percentage points. Meanwhile, an increase in a ton of rice production per capita in a district makes a voter 13.4 percentage points more likely to be a loyal NDC voter. Margins (2) exhibits the marginal effects on NPP core, while the results show that the signs are the opposite of those in Margins (1) but with the similar probabilities.

Table 3C.1. Marginal effects of Model (3) in Table 3.3

	Margins (1) At (-3)	Margins (2) At (3)
Individual Level		
Age	-0.000876	0.000958
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Female	-0.0521**	0.0570**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	-0.0916***	0.100***
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnicity		
Mole-Dagbani(%)	0.151*	-0.165*
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Asante(%)	-0.207***	0.227***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ewe(%)	0.380***	-0.416***
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Fante(%)	0.130	-0.142
	(0.07)	(0.08)
Ga-Dangme(%)	0.281**	-0.307**
	(0.08)	(0.10)
Gurma(%)	0.112	-0.123
	(0.08)	(0.09)
Industrial sector		
Sales(%)	-0.000730	0.000799
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Manufacturing(%)	0.000187	-0.000205
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mining(%)	0.00200	-0.00219
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Agricultural sub-sector		
Cocoa_pc	-0.00894**	0.00978**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Rice_pc	0.0134**	-0.0147**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Groundnut_pc	0.185	-0.203
	(0.18)	(0.20)
Coast	0.0484	-0.0529
	(0.03)	(0.04)
Observations	1701	1701

Delta-method Std. Err. in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

CHAPTER 4. SHIFTING DIMENSIONS OF PARTY COMPETITION – THE EXAMPLE OF ZAMBIA

1. Introduction

Democratic Zambia is an important case study of coalition formation and voter choice because it demonstrates shifts of major party platforms for winning coalitions, first from an ethnic dimension to an issue dimension, and then across issue dimensions. Zambia's first successful democratic party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), started as the party for everyone who wanted to get rid of dictatorship by United National Independence Party (UNIP) that had lasted from the country's independence on October 24, 1964 through the years of single-party rule from 1972 to 1991. From 1991 to 2001, the MMD held an absolute majority in the National Assembly, while Frederick Chiluba from MMD, the second president of Zambia, gained about three-fourths of the vote in both elections in 1991 and 1996. But by the third multiparty elections in 2001, an ethnic cleavage mainly between Bemba and Tonga people emerged as the main axis of political competition and the MMD's dominance showed cracks while the 2001 elections were intensely competitive. In the subsequent elections, the MMD won support from most farmers, the largest employment population in the country, which represented a dimensional shift in the party's support coalition from ethnically based to issue-base. Over three elections, the MMD narrowed its support base from a pan-agricultural issue dimension to exclusively supporting maize production, while the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) shaped a winning coalition of mining workers and the urban poor. This culminated in partisan alternation in power as the PF's coalition was large enough to knock the MMD into opposition.

This chapter traces the party strategies in Zambia, which reveal feasible voting blocs created by ethnic and industrial variations. These variations can be purposefully divided into

69

multiple discrete elements, various combinations of which could form majority coalitions. In Zambia, the Bemba ethnic group and farmers had been the main (cross-cutting) axes of successful party building that had taken turns for power until non-maize farmers and urban workers united under one party. Attributes of ethnic associations alone or of the ideological approach—urban poor versus others—by itself cannot explain the shifts in major dimensions of political coalition-formation. To help understand the shift visually, I, first, propose a modification of Daniel Posner's identity choice model to make it more appropriate for the study of party building. Next, I trace the argument through the case of Zambia, which provides interesting internal party dynamics for exploring the effect of elite coalitions on shaping party platform and a turnover of parties in power. Then, I show that the policy choices in Zambia were made according to the party's support base. I conclude by discussing the argument's implications for the prospects of multi-party democracy in Africa and how it impacts societies.

2. Principles of Building a Winning Coalition

My research explores changes in party identity, where a political party seeks to win a presidential election or majorities in the legislature. This investigation is placed in the context in which parties look for ways to maximize votes or incumbent members' reelection, while voters consider multidimensional factors to maximize their self-interest (Downs 1957). Using the potential multi-dimensional elements of party identities as addressed in the previous section, how will parties shape their support bases? What determines the sizes and dimensions of the party bases? This section suggests a mechanism.

Daniel Posner's (2005) model of pivotal group's choice is a useful tool to apply to a party identity choice. Posner provides accounts on how and which ethnic identity becomes salient

among all possible options. His case study of Zambia shows that the broadening domain of electoral competition from the constituency-level to the national level in 1991 changed the politically salient unit of social identity from tribe to language group. In other words, the institutional evolution from single-party regime to multi-party democracy (re)constructed political cleavages. Considering that his model uses multiple dimensions of social cleavages and highlights the need to form a majority coalition, I apply it to a more modern setting where constituents express concern for economic policy issues—not just for ethnic affiliation—in a multi-party system.

While Posner's model is created to account for the effect of institutional transitions on an individual's choice of social identity, shaping a successful party identity expects parties to react to the (exogenously determined) distribution of voters' interests over the salient dimensions of competition. At the same time, the voters' preferences are closely related to *who* constitutes the party leadership, for ethnicity, as sketched above, exerts a powerful political appeal to co-ethnics. Simply put, once parties know what the voters want and how many (ethnic) competitors they face, they can construct their platforms, or sets of appeals, in order to maximize votes. The application of a party's choice follows the explanation of the assumptions from the original model.

Figure 4.1. Winning-coalition-building in multidimensional competition

B

	b_1	b_2	b_3	...	b_m
a_1	*w*			*x*	
a_2					
a_3					
...	*y*			*z*	
a_n					

A

Posner's model, depicted in Figure 4.1, suggests a cleavage structure of A and B that contains two possible options of politically salient identities. The cleavages consist of identity groups (A = {$a_1, a_2, a_3, ... a_n$} and B = {$b_1, b_2, b_3, ... b_m$}), and their sizes vary ($a_1 > a_2 > a_3 > ... > a_n$ and $b_1 > b_2 > b_3 > ... > b_m$). Cleavages are types of identity dimensions (i.e. policy, ethnicity, religion, etc.), whose components are categorized by descriptive identities (e.g., Bemba, Ewe, Christians, Muslims, coffee farmers, miners, etc.). Each individual *i* has an identity repertoire of (a_j, b_k) but ultimately is identified by only the one dimension she chooses. This choice implies which political leader's group she wants to join, where leaders *j* and *k* do not share resources with one another but share only within their own groups. This choice occurs in a political arena in which a candidate is elected under a plurality rule and where every member in a winning coalition is equally rewarded.

Assuming that the largest group on each of the two dimensions can form credible coalitions that could win (along a_1 and b_1), an individual's optimal choice differs depending on which category she belongs to among *w, x, y,* and *z*. Individuals in *x* and *y* will choose their identity units of a_1 and b_1, respectively, that maximize their chances of winning rather than the

available options in the other dimensions. Those positioned in w form the pivotal group that will determine which party will win. Meanwhile, although z might contain the largest population, individuals in z are so fragmented in their identities and interests that it will be hard for them to form a coherent coalition.

The remaining question is which dimension the pivotal group or the cross-pressured group (w) will choose. Under the assumption that individuals make the choice that will yield a bigger piece of a pie, they will prefer a winning coalition that is shaped with a smaller number of members to share resources. When $x > y$, w will choose to form a coalition with y, thereby particizing the b_1 dimension of their identity. When $y > x$, conversely, they will prefer to ally with x, identified by a_1. However, in a situation where one group outnumbers the others regardless of w's contribution, w has no choice but to become part of a larger coalition: allying with x when $x > w + y$ or with y when $y > w + x$.

Consider this game from the party's perspective. The formation of a winnable party identity in Africa does not depend solely on w's decision between a_1 and b_1 because parties' presidential candidates often want to shape support bases that include their co-ethnics. Therefore, the ethnic affiliation of the party's president or of the party elites' coalition predetermines the possible coalition type and its size. If presidential candidate X is from an ethnic group smaller than a_1 ($a_x < a_1$), his party would build a coalition on the other cleavage (B), using the b_1 dimension when $x > y$ or a larger dimension than b_1 (e.g., b_1+b_2) when $y > x$, which is an optimal choice to best represent the co-ethnics' interest and win the plurality vote. So, for example, a super-majority coalition of farmers might be formed when a party leader comes from a small ethnic group, for which agriculture is the smallest possible identity category that can win a plurality vote and also satisfy the co-ethnics' economic interest. Meanwhile, building a multi-

ethnic coalition without common economic ground is still another option (e.g., $a_x + a_y + a_z$) if the constituent groups find this way most effective to make political appeals and if the party's ethnic leaders consent to sharing power. At its core, effective strategies are constrained by internal party politics not just voters' preferences. Thus, elite coalition building becomes the key to successful party building.

Also note that a ruling party has an advantage over its challengers in shaping and managing support bases. After an incumbent party chooses its platform and distributes kickbacks within the constituencies it manages to win, opponents must build their support bases from the parts of the palette that the government disregards. If it serves its coalition of supporters well, the ruling party is a likely winner. Still, there is a chance of the challenger's victory if incumbent parties narrow their electoral bases down to the point where they are minimal-winning. This can happen when ambitious leaders seek to eliminate challengers and other factions within the party to secure a larger share of benefits for themselves and the voters who show allegiance to them. However, miscalculation, ambition, or greed can lead to over-shooting. If the power struggle inside the party scrapes too many prominent party leaders off from the top positions and their followers follow them out of the party, the party may cease to represent a majority of the electorate and fall out of power. Especially in systems using plurality rules for elections, shrinking an incumbent's party base below a majority will place it at risk of electoral failure if opposition parties manage to ally with ruling-party defectors to build a new winning coalition.[32] Another possibility to win against an incumbent party is that an opposition party outbids the cross-pressured voters (who are in w in the model) by funneling more resources or promising

---

[32] Such miscalculation is not the sole factor in party turnover in reality. Outside the dimensional consideration, an incumbent party can lose for a variety of reasons such as economic crisis, under-appreciated government performance, high level of campaign spending by opposition parties, and voters' preference to a new party. (See Jacobson 1990, Remmer 1991, Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, Samuels 2000.)

their favorable policies and forms a plurality.

3. Dimension Shifts and Adjustment of Party Bases in Zambia

Regarding the unique feature that the mass movement led by the labor union leaders brought

about re-democratization, Zambia under democracy provides an interesting case study of

transformation of the party's platform because the most powerful explanation for the over-time

increases in opposition support and eventual party turnover in government is the ruling party's

deliberate narrowing of its support base.[33] Figure 4.2 presents the trends of the Zambian parties'

popularity in multi-party competitions, and shows the defeat of the Movement for Multi-party

Democracy (MMD), the long-time incumbent party, in 2011.[34] Until the 2011 election when the

Patriotic Front (PF) took over the government, there had been two adjustments of support base

within the MMD, which led to a shift for the opponent. Table 4.1 underlines the links between

ethnic and industrial characteristics of the presidents' co-ethnic regions and the incumbent

parties' choices of their platforms and the factors affecting the shifts.

---

[33] Zambia, since independence, has always used the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system in both presidential and legislative elections.
[34] After the twenty-year single-party rule, a multi-party system was re-launched in 1991 in Zambia. But in the elections in the 1990s, MMD had been dominating party and won all presidential contests and most legislative seats. The 2001 election is regarded as a start of meaningful multi-party contests.

Figure 4.2. Presidential election results in Zambia (2001-2011)

Table 4.1. Description of Zambia's winning-coalition bases and explanations for the changes

Incumbent party	MMD			PF
President	Frederick Chiluba	Levy Mwanawasa	Rupia Banda	Michael Sata
Term in office	1991-2001	2002-2008	2008-2011	2012-2014
Ethnicity of President	Bemba (33.5%)	Lenje (1.2%)	Nyanja (14.8%)	Bemba (33.5%)
Economic interests	Mining & Agriculture	Agriculture	Maize sector	Mining & Non-maize agric.
Coalition type	Overarching /Bemba	Farmers	Maize farmers	Non-maize
Logic behind party formation	Democratization → Ethnic party	Dimension shift	Minimal winning	Majority on issue dimension

76

Multiparty democracy in Zambia began with the 1991 victory of the MMD over Kenneth

Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP), which had dominated since the country's

independence in 1964. From 1991 to 2001, the MMD held an absolute majority in the National

Assembly and Frederick Chiluba gained about three-fourths of the vote in both elections in 1991

and 1996. The MMD's popularity was obtained from the voters who were pleased by the

reintroduction of multiparty system, and also strong support was provided by the Bemba people

who spoke the same language as Chiluba.[35]

Despite being non-Bemba, Chiluba's handpicked successor, Levy Mwanawasa, receiving

28.69% of the total vote, won in the 2001 presidential election. Most of his support hailed from

dominantly Bemba-speaking Copperbelt, Northern, and Luapula provinces and in some Lenje

speaking constituencies of the Central province where he came from. Although Anderson

Mazoka from the United Party for National Development (UPND) trailed closely behind

Mwanawasa with 26.76% of the vote in the 2001 elections, the fragmented party alignment

prevented any one party from obtaining substantial popularity from voters and gave a victory to

MMD again (Burnell 2002) (see Figure 4.3). With 28 parties registered in the 2001 elections,

votes were split among different parties along ethnic lines (Gould 2007). Considering this ethnic

voting trend, the main factor on the vote choice in the 2001 elections appears to have been the

ethnic cleavages. Appendix 4A displays the changes in the incumbent party bases (shaded) from

election to election in a modified version of Posner's matrix with two dimensions of ethnicity

and policy interest. When calibrating the possible winning coalitions, the politically distinctive

Tonga people in Southern province are not considered, as they always prefer to form an

---

[35] Bemba is the largest language group in Zambia taking up about 33.5% of the population and followed by Nyanja (14.8%), Tonga (11.4%), and Lozi (5.5%) (Zambia 2010 Census of Population and Housing).

ethnically autonomous coalition, and all support the UPND.[36]

Figure 4.3. 2001 Presidential election results in fragmented party system and Bemba dominance in MMD

The first shift of political cleavage dimension occurred from ethnic dimension to policy

issue dimension during the government under Levy Mwanawasa in 2002-8. In Zambia, where

73% of the total labor force engages in agriculture,[37] there was a severe food shortage due to

drought in 2001-2. To relieve the suffering, a large quantity of food aid, including genetically

modified (GM) maize, was offered by the United States. In response to the offer, the

Mwanawasa government banned the GM food aid, supposedly for ethical concerns.[38] At the

same time, they began to implement policies to reinvigorate domestic agricultural production in

order to alleviate the food deficiency and to promote self-sufficiency on food. Mwanawasa

---

[36] Historically, Tonga speakers have repeated to coalesce and break up with Bemba people in an attempt to control the government throughout the post-independent period. (See Scarritt 2006). The Tonga's solidarity with the UPND does not seem to convey any tribal grievance rooted in history. For an ideological discussion on the historical foundations of Tonga's political unity, see Giacomo Macola, *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
[37] International Labor Organization (ILO) Survey 2011, Zambia
[38] Margaret Wilson and Roger Highfield (2002 October 30). 'Starving Zambia rejects America's GM maize.' *The Telegraph*. Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zambia/1411713/Starving-Zambia-rejects-Americas-GM-maize.html

successfully formed a farmers' coalition across all ethnic groups and nearly all regions.[39] As a member of the small Lenje ethnic group, he built a non-ethnic coalition based on the agricultural sector (Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010). Figure 4.4 plots fitted lines of the margin of MMD vote share in the last four elections from 2001 to 2011, showing its relation with the share of rural population and the share of maize farmers on the left and right hand sides, respectively. The observations are of Zambia's 72 districts. The left graph displays the shifts in MMD base from no relation to the agricultural sector in 2001 to pro-agriculture in 2006, as the MMD vote share increased with district ruralness. The right graph replaces ruralness with the share of the population engaged in maize cultivation, and the positive correlation with MMD support is even stronger in all elections after 2001.

---

[39] In the 2006 election, Mwanawasa's MMD reaped an impressive comeback by winning 43% of the vote. The biggest challenger with a margin of 13.6% was Michael Sata from PF, whose support was concentrated in the Bemba speaking urban areas: See Gero Erdmann, 'Ethnicity, voter alignment and political party affiliation-an African case: Zambia' (2007). Hakainde Hachilema from the United Democratic Alliance (UDA), (which was an alliance of UPND, UNIP, the Forum for Democracy and Development, and the United Liberal Party), gained 25.3% of the popular vote.

Figure 4.4. The MMD support base shifted beginning in 2006

In terms of the MMD's party leadership, Mwanawasa formed a regionally broad inner

circle by sacking most of Chiluba's close allies, mostly Bembas, on charges of corruption, and

by inviting the leaders of the opposition parties such as Dipak Patel from the FDD, Sylvia

Masebo from the Zambia Republican Party (ZRP), and deputy ministers from the Heritage Party

(HP), UPND, and UNIP. Reacting against this move, some Bemba MMD members of parliament

from Luapula and Northern provinces quit the party in solidarity with Chiluba, criticizing the

'victimization of Bembas' by Mwanawasa.[40] Some of them defected to the PF. Except for the

Bemba politicians, who voluntarily stepped out, and the Tonga people in Southern province

supporting the UPND, the MMD built a comprehensive alliance of agricultural elites from

almost all provinces across Zambia.

The second change of the MMD platform started when Rupiah Banda was nominated as

---

[40] (2003, March 7). 'Outgunning the opposition.' *Africa Confidential*. Retrieved from http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/199/Outgunning_the_opposition

the MMD presidential candidate for the 2008 by-election. After the sudden death of Mwanawasa,

three existing factions of leadership within MMD—Banda's Eastern province faction, Vernon

Mwaanga's old Bemba elites from the Chiluba government, and N'gandu Magande with other

young politicians from Mwanawasa's overarching coalition—competed for the presidential

candidacy. With assistance of Mwaanga and his allies, Banda won the nomination against

Magande faction.[41] As a result, the MMD lost some support in Magande-Mwanawasa

strongholds in Central, Northwestern, and Western provinces, and also in Northern region where

PF's Sata was progressing. The party's shrinking regional basis was a consequence at the

moment that arose from the nomination process to win the candidacy within the party by

eliminating the challengers from the inner circle of party leadership. After he gained the

presidency, Banda eventually expelled Magande (Tonga ethnic group) with other influential

figures from the party in order to place his own allies including his sons and the other

businessman politicians in top party positions.[42] This dismissal of non-Nyanja and non-Bemba

elites from MMD corresponded to Banda's narrowed attention to maize farmers in the

distribution of resources. Maize growers comprised the majority of farmers in the country and

the dominant group in Banda's home ground of Eastern province.[43] While the former president,

Mwanawasa, emphasized crop diversification for commercial purposes in addition to the growth

of maize production for food security, Banda mainly focused on benefiting maize producers. As

the steepest line on the right side of Figure 4.4 shows, the 2008 MMD coalition was more geared

toward the interests of the maize sector in comparison to that of the 2006 election. Hence, the

---

[41] (2008 August 31). 'A potential MMD split?' *Zambian Economist*. Retrieved from http://www.zambian-economist.com/2008_08_01_archive.html

[42] (2011 June 10). Africa Confidential, 'Banda brothers on the attack.'

[43] Roughly 80% of smallholder farmers plant maize, while 96% of farms are in small-scale in Eastern province: See Susan Chiona, *Technical and allocative efficiency of smallholder maize farmers in Zambia*. (The University of Zambia, unpublished PhD dissertation, 2011).

focus of the MMD platform on maize planting areas and its neglect of the urban poor gave opposition parties a chance to gain support from non-maize farmers and urban dwellers.

The most recent change in a composition of a winning coalition produced the electoral victory of PF, which gradually gained most of its backing from urbanites and Bemba voters up to the 2011 elections. Figure 4.5 displays PF's growing strength in urban and Bemba-dominant districts, while a large share of Bemba districts are also located in copper mining cities in Copperbelt province. Although fear that adequate grain supply to the major urban centers would fail led the government to continue to take some part in assisting agricultural production even in the period of economic reforms, urban workers were the definite victims of privatization and other reforms that had been implemented in the 1990s. A number of mining workers and public employees were laid off throughout the liberalization process, and formal unemployment rate soared from 12.4% in 1991 to 19.7% in 1994 and it did not drop under 15% even in 2009.[44] In addition, the living standard in the mining towns deteriorated as the government sold off the mining companies to private entrepreneurs including Chinese companies. Michael Sata, the president of PF from the Northern region, articulated the grievances of the workers and the poor and presented his party as the advocate of the people disadvantaged by the government's policies (Larmer and Fraser 2007, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2010). Note that the party platform that Chiluba's MMD had established with the backing of Bemba people and miners recurred two decades later as Sata's PF. This well captures my argument about Zambia's party strategy that draws on the country's important industrial sectors. Also, the recurring pattern of a winning coalition structure reflects that the socio-economic configuration of a society is an important determining factor of coalition-building.

---

[44] Ministry of Labor and Social Security, Zambia, <http://mlss.gov.zm/>

Figure 4.5. PF's increasing popularity in Bemba-dominant and urban districts

During the PF's campaign in Northwestern and Western provinces, which are the poorest,

and least populated regions, Sata's message focused on criticizing the MMD government's

policies of marginalizing development in these regions, in areas such as health, education,

infrastructure, and agricultural production. In the PF's rally in Mwinilunga district of

Northwestern, Sata pointed out the fact that the MMD's fertilizer allocation overlooked the

region by saying 'Levy Mwanawasa left you eight bags of fertilizer, Rupiah Banda took fertilizer

away from you.'[45] Also in Western province, Sata attempted to associate the Westerners'

struggle for independence of Barotseland with everyone's struggle for more food and more

infrastructure that had not been achieved by the MMD government.[46] Consequently, by obtaining

rural votes from areas neglected by the MMD's selective maize support, the PF was able to forge

a winning coalition of the marginalized in the 2011 elections while framing the electoral

---

[45] (2011 August 18). The Post, 'Sata takes his campaign to Mwinilunga.'
[46] James Muyanwa (2008 October 21). 'Sata entices West on Barotse Agreement', Times of Zambia.

competition as a battle between maize farmers and everyone else. (Appendix 4B shows that maize growers in the Bemba-dominant constituencies stayed with the MMD's maize coalition even in the 2011 elections when the majority of Bembas backed the PF and the PF won.)

In sum, the management of internal competition must be carried out strategically, with an eye on the opposition, because the result of the struggle relative to the competitors' positions affects the fate of the party. When it comes to positioning on the multiple identity dimensions, although using ethnic appeals is a strategically reasonable choice, I show that policy dimension has become the main space of competition, on which parties' distinguishable positions have decided the election outcomes.

4. Party Bases and Policy Choices

As the MMD's platform shifted from an ethnic dimension to a policy dimension and modified in its size, the flow of policies adopted by the government reflected the party's re-shaped support base. In this section, I introduce the policy choices by each administration since Mwanawasa's increased support for agricultural sector and Banda's substantial assistance for maize growers in more populous regions until Sata's PF was formed in opposition to the partial development policies of the MMD. The available evidence of policy changes according to party platforms directly shows the important role of political parties in policy making.

To achieve self-sufficient food production, Mwanawasa introduced a cash-based input subsidy system in 2002 with the creation of the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP), which was to distribute fertilizer at 50% fixed subsidy rate. During his first term (2002-6), an average of 51,000 metric ton (MT) of fertilizer was allocated every year, which was a significant increase from an average of 30,000 MT per year under the Fertilizer Credit Program (1997-2001) of the

Chiluba administration. In 2006, following the re-election of Mwanawasa, the amount of

fertilizer subsidy peaked at 84,000 MT with an increase in the subsidy rate to 60% (Mason et al

2013). In respect to maize purchases, the pattern of agriculture-favoring policy was similarly

maintained during the second half of the Mwanawasa administration. The Food Reserve Agency

(FRA) under Mwanawasa increased its purchases of maize gradually every year from 58,250 MT

in 2003 to 250,000 MT in 2007 (Govereh et al 2010). As a result of these policy efforts and good

weather, Zambia attained relatively good harvests in all years throughout Mwanawasa's time in

office, and had a bumper harvest in the 2006 election year when he successfully formed a

farmers' coalition across all ethnic groups or all regional orientations.[47]

The succeeding president, Rupiah Banda, narrowed the party basis to maize producing

regions by increasing the amount of input subsidies substantially. He raised the fertilizer subsidy

rate from 60% to 75% in 2008 and up to 76% in 2010 and distributed an average of 119,000 MT

of fertilizer per year with the establishment of a new system, called Farmer Input Support

Program (FISP).[48] Banda's Eastern province, dominated by maize-farming households, gained

the most benefits from this program in terms of the total amount of the fertilizer subsidies

received. However, it does not imply that all the regions outside Eastern province were

marginalized by this policy. Rather, in the regions where the MMD won or lost by a small

margin in the 2008 elections such as Central, Lusaka, and Northern provinces, larger number of

households gained greater benefits than in the other regions (Mason et al. 2013). Banda's MMD

attempted to form a maize coalition that included Bemba maize farmers in Northern and Central

provinces. However, the formation of maize farmers' coalition negatively affected the regions

---

[47] Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MACO). 'Fertilizer Support Program Implementation Manual,' Various years, Lusaka: MACK

[48] MACO. 'Farmer Input Support Program Implementation Manual for the 2009/10 Agricultural Season,' Various years, Lusaka: MACO.; Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL), "Farmer Input Support Program Implementation Manual," 2012.: MAL, '2012/3 Agricultural Season', 2012.

growing little maize such as Luapula, Copperbelt, Northwestern, and Western. Sparsely

populated Northwestern and Western regions were of a little interest to the MMD to distribute

resources. The MMD also had been losing favor in urban areas where Banda government's

policies harmed domestic workers' interests in securing jobs and better education for their

children but instead benefited the targeted maize farmers, the business-political elites, and

foreign investors.[49]

Policy changes made by the PF government since November 2011 reflect the interests of

its constituency of urban workers and consumers and non-maize farmers. Immediately after Sata

was elected president, the mineral royalty rates were raised in December 2011 and resulted in an

increase in fiscal revenue from the mineral royalty tax by 7.3% in 2012.[50] Also, the basic

minimum wage was raised by 108% and the agricultural input subsidies were expanded to

include small-scale producers of sorghum, cotton, and groundnuts by the end of 2012.[51] The PF

government also cut fertilizer subsidies for small-scale farmers from 75% to 50% and limited

state maize purchases to 34% of the total agriculture sector spending in 2013 2013.[52] Due to bad

weather and poor government assistance, Zambia's maize production fell to 2.5 million MT by

11% in 2013 from 2.85 million MT in 2012, and the reduction in production and a hike in mealie

meal (maize flour) prices resulted in the policy of banning maize export in 2013, which hurt the

---

[49] My own analysis of the Zambian government's basic education spending shows that it benefited rural districts than urban districts: See Ministry of Finance, 'Statement 'C'', 2008-11.
[50] Andrew England (2011 November 11). 'Zambia to double mine royalties', Financial Times.
[51] Economist Intelligent Unit Zambia Report (2012 November); The Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment Act (Chapter 276 of the Laws of Zambia) was revised for minimum wage increases from K250,000 in 2011 to K522,400 in 2012 for domestic workers and from K419,000 in 2011 to K1,132,400 in 2012 for shop and general workers.
[52] (2013, May 15). 'President Michael Sata defends the removal of maize subsidies.' *Lusaka Times*. Retrieved from https://www.lusakatimes.com/2013/05/15/president-michael-sata-defends-the-removal-of-maize-subsidies/ (2013, September 30). 'Removing subsidies in Zambia-the way to go?' *IRIN News*. Retrieved from http://www.irinnews.org/report/98849/removing-subsidies-in-zambia-the-way-to-go

small-scale farmers twice.[53] Though not necessarily maximizing benefits for the country's economy as a whole, the platform the PF chose, in fact, resulted in the implementation of policies maximizing its supporters' interests.

5. Conclusion

Zambia provides several large blocs of socio-economic interests, associated with industrial subsectors, class, and ethnicity: Bemba language group takes up over 30 percent of the population; maize production supports approximately a half of livelihoods; and urban dwellers including copper miners are anther highly sensitive group from a political economy standpoint. The sufficiently large sizes of these blocs, though fluid and flexible to allow altered categories within the same spectrum (i.e., maize—grain—farming), may attract politicians to mix and match them for political use. Because each of the categories is sizeable and incongruent with one another, however, the winning coalitions are forged from one dimension and shifted to the other rather than form around several economic sectors nested within an ethnic boundary, or vice versa. Therefore, this chapter shows that although a country's endowment of industries and ethnic groups shapes the patterns of voter alignments, it still allows for a variety of coalition-building strategies. The summary of the patterns follows as below.

Economic features of the party president's home region often lay out a key axis of a party platform, and peripheries join the party if they share its policy interests. Because people living in close proximity are likely co-ethnics and endowed with similar environmental resources and jobs, the party's preferences concerning sectoral interests often overlap with its ethnic interests and it is easy to confound ethnic attachment and economic interests. And yet, the finding points to the importance of policy interests in multi-dimensional competition. Winning coalitions in Africa

---

[53] Catherine Nyirenda and Andrew Phiri (2013 December 19). 'Mealie-meal prices rise.' Times of Zambia.

can be formed on not just ethnic identities but policy issues where politicians emphasize voters' policy interests that they intend to represent through parties. Incorporating sectoral interest as a variable in parties' strategic calculations helps us to better understand party behavior in multiparty competition.

Once the farmers' coalition won with more than sufficient support, the party elites narrowed the party base toward minimal winning size by scraping challengers inside the party and they also reduced the party's spatial position on the ethnic and economic dimensions. However, as the Zambian case shows, political parties sometimes make strategic miscalculations that can lead to electoral failure, which means a turnover of power for an incumbent party. In particular, where there are more than two parties, the minimum size that a coalition needs to win a plurality of votes is not certain. Opposition parties, which also develop strategies in multiple dimensions, have a high chance of winning an election if building a platform on the same dimension with the ruling party when it narrows its base.

In Zambia, where the several sizeable socio-economic groups represent the population, a winning coalition established on a certain dimension crisscrosses its members' interests on the second dimension. For instance, the maize coalition constitutes many different ethnic groups though with some varying degrees they rely on the sector for their livelihood. Similarly, Bemba people may be tempted to form their own ethnic coalition, but they have heterogeneous economic interests. The fact that political actors have many feasible options of party strategies across cleavage dimensions may provide the country with little chance of stable party system. But shifting axes of partisan competition might also mean more opportunities for partisan turnover in government – which some see as a defining feature of democracy (Przeworski et al. 1996), and which is still rare in Africa. And yet, as the PF formed a successful opposition with

88

miners and the urban poor against the MMD's maize coalition, any effective coalition formed along either ethnic or economic dimension in opposition to the mainstream voting blocs (such as the Bemba or maize growers) has a chance to win the government and change the redistribution of the state resources.

Appendix 4A. Changes in Party Bases in Zambia

Figure 4A.1. Winning parties' platforms in multidimensional space

Region	Maize farmer	Non-maize farmer	Non-farmer
Bemba			
Nyanja			
NW/W			
Others			
Tonga			

Built by Chiluba pre-2001, elected Mwanawasa

Region	Maize farmer	Non-maize farmer	Non-farmer
Bemba			
Nyanja			
NW/W			
Others			
Tonga			

Mwanawasa changes the dimensionality of the party system in 2002-8

Region	Maize farmer	Non-maize farmer	Non-farmer
Bemba			
Nyanja			
NW/W			
Others			
Tonga			

Banda succeeds Mwanasasa in 2008

Region	Maize farmer	Non-maize farmer	Non-farmer
Bemba			
Nyanja			
NW/W			
Others			
Tonga			

Banda loses to Sata's PF party in 2011

Appendix 4B. Bemba Maize Farmers' Party Choice

Although a fully specified model of voting choice is beyond the scope of this article, a choice of the cross-pressured group whose policy interest differs from the rest of the members of the same ethnic group is particularly important for the strategies of shaping party platforms.[54] If their ethnic and economic interests cut across two different party bases, their choice of which party to support may be less straightforward. This section attempts to test hypotheses about cross-pressured groups: They vote 1) along ethnic lines; 2) for policies; or 3) to form a (minimal) winning coalition. In this case, the cross-pressured group is maize growers from the Bemba ethnic group. I constructed an original panel data set with four cross sections (2001, 2006, 2008, 2011) for election results and merged it with demographic data for the 72 districts in Zambia.[55] On average, the population of a district in Zambia was about 173,105 in 2010.

To understand voting behavior of the Bemba maize farmers in relation to MMD's vote share, it is helpful to consider an OLS model:

$$V_i = \alpha_1 Rural\ pop_i + \alpha_2 Maize\ ratio_i + \alpha_3 Ethnic\ ID_i + \alpha_4 Infant\ mortality_i + Z_i\theta + \varepsilon_i$$

where V_i is MMD's vote share in district i, measured by the total number of votes the party candidate obtained, divided by the total vote cast in a district[56]; *Rural pop_i* is a measure of the share of people engaging in agriculture in district i; *Maize ratio_i* is calculated as maize growing area divided by the sum of maize and non-maize growing areas, indicating the intensity of maize farming in comparison to the other crops; *Ethnic ID_i* is the percentage of each ethnic group in a district; *Infant mortality_i* represents one of the government policy outcomes; Z_i is a vector of the interaction term of Bemba ethnic group and *Maize ratio* to show the effect of Bemba ethnicity on

---

[54] This is an example of what scholars refer to as "cross-cutting cleavages." See Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Lijphart (1975), and Dahl (1982).
[55] Redistricting conducted in 2013 increased the number of districts from 72 to 103, but for the elections before then, I use the previous administrative divisions.
[56] The original election data report encompasses 150 constituencies, broken down into 72 districts.

the response of intensity of maize farming; and ε_i embodies all unobservable variables of which $E(\epsilon_i) = 0$. In Table 4B.1, each column is on the MMD vote share for each election year observation.

To predict ethnic voting by the cross-pressured group, the coefficient of the interaction term should be negative since the 2006 elections when the MMD became a farmers' coalition encompassing almost all the ethnic groups while the PF emerged in urban Bemba regions. By contrast, if the cross-pressured group is concerned most about maize policy, the interaction would show a positive effect since 2006 and become more significant since the maize coalition of Banda administration kicked off in 2008. If their top concern is to belong to any winning team, they will switch their support from MMD to PF in the 2011 elections, by shifting the coefficient sign of the interaction term from positive to negative.

The regression results in Table 4B.1 show that Bemba itself has a negative effect on the MMD vote share, but the interaction between Bemba and maize has a positive effect on both 2008 and 2011 election models. While most districts with high Bemba population show weak support for the MMD, the Bemba maize farmers stayed loyal to the MMD. Figure 4B.1 shows the effect visually. In districts with high maize production, constituents are more likely to vote for the incumbent party even at a high level of the Bemba population.

Table 4B.1. Bemba maize farmers' party choice (DV: MMD vote share)

	2001	2006	2008	2011
Rural pop	0.126**	0.386***	0.441***	0.397***
	(0.0453)	(0.0724)	(0.0724)	(0.0734)
Maize ratio	0.0968	-0.0191	0.0221	-0.0880
	(0.0756)	(0.151)	(0.128)	(0.117)
Bemba	0.0511	-0.340*	-0.462***	-0.586***
	(0.108)	(0.135)	(0.130)	(0.126)
$Maize \times Bemba$	0.0634	0.420	0.733**	0.768***
	(0.166)	(0.212)	(0.239)	(0.210)
Tonga	-0.257***	-0.593***	-0.502***	-0.440***
	(0.0594)	(0.0753)	(0.0626)	(0.0554)
Nyanja	-0.296***	-0.314***	0.208**	0.287***
	(0.0735)	(0.0761)	(0.0750)	(0.0720)
Lozi	-0.122	0.270**	0.224**	-0.211**
	(0.0805)	(0.0936)	(0.0740)	(0.0679)
Northwestern	-0.0908	-0.0311	-0.0635	-0.0481
	(0.0686)	(0.101)	(0.0949)	(0.0874)
Infant mortality	0.0231	-0.225**	-0.140	-0.170*
	(0.0556)	(0.0824)	(0.0893)	(0.0705)
Constant	0.188	0.585***	0.325*	0.424**
	(0.104)	(0.150)	(0.125)	(0.135)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R^2	0.601	0.642	0.678	0.663

Standard errors in parentheses

$* \ p < 0.05, ** \ p < 0.01, *** \ p < 0.001$

As Table 4B.1 shows, however, ruralness has a positive effect on the incumbent candidate's popularity in all four elections with a high statistical significance at 0.01 or 0.001 level, while its coefficient triples between 2001 and 2006. The negative coefficients on infant mortality in the models of 2006-11 show that where the government provides with good policy support or where low infant mortality appears, voters are more likely to support the ruling party. In addition to the Tonga people's steadfast preference for the UPND, the effects of Nyanja and Lozi ethnic groups have statistical significance as well. Interestingly, the results show that Nyanja voters switched to the MMD in the 2008 elections while the Lozi jumped on the PF bandwagon in the 2011 elections. While ethnicity still matter in voting, this fining about cross-

pressured voters suggests that African voters do not blindly vote along ethnic lines.

Figure 4B.1. The effect of Bemba in interaction with maize farming

Predictive margins of Bemba by maize ratio

All the other variables at mean

CHAPTER 5. ETHNIC COMPETITION FOR POLICY BENEFITS – THE EXAMPLE OF KENYA

1. Introduction

Since its return to multiparty politics in 1992, Kenya has experienced frequent ethnic conflicts, associated with political mobilization and election results. The first was in 1992 targeting Kikuyu people, instigated by Kalenjin and Luo communities in the Rift Valley. Another broke out in 1997 by the coast-natives against all immigrant ethnic groups in the Coast province. The clashes culminated in the nation-wide postelection violence of 2007-8, which was most noticeable in the Rift Valley, Nairobi, and Mombasa. Rather surprisingly, most empirical research on Kenya's ethnic conflicts highlights economic factors such as resource provision, access to power, and land rights to account for the key drivers of the violence (Kimenyi and Romero 2008, MacArthur 2008, De Smedt 2009). Using a survey conducted a few weeks ahead of the 2007 general elections, Kimenyi and Romero (2008) showed that Kenyan voters intended to support a presidential candidate on the basis of the incumbent government's performance and the candidate's home region, which reflects historical grievances over economic and political exclusion of ethnic communities. Hence, the existing inter-ethnic economic disparity and the disproportionate distribution of income and wealth across ethnic groups is central in explaining the incentives of the conflict. In this context of ethnic violence, ethnic cleavages are treated as a tool constructed to compete for the allocation of economic favors and to gain advantageous policy decisions.

Parties in Kenya have long been regarded as political bodies for ethnic representation. Ethnic parties' electoral strategies are solely based on appeals they make exclusive to their own group rather than all voters or other types of groups in order to define a party as a channel for the

group interest (Chandra 2011). Unlike prior works focusing on the salience of ethnic markers invoked for political mobilization, in *Political Parties in Africa*, Sebastian Elischer (2013) argues that ethnicity is not the dominant factor shaping African parties. Although an ethnic appeal is an important strategy for many parties and multiparty alliances, an increasing number of African parties have formed their bases on catch-all, programmatic, and personalistic, non-ethnic matters.[57] Of ten countries in Elischer's study, however, only Kenya has not succeeded in generating an effective non-ethnic party: Kenyan parties are all either mono-ethnic or explicit ethnic coalitions. Susanne Mueller (2008) also views the Kenyan parties as non-programmatic, but based on ethnicity-driven clientelism. Thus, there is interest in political science in question of why ethnic politics persists in Kenya, and why economic dimensions of political competition tend not to appear as predictors of party platforms.

The sector-based approach I suggest in my dissertation can be an alternative to ethnic appeals because the economic interests are useful building blocks for coalitions that may rival, complement, or supersede affiliative identities that create in-group favoritism. In contrast to the studies using a broad framework to sort out non-ethnic parties from ethnic parties, the economic-sector-based explanation is somewhat similar to the logic of an ethnic account—economic interests live and work in close proximity, enjoy exclusive membership (at least in the short run), and may be the appropriate size to be a voting block—as discussed in Chapter 2. Also, the economic motives hidden behind the ethnic appeals make more sense when we consider that as Bates (1989) argues, ethnic groups are likely to be spatially concentrated, and the environment they are given to exploit determines what they produce and in turn their economic policy interests.

---

[57] The result was from the case studies of 39 parties in 10 African democracies (Kenya, Namibia, Ghana, Tanzania, Botswana, Senegal, Malawi, Burkina Faso, Zambia, and Benin).

If ethnic identity and economic sector largely coincide, then the fact that co-ethnics vote together may be over-determined. However, a key distinction is that my explanation of economic-sector-based coalitions is more general than the ethnic mobilization theories, because it is more likely to be able to account for alliances across ethnic groups. When a group's own leader is not running for office, how do members of the group decide whom to support? How would purely ethnic appeals give clues to non-co-ethnics about which party would better serve them? And why would those alliances shift over time? In the Kenyan case, why did the Kalenjin abandon their Luo allies in favor of a new coalition with the Kikuyu? My research finds the partisan polarities in distinctive economic interests.

I divide the remainder of this chapter into five sections. In the next section, I outline the history of the transformation of party coalitions, which reveals the equilibrium structure of competition between Luo and Kikuyu ethnic groups. In the third section, I identify ethnic party supporters in terms of their agricultural interests and find that while the boundaries of ethnic groups are mostly congruent with those of agricultural production sites in Kenya, the match is not perfect, and so I focus on cross-pressured groups whose ethnic and economic affiliations point them in different directions at election time. In the fourth section, I document policy changes that significantly impacted local economic development as stimuli that spurred and sustained support from the favored regions. I then conclude by summarizing the chapter and arguing observable implications.

2. Political Parties and Electoral Coalitions

Since Kenya's independence from Britain in 1963, electoral contests have often revolved around parties' leadership composition because of the strong links between voters and ethnic

frontrunners, and because rather fixed ethnic boundaries help the politicians quantify support. The survival tactics adopted by the elites from different ethnic communities were to skillfully unite to forge winning coalitions and to co-opt ethnic elites to break the loyalties of ethnic supporters into several parties. Is this sufficient to describe Kenya's party politics? Has there been no change in this pattern of ethnic alliance since its independence? Some political scientists have argued from multiple-country studies that democracy in Africa is evolving, that repeated democratic practice fosters the expansion of democratic values and generate more developed political systems (Lindberg 2007, Elischer 2013). So is Kenya an exception – stuck in a "pre-modern" quagmire of ethnic deal-making? One might reasonably think so. Especially since the aftermath of the 2002 elections, competition and coalition building has centered on the leaders of two rival ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and the Luo, and they seem certain to structure the upcoming 2017 elections as well. Table 5.1 presents the ethnic composition of Kenya.

Table 5.1. Ethnic groups in Kenya

Ethnicity	Percentage of Population
Kikuyu	17.2%
Luhya	13.8%
Kalenjin	12.9%
Luo	10.5%
Kamba	10.1%
Kenyan Somali	6.2%
Kisii	5.7%
Mijikenda	5.1%
Meru	4.3%
Turkana	2.6%
Masai	2.2%

Source: Kenya Population Census 2009.
Only for the ethnic communities greater than 2 percent are listed.

At its independence, there were two parties in the Kenyan parliament. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) was led by leaders from larger ethnic communities, Jomo Kenyatta from Kikuyu land in Central Province, and Oginga Odinga from Nyanza Province, the home of Luo people. The Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was headed by Ronald Ngala, who

derived support from Mijekenda- and Somali-dominant Coast region, Masinde Muliro leading Luhya people in Western Province, and Daniel arap Moi from the Kalenjin community in the Rift Valley. In fear of KANU's dominance, KADU voluntarily dissolved itself in 1964 and its members joined KANU. In 1966, however, the leading Luo faction in KANU defected to form the Kenya People's Union (KPU). Although the party took the ideas of socialism and foreign policy cordial to the Soviet Union, its ethnic identification in favor of Luo's interest was apparently so strong that most Kikuyu worried about a Luo succeeding Kenyatta as president (Koff 1966). The KPU lasted until 1969 when Tom Mboya, a Luo politician considered a potential successor to Kenyatta, was assassinated, and the party was banned after the violence occurred during Kenyatta's visit in Luoland. After the demise of the KPU, the KANU became a sole political party, and its single-party rule had been authorized by the constitution between 1982 and 1992.

By the re-launched multiparty elections held in December 1992, new parties were set up alongside the existing factions in the KANU. The Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD) was established in May 1991 by six opposition leaders including Oginga Odinga (Luo) and Kenneth Matiba (Kikuyu). Later in August 1992, Matiba's faction separated from the FORD and formed the FORD-Asili, while the rest with Odinga renamed their party, the FORD-Kenya. Furthermore, former vice-president of KANU and then minister of health, Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu), left the party and founded the Democratic Party (DP) with John Keen (Masai) and Eliud Mwamunga (Somali). Whereas individual parties with multiple ethnic leaders did not appeal with distinctive ethnic messages in the 1992 election campaign amid the expected victory of the KANU, ethnic appeals were further developed afterwards throughout splits and mergers (Elischer 2013).

After Oginga Odinga died in 1994, Kijana Wamalwa (Luhya) was seated as chairman of FORD-Kenya. However, Oginga's son, Raila Odinga's failed attempt to overthrow Wamalwa caused Raila himself to quit FORD-Kenya and joined the National Development Party (NDP), bringing FORD-Kenya's Luo members with him. On the other hand, Kibaki's DP got stronger in Central province as FORD-Asili withered with Matiba's departure from the party. Despite the defection of prominent Kamba MP, Charity Ngilu to the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Kibaki finished second to Moi for presidency, and DP won the second most parliamentary seats in the 1997 elections. KANU filled its candidates from wider regions and won more broadly than the other parties, but support outside Kalenjin territory was not as strong as in the region. Through the 1997 elections, the pattern of mono-ethnic parties was reinforced.

In the run-up to the 2002 elections, there had been a number of complex marriages and break-ups among politicians and parties, and the process ended up with the contest between KANU (which had merged with the NDP) and the newly organized National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). After its merger with NDP, KANU was temporarily an all-encompassing party with leaders representing all major ethnic groups in Kenya after its merger with NDP. As a result of the party election in March 2002, the new leadership formed as follows: Moi as the chairman, Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba), Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu), Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya), and Katana Ngala (Coastal) as vice-chairmen, Raila Odinga (Luo) as general secretary, and Yisuf Haji (Somali) as national treasurer. However, Moi's decision to appoint Kenyatta as the KANU's next presidential candidate and Mudavadi to vice-president infuriated Odinga and triggered the formation of the NARC. NARC was built by the merger between Odinga's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which he developed from his faction under KANU, and the National Alliance Kenya (NAK) established by an agreement among Kibaki, Wamalwa, and Ngilu. Ultimately, this

coalition with Kibaki as the president became the winner of the 2002 election against Kenyatta's KANU by large margin and ended KANU's twenty-three-year rule.

Shortly after Kibaki took power, it became clear that the giant coalition had been formed just to remove KANU from office. Kibaki filled the cabinet with his close allies, mostly Kikuyu politicians and businesspeople. Over a constitutional referendum on defining executive power and devolved government, Kenyan parties once again experienced a major realignment. The "No" camp in favor of devolution consisted of Odinga's LDP, Ngilu's NPK (formerly the SDP), and some KANU people. The referendum was defeated with 41.65 percent in favor and with 58.35 percent against. The humiliated president, Kibaki, dismissed his entire cabinet and reconstituted it with the key members of KANU and FORD-P, bypassing Odinga's allies again. Reacting to this move, Odinga founded the Orange Democratic Movement-Kenya (ODM-K) on the opposition side again.

In the months leading up to the 2007 elections, ODM-K was split into two, Odinga's ODM and Kalonzo Musyoka's (Kamba) ODM-K. And they both were defeated by Kibaki, who ran under the Party of National Unity (PNU).[58] For this election, ODM-K was a team backed by Raila Odinga (Luo), Musalia Mudavadi (Luhya), Charity Nguilu (Kamba), Najib Balala (Coastal), and KANU's William Ruto (Kalenjin), while the PNU was led by non-Luo politicians including Mwai Kibaki (Kikuyu), Moody Awoi (Luhya), Nicolas Biwott (Kalenjin), Symon Nyachae (Kisii), and Uhuru Kenyatta (Kikuyu) from KANU. The post-election clashes between Kikuyu and Luo and Kalenjin people proved the significance that ethnic ties wielded for political purposes.

Following the violence instigated around the 2007 elections, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Kenyatta and Ruto as perpetrators of the atrocities. But the ICC decision

---

[58] Meanwhile, the ODM won a majority of the parliament from the 2007 election.

prompted a surprising result that brought the two accused leaders together to construct the

Jubilee Alliance for the 2013 elections, a merger between Ruto's United Republican Party (URP)

and Kenyatta's The National Alliance (TNA). Prior to the coalition being announced, Kalenjin

MPs including Ruto himself were already disappointed by Odinga's treatment of them after he

secured the prime minister position. The relationship between Odinga and Ruto deteriorated

further when Odinga ordered evictions of squatters from the Mau Forest in western Kenya in

2008, which affected mostly Kalenjins (Cheeseman et al. 2014). Aggravating the situation,

Odinga's former allies, Balala and Ngilu, joined the Jubilee Alliance, while Mudavadi himself

ran for presidency with the United Democratic Forum (UDF) as Odinga's rival. Odinga and his

CORD picked Musyoka, who was his competitor in the previous election, as his vice president.

Although the 2010 constitution changed the electoral system from a plurality rule to a two-round

system, by obtaining 50.5% of vote, Kenyatta was declared the winner with no need of the

second round.

Table 5.2 summarizes how the eight regions in Kenya as voting blocs have responded to

the continuous transformation of parties and party coalitions since 1992. If there is any

presidential candidate who obtains more than 50 percent of the vote in a region, the region is

coded "stronghold" and "competitive," otherwise. Considering the dominating ethnic groups in

each region demonstrated in Table 5.3, notice that there are core, swing, and competitive (or

heterogeneous) regions. (Also, see Appendix 5A for an ethnic map.) In the 1992 and 1997

elections, Nyanza province could be identified as the stronghold of the Luo ethnic leaders, while

Coast, Northeastern, and Rift Valley provinces were of the KANU, and Central province of the

Kikuyu leaders. The other regions had competitive races among two or three candidates. The

2002 elections were an unprecedented event in that the NARC, the grand coalition of opposition

parties, won over the long-standing KANU and that each region showed strong electoral support for one of the two coalitions. The NARC was backed by almost nation-wide support, except Northeastern and Rift Valley provinces stayed put with the KANU. In the 2007 and 2013 elections, it was clear that the electoral strongholds of presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, were mostly in lowland provinces like Coast, Nyanza, and Western, while the Kikuyu-related parties (PNU and Jubilee) won in constituencies Central province by a landslide and gained more than a majority of vote in Northeastern province. Interestingly, however, since the 2007 elections, the multiethnic, heterogeneous capital city, Nairobi, has had highly contested races between Odinga and the respective Kikuyu candidates. Meanwhile, Rift Valley province has switched its partners from ODM to Jubilee in the 2013 elections.

What is worth paying close attention to about Kenya's party politics is that the structure of party competition frequently arises as rivalry between Kikuyu and Luo, Kenya's largest and fourth largest ethnic groups, respectively. In the midst of the convoluted process of party mergers and party splits, the two ethnic groups have been the two poles in the system, between which the other ethnic groups are rather dispersed or switching teams while playing a pivotal role for winning. Below, I will identify the voting groups' economic interests in terms of agricultural subsectors and ethnic affiliations and I will examine actual policy changes in accordance with the changes in the incumbent's supporters' industrial interests.

Table 5.2. Coalitional configuration in multiparty Kenya (1992-2013)

Year	Strongholds			Competitive regions
	Luo-based parties	Kalenjin-based KANU	Kikuyu-based parties	
1992	*Oginga Odinga (FORD-K)*	*Daniel arap Moi (KANU)*	*Kenneth Matiba (FORD-A)*	
	Nyanza	Coast Northwestern Rift Valley	Central	Eastern Nairobi Western
1997	*Raila Odinga (NDP)*	*Daniel arap Moi (KANU)*	*Mwai Kibaki (DP)*	
	Nyanza	Coast Northwestern Rift Valley	Central	Eastern Nairobi Western
2002		*Uhuru Kenyatta (KANU)*	*Mwai Kibaki (NARC)*	
		Northwestern Rift Valley	Coast Central Eastern Nairobi Nyanza Western	
2007	*Raila Odinga (ODM)*		*Mwai Kibaki (PNU)*	
	Coast Nyanza Rift Valley Western		Central Northwestern*	Eastern Nairobi
2013	*Raila Odinga (CORD)*		*Uhuru Kenyatta (Jubilee)*	
	Eastern Coast Nyanza Western		Central Northwestern Rift Valley	Nairobi

*Kibaki 50.3%, Odinga 47%

Table 5.3. Regionally dominating ethnic groups

Region	Ethnic group(s)	Region	Ethnic group(s)
Central	Kikuyu	Northeastern	Somali
Coast	Mijikenda, Taita-Taveta	Nyanza	Luo, Kisii
Eastern	Kamba, Embu, Meru	Rift Valley	Kalenjin
Nairobi	Multiethnic	Western	Luhya

3. Identifying Voting Blocs by Their Industrial Interests

As citizens' economic interest informs their vote choices, cleavages based on industrial

(sub)sectors tend to shape politics. In this section, I apply this argument in a case of Kenya

where agriculture is the main source of income and employment for most people and its various

components present their dynamic incentives. First, I explore how topographical features of

different regions in Kenya affect election results by using two measures to identify their

agricultural characteristics: agro-ecological zones and crop diversity. Second, I reinterpret ethnic

interest by characterizing ethnic groups in terms of their sectoral concentrations and matching

with their vote choices. I show that the agricultural subsectors shape politically salient economic

cleavages in Kenya.

The mapping of Agro-Ecological Zones (AEZ) is a method to estimate agricultural

suitability in each cross section defined by altitude, temperature, and rainfall quantities. As

shown in Figure 5.1, the horizontal axis indicates levels of humidity from very humid (0) to very

dry (7), while the vertical axis identifies different belts by temperature and elevation. The name

of each zone refers to potential crop production that can flourish in the zone. Figure 5.2 exhibits

the constituency-level vote shares of the two top presidential candidates for each of the

consecutive elections in 2007 and 2013, expressed as the size of the circle.[59] The two graphs on

the first row show the topography of support in the 2007 election for the Luo leader, Raila

Odinga in the left panel and the Kikuyu leader, Mwai Kibaki on the right. The second row does

the same for the 2013 election results, comparing Odinga's performance on the left with that of

---

[59] There were 210 constituencies before the 2010 Constitution, and in the 2013 elections the new boundaries of 290
constituencies were in effect. However, because a shapefile for the new boundaries is not available, I merge the
2013 election results with the 2007 results. In the process of binding this election data to the AEZ data, 18
observations out of 210 are dropped while longitude-latitude coordinates are rounded to two decimal places. Thus,
the figure shows the results for 192 constituencies. Although a constituency sometimes crosscuts more than one
AEZ, I use the average, and assign one zone per constituency.

the new Kikuyu candidate Uhuru Kenyatta on the right. We notice there are strongholds of the leader(s) of each ethnic group: Belts of CL and LM below 3 of the aridity level seem to be the Odinga strongholds; and the constituencies in TA2, UH, LH5, UM2, and IL7 favor Kibaki and Kenyatta, the Kikuyu elites. In regard to potential leading crops in these zones, Odinga's supporters tend be involved in lake/ocean fishing, sugar, and cotton mostly in the lower zones in contrast to the fact that the backers of the Kikuyu leaders usually reside in the highlands, engaging in cattle ranching, dairy, pyrethrum, wheat, and coffee production.[60] Those who contributed to Kenyatta's victory in the 2013 elections by switching their support from Odinga in 2007 to Kenyatta in 2013 can be found in the UH and LH zones of cattle, wheat, and pyrethrum farming as well as in the coffee zone coded as UM2.5. It is interesting to note that the constituencies that switched alliance affiliation are located in between the two camps of sugar-fish growing regions and highland cash crop producers.[61] Taken together, the identification of ideal agricultural sub-sectors aptly represents the common economic interest of each group of voters: Coast, Nyanza, and Western regions as Odinga strongholds, Central and Northeastern provinces as Kibaki and Kenyatta core areas, and Rift Valley province as a swing region as shown in Table 5.2.

---

[60] Lakes and dams are not assigned as one of the zones in the chart. So I code them as LM0. They are the only LM0s.
[61] Observations not seen in a certain period such as IL5 in 2007, for example, mean they backed the third party in that year.

Figure 5.1. Agro-Ecological Zones of the tropics

Main Zones / Belts of Z.	0 (perhumid)	1 (humid)	2 (subhumid)	3 (semi-humid)	4 (transitional)	5 (semi-arid)	6 (arid)	7 (perarid)
TA Tropical Alpine Zones Ann. mean 2-10° C	Mountain swamps	I. Cattle-Sheep Zone	II. Sheep Zone				High altitude deserts	
UH Upper Highland Zones Ann. mean 10-15° Seasonal night frosts		Sheep-Dairy Zone	Pyrethrum-Wheat Zone	Wheat-Barley Zone	U. Highland Ranching Zone	U. H. Nomadism Zone [4]		
LH Lower Highl. Zones Ann. mean 15-18° M. min. 8-11° norm. no frost		Tea-Dairy Zone	Wheat/Maize [2] - Pyrethrum Zone	Wheat/(M) [2] - Barley Zone	Cattle-Sheep-Barley Zone	L. Highland Ranching Zone	L. H. Nomadism Zone [4]	
UM Upper Midland Zones Ann. mean 18-21° M. min. 11-14°		Coffee-Tea Zone	Main Coffee Zone	Marginal Coffee Zone	Sunflower-Maize [3] Zone	Livestock-Sorghum Zone	U. Midland Ranching Zone	U. Midland Nom. Zone [4]
LM Lower Midland Zones Ann. mean 21-24° M. min. >14°		L. Midl Sugarcane Zone	Marginal Sugarcane Zone	L. Midland Cotton Zone	Marginal Cotton Zone [6]	L. Midland Livestock-Millet Zone	L. Midland Ranching Zone	L. Midland Nom. Zone [4]
L Lowland Zones **IL** Inner Lowland Z. Ann. mean >24° Mean max >31°		Rice-Taro Zone	Lowland Sugarcane Zone	Lowland Cotton Zone	Groundnut Zone	Lowland Livestock-Millet Zone	Lowland Ranching Zone	Lowland Nom. Zone [4]
CL Coastal Lowl. Z [5] Ann. mean >24° Mean max <31°		Cocoa-Oilpalm Zone	Lowland Sugarcane Zone	Coconut-Cassava Zone	Cashewnut-Cass. Zone	Lowland Livestock Millet Zone	Lowland Ranching Zone	Lowland Nom. Zone [4]

Source: Der Tropeniandwirt, Zeltschrift fur dle Landwirtschaft in den Tropen und Subtropen 83, Jahrgang, April 1982. S.15-34.

Figure 5.2. Presidential vote shares by constituency over the Agro-Ecological Zones

Odinga 2007

Kibaki 2007

Odinga 2013

Kenyatta 2013

While the average ecological features of the districts describe the patterns of party support and party switching, how does the crop profile of a district affect election results? To answer this question, I use a simple OLS regression to estimate the effect of crop diversity on electoral competitiveness. The data are only available for Kenya's two provinces, Nyanza and Western. But these two regions do include more than a half of croplands in Kenya. Another importance of the regions is that they have shown rather consistent voting behavior in the last two elections. Given that party preferences are consistent across elections, the regions are advantageous as a sample to see the relationship between economic interests and vote choice. The dependent variables (*Margin07* and *Margin13*) capture the vote share margin of victory of a candidate in a constituency from the presidential election results, indicating the degree of any leading candidate's popularity—a smaller vote margin for the leading candidate indicates a more competitive race. The average number of crops at the constituency level (*crop diversity*) serves as the independent variable.[62] Areas cultivating a small number of crops are either those with little arable land or those with highly productive farms producing a single cash crop (Henninger and Landsberg 2007). The poverty rate is included in the model to control for any effect of poverty-related voting behavior. Because electoral constituencies in Kenya tend to be ethnically homogenous (Kasara 2013) and Nyanza and Western provinces are comprised of more homogenous ethnic communities in comparison with the Rift Valley (Boone 2011), we would generally expect elections to be more competitive in constituencies with greater crop diversity. Table 5.4 shows summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Table 5.5 provides strong evidence that high crop diversity had a negative impact on unanimous support in both 2007 and 2013 presidential elections.

---

[62] The original unit of the crop diversity data as a shapefile is ambiguous in the provider's note, but it is overlaid with the constituency boundaries and averaged at the constituency level. The data set is provided by the World Resources Institute and can be found at http://www.wri.org/resources/data-sets/kenya-gis-data.

Table 5.4. Summary of variables

	Min	Q1	Median	Mean	Q3	Max
Margin07	0.01	0.06	0.42	0.48	0.96	1.00
Margin13	0.02	0.26	0.62	0.57	0.94	0.98
Crop diversity	1.12	2.30	3.07	2.91	3.43	5.41
Poverty rate	0.44	0.59	0.64	0.63	0.69	0.81

Table 5.5. An OLS analysis of the impact of crop diversity on presidential vote share by constituency in Nyanza and Western Provinces

	Margin of victory 2007 (*Margin07*)		Margin of victory 2013 (*Margin13*)	
	Estimate	Std. Error	Estimate	Std. Error
Crop diversity	-0.32***	(0.04)	-0.25***	(0.04)
Poverty rate	-0.52	(0.54)	0.06	(0.48)
Intercept	1.74***	(0.38)	1.26***	(0.34)
N	56		56	
Adjusted R	0.47		0.41	

Considering that some voters do vote ethnically in Africa, I present a county-level analysis of the relationships among major economic sectors (agricultural sub-sectors), ethnic configurations, and election results.[63] First, Table 5.6 compares the average shares of ethnic groups in counties that produce more than the national mean of per capita production for each of the selected sub-sectors. To interpret the figures, per capita production of dairy cattle, for example, is greater in 19 counties than its national average, and the average ethnic composition of those 19 counties is 36.22 percent Kikuyu, 5.93 percent Luhya, 2.27 percent Luo, and 28.57 percent Kalenjin. The sum of populations of those counties is about 14 million, out of the total Kenyan population of approximately 44 million. Hence, the table shows which ethnics groups dominate which important agricultural sub-sectors in the region: in dairy cattle, coffee, tea, and horticulture-dominant counties, at least 25 percent of the population is Kikuyu; maize is significant in areas higher populations of Luhya, Luo, and, especially, Kalenjin, relative to the

---

[63] There are 47 counties recognized by the 2010 constitution.

110

Kikuyu population; sugarcane is mostly produced in Luhya and Luo dominant regions; a majority of the population in fishing regions is Luo; and many Kalenjin people live in the areas where diary cattle, maize, tea, and horticulture is produced in some significant size. Maps of Kenya's sugar and coffee growing areas in Appendix 5B show the geographic distribution of the subsectors that are segregated from one another. To disproportionately benefit the "Kikuyu coalition," the government can promote the coffee sector, while government policies that favor the dairy cattle, tea, or horticulture sectors would benefit a Kikuyu-Kallenjin alliance at the expense of the Luhya and Luo. This pattern of drastic contrast between the major agricultural production in Kikuyu and Luo regions represents conflicting interests of the two ethnic groups, which provides an economic rationale for their differing partisan preferences.

Table 5.6. Cross-tabulation of ethnic groups with key sub-sectors

Sub-sector	Kikuyu	Luhya	Luo	Kalenjin	Population (No. of County)
Dairy Cattle	36.22	5.93	2.27	28.57	14 million (19)
Maize	8.72	18.35	13.78	29.01	13 million (16)
Coffee	32.76	7.47	0.95	7.78	11 million (12)
Tea	35.41	2.37	1.88	21.80	10 million (11)
Sugarcane	2.48	32.14	46.56	7.09	7 million (6)
Fish	4.60	3.46	52.49	0.44	5 million (7)
Horticulture	25.57	0.91	0.63	18.52	2 million (5)

Source: 1989 Kenya Population and Housing Census; 2013 Ministry of Agriculture Annual Reports

In the 2007 presidential election, the third place candidate was Kalonzo Musyoka, whose home ethnic area was Kamba in Eastern province, and he had no realistic chance of winning the plurality vote needed to be elected as a president. Looking at Kamba majority districts in regard to their preferred candidates and significant subsectors may help tease out the principal factor of their vote choice. Table 5.7 presents vote shares of the three leading presidential candidates and nationally recognizable crops in districts with Kamba majority. Note that none of the districts has an agricultural subsector profile that differs significantly from that of the country as a whole.

111

Without a distinctive sub-sector, constituents of the districts seem to vote along ethnic lines, as Musyoka swept all the Kamba regions. The vote share that Musyoka obtained in the three counties from the 2013 presidential election when Kikuyu and Kalenjin leaders coalesced to form a coalition against Odinga and Musyoka remained almost the same as in 2007 (no shown). Thus, for Kamba people, ethnicity has a great impact on vote decision because their sectoral interest is not substantial enough to cue voters in the community.

Table 5.7. 2007 Presidential vote share and agricultural subsector in Kamba districts

District (% Kamba)	2007 Presidential vote share	Nationally significant sector (above the mean)
Kitui (97%)	**Musyoka (85.0%)** Kibaki (12.9%) Odinga (1.2%)	None
Machakos (97%)	**Musyoka (87.0%)** Kibaki (9.3%) Odinga (3.4%)	None
Makueni (97%)	**Musyoka (90.0%)** Kibaki (6.5%) Odinga (1.1%)	None

Meanwhile, most Luhya's vote choice in the 2013 elections reflects their economic interests and shows little correlation with ethnic affiliation. The Luhya, the second largest ethnic group in the country, had its prominent ethnic leader, Musalia Mudavadi, as a presidential candidate in the 2013 election, unlike the 2007 election when he ran for vice president with Odinga, his presidential running mate. With a Luhya candidate running for president, the ethnic voting argument would predict that majority-Luhya constituencies should have rallied to support Mudavadi. However, it seems that their preferences had more to do with economics than ethnicity. To help keep in mind the ethnicity-subsector match, consider Table 5.8, which depicts significant crops in areas where Luhya is dominant. Interestingly, in all the Luhya counties producing sugarcane, fish, or/and maize at some significant level, Odinga out-polled Mudavadi,

112

their ethnic leader, though with varying degrees.[64] In Busia, where fishing was particularly

important, Odinga won big, while the vote margin was smaller in Trans Nzoia, where many

residents having some value in cattle ranching besides huge maize production backed Kenyatta

with some significant support. On the contrary, Vihiga county, which lacked a distinctively

significant subsector, gave Mudavadi a slim lead over Odinga. Thus, for both ethnic groups that

saw one of their own run for president, ethnic voting occurred in places where there is no

distinctive agricultural profile,[65] but gave way to economic voting (in favor of the non-coethnic

with the most favorable relevant policy platform) when the district did feature an economic

production profile different from the national average.

Table 5.8. 2013 Presidential vote share and agricultural subsector in Luhya counties

County (% Luhya)	2013 Presidential vote share	Nationally significant sector (above the mean)
Bungoma (83%)	**Odinga (53.64%)** Mudavadi (31.20%) Kenyatta (12.44%)	Sugarcane (> 1SD) Coffee (< 1SD) Maize (< 1SD)
Busia (61%)	**Odinga (86.51%)** Mudavadi (8.51%) Kenyatta (3.74%)	Fish (> 2SD)
Kakamega (95%)	**Odinga (64.80%)** Mudavadi (30.99%) Kenyatta (2.67%)	Sugarcane (Largest) Maize (< 1SD)
Trans Nzoia (52%)	**Odinga (47.13%)** Kenyatta (38.13%) Mudavadi (12.68%)	Dairy Cattle (< 1SD) Maize (> 3SD)
Vihiga (95%)	**Mudavadi (49.81%)** Odinga (47.03%) Kenyatta (1.54%)	None

Appendix 5C shows 2007 and 2013 presidential election results in Kalenjin majority

counties, as well as the significant agricultural sub-sectors in those counties. We can see that all

---

[64] Unit standard deviation shows how significant a sub-sector is in a county in relation to the country's average. For example, per capita production of sugarcane in Bungoma is greater than one standard deviation above the national mean and less than two standard deviations. Trans Nzoia produces more dairy cattle per capita than the national average, but by less than one standard deviation above the mean.

[65] Considering that the Luhya population is over 90 percent in Vihiga county, however, an ethnic account still falls short of explaining the strength of Odinga support in this county.

such counties backed the opposition candidate, Odinga (a Luo), in the 2007 elections but switched to Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) in the 2013 elections regardless of the county-level important sub-sectors. Engaged in various agricultural activities, Kalenjin people have common economic interests with both grain-planting Luos and cash crop Kikuyu farmers. To account for their collective voting behavior in the two consecutive elections, there are two possibilities. First, most Kalenjin farmers may be indifferent to which coalition their ethnic leaders choose to join because most of them grow food *and* cash crops, so either alliance would entail benefits and costs; Second, if each Kalenjin farmer focuses on one agricultural subsector and therefore would prefer one alliance over the other, all would rather choose to increase ethnic solidarity by following their ethnic leaders into any political coalition than to pursue their own policy interests. Without data on crop diversity at the level of the individual farmer, I am unable to adjudicate between the two possible explanations.

In terms of subsectoral interests, the 2007 winning coalition represented constituencies with highland agriculture like pasturing and tea and also where coffee production was fairly exclusive. In 2013, as more constituencies with significant tea, cattle, and maize farming aligned with the incumbent, the strengthened highland cash crop coalition succeeded in the election. Shown in the results of the two consecutive elections, the third place candidates did not necessarily gain all the ethnic votes from their homes when the voters' ethnic interests were crosscut by their stakes in economic activities. Also interestingly, in Nyanza and Western provinces diversified interests in crop production affect the election to be competitive. The following section examines whether the government has been responsive to its supporters' policy demands.

114

4. Policy changes in agricultural subsectors

In the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and western donors funded structural adjustment programs for Africa, requiring African states to adopt macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and free market development. Although how necessary the program was for Africa was controversial, some kind of economic reform was inevitable for most African countries that were experiencing stagnation of state-led economies. In the course of economic liberalization to boost the efficiency of economic activities, governments had to prioritize policies regarding the order and the timing of the transition to private-sector-led economic development and to enact new rules and regulations guiding development. While there was a wide range of economic enterprises struggling to improve their quality, the Kenyan government's policy priorities for the economic reforms can be interpreted as principal indicators of its political strategy.

A major problem the government faced when considering the privatization of state-owned enterprises was a huge debt the companies could not pay. In the beginning of the privatization process, major cash crop sectors had high production costs, which made them less competitive and unable to pay the debt, most of it owed to the central bank. Therefore, government bailouts had to be provided before privatizing the factories. Some agricultural subsectors assisted by financial bailouts have been restructured successfully and have increased the participation of private actors in production, processing, marketing, and trading of the commodities, but others some are still in the government's hands, suffering under inefficient management. The tea, coffee, and pyrethrum sectors are the major beneficiaries of the reform. The sugar industry, by contrast, remains largely in government hands, and has not benefited.

Under Moi's government in the 1990s, a group of opposition MPs led by Mwai Kibaki

established the Coffee and Tea Parliamentary Association (COTEPA) to push for liberalization legislation for the cash crop sectors. Once Kibaki succeeded Moi as president (2003 - March 2013), the three major cash crops were completely liberalized. Table 5.9 shows the progression of **coffee policies** that are expected to lead to increased investment and a sustainable flow of returns from unrestricted activities.

Table 5.9. Coffee policies

Year	Law	Effect
2001	Coffee Act	Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK) to retain only regulatory functions
2002	Coffee General Rule	Marketing agents to be registered with CBK
2006	Coffee Act Amendment	Direct sales allowed Coffee Development Fund established
2009	Finance Act 2009 – repealing section 18 in Coffee Act 2001	Extending the roles of the license holders
2014	Coffee Industry Task Force	Recommendation for revitalizing and restructuring the sector

Since the 2001 reform that liberalized the marketing function of the Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK), 2006 saw the important amendment to establish the Coffee Development Fund (CoDF) and allow direct sales even at the farm-gate level. The CoDF was proposed to give small-scale farmers access to credit and inputs and to help farm development and price stabilization. The 2009 Finance Act extended the roles of license-holding coffee dealers to participate in buying and processing for local sale or exports. The sector privatization has sailed through because the government has bailed out the debts. Billions of shillings worth of loans to coffee farmers and firms were written off during the Kibaki administration[66] and the Kenyatta government continues to favor the coffee planters' interests by paying their debts and staffing a

---

[66] Victor Juma (2013, February 14) 'Treasury writes off Sh40bn sugar millers' debt.' *Business Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate-News/Treasury-writes-off-Sh40bn-sugar-millers-debt/-/539550/1694480/-/9h3rrkz/-/index.html

management team called the "Coffee Industry Task Force" to provide solutions to problems in the sector.[67] As a result, the area under coffee plantation has increased from 109,795 hectares to 113,500 hectares between 2013 and 2015 as farmers have started to cultivate the crop even in non-traditional coffee regions.[68]

The liberalization of the **tea sector** was carried out with an aim of attracting private investments and raising farmers' participation in factory ownership and business management. Before the Kenya Tea Development Agency Ltd. (KTDA) was created following the privatization of the Kenya Tea Development Authority, there was no organization, such as co-operative or trade union, to protect the interests of smallholder tea farmers. But now the farmers are shareholders of the KTDA through their respective factories where they are registered as independent and private suppliers of green leaf tea. There were 400,000 small-scale farmers and 45 smallholder factories in 2000, and the number jumped to 555,000 growers and 66 factories by 2011.[69] Kenya's tea policy changes are listed in Table 5.10.

---

[67] George Ngigi (2013 March 4). 'Coffee farmers hit by steep price drop.' *Business Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Coffee-farmers-hit-by-steep-price-drop/-/539552/1711336/-/ptvcdyz/-/index.html
Samuel Kranja (2013, November 17). 'Coffee farmers petition Uhuru on Sh1.7bn rescue balance.' *Business Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Coffee-farmers-petition-Uhuru-on-Sh1-7bn-rescue-balance/-/539546/2077094/-/eeelcoz/-/index.html
[68] Gerald Andae (2016, February 1). 'Area under coffee up by 3,500 hectares in the past three years.' *Business Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Area-under-coffee-up-by-3500-hectares-in-the-past-three-years/-/539552/3057996/-/14cl6mx/-/index.html
Mu Xuequan (2016, January 31). 'Kenya seeks to increase new areas for coffee production.' *Xinhua*. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-01/31/c_135060225.htm
[69] Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), 2011, December 7, p. 32-33.

Table 5.10. Tea policies

Year	Law	Effect
2000	Companies Act	Kenya Tea Development Authority transformed into a private company, Kenya Tea Dvmt Agency Ltd.
		Repeal of tea growing license
		Repeal of tea planting cess
2007	Tea Industry Task Force	Recommendation for revitalizing and restructuring the sector based on the Tea Act and Sessional Paper No2. of 1999
2011	Tea Act Amendment	Replace manufacturing cess of Ksh 46 cents per kg with Ad Valorem Levy not exceeding 2 percent of auction price
2012	Tea Act Amendment	Ad Valorem Levy at 1 percent
2012	Tea Act Amendment	Expansion of farmer representation in the Board
2015	Tea Industry Regulations	Ad Valorem Levy at 0.75 percent

In 2011, an ad valorem levy was introduced on the total sales value of the tea at the Mombasa auction to fund tea development research and marketing. However, the tea farmers complained that the increased prices would make the sector uncompetitive. Following the outcry, the parliament and the Kenyatta government continued to review the levy and the rate has been reduced from near 2 percent to 0.75 percent over a short period of time.[70] This process of lobbying and policy change shows how readily the government acted on the preferences and demands of their supporters.

The privatization of the **pyrethrum sector**, though an important foreign exchange earner, had been delayed until recently. Pyrethrum is a flower grown in the Rift Valley and Central provinces, and whose extract is used in pesticides. The industry has experienced production declines since the mid-1990s due to high production costs and late payments by the parastatal

---

[70] Charles Mwaniki (2014, June 11) 'Uhuru directs Treasury to slash levies for tea farmers.' *Business Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Uhuru-directs-Treasury-to-slash-levies-for-tea-farmers/-/539552/2344972/-/44diia/-/index.html
Gerald Andae (2015, March 15). 'Ministry proposes VAT waiver to spur tea earnings.' *Business Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Ministry-proposes-VAT-waiver-to-spur-tea-earnings/-/539552/2654292/-/u60g9g/-/index.html

Pyrethrum Board of Kenya (PBK), which was the sole marketing agency. The Pyrethrum Bill, which had been repeatedly redrafted and re-proposed to repeal PBK's monopoly over the last 15 years, finally passed into law in January 2013, two months before the general elections. Although it is unclear exactly why the bill was passed at that time, it is likely that pyrethrum farmers might have considered the expected positive effect of the reform when they went to the polls.[71]

In contrast to the bailed out and re-regulated coffee, tea, and pyrethrum sectors, the **sugar sector** is still struggling to survive. The sector is one of the important industries in Kenya, offering 500,000 jobs including 300,000 small-scale farmers, and about 6 million people rely directly and indirectly on the sugar industry for their livelihood. Sugarcane is harvested and manufactured in the western part of Kenya, mainly in Western and Nyanza provinces. The country produced, on average, 600,000 tons of the commodity per year between 2008 and 2013, while the demand stands at around 800,000 tons annually.[72] The deficit is filled by imports mostly from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) region. However, control of imports has become a very sensitive political issue because while the country is pressured to commit to trade liberalization, increasing imports may generate instability in the sector due to its high production costs. On the other hand, blocking imports will cause an increase in consumer price and make consumers unhappy and start blaming the government. To lower the price, in 2009, then-Finance Minister Kenyatta removed the Sugar Development Levy (SDL) charged on imports of a consignment of sugar that is used to make drinks. Given that the

---

[71] The basic structure of the deal had been in place since 2006, when the government first agreed to spend 1.45 billion shillings ($17 million) to resolve the arrears issue and to purchase farming inputs. This information can be found in Chales Wachira (2014, August 7). 'Kenya woos private investors to regain pyrethrum top spot' *Bloomberg*. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-06/kenya-woos-private-investors-to-regain-pyrethrum-output-top-spot
[72] Edmund Blair and Angus MacSwan (2015, March 18). 'Kenya sugar farming turns sour as import curbs fail.' *Reuters*. Retrieved form http://www.reuters.com/article/kenya-sugar-idUSL5N0WE3RH20150318

SDL was the most reliable source of credit for the sector and the only source of funding for the

Sugar Board of Kenya and the Kenya Sugar Research Foundation, the trade policy Kenyatta took

was to champion the interests of consumers over that of the sugar industry, whose western

producers were not among his political backers.[73]

In addition, tariff reductions and quota increases have been allowed under the Kibaki-

Kenyatta administrations through negotiations with the COMESA countries, as presented in

Table 5.11. Although the process was a gradual reduction of the protective measures as a way to

help the industry's smooth transition to market, the government was not clearly strategic about

the revival of the sugar sector, and it still is not ready to compete in a free market. Of eleven

milling companies, five are still government-owned a decade after privatization began under the

Privatization Act of 2005. The combination of huge debt and fear of corruption defeats much of

the purpose of privatization. Despite frequent news reports on government's promises of debt

relief, the present situation of the industry reflects the government's insufficient support to

resuscitate it. Some studies on Kenya's sugar policy and politics also point out the problem of

government's reluctance to develop explicit plans and deal more vigorously with the

malfunctioning parastatal companies (Wanyande 2001).[74] The incentive effects of active

government assistance are clearer when comparing the sugar industry with the other sectors that

have become productive through the policy reform and efficient aid as examined above.

---

[73] Allan Odhiambo (2009, June 28) 'Sugar sector hopes hinged on Sh59bn debt write-off.' *Business Daily*. Retrieved from http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/-/539444/616656/-/rvra5y/-/index.html
[74] The information is also from Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) Annual Report (2010).

Table 5.11. Sugar quota and above-quota tariffs imposed on imports from COMESA

Year	Quota (1000 MT)	Tariff Rates (%)
Before 2008	200	100
2008/9	220	100
2009/10	260	70
2010/11	300	40
2011/12	340	10
2012/13	340	10
2013/14	340	10
2014/15	350	10

A 2015 trade deal made between President Kenyatta and Ugandan president, Yoweri Museveni, provides another example of governments choosing policies to represent the preferences of their followers. The deal allows imports of cheap sugar from Uganda in exchange for increased exports of Kenyan beef and dairy products to Uganda. Backing the interests of his strongholds in the Sugar Belt, Raila Odinga, asserted that this move that would kill the local sugar industry.[75] The beneficiaries of this decision include not just Kalenjin and Kikuyu ranchers but also non-co-ethnics who supported the Jubilee coalition because of their self-interest in livestock policy. In their study of the 2013 election campaign in northern Kenya, Carrier and Kochore (2014) find that William Ruto's appeal for the pastoralist link between himself and the northerners had the greatest impact on the election success of the Jubilee coalition in this potential swing region.[76]

The sequencing and actions so far taken in the economic adjustment process in Kenya reflect strategic choices by politicians to grant rewards to maintain electoral support. Throughout its ten years in power, the Kibaki administration took great strides toward liberalization,

---

[75] Bernard Namunane (2015, August 11) 'Who will be benefit from Kenya-Uganda trade pacts? Raila Odinga asks Uhuru Kenyatta.' *Daily Nation*. Retrieved from http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Raila-Odinga-queries-Uhuru-Kenyatta-Yoweri-Museveni-deals/-/1056/2828322/-/tvhnca/-/index.html

[76] Their study focuses on Isiolo, Mandera, and Marsabit counties. They recognize that the support for the Jubilee coalition was not uniformly strong across all the constituencies, but overall impressive.

especially in privatizing government-owned processing and marketing agencies of some cash crop sectors. Importantly, they simultaneously bailed out debt-ridden producers in these industries. The benefited industries included coffee, tea and pyrethrum, which are mainly grown in central highlands, the home of Kikuyu people. Helped by the foundation laid in Kibaki's term, the Kenyatta administration's further reforms and financial aid improved sustainability in the supply chain of coffee and tea through efficient management. Furthermore, the government of the Kenyatta/Ruto alliance sought to expand the scope of beneficiaries of the liberalization plan to those who switched votes from Odinga's CORD to the party associated of the Kikuyu leader, Kenyatta. Accordingly, cattle herding farmers including many Kalenjin residents in the Rift Valley take advantage of export promotion in the bilateral trade deal with Uganda. In contrast, most of Luo Nyanza, the opposition stronghold, is not suitable for those cash crops and not as competitive as Central and Rift Valley regions in terms of dairy production. And Kenya's sugar industry, which is easily the most important in Nyanza and Western regions, has suffered years of decline, standing in the policy-area center of the opposition camp.

5. Conclusion

The Luo ethnic group is geographically concentrated in the sugar-growing area located in western Kenya, while Kikuyu people grow coffee near Mt. Kenya in the East. The Luo-Kikuyu rivalry is the most consistent in Kenyan politics, as manifested in party politics. My argument for why these two politically salient ethnic groups remain rivals is based on their distinctive policy interests rooted in agricultural activities they engage in. I argue that the basis of party competition is closely associated with core supporters' policy preferences. Meanwhile, Kalenjin people, territorially located in between Luo and Kikuyu lands, are an economically cross-

pressured group that shares economic interests with each of the first two groups: maize and other staple grains with the Luo and tea and cattle with the Kikuyu. Whether the agricultural policy issue was the chief motivation for the formation of the Kikuyu-Kalenjin alliance in 2013 is not the focus of this chapter. But the new alliance clearly produced a new mix of policies, cutting the economic sectors dominated by Kalenjin into the deal. Kalenjin voters were persuaded to form an alliance of tea and cattle and that the coalition government would choose a policy corresponding to its expanded support base. Moreover, the sector-based explanation of coalition formation is able to account for cross-pressured groups' voting behavior. Given clear economic preference, they express an intention to vote for what any party can offer to favor their policy interests. If nothing else, it seems clear that, despite the endemic problem of corruption in Kenya, the government is responsive to the needs and concerns of its old and new supporters. We should expect, therefore, another alternation of parties in power will bring quite a different policy package in favor of the people in opposition.

Appendix 5A. Ethnic Map of Kenya

Source: BBC NEWS Jan. 2 2008

Appendix 5B. Sugar and Coffee-Producing Regions

Source: Export Processing Zones Authority, "Kenya's sugar industry 2005"

Source: Coffee and Conservative, "Coffee growing in Kenya"

125

Appendix 5C. Features of Kalenjin Majority Counties

Table 5C.1. 2007-13 presidential vote share and agricultural subsectors in Kalenjin majority counties

County	2007	2013	Nationally significant sector (above the mean)
Baringo (83.79%)	Odinga (77.93%) Kibaki (20.44%)	Kenyatta (88.58%) Odinga (9.48%)	Dairy cattle (> 1SD)
Bomet (82.66%)	Odinga (94.53%) Kibaki (4%)	Kenyatta (93.26%) Odinga (4.64%)	Dairy cattle (> 1SD) Tea (> 2SD)
Elgeyo Marakwet (91.32%)	Odinga (90.94%) Kibaki (7.23%)	Kenyatta (92.84%) Odinga (4.89%)	Horticulture (< 1SD) Cattle (> 2SD) Maize (> 1SD)
Kericho (82.66%)	Odinga (89.14%) Kibaki (9.13%)	Kenyatta (91.41%) Odinga (6.64%)	Coffee (< 1SD) Dairy cattle (> 2SD) Tea (Largest) Maize (< 1SD)
Nandi (73.64%)	Odinga (87.67%) Kibaki (10.32%)	Kenyatta (82.30%) Odinga (8.78%)	Coffee (< 1SD) Dairy cattle (> 1SD) Tea (> 2SD) Maize (> 1SD)
Uasin Gishu (52.63%)	Odinga (76.35%) Kibaki (21.62%)	Kenyatta (75.01%) Odinga (21.31%)	Dairy cattle (> 2SD) Maize (> 2SD)
West Pokot (85.15%)	Odinga (70.37%) Kibaki (18.45%)	Kenyatta (73.82%) Odinga (23.10%)	Maize (< 1SD)

Note: In Uasin Gishu, the rest of the population is comprised of 18.35% Luhya and 16.9% Kikuyu. Kericho county was carved out from Bomet district by the 2010 constitution. So the 2007 election results in Bomet and Kericho are matched with the 2013 boundaries.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

1. Local Ingredients and Party Strategy

In this study, I have focused on the logic of political party formation in several sub-Saharan African countries. Taking advantage of cases in which democratic partisan turnover has taken place, I have examined electoral and party behavior in relation to industrial and occupational structure and demographic characteristics in African democracies. Different settings provide different ingredients for the formation of successful political coalitions. Multiple politically salient cleavages are likely to emerge in ethnically and economically diverse societies, including groups identified with ethnic ties, urban-rural locality, and industrial sectors. In addition to the type and the number of cleavage dimensions, distribution of these traits in the population and their geographic locations are the important factors of coalition formation. Within a country's historical and economic context and institutional constraints, politicians develop and reinforce links between parties and social groups, using various tactics. Politicians sometimes allocate patronage resources to gain votes for themselves and their parties, often along ethnic lines. Generating policy appeals and accomplishing policy goals are another kind of important political skill. Taken together, the politically relevant cleavages and party strategies to combine them to form a coalition constitute the structure of political competition and determine the fates of the parties. While I draw on the experiences of several of the relatively new African democracies, my argument highlights the significance of policy bases of partisan support for a more comprehensive understanding of the transformation of parties and party coalitions anywhere in the world.

The Ghana case is an example of a consolidated two-party system, in which each party organizes its support base around both economic and ethnic cleavage dimensions. The main

industrial sectors whose interests the NPP represents are cocoa and oil palm in southern Ghana where there is relatively greater economic and human development than in the north. Ethnically speaking, the NPP strongholds are comprised of the Asante-majority area and regions of the other smaller ethnic groups in the south. Importantly, the NPP is shaped not just to serve the interest of Asante cocoa growers, but the cocoa sector in general, attracting non-Asante cocoa farmers as well. The NDC bases its appeal in similar logic but with different contents: the rice sector is the focus of the NDC's economic policy platform, while the Ewe and Ga-Dangme ethnic groups in the east and the Mole-Dagbani people in the northern part of the country appear as NDC's core supporters. To win the majority of the vote necessary to take the presidency and control the legislature, however, neither party's "ethno-economic core" is sufficient. Parties must woo unattached voters with promises of policy or economic benefits.

The study of the Zambia case shows that the parties strategically choose between economic and ethnic cleavages as the basis for coalition building. The economic dimension considers policy preferences vis-à-vis conflicting interests among different sectors of the economy. In Zambia, the dominant industrial sector is agriculture, and maize is the country's staple food and the most important crop in terms of the number of farmers who cultivate it. The copper-mining industry also constitutes a crucial part of its economy as a major source of export earnings. On the other hand, while ethnicity is politically salient, voters from the four largest ethnic communities, the Bemba, Tonga, Nyanja, and Lozi, are particularly likely to identify ethnically. These ethnic categories, however, do not necessarily correspond with the division of labor. While farming is the principal economic activity across ethnic groups, the copper mining sites are located in the Bemba region. In this socio-economic setting, the MMD started as a Bemba-leading multiethnic party when it won the 1991 elections in a fragmented multiparty

system. Then, its new leader from a small ethnic group reshaped its support base as a farmers'

party, putting more emphasis on agricultural issues than ethnic differences. But in the following

elections, the MMD narrowed the support base from all farmers to maize farmers, because the

then-party-leader's home region was in the center of the maize belt of the country. When the PF

ultimately defeated the incumbent MMD, its winning coalition was an alliance of miners and

non-maize farmers, including many Bemba voters. Thus, in Zambia where ethnic cleavages are

crisscrossed by economic cleavages, the ingredients chosen to produce winning coalitions have

changed – more than once – over time.

My argument that policy issues matter for coalition building also finds support in the

evidence from Kenya. Kenya is a country of great diversity in its people and agricultural

production. Typically, ethnic groups are segregated into distinct geographic spaces and engage in

specific agricultural subsectors most suitable with the environment of particular regions.

Determined by the geographic distribution of major crops and pastures, the highland Kikuyu and

the lowland Luo ethnic groups rarely have common economic interests. These two opposing

interest groups constitute the major axis of electoral competition, along which multiethnic

coalitions form. Although ethnics groups in Kenya are typically economically homogeneous,

some voters may be cross-pressured if they grow different crops from the ones their ethnic

leaders choose to support. Co-ethnics of a third- or fourth-place presidential candidates might

also be cross-pressured. If their economic interests do not coincide with those of the party that

their leader chooses to support, they may be forced to choose between interests and identity. In

Kenya in 2011, when Kalenjin leader Ruto forged a pre-electoral coalition with Kikuyu leader

Kenyatta, many Kalenjin who preferred to ally with the Luo' Odinga were faced with just such a

choice.

2. More Examples of Partisan Turnover and The Strategies

The argument I advance in the dissertation accounts for the variation in voting behavior, coalition formation, and the structure of political competition in Ghana, Zambia, and Kenya. These cases are three of a small handful of African countries that have seen democratic alternation of parties in power, which present the dynamics and development of multiparty democracies. They clearly show that political outcomes regarding electoral alliances depend on how parties exploit economic and social endowments in their strategic maneuvering for power. In this section, I briefly sketch out two additional examples that demonstrate the relationship between the socio-economic structure and the political coalition formation: Benin and Malawi.[77]

2.1. Benin

Since its multiparty system began in 1991, Benin, like Kenya, has featured shifting coalitions in government. The parties are shaped on the basis of four ethno-regions of north, center, southwest, and southeast, and form multiethnic alliances to win a majority that is required for success in presidential elections. For the most part, a consistent axis of electoral contestation has emerged along the north-south division, while the southwestern region often split votes across different parties. This pattern is similar to Kenya's Luo-Kikuyu competition in that the differences in the major regional industry between the north and the south are the key determinant of voters' party preferences in Benin. With respect to agricultural production, northerners grow cotton, which is the country's most important export crop accounting for 40 percent of total exports,[78] while oil palm cultivation is concentrated in southern Benin. On the other hand, the southeastern (Littoral

---

[77] Senegal, Sierra Leone and Lesotho are the other African democracies that have experienced democratic partisan turnovers. Four other African countries generally considered to be democratic. South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and Tanzania have yet to experience partisan turnover in power.

[78] The figure is the average between 2003-15 offered by *Trading Economics* in http://www.tradingeconomics.com/benin/exports

and Ouémé) and central (Zou) parts of the country have more diverse economies driven by petroleum industry, banking, and trade with rail and seaport access. The southwestern regions such as Mono and Couffo Departments suffer food insecurity and less development than the southeast.[79] They are the regionally marginalized, so their party preference is not necessarily the same as the southeasterners. Rather, they swing between parties and split their support.

Benin has experienced three presidential turnovers after Nicéphore Soglo's Union for the Triumph of Democratic Renewal (UTRD) coalition took power in the 1991 multiparty elections. The first was 1996 with the return of Mathieu Kérékou who had been a long-serving ruler under the single-party regime in 1972-1990. While Soglo's victory in the 1991 elections was based on his advantage in the larger population size of his strongholds in the south than Kérékou's core constituencies in the north, Soglo was defeated in the 1996 elections by losing considerable numbers of southern votes. About his loss of popularity, John Heilbrunn (1999) argues that Soglo's campaign failed to emphasize the positive impact of the economic policies that his government had undertaken. As part of an economic liberalization, the Soglo administration accepted a sharp devaluation in 1994, and was harshly criticized for short-term fiscal crisis and damaging the import sector. By contrast, exports improved, with cash crop farmers, the main beneficiaries. Without communicating this positive effect of the devaluation and a quick recovery from the recession to the people, however, he was not able to maintain the support he had obtained earlier, while his competitors denounced him as a footman of western powers (*ibid*. p.234-5). Despite Soglo's unsuccessful campaign strategy, the main electoral cleavages maintained along the north-south divide.

The second leadership alternation in office occurred as a result of the 2006 presidential elections, in which Soglo and Kérékou who were ineligible to run because of the age limit set in

---

[79] Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) report – Benin (2014)

the constitution. Boni Yayi, an independent candidate from the north, won 35.8 percent in the first round and 74.6 percent in the second round against Adrien Houngbedji of the Democratic Renewal Party (PRD). Besides the northerners' backing, in the second round Yayi enjoyed the support of almost all the regions except the PRD's stronghold, Ouémé Department in the southeast, where there is more economic diversity than the rest of the country (Gisselquist 2008).

Benin's most recent presidential turnover saw independent candidate Patrice Talon win the 2016 presidential elections. Talon's election also shows that the differences in the economic interests have a strong impact on candidate preference and vote choice. Talon is a well-known business mogul who won many bids for privatized state assets including three cotton-ginning factories, and acquired the management of Cotonou's port. Youth in urban areas wanting more jobs and residents in Littoral and Zou with business interests demonstrated strong support for Talon despite critics' attacks on his near monopoly control over fertilizer imports, cotton-ginning, and the management of the tariffs of the port.[80] On the other hand, Lionel Zinsou was the incumbent candidate, backed by the Republican Alliance of PRD, RB, and Yayi's Cowry Forces for an Emerging Benin (FCBE). Yet, the PRD and RB's traditional strongholds in southern Benin turned him down by choosing Talon. Table 6.1 shows that the presidential candidates were able to win either by obtaining support from the south or by outflanking some votes from the south to add to the northern loyal votes. Therefore, a series of elections in Benin manifest the continuing persistence of the south-north-vote alignment on the basis of differing policy interests.

---

[80] (2016, March 7). '2016 Benin presidential election heads towards runoff.' *The Cotonou Times*. Retrieved from http://www.cotonoutimes.com/index.php/2016/03/07/2016-benin-presidential-election-heads-towards-runoff/
 (2016, March 23). 'Who is Benin's new president Patrice Talon?' *Global Black History*. Retrieved from http://www.globalblackhistory.com/2016/03/who-is-benins-new-president-patrice-talon.html

Table 6.1. Presidential turnover in Benin

Election year	Elected candidate and party	Region of support
1991	Nicéphore Soglo (UTRD)	South
1996	Mathieu Kérékou (Independent)	All but southcentral
2006	Boni Yayi (Independent)	All but southeastern
2016	Patrice Talon (Independent)	South

2.2. Malawi

The importance of economic interests to political coalition formation in the foregoing cases can be contrasted with another African country that has experienced partisan turnover, Malawi. This country displays little variation in economic interests across its very small territory. In Malawi, approximately 90 percent of labor force is engaged in agriculture, and most of smallholder farmers who cultivate 85 percent of the country's arable land focus on producing maize, a primary staple food, and tobacco, the largest source of foreign exchange earnings. Maize and tobacco both are produced throughout the country from north to south, and almost all tobacco farmers also grow maize for their own consumption.[81] With this agricultural situation that characterizes Malawi's industrial structure, the question is what social cleavages shape party preferences?

Malawi's polity is divided into three ethnic regions of North, Center, and South, which were created by the British in 1921. Most of the time, the party system clearly revolves around three ethno-regional parties—the contest prior to the 2009 presidential election was among the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD) for the north, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in the central region, and the United Democratic Front (UDF) in the south; in the 2014 elections the three competitors were the People's Party (PP) in the north, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for the south, and the MCP again in the central region. Thus, coalition-building options

---

[81] (2003) 'Issues in the global tobacco economy: selected case studies.' Chapter 5. *Food and Agriculture Organization*. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y4997e/y4997e0i.htm#bm18

were essentially limited to pairings of two regional parties against the third or to fielding a fourth-party candidate to split votes in more populous southern region.

However, an exception that proved the rule was the 2009 elections, when the newly established DPP crosscut the regional divide by appealing to the agricultural sector in all regions. Bingu wa Mutharika, who was the former president as a chair of the UDF in 2004-2009, established the DPP for the 2009 elections after defecting from the UDF. His nationwide distribution of fertilizer subsidies, which was conducted in his first term with the UDF, bought voters' support for himself and his new party. Ultimately, the tactic worked, and the DPP won a majority of the vote and the presidency. Its implication for Malawians' voting behavior is critical: economic causes were determinative of their vote choice in that election. But because parties are often not willing to form a coalition larger than necessary, the maize coalition was an unusual choice, from which its members quickly broke away to go back and maintain the cleavage structure along the three regions (Ferree and Horowitz 2010). And yet, the 2009 example showed the evidence of the latent pattern of economic voting in Malawi. Furthermore, the Malawi case shows that when there is no salient economic cleavage in a country, ethnicity remains likely the most convenient basis for coalition building, particularly when the groups are relatively few and relatively large.

3. Implications and Future Research

The implications of my dissertation span at least four different domains. First, the research speaks to the broader literature on democracy and political development. According to Donald Horowitz (1993), democratic systems operated by purely ethnically-based parties bring about undemocratic results because ethnic favoritism leads to the politics of exclusion and the denial of

134

equal access to resources and prestige positions. Drawing a comparison among different types of parties, Keefer and Khemani (2005) further argue that "competition between credible, policy-based parties that engage in some patronage is almost certainly better for public policy than competition between more purely machine-based parties" and personalist systems (p.15). In fact, political parties in African democracies do build distinct policy platforms that serve to attract votes from the relevant portions of the electorate, and voters, in turn, make choices that make sense in terms of their policy interests. Once in government, parties seek to achieve their policy objectives to make themselves more responsive towards their supporters. Policy-based political competition was not achieved overnight, and some measure of ethnicity-based clientelism clearly persists. But in at least a small number of African polities, the shift toward coalitions of economic interests is a key feature of democratic development, and its viability is likely a key reason that democratic partisan turnover in government has been realized in the first place.

A second implication of this study is to provide a comparative analysis of party strategies and party systems and to emphasize the variety that makes the political institutions dynamic and available to enrich political life. Initially, I planned to categorize coalition-building strategies by the number of voting blocs and their sizes in each society. However, the fact that not just social and economic structures but also the complexity of social and economic interactions vary across countries results in diverse party strategies to coordinate alliances and support. I found in all cases that the multidimensionality of the policy space plays an important role in parties' strategic calculations, and allows for more options for political coalitions than just ethnic ones.

Third, a contribution of the work lies in enhancing our ability to explain the formation of a winning coalition. Knowing the full panoply of ingredients (interests) available in a country, we are able to understand the optimal configuration of a coalition or a path for an opposition to

135

reconfigure its support base in order to defeat an incumbent. For example, if the parties ignore voters' policy preferences and try to form a simple ethnically-based coalition like as Benin's incumbent alliance did in the 2016 elections, they might find themselves outflanked by a coalition formed along non-ethnic lines. By contrast, the farmers' coalitions in Zambia and Malawi were successful in spite of the fact that they crosscut ethnic cleavages. But when Zambia's MMD under Banda narrowed its base from all farmers to just maize farmers, the PF was able to assemble a coalition of nearly everyone else (despite their ethnic and economic heterogeneity) to topple the MMD. Moreover, Ghana's John Atta Mills from the Fante, an ethnic subgroup concentrated in the opposition party's stronghold, was able to win the 2008 presidential elections standing on the NDC platform that favored the interest of rice growers. Ethnicity alone falls short of explaining these successful coalitions.

Last, a clear implication is that formation of electoral coalitions and party systems affects local development and economic growth. In the dissertation, I analyze the relationship between the winning party's platforms and the policies they implement once in power. My main conclusion is that the party in office follows its most preferred policy oriented toward serving its supporters – loyal regions are better represented in national decision-making than are opposition regions. That is good news for those who value responsiveness and accountability. But it is also true that policy decisions designed to discriminate between supporters and opponents are not necessarily those that engender broad-ranging trust in government, or those that generate the conditions for long-run economic growth or reductions in inequality of wealth and income (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik 1991).

The above implications of the study provide useful insights for considering topics of further research. First, future research could compare the cross-pressured voters' behavior across

several regions and countries with updated individual level data. It seems unlikely that their decisions are as consistent as those of core voters. To what extent do an individual's economic interests (occupation, type of crop farmed, etc.) influence her party choice in different settings? Such a study will help account for conditions under which voters use specific cues to cast votes for a party they choose.

Second, is my theory of sector-based party identity applicable to other consolidating democracies? How does the party platform of an incumbent party affect priorities for trade liberalization? Are industrial (sub)sectors in the party's main support base protected by the government's trade policies? A quantitative comparative analysis would supply additional insight into the mechanisms by which domestic politics promotes or constrains trade liberalization. Trade liberalization in African states is often attributed to economic crisis and ineffective bureaucracy when it is studied at the country-level. But this research would help measure the impact of party positions on specific products as priorities for liberalization. It would also untangle the ethnic aspects of policy choice regarding trade.

In conclusion, my study of partisan turnover in African democracies suggests that party coalitions become associated with the policies demanded by their core supporters. Although the study of what parties do with policy issues has been largely ignored in the African context, when politicians and parties face serious competition at the polls, appealing to policy interests is a wiser choice than ignoring them. On the other hand, distribution of ethnic groups and industries in the population and their geographic locations give the parties clues about kinds of policies and voter groups to target. Ethnic politics gains strength either when setting a clear policy goal is not very feasible due to unvarying economic interests among the population or when policy preferences vary along ethnic lines.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, J. F., Merrill III, S., & Grofman, B. (2005). *A unified theory of party competition: a cross-national analysis integrating spatial and behavioral factors*. Cambridge University Press.

Aldrich, J. H. (1995). *Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America* (Vol. 15). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1991). *Distributive politics and economic growth*(No. w3668). National bureau of economic research.

Al-Samarrai, S. (2005). *Financing primary education for all: public expenditure and education outcomes in Africa*. Department for International Development.

Arriola, L. R. (2012). *Multi-ethnic Coalitions in Africa: Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns*. Cambridge University Press.

Asante, R., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2004). Ethnic structure, inequality and governance of the public sector in Ghana. *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development*.

Austin, D. (1964). *Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960*. Oxford University Press.

Arthur, P. (2009). Ethnicity and electoral politics in Ghana's Fourth Republic.*Africa Today*, 56(2), 45-73.

Avenstrup, R., Liang, X., & Nellemann, S. (2004). Free primary education and poverty reduction: the case of Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Uganda. *Africa Region Human Development Department, The World Bank, Washington DC*.

Baldwin, K. (2013). Why vote with the chief? Political connections and public goods provision in Zambia. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4), 794-809.

Banful, A. B. (2011). Old problems in the new solutions? Politically motivated allocation of program benefits and the "new" fertilizer subsidies. *World Development*, 39(7), 1166-1176.

Bates, R. H. (1981). *Markets and states in tropical Africa: the political basis of agricultural policies*. University of California Press.

———. (1983). Modernization, ethnic competition, and the rationality of politics in contemporary Africa. *State versus ethnic claims: African policy dilemmas*, 152, 171.

Bates, R. & Steven B. 2009. "Political Economy of Agricultural Trade Interventions in Africa." Agricultural Distortions Working Papers 87.

Berman, B. 1998. "Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The Politics of Uncivil Nationalism." African Affairs 97:305-341.

Bleck, J., & Van de Walle, N. (2013). Valence Issues in African Elections Navigating Uncertainty and the Weight of the Past. *Comparative Political Studies*, 46(11), 1394-1421.

Boone, C. (2005). State, capital, and the politics of banking reform in sub-Saharan Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 401-420.

———. (2011). Politically allocated land rights and the geography of electoral violence: The case of Kenya in the 1990s. *Comparative Political Studies*.

Bratton, M. & Bhavnani, R. (2008). ``Voting in Africa: Ethnic, Economic, or Strategic.'' Working Paper. Department of Political Science, Michigan State University.

Bratton, M., Bhavnani, R., & Chen, T.H. (2012). Voting intentions in Africa: Ethnic, economic or partisan?. Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 50(1), 27-52.

Brusco, V., Nazareno, M., & Stokes, S. C. (2004). Vote buying in Argentina. Latin American Research Review, 39(2), 66-88.

Burgess, R., Jedwab, R., Miguel, E., & Morjaria, A. (2013). *The value of democracy: evidence from road building in Kenya* (No. w19398). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Burnell, P. (2002). Zambia's 2001 elections: the tyranny of small decisions,'non-decisions' and 'not decisions'. *Third World Quarterly*, 23(6), 1103-1120.

Campbell, J. L., & Pedersen, O. K. (2001). *The rise of neoliberalism and institutional analysis*. Princeton University Press.

Carrier, N., & Kochore, H. H. (2014). Navigating ethnicity and electoral politics in northern Kenya: the case of the 2013 election. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(1), 135-152.

Chabal, P. (2002). The quest for good government and development in Africa: is NEPAD the answer?. *International Affairs*, 78(3), 447-462.

Chabal, P., & Daloz, J. P. (1999). Africa works: disorder as political instrument. *African issues*.

Chandra, K., (2004). *Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic head counts in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. (2006). What is ethnic identity and does it matter?. *Annual. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, *9*, 397-424.

———. (2011). What is an ethnic party?. *Party Politics*, 17(2), 151-169.

Chazan, N. (1983). *An anatomy of Ghanaian politics*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Cheeseman, N., & Hinfelaar, M. (2010). Parties, Platforms, and Political Mobilization: The Zambian Presidential Election of 2008. *African Affairs*, 109(434), 51-76.

139

Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G., & Willis, J. (2014). Democracy and its discontents: understanding Kenya's 2013 elections. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 8(1), 2-24.

Cheibub, J. A., & Przeworski, A. (1999). Democracy, elections, and accountability for economic outcomes. *Democracy, accountability, and representation*, 222-49.

Connor, W. (1994). *Ethnonationalism*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Couglin, P.J.(1992) Probabilistic Voting Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making votes count: strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems* (Vol. 7). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, G. & McCubbins, M. (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. *The journal of Politics*, 48(2), 370-389.

Dahl, R. A. (1982). *Dilemmas of pluralist democracy: Autonomy vs. control* (Vol. 31). Yale University Press.

———. (1991). A Rejoinder. *The Journal of Politics*, 53(01), 226-231.

De Smedt, J. (2009). 'No Raila, No Peace!' Big man politics and election violence at the Kibera grassroots. *African Affairs*, 108(433), 581-598.

Decalo, S. (1995). The Church and Political Change in Malawi 1992. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(2), 243-262.

Della Porta, D., & Vannucci, A. (1997). The 'perverse effects' of political corruption. *Political studies*, 45(3), 516-538.

Dixit, A., & Londregan, J. (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. *The Journal of Politics*, 58(04), 1132-1155.

Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of political action in a democracy. *The journal of political economy*, 135-150.

Dunning, T., & Harrison, L. (2010). Cross-cutting cleavages and ethnic voting: An experimental study of cousinage in Mali. *American Political Science Review*, 104 (01), 21-39.

Duverger, M. (1959). *Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state*. London: Methuen.

Eifert, B., Miguel, E., & Posner, D. N. (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in Africa. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(2), 494-510.

Elischer, S. (2013). *Political parties in Africa: Ethnicity and party formation*. Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (1996). Explaining interethnic cooperation. *American political science review*, 90(04), 715-735.

Fearon, J. D. (1999, May). Why ethnic politics and 'pork' tend to go together. In *an SSRC-MacArthur sponsored conference on "Ethnic Politics and Democratic Stability," University of Chicago*.

Fearon, J. D., Kasara, K., & Laitin, D. D. (2007). Ethnic minority rule and civil war onset. *American Political Science Review*, 101(01), 187-193.

Ferree, K. E. (2006). Explaining South Africa's racial census. *Journal of Politics*, 68 (4), 803-815.

———. (2010). *Framing the race in South Africa: The political origins of racial census elections*. Cambridge University Press.

Ferree, K., & Horowitz, J. (2010). Ties that bind? The rise and decline of ethno-regional partisanship in Malawi, 1994–2009. *Democratization*, 17(3), 534-563.

Franck, R., & Rainer, I. (2012). Does the leader's ethnicity matter? Ethnic favoritism, education, and health in sub-Saharan Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 106(02), 294-325.

Fridy, K. S. (2007). The elephant, umbrella, and quarrelling cocks: Disaggregating partisanship in Ghana's fourth republic. *African Affairs*,106(423), 281-305.

Frieden, J. A. (1992). *Debt, development, and democracy: modern political economy and Latin America, 1965-1985*. Princeton University Press.

Fox, J. (1994). The difficult transition from clientelism to citizenship: Lessons from Mexico. *World politics*, 46(02), 151-184.

Gisselquist, R. M. (2008). Democratic transition and democratic survival in Benin. *Democratization*, 15(4), 789-814.

Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures: Selected essays* (Vol. 5019). Basic books.

Gellner, E. (1983). Nationalism and the two forms of cohesion in complex societies. British Academy.

Glazer, N., & Moynihan, D. P. (1963). Beyond the melting pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians and Irish of New York City.

Gould, J. (2007). Zambia's 2006 elections: The ethnicization of politics?. *News from the Nordic Africa Institute*, 1(2007), 5-9.

Govereh, J., Chapoto, A., & Jayne, T. S. (2010). 13. Assessment of alternative maize trade and market policy interventions in Zambia. *Food Security in Africa*, 354.

Greene, W. H., & Hensher, D. A. (2010). *Modeling ordered choices: a primer*. Cambridge University Press.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (Ed.). (2004). *Democratic reform in Africa: The quality of progress*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Habyarimana, J., Humphreys, M., Posner, D. N., & Weinstein, J. M. (2007). Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision?. *American Political Science Review*, 101(4), 709.

Haspel, M., Remington, T. F., & Smith, S. S. (1998). Electoral institutions and party cohesion in the Russian Duma. *The Journal of Politics*, 60(02), 417-439.

Harding, R., (2010). Urban-rural differences in support for incumbents across Africa, Afrobarometer Working Paper, 120.

Heilbrunn J. (1999). Corruption, democracy, and reform in Benin. In A. Schedler (Ed.). *The self-restraining state: power and accountability in new democracies*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Henninger, N., & Landsberg, F. (2007). Nature's benefits in Kenya: An atlas of ecosystems and human well-being. Retrieved from http://www.wri.org/publication/natures-benefits-inkenya

Herbst, J. I. (2000) *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.

Hix, S., Noury, A., & Roland, G. (2005). Power to the parties: cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(2), 209-234.

Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic groups in conflict*. University of California press.

———. (1993). Democracy in divided societies. *Journal of democracy*, 4(4), 18-38.

Humphreys, M., & Bates, R. H. (2002). *Political institutions and economic policies: Lessons from Africa*. Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs.

Ichino, N., & Nathan, N. L. (2013). Crossing the line: Local ethnic geography and voting in Ghana. *American Political Science Review*, 107(02), 344-361.

Jacobson, G. C. (1990). The effects of campaign spending in House elections: New evidence for old arguments. *American Journal of Political Science*, 334-362.

Jeffries, R., & Thomas, C. (1993). The Ghanaian elections of 1992. *African Affairs*, 331-366.

Jensen, P. S., & Justesen, M. K. (2014). Poverty and vote buying: Survey-based evidence from Africa. *Electoral Studies*, 33, 220-232.

Kasara, K. (2007). Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of

agriculture in Africa. American Political Science Review, 101(1), 159.

Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing models of party organization and party democracy the emergence of the cartel party. *Party politics*, *1*(1), 5-28.

Keefer, P. (2010). The ethnicity distraction? Political credibility and partisan preferences in Africa. Political Credibility and Partisan Preferences in Africa (March 1, 2010). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series.

Keefer, P., & Khemani, S. (2005). Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor: understanding political incentives for providing public services. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 20(1), 1-27.

Killick, T. (2010). *Development Economics in Action Second Edition: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana*. Routledge.

Kimenyi, M. S. (2006). Ethnicity, governance and the provision of public goods. *Journal of African Economies*, 15(1), 62-99.

Kimenyi, M. S., & Romero, R. G. (2008). Identity, grievances, and economic determinants of voting in the 2007 Kenyan elections.

Koff, D. R. (1966). *Education and Employment Perspectives of Kenya Primary Pupils*. University College.

Kolavalli, S., Vigneri, M., Maamah, H., & Poku, J. (2012). The partially liberalized cocoa sector in Ghana: Producer price determination, quality control, and service provision.

Kramon, E., & Posner, D. N. (2011). Kenya's new constitution. *Journal of Democracy*, *22*(2), 89-103.

Kramon, E., & Posner, D. N. (2012). Ethnic Favoritism in Primary Education in Kenya. *Unpublished paper. University of California, Los Angeles*.

Kraus, J. (2002). Capital, power and business associations in the African political economy: a tale of two countries, Ghana and Nigeria. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40(03), 395-436.

Kurer, O. (2001). Land and politics in Fiji: of failed land reforms and coups.*Journal of Pacific History*, 36(3), 299-315.

Larmer, M., & Fraser, A. (2007). Of cabbages and King Cobra: Populist politics and Zambia's 2006 election. *African Affairs*, 106(425), 611-637.

Lemarchand, R. (1972). Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing solidarities in nation-building. *American political science review*, 66(01), 68-90.

Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational democracy. *World politics*, 21(02), 207-225.

Lindberg, S. I. (2012). Have the cake and eat it: The rational voter in Africa. *Party Politics*, 19(6), 945-961.

Lindberg, S. & Morrison, M. 2008. "Are African voters really ethnic or clientelistic? Survey evidence from Ghana." Political Science Quarterly, 123(1), 95-122.

Lindbeck, A. & Weibull, J. 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition." Springer, 52(3), 273-297

Lipset, S. M., & Rokkan, S. (Eds.). (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives* (Vol. 7). Free press.

Logan, C. (2008). Traditional leaders in modern Africa: can democracy and the chief coexist?. Michigan State University, Afrobarometer Working Paper, 93.

MacArthur, J. (2008). How the West was won: regional politics and prophetic promises in the 2007 Kenya elections. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2(2), 227-241.

Macola, G. (2010). *Liberal Nationalism in Central Africa: A Biography of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula*. Palgrave Macmillan.

Mason, N. M., Jayne, T. S., & Van de Walle, N. (2013, August). Fertilizer subsidies and voting behavior: Political economy dimensions of input subsidy programs. In *presentation at the Agricultural & Applied Economics Association's 2013 AAEA & CAES Joint Annual Meeting, Washington, DC*(pp. 4-6).

Mattes, R. B. (1995). *The election book: Judgment and choice in South Africa's 1994 election*. IDASA, Public Information Centre.

Mattes, R., & Piombo, J. (2001). Opposition parties and the voters in South Africa's general election of 1999. *Democratization*, 8(3), 101-128.

Mattes, R., & Shenga, C. (2007). Uncritical Citizenship in a "Low-Information" Society: Mozambicans in Comparative Perspective. In *Conference Paper no.* (Vol. 23).

Miguel, E., & Zaidi, F. (2003). Do politicians reward their supporters? Public spending and incumbency advantage in Ghana. *Manuscript, University of California, Berkeley*.

Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. *World Politics*, 56(03), 328-362.

Mikell, G. (1989). Peasant politicisation and economic recuperation in Ghana: local and national dilemmas. *Journal of Modem African Studies*, 27(3), 455-478.

Milyo, J., Primo, D., & Groseclose, T. (2000). Corporate PAC campaign contributions in perspective. *Business and Politics*, 2(1), 75-88.

Mkandawire, T. (2015). Neopatrimonialism and the political economy of economic performance in Africa: Critical reflections. *World Politics*, 67(03), 563-612.

Morjaria, A. (2011). Electoral Competition and Deforestation: Micro Evidence from Kenya. *Presented for WGAPE*.

Morrison, M. K. (2004). Political parties in Ghana through four republics: a path to democratic consolidation. *Comparative Politics*, 421-442.

Mozaffar, S., Scarritt, J. R., & Galaich, G. (2003). Electoral institutions, ethnopolitical cleavages, and party systems in Africa's emerging democracies. *American political science review*, 97(03), 379-390.

Mueller, S. D. (2008). The political economy of Kenya's crisis. *Journal of Eastern African Studies*, 2(2), 185-210.

Norris, P., & Mattes, R. B. (2003). *Does ethnicity determine support for the governing party?*. (No. 26). Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA).

Nugent, P. (2001). Ethnicity as an explanatory factor in the Ghana 2000 elections. *African Issues*, 2-7.

Olson, M. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Olukoshi, A. O. (Ed.). (1993). *The politics of structural adjustment in Nigeria*. James Currey Publishers.

Olzak, S. (1992) The dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict. Stanford University Press. Stanford, CA.

Osaghae, E. (2003). Explaining the changing patterns of ethnic politics in Nigeria. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 9(3), 54-73.

Osei, A. (2013). Party System Institutionalization in Ghana and Senegal. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 48(5), 577-593.

Pitcher, M. A. (2012). *Party politics and economic reform in Africa's democracies* (Vol. 119). Cambridge University Press.

Pitcher, A., Moran, M. H., & Johnston, M. (2009). Rethinking patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism in Africa. *African Studies Review*, 52(1), 125-156.

Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, A., & Sprague, J. D. (1986). *Paper stones: a history of electoral socialism.* University of Chicago Press.

Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (1996). Classifying political regimes. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 31(2), 3-36.

145

Rabushka, A., & Shepsle, K. A. (1972). *Politics in plural societies: A theory of democratic instability*. Columbus, OH: Merrill.

Rakner, L., & Van de Walle, N. (2009). Opposition weakness in Africa. *Journal of Democracy*, 20(3), 108-121.

Rathbone, R. (1973). Businessmen in politics: Party struggle in Ghana,'1949–57. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 9(3), 391-401.

Reilly, B. (2001). *Democracy in divided societies: Electoral engineering for conflict management*. Cambridge University Press.

Remmer, K. L. (1991). The political impact of economic crisis in Latin America in the 1980s. *American Political Science Review*, 85(03), 777-800.

Riker, W. H. (1962). *The theory of political coalitions* (Vol. 578). New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rogowski, R. (1989). *Commerce and coalitions: How trade affects domestic political alignments*. Princeton, NJ.

Rosenbluth, F. M., & Thies, M. F. (2010). *Japan transformed: political change and economic restructuring*. Princeton University Press.

Rothschild, J. (1981). *Ethnopolitics, a conceptual framework*. Columbia University Press.

Rothchild, D. 1991. Ghana and Structural Adjustment: An Overview. In *Ghana. The Political Economy of Reform*, edited by Donald Rothchild. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Samuels, D. J. (2000). The gubernatorial coattails effect: Federalism and congressional elections in Brazil. *The Journal of Politics*, 62(01), 240-253.

Sandbrook, R. (1993). *The politics of Africa's economic recovery*. Cambridge University Press.

Scarritt, J. R. (2006). The strategic choice of multiethnic parties in Zambia's dominant and personalist party system. *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 44(2), 234-256.

Schedler, A. (2002). The menu of manipulation. *Journal of democracy*, 13(2), 36-50.

Shils, E. (1957). Primordial, personal, sacred and civil ties: Some particular observations on the relationships of sociological research and theory. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 8(2), 130-145.

Smith, D. A. (2002). Consolidating democracy? The structural underpinnings of Ghana's 2000 elections. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40(04), 621-650.

Stasavage, D. (2005). Democracy and education spending in Africa. *American journal of political science*, 49(2), 343-358.

Steinmo, S., & Thelen, K. (1992). *Structuring politics: historical institutionalism in comparative analysis*. Cambridge University Press.

Stokes, D. (1963). Spatial Models and Party Competition. *American Political Science Review*, 57 : 368-377.

Stokes, S.C. (2005). Perverse accountability: a formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 315-325.

Stokes, S. C., Dunning, T., Nazareno, M., & Brusco, V. (2013). *Brokers, voters, and clientelism: The puzzle of distributive politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Strom, K. (1990). A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties. *American Journal of Political Science,* 34 (3), 565-598.

Souaré, I. K. (2011). The 2011 Presidential election in Benin. *of African Elections*, 73.

Van de Walle, N. (1989). Rice politics in Cameroon: state commitment, capability, and urban bias. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(4), 579-99.

————. (2001). *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge University Press.

————. (2007). The path from neopatrimonialism: democracy and clientelism in Africa today. *Cornell University, Center for International Studies, Working Paper*, (3-07).

Varshney, A. (1998). *Democracy, development, and the countryside: Urban-rural struggles in India*. Cambridge University Press.

Vicente, P. C., & Wantchekon, L. (2009). Clientelism and vote buying: lessons from field experiments in African elections. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, 25(2), 292-305.

Wantchekon, L. (2002). Why do resource dependent countries have authoritarian governments?. *Journal of African Finance and Economic Development*, 2, 57-77.

Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World politics*, 55(03), 399-422.

Wanyande, P. (2001). Management Politics in Kenya's Sugar Industry: Towards an Effective Framework. *African Journal of Political Science/Revue Africaine de Science Politique*, 123-140.

Weghorst, K. R., & Lindberg, S. I. (2013). What Drives the Swing Voter in Africa?. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(3), 717-734.

Whitfield, L. (2009). 'Change for a Better Ghana': Party Competition, Institutionalization and Alternation in Ghana's 2008 Elections. *African Affairs*,108(433), 621-641.

147

Widner, J. A. (1994). *Economic change and political liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Johns Hopkins Univ Pr.

Wolfinger, R. E. (1965). The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting. *American Political Science Review*, 59(04), 896-908.

Young, C. (1979). *The politics of cultural pluralism*. University of Wisconsin Press.

Young, D. (2009). *Support you can count On? Ethnicity, partisanship, and retrospective voting in Africa* (No. 115). Afrobarometer Working Paper.