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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN DIEGO

Democracy, Television, and the Mediatization of Chilean Politics:

How the Medium Became the Message in Post-Pinochet Chile

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirement for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Communication

by

Harry L. Simón Salazar

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2016

The Dissertation of Harry L. Simón Salazar is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically:

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University of California, San Diego

2016

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DEDICATION

Este trabajo es dedicado a las mujeres que le han dado razón a mi vida.

Mi más querida Adriana, esta meta no hubiese sido posible sin tu total e incondicional apoyo desde el primer día que entregue las llaves de mi salón de la Memorial para empezar la maestría. De eso ya hace nueve años. No sé cómo tuviste la paciencia para aguantar tanto tiempo, las mudanzas, lo que fue el sacrificio económico, las presiones familiares, y todo lo demás. Pero te lo agradezco profundamente. Tú que eres mi compañera política, mi mejor amiga, y el amor de mi vida, sin duda, este proyecto y el titulo que representa son tuyos tanto como míos, y te los dedico a ti con todo mi corazón.

My dearest Tuti, you were only six years old when I went back to school in 2007, so you might not even have a clear memory of our family life before I began this process. Nonetheless, you should know that my going back to school involved tremendous audacity and sacrifice for all of us, including you. Unbelievably, you have now grown up, and are thinking about your own academic future. It is a beautiful thing to see. Now that I have come to the end of my own educational journey, what is important is that you understand that your mother and I put our family through all of this because by doing so, we established for you a foundation upon which you can build your own future, a future without limits. As you already know, it is easy for us to speak of you being so much more than us. Drawing from both your mother and I, you embody everything that is good in us, and we have no doubt that you will achieve much more than what we could ever have dreamt. You are my all-time favorite person, I deeply admire your spirit, and I love you with all my heart. This project is dedicated to you.

También les dedico este trabajo a mis "Chinas," empezando con mi hermana Laura Angélica. Desde que yo era un niño, tu fuiste la persona que me impulsaba a leer, escribir, y reflexionar sobre un mundo que todavía no conocía. Tu fuiste la que me dio

el ejemplo de hacer pedazos cualquier obstáculo que se me ponía en frente. También fuiste por muchos años mi amiga, y estoy agradecido de haber recuperado y enriquecido esa vieja amistad de nuevo. Chela y Sofía, sepan ustedes también forman parte importante de esta narrativa educacional, y también sepan que su tío las ama mucho. Tal vez a veces piensen que soy un loco, y es cierto, si lo soy, pero loco por ustedes más que nada. Chela, pórtate bien y sigue adelante con tus sueños. Sofía, nunca dejes de ser la más tierna jovencita que conozco. Y sin duda alguna, mi más estimada Tracey, tú eres la mujer más buena onda entre este circulo femenino que me rodea, y siempre has sido la mejor cuñada posible.

Dedico tambien este proyecto a mis suegros, y a mis compadres. Mama Luz, le agradezco profundamente que siempre me haya apoyado, gracias. A mi suegro Serafín, también gracias por ser como es, y por haberme aceptado en su familia. Compadres Erika y Jorge, espero que siempre sean felices, porque de sus hijos nace la felicidad. Dayana y Juanito, ustedes están muy chiquitos para entender que significan estas palabras, pero igual como si fueran mis hijos, deben verlos como una contribución también para su futuro. Rosi, you have been so incredibly supportive, there is no way you could be left off this list. Thank you for everything, especially during the last few years, when your support mattered most to us.

I also dedicate this project to Juan B. Barra - "the dude." I miss you holmes. You left me surrounded by mujeres, but that is ok, so far I have survived all their crazy. I think about you all the time, and I know you would be proud of me as I close this final chapter of my educational life.

Finalmente, Madre mía, Victoria Barra Salazar, con todo el amor que un hijo le puede tener a su mamá, te escribo estas palabras para que sean parte permanente de mi tesis doctoral. Es decir, que estas palabras quedan grabadas para siempre como parte de este proyecto académico, y que ahora forman parte del record histórico de la Universidad. Lo hago con la intención de cumplirte lo que siempre me habías pedido, aquí te presento este trabajado que tanto trabajo me costó, y que tanto sacrificio les pidió de

todas. Bien sabes que sin tu constante apoyo, nunca pudiera haber completado esta misión. Después de tantos años, y tantas controversias, hoy ya se te han hecho realidad tus sueños - una familia unidad, tus hijos bien educados, y nietas a las que se le ilumina un futuro muy propicio. Madre mía, este proyecto. y el titulo académico que representa, te los dedico a ti. con todo mi amor. Ahora sí, dile a quien te de la gana, "yo tengo un hijo que es doctor…"

EPIGRAPH

"Upon the social conditions of existence, rises an entire superstructure of distinct and peculiarly formed sentiments, illusions, modes of thought, and views of life. The entire class creates and forms them out of its material foundations and out of the corresponding social relations. The single individual, who derives them through tradition and upbringing, may imagine that they form the real motives and the starting point of his activity…. In historical struggles one must distinguish…the phrases and fancies of parties from their real organism and their real interests, their conception of themselves from their reality…"

- Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 1852.

"Antes de nada quería mencionarles que lo que van a ver a continuación esta enmarcado entre el actual contexto social. Nosotros creemos que el país esta preparado para una comunicación de esta naturaleza… No hay que olvidar que la ciudadanía ha subido sus exigencias *en torno a la verdad... en torno a lo que le gusta*. Seamos honestos. Hoy, *Chile piensa en su futuro*."

- Rene Saavedra, "NO," 2012.

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Finally, I submit this project, in part, to honor the memory of my friend, political mentor, and comrade in struggle, Ernesto Bustillos. Your example as a thinker, a writer, and agit-prop visionary, helped me cobble together what I hope is a decent dissertation about media, politics, and struggle. I did not forget the warning you gave me when I first left Memorial to go to graduate school – you said "comrade, don't sell-out, ok." Well, I didn't sell-out. And it was your memory and example that helped me to stay focused throughout these years of academic isolation.

VITA

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Democracy, Television, and the Mediatization of Chilean Politics:

How the Medium Became the Message in Post-Pinochet Chile

by

Harry L. Simón Salazar

Doctor of Philosophy in Communication

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Professor Michael Cole, Co-Chair

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Augusto Pinochet's regime permanently altered Chilean politics during his seventeen years as dictator of Chile. By the late 1980s, Pinochet's hold on power remained unyielding, political reconciliation with the military was unimaginable, and civil war seemed inevitable. Notwithstanding the lack of substantive political change, on March 11, 1990, Pinochet ceremoniously handed the presidential sash to the leader of his legal opposition, Patricio Aylwin, thus initiating a peaceful transition to civilian rule in Chile.

My dissertation examines the context and content of the *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* of 1988. What loosely translates as "official space for electoral propaganda" - was a nationally televised, largely uncensored, 30-minute political program, representing the two sides of the 1988 *Plebiscito*; the *NO* campaign in opposition to the military regime, and the pro-Pinochet *SÍ* campaign.

The *Franja Electoral* became a mediated space of Chilean politics, just beyond the repressive reach of the Pinochetista regime, within which a seemingly impossible transition was not only articulated, but also, through which, a transformation of Chilean political culture was engendered. To help explain this transformation, I draw from a conceptual framework known as *mediatization theory*, to examine the *Franja Electoral* as a sample case for the *mediatization of Chilean politics.* I propose that this case is best understood as an historical, political, and theoretical process, rooted in the cultural assimilation of an imagined political configuration. The *mediatization of Chilean politics* was a process that would ultimately help reconcile a contradictory relationship between what was politically viable as a social and historical course of action, with what was represented as acceptable in a mediated, televisual space of political culture.

Furthermore, this project helps in the recovery of an exceptionally rare, complete collection of the 1988 *Franja Electoral,* and includes one of only a handful of content analyses performed on this important audio-visual material. Finally, my use of *mediatization theory* involves the incorporation of *Cultural Historical Activity Theory* (CHAT), to analyze the *Franja Electoral* as an *artifact of Chilean political*

culture - a mediated representation of an enduring qualitative alteration in the meaning

of Democracy in Chile.

INTRODUCTION

Image 0.1: Michelle Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei in 2013.

This project focuses on the 1988 *Franja de Propaganda Electoral*, a month long televised political advertising campaign developed by media professionals to help convince the Chilean people to put aside their fear, and vote their way out of a brutal 15-year military dictatorship. Ultimately, the NO campaign in the 1988 *Plebiscito* proved successful, and has since marked the end of Augusto Pinochet's 17-year rule of this South American country. By all accounts this electoral victory was an important moment in the contemporary political history of Chile, and consequently has been the subject of research for many scholars.

Yet, this project is not an historical narrative, per se. Instead, I historicize the conditions and motives of the transition to civilian governance, and the co-evolution of the Chilean television industry within that context, to situate and track the relationship between political communication, culture, and democratic change that was engendered by the 1988 *Plebiscito,* and thereby operationalize *mediatization* theory more broadly.

During the process of developing this project, a second unexpected and important contribution became apparent. I struggled to explain why it took me nearly four years to find a complete set of the televised Franjas that were broadcasted during the 1988 *Plebiscito*, and the set that I finally used for the Content Analysis portion of this dissertation is very likely the only one that is publicly available.[1] For reasons I did not understand until recently, the curious elusiveness of this audiovisual material helps confirm my theoretical argument, and underscores the *mediatization of Chilean*

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[1] I intend to make my set of Franjas and the results of my Content Analysis publicly available after my 2016 defense.

[2] *La Concertación* was the name of the political coalition that took shape in 1988 and held the presidency from 1990 to 2010.

[3] "El Sistema Binominal" was finally reformed in 2015.

[4] "Everyone here is a pain in the ass, the political class, and even the people of Santiago. Disingenuous

politics as both an historical and enduring cultural process in post-Pinochet Chile, and still readily apparent in the present political context.

The Exceptional Modernity Of The 2013 Chilean Presidential Elections.

On the surface, the 2013 presidential elections in Chile were uniquely modern in form and content, framed by professional women leading highly media-centric electoral struggles in a country that is often celebrated as the model of economic and political stability in Latin American (Angell 2007: 197). Well organized campaigns generated first-rate political advertising intended to highlight the qualities of the top two contenders - Michelle Bachelet Jeria, the pediatrician and candidate of the center-left Nueva Mayoria coalition; and Evelyn Matthei Fornet, a lawyer and the candidate of the UDI and the conservative coalition. Observed from the field of political communication, the 2013 electoral cycle kept pace with any high-dollar North American presidential campaign, and in spite of legal limits placed on campaign spending, billions of pesos were paid out on behalf of both candidates to make the 2013 elections the most expensive in Chilean history. It is not difficult to understand why the candidates Bachelet and Matthei became symbols to reinforce a myth of Chilean political modernity.

Furthermore, mirroring the 2008 and 2012 campaigns of Barak Obama, there was a significant increase in the use of social media on behalf of the candidates, helping the Chilean electorate follow the principal themes of education, tax, and electoral reforms – identified by polling companies as the issues most important to the

Chilean voter in 2013 (Fontaine 2013). Indeed, the political marketing developed for

the 2013 presidential elections not only qualifies as modern, but also exceptional,

when compared to electoral propaganda used in other Latin American countries. The

2013 campaign is still used by national and international analysts to celebrate a

fortified political reconciliation, procedural consensus, and systemic stability

uncommon within a Latin American political landscape historically marked by

partisan tensions and economic crisis (Romero 2013).

Image 0.2: Michelle Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei
campaign social media banners from 2013.

This was the second presidential run for Bachelet, who in 2006 became the

first elected female president in South America. She had previously been appointed

Minister of National Defense and Minister of Health; two posts she also marked as the

first female in Chilean history to serve in these positions. More extraordinary is the

fact that Bachelet is a life-long socialist and "professed agnostic single mother of

three, in a country that legalized divorce only five years ago… [Bachelet] shattered the

mold of traditional Chilean politicians in this Roman Catholic stronghold…" to

establish herself for over a decade as the dominant figure of Chilean presidential politics. By the end of her first term as President of Chile she had become "one of her country's most popular leaders. Polls… show her public approval to be above 70 percent… the highest since Chile went from dictatorship to democracy in 1990" (Barrionuevo 2009). It was, therefore, no surprise that the 2013 presidential campaign ended after a second round of voting, with Chileans having awarded Bachelet 62% of the vote to Matthei's 38%.

The 2013 elections in Chile are used as evidence to underscore what political commentators point to as a uniquely stable Latin American democracy. To be sure, the presidential contest of 2013 was admittedly state-of-the-art, and Chilean politics since 1990 have been remarkably stable. Yet, as is often the case with symbolism and sweeping generalizations used to describe political culture, closer inspection reveals unexpected hostility and incongruity, traits that are obscured within the current political landscape subject to mediated political communication.

Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Historical Paradox Of Chilean Political Stability.

Indeed, the ultra-modern presidential election of 2013 was deeply symbolic on multiple levels, astonishingly historical, inextricably linked to the 1973 coup d'état, and in very direct ways nourished by tensions and contradictions rooted in unsettled political conflicts of the Pinochet dictatorship. To recover these narratives one only needs to begin with the most accessible – the individual histories of the two leading candidates. As has been noted, it is odd that Michelle Bachelet Jeria could be an agnostic, socialist, single mother of three, and retain such high levels of popularity among a largely Catholic and socially conservative Chilean electorate. What is more striking is how her leftist pedigree is bound to her lived experiences since 1973.

Just over 40 years ago Michelle and her mother were forcibly detained after the 1973 coup d'état. They were pulled from their home by Pinochet's military police, blindfolded, and taken to Villa Grimaldi, one of the military dictatorships' most notorious detention centers on the outskirts of Santiago. While detained at Villa Grimaldi, she and her mother were violently interrogated and tortured, thereafter compelled to leave Chile to live in Australia as exiles.

Michelle and her mother were subjected to this treatment because they were the daughter and wife of General Alberto Bachelet Martínez, who at the time of the 1973 military coup was among the few Generals who remained loyal to the socialist government of democratically elected president Salvador Allende. General Bachelet Martínez had been among the first officials arrested during the 1973 coup and he was also interrogated and subjected to torture, at times by the hands of men who had

served under him in the Fuerza Aérea de Chile (FACH). In March of 1974 he was still

in military custody when he died of a heart attack provoked by maltreatment. Michelle

was 23 years old when her father was killed.

Image 0.3: General Alberto Bachelet Martínez (left) and
General Fernando Matthei Aubel (right).

Evelyn Matthei Fornet, the conservative runner-up of the 2013 presidential

elections, is also a daughter of an important military figure. Her father, General

Fernando Matthei Aubel, participated in the 1973 coup d'état against the Allende

government, and later became a high-ranking member of Pinochet's governing

military junta. Furthermore, it was under General Matthei's command that the

detention and torture of General Alberto Bachelet took place, therefore making

General Matthei indirectly responsible for the death of General Bachelet, in 1974. In

short, Evelyn's father had a hand in the torture and subsequent death of Michelle's

father (Dorfman 2013).

Fifteen years later during the 1988 *Plebiscito*, Evelyn was a prominent youth leader in the televised campaign to legitimate Pinochet's rule over Chile for an additional eight years. By 1988 Michelle had retuned to Chile, and was working for a human rights organization providing medical care for the children of Chile's victims of torture and the "disappeared." It would seem that a rivalry such as the one between these two women would have been more appropriate submitted as evidence to a human rights tribunal than as the backstory of a presidential contest.

Historical controversies such as this aren't necessarily unique in a country like Chile that has suffered through recent political strife. That both candidates avoided this key chapter of Chilean political history throughout the 2013 presidential campaign is extraordinary, and that this relative silence occurred in the context of 2013 marking the 40th anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état. In fact, many Chileans consider Bachelet's reticence to speak about her experiences as her being respectful of contemporary Chilean political life (Bucciferro 2012: 39).

To the audience consuming 2013 presidential campaign media this entire narrative passed unnoticed while a decisive moment in Chilean political history was rendered illegible to an uniformed consumer of contemporary Chilean politics. On the other hand, to the historically informed Chilean eye, and in particular to researchers of Latin American political communication, the 2013 presidential campaign represented a whole lot more than a simple contest between two women who might serve as the next president of Chile, and was exceedingly more complex than the standard themes of education, taxes, and electoral reform identified by polling companies as the most

important issues that year. Nor was this the only Chilean drama unfolding during 2013.

The 2013 presidential elections took place within a constitutional framework originally imposed by the dictatorship in 1980 and, as such, it remains illegitimate among a substantial portion of Chileans (Angell 2007: 141). A case in point is how "el Sistema Binominal" throws into sharp relief the undemocratic origin of the 1980 Constitution. "El Sistema Binominal" was one of the most enduring and especially notorious statutes within the 1980 constitution that mandated a congressional configuration built on institutional gerrymandering to artificially inflate the political power of Chilean conservatives (Navia 2004: 90, Angell 2007: 34). For decades, *Concertación* forces pledged to change this egregious section of the constitution (Angell 2007: 142).[2] Although in 2013 they came closest to changing the Constitution, those forces - linked either politically or historically to the opposition who united against the now long-dead dictator - again failed to win the congressional supermajority required to finally end "el Sistema Binominal," as well as other reactionary elements of the 1980 Pinochetista Constitution.[3]

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[2] *La Concertación* was the name of the political coalition that took shape in 1988 and held the presidency from 1990 to 2010.
[3] "El Sistema Binominal" was finally reformed in 2015.

Modern And Stable = Bizarre And Potentially Neurotic?

Despite conventional assumptions, partisan contests in Chile do tend to disturb hidden tensions and expose an historical impunity of a uniquely Chilean sort. There exists a cumulative symbolism in Chilean political culture that is rife with "apariencias y pretensiones," as one Santiago resident commented to me after I informally described my research to him at a shared lunch counter.

I was sitting alone at a table that was part of the outdoor café at the entrance to *el Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos* in Santiago. I was eating a sandwich and reading the 1997 book *Chile Actual: Anatomía de un mito* by Tomás Moulian. All the other tables were occupied, and consequently a gray haired man, who must have been in his late fifties, asked if he could share my table while he ate his lunch. Presumably, by my verbal welcome to sit or otherwise, he immediately noticed my foreignness and asked me where I was from, and followed up with questions regarding my opinion of the book. I summarized my research on Chilean political communication and culture and the significance of the book in that regard, but the man interrupted me to declare "Son unos huevones, la clase política, y la misma gente de Santiago. Puras apariencias y pretensiones."[4] He went on complaining for a short time, finished his lunch, wished me well as he shook my hand, and departed.

"Disingenuous and pretentious" was his harsh assessment of Chilean political culture and the dominant political class. Tomás Moulian argued as much in his 1997

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[4] "Everyone here is a pain in the ass, the political class, and even the people of Santiago. Disingenuous and pretentious is what they are."

book, which has become a touchstone for critics of the Chilean status quo. Moulian developed one of the first and still most scathing critiques of the post-dictatorial Chilean political consensus as the functional equivalent of the military regime (Angell 2007: 159). Moulian considered "…al Chile Actual como una producción del Chile Dictatorial, pero sin aceptar ni el determinismo ni la necesidad, la imagen simple que una sociedad creada con los 'materiales' del Chile Dictatorial no podía ser otra cosa que una fotografía de éste, algunos años después" (15).[5]

What can be drawn from Moulian's harsh criticism, or even the gray-haired man's frustration, that may help explain the nature of the latent tensions in Chilean political culture, as exemplified by the Bachelet versus Matthei electoral contest of 2013? To be sure, the historical configuration of Chilean politics is strongly represented in the present. In fact, the bulk of Chilean representative democracy since 1988 stands out for the strange consistency of its political actors, especially within presidential politics, where the same family names appear and reappear year after year, decade after decade, seemingly insulated from surrounding changes in political history and culture. Surnames associated with the 1973 coup, *la Concertación*, *la Unidad Popular*, and even the armed left, still dominate a large part of the Chilean political landscape.

Critical assessments, such as those of Moulian, point to this idiosyncratic political order as being rooted in a commitment within the Chilean political class that

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[5] *Chile As It Is: Anatomy of a myth*. "I consider Chile as it is today a byproduct of dictatorial Chile, and even without any determinism or necessity, a simple image of a society created from the 'material' of dictatorial Chile could not be anything other than a photograph of the same, even years later."

privileges systemic stability as icon of democracy, even when these same notions of Chilean democracy run in contradiction to otherwise universal democratic ideals, effectively institutionalizing impunity, illegitimate constitutional frameworks, and normative consensual self-censorship. There is more to Chilean politics and Chilean political history than what the dominant narratives of reconciliation and systemic stability provide for, and yet, it is nonetheless true that institutional politics in Chile have indeed remained remarkably stable. Such is the state of contemporary Chilean politics since the 1988 *Plebiscito* – much-admired change on the surface, but a constitutional framework, an economic model, and a political calculus that have remained surprisingly consistent with what was in place when the Chilean military patrolled the streets and Pinochet's iron fist still cast its shadow over the country.

To what sociopolitical process can we attribute the incongruity of a political system celebrated for its dynamic stability while it conceals and assimilates inherent instability? *Seria el gatopardismo en Chile pues?*[6] What is at work when dominant discourses and media representations of Chilean politics so consistently idealize a modern and stable South American republic on the one hand, while on the other hand so consistently fail to draw attention to its systemic contradictions, unresolved tensions, and historically/ economically rooted potential for volatility? How can two such contradictory historical narratives not only coexist, but also thrive and form the foundation of modern Chilean institutional politics? Can and should this surreal

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[6] Literally translates to "Then it must be a dark colored cat?" This is a reference used by Moulian to name a political calculation based on the following principle: "If we want things to remain as they are, everything must change." It comes from a 1950 Italian novel by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa titled *Il Gattopardo*.

political order be attributed primarily to pacted agreements established among political elites in 1988 as scholars have traditionally suggested?

Moulian is among the earliest of numerous critics who do not accept the dominant narrative of peaceful political reconciliation in Chile (Espinoza 2008, Garcés 2012, Garcés and Leiva 2005, Gaudichaud 2015, Mayol 2013, etc.). These scholars resist the idea that a 40-year-old pacted agreement among elites could be so pervasive as to conceal the morbid modernity and tragic irony of the 2013 Bachelet – Matthei presidential contest. I include my own project as one among the many that are critical of the dominant narrative and do not accept the prominent idealization of the 1988 televised NO campaign as sufficiently robust for describing its significance for post-Pinochet Chilean political culture. Instead, this project looks at the 1988 *Plebiscito* as the *point of origin* for the current configuration of Chilean politics, and I use the case of the 2013 elections only to demonstrate one contradictory internal logic of Chilean political culture. I argue that what happened in 1988 set the foundation for the 2013 Bachelet – Matthei narrative, as well as numerous other paradoxical accounts of political life in post-Pinochet, culturally schizophrenic "Chile Actual" (Cronovich 2013: 8).

More precisely, I am convinced that the 1988 *Plebiscito* in general, and the televised *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* in particular, mark the beginning of a unique shift in Chilean political history, and that in spite of the dominant narratives that suggest otherwise, this shift did not involve a substantive political and economic transition as such. The shift that took place in Chile was more about the cultural

internationalization of a political contradiction intrinsic to any articulation of peaceful transition to democracy in Chile. That is to say, the political limits of the lived Pinochetista despotism imposed on Chileans, conflicted with a strong popular desire for a peaceful conclusion to the Pinochet dictatorship. So, in 1988, the Chilean people found themselves compelled to reconcile the irreconcilable. Under these circumstances, the televised *Franja de Propaganda Electoral,* when understood as an artifact of Chilean political culture, articulated a political fiction just beyond the reality of the military regime, and just powerful enough to induce a real shift in Chilean politics. When these Franjas are evaluated as an artifact of Chilean political culture they provide clues to help understand the incongruity of modern Chilean political life.

This argument draws from the work of media scholar Nick Couldry who suggests that there is a need for "a new paradigm of media research which understand media, not [only] as texts or structures of production, but as practice... [a] paradigm [that] aims to move beyond old debates about media effects and the relative importance of political economy and audience interpretation, at the same time as moving beyond a narrow concentration on audience practices, to study… [a] range of practices which are oriented towards media and the role of media in ordering other practices in the social world" (2004). *To study the role of media in ordering other practices in the social world* is precisely what is needed to better understand the significance of the exaggerated fictive representations of democracy found within the televised Franjas, as well as their enduring role within Chilean political culture.

The 1988 Franjas are the original Chilean political fiction developed precisely with the intention of helping mediate an internally fractured political reality. During 1988, the Franjas articulated a differentiation between experiential political life from mediatized representations of political life in Chile – a military dictatorship metastasizing a violent and contradictory lived social process on the one hand, while on the other hand, oppositional televised Franjas articulated happy political self-representations celebrating Chilean democratic life, featuring mimes, dancing and jingles. After 1988 this fractured political reality congealed as a gap in Chilean political culture.

I propose that what began with the emergence of this gap in 1988 be best understood as a socio-historical process identifiable as the *Mediatization of Politics*: "…a social change process through which the media have become increasingly autonomous from political institutions and actors while at the same time increasing their influence over political actors, institutions and processes" (Strömbäck 2016). My definition of the *mediatization of politics* names a process of differentiation between what is politically knowable and viable as a social and historical course of action, with what is potentially acceptable in a mediated space of political culture.[7]

I employ both quantitative and qualitative research methods to track and name the initial moments and the accompanying logics of this *mediatization of politics*. By

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[7] I am borrowing here from L.S. Vygotsky and his "zone of proximal development" as it has been used in Cultural-Historical Activity Theory to describe the relationship between human development and learning: "What we call *the zone of proximal development… is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers*" (86). Emphasis comes from the original.

using the situated development of the 1988 Franjas as a case study to code the

approximately thirteen hours of Franja Electoral material through a Content Analysis,

I demonstrate how historical narratives and political discourse within the 1988

Plebiscito in general, and the televised *Franjas* in particular, originally took shape

within politically determined media strategies framed by the context and situated

intentions of the moment, marked the differentiation between lived political

engagement and media representations of politics, and suggests a process of

mediatization of Chilean politics with the Franjas themselves elevated to a space of

political engagement and formation.

I further develop my investigation through a qualitative analysis employing a

combination of historical, discursive and textual research methods to establish how

this initial moment in the *mediatization of Chilean politics* evolved into a more

expansive qualitative change in the meaning and enactment of Chilean democracy

within which mediatized televisual politics became politically ascendant, and signaled

an enduring change in Chilean political culture. Forward again to the 2013 presidential

elections, we see this qualitative paradox in full bloom - modern and stable yet

simultaneously bizarre and potentially neurotic.

My use of the *mediatization of politics* as a conceptual framework involves

side-stepping any attempt to situate the *Franjas* and the 1988 electoral victory of the

NO campaign as a demonstration of some type of instrumentalized political power

intrinsic to political communication via TV. Unlike other investigations that involve

the 1988 *Plebiscito,* this is not a media effects research project, nor I do not look at

audience reception and Chilean voting patterns to substantiate my theoretical

argument. Moreover, the configuration of the Chilean television industry in 1988 was

outside the norm of other comparable Latin American television systems, rendering

this Chilean case of political communication as less-than ideal for gathering useful

insight into the role of TV as an instrumental medium for political change. Thus, this

project is not another effort to nail down a causal relationship between the televised

Franjas and the NO victory in the *Plebiscito*.

Organization of Dissertation

Part I of the dissertation is composed of Chapters 1 and 2, and establishes the historical context for the project beginning with Chile in 1970 and ending with the transfer of the presidential sash to Patricio Aylwin in 1990. Chapter 1 begins with the political crisis of the Allende presidency, then focuses on the terrible violence, crushing power, and enduring political legacy of Pinochet's military regime in Chile, describing how it came to dominate all facets of life after 1973. I also describe the most important stages in the development of the 1980 constitutional plebiscite, and the context of the 1988 *Plebiscito* as a political, historical, and cultural process envisioned and articulated as a legitimation of Pinochet's power. In this chapter I also describe the increasingly significant domestic and international pressures levied against Pinochet and his regime, demanding democratic change and a transition to civilian governance up to the final moments preceding the 1988 *Plebiscito.* Chapter 1 concludes with an introduction and overview of the internal reforms, institutional preparations, and oppositional acceptance of the 1988 *Plebiscito.*

Chapter 2 is a continuation of pertinent historical narrative and opens with an overview of the televised Franja campaign in the context of 1988, followed by a summary of Chilean political history immediately after the 1988 *Plebiscito*. I end this chapter with a review of the unique history of Chilean TV as a national industry and as an instrument of cultural production through 1990.

Part II introduces and develops the Mediatization of Politics as the theoretical framework of my project. I open Chapter 3 by highlighting the cultural significance of

the 1988 Franjas and an enduring example of political communication as expressed

through the 2012 feature film *NO*. Here I provide an historical narrative of this

political moment, critique the limits of this narrative, and the emergence of a

Plebiscito/ Franja mythology as an artifact of Chilean political culture. This chapter

establishes the 1988 Franjas as an artifact of the *mediatization of Chilean politics*, and

provides a review of existing scholarship that builds on the theories of Mediatization

and the Mediatization of Politics. In this chapter I introduce numerous terms and

concepts that relate to Mediatization theory in general, and to the Mediatization of

Politics in particular. I also elaborate on my adaptations of Mediatization theory for

studying this Chilean case. The intention of Chapter 3 is to introduce these conceptual

tools and to explain the elements and basic configuration of my conceptual

framework.

Chapter 4 starts by looking the 1988 Plebiscito as a shift in political culture,

and the Franjas as an example of political communication that transcends the limits of

existing media research and conceptual tools. I argue that the Franjas are better

understood when looked at by less traditional/ less established theoretical frameworks

as described in Chapter 3. I also develop my references to Cultural Historical Activity

Theory and Vygotsky's "zone of proximal development" as useful conceptual models

for understanding this shift Chilean political culture. I end Chapter 4 with a brief

review of existing research on the Franjas in particular, highlighting some of the most

salient contributions and limitations of this work.

Part III focuses on the empirical aspects of my research. Chapter 5 opens with a technical description of the Franjas and the timelines for the securing and recovery of this important audio/ visual material, as well as the methodology and coding scheme developed for this Content Analysis, followed by the hypotheses I developed to test my theoretical framework. Chapter 5 ends with a range of quantitative descriptions of the Franjas.

Chapter 6 opens with a descriptive overview of the Franjas as an audio/visual text, and covers the results of my content analysis, to end with a description of the internal tensions and contested space of Chilean political/ historical memory.

Finally, I conclude this project in one final chapter. Chapter 7 covers the historical arch of *la Concertación*, delineates the key elements and consequences of the *mediatization of Chilean politics*, and points to my impressions regarding the theoretical and conceptual implications of this research, highlighting the most relevant characteristics of "mediatization of politics" as a global process, and my plans for future research in the field.

The final sections of this project are reserved for the Appendices and the Bibliography. The Appendices include extensive documentation related to my content analysis, charts representing the data sets developed for this thesis, as well other documents related to the general themes highlighted in the dissertation.

PART I:

The Historical Context

Image 1.1: General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 1973.

Chapter 1.
The Foundation Of Pinochet's Enduring Legacy

Although this project focuses on the audio-visual content that was broadcasted during the 27-day televised campaign known as the *Franja de Propaganda Electoral*, I believe there is theoretical and historical value in looking more closely at the enduring implications of this media/ culture relationship. My broader intention has always been to better understand the significance of this a/v material as an artifact of Chilean political culture. With this in mind, I begin this project by building upon the historical proposition that when the Franjas were broadcast nationally during the 27-days of the televised campaign, that was the initial moment when the contours of a post-Pinochet political landscape was articulated to the Chilean public.

How Chileans understood the Franjas at that particular moment might remain open for debate, but what is abundantly clear is that the 1988 *Plebiscito* took place at a moment when the vast majority of Chileans (both Pinochetistas and the opposition) where prepared to accept some form of political transition in spite of the fact that Pinochet still held a firm grip on power. The emergence of this consensus involved a drawn-out process historically rooted in the period of Allende and *la Unidad Popular*. Hence, to begin my analysis it is necessary to historically situate the 1988 Franjas through a periodization of Chilean politics that spans both the *Unidad Popular* government and the Pinochet dictatorship, precisely because the significance of the 1988 *Plebiscito* as a political process is best understood when it is contrasted against the 18 years of political conflict that preceded it. The first part of this periodization

therefore begins in 1970 at the beginning the Presidency of Salvador Allende, and

ends with the 1988 *Plebiscito* and the political context when the first Franja del NO

appeared on television screens across Chile.

Chile 1970 to 1988

Through 1973 Chile was one among only a few stable democracies in Latin America (see Appendix G). Since the late 1920s through 1970 the country had maintained a relatively firm and uninterrupted chain of civilian governance (Angell 2007: 197).[8] The Carabineros de Chile (the militarized national police force) and the Chilean armed forces were known as well trained, uncorrupted, disciplined organizations. The institutional political culture of Chileans ran deep, with large swaths of the population actively engaged in national politics, self-identifying with strong labor unions, student federations, and other related civic organizations (Boas 2009b: 64-65).

To accompany the high level of popular political engagement through 1973, Chile also nurtured a vibrant political literacy and political culture. Although the majority of the daily national newspapers were widely considered instruments of the political and economic elite, an unusually high number of them circulated throughout Chile. In 1963 a survey concluded that 86% of Chilean adults read a daily newspaper (Alisky 1981: 200). In 1973 five newspapers with a total circulation of 312,000 were considered supportive of the UP government, six newspapers with a total circulation of 541,000 were considered as part of the opposition (Stein 2008: 287), and newspaper circulation was at 89 per 1000 Chileans (Salinas Bascur 1979: 84). Each of these

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[8] Identifying this as a period of political stability can be contested when the violence and repression of the González Videla presidency (1946-52) is factored in, though his tenure did represent a period of civilian governance.

figures was well above the average circulation of newspapers for most Latin American countries and point to a robust political culture throughout the country.

Similar to the rest of Latin America, radio emerged as a prominent source of news and political information for Chileans. During the 1970s there were at least 150 radio stations throughout the country and "better than 90% listened to radio news every day" (Alisky 1981: 200). In 1970 TV, on the other hand, was still a novelty limited to the wealthy (Fox 1993: 279). Often eclipsing print journalism and radio, the most important sources of political information and individual civil engagement were political parties and broad coalitions that covered the entire ideological spectrum, ranging from the *Partido Nacional* on the right, to the *Unidad Popular* on the left. Historically, Chileans strongly identified themselves through ideological ties and party affiliation, and accumulated political formation primarily through direct experience from participation in unions and federations, as well as interpersonal communication among compatriots (Angell 2007: 10).

Salvador Allende Gossens won the presidency of Chile in 1970 as the candidate of the left coalition know as *la Unidad Popular* (UP). With active support from the United States, Chilean ultra-conservatives immediately initiated anti-government plans and mobilized activities to disrupt the institutional order. The constitutionalist General and then Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, René Schneider, was mortally wounded on October 22, 1970, within a month of Allende taking office. This assassination was designed to disrupt the congressional vote confirming Salvador Allende as President of Chile (Loveman 2001: 248). General

Schneider had been identified among the Chilean right and by CIA operatives in Chile

as one of the most substantial obstacles to blocking Allende from assuming control of

La Moneda (Loveman 2001: 257). The General's assassination set the tone for

subsequent struggles, and "…the first year of the Unidad Popular government was

characterized by euphoria on the left… [while the] dominant class concentrated on

obstructing the popular government politically, impeaching Allende's ministers,

refusing to pass UP legislation, and attempting to use ambiguous provisions in the

Constitution to block intervention or expropriation of industries" (Davies 1999: 90).

These activities increased both in number and intensity, spilling out into Chilean

streets and countryside as hostility spread throughout 1972 and 1973. In the months

leading up to September 1973, the economy of Chile had been utterly destabilized and

political violence had increased dramatically, while unceasing rumors of an inevitable

coup d'état became *el pan de cada día*.[9]

The most brutal chapter of Chilean history began on September 11, 1973 when

the democratically elected socialist government of Salvador Allende was subjected to

a CIA sponsored anti-communist military coup d'état led by the recently appointed

Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte.[10] In the course

of this coup, and once it had become clear that Allende would not resign the

presidency, the principal seat of Chilean government known as the *Palacio de la*

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[9] "…the daily bread." There had already been one failed coup on June 29, 1973 known as "El Tanquetazo."

[10] Pinochet was appointed to the position on August 23, 1973, after the resignation of General Carlos Prats González.

Moneda was surrounded with tanks and combat-ready infantry by order of Pinochet and his fellow coup plotters. Under threat of imminent death Allende still refused to surrender, and instead relieved his staff of duty and instructed all but a few men from his security detail to evacuate La Moneda palace. The Chilean Air Force (FACH) initiated the bombing of La Moneda at 11:52 a.m. President Allende was killed during the subsequent siege of the presidential palace, and his death was declared a suicide by the *golpista* military regime.[11]

The smoke had not yet cleared from La Moneda when political leaders, artists and scholars were rounded up and imprisoned in Santiago's *Estadio Nacional*, which at that point had been converted into a concentration camp for real and perceived enemies of the military regime.[12] While incarcerated with thousands of other political prisoners at the Estadio Nacional, the leftist musician Víctor Jara was made to suffer more severely as a warning to those who might oppose the new military junta. In order to display the power of the regime, before Jara was killed, his captors crushed his hands to prevent him from playing his guitar during his few remaining days in custody at the stadium.

Martial law descended across Chile, and a permanent curfew was imposed. Anyone caught on the streets after dark was subject to interrogation and possible arrest. Just days after the coup, the internationally recognized poet and Nobel laureate Pablo Neruda was murdered by a poison injection given to him while he was

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[11] For decades the circumstances of Allende's death remained a topic of debate and speculation that contributed to the inscrutable nature of Pinochetista violence. Recent investigations confirmed that Allende did indeed commit suicide.

[12] The national soccer stadium in Santiago.

hospitalized in preparation for an otherwise standard medical procedure.[13] During this initial period, all active duty officials who had shown reservations about the coup d'état were purged from the military forces. Any high-ranking officials who had expressed their loyalty to the Chilean constitution were immediately detained and often subjected to torture or even death, as was the case of General Bachelet Martínez, the father of future President Michelle Bachelet.

In the course of the subsequent months political parties were outlawed. All remaining constitutional guarantees were suspended, the Chilean Congress was dissolved, and all non-government political activities were declared illegal. Radio and TV broadcasting towers that had not been destroyed or occupied by military troops were threatened with violent seizure should they broadcast any content deemed unacceptable by military censors (Davies 1999: 120). Soon thereafter all media outlets, broadcast and print, were brought under the control of a military council of censors know as *la División de Comunicación Social* (DINACOS).

The armed forces occupied all Chilean universities, and existing administrators were replaced with military appointed councils led by "Rectores Delegados" or "delegated chancellors" who immediately brought Chilean TV stations under the direct control of the regime and began to purge critical thought from the schools (Matte Larraín 1988: 115). "Under the military regime, the social sciences suffered massive expulsions of students and dismissals of professors, with the notable

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[13] Although there is strong evidence to suggest that Neruda was murdered, recent investigations have not yet provided incontrovertible proof of the act.

exception of the orthodox or 'neoliberal' schools of economics associated with the Chicago Boys… around 25 per cent of the professors, 10 to 15 per cent of the non-academic personnel and 15 to 18 per cent of the students (more than 20,000) were expelled" (Davies 1999: 109).

All educational institutions from high school and below were brought under the administrative control of the military. Foreign citizens who had developed any type of relationship with the Allende government were detained; some were tortured and expelled from Chile.

Throughout subsequent years, tens of thousands of Chileans were tortured and/or killed. Across the country, cities and towns were visited by the extra-official military *Caravana de la Muerte* that infamously murdered people who had been included on secret lists collected since 1970[14] (Enfoque 2016). The whole of Chilean civil society was systematically crushed. Student leaders, political activists, cultural workers, labor union leaders, and supporters of the Allende government were detained, tortured, and killed. Many others were "disappeared," a name given to a covert form of government repression most often involving masked tactical teams of DINA and CNI agents who would conduct pre-dawn raids of homes, looking for individuals who were guilty of having supported the Allende government or resisted the Pinochet regime.[15] During these pre-dawn raids, agents would invariably converge on their targets in dark green Ford Falcon sedans, knock down the doors to homes, and

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[14] "Caravan of Death" – a national mission undertaken by a Chilean military death squad in 1973.

[15] DINA – The *Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional* was the precursor to the CNI (Central Nacional de Investigaciones). Both were Pinochet's political police and enforcers for the military regime.

carry away the political enemies of the military regime. It has been reported that many of the *disappeared* were thrown from military helicopters into the Pacific Ocean. At least 3,000 people were *disappeared* or "killed by the state" throughout Chile, and for most of these people, it was the last their families ever heard of their whereabouts (Bucciferro 2012: 30).

Between 1973 and 1988 at least 200,000 Chileans were forced into exile, although some accounts place the number as high as one million (Bucciferro 2012: 30). Leaving everything behind, a massive swath of Chilean society was compelled to live out the remainder of their lives in random countries scattered across the world. One of these exiles was the constitutionalist General Carlos Prats González, the last Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army who had remained loyal to President Allende but was forced to resign a few weeks before the 1973 coup d'état.

On September 30, 1974 while living in exile in Argentina, General Prats and his wife, Sofia, were assassinated by the explosion of a car bomb planted by DINA agents by order of Pinochet. Two years later, on September 21, 1976, the former Chilean ambassador to the United States, Orlando Letelier, was also assassinated by a DINA car-bomb while living in exile in Washington D.C. The murder of Ambassador Letelier also came by order of Pinochet and the military regime.

From 1975 through 1989 Pinochet's military government and his DINA and CNI agents were architects, founding members, sponsors, and key operational supporters of *Operación Cóndor*, a continent-wide campaign to coordinate and carry out a right-wing military strategy of state terrorism responsible for having helped

orchestrate, or had a direct hand in coup d'états, assassinations, and cases of torture that resulted in at least 50,000 people assassinated, 35,000 disappeared, and 400,000 imprisoned across the southern cone of Latin America (Gaudichaud 2005: 17). The supplementary intention of this violence was the complete disarticulation of existing and future leftist political influence in Chile, and potentially the violent "extermination" of leftist politics from the whole of South America.

Within Chile, the national economy was rapidly and aggressively restructured according to the neoliberal dictates of Milton Friedman and his "Chicago Boys." New labor related proclamations imposed a wage freeze, eliminated government subsidies and price regulation of basic consumer goods, proscribed the right to strike, and instituted a framework for the military government to intervene and if necessary impose collective punishment across entire industries[16] (Gaudichaud 2015: 23).

Previously nationalized Chilean copper production was partially opened for private and international investment, but its nationalization was not reversed during the military regime as one might have expected. Instead the state-owned corporation CODELCO was formalized and expanded, while proceeds from copper extraction helped sustain the military regime during years of increasing international diplomatic and economic isolation that came as a consequence of its ongoing policy of state terror. (Heiss and Navia 2007: 180). The United States, China, Israel, and South Africa were Chile's only prominent international supporters, although even Pinochet's

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[16] This was primarily directed against Chilean miners and ancillary workers of the nationalized copper industry.

harshest international critics maintained at least some degree of economic trade with Chile throughout this period (Angell 2007: 16).

Before Pinochet, the Chilean people had cultivated a strong political and civic culture, accumulated across generations of struggle and informed political debate. From Chile emerged scholarship, music, poetry, art, and political thinking which had an influence that extended across Latin America and the world. This vibrant Chilean political culture was crushed on September 11, 1973, and all that related to the previous procedural democracy and institutional order was disrupted. All national media was an instrument controlled by those Chileans "adictos al régimen" (Boas 2015: 9)[17]

This is a brief summary of how the military regime that conquered state power in Chile had become one of the most repressive of Latin America. Under the institutionally uncontested control of the Pinochet military regime, the dictator imposed his political will on Chilean civil society through violence and the perpetual threat of violence. The history of Chile was altered to accommodate Pinochet's power, and among the Chilean people there was absolutely no confusion as to who was in charge of the country both politically and culturally between 1973 and 1988 (Crofts Wiley 2006: 672, Silva 2009: 249). Indeed, this was the darkest period in Chile's modern history.

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[17] This phrase is used by Patricio Bañados in one of the earliest NO Franjas. It refers to "those who are addicted to the military regime." The phrase was used as a less pejorative description of Chileans who were actively collaborating with the military regime. Supporters of the military regime represented a significant percentage of the population, and the NO campaign did not wish to totally alienate this sector from the opposition.

The Urgency Of Political Normalization

In spite of the seemingly unhinged nature of the violence undertaken by the Pinochet dictatorship during and after the 1973 coup, it was, however, uniquely methodical and ideologically rationalized. There were many among the political leadership of the military regime that held firmly to an anti-communist rational-legal authority as justification for their actions; key among those figures was Jaime Guzmán, a constitutional law professor, and one of the most important ideologues of the Pinochet regime. Guzmán was the intellectual author of the concept that Chilean institutional order should be re-created as a "protected democracy." This involved a preference for civilian governance, but military intervention in the political affairs of Chile was always justified, should the stability of the state be threatened, particularly from the organized left. This conceptualization of Chile as a "protected democracy" became a key factor in motivating the military regime to set forth plans for a return of civilian control to Chilean politics.

Chilean scholar and prominent Christian Democrat during the 1988 transition, Edgardo Boeninger, summarized the ideological roots and political intentions of the regime in three essential objectives:

> 1. *La implementación de una 'democracia protegida' (denominación dada por su inspirador Jaime Guzmán) en sustitución de la supuestamente fracasada 'democracia liberal.' Como expresión de dicha protección, los marxistas debían quedar excluidos del sistema político.*
> 2. *La adscripción de Chile a una economía capitalista, abierta al exterior, plenamente liberalizada, en la que al Estado le cabría un reducido rol subsidiario.*
> 3. *La prolongación del gobierno de Pinochet, estimado en un total de veinticinco años, para consolidar el nuevo modelo.*

Las tres propuestas anteriores se plasman en la Constitución de 1980 dictada por Pinochet. (24)[18]

According to this argument, from 1980 onward, the military regime sought to establish a "protected democracy," operating to fill the gap left by the presumed ideological bankruptcy and political failure of Chilean liberal democracy. This new "protected democracy" could only take root after having disarticulated or purged any Marxist threat from the country. Clearly at work guiding the military regime's transition policy, this ideological/political framework was the foundation of the dictatorship's normative political logic between 1973 and 1990.

Soon after the 1973 coup d'état, the military regime worked to identify potential institutional avenues to legitimate its seizure of Chilean state power, and assigned its most effective political thinkers to develop a medium to long-term plan that would include a civilian path towards political normalization in Chile. For the tyrant, the long view was to discipline the progression of Chilean national politics to remain within the parameters established through what was to become his 17-year dictatorship.

It was clear to Pinochet and his associates that this process of political normalization would require first and foremost judicial immunity for all actions taken

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[18] 1. The implementation of a "protected democracy" (so denominated by its founder Jaime Guzmán) to take the place of the failed "liberal democracy." The key expression of this protected status that Marxists would be excluded from the political system. 2. Chilean ascription to a capitalist economy, open to international capital, broadly liberalized, within which the State must play a diminished subsidizing role. 3. Prolonging Pinochet's government to a total of 25 years, the time required to consolidate this new model of governance. These three goals are directly reflected in Pinochet's 1980 Constitution.

on behalf of the regime since 1973. Furthermore, there was a need for the legitimation of the existing military and forthcoming civilian re-configurations of state, legislative, and economic power. Finally, the process required enough institutional permanence to survive the inevitable return of civilian rule to the country.

Institutional political power would have to be re-created from scratch, and this pointed to a need for the development of a new constitutional framework for Chile. Thus, the task of developing the plan and a new constitution was commissioned to a group that became know as *la Comisión Ortúzar*, named so in honor of its director Enrique Ortúzar Escobar. This constitutional commission included the participation of Jaime Guzmán, the architect of the "protected democracy." The *Ortúzar* plan proposed the establishment of a "legal" framework within which a controlled transition process could be delineated through a new Chilean constitution. This new constitutional framework was key to the long-term survival of the regime since, over time, it would be "democratically" sustained, offering a political blueprint outlining a plebiscitory process intended to legitimate the existing political order, via the hallmark of all procedural democracies – the popular vote.

In broad strokes, this process of political "opening" was accepted by the military junta and approved by a complacent Chilean Supreme Court in 1979. Each step thereafter was deliberate, seeking to establish a legal veneer and ultimate civilian approval for prolonging the political life of the regime that had seized state power in 1973. Each reform and every vote, both for and against this new constitution, represented a step forward in the process of transitioning the existing regime from

being classified as a military dictatorship, towards institutional self-representation as a legitimated procedural, "protected" democracy.

By 1979 the work of this commission had been completed, and a new chapter commenced in this planned "transition" to civilian rule when, in 1980, the new constitution was introduced to the country. Again, this new constitution had not come from a constituent assembly, but from a special commission convened by the Chilean military government as a consequence of their having suspended the previous Constitution of 1925. An historically unprecedented Constitutional Plebiscite, which would leave behind Pinochet's interruption of constitutional governance and usher in a new constitutional order, was scheduled to take place in late 1980. Approval of Pinochet's new Constitution would formalize his new position as "President of the Republic" and provide a "legal" institutional framework justifying everything that had taken place thus far.

The 1980 constitution afforded the military regime a series of completely anti-democratic powers: when Pinochet would finally surrendered the "presidency" (whether this be in 1990 or in 1997) he would immediately become a "Senator for Life," and be awarded immunity from any type of prosecution for actions taken on behalf of "Chilean institutional order." Furthermore, Pinochet would serve as a "Senator for Life" in a Chilean Senate where he would have the constitutional power to personally appoint 1/4 of his fellow senators. Most importantly, Pinochet would remain "Commander in Chief" of the Chilean army, the same position from which he had directed the 1973 coup d'état (Angell 2007: 142). Pinochet would also retain a

legal mandate to choose his own National Security Council that would be empowered to dissolve congress and constitutionally depose any subsequently elected civilian president, if such an action were to be deemed necessary by this Security Council for containment of threats that jeopardized the "national security." The Constitution also imposed a binomial electoral configuration that artificially inflated the representative congressional power of political conservatives across the country.

Clearly, Pinochet had every intention of remaining in power through 1997, albeit with the authority granted to him through the new Constitution of 1980. From 1989 onward Pinochet hoped to remain in power as a president with a democratic mandate. The planned "transition" that was to take place in Chile thus began in 1980 with this initial constitutional plebiscite that was authored and authorized by the Pinochet regime to establish "popular ratification" of his 1980 Constitution.

Indeed, "popular ratification" of this new constitution symbolically took place on September 11, 1980 with a national referendum involving a SÍ or NO vote - "yes" to ratify and "no" to reject the Pinochetista Constitution. The SÍ option was quickly declared the winner having secured 67% of the vote, and Chile thereafter had a new Constitution that was more in line with the political configuration of the military regime.

Image 1.2: Ballot used for the 1980 Constitutional Plebiscite.

Of course the constitutional plebiscite of 1980 was not convened with any type of national voter roll, nor was this plebiscite subject to oversight from a formal electoral/procedural organization. Although this first 1980 plebiscite was denounced as fraudulent by the political opposition to Pinochet, and its legitimacy was severely questioned by all international observers, the results of the 1980 plebiscite were nonetheless declared legitimate by the military junta and the 1980 Constitution was thereby ratified.

Included as part of the 1980 plebiscite was an important section that set forth the framework for a second plebiscite in 1988 that would mark the end of "the period

of institutional reconstitution" – the phrase used in the new constitution to legitimate

the 1973 coup d'état and subsequent 17-year dictatorship.[19]

2013 marked both the 40th anniversary of Pinochet's coup d'état and the 33rd

anniversary of Pinochet's constitution. In observance of this moment, Chilean political

scientist Claudio Fuentes developed a report outlining the fraudulent nature of the

1980 Constitution as part of a contemporary legal challenge to the existing Magna

Carta. His report opens with the following description:

> El fraude electoral más grande de la historia de Chile se ejecutó
> en un mes. Entre el 10 de agosto y el 11 de septiembre de 1980 la
> dictadura militar del general Augusto Pinochet materializa un acto en el
> cual no se cumplió ninguna de las condiciones básicas para el ejercicio
> de un proceso libre e informado por parte de la ciudadanía… [Se] sabia
> que con este fraude el general Pinochet terminaría por institucionalizar
> su régimen. Se trató de un engaño burdo… sin padrón electoral, con
> vocales de mesa designados por el régimen, con la abierta intervención
> de organismos de seguridad, sin acceso al conteo de votos, sin libertad
> de prensa, con una papeleta semitransparente que dejaba ver la
> preferencia de los electores. Un proceso que se realizo en el marco de un
> estado de emergencia y con una fuerte represión a los opositores que
> intentaron llamar a votar que No. El régimen utilizó todos los medios del
> Estado a su alcance para socializar sus ideas. Movilizó a militares,
> intendencias y municipios. Incorporó a empresarios, sindicatos y a
> gremios. Realizó parodias de apoyo, congregó gente en las calles. Se
> dieron órdenes directivas para trasladar a la gente. Suspendió clases e
> hizo que cientos de personas salieran a la calle a saludar a Pinochet en
> una gira que se extendió por varias semanas…
> A esas irregularidades se sumaba el hecho de que, contra toda
> lógica, el plebiscito consultaba sobre tres materias distintas: la
> Constitución, el itinerario de transición y la permanencia del general
> Pinochet. Una sola marca (votar SÍ o votar No) dirimía el conjunto de la
> materias.
> No se permitió que la oposición o la ciudadanía en general
> tuviesen acceso a los medios de comunicación para dar a conocer la

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[19] This 1980 constitutional binomial arrangement remained in effect until 2015. Since 1990 multiple constitutional reforms eliminated some of the more egregious undemocratic elements of the 1980 Constitution.

postura contraria al plebiscito. Únicamente se autorizó un acto público masivo antes de la votación, pero se prohibió que fuera transmitido por las pantallas de televisión. El acto del plebiscito se realizó bajo declaración de estado de emergencia, con las libertades públicas de movimiento, prensa y reunión, entre otras, restringidas. Además, los partidos políticos se encontraban proscritos, sin posibilidad de organizarse para defender la opción No. Quienes se atrevieron a expresarse en las calles fueron fuertemente reprimidos por carabineros y la Central Nacional de Investigaciones - CNI (11-12).[20]

Chilean print and broadcast media was heavily censored throughout this period, although there was no rapid privatization of the media as one might have expected from this Chicago Boy regime (Portales 1986: 99-100). The only print media tolerated by the dictatorship were "small-scale publications such as *Análisis, Apsi, Fortín Mapocho,* and *La Epoca* (Cronovich 2013: 15). There were two important radio signals tolerated by the regime as representative of Pinochet's opposition, *Cooperativa*

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[20] "The biggest electoral fraud in the history of Chile was executed in a month. Between August 10th and September 11th 1980 the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet materializes an act in which none of the basic conditions for a free and informed civil process was fulfilled ... [It was] clear that through this fraud General Pinochet would eventually institutionalize his regime… This was a gross deception... with no electoral roll, with poll workers appointed by the regime, with the public intervention of security agencies, with no public scrutiny of the vote count, with no freedom of the press, with a semi-transparent ballot that allowed the voter preference to be seen from the outside. This was a process that was carried out under a state of emergency, while a heavy repression of opponents took place, as they tried to rally people to vote NO. The regime used every means at its disposal to socialize its ideas. It mobilized the military, districts and municipalities. The regime recruited employers, unions, and guilds. It staged events to demonstrate popular support, convening people in the streets. Directives were issued to move people from one place to another. The regime suspended classes and compelled hundreds of students to take to the streets to greet Pinochet, who went on a national tour that lasted several weeks.
"To all of these irregularities add that, perversely, the plebiscite involved three different decisions: approval of the Constitution, the timeline for the transition to civilian governance, and permanence of General Pinochet. A single vote (YES or NO) decided the whole matter.
"The opposition and the general public were denied access to the media to publicize their opposition. Only one public event was authorized before the vote, and it was banned from television. The entire plebiscite took place under a declared state of emergency, with restrictions imposed on public freedoms of movement, press and assembly, among others. In addition, political parties were banned, offering no possibility to organize on behalf of the NO option. Those who dared to express themselves in public were strongly repressed by the police and the National Intelligence Agency (CNI).

and *Chilena* (Angell 2007: 22), although television remained completely controlled by the military regime (Sunkel 2001). Television for its part had been fully consolidated by the mid 1980s, but was always perceived as a direct mouthpiece military regime and, therefore, all content was understood as biased in favor of the regime (Boas 2015: 9). During the dictatorship the most frequented sources of political information shifted away from newsprint. Radio remained consistent, but it was television that gained prominence in the field of Chilean political communication (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 3).

     In summary, between 1973 and 1987 all national political, legislative, cultural, and economic fields within Chile were brought under the control of Augusto Pinochet and his two main sources of political power - the military junta representing each of the newly politically activated branches of the military forces, the Carabineros, the secret police (DINA and CNI), and the economic elite of Chile that formed the core of Pinochet's civilian supporters (Matte Larraín 1988: 110).

The First Cracks In The Dictator's Iron Fist

Throughout this period, significant resistance to Pinochet and the military regime was rooted among Chileans within the country, as well as increasingly emerging from exile communities and people from around the world working in solidarity for a democratic Chile (Angell 2007: 2). There were multiple forms of domestic resistance during the military regime, though broad political opposition within Chile was largely confined to operating within the boundaries set by the military government under the ever-present threat of violence. All political parties remained illegal, and the social and cultural networks established by these groups had been thoroughly diminished. Yet, in spite of this repressive environment, some political organizing managed to survive. Trade unions and federations were also repressed, though a handful remained active throughout the country (Silva 2009: 250).

On May 11, 1983, for the first time in a decade, the Chilean people poured into the streets in large numbers to answer a call issued by la Confederación de Trabajadores del Cobre (CTC) invoking national protests against the regime (Salazar Salvo 2008). These protests began to spread rapidly in spite of a renewed wave of violent repression unleashed by the dictatorship to contain them. When protests continued to surge, the military junta intensified its response by declaring a national emergency and a state of siege that remained in force through most of 1984. Thereafter national protests would spread, inevitably subside, and then suddenly explode again across Chile.

On March 3, 1985 a massive earthquake struck Chile seeming to embody Mother Nature's contribution to escalating political tensions. In the aftermath of this earthquake, particularly in the poorest sectors of Santiago, Chileans were often compelled to organize the recovery effort for themselves, and many of these community-level popular coalitions became public spaces for the reproduction of political discontent (Chile: Las Imágenes Prohibidas Cap. 2). The cycle of protest and repression culminated in July 1986 with a call for "un paro nacional" - a general strike demanding a return of democratic rule to Chile.

Image 1.3: Flyer announcing the general strike of 1986.

Political crises such as those provoked by the 1985 case of "Caso Degollados,"[21] and the July 1986 "Caso Quemados,"[22] and the failed September 1986

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[21] The "Caso Degollados" literally translates as "The Case of the Cut Throats." This refers to the infamous case of three activists - artist Santiago Nattino, college professor José Manuel Parada, and teacher Manuel Guerrero - kidnapped in broad daylight off of busy Santiago streets on March 27 and 28, 1985. They were found five days later along the side of a highway, their throats cut and their bodies showing clear signs of torture. The three men were also active members of the Communist Party. Although the Chilean courts identified nine officers from the Carabineros as responsible for the murders, none were ever prosecuted for their crimes.

"ajusticiamiento" of Pinochet by the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR)[23]

exacerbated political tensions across Chile. Daily spontaneous popular outbursts as

well as organized protests and anti-Pinochet actions increased in frequency and

intensity with each episode of political violence and repression.

Throughout this period there were also increasingly significant external

pressures on Pinochet and the military regime demanding they reconsider their violent

administration of the country. To begin, Chile – "the exemplar of 'pure' neoliberal

practices after 1975 - got hit by an economic crisis during the early 1980s: gross

domestic product fell by nearly 14 per cent," unemployment rose to 24 percent, and

40% of Chileans were classified as living below the line of poverty (Harvey 2005: 74,

Tironi 2013: 124, McChesney 1999: 112). This economic crisis exploded in tandem

with the earlier described political crisis to burst open in 1983.

By the end of 1985 it was apparent that the political resilience of the dictator

had been shaken, and the military regime was caught in a destabilizing cycle of

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[22] The "Caso Quemados" literally translates as "The Case of the Burned Ones." This refers to another infamous case of two young Chileans, 19-year-old photographer Rodrigo Rojas de Negri, and 18-year-old student Carmen Gloria Quintana, who were both detained on July 2, 1986 by an army patrol of 25 men. At the time of their detention, approximately 8:00 am, Carmen and Rodrigo were preparing to participate in a "paro nacional"-related protest. While in custody on a centrally located street of their Santiago barrio, the soldiers beat them, then doused them with gasoline, and set them both on fire. After letting them burn for some time, the soldiers were ordered to put out the flames and load the badly burned young people into the back of a military vehicle. Rodrigo and Carmen were found a few hours later, abandoned to die on the side of a rural road just outside of Santiago. Rodrigo died soon after, although Carmen survived. Of the 25 military personnel involved in this criminal act, only one solider was imprisoned then released on a medical reprieve after having only served one year.
[23] The Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez was an armed offshoot of the Chilean Communist Party. On September 7, 1986 the Frente organized an attempt to "physically eliminate" Pinochet who was riding in a military caravan from his rural residence back to Santiago. The operation failed to eliminate Pinochet, although he was wounded during the attack and five members of his security detail were killed.

escalating state repression on one side, and expanding civil resistance on the other.

When it had become clear that increasing repression engendered the opposite of the

intended result by motivating larger protests, it was also clear that the disciplining fear

that had been enough to contain public political opposition in the past was beginning

to lose its potency. Even the Catholic Church became involved in Chilean politics

during a controversial and highly politicized papal visit to Chile in 1987, with Pope

John Paul II openly criticizing the violence unleashed by the regime - although the

Pope was also harshly criticized by Pinochet's opposition for failing to openly call for

an end to the dictatorship.

Nonetheless, resistance and extraneous pressures helped rally additional

support for a small but significant shift in how Chilean political power was perceived

within the military regime, motivating discussion and incremental action about how to

interpret the next "democratizing" step called for within Pinochet's 1980 constitution,

the potential of forthcoming political reforms, and the direction the country should

take as it prepared to enter the new decade of the 1990s.

As previously stated, the primary source of these reforms did not originate

from a thirst for democracy within Pinochet's heart, nor a change in spirit of the

military junta. These reforms were primarily motivated by an interest to legitimate the

existing political order, and a secondary impulse to placate mounting domestic and

international pressure for an end to the military regime. There was no contending

source of political power in Chile capable of forcing the hand of the military regime.

Throughout the 1980s the dictatorship was, by all accounts, still strong and fully

capable of imposing its power through violence. To be sure, the protests and external pressures had been mounting, but by 1985 the economy was once again growing, there had been a self-glorified success declared by the military regime during the 1978 border crisis with Argentina, and the outlook was generally positive among supporters of Pinochet's status quo (Tironi 2013: 124). In other words, through the 1988 *Plebiscito* and even through the presidential elections of March of 1990 there was no distinction between Pinochet's power and what the Chilean people understood as representations of Pinochet's power - the reality of Chile remained one defined by the military dictatorship with the reigns of Chilean political power firmly in the hands of the military strongman.

This period was the last where the political landscape might still be considered "pre-mediatization" (see Strömbäck 2008, Mazzoleni 2008); the final moment in the political history of Chile when Chilean politics did not bow to accommodate any type of "media logic," which was already prominent in Chile but limited to commercial and entertainment media. This was a military dictatorship within which Chilean politics and political culture were violently fractured but still undivided; on the one hand operating under the dictates of the military regime, or on the other hand, struggling to resist the military regime.

Under these circumstances official preparations began in earnest for the military to accommodate some "protected" democratic reforms. By the mid 1980s this process was perceived by the dictatorship and its allies as key to their legitimation and continued political dominance through at least the subsequent decade. As far as

Pinochet's most sophisticated political minds were concerned, the entire process would be a controlled one, it would inevitably work in their favor, and in the end, even if things should go awry, their interests would remain fundamentally protected by the power of the Chilean armed forces.

El Plebiscito

The 1988 *Plebiscito* was the third plebiscite authored and authorized by the Pinochet regime. The first plebiscite was convened by the regime in 1979 as an effort to resist mounting international criticism of its policy of state terror. The second plebiscite was convened in 1980 to establish "popular ratification" of the new Constitution, and the third plebiscite was intended to provide "popular affirmation" of the process, conclude the transition to democracy and confirm a civilian presidency for Chile – albeit preferably by having the general remain in La Moneda and only have to exchange his military uniform for a business suit. The tyrant and his closest supporters fully expected to be "elected to office" when the final results of the 1988 *Plebiscito* were tallied, resulting in the de jure legitimation of Pinochet as the new president of Chile.

The third and final national plebiscite - which I identify as *el Plebiscito* throughout this project - was scheduled to take place on October 5, 1988 as a final referendum on whether Pinochet would remain in power for another eight years as duly elected President of Chile to serve until new elections were convened in 1997, the culmination of this nearly decade-long transition process. Within Chile and internationally, the process itself was already celebrated as "democratizing," irrespective of the final results of the vote. What was most important was that the 1988 *Plebiscito* be allowed to run its course because only as a completed process could *el Plebiscito* serve to confirm the democratic nature of this transition to procedural democracy, even with a Pinochet victory.

As in 1979 and 1980, the 1988 *Plebiscito* was to be decided according to a simple vote of *SÍ* or *NO*; a *"SÍ"* or *"YES"* victory would be a democratizing mandate for the dictator to retain power in Chile for another eight years as a "democratically elected" president. A *"NO"* victory required Pinochet to convene new presidential elections within twelve months of the 1988 *Plebiscito,* and subsequently surrender the "presidency" of Chile to a newly elected leader chosen from a field of candidates, presumably excluding Pinochet.[24]

Of course there was a risk that everything the military regime had "accomplished" during its 15 years of rule in Chile might be lost, although it was a very limited risk and mitigated by the fact that the power of the military remained in the hands of Pinochet indefinitely (Crofts Wiley 2006: 674, Angell 2007: 42). If by some slim chance the NO campaign won the 1988 *Plebiscito*, Pinochet was still guaranteed more constitutional powers and privileges than any guarantees enjoyed by a newly elected civilian president.

On the other hand, the potential benefits of a SÍ victory in 1988 were enormous, and would represent a major triumph for Pinochet and his supporters. An electoral victory of this kind could legitimate the existing position of the military regime to wash away the blood they had drawn from the Chilean people during and

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[24] There was a moment when some thought it would be possible for the supporters of the military regime to select someone other than Pinochet, preferably a civilian, as the candidate of the 1988 SÍ campaign. Of course Pinochet did not share that opinion, and he eagerly accepted the formal nomination offered to him in a closed meeting of the military junta. This ironic episode of political theatre was ridiculed in the Franja segment "El Vals de los Generales," broadcast on September 05, 1988. This was the only segment developed by the NO campaign that directly criticized the military junta.

after the 1973 coup d'état. More importantly, winning an election would mark the generals as excellent democrats – honor-bond soldiers who saved Chile from falling into the grasp of a "Cuban/ Soviet-style communist dictatorship," then when the time was right, actively restoring the institutional order of the Republic (Angell 2007: 4, 140). The image of an heroic Pinochet would be inscribed in Chilean history as an epic story of selfless patriotism, were the General was fearlessly driven to take direct action in order to save the country from the godless communists (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 111). So deserving of respect and admiration was Pinochet that when it was appropriate, the Chilean people rewarded his heroism by formally electing him President of the Republic he had rescued in 1973. Indeed what a wonderful story that would make! Pinochetista pollsters assured him that the majority of the Chilean people subscribed to this narrative, and a substantial percentage of the electorate would vote for the SÍ.

Delusional ruminations aside, Pinochet was building upon a 15-year foundation of methodically fascist state terror, and he had very little to lose. According to the more pragmatic thinkers of the military regime, in the unlikely chance there was a NO victory, what could the defeated and dispersed opposition do to him? They were far too diverse to manage an effective campaign much less manage the affairs of the Chilean state, and outside of the failed attempts to assassinate Pinochet, the opposition posed no military threat to the existing regime. "Let the people vote if that is what they want!" declared Pinochet - there was absolutely no support in Chile for a return to the past, the past of la Unidad Popular that is.

Ironically, the leadership of Pinochet's centrist and center-right political opposition within Chile had reached the same conclusion. Many among them had been early supporters of Pinochet's 1973 coup d'état, and now they were seeking to secure their own political future within the inevitable political transition, without having to plunge the country into another period of unrestrained political violence (Matte Larraín 1988: 112, Crofts Wiley 2006: 680). Moreover, Pinochet's center-right opposition had no interest in returning to the pre-1973 version of Chilean democracy, a period within which they had been marginalized by the political left. Pinochet was the figure they wanted removed from power, and that was their only principle of unity. So began innumerable conversations, informally at first, as Chile's opposition forces were compelled to come together to critically assess what role they would play within the upcoming 1988 *Plebiscito.*

Still, there remained major doubts among the opposition about the plebiscitory process itself, as well as among the population as a whole (Tironi 2013: 123). There were two obvious problems that stood out in sharp relief. First, there was little confidence that the process would be honored by Pinochet should it not work out in his favor. Neither within junta, nor the opposition, nor among the population in general (especially for Chilean youth) was there any confidence that Pinochet would recognize an electoral defeat (Valdés 1988: 31). Instead, if the NO showed signs of doing well, what was expected was a unilateral disqualification of the *Plebiscito – "un auto-golpe"* as it is called in Latin America – a self-coup. In fact there was strong

evidence, especially within the highest levels of the military, that this was nearly the case in 1988 (Angell 2007: 25, Loveman 2001: 304, Espinoza 2008).

Next, there was a disturbing surge of political repression on the streets of Santiago and throughout the country. Particularly in the weeks around September 11, protests and anti-regime activities would intensify throughout Chile. As a response to this increase in political tensions, the military regime again stepped up its repression and the country had been under a permanent *toque de queda* for over a year.[25] Under these circumstances, there was an inherent risk for the opposition to go along with the Pinochet sponsored *Plebiscito*. If they committed themselves to the process and there was suddenly some terrible escalation in political repression, the opposition might end up being perceived as collaborators of Pinochet in the repression and therefore end up completely "*desprestigiados*," perhaps even more than Pinochet himself should he summon a self-coup.[26]

Eugenio Tironi, a leading strategist of the Chilean opposition of the center-right, suggested that there were only two choices during that period: "…a mediados de los ochenta, las opciones de la oposición se polarizaron irrevisablemente, reducidas a dos: adaptarse a la institucionalidad del régimen para derrotarlo a partir de sus propias reglas, o intentar su derrocamiento mediante la combinación entre movilización popular y creación de una fuerza militar propia…"[27] The PC had already decided for

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[25] Military imposed curfew, martial law.

[26] To lose all creditability among the people.

[27] "…from the mid 80s, the options for the opposition became irreversibly polarized, and reduced to two choices: adapt to the institutional order or the regime in order to defeat it by its own rules, or

the second option, and had declared 1986 as "el año decisivo" for the armed struggle

to overthrow Pinochet (129-132). In the end, the opposition decided that collectively

they had more to gain by participating in Pinochet's *Plebiscito* than by boycotting it,

and decided to participate as best as they could under the given circumstances. At

minimum, through their inclusion within the *Plebiscito* they would be provided with a

national and international platform from which they could expose the abuses of the

military regime, and hopefully rally increased support for the cause of Chilean

democracy.

      Once a significant part of the Chilean opposition had made it clear that they

would not boycott the *Plebiscito,* the military regime responded in kind with a series

of decrees formalizing a space within which Chile's newly reconstituted opposition

could function. Constitutionally mandated for the *Plebiscito*, this series of

"institutional reforms" were introduced by the dictatorship in late 1986 and 1987 to

gradually permit legal space for the limited operation of nationally organized political

opposition within Chile. Military and Carabinero forces were ordered scale back

operations related to policing the legal opposition, although the security and

intelligence forces were never ordered to stand down and continued to surveil

oppositional political activities.

      This was a key moment for the re-emergence of Chilean opposition forces. The

ability to operate legally on a national scale marked a turning point for their plans

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attempt to overturn it by a combination of popular mobilization and the creation of our own military
power…"

within Chile to unite their work against the dictatorship. An "opening" like this was simultaneously perceived as a public relations victory for the military regime, and it was soon followed up by additional symbolic gestures and legal reforms. For example, in an act designed to underscore the new political opening in Chile, on December 31, 1986 it was formally announced that, for the first time since 1973, exiles would be allowed to return to the country without fear of being detained at the airport (Salazar Salvo 2008). And in February and March of that year political parties were once again legalized - with the exception of the Communist Party and other Marxist-oriented groups.

To maintain operational control of the political field, the military regime only "legalized" organizations that had successfully registered as political parties with the recently re- established Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) - a council dominated by representatives of the dictatorship. Of course, only those political parties that had been deemed "legal" were allowed to register with the CNE. Consequently, in order to oppose the military regime legally, the opposition had to be legally approved by the military regime. This shell game about what organizations could operate legally within Chile would become more important later in the process, because only CNE approved groups would be allotted access to the, as of yet, still unannounced national Franja TV broadcasts.

The continued proscription of Marxist parties was not a deal-killer for the opposition. As far as the legal opposition was concerned, it was obviously impossible for everything to be so rosy and open as to allow Chilean communists to once again

legally operate inside the country. After all, Chile was still ruled by a military dictatorship, and the Communist Party had already acted on its pledge to undertake revolutionary violence to overthrow Pinochet. Thus, the newly legalized opposition did not put up any significant organized challenge to a continued red proscription (Crofts Wiley 2006: 675).

The fact that the military was still firmly in charge of the entire country was used to mitigate complaints about how the transition process still remained largely symbolic. Large-scale oppositional activities in public spaces were still banned at the moment of these "democratic" reforms, and violent repression of activities convened by the opposition remained frequent. There was no way the legalized opposition could resist the power of the military, and the legalized opposition transitioned into becoming a loyal opposition as the *Plebiscito* process progressed, even when faced with the most egregious violations of democratic protocols within this Chilean "transition to democracy."

Still, within the context of the 15-year Chilean military dictatorship, this "opening" was meaningful, and it was at this point that the dictatorship had opened up just far enough as to make unilaterally reigning the process back impossible without provoking a dramatic escalation of political violence, and thereby risking the total delegitimation of its still gestating "democratizing" credentials. By the end of 1987 this growing organic form of political opposition had been provided enough legal/ unrepressed space to develop national and international operational capacity, and could at that point potentially compel the dictatorship to follow through with its

promised changes by other means, should favorable results in the *Plebiscito* be aggressively manipulated or unilaterally cancelled by the military regime.

Soon after the closure of the official party registration process, fourteen opposition groups announced an alliance of political parties and civic organizations that became know as "the Coalition of Parties for the No" (*La Concertación De Partidos Por El NO*). This was the most significant step that the opposition had taken up to that point, legitimating and unifying Chilean opposition against the continuation of Pinochet as a "democratically elected president" of Chile – i.e. rejection of a sanitized continuation of the military regime under another title (Scully and Valenzuela 1993: 9). On the other side, Pinochet's supporters formally gathered themselves behind the SÍ campaign.

Image 1.4: The logos used for the NO and SÍ Plebiscito campaigns of 1988.

Of course *la Concertación* still had limited organizational capacity within Chile, but when compared to what they had been allowed to do before 1987, this new reality represented a significant change, and there was a consensus within *la Concertación* that they needed to leverage this changed political space against the military regime to the best of their collective ability – which, as it turned out, was not as insignificant and chaotic as Pinochet and his advisors had originally expected. *La Concertación* gathered nearly all the most experienced members of the old Chilean political elite, most of whom had been isolated or had been forced out of the circles of power established by the military regime between 1973 and 1987.

In March of 1988, voter registration was permitted in Chile for the first time since the 1973 coup d'état. In a highly symbolic nationally televised ceremony, Pinochet smiled for the cameras as he registered his name as the first Chilean since 1973 to be registered to vote, reserving for himself line #1 of the new voter rolls. Pinochet was the alpha and omega of Chilean political power. The man responsible for so much death and violence, for the aerial bombing of La Moneda, and for the destruction of the former electoral infrastructure - including the previous voter rolls (Navia 2004: 88-90) – was confidently registering to vote in a democratic contest that was entirely of his making and within which he was "el candidato único."

Within itself, the rigorous public campaigning that took place throughout Chile in 1988 was an entirely new experience. For the first time since 1973 the country was awash in campaign propaganda, political rallies, and speeches debating the future of Chile – though these activities were still accompanied by normalized threats, beatings,

detentions, and the occasional political assassination. Even during the most "open" moments of the *Plebiscito* process, lived, enacted oppositional politics could earn a person a painful visit from the "guanaco," the "zorillo," or worse.[28]

Nonetheless, by mid 1988 the leadership of *la Concertación* believed that within the correlation of forces in Chile there existed a possibility of not only rationalizing their participation in the 1988 *Plebiscito* as an effort to expose the undemocratic nature of the military regime, but also actually winning the contest (Tironi 2013). To this end the *Comando Por El NO* unleashed an unprecedented voter registration drive, and Chilean electoral rolls went from what had been 36.8% of total population in 1973 (after the election of la Unidad Popular the percentage surged, Navia 87), to 58% of the total population in 1988 (see Graph 1.1). By the end of the period allotted for voter registration, 92% of eligible Chileans had been registered to vote, the highest percentage in the country's history, and 40% of these registrants had never voted before (Portales & Sunkel 1989: 121). This voter registration effort by the opposition has been described as miraculous, and has since been interpreted by many political historians as the single most important factor that led to the NO victory of 1988 (Loveman 2001: 304, Navia 2004: 91).

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[28] "Guanaco" or the "zorillo" are literally two types of animals common in Chile, the first is a similar to a llama, and the second is a skunk. Chileans living under the dictatorship, especially those of the opposition, used these names to refer to the armored vehicles used by the military regime to repress demonstrations. The guanaco was a large vehicle with a water cannon mounted on top, and the zorillo was a smaller vehicle often used to release tear gas from a hatch located on its rear panels.

Graph 1.1: Chilean Population Growth & Electoral Rolls

Chile Population Growth & Electoral Rolls, 1950 to 2005.

Ibáñez, Alessandri & Frei Governments.

TV introduced in 1959.

Pinochet military dictatorship, political repression, economic transition.

Concertación governments

U.P. government

Persons in millions.

— Total Population   — Total Electoral Rolls*

* The red line represents total Chilean population growth. The percentages above the red line represent the corresponding rate of urbanization. The percentages below the red line represent the corresponding rate of Chilean homes with a television set.

There is no doubt that this was indeed a major contributing factor to the victory of the NO, but one should also be careful not to misinterpret the successful voter registration drive as the equivalent of voter turn-out, and less so the equivalent of voter turn-out in support of the NO campaign. In other words, there is no direct causal link between the voter registration campaign and the victory of the NO, just as there is disagreement about a direct and quantifiable link between what many Chileans - including political and cultural personalities - suggest was also among the most important factors that led to the victory of the NO campaign – the televised Franjas of 1988.

Image 2.1: Screenshot from the 2012 film NO. In this scene the character
played by Gael García Bernal pitches his conceptualization
of the NO campaign while the assembled group of representatives
from la Concertación react negatively to his ideas.

La Franja De Propaganda Electoral

Having established the historical context of the 1988 *Plebiscito*, I now move to

the most unique and memorable aspect of the 1988 *Plebiscito* and what has been the

focus of my research during the last five years, the *"Franja de Propaganda*

Electoral." The *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* – what loosely translates as

"official space for electoral propaganda" - was a nationally televised, largely

uncensored, 30-minute political program representing a form of televisual debate

between the two sides of the 1988 *Plebiscito;* the *NO* campaign in opposition to the military regime*,* and the pro-Pinochet *SÍ* campaign*.*

Franja Electoral content was broadcast from September 5th to October 1, 1988, during the final month before the October 5th *Plebiscito* vote was scheduled to take place. Broadly delineated in the 1980 Constitution and subsequently sanctioned and coordinated by the Chilean military dictatorship, access to the *Franja Electoral* was afforded to both sides of the *Plebiscito,* each side provided with 15 minutes of national airtime beginning at 10:45 p.m. back-to-back every week-night and at 11:45 am on weekends, running for a total of 27 days. After the televised Franja campaign there would be three days of constitutionally mandated "campaign silence" from October 2 to the 4th, and then the polls would open on the 5th for the national vote.

For each Franja broadcast day the campaigns alternated which of the two sides was broadcast first. *Franja* content was required to be broadcast on all TV channels and across all networks in Chile via *Cadena Nacional*.[29] According to the "legal" framework, with respect to the Franjas established by the dictatorship in accordance to its 1980 Constitution, a 15-minute space of national airtime was to be the only time campaign messages could appear on television each day. This TV access was granted to each campaign free of charge and with no specific restrictions placed on content. Theoretically, Franja content was only subject to the technical specifications established by the CNTV required for national broadcast.

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[29] Broadcast via a national TV "network of networks."

The NO Franjas Electrify Chileans

When the final October 5th vote was exactly one month away and everything organizationally within the means of the NO leadership was in place, by all accounts there was still a latent fear and intense uncertainty in the hearts of many Chileans that dominated the political landscape. The enduring mystique this televised Franja campaign has generated over time can be pinpointed to the moment of the first televised Franja broadcast on Monday, September 5, 1988. That day represented the culmination of months of intense and risk-laden organizing by members and supporters of the NO and *la Concertación*.

On September 5th the moment arrived for Day 1 of the nationally televised "Franja De Propaganda Electoral." Exactly at 10:45 pm a green screen flashed across every television channel in Chile, and Vivaldi's "La Cetra violin Concerto No. 8 in D minor" filled rooms across the country. The disembodied voice of the military regime entered abruptly to read words that simultaneously flashed on the screen:

"EN CUMPLIMIENTO A

DISPOSICIONES REFERIDAS A

PROGRAMAS ELECTORALES

LOS CANALES DE TELEVISIÓN

DEBERÁN INTEGRAR CADENA

NACIONAL A PARTIR DE

ESTE INSTANTE."[30]

Image 2.2: Screenshot of green screen of the Franja broadcast.

Immediately after, the NO rainbow of *la Concertación* was on television,

marking the first nationally televised self-representation of political opposition in

Chilean history.

Image 2.3: Screenshot of first seconds of the NO Franja broadcast first on
September 5, 1988 at 10:45 pm.

[30] "IN COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS REGARDING ELECTORAL PROGRAMS, ALL
TELEVISION CHANNELS SHOULD INTEGRATE THE NATIONAL NETWORK AS OF THIS
THIS INSTANT."

Patricio Bañados opened the campaign with a short but meaningful

introduction. *"Chile, la alegría ya viene. Buenas noches. Por primera vez en 15 años,*

quienes no comparten el pensamiento oficial tienen la oportunidad de dirigirse a

usted a través de un programa de televisión propio. Oportunidad para mi de

reencontrarme con esta profesión también de la cual fui marginado hace más de cinco

años. Pero 15 minutos en 15 años no es mucho, y vamos a esa alegría que viene." [31]

Simultaneously millions of television sets began to sing "Chile, La Alegría Ya

Viene." This moment electrified Chileans across the country to mark the beginning of

a qualitative shift in Chilean political culture and what I argue is the initial spark of

what was to become the *mediatization of Chilean politics*.

Image 2.4: Screenshots of Patricio Bañados (left) and the
first clip of the "Chile, La Alegría Ya Viene" (right).

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[31] "Chile, happiness is on its way. Good night. For the first time in 15 years, those of us who do not partake in the official way of thinking have the opportunity to address you through a television program of our own. This is also an opportunity for me to reconnect with this profession, from which I was marginalized more than five years ago. But 15 minutes in 15 years is not very much time, so let us begin to partake in that happiness that is coming our way." Link to a YouTube clip of Day 1 of the Franja campaign: <https://youtu.be/MUNB_PxP6i8>.

30 years later the discursive power of this initial moment is still palpable. For many viewers who had grown up politically under the military regime and had only experienced the total instrumentalization of TV, it was a tremendous shock to see a representation of Chilean politics that was so fundamentally different from the official portrayals of Chilean politics produced by the government and its media allies. At times, these Franjas were openly critical of Pinochet on national TV! During the 15 years previous to the Franja campaign, nationally televised direct critical representations of the dictator were something which no one would have dreamed possible.

There are multiple accounts about how the televised programs of the NO have come to represent a seminal moment in Chilean political communication. Latin Americanist Paula Cronovich claims that the NO *Franjas* "left a mark on the nation's collective memory; its rainbow emblem and the lyrics and tune of its upbeat jingle still stick in people's minds" (2). During the first days of the Franjas, Chilean filmmaker and Franja production director Ignacio Agüero mused about public reactions to the Franjas and how the televised ad-wars had impacted the entire country:

> [The campaign] has become a spectacle, where people come together to give their two-cents worth and celebrate. The program has managed to grasp the experience of the people; it has become the space of the TV viewer who makes whatever he wants of it. It's not that the television is showing something new, but rather the fact that it is being shown on television at all, that produces a phenomenon of collective identity. Each person knows that what he [and she] is seeing is also showing in every barrio, in every city, at the same time. It has thus brought together very different people, of different ages and social conditions, motivating and exciting them. (27)

People would go about the day looking forward to the next debate and talking about the program from the night before. "On the screens, the waves were transformed into a political incident, in which for 30 minutes of propagandistic swirl, the 'yes' and 'no' camps of the *Plebiscito* confronted each other for the first time… From every corner of the country, the people would set aside anything they were doing, or postpone their sleep, to watch the new show: the government against the ethereal opposition, on a level playing field, in a sparring match of commercials." (Quilter 1989: 300). Within the context of the highly restrained 1988 *Plebiscito,* the Franjas suddenly became a new, exciting, yet ephemeral "public sphere" – a mediated space that appeared to operate in a Chile that already existed just beyond the repressive reach of the military regime, "for the latent oppositional majority – an affective and visual space in which anti-authoritarian sentiments could be placed, shared and made explicit…" (Crofts Wiley 2006: 680).

The Franjas of the NO campaign unexpectedly introduced a vision of Chilean democracy composed of beautiful smiling faces, dancing bodies, mimes, catchy jingles, and ironic humor. A unique mediatized form of oppositional politics was broadcast nationally and internationally for the world to see, and subsequently inspire depictions of happy "forward looking" Chileans, dancing and blissful, peacefully waiting for a chance to vote NO and thereby open the door for democracy to arrive in Chile in the form of "esa alegría." This was how during September of 1988 the televised Franjas introduced a new, though thoroughly fictive understanding of what Chilean democracy meant to Chileans and to the world.

During the 27 days that followed, Chilean viewers would see national and international TV personalities, sports figures and cultural icons publicly taking political stances against the military regime for the first time. Performers and artists who had been marginalized from government-controlled broadcasting (such as NO anchor Patricio Bañados) were suddenly back on TV, and with a distinctly uninhibited and even liberatory swagger to their presentation.[32] Or as was the case of the highly popular, youth oriented, and politically conscious Chilean rockers *Los Prisioneros*, the Franjas would be the first time their existence was ever acknowledged on Chilean TV. The NO Franjas as such became a televisual political event, where Chileans no "adictos al régimen" first saw themselves and many others like them on national television – a mediated political catharsis for many Chileans.

After the vote, opinion polls were conducted to track what Chileans thought about the *Plebiscito.* The most frequent descriptors expressed by viewers of the Franjas were that they felt like a "breath of freedom" (Quilter 1989: 303). The number of daily viewers of the Franjas numbered 4.5 million, and it was immediately ranked the most widely viewed TV program in Chile, scoring the highest ratings in the history of Chilean television up to that moment - ten points higher than the most popular show *Sábado Gigante* (Piñuel Raigada 1992: 14, Boas 2015: 9, Quilter 1989: 300). By the time the October 5th vote had arrived, 93% of registered voters had watched at least one day of Franja Electoral programming (ibid).

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[32] DINACOS and the military government in general was known to have maintained black-lists of people (Chileans and otherwise) not allowed to appear on television, regardless of the channel (Quilter 298).

Once the result of the October 5, 1988 *Plebiscito* was confirmed and time was taken to reflect on the process, many sectors declared that the cheerful and relatively innocuous television campaign developed by Pinochet's opposition had been the key factor that tipped the scales in favor of the NO, enough to cajole an electoral victory from the Chilean military dictatorship that had been in power for fifteen years (Piñuel Raigada 1992, Tironi 2013). Independent of this argument, the 27 televised *Franja* programs remain the most fascinating cultural/ political artifacts produced during this period in Chilean history. Franja themes and imagery have since helped reproduce a political mythology in a country that, for the next twenty years, voted in favor of *la Concertación* governance.

Image 2.5: Ballot used for the October 5, 1988 *Plebiscito*.

The Political Stasis Of 1988 - 1990

Late into the night of October 5, 1988 the political coalition conforming the *NO* campaign was officially declared winner of *el Plebiscito* having secured 56% of the vote. Formal recognition of the NO victory took many more hours than what was needed because the option of an "auto-golpe" by Pinochet was still very much on the table. The whole of Chile understood that the delay in official announcement of the results of the *Plebiscito* meant that the NO had won, and what was now being deliberated was whether Pinochet would recognize this electoral setback (Mayol 2013).

Across Santiago that night, news spread of a late night emergency meeting of the military junta being convened at La Moneda. At 2:00 am reporters waiting outside of the presidential palace rushed to question the Generals as they arrived via motorcade at the Chilean presidential palace to attend this mysterious reunion. All but one of the junta Generals refused to comment on the nature of this meeting and the extraordinary turn of events precipitated by the *Plebiscito*. Incredibly, without breaking his stride as he entered La Moneda, nor pausing to offer a formal commentary, General Fernando Matthei broke with military discipline and verbally confirmed in the presence of the assembled media that the NO had indeed won the *Plebiscito* - "…tengo bastante claro que ha ganado el No, pero estamos tranquilos…" (Espinoza 2008).[33] All of Chile was stunned by the informality of his statement, and as it turned out, Pinochet was among those surprised by Matthei's candor. General

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[33] This was the same General Matthei I describe in my introduction.

Matthei quickly entered La Moneda, and 1.5 hours later the CNE officially confirmed

the NO victory on national TV.

In spite of this stunning electoral defeat, the military regime was not by any

means left powerless. Indeed the majority of the Chilean electorate had voted NO, but

the (still substantial) 44% of the vote won by Pinochet and his SÍ campaign shielded

the tyrant and his supporters from total surrender, and to a significant degree did

indeed legitimate a renovated Chilean right-wing (Matte Larraín 1988: 133-134). Even

so, within Chile and throughout the world, people understood this episode as the

culmination of a democratic transition in Chile, and from that point forward the

country could at least tentatively celebrate the return of democratic governance.

Scholars, political figures, and popular cultural texts praised the Chilean *Plebiscito* of

1988 as a hitherto unique and important example of non-violent democratic transition.

Image 2.6: October 6, 1988 cover of *El Mercurio*.

There is indeed an important historical break that took place within Chilean

politics after the NO victory of 1988, but I venture to argue that this break is dissimilar

to the narrative so popularly promoted as having precipitated the removal of Pinochet

from power and ushered the return of civilian rule. In fact no such transition ever

happened in Chile. After having lost the October 1988 *Plebiscito,* Pinochet and his

junta continued direct military rule of Chile for another 1.5 years. During this period

the military regime accelerated efforts to consolidate institutional and legislative plans

protecting the neoliberal political economic order. "Leyes de amarre" were passed in

rapid succession to guarantee Pinochetista institutional and economic continuity

(Mayol 2013, Tironi 2013, Loveman 2001, Angell 2007: 44). The power of the

military regime had only been partially mitigated by the NO victory, and there was no

viable political force in Chile that could bring the Pinochet regime to heel. Political

violence, censorship, and institutional intimidation in Chile were destined to continue

beyond October 1988.

When questioned about the potential consequences of the NO victory for his

supporters, Pinochet was unequivocal: "Yo no amenazo, no acostumbro amenazar.

Sólo advierto una vez. El día que me toquen a alguno de mis hombres se acabó el

estado de derecho" (Angell 2007: 45).[34] The political change that actually took place

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[34] "I don't make threats. I only give one warning. The day one of my men is touched this constitutional order is done." This statement was made during an interview on October 14, 1989, one year after the *Plebiscito* and two months before the presidential elections.

unfolded independent of the fact that the configuration of power in Chile after the 1988 *Plebiscito* would not be substantively different along most measures within the political and economic terrain – it was a shift significantly less material than what qualifies as a definitive transition from military dictatorship to democracy. This was not only a function of Pinochetista political sandbagging, but also a reflection of the limitations of Pinochet's organized opposition.

La Concertación had come into existence as a function of the *Plebiscito;* a short-term conglomeration, originally envisioned as a temporary political vehicle within which to concentrate oppositional participation in the 1988 electoral process. This was a form of political unity with a long history in Chilean politics known as "una unidad coyuntural."[35] There was no post-*Plebiscito* consensus within *La Concertación,* and the opposition had to move quickly to make up for this structural weakness.

Immediately after the precarious victory of the NO campaign in 1988, a second period of presidential campaigning opened for the opposition forces, and the short-term vehicle of *la Concertación* was modified enough to take on a second campaign in support of Patricio Aylwin in the first presidential elections convened for December 14, 1989. Of course it helped that popular support for the opposition was already mobilized, and having secured a victory in the *Plebiscito, Concertación* forces on the ground were energized for the presidential campaign. The energy and organization was there, the trained party cadres were ready, and all that was needed was to close

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[35] A conjunctural unity.

ranks behind a new presidential candidate (Boas 2009b: 109-110). The candidate

chosen to represent the civilian right wing was the economist Hernán Büchi, a young

member of the UDI party, a "Chacarillas boy",[36] chief economist and minister of

Hacienda for the military regime, and a prominent Pinochetista featured in the SÍ

Franjas of 1988.

There was a third minor independent candidate, Francisco Javier Errázuriz, a

wealthy "conservative populist" who attempted to position himself as a neutral centrist

option between Aylwin and Büchi, but he did not figure prominently within this

process more than drawing attention and votes away from Büchi (Angell 2007: 41).

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[36] Chacarillas is a reference to the July 9, 1977 (09/07/77) "Acto de Chacarillas," a fascist political/ cultural event convened by the Pinochet dictatorship on the historically symbolic Chacarilla hill in the center of Santiago. This nocturnal event involved a ceremonial night march of 77 "exceptional" Chilean youth, each holding a torch as their procession made its way up the hill to assemble for an event at the cusp. These 77 youth were considered leaders in diverse fields such as politics, sports, and entertainment. At the top of this hill, at night, while holding flaming torches, each young person declared their loyalty to Pinochet as the tyrant recognized them for representing the brightest future of Chile. During his speech Pinochet also delineated his three-step plan for institutionalizing the political configuration of his regime so it could endure the inevitable return of civilian governance. Pinochet's speech was broadcast live on all TV channels and radio frequencies. While developing my content analysis at first I did not realize the significance of this event until upon a second review of the 1988 SÍ Franjas I recognized multiple visual references to this event and at least ten of the youth participants make featured appearances during the televised campaign. Nearly 40 years after this event many of the "Chacarilla Boys" remain central figures in the political, economic and cultural establishment of Chile (Bengoa, The Clinic 2011).

Image 2.7: 1989 presidential campaign posters for
Patricio Aylwin (left) and Hernán Büchi (right).

On December 14, 1989, Aylwin won the presidential election by securing 55%

of the vote, a major victory when compared to Büchi who secured only 29% of the

vote. Patricio Aylwin was officially declared interim President of Chile.

Still, Aylwin, *la Concertación,* the Chilean people were forced to wait another

three months before a transition of power was scheduled to take place in March of

1990. The opposition had won the second of two resounding electoral victories within

the repressive limits set by the military regime, they had overcome years of political

violence and intimidation, and they had to tolerate the largely undisturbed and

undemocratic legislative/ constitutional framework. Yet, with this, and after living

through 16 years of military rule, the opposition still had not forced Pinochet to

surrender the presidency of Chile. It was clear that *la Concertación* had no other

choice but to wait for Pinochet to be ready to "transfer the presidency" because it

would not happen one minute before he was ready. The opposition had learned to

accept tyrannical rules as prerequisite for the tyrant to accept the end of his tyranny.

Image 2.8: The March 11, 1990 *Transmisión de Mando* or
Transfer Of Power from General Augusto Pinochet
to the new President Patricio Aylwin.

On March 11, 1990, after having ruled Chile 16 years 6 months to the day,

Pinochet handed the presidential sash to Patricio Aylwin. Thus began an institutional

irony that has been the hallmark of Chilean presidential politics since - reconciling the

irreconcilable to nourish the enduring historical paradox of Chilean political stability.

Every *Concertación* presidency after the original Aylwin victory has borne the happy

burden of the 1988 "alegría que ya viene," while presiding over an inexplicably tragic

impunity of a uniquely Chilean sort (Angell 2007: 5). Pinochet remained Commander

and Chief of the armed forces, and the military continued to buttress to the old system,

self-anointed guardians of the new democratic order, threatening to spring into action

again, if the so-called "protected" democracy should be compromised. "Finally, it seemed, the abstraction of free markets and free people was made manifest. Advocates of economic liberalism could wash the stink of Pinochet off themselves, vindicated by the fact that even Chile had turned democratic. The 'proof is available for all to see,' wrote [Milton] Friedman following the 1990 restoration of democratic rule in Chile, 'the sound operation of a free-market economy in a free society'" (Grandin 2006: 192-193).

What Came After 1988 Should Not Be Classified As A Democratic Transition

What came after the 1988 *Plebiscito* is not easily classified as a prototypical democratic transition because the *Plebiscito* was framed undemocratically. As described in Chapter 1, years before the *Plebiscito* or its televised Franja were even imagined, the military dictatorship initiated a series of changes that pointed toward some form of political normalization undemocratically visualized and articulated as part of the 1980 Constitution and subject to the creation of a "protected democracy" in Chile. Thus, the historical basis of the 1988 *Plebiscito* was primarily an expression of the military regime's own political dominance, developing and operating along the regime timelines, restrictions, and political calculations. Deviations from these limits were often repressed through violence. This is historically well established.

Another obvious "democratizing" contradiction was that regardless of the outcome, the *Plebiscito* as such could not represent a return to a constitutional democracy, as this type of governance was understood before the military coup d'état of 1973. A logical assessment of Chilean politics during this period shows that the last time democracy had existed in Chile had been in 1973 with the UP in power, and the only way to begin to reestablish a similar democracy was to impose justice on behalf of those who had been overthrown, and enact a constitutional re-establishment of Chilean procedural democratic order as it had been structured before the 1973 coup (Espinoza 2008). Chilean justice and democratic reconciliation would obviously have to include the imprisonment of all coup leaders, their associates and their enablers to hold accountable those who had formulated and subsequently benefitted from the coup

of 1973. Finally, a democratic recovery would inevitably have to address the initial

and ongoing violations of constitutional order and human rights perpetuated by the

Chilean military, which would have to immediately be purged of all ranking golpistas

and Pinochetistas, and then compelled to submit to the orders of a reconstituted

civilian government. Subsequently, some alternative form of procedural justice would

have to be provided to the victims and families of the tortured, exiled, assassinated,

and disappeared. To be sure, this would be no small undertaking. The "political logic"

of pre-1973 Chilean political culture would have accepted nothing less.

Yet, not one of these seemingly obvious democratizing expectations was ever

realized within the Chilean transition of 1988 – 1990, and over forty years later such a

democratic "rendimiento de cuentas" still remains largely impossible.[37] But awareness

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[37] In 2000 Ariel Dorfman wrote an open letter about the release of Pinochet from house arrest in London. This letter best summarizes this crisis of memory and justice:

"…El Gobierno democrático de Chile invocó aquella soberanía - falsamente a mi entender - para exigir el regreso de Pinochet, aduciendo que somos capaces de resolver nuestros propios dilemas, proclamando que un juicio a Pinochet en su patria era absolutamente factible. El mundo entero espera ahora que sepamos desplegar plenamente, con el nuevo Gobierno de Ricardo Lagos, esa soberanía. Soberanía frente a unas Fuerzas Armadas que se resistirán a que su ex comandante en jefe sea colocado en el banquillo de los acusados, tratado como un ciudadano cualquiera. Pero soberanía también frente a tantos cómplices de la dictadura que ocupan puestos de poder y casi de veto en la legislatura, para no mencionar a los pinochetistas que dominan el empresariado y la prensa. Y la soberanía más ardua de todas: la que hay que ejercer sobre nuestro pasado para que finalmente nos pertenezca tanto como un pedazo del territorio nacional.

"Porque el Jefe Máximo no actuó solo.

"Son muchos, innumerables, los que participaron y permitieron sus abusos. Están, por cierto, los centenares de militares y funcionarios de primera y cuarta categoría que llevaron a cabo las órdenes del general, los hombres que apretaron el gatillo o hundieron el bisturí en el ojo ajeno o agarrotaron el tornillo en los genitales de un hombre o una mujer inermes. Ni qué hablar de quienes compraban los materiales con que tales horrores se perpetuaron, aquellos que arrendaban esos sótanos y los limpiaban, los que pagaban los sueldos de esos agentes y mecanografiaban los informes y servían el café y las galletas a la hora del reposo de los guerreros. Y a ellos se agregan, en forma menos visible, tantos

and acceptance of the irreconcilable nature of these contradictions was the cost of

admittance to the original plebiscitory process itself, and points directly to the less

celebrated nature of the much-celebrated transition of Chilean politics demanded by

the military regime. The "democratizing" function of the *Plebiscito* did not in fact

promise a return to democracy as it had been enacted before 1973. In an objective,

material sense, a substantively democratic and peaceful transition had already proven

to be impossible for Chile, and the *Plebiscito* as a political process alone was not

enough to impel a peaceful democratic transition.

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millares que negaban esos desmanes sabiendo que eran ciertos o que los justificaban como un mal inevitable para salvar al país de las bárbaras hordas marxistas.

"Pero no me refiero tan sólo a ellos. Pienso en otros: los que cerraron los ojos para no ver, los que decidieron hacer caso omiso de los aullidos, los que se dijeron en voz baja y a menudo en forma pública que las madres de los desaparecidos eran unas locas y que hasta cuándo seguían jodiendo. Los que aprovecharon la dictadura para hacerse ricos, para comprar el patrimonio del Estado, para echar al trabajador indefenso. Y aun otros más: aquellos que, más tarde, cuando vino la democracia, prefirieron olvidar, prefirieron la amnesia del consumo desenfrenado mientras el dolor se paseaba en la callejuela de al lado, mientras el dolor surgía desde todos los rincones y conciencias de la patria. Me refiero a los que permitieron con su silencio que Pinochet prosperara, que Pinochet existiera.

"Me refiero a todos aquellos que, si Pinochet es juzgado, tendrían que preguntarse -quizás, quién sabe, tal vez- aquello que verdaderamente importa: ¿hasta qué punto soy responsable yo de que no haya justicia en mi país y, una pregunta más urgente y crucial, qué estoy dispuesto a hacer hoy para remediar esa situación?

"Pinochet es un espejo.
Y su retorno a Chile, una oportunidad histórica para mirarlo a él y mirarnos simultáneamente nuestra verdadera e impostergable cara.

"¿Estamos de veras dispuestos a enjuiciarlo? Es una pregunta que tenemos que hacernos, pase lo que pase con el perecedero cuerpo o la artera o deteriorada mente del hombre que reinó sobre nuestros destinos durante 17 años. Haya o no desafuero y juicio.

"¿Estamos dispuestos a juzgar al país que dio origen a Pinochet? Es la pregunta y el espejo último que el general nos trae, como un regalo perverso y maravilloso, desde el mundo exterior.

"Este sueño sí que recién comienza" (Dorfman 2000).

Because such a thing was not possible, and *la Concertación* was bound to

these political rules of the real world, the peaceful democratic change that Chilean

political reality could not provide needed something else in its place; a cultural place-

holder so-to-speak. Such was the state of contemporary Chilean politics since the 1988

Plebiscito - dramatic change on the surface, but a constitutional framework, economic

model, and political calculus that remained surprisingly consistent. Of course my

intention here is not to pass judgment on the history of the 1988 *Plebiscito,* much less

litigate Chilean democracy as a whole, but I do hope to contribute to a better

understanding of how the Franjas were used during the 1988 *Plebiscito* to help

mitigate these politically irreconcilable contradictions, and subsequently contributed to

a change in the meaning of Chilean democracy itself.

It is nonetheless undeniable that an important change took place in 1988, at the

intersection of Chilean institutional power, media, and political history - something

that has not yet been named nor sufficiently researched, something not satisfactorily

explained by in the literatures on political transition and/ or procedural democracy.[38] A

fictive democratic transition was broadcast on national TV and then confirmed by

popular vote - TV had made real what politics had deemed impossible.

On October 10, 1988, five days after having lost the *Plebiscito,* Pinochetista

scholars convened a panel discussion to analyze the reasons why the SÍ had lost the

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[38] "El Plebiscito de 1988 será recordado como un evento político-mediático donde la televisión jugó un rol central en la reconciliación nacional y la recuperación de la democracia… Porque fue a través de la televisión donde los chilenos se enfrentaron a la posibilidad de recuperar la democracia, así como por la masificación que alcanzo la televisión en los hogares chilenos, el plebiscito de 1988 también marca el inicio de la mediatización de la política en Chile" (Arraigada and Navia 2011: 7).

vote. Unsurprisingly, television figured prominently in the debate. University professor and director of the Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP)[39] Arturo Fontaine Talavera channeled his inner Rene Saavedra and resigned himself to the NO victory: "…a mi juicio, lo que partió como publicidad se transformo en actitudes. Hoy día (una semana después del plebiscito), tenemos un país distinto por el tono que adoptó el Comando del NO en su campaña… La realidad hoy es otra… nos instala en un país distinto" (Matte Larraín 1988: 120).[40] *What began as advertising was transformed into a state of being…* Within itself the 1988 *Plebiscito* did not represent a political and democratic transition, but then what was it? Clearly TV played a key role, so to begin to answer this question I am compelled to offer a bit of historical background focused on the evolution of Chilean TV.

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[39] Founded in 1980, the CEP was the most important Pinochetista think tank in Chile and the source of most of the quantitative research utilized by the military regime throughout the 1980s.

[40] "…in my judgment, what began as advertising was transformed into a state of being. Today (one week after the *Plebiscito),* we are in a different country precisely because of the tone adopted by the *Comando Por El NO* in its campaign… This reality is distinct, and the tone that the *Comando* adopted has left us in a completely different country."

A Brief History Of Chilean Television, 1958-1990

For better or for worse, Chilean TV has always been considered an instrument of cultural production. When comparing market, structural, or technical aspects of media systems across Latin American countries, Chilean television has historically been an outlier. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that this distinctive history of Chilean TV was a contributing factor of the manifest success of the televised Franjas of the NO (Sunkel & Portales 1989).

The evocative power of the 1988 Franjas was not only characterized by the content of the programs but also by their delivery via television as the most important medium for political communication in Chile. At the time of the Franja broadcasts in 1988, Chilean television had evolved into the most widely referred source of political information, but was simultaneously the least trusted among the Chilean people (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 5). An historical review of Chilean TV is in order to help explain how this seemingly contradictory status could come about.

There are four distinct periods of Chilean TV: 1958-1964, 1964-1973, 1973-1990, and 1990 to the present. 1958-1964 marks the late introduction of TV in Chile as a project under the administration of Chilean universities. 1964-1973 represents the polarization of Chilean media, the September 11, 1973 military coup d'état, and the transition of television administration to adherents of the military regime. 1973-1990 is the period that spans the Pinochet dictatorship, the development and consolidation of national Chilean TV, the 1988 Plebiscito, and the final transfer of the presidency from Augusto Pinochet to Patricio Aylwin.

1990-present is marked by rapid privatization and concentration of television outlets and the consolidation of what I consider the *mediatization of Chilean politics* under *Concertación* presidencies. This last historical period is not included in this section but is addressed in the concluding chapter of this project. What follows is a general overview of the first three periods of Chilean TV history, 1958 to 1988.

1958-1964.

Although Chile was among the last countries in Latin America to formally sanction the development of TV, since the 1950s Chileans had initiated a rich political debate about television as a communicative form and an instrument of cultural production. The dominant political and cultural considerations can be seen in how during its first 30 years (from its introduction in 1958 through 1988), Chilean TV developed along a socio-political timeline more than a market or technical timeline. During this period Chilean television was perceived primarily through a political and cultural lens, and remained a point of political contention in its own right. The official introduction of TV in Chile is evidence of this contention.

The arrival of television in Chile has been recorded as having commenced in 1959 on the 21st and 22nd of August, when the Universidad Católica de Chile in Santiago and the Universidad Católica de Valparaiso initiated their first official TV broadcasts. These original signals came nearly a decade after most other Latin American countries had initiated their own early broadcasts. Chileans resisted the model of commercial broadcasting that was already dominant throughout Latin

America. As Elizabeth Fox posits, "The image of broadcasting that first reached Latin America was of the privately owned, commercially operated industries forming in the United States. Many Latin American and U.S. scholars have imputed the evolution of Latin American broadcasting into one of the most successful, monopolistic and undemocratic commercial broadcasting industries in the world due to the influence of the U.S. government and broadcasting industries" (1993: 2). The notable Chilean reluctance to introduce private commercial television broadcasting and the preference for university administration was rooted within the political class (representing all sides) who feared that self-interested parties could use the novel communicative form to dominate politics and/or distort Chilean culture on a national scale (Sunkel and Geoffrey 2001: 83). "The Christian Democrats, socialists, communists, Radicals, and some conservatives for the most part rejected private commercial television on the grounds that it would favor big business and encourage mass audiences at the expense of educational and cultural programming. Others in the center and to the left feared that commercial television would swing the existing political balance of the media to the right. University-managed television was a political stalemate. No one party felt it was at a disadvantage or feared the use of television's power by another party" (Fox 1993: 263).

This interventionist position was neither capricious nor repressive. There was a broad political consensus that TV evolving along private commercial logics simply could not be trusted to broadcast content that would serve the interests of the greater good in Chile. Television throughout the majority of Latin American countries had

been largely constructed along North American private commercial norms, and the

Chilean political elite viewed North American television and its Latin American

surrogates as examples of what to avoid versus a model to emulate (Portales 1986:

83). Until the late 1960s this position was shared by a majority of the political class as

they sought to restrict the private commercial instrumentalization of the medium,

contrary to what other Latin American countries had undertaken, and in spite of the

regional and international pressure being leveraged against the Chilean government by

North American broadcasting companies, the Asociación de Radiodifusores de Chile

(A.R.Chi), and the Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión (A.I.R., Portales

1986: 97)[41]

It is also noteworthy that the development of Chilean TV was distinct from

Chilean radio, which was already politically influential and largely commercialized by

1958. Unlike the rest of Latin America, where the owners of radio stations played a

key role in the early development and capitalization of national television systems,

Chilean radio broadcasters were legislatively prohibited from playing a greater role in

early TV. This prohibition was a key-contributing factor to the dominant visualization

of non-commercial Chilean television (Fuenzalida 2002: 164-165, Fox 1997: 118-

119).

Another key-contributing factor to the emergence of non-commercial Chilean

TV was the relatively limited presence the North American TV networks CBS, NBC,

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[41] Asociación Interamericana de Radiodifusión was the powerful trade organization for private commercial broadcasting in Latin America. See A.I.R. position regarding Chilean TV.

and ABC had in Chile during this period. Whereas in the rest of Latin America these media corporations played a key role in the early introduction of TV (for example in Mexico beginning in 1950), these companies were blocked from doing so by the government in Chile (Asdrúbal Contreras Arellano 1987: 49). Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) related policies dominant in Chile during the 1950s and 1960s restricted the importation of North American TV broadcasting equipment and receivers, and went as far as to impose broadcasting limits on North American content (Fox 1993: 260). In 1956 the Chilean government rejected a proposal by a North American firm to construct a television broadcasting station and import 30,000 television sets. The rejection was issued on the argument that such a project did nothing to promote Chilean industry or the technical development of national TV infrastructure (Getino 1996: 127).

Finally, the introduction of TV had proven too contentious a political issue to be resolved sooner through legislative action, and was instead postponed for nearly a decade. When the time came, private domestic commercial broadcasting interests where not provided a seat at the table (Portales 1986: 84). Other contributing factors that helped restrain private-commercial TV were the broad legislative limits placed on foreign investment, the small size of the Chilean market, the relative strength and prestige of cultural and educational institutions in Chile (institutions that had already been identified as potential hosts for the new medium), and the strength of established political parties openly suspicious of private- commercial broadcasting and its potential negative effects on the nation (Fuenzalida 2002: 164-165).

A 1958 presidential decree issued by Carlos Ibáñez del Campo finally provided television with its first institutional, yet still tentative introduction in Chile. Although the 1958 decree did not establish formal legislation, this presidential action ordered the development of a TV system that would be the most politically restricted of any Latin American country. In the absence of congressional legislative action, the key provisions in the 1958 decree included the following:

- The development of TV as an institution that would remain under the personal discretion of the presidency.

- The private commercialization of TV was prohibited unless the right was explicitly granted by the presidency.

- Unpaid access to TV by a range of Chilean political actors was compulsory.[42]

- Chile was the only country to experiment with an alternative type of administration by assigning this communicative form to the universities to serve as a cultural-educational medium, formally instituted "to advance the national welfare" (Fuenzalida 2002). University administration of Chilean TV guaranteed space for educational programming, and as tax-exempt institutions, Universities could import whatever studio and transmission equipment they needed for television broadcasting (Fox 1993: 262).

Succeeding President Carlos Ibáñez del Campo (1952-1958), the more conservative President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) inherited this presidential decree

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[42] This policy was the legal precedent of the televised Franjas, reinstituted by the Pinochet regime for the 1988 Franjas.

for television, though he was unusually hostile to this particular communicative form, one he considered overwhelmingly "mediocre and banal" (Fox 1993: 262). During his presidency, Alessandri crushed any possibility of early commercial dominance of Chilean TV, refusing to grant even a single commercial broadcasting license during his six years in office (ibid).

A noteworthy example of the political restraint over Chilean commercial television came when this country was host to the 7th FIFA World Cup of Soccer during May and June of 1962. President Alessandri refused to authorize any private interests taking charge of the national broadcasting and international televisual feed of the World Cup. Instead he required the relatively novice University channels assume the leadership of this effort, impelling a more rapid technical development, professionalization, and commercialization of these channels than what might have taken place without this unexpected international commercial pressure (Portales 1986: 81, Fernández Medina 2004: 280, Fuenzalida 2002: 163).

Although largely unique within a Latin American context, the administration that dominated the early years of Chilean TV was similar to the administrative forms that were developed for Public Service Broadcasting in other parts of the globe, particularly in Europe (Bresnahan 2003: 54). Hallin and Mancini's four models of the governance of public broadcasting suggest how early Chilean TV resembled a "civic" or "corporatist" model of European television, with some degree of "proportional representation," similar to German and Dutch broadcasting (2004: 31). In the Chilean

case, it was the Chilean universities that played the role of "socially relevant group" that was anointed with the task to administer TV.

Ironically, early Chilean TV was not considered a public service. The political concerns that motivated Chilean legislative restraint of TV were not indicative of a preference for a normative "public service" logic as a guide for the development of televisual content, described by Landerer as a Public Service format "based on a sense of co-responsibility for the well- being of the political system and the democratic process. The style of political reporting is descriptive, journalists inform about facts, issues and contexts... The public is no longer informed about what the political elite allows them to know, but what as citizens they *should* [emphasis added] know in order to rationally participate in a democracy" (245). The restrictions placed on Chilean TV were on the other hand closer to a presumption that this medium was intrinsically corrosive to democracy and national culture, particularly in its private commercial form.

The fact that advertising was not prohibited is evidence of this presumption. Instead of providing space for private commercial ownership of TV, as far back as 1960 under the Alessandri presidency, university administrators were permitted to broadcast commercial advertising in order to supplement their operating budgets. It was expected that the negative cultural impact of commercial advertising would be mitigated under University administration - it was the private commercial ownership that was restricted, not commercial content. Explicit prohibition of commercial content was never imposed, and university channels regularly charged for

broadcasting advertisements, entered into commercial agreements with private

interests, and later began to import a significant portion of their content. This situated

Chilean TV as a unique hybrid subject to public service administration, while

operating on the basis of private commercial content. This configuration exposed

Chilean audiences to an early form of televisual marketing language common in

private commercial TV systems, but simultaneously protected university

administration and guaranteed parity for educational and public service content.

1964-1973.

During the mid-1960s the North American company ABC–World Vision

aggressively established itself in Chile working through partnerships with University

administrators and by providing major capital investments in Canal 4 and Canal 13.

Canal 13 shifted to being largely supported by advertising revenue as it took over the

largest percentage of audience share. From 1964 to 1970 the North American presence

in Chilean TV expanded, and by 1970 it also included North American ownership of

three of the five largest advertising production companies in Chile, while 45% of all

TV content broadcast on Canal 13 was foreign programming (Asdrúbal Contreras

Arellano 1987: 78). Other channels quickly began to model themselves after Canal 13

(Portales 1986: 81).

The growing influence of North American broadcasting companies in Chile

during the 1960s and 1970s was relatively insignificant when compared to the almost

total North American domination of TV systems throughout the rest of Latin America.

Nonetheless, the North American presence within Chilean TV alarmed powerful sectors of the political class, and helped motivate a series of legislative reforms in 1970 intended to reign in this influence. *La ley de televisión 17.377* was the first legislation passed that formalized existing arrangements. This legislation was developed to address a contentious dispute between the left coalition *Unidad Popular* and right-wing political parties threatening to block the presidency of Salvador Allende. While the 1970 legislation was primarily a confirmation of the most salient parts of the 1958 presidential decree, this new legal framework added a series of important changes to TV administration, in order to block control of TV from being transferred to the incoming Allende government.

The 1970 legislation provided legal affirmation for existing university TV channels already broadcasting on a regional level. It also provided legal recognition and institutional support for Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN) - the national state network that had been founded in 1968 by President Eduardo Frei Montalva. TVN was the only authorized national network operating under the immediate control of the Ministry of Education, which mandated that TVN remain under the direction of a "non-partisan" administrative body and, therefore, insulated from government influence.

The 1970 legislation required that TVN "affirm the values, education and culture of the Chilean people, the dignity of the family, provide objective national and international news content. Under no circumstances should it serve to advance any one ideological perspective, and must instead respect all political tendencies as expressed

in the ideas of all sectors of the Chilean people" (Sunkel & Geoffroy 2001: 84). In practice, TVN was more closely aligned to the Christian Democrats that hoped to contain UP influence.

Additional points that were key to the 1970 legislation included delineating a process for the issuance of governmental permits for broadcasting; it established a minimum level of state funding for TV allotted proportionally and favoring those TV channels with less commercial income (Getino 1996: 128). It also required broadcasting minimums for Chilean produced content; ordered the creation of a second national network to bring together the existing university channels for broadcasting on a national scale; and ordered the establishment of a politically independent national TV council, the Consejo Nacional de Televisión (CNTV) (Fernández Medina 2004, Fox 1997, Fuenzalida 2002). Finally, this legal framework also limited commercial advertising to an average of 6 minutes for every hour of broadcasting (Tealdo 1989: 55).

With sharply divided debate and tensions over the future of Chilean political power culminating during the period of la UP, polarization within the still fledgling Chilean TV industry expanded rapidly, and in some cases was expressed through violent struggles exploding between TV channel administrators (who were united in their opposition to the UP), and TV station workers and journalists who in some cases (Canal 9 of the UC for example) sought airtime to broadcast their support for Allende (Davies 1999: 101, 131). The increasing political polarization of the country during the early 1970s took shape within the print and broadcast media as internal ideological

contestation within media organizations between owners, administrators, and workers, resulting in the dominance of a "political press" - media outlets openly connected to political parties and aggressively advocating for one political camp against the other.

Print and radio "political press" continued to rise in power and influence through 1973, with the notable strengthening of the presence of the political left and radical press within the national print and radio media (Sunkel 2001: 31). "Expropriation of the media was a serious issue, because the rights enjoyed by oligopolies in all the major media: 82 of 134 radio networks, 45 of 64 periodicals, and the largest circulation dailies, especially *El Mercurio*, were all under proprietary and editorial control of the opposition to Unidad Popular… The governing bodies for all four television stations were also aligned with the right" (Davies 1999: 86).

By 1973 this tendency towards sharp political polarization was a foregone conclusion for print and radio. In 1970, Chilean television was still limited to a small number of receivers concentrated in Santiago and Valparaiso, and completely subordinate to radio and print media in relation to the dissemination of political information. Although TV had not yet been established as a national medium, it too was becoming an increasingly contested political space for those seeking to control what it would inevitably become. In spite of the limited national penetration of only 15- 17% of households, by 1973 Chilean TV was fast becoming an important arena for the intense political struggles raging throughout Chile.

Too often finding itself on a defensive footing, the UP focused most of its mass media struggle on radio, and as a consequence, the Allende government was

never able to successfully establish a foothold within Chilean TV. Technical and programming control of most of Chile's TV industry remained under the direct or indirect control of those forces opposed to the UP and the Allende presidency. "Despite the social service orientation, television was a relatively elitist medium in Chile… Television viewers came mainly from the middle and upper classes…" (Fox 1993: 279). Furthermore, the proportion of foreign programming (mostly North American) broadcast by all channels actually increased between 1970 and 1973, in spite of the protests of the ruling UP (Fox 1993: 278).

The 1973 military coup swiftly imposed severe modifications on the Chilean media landscape. The most immediate was the closure and military seizure of all forms of "political press," and the subjugation of the television system to a rigid structure of political control that was to be maintained under threat of physical repression. All direct links between media and the Chilean political landscape were cut, and direct military control was instituted in its place.

Table 2.1: The Development Of Chilean Television

Governments	- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, & Administration	- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization	- Population (in millions)/ % Urban/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources**
1952-58 Ibáñez del Campo – Dem 1958-64: Alessandri R. – Dem	- 1958 Presidential Decree orders introduction of TV. - TV introduced in 1959 with initial capitalization from the universities and state. / - Unique university-quasi-public service model. / - Universidad Católica de Valparaíso and Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago.	- TV was still a purely political debate. - Highly restrained, yet no formal regulation. / - No significant political instrumentalization.	- 7.5 million. / 67% urban. / - 0.25% TV households. - Initial restrictions of commercial TV resulted in university control through political consensus among Chilean political parties. The universities were seen as the only institution capable of guaranteeing TV content with political pluralism and a commitment to Chilean cultural development. - 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 16, 18, 19.
1964-70: Frei Montalva – Dem 1970-73: Allende Gossens – Dem	- Plural. / - Unique university-quasi-public service model. / Commercial partnerships established during this period. - Channel 4 Universidad Católica de Valparaiso - ABC. / - Channel 9 Universidad de Chile. / - Channel 13 Universidad Católica de Santiago – PROTEL, L. Letelier, J. del Rio, R. Vergara, ABC, RCA. / - TVN – Government network.	- No regulation until 1970. / - Limited political instrumentalized, increasing throughout 1960s until 1973 when TV was highly instrumentalized.	- 8-10 million. / 72-75% urban. / - Major jump in TV households from 2% in 1965 to 18% in 1973 resulting from state intervention subsidizing expansion. / - Chilean TV was not regulated other than operating within the 1958 decree limiting its control to the universities and prohibiting its commercialization. Later the decree was interpreted to allow limited commercial income, and some formed associations with private media companies. As conditions in Chile became more polarized through the 1960s, control of TV became a major point of contention among opposing political sectors. State TV established in 1969 with Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN). 1970 regulations confirmed and expanded 1958 decree. /

From Simón Salazar. Sources: Fernández Medina, Fox (1997), Fox (1988), Fox & Waisbord, Orozco, Skidmore, UNdata, WDI, ITU, UNESCO, Sterling, Asdrúbal Contreras Arellano.

1973-1988.

Under Pinochet, journalism and politically informative content was censored or cancelled, at least 40 Chilean journalists were killed in the process of the coup

d'état, 300 expelled from the country, and approximately 1,000 more were blacklisted (Fox 1993: 280, Bresnahan 2003: 39, Uribe 1998: 31). Only five print dailies survived the coup and circulation dropped by almost half (Piñuel Raigada 1992: 17). Chilean print journalism never recovered from this military intervention. Radio, on the other hand, grew rapidly under the military regime. During its 17-year dictatorship, the military regime made an aggressive push to expand Chilean FM radio, expanding concessions by over 700% and investing heavily into national broadcasting infrastructure (Sunkel 2001: 59).

TV administration was re-organized and re-structured to reward a "civic duty" for self-censorship (Halpern 1993: 3). What remained of independent thinking in the TV industry was brought to heel and forced to accommodate the ideological tenets of the dictatorship (Boas 2015: 9). Political communication was generally minimized and restricted to the early evening news. The swift dictatorial intervention in television did not permanently shut down nor privatize any channels, but immediately took administrative and editorial control of all of them. All institutional administration of TV established before the 1973 coup was shuttered and managerial powers passed from civilian hands to representatives of the military regime. University-based television operations that had previously been under the direction of university councils were immediately intervened. The dictatorship appointed new rectors to all private and public universities, while all campus based TV councils were dissolved to surrender complete control to these new rectors. In effect, TV was completely under

the control of the military regime, but still administered through the universities (Portales 1986: 92).

The existing CNTV was dissolved, and a new smaller council was convened and filled with coup supporters with orders to carry out the televisual will of the military regime. The directorship of TVN passed from the recently dissolved Ministry of Education and transferred to a new communications ministry created by the military, *la Dirección Nacional de Comunicación Social* (DINACOS), the organism in charge of "social communication" designed to facilitate direct control of broadcast content. Furthermore, it was ordered that all existing TV channels be required to surrender a minimum of one hour per day to broadcast messages approved or developed from within DINACOS (Sunkel and Geoffroy 2001: 85).

Chilean TV was aggressively expanded during the Pinochet dictatorship and awarded a privileged position as the regime's favored instrument for political communication, to the point that the dictatorship's representatives within TVN were given operational control over the state owned film production corporation, *Chile Films,* in order to expand its productive capacity for TV content (Getino 1996: 129). By 1975 TVN and Canal 13 had become the two most watched channels in Chile – with TVN reaching 90% of Chileans and Canal 13 reaching 70% (Sunkel and Geoffroy 2001: 15). In 1978 TVN first introduced color broadcasting to Chile, marking the final consolidation of this medium throughout the country.

Early in the dictatorship, state allocated national budgets for television were cancelled. In order to pay the bills of existing national television, the still relatively

new industry was expected to self-finance via commercial ventures and selling airtime for private commercial publicity. Existing civilian policies restricting publicity and commercial content on TV content were relaxed or altogether eliminated. When Chilean TV was not broadcasting the values and ideological core of the Pinochet dictatorship, it filled the bulk of its schedule with commercial advertising and imported entertainment programming. To accelerate this trend, DINACOS implemented editorial requirements for content that lead to a dramatic increase in entertainment (including sports) and commercial programming. Between 1975 and 1984 the share of commercial advertising content that was broadcast on radio and TV exploded to twenty times its original size, and TV "hoarded" 50% of all Chilean advertising revenues (Getino 1996: 129). Thus Chilean dictatorial TV was commercialized but not privatized. Finally, by 1979, 71.2% of Chilean TV programming was imported, and the vast majority of this content was entertainment (Fox 1993: 281).

A dictatorial television system that sold consumer goods and entertained is the most accurate description for Chilean TV from 1973 through at least 1988 (Sunkel and Geoffroy 2001: 87, Crofts Wiley 2006: 671). The surge in Chilean TV commercial content not only fertilized a rapidly expanding culture of consumption in Chile, the ancillary marketing industries absorbed much of the national talent who had been displaced by the regime's heavy-handed censorship in the mass media and the performing arts. As a consequence, TV producers and visual performing artists who remained in Chile were forced find employment in commercial advertising ventures or

move to radio (Cronovich 2013: 8-11, Crofts Wiley 2006: 676). Both of these factors influenced the future development of the televised Franjas of 1988 in important ways (Cronovich 2013: 15) that are described in detail in Chapter 5.

All forms of mass media in Chile were effectively instrumentalized by the military regime (Bucciferro 2012: 40). The high degree of political control over Chilean mass media during this period was very important for reproducing the symbolic power of the dictatorship - for 15 years the military regime was portrayed as a politically unbreakable force embodied in the figure of Pinochet. This was especially true for TV because of its monopolization by the Pinochetista regime; it was within the context of the military dictatorship that television emerged as the dominant source of political information in Chile. Chilean TV did not mediate politics, but was totally subservient to the regime.

Table 2.2: Chilean Television, 1973 to 1988

Government/ TV Channel Pinochet Ugarte – Dic/	- Concentration/ - Model/ - Prin. Channels, & Administration	- Regulation/ - Political Instrumentalization	- Population (in millions)/ % Urban/ - % TV Households*/ - Notes/ Sources**
Canal 4	- Universidad Católica de Valparaiso - ABC.	- Suspension of all regulation under 1970 legislation./ - Direct political instrumentalization by the military regime.	- Approximately 10.5 in 1973 and 12 million in 1988./ - 78% in 1973 and 83% in 1988./ - 18% in 1973 and 78% in 1988.
Canal 9	- Universidad de Chile.		
Canal 13	- Universidad Católica de Chile en Santiago.		
TVN – Televisión Nacional de Chile	- Government network.		

The dictatorship left its mark on Chilean TV as the industry consolidated during the late 1970s and 1980s. Pinochet's 1980 constitution explicitly established private-commercial TV as a constitutional right, suggesting a planned dictatorial redistribution of state media resources in the future, though while in power military regime refrained from privatizing TV. Instead, the industry was compelled to assimilate the communicative values of the regime, which blocked the emergence of private commercial TV ownership (private ownership was perceived as potentially complicating the concentrated Pinochetista control over television), while radically expanding foreign content and entertainment programming (Fox 1993: 258). Consequently, Chilean TV was run as a private commercial venture while under the direct control of the military regime and its allies serving as the equivalent to a proprietor (Tealdo 1989: 58). This configuration of Chilean TV never transitioned to democracy after 1988. Instead, during the last 16 months of military rule the dominant position of the military regime in the Chilean TV industry was largely transitioned to civilian control concentrated in hands of Pinochetistas. The implications of this rushed redistribution would ultimately impact the totality of the Chilean mass media, even after the death of Pinochet.

When the October 5, 1988 *Plebiscito* vote took place, Chile was 83% urban and nearly 80% of homes had a television. The number of sets had grown from 1 million in 1973, to between 3 and 4 million in 1988 (Quilter 1989: 296). More

importantly, penetration expanded from 17-18% TV households in 1970, to nearly

77% TV households in 1988 (Graph 2.1). "By 1988, Chile had more television sets

per capita, and the highest percentage of homes with televisions of any Latin

American country; it was also one of the few countries in Latin America at the time

for which television broadcasting covered the whole national territory" (Davies 1999:

129).

Graph 2.1: TV Sets By % Of Households, 1970 & 1988

Source: Simón Salazar 2009.

Under the Pinochet dictatorship some critical media was tolerated, since their

existence provided legitimacy to the regime, although they did not provide functional

political alternatives for the majority of the population; in other words, these outlets

were allowed to broadcast some critical content, but not permitted to widen the "communicative spectrum." This early oppositional media was limited to print and radio, and they largely operated within the political limits established by the regime (Halpern 1993: 32-34, 55).

What audio/ visual content that did speak out against the regime was almost entirely based outside Chile or was forced into clandestine distribution.[43] Very limited oppositional broadcast media existed, and only Teleanálisis, founded in 1984 by Augusto Góngora, offered clandestine TV in the years before the *Plebiscito*, and this content was able to achieve only very limited distribution. Teleanálisis content and production experience proved to be invaluable when the time came for the Franja Electoral and served as an important resource for the development of the NO Franjas. Teleanálisis carried with it the accumulated experience of oppositional TV, a collective distributed form of gathering and reporting news, but from a clandestine perspective, and many of the same people who had worked for Teleanálisis were called upon to direct the "NO-ticias" section of the Franja (Espinoza 2008, Crofts Wiley 2006: 676).

The First "Opening" of Chilean TV.

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[43] For example, the a/v work of Patricio Guzman in *La Batalla de Chile I, II, & III*. The original a/v material used to make this documentary had to be smuggled out of Chile when, in 1974, the original filmmaker Jorge Müller Silva was "disappeared" by the dictatorship. The material was collected by Patricio Guzmán while in Cuba and made into a documentary with support from ICAIC. To this day this important documentary has not been allowed to be broadcast on television in Chile (Guzmán 2016).

By 1987 there had been intensifying calls for the political opening of Chilean TV: "todos los sectores de opinión deben tener acceso equitativo a la televisión..." (see Portales & Sunkel 2001, 1987 Catholic Church document from Conferencia Episcopal de Chile). "Equal access to television" for all political actors in Chile had an historical tradition dating back to its introduction in 1959, and "equal access" to national media was considered by many influential people in Chile - even supporters of the military regime - as the hallmark of an authentically democratic, legitimating transition process to civilian rule. The opening up of the television system for oppositional political communication was introduced as a key indicator of whether the legitimating process would muster real democratic credentials.

The first notable opening in televised political content came in early 1988, when representatives from the opposition were for the first time allowed to speak for themselves on political talk shows - as invited guests representing the opposition - as well as being included in interviews that would appear in more traditional news reports. These televisual interventions by the opposition were usually accompanied by vigorous rebuttal by news anchors or official representatives from the regime, but the sudden appearance of opposition voices speaking in the first person on TV was nonetheless noteworthy (Portales & Sunkel 2001: 39).

The most historic part of this "opening" of the media system was of course the 1988 *Franja de Propaganda Electoral*. When the plans for the nationally televised Franja were made public in 1987, there were immediate complaints from all quarters: Pinochetistas complained of the prospect of an overly commercialized "US styled"

voting environment considered undignified and inappropriate, especially for Pinochet. TV executives who had won their positions during the dictatorship ironically denounced the injustice of forcing them to broadcast the Franjas free of charge. The political opposition to Pinochet denounced the unfair advantage the dictatorship had with years of accumulated experience and resources for TV production (Quilter 1989: 298). Leading up to the 1988 *Plebiscito*, there was fear among the opponents of the dictatorship, that Pinochet would use the full power of TV to manipulate and frame the upcoming October *Plebiscito* to its advantage. This was a concern soon realized when dictatorial TV did everything it could to attack the opposition and promote Pinochet (WOLA-CIIR). "From January to August of 1988, a total of 7302 [pro-Pinochet] spots were telecast. They averaged 912 per month, totaling 109 hours of broadcast time. As there was no access to television, the opposition could not broadcast any message of its own [during this same period]" (Davies 1999: 137).

"15 minutos en 15 años no es mucho..."[44] Fifteen minutes of uncensored TV access versus fifteen years of censorship and total control - this was the democratizing televisual "opening" provided by Pinochet to his political opposition. The incredible imbalance of TV access underscores that the only substantive "opening" of this medium took place within the Franja for the NO campaign, otherwise the television system remained "an instrument in the service of the military government used for broadcasting its messages" (Portales & Sunkel 2001: 42-45). .

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[44] This is a phrase first uttered by Patricio Bañados in the 30-second introduction to the first Franja Electoral for the NO on September 5, 1988.

The introduction of nationally televised political content developed by an organic opposition had a tremendous impact on Chileans who were only familiar with and had grown accustomed to dictatorial TV. Up until that moment the opposition had been incessantly demonized and framed as criminal within the mass media, and was suddenly authorized to self-represent on national TV for all to see. This opening up to the television viewing audience lent at least a symbolic democratic significance the *Plebiscito* had not yet achieved, and buttressed the work which already had been undertaken.

The SÍ was well aware of this dynamic. The topic of television figured prominently in the October 10, 1988 panel discussion convened by Pinochetista intellectuals to debate the reasons why the SÍ had lost the vote. Arturo Fontaine Talavera argued that the *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* itself was a milestone in the transition:

> …el único hecho verdaderamente relevante fue la apertura de la televisión… el uso monopólico de la televisión Chilena [por el régimen, y] la ruptura de ese control… es el hito más importante desde 1973, hito que marca definitivamente el futuro de la política Chilena. La necesidad de validar en Chile y en el extranjero las reglas de la elección plebiscitaria-presidencial lleva al gobierno a ampliar los márgenes de la tolerancia y darle acceso a la pantalla a la oposición. Con todo, ello se hace sin alterar los mecanismos jurídicos correspondientes… de pronto, el país se vio enfrentado a una verdadera opción política en *el* medio político por excelencia, la televisión. (Matte Larraín 1989: 115)[45]

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[45] "…the only truly relevant issue here was the opening of television… the televisual monopoly originally maintained by the regime and] the ultimate rupture of this total control… is the most important milestone since 1973, a milestone that definitively marks the future of Chilean politics. The necessity to validate the rules of the plebiscite-presidential election forced the government to expand the margins of tolerance and allow opposition access to the small screen. Overall, it was done without any alteration in the corresponding judicial mechanisms… Soon thereafter, the country came face to face with a real political option right in the middle of *the* political medium par excellence, television."

The NO was not only aware of this dynamic, but leveraged it in their favor. Mariano Fernández, a member of the NO technical committee commented "…the manipulation and lack of television access was almost transformed into an advantage, because the NO team that was formed to make the television spot had to concentrate on those daily fifteen minutes, and they produced a compact, beautiful, high quality program, of high technical and communicational quality" (Cronovich 2012: 18, Valdés 1988: 25).

Graph 2.2: Chile TV Sets, Homes, & Governments, 1950 & 2005

Chile Total TV Sets, TV Homes, and Governments, 1950 to 2005.

Total in millions.

After the votes had been counted and the NO declared the winner of the 1988 *Plebiscito*, the political instrumentalization of TV remained. All channels and networks remained under the direct authority of the military regime through its representatives in the universities, and content was still censored by DINACOS. Quantitatively, the vast majority of political messaging broadcast between October 1988 and March 1990 was still overwhelmingly in favor of the military regime (Angell 2007: 47). The only readily apparent exception was the second series of Franjas developed for the 1989 presidential campaigns.

A notable qualitative change had nonetheless taken hold. Albeit still marginalized and often misrepresented, political opposition on TV was humanized the moment it was first allowed self- representation. The happy symbolism and innocuous motifs that had been tolerated for 15 minutes during the 27 days of the Franja campaign had established a democratizing televisual beachhead. What came after this moment does not qualify as a substantive democratization of TV, but can be better classified as new media representations of politics that more closely coincided with a changed definition of democracy within Chilean political culture (Crofts Wiley 2006: 672).

In sum, this period in Chilean television history represented the convergence of important technological, commercial, and political forces unique to this historical moment but had lasting repercussions on the long-term development of Chilean television as an instrument of cultural production. What finally emerged from the 17-year Pinochetista domination of Chilean television was a fully consolidated and

modern media system with complete coverage and total penetration of the Chilean

market, that had evolved and was consolidated as a technology of dictatorial power

(Arriagada and Navia 2011: 3).[46] In spite of continued university administration of TV

and DINACOS censorship, Chilean viewers were familiar with all current forms of

commercialized North American content relating to advertising and entertainment, and

accustomed to a televisual marketing "media logic." Hence, the Chilean television

industry was also one of the most highly commercialized and, simultaneously, one of

the most politically restrained in the Western Hemisphere (Getino 1996: 129).

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[46] Arriagada and Navia 2011: "En cierto modo, la Democracia Chilena antes de la dictadura de Pinochet utilizaba como medios de comunicación la radio y los diarios. Después de la experiencia autoritaria, y producto del desarrollo de esa tecnología, la televisión se consolido como el principal medio de comunicación entre la política y los ciudadanos" (3).

PART II:

Mediatization As A Theoretical Framework

Chapter 3.
The *Franja Electoral*:
A Fictive Self-Representation Of Chilean Democracy

Image 3.1: Screenshots of NO & SÍ campaign jingles. As soon as the success of the NO campaign jingle "Chile, La Alegría Ya Viene" became evident, the SÍ campaign developed its own version of the song, "Compañeros, Los Marxistas Ya Vienen." Below are screen shots of the NO and SÍ videos developed for the jingles that were broadcast nationally in 1988.

The original intention of the images on the previous page, when they were broadcast in 1988 as part of their respective Franjas, was that they would be understood as contending representations of what the future held for Chileans, depending on what side they supported in the *Plebiscito.*

On the left is the first "democratic" self-representation of the NO and *la Concertación*, and on the right is the SÍ representation of the violent intentions of the NO. How could these images have been developed for use as part of the campaign strategy within the same *Plebiscito*? Clearly, both sides of the campaign had very different relationships with the political reality of Chile in 1988 – perhaps more of a struggle between truth versus fiction, and even the informed observer might assume it is the NO campaign images that are closer to the truth than the SÍ images, which are vicious exaggerations designed to scare people and thereby keep them from voting for the NO. Yet this was not the case, since the images on the right are all drawn from real events in Chile, while the images on the left were all fictional depictions of Chilean democracy. In the end, Chilean viewers perceived the NO Franjas as "more credible" than the SÍ Franjas by over 40 points (Piñuel Raigada 1992).

The 2012 Film NO & "The Rainbow That Brought Down A Dictatorship"[47]

40 years after the "golpe" and 25 years after the 1988 *Plebiscito,* the phrase *"A Rainbow That Brought Down A Dictatorship"* still refers to the rainbow symbol developed by Pinochet's opposition, and has since been used to allude to the idea that it was the happy content of the *NO* campaign (presumably linked to the culture of marketing) that helped defeat the *SÍ* campaign. In spite of the fictive nature of this narrative, *"A Rainbow That Brought Down A Dictatorship"* has come to embody the idea that the 1988 *Plebiscito* victory and the role of the Franjas represented something greater than the electoral victory of the NO to embody the peaceful rejection of a violent military regime, the removal of Pinochet from power, and a transition to a procedural democracy in Chile. The magical stories of 1988 not only endure, but also are also reproduced and re-circulated to reinforce this mythical success, often in the context of contemporary political messaging.

This narrative has become dominant because of its enduring reproducibility over time in the form of the NO Franjas themselves. Online, in documentaries, and in popular culture, the NO Franjas are evidence of what must be celebrated in the present about what took place in 1988. It is no coincidence that the first feature film made about the events of 1988 focused primarily on the Franjas of the NO campaign. The basic premise and subsequent criticism of 2012 film *NO* serve as a useful illustration of the enduring myth of the Franjas.

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[47] This phrase refers to the work of Chilean writer Antonio Skármeta, author of the novel *Los Días del Arcoíris* and the play *El Plebiscito* – stories used as the basis for the 2012 film *NO* directed by Pablo Larraín. These works sought to tell the story of the 1988 *Plebiscito,* but have since been criticized for foregrounding the televised Franjas as central to the electoral victory of the NO campaign.

Directed by Pablo Larraín, the 2012 film *NO* was a cinematic representation of events surrounding the 1988 *Plebiscito* and its televised *Franja Electoral.* The film featured Mexican film heartthrob Gael García Bernal playing the fictional character of René Saavedra, a youthful skateboarding ad-man, recruited by the political opposition to the Pinochet dictatorship to help sell the Chilean people on the idea of democracy.

The opening scene of this Oscar nominated film offers an exaggerated close up, with a solemn René reciting what appears to be his most revered political conviction: "Bueno, antes de nada quería mencionarles que lo que van a ver a continuación esta enmarcado entre el actual contexto social. Nosotros creemos que el país esta preparado para una comunicación de esta naturaleza."[48] Saavedra glances to his compatriot, who nods in affirmation confirming René's remarks - "Absolutamente." René re-assumes a stern look and continues his speech, "No hay que olvidar que la ciudadanía ha subido sus exigencias *en torno a la verdad... en torno a lo que le gusta*. Seamos honestos. Hoy, *Chile piensa en su futuro*."[49]

René gestures towards his video equipment queued to provide a sample of this new and improved "forward looking truth." He turns dramatically to switch on a small analog television set, and immediately fills the room with images and sounds of synthesized music from a 1980s rock concert. Smoke, mirrors, mimes, and hundreds of North American-looking young people celebrate the introduction of a new soft

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[48] "Well, first of all I must tell you that what you are about to see is framed within the current social context. We are convinced that the country is ready for communication of this nature."

[49] "We must keep in mind that the public has raised its expectations around *what it considers the truth...* about what the public enjoys. We must be honest. Today, Chile thinks primarily about its future."

drink aptly named "Free." It immediately becomes clear that Saavedra is making a

sales pitch to soda company executives, seeking to win approval for his new

advertising campaign. Our protagonist René Saavedra is a salesman.

Saavedra repeats this marketing motif at two other moments in the film. The

second speech comes in the middle of the movie when he is pitching the most

important elements of the multicolored rainbow-clad NO campaign to a room full of

skeptical representatives from the Chilean dictatorship's political opposition. Saavedra

explains to his audience that Chilean voters must be *sold* on the idea of a democratic

future using a modern consumer-based televisual language. He emphasizes his ideas to

the people gathered in the room - all leading members of the pre-1973 Chilean

political class and witnesses and/or survivors of torture, exile, and other forms of

political violence perpetrated against them by the dictatorship. The Chilean public *has*

raised its expectations about what it considers to be the truth... about what the Chilean

people enjoy… René reminds them that in the present, Chileans are not interested in

reliving the problems of the past, instead, *"Chile now thinks primarily about its*

future."

Initially he is rebuked by members of the gathered audience and admonished to

not so easily forget the thousands of Chileans tortured, killed and disappeared at the

hands of the Pinochet dictatorship. René responds that such messaging will not sell

Chileans on the idea of voting for the *NO*. One of the participants, presumably a

representative from the Communist Party of Chile, is so offended that he storms out of

the room. Debate ensues, and René's vision is tentatively accepted. Our protagonist

then spends the remainder of the film surreptitiously producing the now internationally famous *Franjas,* working behind closed doors to reassure his *NO* compatriots of the utility of this "modern forward looking brand" of politics, and simultaneously dodging repression by Pinochet's state security forces on the streets of Santiago.

The third and final sales pitch is also the last scene of the film, set some time after the *NO* campaign has claimed victory in the October 1988 *Plebiscito*. René Saavedra is back at his old job with a commercial advertising agency, once again working under his old boss, who at this point in the film has been identified as a leading *Pinochetista*, a key figure in the failed *SÍ* campaign, and source of numerous threats of violence against René, René's young son, and the child's mother.

This final scene revisits the opening scene of the film, only now the vindicated Saavedra is not selling soda, nor democracy, but selling a new *telenovela* entitled *"Bellas y Audaces,"* sharing the stage with his boss and former political enemy. It is not clear what exactly has changed between them after the NO victory, if anything at all. Of course, this is the point Pablo Larraín is hoping to make about the much-mythologized *Plebiscito*. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*. Or perhaps *el gatopardismo en vivo y directo*.

Our protagonist René Saavedra is a talented and *successful* salesman, and this commercial *success* stands in metaphorically for the *success* of the *NO* campaign in 1988, and even points to the mythologized *success* of contemporary Chilean politics. The moral of the story is clear – modern democracies have learned to market democratic politics like any other product - people must be induced to want it, people

must enjoy it, otherwise, what is it good for? The *Franja* was evidence that with the right messaging broadcast to a sufficient number of people, even a violent dictator like Augusto Pinochet can be brought down peacefully - such is the power of the modern media (Valdés 1988: 10). From this perspective, it was indeed *"a rainbow that brought down a dictatorship."*

Pablo Larraín's film generally received positive reviews outside Chile, won numerous international awards and was nominated for best foreign-language film at the 2013 Academy Awards in the United States. Yet this international recognition was not enough to completely insulate the film from severe criticism abroad and within Chile.[50] Some film critics, scholars and Chilean political figures published essays challenging the basic premise of the film, arguing, "that reality was far messier than a catchy ad campaign" (Khazan 2013). These critics were especially concerned that by foregrounding the televised *Franja*, the film undermined the truth that the NO campaign included a broad range of struggles, tactics, as well as a significant degree of sacrifice before securing a victory was even imaginable.

NPR film critic John Powers posits, "...indeed, if Larraín's work has a limitation, it's a certain reductivism... [it is] stronger at revealing a darkly ironic sense of metaphor than a detailed grasp of social complexity" (Powers 2013). Genaro Arriagada, a leading *Demócrata Cristiano* - executive director of the *Comando Por El*

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[50] The debate surrounding Larraín's film has been further complicated by issues unrelated to cinematic concerns, specifically Mr. Larraín's connection to two prominent right-wing Pinochetista families. His father, Hernán, is a senator who was president of the main Pinochetista party UDI, and his mother, Magdalena Matte, who served as a cabinet minister in Chile's Piñera's conservative government, is a member of one of Chile's wealthiest families (Rother 2013).

NO and the real 1988 *Franjas,* a prominent fixer within the Frei and Lagos

presidential campaigns, and a guru of Chilean post-Pinochet political communication -

was literally offended by the film's central premise. "The film is a gross

oversimplification that has nothing to do with reality... The idea that, after 15 years of

dictatorship in a politically sophisticated country with strong union and student

movements, solid political parties and an active human rights movement, all of a

sudden this Mexican advertising guy arrives on his skateboard and says, 'Gentlemen,

this is what you have to do,' - that is a caricature" (Rother 2013). A "gross

oversimplification?" A "caricature?" These are harsh words coming from a key figure

behind the production of the actual *NO Franjas* of 1988.

Larraín readily admitted he was trying to fool his audience's ability to

differentiate between historical footage from 1988 Chile and his own film work by

filming the entire movie with vintage U-Matic cameras and film. This was done to

more closely match the color and granular quality of the historical footage, so as to

take the viewer to a place of believing the entire movie was an historical documentary

(Delgado Criado 2013: 20, Tironi 2013: 20).

Media studies professor Caetlin Benson-Allott offers a thoughtful critique of

the film's fictive aesthetic: "...it acknowledges that motion pictures, both fictional and

archival, create illusions — illusions of immersion in a made-up world or illusions of

access to a past reality. By matching his video medium to that of the original NO

campaign, Larraín emphasizes that both are constructions and suggests that there can

be no unmediated access to the history of the NO campaign, because the NO itself was

a media creation. By making his fiction look archival, he underscores the fictive quality of the archive and of politics in general" (62). Indeed, my argument has been that the original 1988 Franjas are the source of the most prominently fabricated qualities in modern Chilean presidential politics.

In spite of these admissions of fictive guilt, Larraín's *NO* has since been assigned a filmic position closer to historical text, placing it beyond the category of other feature films, elevated into a space shared by contemporaneous historical works such as the 2012 films *Argo* and *Lincoln*. This notoriety has had the effect of insulating the work (and Franja mythology as a whole) from more substantive critique or analysis within Chilean political circles. Its relatively protected space is rooted in an expectation that all forms of communication media involve an intrinsic distortion of lived reality, underscoring the definitive qualities of media and mediation in general.

Nonetheless, the broad range of criticism about the shortcomings of Pablo Larraín's film also point to a long standing scholarly concern over the limits of research that foregrounds a media text as subject for analysis. It is true that well before the release of the 2012 film, Latin Americanists and media scholars, among others, have referred to the significance of the televised *Franjas* as an important factor in securing a NO victory, but similar to the premise of the 2012 film, researchers generally stop at that point, without a more substantive interrogation of this significance or its consequences.

The creative historical license within the film embodies a series of presumptions that point to what in the field of Communication research has been

discredited as a long-standing and seemingly irrepressible tendency to elevate media, in this case television, to a technologically deterministic, hypodermic needle, media effects quintessence. The portrayal of the *Franjas* in Larraín's film is a case in point. In this peculiar but prominent narrative, the political power of TV is reified with an almost divinely influential quality. The formula for success stands in clear relief – just get the right message out there, be careful that it not be too negative, tie it all together with a catchy tune, and when enough people are exposed to it they will want it, and in fact they will do anything to get what you are selling. In this Chilean case the message was "democracia es alegría."

The 2012 film is based on events that took place in 1988, so it should come as no surprise that in the current media-saturated environment this form of technological determinism is ever more entrenched (Davies 1999: 159, Hirmas 1993). Furthermore, it is a challenge to track and describe the operation and impact of the Franjas within the Chilean *Plebiscito,* while not over- estimating their influence or assuming *a priori* that existing forms of enacting politics have become secondary or subordinated to undeniably influential televisual messaging such as the Franjas. In other words, how can the impact of the Franjas be understood without falling into the trap of ascribing too much power to the televisual campaign? More importantly, is there any additional theoretical value in seeking to quantify the effect of the Franjas on the *NO* vote 25 years after the fact, as other scholars have already done (Boas 2009a, Tironi 2013)?

It is true that too much significance has been assigned to the televised Franjas as the key factor contributing to the *NO* victory, but I am convinced that seeking to

reinvigorate this old debate cannot reveal the theoretical potential of the Franjas as a cultural artifact. There exist few theoretical tools useful for tracking the fictive, distorting characteristics of mediated political communication, but these theoretical tools do indeed exist. There are even fewer examples of studies that look more closely at the forms of political communication that were developed for the 1988 *Plebiscito*.

I propose that by reconsidering the 1988 *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* using the *mediatization of politics* as a conceptual framework we can contribute to not only answering, but transcending some of these important questions, and ultimately contribute to a better understanding of the enduring implications of the Franjas on Chilean political culture even 25 years after they were first broadcast.

The Mediatization of Chilean Politics?

In Chapters 1 and 2 of this project I elaborated a periodization of contemporary Chilean history necessary to contextualize my use of the *mediatization of Chilean politics* as a theoretical framework. Of course, these are uniquely important chapters in the contemporary political history of Chile in their own right, although my use of this periodization is not primarily intended for highlighting this historical significance, but to clearly outline the configuration of political economic power in Chile. My emphasis is in how the Chilean political landscape after 1973 was dominated by the military regime to reshape institutional Chilean politics according to its functional and ideological foundations, and to underscore the dominant position of Pinochetista political logics over the 1988 *Plebiscito* and the any potentially autonomous media

logics expressed within the Franjas. As such, 1973-88 might be considered a "pre-mediatization" moment in Chilean politics, when the lived politics of the military regime clearly determine media representations of these politics and the media are subject to these dominant Pinochetista logics.

1988 to 1990 can be considered "antesala de la transición," [51] or the moment when the link between lived Chilean politics (still firmly in the grip of Pinochet's military dictatorship), and media representations of these politics (articulated most clearly within the Franjas of the NO) are initially decoupled, and become subject to contradictory post-*Plebiscito,* post-Pinochetista logics. The Franja campaign itself helps solidify a shift in political culture collectively experienced as blissfully vigorous campaigns and multiple electoral victories for the Chilean opposition, meanwhile virtually every aspect of post-*Plebiscito* institutional, economic, and military power remained remarkably consistent with dictatorial Chile and worked out in the interests of Chilean Pinochetistas in the form of this "protected democracy." This differential collapse between political change and political consistency in Chile has been more critically referred to as "el gatopardismo" and is evidence of the emergence of a representational gap between Chilean political life and Chilean political culture. Furthermore, this gap took shape within the context of the *Plebiscito* and was articulated nationally within the Franjas via the politically dominant medium of television. The emergence of this representational gap marks the beginning of my theorization of the Franjas as an artifact of political cultural that confirms the

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[51] "Entryway or antechamber to the transition."

mediatization of Chilean politics as both an historical and a socio-cultural process. That the Franjas continue to gain prominence as artifacts of political culture after the *Plebiscito,* redeployed and reinterpreted as cultural prophylactic protecting against institutional reemergence of unresolved tensions, repressed memories and contested political history in Chile is further verification of my theoretical argument.

It must be made clear that the *mediatization of Chilean politics* represents only my interpretation of the *mediatization of politics*; it should also be clear that the *mediatization of politics* is only one field within mediatization theory in general. There are multiple fields of research that are currently being elaborated, such as the *mediatization of religion* (Hjarvard 2006), the *mediatization of medical practices* (Briggs and Hallin 2016), *the mediatization of military conflict* (Maltby 2012, Cottle 2006), the *mediatization of scientific research* (Rodder 2011, Hjarvard 2008: 107-108), as well as "science, music, identity construction, health, childhood, theatre, tourism, memory, climate change, policy making, performance, consumption, madness, death, intimate relationships, human geography and education" (Deacon & Stanyer 2014: 1033).

These fields share common terms and conceptual frameworks, for example interpretation of the increasing autonomy of media institutions from their related social and/or political fields is an important conceptualization within mediatization theory (Hjarvard 2008: 106), i.e. the relative autonomy of pharmaceutical advertising in influencing medical treatment sometimes, in spite of medical best practices. Mediatization theory also tracks the relationship between ordering "logics" – media

logic, political logic, etc. usually expressed at the point of production of the media

artifact.

Mediatization As A Theoretical Framework: Introduction

Nick Couldry and Andreas Hepp propose a useful summary in the August

2013 Special Issue of Communication Theory, "Conceptualizing Mediatization:"

> ...across different traditions of doing mediatization research the contours
> of a shared, basic understanding of the term have emerged. On that
> fundamental level the term 'mediatization' does not refer to a single
> theory but to a more general approach within media and communication
> research. *Generally speaking, mediatization is a concept used to analyze
> critically the interrelation between changes in media and
> communications on the one hand, and changes in culture and society on
> the other…* [Emphasis added]. At this general level, mediatization has
> quantitative as well as qualitative dimensions. With regard to
> quantitative aspects, mediatization refers to the increasing temporal,
> spatial and social spread of mediated communication. Over time we
> have become more and more used to communicate via media in various
> contexts. With regard to qualitative aspects, mediatization refers to the
> specificity of certain media within sociocultural change: It matters what
> kind of media is used for what kind of communication. (2013b: 197)

It is also suggested that mediatization should be "...conceived of as a

metaprocess, similar to globalization, individualization, and commercialization"

(Landerer 2013: 239, Hjarvard 2008: 109). Scaling up the idea of mediatization as a

metaprocess similar to globalization underscores the potential utility of developing

broad categories and accompanying conceptual tools for operationalizing

mediatization theory "beyond the Western world" as described by Hallin and Mancini

in 2012 (Introduction) and by Deacon and Stanyer in 2014 (1039). It is my hope that

this project represents a contribution to this end.

Finally, Couldry and Hepp further elaborate on an institutionalist trend within

mediatization theory "coming mainly from journalism studies and political

communication... [This] tradition understood media more or less as an independent

social institution with its own sets of rules... Mediatization here refers to the

adaptation of different social fields or systems (for example, politics or religion) to

these institutionalized rules" (2013b: 196). Hjarvard's work has done the most to

contribute to this trend, which refers to *mediatization* as "…the process whereby

society to an increasing degree is submitted to, or becomes dependent on, the media

and their logic. This process is characterized by a duality in that the media have

become integrated into the operations of other social institutions, while they also have

acquired the status of social institutions in their own right. As a consequence, social

interaction – within the respective institutions, between institutions, and in society at

large – take place via the media" (113). I consider this institutionalist trend as the most

appropriate starting point for my Chilean case, which I have supported by an historical

argument and a larger theoretical framework that includes essential cultural

components. These are conceptualizations I have found to be important to my

theoretical argument that the *mediatization of Chilean politics* is both an historical and

socio-cultural process.

In the course of developing this project, the intention of my research has been

misunderstood on numerous occasions and I, therefore, feel the need to reiterate one

important epistemological admonition to constructing such an analysis. I have no

interest in identifying a causal link between Chilean media on the one hand (the

Franjas) and electoral politics on the other (the *Plebiscito* vote*)*. My project does not

involve a media effects/ audience reception analysis. My project is historical and

theoretical, and I set out to track conceptual relationships "...designed to capture both

how the communicative construction of reality is manifested within certain media processes and how, in turn, specific features of certain media have a contextualized 'consequence' for the overall process whereby sociocultural reality is constructed in and through communication" (Couldry & Hepp 2013b: 196). My perspective on mediatization focuses on the "...symbolic and hegemonic qualities of media... different [but neither limited nor isolated] from functionalist, institutional, or structuralist works on the issues" (Block 2013: 260).

I primarily refer to mediatization-related concepts that are most common to the field of politics grouped under what is understood as the *mediatization of politics*. The *mediatization of politics,* as one field of mediatization theory, involves the use of terms and concepts such as *mediation, media logics,* and *political logics,* each of which need to be defined as such before my use of the *mediatization of politics* framework can be further elaborated.

Mediation, Mediated Politics & The Logics

Conceptually, mediation has a long history in communication research, and is better established in political communication research than mediatization theory (Esser 2013, Mazzoleni 2008, Strömbäck 2008). Therefore, it is not surprising that mediation is also used within mediatization theory, although the definition of *mediation* has some unique characteristics that must be differentiated from *mediatization*.

Mediatization is a more expansive and theoretically complex concept, while within mediatization theory, mediation is primarily descriptive and indexical, more appropriate for the establishment of quantitative markers that are important to understand the circumstantial development of individual media systems. The most often cited definition of mediation, as it relates to the *mediatization of politics,* comes from the work of Swedish communication scholar Jesper Strömbäck: "Politics could... be described as mediated whenever the mass media are the main channels through which politics is communicated and when, as a consequence, the depictions of 'reality' that are conveyed through the mass media presumably have an impact on how people perceive 'reality.'" Strömbäck continues, "*mediated politics* [emphasis in the original], refers to a situation in which the media have become the most important source of information and vehicle of communication between the governors and the governed… the media *mediate* between the citizenry, on the one hand, and the institutions involved in government, electoral processes, or more generally, opinion formation, on the other" (230).

This often cited passage suggests that Strömbäck is working with a normative understanding of mediation aligned with Western procedural democracies (236) rather than one more appropriate for understanding media institutions potentially operating as autonomous political actors, as is more often the case "beyond the Western world," and points to my first critique of the current state of mediatization theory.

Broadly, mediatization theory, the mediatization of politics, and related concepts - such as mediation, media logics, etc. - have primarily been used to describe "a more general process in highly developed, post-industrial mass democracies" (Esser 2013: 158). It thus follows that concepts like *mediated politics* as such, are politics legitimated through the process of being represented in the media, and the ideal definition of *mediated politics* is implicitly one that has media fulfilling the role of providing access to important political information and analysis, presumably in the service of the public good.

Furthermore, this normative, largely Western European and North American understanding of *mediated politics* presumes the existence of Schudson's editorial "wall" between political content and market forces, and implies the existence of other normative logics influencing political communication such as journalistic professionalization, market forces, proximity to the state, legislative protections for a "free press," etc. This conceptualization explicitly conjures a qualitative, cultural expectation that people *believe* in the mass media and in its construction of a given political "reality," the existence of a democratic relationship that media help mediate, and clearly situates the media "in the middle" or "between" two or more political

actors and/or institutional political powers operating on a more or less horizontal

procedural (i.e. non-dictatorial) playing field. This high threshold underscores an

expectation for the general fulfillment of a fourth estate, public sphere, watch dog

functionalism to media and falls in line with some of the institutionalist scholarship

that has been developed within the field of the *mediatization of politics*. To be sure,

Strömbäck's definition of *mediated politics* is not far from what most mediatization

scholars agree upon (Hjarvard 2008, Mazzoleni and Schulz 2008) as well as numerous

Latin American media scholars (Boas 2012, Waisbord 2008[52]).

Finally, this description presumes a fully consolidated media system, for

example a national or regional TV system within which broadcasting has achieved full

geographic coverage and a total penetration rate of TVs per household of 75% or

higher. This point is inferred because most conceptual descriptions of *mediation* do

not define a specific operational threshold for the mass media as such, which would

require unique historical and quantitative as well as theoretical considerations. While

this operational threshold is not a problem for my Chilean case, it can potentially be

problematic, if presumed to work for all countries beyond Western European and

North American cases.

Perhaps anticipating the potential limitations of his initial characterization,

Strömbäck set a baseline definition for lowest level of *mediated politics*: "In any case,

to assess whether politics in a particular society is mediated or not, it really does not

matter whether... the media are independent from, or controlled by government or

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[52] From an unpublished paper cited in Boas 2012.

political actors, such as political parties, or what professional norms and values guide journalists in their work. What matters is whether the mass media constitute the most important channels for information exchange and communication between people and political actors. *Mediated politics should thus be understood as something different from politics experienced through interpersonal communication or directly by the people*" (Emphasis added, 231).

This is a substantially more expansive position that moves to the background media content, formatting, and production logics, to foreground a qualitative cultural shift in the enactment of politics by calling out the primary characteristic of *mediated politics* as being distinct from experiential politics. Since so much of my own research pivots on this concept, I prefer to characterize this definition as conceptually closer to mediatization.

Mediated Politics In A Chilean Context.

I draw as much as I can from Strömbäck's explanation of *mediated politics* to guide my own analysis of Chilean TV at the time of the 1988 *Plebiscito.* When his conceptualization is applied to Chilean television system operating under the control of the Pinochet dictatorship, two problems become evident. First, a difference must be noted between mass media provisioning the "most important channels for information exchange and communication between people and political actors" versus a medium that is the most *politically influential* channel for information exchange and communication between people and political actors.

For example, in 1988 Chile, the "mass media" (television) indeed constituted the "most important channel for information exchange and communication between people and political actors," although it would be incorrect to assume that such a statement includes a process of robust opinion formation and popular affirmation of Chilean "political reality" through television. It is true that by 1988 77% of Chilean households had access to a television set, well above any inferred operational threshold expected from *mediated politics* as understood thus far. Ironically, though universally recognized as the most important source of political information in 1988 Chile (80% of Chileans got their news from television), TV was simultaneously perceived the least trustworthy (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 5, Quilter 1989: 297). In a poll conducted in 1987, only 14% of Chileans responded that the information broadcast on TV was credible (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 58, Quilter 1989: 296).[53] Thus, a substantial majority of Chileans living under the military regime in 1988 did not trust the depictions of political "reality" disseminated by the mass media in general. Of course this lack of credibility is not by any means unique to Chile in 1988.[54] Nor does this lack of credibility disqualify 1988 Chilean politics from being categorized as mediated politics. To be sure, by 1988 television was well established

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[53] In May of 1987 CENECA and FLASCO conducted a poll in Santiago, "Encuesta de Consumo Cultural." Residents were asked, "Which type of media does the best job at honoring the truth: newspapers, magazines, radio or TV?" 41.4 % answered radio, 18.1% newspapers, 14.1% TV, 9.4% magazines, and 3.4% answered none of these (Portales & Sunkel 58). Television did not surpass print and radio in trustworthiness until over twenty years later, when in 2008 57.9% of Chileans declared their confidence in TV (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 5).

[54] A example of this dynamic can currently be observed in the United States where a disdain for the "main stream media" (from the left) or the "liberal media" (from the right) are pervasive in political discourse.

as the dominant medium for political communication in Chile (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 10, Cronovich 2013: 6), in spite of operating as the least relevant to fulfilling a fourth estate, public sphere role expected in Strömbäck's model of *mediated politics*.

If nothing else, this incongruity exemplifies how both the quantitatively dominant position Chilean TV and its qualitative ill repute influenced each other at the time of the *Plebiscito*. In hindsight, the overwhelming skepticism Chilean TV engendered in 1988 became an important factor contributing to the elevated symbolic impact of the NO *Franjas* for Chileans across the country, *precisely* because TV had been the most manipulated communicative instrument wielded by the military regime (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 6, Cronovich 2013: 13). This peculiarity in the Chilean case can potentially provide insight into how these two dimensions of media culture are not mutually exclusive and can overlap to generate unexpected consequences.

Another problem that becomes evident through direct application of Strömbäck's definition of *mediated politics* to 1988 Chile is based on the completely undemocratic nature of Pinochetista politics. The keywords and concepts that form part of Strömbäck's model - institutions, electoral process, mass media, governors and governed - do not readily map on to the Chilean context, nor did the dictatorial mass media in Chile *mediate* a political configuration shared by multiple sectors or groups within civil society. This non-mediating characterization is particularly true for TV between 1973 and 1990 precisely because it evolved and was consolidated as a technology of dictatorial power. Dictatorial mass media was not in the *middle* of a larger political configuration to mediate internal tensions between the military regime

and the Chilean people - that was the role assigned to political violence. The function of the mass media under the Pinochet dictatorship was as blunt communicative bludgeon more than a mediator. Of course there were exceptions to this characterization found in print and radio, but they were indeed exceptional.

Chilean TV had undoubtedly reached the operational threshold of *mediated politics* by 1988 (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 2)*,* but the Chilean dictatorship simply does not square with the normative political characteristics of Strömbäck's model of *mediated politics*. Aside from these limitations, Strömbäck's description of *mediated politics* is still relevant to the Chilean case, though with a few revisions. A better way to described the *mediated politics* of dictatorial Chile is the following:

Politics can be described as mediated when the mass media are the main channel through which political information is communicated, and mediated politics *refers to a situation in which the media have become the most important vehicle for political self-representation and institutional legitimation between the citizenry, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the institutions involved in governance, electoral processes, and/ or opinion formation more generally. Mediated politics should thus be understood as something different from politics experienced through interpersonal communication or as a lived experience directly between people.*

This is the definition of *mediated politics* I use to construct my subsequent interpretation of the *mediatization of Chilean politics.*

Media Logics & Political Logics.

There exists an unsettled debate about the significance of media versus political logics within mediatization research. The current state of logics-related conceptualizations within mediatization theory is less stable than the discussion of *mediated politics.* Altheide & Snow, Couldry, Hjarvard, Schulz, and Strömbäck have all made important contributions in developing ideas about the media and political logics, but no single conceptualization has emerged as definitive. According to Landerer, these existing descriptions "…lack a thorough conceptualization in the context of mediatization…" and "…are more often referred to than actually defined and operationalized" (240). Thus, within the current literature on mediatization theory, the discussion on *logics* remains unsettled. The most prominent definitions of political and media logics usually begin with a qualitative and relational assessment of political communication and media at the point of production.

I begin with current conceptualizations of *media logic.* Couldry and Hepp help summarize the logics referred to in mediatization theory as related to communicative categories or events subject to "…media… as an independent social institution with its own sets of rules... Mediatization here refers to the adaptation of different social fields or systems (for example, politics or religion) to these institutionalized rules. The latter are mainly described as a 'media logic'... that is, in the widest sense of the word, institutionalized formats and forms of staging. This 'media logic,' on the one hand, takes up nonmediatized forms of representation; on the other hand, nonmedia actors have to conform to this 'media logic,' if they want to be represented in the (mass)

media or if they want to act successfully in a media culture and media society"

(2013b: 196).

Altheide contributed to the concept of media logic by suggesting that it

represents "the assumptions and processes for constructing messages within a

particular medium. This includes rhythm, grammar, and format…. This logic—or the

rationale, emphasis, and orientation promoted by media production, processes, and

messages—tends to be evocative, encapsulated, highly thematic, familiar to audiences,

and easy to use. Media culture is produced by the widespread application of media

logic. Specifically, when media logic is employed to present and interpret institutional

phenomena, the form and content of those institutions are altered. Studies document

how sports, religion, news, and politics have changed to accommodate this logic"

(294).

Strömbäck includes storytelling techniques such as "simplification,

polarization, intensification, personalization (Asp 1986; Hernes 1978), visualization

and stereotypization, and framing of politics as a strategic game or 'horse race'

(Mazzoleni 1987; Patterson 1993)" (Strömbäck 2008: 233).

Landerer recommends that a more comprehensive discussion is needed to

better understand the relationship at work between media logic and political logic in

his essay "Rethinking the Logics: A Conceptual Framework for the Mediatization of

Politics." He posits that the concept of *media logic* should be replaced with another

found in the often hidden market logic organic to private commercial media.

> Both issue selection and presentation formats are subordinated to a
> single overarching goal: the maximization of audience — readers,

viewers, and listeners — in order to generate profit. This commercially oriented rationale inherent in (private) media companies has been discussed in the past (Hamilton, 2004; McAllister, 1996; McChesney, 2008; McManus, 1994; Schiller, 1989). But it is not sufficiently recognized as the dominant logic behind the concept of media logic and its operationalizations: Wherever media logic refers to newsworthiness and to particular characteristics of media formats, the idea of competitiveness and hence the commercial logic is the dominant underlying rationale. (244)

To differentiate media logic from political logic, Landerer summarizes political logic as being primarily "...about collective decision-making and substantial implementation" of policy, and presumes a largely unmediated or pre-mediated enactment of politics (246). He continues by also suggesting the reconsideration of political logic, which he argues is too vague. Landerer suggests instead the use of "normative logic:" the "...core interest or ultimate goal in normative logic is to find viable solutions to substantial societal problems... it is this predominant concern with substance and policy issues that distinguishes normative logic from market logic. Whereas, in normative logic, content is more important than presentation, in market logic, content is adapted (selected, organized, and presented) to the expected preferences of the audience in a cost–benefit calculation" (249).

This argument points to a possible instrumental overlap/ fusion of media and political logics within electoral contests: "Electoral logic is therefore considered a functional equivalent in political decision making to commercial logic in media coverage. Commercial logic refers to the formatting techniques and selection modes chosen by commercial media companies, in order to present and frame issues in as newsworthy a way as possible and, hence, sell news to the largest possible audience.

Electoral logic refers to the politician's format of choice to appeal to the widest

possible electorate" (Landerer 2013: 250).

Table 3.1: Normative & Market Logics

	Normative Logic	Market Logic
Media actors	Public Logic e.g., Public-service broadcast companies	Commercial Logic e.g., Commercial media companies
Political actors	Policy Logic, Policy-seeking actors e.g., Technocratic parties	Electoral Logic, Office-seeking actors e.g., Populist parties

Source: Landerer 250

Landerer's conceptualization is more circumstantial, with stable media and

political "actors" choosing from fluid normative and market logics based on their

immediate goals. Perhaps as a result of differences in scale, this argument runs counter

to what other researchers describe as distinct characteristics of media logic being

expressed in a non-mediated context, and under certain circumstances developing in

tension with political logic. For example, Strömbäck's process-oriented model of

mediatization of politics tracks the degree to which each of these logics (media or

political) is dominant over the other, as the key indicator for which phase of

mediatization is in effect (Strömbäck 2008: 234). Landerer's model, on the other hand,

suggests there can be multiple dimensions to the relationship between market and

normative logics, and that these may overlap and even reinforce each other depending on the intentions of the "actors" involved.

During several conversations with Dan Hallin, he challenged the idea that a commercial logic is the dominant underlying rationale within private commercial media and/or electoral logics, arguing that, potentially, there are other ancillary logics at work in this process that can influence media and political actors in other ways; for example, that might be strong journalistic logics at work that may run counter to, and even suppress market logics. Hallin further suggests that conceptualizations of political logic should not be considered exclusively normative in the same way (individual conversations 03/2016 and 05/2016).

These citations demonstrate the range of ideas that relate to how one might choose to define media and political logics. Because of the unresolved nature of this discussion, my intervention into this subject is elaborated later in my theoretical formulation, after this introductory section and within the context of a more empirical review of the logics operating within the *mediatization of Chilean politics* as a theoretical framework within the case of the *1988 Franja de Propaganda Electoral*.

The Mediatization of Politics

As mentioned previously, the *mediatization of politics* is one of multiple conceptual frameworks within mediatization theory and is more expansive than the concept of *mediated politics*. The *mediatization of politics* is most often referred to as a national process involving theoretical categories that relate to mass media and political engagement, though it is also considered a "meta-process" that characterizes contemporary political communication. Finally, the *mediatization of politics* is a conceptual framework with both qualitative and quantitative dimensions, as I intend to demonstrate in this project.

Strömbäck offers a working definition of this conceptual framework via his website/ academic blog "mediatization-of-politics.com":

> …at heart, the mediatization of politics refers to a social change process through which the media have become increasingly autonomous from political institutions and actors while at the same time increasing their influence over political actors, institutions and processes… Mazzoleni (2008a) consequently argues that 'Mediatization of politics is a complex process that is closely linked to the presence of a media logic in society and in the political sphere. It is distinguished from the idea of 'mediation', a natural, preordained mission of mass media to convey meaning from communicators to their target audiences. To define politics as 'mediated' is a simple truism, in that communication and mass media are necessary prerequisites to the functioning of political systems. (<http://mediatization-of-politics.com/defining-mediatization/>)

In an earlier study Strömbäck provides an often-cited four-step definition of the mediatization of politics:

> 1) The first aspect of the mediatization of politics is the degree to which the media constitute the most important or dominant source of information on politics and society [i.e. are politics *mediated*?].

2) A second aspect is the degree to which the media are independent from political institutions in terms of how the media are governed.
3) A third aspect is the degree to which the media content is governed by a political logic or by media logic.
4) A fourth aspect, finally, is the degree to which political actors are governed by a political logic or by media logic. (234-235)

This four-dimensional conceptualization is represented in the following table, with the characteristics of a pre-mediatization of politics context on the left, and the characteristics demonstrating the mediatization of politics on the right:

Table 3.2: Strömbäck's Four-Dimensional Conceptualization

Most important source of information: Experiences or interpersonal communication	← →	Most important source of information: The media
Media mainly dependent on political institutions	← →	Media mainly independent of political institutions
Media content mainly governed by political logic	← →	Media content mainly governed by media logic
Political actors mainly governed by political logic	← →	Political actors mainly governed by media logic

Source: Strömbäck 235

The first dimension for the *mediatization of politics* corresponds to a transition in the quantitative, operational threshold of political communication understood as *mediated politics.* The second dimension involves an institutional, historical and qualitative categorization of distinct political and media institutions. The third and forth dimensions are qualitative, cultural and relational characterizations of logics

framing political action (I infer that these logics are expressed/ inscribed at the point of media production and postproduction).

Strömbäck adds, "These aspects form the major dimensions that, taken together, determine the degree to which politics is mediatized… Although the four dimensions are highly intercorrelated, the breakdown of the concept of the mediatization of politics into separate dimensions might help clarify the concept in assessments of the degree to which politics in a particular setting is mediatized… What is important to note, however, is that the process must not be linear or unidirectional across the four dimensions. It is certainly conceivable that the impact of media logic on political actors, located within various institutions, varies, both within and between countries." (234).

The Mediatization of Politics In A Chilean Context.

Whereas *mediatization theory* focuses on the increased autonomy of media institutions and the prominence of accompanying media logics, my research on the *mediatization of Chilean politics* points to a more fluid relationship between politics, media, and political culture that does not easily fit within existing conceptualizations. To synthesize this complexity and to explain my preferred conceptual tools for building up the mediatization of politics as a theoretical framework appropriate for the Chilean context of 1988, I begin by examining the utility of Strömbäck's existing conceptualization of the *mediatization of politics* in a Chilean context focusing specifically on the 1988 Franjas. When I operationalize Strömbäck's table "A Four-

Dimensional Conceptualization of the Mediatization of Politics" (235) within a

Chilean context several problems become apparent.

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Table 3.3: Strömbäck's Mediatization of Politics – 1988 Chile

Source: Strömbäck 235

Specifically within the context of 1988 Chile, I begin with Strömbäck's first dimension of mediatization as "the most important source of information," reiterating that television was the most important source of political information, although it was simultaneously the least credible (refer to *mediation* section). Therefore only one of the two indicators is relevant to my Chilean case.

Next, only one of two institutional dimensions is relevant to Chile with the notable exception of the daily 15 minutes allotted to *la Concertación* from September 5 to October 1, 1988. Otherwise all Chilean media was subject to substantial editorial pressure (censorship and self-censorship) imposed by the military regime.[55] Finally, the institutional political logic framed by the military regime within the 1980

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[55] Only the NO Franja of Day 8 was censured. The other 26 days of NO Franja content was not subject to direct censorship, although the entire Franja campaign, as such, was framed by the dictatorial limits of political communication and subject to the political conditions imposed by the military regime.

Constitution was the dominant logic operating across both media and political dimensions of the 1988 *Plebiscito*, privileging the legitimation of the military regime and guaranteeing continuity of its political economic model.

The third and fourth dimensions are strikingly inapplicable to Chile in 1988. It is true that there is evidence of a prominent media logic operating in both Franja campaigns, but broadly, throughout the *Plebiscito* this media logic is not clearly observed as operating beyond the context of the Franjas, nor governing the overall behavior of the primary political actors within the regime or among the opposition. Clearly, as it is articulated here, this conceptualization does not correspond to my Chilean case of 1988.

To further test Strömbäck's model, I will assume that this lack of applicability is based on the contextual specificity of 1988 Chile that is marked by characteristics unique to the Chilean military regime or the Franjas as such, thereby distorting the *mediatization* process. Therefore, it follows that widening the historical range of my case to include pre-*Plebiscito* Chile might prove more successful. Strömbäck suggests as much when he argues that "Consideration should also be given to the fact that societal changes are seldom, if ever, unidirectional… This is, however, one of the major reasons why the conceptualization of the mediatization of politics as a dynamic process is important: It allows us to investigate and assess the degree of mediatization across time, countries, or other units of analysis" (235). In Table 3.4, I test this hypothesis against a Chilean context between 1973 and 1988.

Table 3.4: Strömbäck's Mediatization of Politics – 73-88 Chile

Most important source of information: Experiences or interpersonal communication ✔ ⟷ Most important source of information: The media ✔

Media mainly dependent on political institutions ✔ ⟷ Media mainly independent of political institutions 🚫

Media content mainly governed by political logic ✔ ⟷ *Only true for the NO Franjas.* Media content mainly governed by media logic 🚫

Political actors mainly governed by political logic ✔ ⟷ Political actors mainly governed by media logic 🚫

Source: Strömbäck 235

Strömbäck's conceptualization with 1973 on the left and 1988 on the right yields better, but still inconclusive results. In spite of the inapplicability of this four-dimensional model, the broad definitions provided for the *mediatization of politics* affirm that the 1988 Franjas in Chile should be an exceptional case to operationalize this conceptual framework. Perhaps it is best to focus on what is indeed applicable to the Chilean context?

The problems in both tests of Strömbäck's model are most clear with the conceptualizations relating to the significance of institutions and logics within the *mediatization of politics*. Consequently, in order to operationalize this four-dimensional conceptualization more substantial changes need to be made to the last two dimensions.

In my Chilean case the NO Franjas could offer neither a candidate, nor a party, nor a program, nor could they be used to make democratic promises (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 110). The fundamental contradiction for the opposition was articulating "democratizing" political and media logics within an undemocratic institutional order. I am convinced that internalizing/ transcending (or not) this fundamental contradiction, was a key factor contributing to the overall success of the NO campaign, and the overall failure of the SÍ campaign. In other words, by fusing presumably democratizing political and media/market logics to make sense within an undemocratic institutional order, the NO campaign intended to provide and successfully delivered a televisual representation of political reconciliation, a fictive political reconciliation for Chileans and the world to consume as representative of political reality (Valdés 1988: 32). The Franjas are then a contest for symbolic control over the *Plebiscito* as such, a contest between the dictatorship and the opposition (Chilean institutional political power as a whole) compelled to assimilate multiple contradictory representations:

- Pinochet as both dictator and democrat;

- *La Concertación* as both a violent threat and loyal opposition;

- The Chilean military as both golpista and liberator;

- The survivors of torture and political violence as both victims blissful compatriots;

- The Chilean democratic transition as both inherently contradictory and a celebrated example of peaceful reconciliation.

These are only a few examples of the contradictory representations within *Plebiscito* discourses that were prominently articulated to varying degrees within the NO and SÍ Franjas.

Hjarvard suggests that this is precisely what we should understand as the *mediatization of politics,* when "… media representations of reality have assumed such dominance in our society that both our perceptions and construction of reality and our behavior take their point of departure in mediated representations and are steered by the media, so that phenomena like war [or in this case dictatorship] are no longer what they once were" (111). Indeed, when Chilean people experienced the Franjas of the NO as "a breath of freedom" they also correspondingly perceived the dictatorship differently as well. Thus, demonstrating the harmonizing nature of mediatization described by Mazzoleni & Schulz, the *Plebiscito* in general and the NO Franjas in particular normalized an expectation that Chileans reconcile the irreconcilable (250).

This is one important aspect in the cultural process I see as characterizing the *mediatization of Chilean politics.* Reconciling Strömbäck's model to better fit these Chilean representational contradictions helps reveal more about the process. My first adaptation in Table 3.5 is limited to the Chilean context only within 1988, specifically the media *before the Franjas* on the left, and *within the Franjas* on the right:

Table 3.5: The *Mediatization Of Chilean Politics – 1988 Only*

Most important sphere for political self-representation: Institutional, organizational or experiential	⟷	Most important sphere for political self-representation: The media (TV)
Media instrumentalized and commercialized to reinforce political institutions	⟷	Instrumentalized and commercialized media used by the opposition to influence a change in political culture
Media content governed by and articulating institutional political logic	⟷	Media content bounded by political logic but produced and understood as media logic
Political actors primarily governed by institutional political logic	⟷	Political actors bounded by institutional political logic and politically self-represent a media logic

Original Source: Strömbäck 235.

Institutions, political, and media logics are changed by this adaptation to underscore the dominant role of the dictatorial state, and demonstrate a relationship within the accompanying logics where there is no organic distinction between political and media logics, but instead an hierarchical relationship. My second adaptation compares 1973 to 1988, specifically the media *before the coup d'état* on the left, and *during the Plebiscito* on the right:

Table 3.6: *Mediatization Of Chilean Politics – 1973-1988*

Primary sources of political information: political parties and related print & radio, representing right, center, and left. Trade unions, federations (students, women, etc.). Post coup, direct experiences or interpersonal communication, DINACOS, & instrumentalized mass media	Primary source of political information: During *Plebiscito,* the televised Franjas. After *Plebiscito,* TV, radio, print, in order of importance.
Media primarily instrumentalized by political parties to influence national politics. Post coup, TV instrumentalized by military regime for reproduction of symbolic power and commercialization.	Instrumentalized media (specifically the Franjas) used by political class to influence political culture, and TV more broadly to influence consumption
Political media content primarily governed by and intended to articulate a party-line political logic. Post coup, TV governed by ideological tenets of dictatorship (sharp increase in entertainment and advertising).	Political media content (specifically the Franjas) bounded by institutional political logic and produced and articulated by media logic
Political actors primarily governed by a party-line political logic. Post coup, dictatorship governed by its own political logic of power.	Political actors primarily bounded by existing institutional political logic but win support for political change by deploying a clearly dominant media logic

Original Source: Strömbäck 250.

Both of these tables suggest that the dimensions used to track the *mediatization of Chilean politics* require foregrounding of political institutions and a more fluid, non-binary configuration of political and media logics. The *mediatization of Chilean politics,* as manifested in 1988 and embodied within the Franjas, demonstrate that - for seeking to stabilize a pacted political transition from military dictatorship to

procedural democracy - television served as a more suitable forum and instrument than the military regime and oppositional parties, which were largely guided by their own internal political logics. Had the political contest between them been completely unmediated and unmediatized, both sides would have demanded more substantive political outcomes from each other rendering the Chilean "transition" impossible. Of course this was not necessarily "democratic" – and perhaps, it is better to understand the *mediatization of Chilean politics* as a process involving the *mediation* of Chilean democracy and political culture to better accommodate *el gatopardismo*.

Mapping The Logics

To track the relative significance of the different forces influencing the

Plebiscito requires understanding the historical context and an analysis of the

institutional configuration of political power. Only then can I situate the logics at work

during the production of the Franjas within the broad political context of the

Plebiscito.

I found the political and media logics at work in the Franjas to be fluid and

relational. This logical fluidity made tracking them difficult. To help mitigate this

problem, I decided to begin with the broadest conceptualizations for political and

media logics as described earlier in this chapter (Landerer 2013, Altheide 2004,

Hjarvard 2008, Briggs and Hallin 2016) to see how they worked for Chile, and from

there, I draw my own conclusions. I decided to develop a visual "logics map" to track

differentiations between political and media logics at work throughout the Franja

production process, and the dynamics of institutional political power within a

mediatization circuit (Appendix A). I populated this "logics map" with the dominant

political logics by referencing existing historical narratives of this period (Arriagada

and Navia 2011, Piñuel Raigada 1992, Tironi 2013) framed by the context of the

Plebiscito as a process of political and institutional legitimation (the overarching

political logic). I then populated this "logics map" with the bounded political logics of

la Concertación within the *Plebiscito* as an electoral contest, and followed the same

process to populate my "logics map" with what I considered the corresponding media

logics present in the Franja production process, corroborated by the results of my own

Franja content analysis. I then ranked these logics within each category. A pattern

quickly emerged within the logics: at different points in the mediatization circuit,

political and media logics were understood as expression or repression of political

power at the different stages of Franja production and circulation.

In other words, I discovered that, as a consequence of characteristics intrinsic

to the media production process itself, a hierarchical classification for each of these

logics was needed to identify them as enacted "before/ above the point of production,"

at the "point of production," or at the "point of postproduction." I found this

disaggregation useful for isolating distinct logics, to make legible insight into the

Franja process that otherwise might have been imperceptible - for example

differentiating between the political logic behind editorial decisions during

postproduction versus political debates during pre-production. Still, due primarily to

personal time constraints, I only populated my logics map enough so as to identify the

emergence of this basic pattern. In the future I would like to differentiate "thematic

logics" within this map because I believe that doing so would reveal even more

information useful to further develop my model for the *mediatization of Chilean*

politics and the logics embodied within the Franjas.

I also discovered that adding the dimension of *intentionality* as a variable in

tracking the logics was useful for keeping track of this process. For example, the

erratic nature of the SÍ Franjas, particularly the overwhelmingly positive content of the

first week, can be understood as a first attempt at non-violent, democratizing televisual

self-representation of Pinochetista institutional political power. Even with its near total

monopoly of mass media and the vast resources at its disposal, the military regime was largely unprepared and perhaps incapable of moving beyond a televisual self-representation anchored within a normative/ political logic concomitant with its actual position as military dictatorship – in other words, the military regime failed to elaborate a fictional representation of itself as a democratic regime.

The SÍ campaign, and by extension the military regime as a whole, initially refused to assimilate a marketing/ media logic – a logic which would have required the introduction of televisual content constructing an essentially fictive representation of the dictator Pinochet as one electoral contender within a larger electoral contest, and the military regime as one of two viable options in a contest for democratic legitimation, versus a continuation of existing Chilean politics with Pinochet, the military strongman, to be legitimated as a democrat. I see this reticence as a function of the dominant political power of the military regime.

On the other hand, because the *Franja* format was politically unique and limited to 15 minutes for the NO, it was the most highly composed form of political struggle with a production value representative of unified political intentionality – even if this did not exist in the lived politics of *la Concertación*. Moreover, because the NO Franjas were national and *semi-live,* their production developed along rigid by production schedules, largely beyond the limits of the individual political parties and interests within *la Concertación*. The oppositional politics enacted in the streets did inform the content of the NO Franjas, but the broad political calculations or specific media intentionality were the only logics factored into the production process. The

political long view was dominant and neither subject to reacting to daily events on the streets of Santiago nor subject to potentially contradictory short-term goals.

Another example of how the political and media logics developed in the Franjas as a function of political power was how the internal production logics of the NO campaign perceived the act of being too political or developing serious substantive political content for the NO Franjas as a losing strategy if the primary intention was to win the *Plebiscito*. To be sure, politically substantive content within the NO Franjas would have been best to inform Chileans about democratic governance and the urgency of a return to civilian rule – but what was considered the only practical course of action for a return to democracy for Chile was a NO electoral victory, and therefore content that was deemed too political was rejected.[56] Thus, censorship and self-censorship became "democratizing" logics (representing a fusion both political and media logics) within the *mediatization of Chilean politics*.

The NO campaign did not assume for itself the convenience of subjecting all content to a strict political logic. The principle of unity for the NO campaign was fundamentally the electoral defeat of Pinochet in the *Plebiscito*. The format and content of the NO Franjas point to a clear preference for a media/ marketing logic that sought to maximize the possibility of a favorable electoral outcome. This underscores a clear differentiation within NO Franja content across the 27 days of broadcasting. On the one hand there is a dominance of content based on an electoral/ marketing

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[56] See Appendix E for the only example of a "traditionally" politically substantive segment present among the NO Franjas.

logic intended to win the *Plebiscito*, and on the other hand there are few examples of content demonstrating a clear political logic intended to raise a substantive political debate about the direction of Chile and/or enactment of a political struggle to recuperate what the dictatorship had crushed.

The presence of media logic within the NO Franjas displays a marketing language with neither the specificity nor the precision of seeking to sell a product to a critical mass of consumers. This media logic was expressed more as a consumer language for popular accessibility/ massification of political intent, and minimization of the risks and fears associated with challenging the power of a fully functional violent dictatorship. This might be described as a bounded political intentionality at the point of production, devising a marketing or publicity aesthetic, more than a dominant media logic governing the actions of Chilean politicians and political institutions (Valdés 1988: 59). There is a presence of an active and dominant political logic to the NO campaign, but this political logic had been internalized and was bounded by the political context and the implicit political logic of the military regime and the perpetual threat of repression.

Thus when the authors and creative minds behind the NO campaign argue that "que no supuso la sobreimposición de una lógica técnico-persuasiva o política" then it is true and accurate (Delgado Criado 2013: 14), and they echo the argument made by Landerer when he suggests that "mediatization of politics is closely linked, but not equal to commercialization: Mediatization of politics refers to the predominance of audience-oriented market logic over normative logic in political actors' behavior...

Different to the partisan press in earlier periods, the commercialized news companies today reach well beyond partisan and even state boundaries, and their instrumentalization has thus a different quality. Hence, mediatization as a concept confers upon the mass media a pivotal role in the long-term processes of technological, economic, and societal integration that is not accounted for in commercialization" (253-254). The production of the NO Franjas points to an exceptional concentration of efforts within a singular campaign, a simple NO that summoned a diversity of skills and broad political perspectives to forge a unique level of unity of purpose – what Chilean political cadre understand as "la unidad consciente."[57]

My take away is that the *mediatization of Chilean politics* was an internally fractured process, though it was still a predominately political process. Furthermore, what is perceived as a market/ media "logic" in the case of the Franjas is better understood as a popular aesthetic, or prevalent marketing language deployed within a political context, determined by the intention or political goal of influencing the electorate, broadly understood and thereby directed to influence outcomes on a greater scale. These observations confirm the pattern found within my "logics map": the *mediatization of Chilean politics* that begin during the 1988 *Plebiscito* was framed by one dominant political logic rooted in the broader intentions of the military regime that determined the course of secondary/ relative political logics and media logics expressed within the NO and SÍ Franjas. In other words, at the most general level, a

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[57] "A conscious unity." I see this concept as especially relevant to my incorporation of CHAT.

dominant political logic framed the entire *Plebiscito* process (institutional

legitimation), while secondary political and media logics that accompany the

mediatization of Chilean politics were articulated within this dominant political logic,

and were simultaneously produced as functions of political power.

Unlike current models of political mediatization that are an expression to what

degree political logics are adapted to media logics, in Chile this mediatization process

was reversed, with media framed by a dominant political logic, and secondary political

and media logics emerging within that framework but determined by or responding to

more specific factors. This helps explain how political and media logics informing

Franja production could be much more fluid than what might be expected, had I

limited myself to existing conceptualizations of political and media logics.

Thus, I found that the inherent tension between political and media logics that

figures prominently within current mediatization research, was not as important a

factor within 1988 Chile as might have been expected. The overall *mediatization of*

politics, based on the "degree to which media and/or political institutions or actors are

governed by x or y logic," was not relevant to the 1988 case of *mediatization of*

Chilean politics embodied within the Franjas. Mirroring what John Downey and

Taberez Ahmed Neyazi found in their 2014 research on the mediatization of politics in

India, I am convinced that in the place of a model that presumes a tension between one

logic and another (or the supplanting of one for another), the *mediatization of Chilean*

politics is more accurately described as an overlap, fusion or even a collapse in the

differentiation between media and political logics (477). The logics at work in the

1988 Chilean Franjas accommodate the broader political context at the point of production, and media *intentionality* at the point of postproduction. This underscores both to the situatedness and fluidity of political and media logics, and marks the introduction of political intentionality as an importance dimension in the *mediatization of politics*. Furthermore, the relative impact and success of the NO Franjas definitely should not be reduced to the formatting or staging choices (as suggested by Altheide 2004) made by the *Comando Por El NO* in the production process, since the dynamics within the oppositional campaign were far too complex to warrant such a reduction.[58] Finally, the *Plebiscito* process as a whole, and Franja content in particular, were primarily a contest of political legitimation, not an electoral/ marketing contest, as described by Landerer.

In other words, the clear media logic observed in the NO Franjas and so often celebrated as icons of peaceful reconciliation, were rooted in the dominant political logic of the military regime, but also clearly subject to the immediate reality of campaigning for democratic change while still under a military dictatorship - self-censorship and fear rooted within the utterly undemocratic context of their Franja production. Subsequently, the self-censoring broad political logic of the NO Franjas has been misunderstood as a demonstration of professionalized media logic, with "democracy" repackaged as a product to be sold to the Chilean people. This

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[58] *Comando Por El NO* was the name of the executive leadership body directing the NO campaign within which a smaller group had been assigned leadership over the Franjas.

misunderstanding was then reproduced and mythologized as a self-evident truth that the NO Franjas represented the "modernization" of Chilean politics.

Only in hindsight of the national and international political context of 1988 could the winning combination be understood as the fusion of a bounded political logic and a marketing/ media logic, and this was much more natural a fusion for the NO (as a function of its relative powerlessness), operating within the political limits of the military regime. In other words, real political conditions in 1988 made this fusion improbable for the SÍ and absolutely necessary for the NO. This issue becomes more important in that it points to the *mediatization of Chilean politics* as a birth more than a transition. On the one hand *La Concertación* was born mediatized and the Franjas were its birth certificate. On the other hand the military regime was born from the 1973 coup, and only years later unsuccessfully attempted to assimilate a media logic with which it was neither comfortable nor familiar.

Since the goal here is to use the case of the Chilean *Franjas* to operationalize the conceptual framework for the *mediatization of politics* – and mediatization more generally – to be understood as not necessarily as an insular process with a beginning and end, but instead, as a process deeply rooted in history and political culture. To this end, I suggest replacing a logics-based model of *mediatization of politics* (which is not viable in this Chilean case) with a conceptual framework centered on a change in political culture.

Chapter 4.
Chilean Political Culture In The Middle:[59]
A Democratic Transition? NO. A Shift In Political Culture? SÍ.

Image 4.1: "Superman" Christopher Reeves imploring Chileans to vote NO
(Franja Day #27, 10/01/1988).

I am indeed convinced that an important historical break took place after the
1988 *Plebiscito,* though I argue that it largely took shape within the space of Chilean
political culture, with the *Plebiscito* as a major turning point. The collective
experience of having lived through the 1988 *Plebiscito* campaign, having viewed and
debated the 27-days of nationally televised Franjas, and then the NO campaign having
been declared the winner of the popular vote with the support of 56% of the newly
enfranchised electorate, together amounted to a pivotal and qualitatively democratic

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[59] "Culture in the middle" is a reference from the work of Michael Cole, Cultural Psychology: A Once
And Future Discipline.

experience within Chilean political culture, albeit largely unsubstantiated in the corporeal configuration of Chilean political and economic power.

The change that culminated with the October 5 electoral victory of the NO, and was reconfirmed with the Aylwin victory in 1989, was indeed a transition in Chilean political culture precisely because it was *experienced* culturally as a process that transcended the political reality of that moment – a shared social event to articulate a Chilean transition to democracy through the Franjas – a transition that was politically and institutionally unsubstantiated. Instead, the Franjas were a televisual catharsis, and set a cultural threshold of democratic life and political consciousness for a substantial number of Chileans of a certain age.

In other words, the Franjas decoupled Chilean political struggle from Chilean political culture and thus the Franjas moved "to the middle" to become an artifact of Chilean political culture.[60]

> This stance represented a radical departure from traditional Chilean politics, in which ideologues and party leaders staked out a predefined discursive terrain and then rallied party members and voters to support that position. Whereas the traditional approach stared with an ideological position and worked to project it outward to the people, the new, "modern" form of politics searched for a set of messages and communications techniques that adequately captured or expressed voters' sentiments and beliefs. It focused on adjusting the NO campaign messages "to the hopes, fears, aspirations, and needs of the undecided" voters… Television alone did not *produce* affective investment in the NO vote, but it served as a public, national locus, discursively and

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[60] "…an artifact is an aspect of the material world that has been modified over the history of its incorporation into goal-directed human action. By virtue of the changes wrought in the process of their creation and use, artifacts are simultaneously ideal (conceptual) and *material*. They are ideal in that their material form has been shaped by their participation in the interactions of which they were previously a part and which they mediate in the present…" (Cole 1996: 117).

spatially, for the coordination and integration of the broader network of practices organizing that investment. (Crofts Wiley 2006: 679-680)

This expanded theoretical framework helps explain how the symbols of this period remain extremely evocative in Chile. The Chilean people wanted political change. Even many within the military regime wanted political change. But for practical purposes, substantive political change was impossible without completely dismantling Pinochet's institutional order, and that order was ultimately guaranteed by the Chilean military.

What took place in 1988 is better understood as a contest for legitimation for a re-defined Chilean democracy, one that would better accommodate the existing configuration of political power. As Moulian suggested:

> …para comprender el Chile Actual es necesario establecer el lazo, el vínculo histórico, que une a este Chile del post-autoritarismo, con el Chile Pasado, el de la dictadura. El Chile Actual es la culminación exitosa del "transformismo" (...) El objetivo es el "gatopardismo," cambiar para permanecer. Llamo "transformismo" a las operaciones que en el Chile Actual se realizan para asegurar la reproducción de la "infraestructura" creada durante la dictadura, despojada de las molestas formas, de las brutales y de las desnudas "superestructuras" de entonces. El "transformismo" consiste en una alucinante operación de la perpetuación que se realizó a través del cambio de Estado… (141)[61]

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[61] "…to understand Chile as it is today it is necessary to establish a link, an historical connection, that unites this post-authoritarian Chile, with the Chile of the past, the Chile of the dictatorship. Chile as it is today is the successful culmination of 'transformationism…' The objective has been *el gatopardismo,* which is to change in order for things to remain as they are. I identify as 'transformationism' all operations within which Chile as it is today emerges in order to ensure the reproduction of a dictatorial infrastructure, one that has purged it ugliest forms, wiped clean of the brutal and naked superstructures of the past. 'Transformationism' consists of a hallucinatory operation to perpetuate what had taken place when the military government was changed…"

The myth of happy reconciliation and systemic stability articulated in 1988 endured as the most distinctive feature of Chilean political culture, where former torturers share a common civil space with the victims of torture.[62] Residual evidence of this transition of political culture is expressed within Chilean presidential politics that remain deeply symbolic and are inextricably linked to the 1973 coup d'état. As a researcher of televised political communication, I find this incongruity to be the most fascinating aspect in the legacy of the 1988 *Plebiscito, la Concertación,* and in particular the televised Franjas.

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[62] As a Chicano Latin Americanist from San Diego, each time I discovered another shocking historical connection I constantly would ask myself "how can this be?"

My Enrichment Of Mediatization Theory

Armed insurrection became a reality when the Chilean Communist Party

declared 1986 "el año decisivo." Even after September 7, 1986 and his brush with

death on at the hands of the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR), Pinochet

was resolute – he would not surrender his position of power. Chile was on the brink of

a civil war, and Chileans were collectively motivated to regain some form of what

Couldry, Livingstone, and Markham call a "public connection" (5), however

improbable this was by the end of 1986.

The subsequent *Plebiscito,* as a political process, was impossibly

undemocratic. What remained was the mediatized "public connection" provided by the

Franja de Propaganda Electoral. Couldry, Livingstone, and Markham pose important

questions that help understand this Chilean context:

> Television seems "to protect its images, character types, catch-phrases
> and latest creations to the widest edges of the culture, permeating if not
> dominating the conduct of other cultural affairs" and yet it also has 'the
> powerful capacity… to draw towards itself and incorporate (in the
> process, transforming) broader aspects of the culture" (1995: 5). But,
> even if one accepts media's importance in attracting the public gaze and
> so setting the agenda of our shared attention, what are the implications
> of this beyond a collective experience? When is mediated connection
> also *public* connection? (30)

I propose that we identify precisely that process – when *a mediated connection also*

becomes a public connection – as the *mediatization of politics*.

Mazzoleni and Schulz describe such a process as "a major trend in political

systems of the 1990s… [when] mass media… sometimes substitute for interpersonal

exchanges. As an intermediary or mediating system, mass media have the potential for

bridging the distance between actors in both a physical sense and a social psychological sense, that is, reconciling... even conflicting parties" (250). Hjarvard argues that current definitions of *mediatization* treat the concept as:

> …A label for a set of phenomena that bear witness to increased media influence and it should also relate to other, central sociological theories. Mediatization theory not only needs to be well specified, comprehensive and coherent, but also must prove its usefulness as an analytical tool and its empirical validity through concrete studies of mediatization in selected areas (Deacon and Stanyer 1038). Thus, a theory of mediatization has to be able to describe overall developmental trends in society across different contexts and, by means of concrete analysis, demonstrate the impacts of media on various institutions and spheres of human activity (113).

With these ambitious goals in mind, current conceptualizations of the *mediatization of politics* and the accompanying models for tracking logics do not provide a theoretical framework sufficiently robust for describing the shift in political culture that took place in Chile, though new conceptualizations of *mediatization* are still being developed, and my own work will hopefully contribute to this end.

The potential significance of this Chilean case as an example of the *mediatization of politics* cannot necessarily be revealed using the existing conceptual frameworks, nor by limiting research to the theoretical and methodological tools most commonly used for research in the field of political communication. To make up for this limitation, I sought out alternative theoretical tools for describing the process of change within Chilean political culture that took place in 1988. As stated earlier in this project, I borrow from L.S. Vygotsky and his "zone of proximal development"

(ZOPED), as well as a more expansive and dynamic understanding of culture as it has been operationalized in Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT).

ZOPED and CHAT are most often used to help describe one relationship between human development and learning: "What we call the *zone of proximal development… is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers*" (86, emphasis added in the original). Vygotsky developed his theoretical model on the understanding that because humans are social beings, the significance of culture within human development is greater than what can be understood when culture is studied as an exogenous and/or residual process to human development. He was convinced that the significance of social relations and culture within human development can only be fully appreciated when these are understood as an endogenous force fundamental to human development. It follows that an individual learner can learn and do more when working in a collective, social setting, than what is possible for the same learner to achieve individually, or what can be quantified through an individualized testing regime designed to measure intellectual development. In other words, what is not individually viable, is rendered so and surpassed when engaged socially or through collective, socialized cultural experience.

The theoretical appropriation of ZOPED I propose mirrors Vygotsky's model, except that mine is a scaled up version, operating through a televised artifact of

political culture, used to explain a shift in Chilean political culture, decoupled from, and extending beyond Chilean politics as such.

The ZOPED theoretical model is an important part of Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT). My incorporation of CHAT into the mediatization of politics requires elaboration about how it is operationalized within my conceptual framework, for which I draw from my experience working in the UCSD Laboratory of Comparative Human Cognition (LCHC).

> … CHAT refers to an interdisciplinary approach to studying human learning and development associated with the names of the Soviet Russian psychologists, L. S. Vygotsky, A. R. Luria and A. N. Leontiev… The following are some theoretical principles of this approach…
>
> 1.   *Mediation of experience through artifacts*. The initial premise of the cultural-historical school was that human psychological processes are bound up with a form of behavior in which material objects (e.g., hammers, pictures, gestures, and vocal sounds) and corresponding ideal objects (e.g., meanings, values) are incorporated into human actions and modified over generations as a means of regulating humans' interactions with the world and each other. As A. R. Luria put it, artifacts incorporated into human action not only "radically change his conditions of existence, they even react on him in that they effect a change in him and his psychic condition" (Luria, 1928, p. 493). Consequently, such artifacts are both symbolic and material mediators. Vygotsky referred to this kind of mediated action as the "cultural habit of behavior", which enables human beings to begin to regulate themselves "from the outside."
>
> 2.   *Activity as the essential unit of analysis*. The analysis of human psychological functions must be situated in relation to historically accumulated forms of human activity, which are the proximal loci of human experience. The early Russian CHAT theorists demonstrated that at, least in some institutional settings… it is possible to make mediated-actions-in-activity/context a genuine object of study. Contemporary research has enormously broadened the range of activities and institutions to which scholars have been able to turn their attention (Cole & the Distributed Literacy Consortium, 2006; Engeström, Lompscher, & Rükreim, 1999; Greenfield, 2004; Hedegaard, Chaiklin, & Jensen, 1999).

3.   *The cultural organization of human life*. Implied by the dual emphasis on mediation and activity is the centrality of culture in human life. Culture is present in the form of the tools, signs, cultural practices, architectural arrangements, social institutions, and etcetera, which mediate human activity. It consists of all the material/ ideal artifacts accumulated over the social group's history, whether that history is of long or short duration.

4.   *The Primacy of the Social*. As Vygotsky notes: "the relation of the child to reality is from the very beginning a social relation" (1930/1994, p. 216). However, especially 'in the beginning' children are maximally dependent upon adults not only because of their physical immaturity but because they have no knowledge whatsoever of the cultural tool kit of the social group into which they are born. Thus social others have a primary role in the development of psychological processes because it is only by already-enculturated adults arranging for the child to appropriate the cultural heritage of the social group that specifically human, culturally mediated, forms of psychological life become possible.

5.   *Genetic Analysis*. Vygotsky (1930/1978) used the notion of "genetic" in the sense of seeking the origins of current phenomena by studying their history. Individual human development (ontogeny), he held, is the emergent outcome of processes of phylogenetic, cultural-historical, and microgenetic "history." (LCHC 2008)

Aligned with these theoretical principles of CHAT, I assign to the 1988 Franjas the role of *artifact of Chilean political culture* – the televisual idealization of a peaceful transition to procedural democracy. The 1988 Franjas were the first moment in *mediatization of Chilean politics* – a ZOPED of democratic political culture, with the 1988 *Plebiscito* understood as the initiation of a fictional "democratic transition," and the Franjas as the original cultural/ political self-representation of this fiction in Chile, holding together an internally undemocratic political reality.

Furthermore, my treatment of the "democratic transition" in Chile, as my object of study, begins with establishing this transition as an important historical event, although one that must simultaneously be understood as a distinct, internally

contradictory, *social experience*, and a distinct, internally contradictory, *political process*. The social-cultural reconciliation of these contradictions on the one hand, versus the political reconciliation (or lack thereof) of these contradictions on the other hand, is a process that is embodied within the individual segments of the 1988 Franjas.

Hence, my earlier emphasis on differentiating *mediation* and *mediatization* aligns with this point. The *mediation of politics* is primarily a technical/ operational threshold, within my Chilean case represented by a fully consolidated national television system. The *mediatization of politics* is primarily a social and cultural process, and requires *mediated politics,* as well as cultural practices that engender potential political instability/ change.

The Franjas first took shape as *artifacts of Chilean political culture* within the historical and political context of 1988. Though the Franjas remain *artifacts of Chilean political culture* to this day, after 1988 they were understood differently (more symbolically) in the Chilean political context of 1989, 1990, and again differently in post-Pinochetista Chile, particularly in 2010 and 2013.

I also recognize the primacy of the social in my Chilean case. Pinochet had been in power for over 15 years, and democracy as a cultural form was new to a substantial portion of the Chilean electorate. I observe the *mediatization of Chilean politics* as both a political configuration resting on established Pinochetista power, and as an emerging social experience shared among the Chilean people motivated by a peacefully democratizing impulse. Though the *mediatization* process itself would have been impossible without a nationally consolidated television system in Chile, some

form of mediated democratizing power intrinsic to television did not determine the

mediatization of Chilean politics.[63]

  The Chilean people wanted a political transition that Chilean political parties

could not articulate, and that the objective lived political conditions could not sustain.

Instead, this transition was articulated and visualized within the mediatized space of

the Franjas - beyond the limits of the lived, shared, and contradictory political reality.

As described in the introduction to this project, the shift in Chilean political culture

that began in 1988 was a process of differentiation between what is politically

knowable and viable as a social and historical course of action, with what is

potentially acceptable, rational, and viable in a mediated space of political culture – a

ZOPED of political culture.

  Furthermore, the significance of the 2013 presidential elections in Chile is best

understood when looked at through the connections to dictatorial Chile and the 1988

Plebiscito. I believe the social, historical, and cultural processes that took place in

Chile during the 1988 *Plebiscito* are better understood when analyzed through this

revised and expanded *mediatization* framework that incorporates a CHAT framework

to help account for cultural change. In 2008 Strömbäck describes a cultural shift that

supports my claim:

> At this point, the distinction between the media world – the depictions of
> reality shaped by the media logic, and which people have to rely on
> when forming opinions and attitudes-and the real world, as it is
> objectively shaped or played out, begins to lose its significance. The

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[63] Nor, for that matter, does social media embody any intrinsic democratizing power, as has often been assumed to be present in more recent "democratic transitions" around the world.

mediated reality becomes more important than the unmediated reality, in the sense that it is the mediated reality the one to which people have access and to which they react. This is what Lippmann (1997) referred to when he wrote about the "pseudo-environment" and what Nimmo and Combs (1983) refer to as a "fantasy world"… In the absence of alternative realities, shaped by means of a distinctively different logic to that of the media logic, people act on the mediated realities." (238-239)

On the one hand there is the manifest political reality of the Pinochet military regime established through 15 years of institutional transformation, right wing cultural discipline, state terrorism, and generalized political repression. The corporeal source of political life in Chile and a Pinochetista political-economic foundation were one and the same, leaving its indelible mark on Chilean political culture – i.e. the Pinochet military regime as hegemon.[64]

On the other hand, there are the happy Franjas of the NO. These are novel, circumstantially democratic, samples of modern Chilean political communication produced to represent a newly reconstituted Chilean opposition, united under the rainbow imagery of *la Concertación,* precariously navigating the political waters set forth within the institutional dominance of the military regime, but simultaneously operating along its own distinct set of logics, motives, timelines, and "democratizing" criteria (Valdés 1988: 10). Before, during, and after the *Plebiscito, La Concertación*

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[64] Hegemon and hegemony as suggested by Davies as "…presented in contradistinction to force or domination, 'as intellectual and moral leadership'" (1999: 22) or Crofts Wiley as "[T]he supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as 'domination' and as 'intellectual and moral leadership'. A social group dominates antagonistic groups, which it tends to 'liquidate', or to subjugate perhaps even by armed force; it leads kindred and allied groups. A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership' before winning governmental power (this is indeed one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 'lead' as well. (Gramsci 1971: 57-8)" (2006: 671).

was forced to operate almost exclusively within a superstructure of Chilean political

culture as it is entering a process of democratization, while resting on the Pinochetista

political-economic base of the military regime that is left largely undisturbed. Indeed,

this political configuration remains intact years after the 1988 *Plebiscito* victory.

In spite of having to still function under the political-economic hegemony of

the military regime, *la Concertación* carved out a political space of its own as a

Chilean opposition, counterhegemonic within its own right, but not in contradiction

within the objective conditions defined by the military regime. Severely restricted in

the Chile of the "lo que ya está," *la Concertación* established itself as usher and voice

of "lo que ya viene," harbinger of an imaginary Chilean democratic life, "alegría," and

a better future for the country.

The NO Franjas featured mimes, dancing, and jingles as a challenge to a

political reality of tanks, the tortured, and the disappeared. In spite of a message that

was irrational, and impossibly happy about the future, the NO Franjas did indeed make

perfect sense within the bitter context of the 1988 *Plebiscito.* The 1988 Franjas

thereby embody some characteristics of a "media event" as the initial moment within

the mediatization circuit. Hepp and Couldry describe a "media event" as:

> … A "genre" of media communication that may be defined on
> syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels… On the *syntactic level*,
> media events are "interruptions of routine"; they monopolize media
> communication across different channels and programs, and are
> broadcast live, pre-planned and organized outside the media. On the
> *semantic level*, media events are staged as "historic" occasions with
> ceremonial reverence and the message of reconciliation. On the
> *pragmatic level*, media events enthrall very large audiences who view
> them in a festive style. The main point of these criteria is that each as a
> single attribute may also be found in other forms of media

communication; however, when they come together, they constitute the distinctive "genre" of media events. (2)

This "media event" serves as the functional equivalent of "more capable peers" - a ZOPED for Chilean politics, understood as a socially mediated space that extends beyond what is individually/ institutionally viable. The Franjas were broadcast for 27 days - the end point of a shift of Chilean political culture that was made manifest on October 5, 1988 with the electoral victory of the NO. This was followed by another round of Aylwin's presidential Franjas, another electoral victory on December 5, 1989, and the final "transition" in 1990.

Table 4.1: The *Mediatization Of Chilean Politics – 1988-1990*

A cognitive dissonance took shape for the Chilean people, who in 1988 were subject to Pinochetista politics while increasingly supportive of an oppositional

democratizing political culture.[65] The 1988 Franjas are the formative moment of this cognitive dissonance between the actual political/ economic conditions in Chile (and the imminent threat of civil war), and the imagined, peaceful and prosperous future of the Franjas. The subsequent 20-year historical arc of *la Concertación* (1990 – 2010) represented the consolidation and reproduction of this gap, solidified this relationship, and marked a shift for *la Concertación* from the former opposition, to hegemon of Chilean political culture, while assimilating what was formerly opposed – the political economy of the Pinochet regime.

The emergence of this cognitive dissonance entails a differentiation or split - the political-economic hegemony of the military regime on the one hand, and the political-cultural hegemony of *la Concertación* on the other hand - a gap within which politics as a lived social process (that takes form as struggle between people and affiliated institutions representing distinct political interests) is to a certain degree

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[65] Chilean psychologist Eugenia Weinstein describes some of her findings during the Focus Groups she organized while conduction preliminary research for the 1988 NO Franjas. These finding primarily relate to Chilean youth: "…hicimos una ronda donde cada joven tenía que decir en una palabra el sentimiento predominante que ellos sentían al ser jóvenes, en la circunstancia y situación en que estaban actualmente. Creo importante mencionar las palabras que recibimos: frustración, desesperanza, miedo, apatía, discriminación, temor, odio, resentimiento, opresión. No escuchamos ninguna palabra con connotación positiva. Sin embargo, tuvimos dificultades para cortar la conversación cuando llegó la hora de terminar. Todos, sin excepción, tenían ganas de seguir conversando, de ser escuchados…. Observamos en los jóvenes ausencia de memoria histórica. No habían conocido la vida democrática, por lo tanto no se la podían representar como una solución a sus problemas. No podían luchar por algo que no conocían… Su conocimiento de la realidad era ideologizado y discursivo, con pocas referencias a hechos o acontecimientos concretos, o bien televisivo… un profundo nivel de difusión y de perturbación de la identidad, debido a que los soportes fundamentales sobre los cuales se construye la identidad, en el curso del desarrollo, estaban también severamente perturbados. Las necesidades, por las cuales uno se reconoce a sí mismo, postergadas o insatisfechas. Los roles desempañados, fracasados y carentes de valoración social; y la percepción de sí mismos, negativa, impotente, denigrada. Como resultado de esta perturbación y difusión de la identidad, diagnosticamos, en estos jóvenes, una tensión permanente y muchas veces irreconciliable entre lo que podemos llamar el 'sí mismo real' (lo que uno ha llegado a ser en realidad) y el 'sí mismo ideal' (lo que uno quisiera ser)" (Valdés 1988: 38-41).

displaced by politics operating in a mediated cultural space, first established by the 1988 Franjas.[66] Thus, more than a unique sample of Chilean political communication, the Franjas took shape as artifacts of political culture that were "just beyond" the rules of Chilean political reality (Crofts Wiley 2006: 673). Embodied within the Franjas was a generative capacity to help stabilize otherwise politically unstable circumstances (another ZOPED-like characteristic).

In sum, I believe that within the *mediatization of politics,* a model based on tracking cultural change is more effective than one based on tracking media and political logics. Furthermore, I am convinced that my work on *mediatization of Chilean politics*, as well as mediatization research more broadly, benefit from a more robust conceptualization of culture that is provided by the incorporation of CHAT related theoretical models.

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[66] Couldry, Livingstone, and Markham (2007) describe a similar "gap" developing among "civically active" participants surveyed in their research, and the important role media play in the bridging of this gap (192-193).

A Unique Moment For Chilean Political Communication

> …Resumo un primer planteamiento que me parece fundamental
> destacar: los veintisiete programas de 'propaganda política' de la
> oposición no fueron sólo un ejercicio propagandístico. Ellos encierran
> lecciones tanto en el terreno de la comunicación política como en el
> terreno de la televisión en general. Y estas lecciones son útiles para
> comprender las tareas y desafíos que enfrentaremos en democracia.
> (Valdés 1988: 114)
>
> > Juan Gabriel Valdés,
> > Political scientist and Director of the NO
> > Comité de la Franja Electoral

1988 represents a unique moment for Chilean politics and the Franjas are a unique case for political communication research because of their relative isolation from external factors that are otherwise common to televised political communication. The Franjas were the first televised mutual representations and self-representations for both the military regime and for *la Concertación* within a fully developed media system. Franja content for both campaigns were compelled to offer the Chilean electorate distinct visualizations for the future Chilean democracy. Thus the contours of the dominant logics and the intentionality in production and consumption stand in a relatively sharp relief to be more readily studied and tracked.

Although the televised Franja Electoral was only one of numerous important manifestations of political opposition *la Concertación* would undertake within the broad process of the *Plebiscito*, the televised Franjas are extraordinary along, at least, five dimensions. First, television in general, and the Franjas in particular were the only national forum of Chilean political life that was completely new to the political

opposition and therefore magnified the cultural impact of the NO Franjas. It literally was the first time Chileans experienced political struggle in the space of national TV. By 1988 Chileans had been living at least a decade with a fully consolidated national television system, but for 15 years had not experienced any form of organic political struggle through this medium. For those Chileans who had an idea of how Chilean politics operated before 1973, TV was at that time still a novelty enjoyed by the rich, and therefore they had no experience with unrestricted political communication via television. The generation that came after grew up only knowing TV as a media form under the total control of the military regime, completely instrumentalized to reflect and repeat the ideological tenets of Pinochet and the military junta. The absence of unrestricted politics on TV is key to understanding the cultural potency of the 1988 Franjas. The sudden appearance of NO Franja content within this space made for a uniquely potent specimen of "democratic" political communication.

Second, the Franjas were experienced by the Chilean people as the only form of political opposition to the dictatorship that could be perceived as *unrestricted on a national scale* (In spite of the censorship that took place on Day 8 and the constant repression suffered by the NO Franja production team). What I mean by *being perceived as nationally unrestricted* is that the NO campaign - and therefore *la Concertación* as a whole - could use the televised Franjas to represent itself nationally as a unified and singular political force, something impossible to achieve on anywhere near the same scale on the ground across Chile (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 6).

In other words, *la Concertación* in one Santiago provincia or comuna would be subject to a totally different context in Valparaiso, or in Copiapó in the North, or Temuco in the South. Each city experienced different levels of repressions, each local organization had cadre with distinct party affiliations and political formation, and each locale navigated different local populations (Valdés 1988: 57). Only within the NO Franjas was *la Concertación* articulated and represented as a unified political whole – even when the political representation had no foundation in political reality. Whereas there existed sharp, and at times irreconcilable political differences within the lived process of *la Concertación*, the televisual representation of *la Concertación* consumed by a national Chilean audience was of a unified opposition, with a singular consistent choreographed message, modern, upbeat, youthful, and humorous (Cronovich 2013, Portales and Sunkel 1989, Tironi 2013). This factor quickly became a major concern for the SÍ and was a major factor in the sharp change in SÍ content that prioritized anti-NO segments (Matte Larraín 1988: 129).[67]

Third, the very nature of pre-Franja dictatorial Chilean TV helped legitimate the opposition NO Franjas. 15-minute NO Franjas suddenly appearing on screen going toe-to-toe with 15-minute SÍ Franjas framed a real cultural equivalence between the two sides, although it was only a media representation of political equivalence. Those 15-minutes of televised NO context were obviously *mediated politics* in the sense that

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[67] "En las zonas rurales más del 90% de las personas dijo que veía la franja casi todos los días. Los encuestadores que fueron a terreno cuentan que las personas rurales, donde en muchos hogares no hay televisión, caminaban de una casa a otra para juntarse en las noches y ver esta franja televisiva, y más aún, atienden a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Donde aprendió usted el significado del "NO"? Respuesta: 80% por la televisión. De tal manera que hubo un efector innegable, pero, evidentemente, creo que se basa no en un vacío, sino en una realidad" (Matte Larraín 1988: 129).

they were being viewed through TV, but they were unmediated politics in the sense that they were not being restrained by the military regime, and as such people experienced the Franjas as a unique political event, late at night in their homes, and everyone in Chile experienced them in the same way, without fear of repression, and on equal (cultural) terms as the SÍ Franjas.

This cultural equivalency was potent enough to mitigate the overwhelming televisual dominance reserved by the military regime that unabashedly exploited the remaining 23 hours 45 minutes of TV programming to attack *la Concertación* and promote Pinochet (Crofts Wiley 2006: 674). As such, these televised representations of oppositional struggle, regardless of content itself, legitimated not only *la Concertación* but also an understanding of any post-Pinochet Chile as democratic, even if the nature of post-Pinochet Chile was subject to substantially undemocratic conditions.

Fourth, as counterpoint to the happy public representation of *la Concertación,* the Franjas were also the only space for Chilean political opposition to develop a high degree of produced/composed unified political opposition and intentionality outside the frameworks of the individual political parties and often conflicting interests within *la Concertación*. In other words, the limited space of the televised Franjas transcended organic structural limitations and internal tensions of *la Concertación* to become a first *self-representation of democratic oppositionality* as such in Chile. The Franjas of the NO might thus be understood as a reified cultural text and benchmark of political purity, and the embodiment of peaceful democratic transition born of the

undemocratic arrogance of Pinochet's military regime. *La Concertación* was, simultaneously, a minimum and a maximum program for Chilean opposition to Pinochet, in the present (1988), and the Chilean democracy of tomorrow (Crofts Wiley 2006: 682).

Finally, I am convinced that the Franjas were as close to an "unadulterated" sample of political communication incorporating a commercial/ media logic as can be found. The Chilean TV industry in 1988 was highly commercialized, but the Franjas were not subject to private market forces nor editorial pressures associated with advertising since the Franja campaign itself was provided unpaid access to national TV. This case of political communication had no internal market impulse at the point of production or at the point of consumption, although the NO Franjas were clearly developed using televisual marketing formatting and audio/visual language. Furthermore, independent of Franja content, the realization of their broadcast was within itself evidence of democratic practice.

Unlike more traditional televised political communication that takes place in the context of multiple forms of unmediated exogenous factors that influence form and content of televised political communication, the 1988 Franjas were broadcast to the Chilean electorate uniquely isolated from factors such as proximity to state power, individual or institutional instrumentalization of media, notions of normative professionalism, high technical and administrative "cost of entry" intrinsic to televised broadcasting, etc. (Bresnahan 2003: 55, see also Hallin and Mancini 2004 and 2012). The financing of Franja production was direct – the SÍ counted on unlimited financial

support from the military regime and DINACOS, both politically inseparable from the televised SÍ campaign in form and content. Furthermore, to help finance the SÍ campaign the military government decided to "pass the hat" among many of the countries business and agricultural elite who had benefitted from the economic policies imposed by the regime.

The NO campaign on the other hand was financed through large sums of money pouring into Chile from around the world, funneled through NGOs and international funds including nearly four million from the National Endowment for Democracy - NED (Angell 2007: 26, Crofts Wiley 2006: 672). The parties that formed *la Concertación* collected another $11 million in 1988 from USAID, the World Council of Churches, the Ford Foundation, the AFL-CIO, and the US Catholic Conference of Bishops (Crofts Wiley 2006: 676, Whelan 1989: 1002).

Furthermore, the process of developing televised mutual representation and self-representation was the case not only for the opposition, but also involved the military regime and its Franja Production team. The Franjas of the SÍ and the military regime also had to televisually re-imagine itself as a duly elected democratic political force. This high degree of media self-awareness also points to a high degree of ideological intentionality that dominated the Franja production process from start to finish for both sides of the televised campaign. I see this intentionality in the content and the context of the Franjas as having helped shape the meaning of democracy and how Chileans perceive their civic duty within that democracy, even after the *Plebiscito* (Davies 1999: 157, McChesney 1999: 111). The meaning and choice of democracy is

different for the party militant or the participant in a protest that is repressed, than the

meaning of democracy for a person who perceives it primarily through the *Plebiscito*

vote or the televised Franja – so the tension becomes less a contest between continued

dictatorship versus civilian governance, and more about the contest between NO and

SÍ as a symbolic act.

These five dimensions underscore the importance of the historical and political

context that helped the Franjas, and demonstrates how this case transcends methods

and categories commonly used to study more traditional forms of political

communication. The Franjas are better understood as an artifact if political culture,

and merit classification and research using more appropriate theories and methods.

Furthermore, when these dimensions are considered together, the convergence of these

forces give shape to a cultural phenomenon that is best understood as more than the

sum of each of its parts – that is, the mediatization of politics and the political

ascendancy of television in Chile exceeds the outcomes of increased

commercialization; transcends privatization and deregulation; and is indicative of a

process that can't be measured solely by quantitative/demographic expansion of TV or

its episodic political instrumentalization. It is all of this in concert that makes for an

historically distinct phenomenon that was at work in the *mediatization of Chilean*

politics that began on October 5, 1988 with the 10:45 pm broadcast of the first NO

Franja.

Since the original case of the 1988 Franjas was so unique in form and content,

it consequently left an enduring mark on Chilean political culture that inevitably

declines but consistently re-emerges, takes form, and thickens again within spaces that combine Chilean media, culture and politics - spaces that are usually too obstructed in other settings or contexts to allow discursive relationships to be tracked over time (Boas 2009b: 107).

Existing *Plebiscito* And Franja Research

Research on the 1988 *Plebiscito* and post-Pinochet Chile is abundant within the literatures on Latin American democracy and political transitions. Scholars, political figures, and popular cultural texts often celebrate the Chilean *Plebiscito* of 1988 as a hitherto unique and important example of non-violent democratic transition. In spite of the prominence of these narratives, as I have already explained, there exist unavoidable contradictions in identifying the 1988 *Plebiscito* as a democratic transition. Nonetheless, there is a need to review how most existing scholarship addresses the 1988 *Plebiscito* and the Franjas.

The Franjas Within "Third Wave" Research.

One obstacle that contributes to the limited nature of Franja-specific research comes from how this material has been largely confined to studies that focus on political transitions. Research that focuses on political transitions usually starts with normative arguments about political change, democracy, and the instrumental role of a "free" media, followed by case studies referred to as evidence. North American research on Latin American politics and democratic change leads the world in this type of research. It includes scholarship from numerous disciplines, though the most widely cited works come primarily from Political Science, and are known in the field as being rooted in so-called "third wave" literatures (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2006, Huntington 1991, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Skidmore 1993, Smith 2005).

Samuel P. Huntington in particular is recognized for having coined the phrase

"third wave" as a metaphor to describe transitions to procedural democracy that took

place in Latin America and other parts of the world during the 1990s. UCSD Political

scientist Peter Smith summarizes the Huntington thesis and describes its importance:

> From a global perspective, Samuel P. Huntington has posited the
> existence of three broad 'waves' of democratization:
> 1. a 'long wave' stretching from approximately 1828 to 1926, followed
>   (and ended) by a 'reverse wave' from 1922 to 1942,
> 2. a 'short wave' from 1943 to 1962, with a reverse wave from 1958 to
>   1975,
> 3. a 'third wave' from 1974 to 1990… (31)

Scholars who subscribe to the "third wave" school of thought still struggle to

establish a consensus on what has come after the 1990s, but this analysis has become

so widely accepted that it "has become part of the standard vocabulary of political

science" (31-32). It is not difficult to understand the allure of this type of argument,

which might be considered especially relevant for research involving Latin America

since by the late 1970s the list of countries ruled by military dictatorships included

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and almost all of

Central America. By the end of the 1990s, the Generals had almost all surrendered

state power to civilian governments. Political scientists typically include Chile in this

list and describe the *Plebiscito* as primarily a pacted agreement for democratic

transition between the Chilean opposition to Pinochet and the military.

Still, I am compelled to include a critique of "third wave" scholarship because

within this literature the case of 1988 *Plebiscito* in Chile figures prominently among

best examples of a "stunning election" - peaceful, mediated, successful democratic

transition (Huntington 1991: 176). Admittedly, I find Huntington's analysis disingenuous.[68] I do not engage more with this material precisely because I do not subscribe to the "third wave" thesis, nor do I believe that the Chilean case of 1988 meets a minimum threshold for a democratic transition as understood from the standpoint of democratic theory. In the case of the Chilean *Plebiscito* and the Franjas, an institutionalist perspective on the *Plebiscito* privileges an objectively unified opposition against Pinochet, pacted agreements among political elites, the military junta supporting a controlled transition, and popular demand for a return to a substantive democracy - all as key elements for neatly summarizing the NO victory of 1988 in order to compare it to contemporaneous cases of political transition in Latin America such as Argentina, Brazil, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay (Huntington 1991, Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005, O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), or comparing it to transitions in other parts of the world, such as the Philippines or Poland (Huntington 1991).

Furthermore, media analysis does not centrally figure in this type of work. When "third wave" political scientists do refer to the media within their research, it is often peripheral, and they approach this topic through an institutional and legislative lens, or from an instrumentalized media effects perspective that "largely fail to appreciate the interactions, interdependencies, and transactions at a system level and

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[68] Huntington's thesis has primarily been used as a whitewash of the violence and repression upon which the so-called "third wave" was rooted. Huntington goes so far as to offer examples of how the CIA was deployed to "promote democratization" in Latin America (94). This work takes on the characteristics of 1990s state department policy and talking points to rationalize the leading role of the United States in the terrible violence and repression suffered throughout Latin America, since the 1970s.

with regards to how the media shape and reshape politics, culture, and people's sense making" (Strömbäck 2008: 232). If anything can be drawn from the third wave thesis as it relates to Latin American mass media systems, it is that in almost every national case across the region as TV matured and was consolidated during the 1970s and 1980s, it did so as a technology of dictatorial power, or at best as a technology of oligarchic power. In other words Latin American TV was undemocratic "por naturaleza."[69] Still, the democratizing third wave meta-narrative too often holds sway. In contrast to popular accounts about the role of mass media in the 1988 Plebiscito and post-Pinochet Chile (Pablo Larraín's film "NO," for example), North American political science and democratic transition literatures usually situate the role of media as secondary in Chile, if it is included at all, and typically described as an instrument for providing an audio-visual representation of institutional political change.

It is from this body of research that concepts such as "contagion," "demonstration effect," "diffusion," "emulation," "snowballing," and even the "domino effect" are used to describe political communication that moves beyond one country to another (Smith 2005: 265-273), comparable to a virus that is passed between organic bodies. Hagopian & Mainwaring underscore this framework by arguing that media potentially serve a larger process "rather than constituting independent developments in Latin American countries, changing attitudes had powerful demonstration effects across borders…" (39). Although accurate on some levels and most convenient for summarizing the Chilean case, this perspective fails to

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[69] Marked at birth, or written into its DNA.

account for the inherent weakness of the opposition to Pinochet having been forced to

operate within political boundaries established by the military junta, and the

remarkable institutional, economic, and political consistency of Pinochet and his

supporters – *el gatopardismo pues...* As I have already established in previous

chapters, the 1988 Franjas did more than simply emulate the democratizing impulse of

the Chilean people, but marked the initial moment for a substantive transition in

Chilean political culture, a transition largely invisible to the Political Scientists whose

work I have cited in this section.

Still, even among researchers of political communication, the categories and

theoretical tools we have to look at the relationship between media and politics more

closely are not developed enough because ours too often are rooted in the methods of

Political Science. Institutional/ structural categories for tracking the relationship

between media and politics such as state versus private ownership, censorship,

regulation, commercialism, free-flow assumptions all work within frameworks that are

not totally relevant to the Chilean case, and do not easily incorporate cultural

questions that are clearly very important to understand the significance of the Franjas

within the 1988 *Plebiscito*.

Huntington's argument suggests that successful democratization occurs in one

country, and this can potentially encourage democratization in other countries, either

because they face similar problems, or because successful democratization elsewhere

suggests that democratization might be a cure for their own problems - whatever those

problems are - or because the country that has democratized is powerful and/or is

viewed as a political and cultural model worthy of emulation. "Thanks in large part to the impact of global communications, by the mid-1980s the image of a 'worldwide democratic revolution' undoubtedly had become a reality in the minds of political and intellectual leaders on most countries of the world. Because people could and did ask about the relevance for themselves of political events in far-off countries. Solidarity's struggle in Poland and Marcos's downfall in the Philippines had a resonance in Chile that would have been most unlikely in earlier decades." (100-102).

This model describes a media that is primarily understood as an inorganic or adjunct feature of political change, that can be repressed, or that can remain unfettered, depending on the quality of the democratic process itself. Moreover, this category of research is primarily quantitative, frequently excluding cultural inquires, at times lending an ahistorical quality to dominant conclusions.

Finally, I find that the work of these scholars often presumes an equivalence among conservatism, stability and democracy for Latin American countries, such as Chile, that have been forced to reconcile the irreconcilable, endure and internalize political violence and intervention. When winning elections is no longer a useful metric for tracking democracy, "third wave" scholars tend to highlight evidence and construct arguments that accommodate pre-existing theoretical models that are more aligned to ideological models, uncritically celebrating neoliberalism as intrinsically democratic, impunity as responsible reconciliation, and political opportunism as commonsense. "Third wave" scholars too often prefer revisionist and/or reductionist ad hominem criticisms of leftist Latin American governments as anti-democratic "por

naturaleza," even when these have been the most closely scrutinized and electorally tested governments. In sum, the advocates of this model argue that for Latin America in general, and for Chile in particular, a period of rationally democratic responsible reconciliation and commonsense policies, emerging from newly established *alternancia* and *políticos renovados,* is the foundation upon which the region was able to be reemerge from the terrible violence and political crisis of the 1970s. In this context, memory often qualifies as intransigence.[70]

Within this framework, validated as it is for better understanding the relationship between media and political change, there is no room for arguments that seek to track political communication as "ordering social practice." My political-epistemological critique should not be misunderstood as a blanket dismissal of an entire literature. The work of these scholars has indeed informed my thinking about political communication in general, and Chile in particular. For example, in an idealized though still informative description, Guillermo O'Donnell reflects on the symbolic power of oppositional politics initial appearance within mass media still under authoritarian control: "...mutual discoveries of common ideals, which acquire enormous political significance just because they are articulated publicly after such a long period of prohibition, privation, and privatization. In the precarious public spaces

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[70] This is what I took away from Hagopian's argument during the lively debate that took place at the 2015 LASA Conference in San Juan: "Cross-disciplinary Perspectives on Latin American Democratization: Enhanced Citizen Participation or Managed Inclusion?" Presenters:
- Nancy Postero, University of California San Diego.
- Frances Hagopian, Harvard University.
- Charles R Hale, University of Texas/Austin.
- Mario M Pecheny, Universidad de Buenos Aires.

of the first stages of the transition, these individual gestures are astonishingly successful in provoking or reviving collective identification and actions; they, in turn, help forge broad identifications which help embody the explosion of a highly politicized and angry society" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 25, Quilter 1989: 301).

O'Donnell suggests it is more useful to understand this scale of mediatized politics in its additive form – not so much as fictive or dishonest, but functional in a role that is key to an opposition's ability to mobilize support by "generating symbols of partial political identity - around its name, platform, ideology, song," which would presumably "bring together voters and militants across any of the lines which otherwise divide them within society" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 25-26). This "third wave" description exemplifies a good part of what I describe as mediatized politics operating at a level of political culture.

Latin American Franja Research.

Latin Americanists and Chilean scholars have also spent years studying the 1988 *Plebiscito* and the Franjas. The primary unsettled debate among many of them has been the significance of the Franjas for securing a NO victory. In spite of the consensus that the *Franjas* figure importantly in contemporary Chilean political history, these scholars continue researching this question using primarily quantitative media effects methods and frameworks to track media effects and seeking to identify a casual relationship between the *Franjas* and the victory of the *NO* (Boas 2015, Boeninger 2007, Halpern 1993). On the other hand, social-constructivist research

foregrounds the sociocultural and symbolic power of the positive, forward-looking, consumer-focused televisual messaging as having been decisive in mustering among a majority of Chileans courageous enough to secure a victory for the NO campaign (Cronovich 2013, Quilter 1989). This research exemplifies an enduring tension that exists between conventional narratives that highlight the Franjas as the key factor that led to the victory of the NO, and scholarly research that focuses on the Chilean *Plebiscito* of 1988 that suggests that no such causal relationship can be proven. Of course this difference is principally rooted in how to best classify the manifest success of the NO campaign within that particular moment in 1988.

For example, one media effects analysis from 2013 uses post-electoral survey data, collected in Chile in 1988 and 1989, to argue that "the advertising of the opposition's 'No' campaign made Chileans more likely to vote against dictator Augusto Pinochet, whereas the advertising of the government's 'Yes' campaign had no discernible effect" as a consequence of the negativity that rebounded, and was understood, as having been rooted in the existing military regime instead of the opposition (Boas 2015: 2). This media effects analysis cited many of the same sources and data sets used in previous media related investigations that focused on the *Franjas.* Furthermore, these data sets were collected soon after the 1988 *Plebiscito* and were therefore still subject to the repressive political conditions maintained by the military regime and therefore fear of reprisals influenced the responses of the participants.

Other investigations use audience and/ or content analysis to describe specific elements of the *Franja* content and format, and how these influenced the voting patterns of certain groups such as undecided voters, women, and youth (Hirmas 1993, Piñuel Raigada 1992, FLASCO). This research typically compares surveys with the recurrence of particular themes within the content of the two campaigns (Piñuel Raigada 1992), or develops statistical data such as demonstrating that over 60% of Chilean youth preferred the *NO Franjas* to those of the *SÍ* (Hirmas 1993). More often than not, these scholars conclude that it is not possible to identify a definitive causal relationship between the *Franjas* and the final outcome of the 1988 *Plebiscito* because of the multiple additional factors influencing the NO campaign and the Chilean electorate in general.

To my knowledge, scholarly research offering both quantitative and qualitative analysis of how the televised Franjas influenced Chilean politics and its consequences on Chilean political institutions and political culture simply does not exist. The only text I have found, that at least partially sought to provide such an analysis, was a 1989 collection of works edited by Diego Portales and Guillermo Sunkel titled La Política en Pantalla. This book brought together textual and political economic investigations by Portales and Sunkel, as well as essays by Maria Eugenia Hirmas, Martín Hopenhayn, and Paulo Hidalgo that involve audience reception, content, and media effects methods for analysis, but still sought to contribute to a more qualitative interpretation of the Franjas. This collection of essays was excellent though limited because it was published within a few months of the 1988 *Plebiscito,* without the

advantage of hindsight. Nonetheless, I integrated many of the most salient

observations into my elaboration of the *mediatization of Chilean politics.*

La Política en Pantalla proposes that Chilean television had up to that moment

served as an instrument for the dissemination of symbolic dictatorial power and

ideological reproduction on a mass scale, operating as the exclusive and privileged

domain of the military regime. TV was very much a closed system, politically

instrumentalized by the regime that only authorized airtime for entertainment and

commercial content (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 33). The Franjas became a public

display of this medium being torn away from the "milicos" – if only for 15 minutes

late at night. Initially through the 1988 Franjas, and then increasing throughout the

presidencies of Aylwin, Frei, and Lagos, TV was "fundamental" for the construction

(or re- construction) of important categories of political imagery, deployed at the level

of mass culture in a moment of instability within the political process on the ground, a

resurgence and reconfiguration of newly legalized party politics and consolidation of

new broadly based political culture.

The scholars involved with La Política en Pantalla describe a media-centric

process of constructing (or re-constructing) of political imagery that quickly became

associated with a post-Pinochet Chile, in spite of Pinochet remaining in power for

some time after the 1988 *Plebiscito.* These scholars understood the Franjas as

belonging to a process that had transcended standard forms of political

communication, and provided a different type of political formation with active

intervention of media. They argue that TV did not innocently pick up and redeploy the

imagery of pre-existing political culture using its own distinct televisual language.
More precisely, what this signifies is that TV channels intervened in politics, that is,
TV operated as political agents actively appropriating and re-assigning basic elements
of Chilean political culture (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 62). I argue that the insightful
assessment, as proposed by the contributors to La Política en Pantalla in 1989,
anticipated the key conceptual arguments I seek to demonstrate within my
mediatization research and the *mediatization of Chilean politics*. I set out to widen the
scale of analysis to include an assessment of changes in Chilean political cultural that
relate to the 1988 *Plebiscito* and the development of Franjas, in order to support a
more discursive interpretation of Franja content, and a socio-historical treatment of the
Franjas as an artifact of Chilean political culture.

La Política en Pantalla is part of that tradition of Chilean critical scholarship
that considers 1988 to be a "progressive" assimilation of a dictatorial neoliberal order
by both right and left, given idealized form within the Franjas and delivered to the
Chilean people in 1988 via television as midwife. I build on this argument and see this
moment as the pacted collapse of left and right into the birth of a radical center - the
starting point for the *mediatization of Chilean politics* with the Franjas as the non-
material cultural space where this transition took place.

PART III:

The Empirical Study

The Content Analysis Of The 1988 Franja Electoral:
Overview, Preparation, Hypotheses, Tallies, And Formatting

Table 5.1: Franja Sample Programming

| Day 1 to 3 Franja Programs, 09/05/1988 to 09/7/1988 |
| Day 4 Franja Program, Thursday, 10:45 p.m. 09/8/1988 |
| Day 5 Franja Program, Friday, 10:45 p.m. 09/09/1988 |

15-minute "Franja del NO"

16 individual segments.

Broadcast first, runtime of 14m 59s.

Dominant Theme: "La Pobreza en Chile."

| Day 6 Franja Program, Saturday, 11:30 a.m. 09/10/1988 |

15-minute "Franja del SÍ"

16 individual segments.

Broadcast second, runtime of 14m 53s.

Dominant Theme: Attack on Patricio Aylwin.

1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening.
2) (RS) "La Cuenca Sola"
3) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Wmn's Hand
4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
5) (RS) "Estos Hombres Son Chilenos"
6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
7) (RS) Doña Yolita – "Bolsita de Té"
8) (SE) Patricio Bañados
9) (US) "La Realidad de la Pobreza en Chile"
10) (SE) Patricio Bañados
11) (US) René Cortazar
12) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
13) (SE) "NO-ticias"
14) (SE) "NO-ticias" cont. "Artistas Dirán NO"
15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
16) (RS) Edited "La Alegria Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

| Day 7 to 27 Franja Programs, 09/11/1988 to 10/01/1988 |

1) (US) Aylwin vs Aylwin
2) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (Kid w/ Hat)
3) (SE) "El Presidente En Acción"
4) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition
5) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"
6) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition
7) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí"
8) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition
9) (SE) "Chile Lider"
10) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition
11) (SE) "Democracia Sí"
12) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegria Ya Viene"
13) (SE) Commentary Avanzada Nacional
14) (SE) Commentary UDI
15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition
16) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #3 (Kid w/ Hat)

A Technical Overview Of The Franja De Propaganda Electoral

After 1988 Chilean television was ubiquitous within Chilean politics and had

become an essential instrument of the modern political campaign. In fact, televised

political communication in Chile is still influenced by the symbolism of the 1988

Franja Electoral (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 7-8). Though a pervasive mystique about

this audio-visual material endures, a lack of substantive research focusing on the

Franjas provides fertile ground for assumptions to flourish about the content and the

context of the original broadcast. This content analysis is an effort to understand what the Franjas truly contained, in order to better explain what it is about this artifact of political culture that makes it so compelling over two decades after the initial broadcast. Furthermore, as a consequence of the unusual political context in 1988 Chile and the difficulty of accessing this audiovisual material, it is likely that this is the first and only complete Franja content analysis available anywhere. Finally, the results of this content analysis help confirm a critical and qualitative theoretical argument about the significance of media and political culture within the *mediatization of Chilean politics.*

My summary description of the 1988 Franja Electoral begins with 27-days of 30-minute Franja Electoral programs, divided evenly between the pro-Pinochet SÍ campaign and the opposition NO campaign. Both campaigns chose to fill the allotted time with 15-minute "variety-style" programs, divided up into individual short segments formatted similarly to commercial advertising, often stitched together by multiple mini-transitions between 4 to 12 seconds long.

Table 6.1 provides a sample of Franja programming by breaking down the structure of Day 5 of the 27-day campaign. As noted in Table 5.1, Day 5 of the televised campaign was composed of two distinct 15-minute Franja programs. The NO Franja program developed for that day was made up of 16 individual segments, loosely focused around the theme of poverty in Chile. The NO Franja was broadcast first that night, beginning at 10:45 pm.

The Franja program for the SÍ campaign was also composed of 16 segments and was broadcast second that night. The dominant theme of the SÍ program was a multi-faceted attack against Patricio Aylwin, who had been identified as the official spokesperson of the NO campaign within the previously broadcast NO Franjas.

The following day, Day 6 of the campaign was Saturday, September 10, 1988. The SÍ program was broadcast first at 11:30 am - Franjas were broadcast before noon only on the weekends. The SÍ Franja was composed of 19 individual segments loosely related to the theme of Pinochetista youth, or "los jóvenes por el SÍ." The NO Franja followed with 18 individual segments highlighting the theme of Pinochet as "el candidato único" - the "only candidate." This was an important recurring theme for the NO used to frame the *Plebiscito* vote as a contest between Pinochet versus *alegría*. This general format was repeated throughout the 27-day televised Franja Electoral campaign.

Franja Production & Postproduction.

The founding membership of *la Concertación* was dominated by the pre-Pinochet political elite in Chile, with a dominant presence from the Christian Democrats, most of whom had been isolated or had been forced out of the circles of power established by the military regime. It is important to note that none of the Chilean old-guard politicians assembled within *la Concertación* had any experience whatsoever with political communication via television. Their lack of experience was rooted in the history of Chilean TV – before 1973 television was primarily a luxury for

wealthy Chileans, and still not relevant for large scale political communication (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 3). By 1987/88 TV was so tightly under the control of DINACOS that it had become the exclusive medium for the regime's political communication.[71]

Still, the leadership of *la Concertación* understood that the televised portion of the campaign would play a key role in the 1988 *Plebiscito,* and immediately recognized that among them they could not muster the necessary tools to enter the space of televised politics from a position of strength. A consensus was achieved among them that the televised *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* would be the most important communicative outlet of the NO campaign, and that it would be assigned a privileged position within the *Comando* (Tironi 2013).

It was therefore agreed that to participate in this important forum of political communication, *la Concertación* would have to mobilize resources outside of the traditional Chilean political class who they historically represented. Through Gabriel Valdés, a leading member of the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC) and well-known political fixer, *la Concertación* reached out to Chilean social scientists, campaign strategists, and potential allies in the fields of television marketing and commercial TV production to assemble the *Comando Por El NO*. Valdés quickly found enthusiastic volunteers from within broadcasting professional circles who had already made a name for themselves within the Pinochetista media firms, though they did not share the same political preferences as their employers (Cronovich 2013: 4).

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[71] For a more detailed overview of the history of Chilean television see Chapter 2.

Eugenio Tironi, who at the time worked as a leading member of an important

NO sub-committee (el Comité Técnico), describes the NO production team as a group

who came from a certain class of Chileans: "…todos sobrevivientes del Golpe de

1973; todos exitosos en su adaptación al nuevo régimen creado por la dictadura; todos

pasando por un singular momento de su ciclo vital…" (21).[72] Both Tironi and Forch

argued that the professional Chilean publicists who directed the NO production team

had been denied a future in more artistic and political endeavors as a consequence of

military censorship, and that "the television campaign was not done just by publicists

or producers but was done by the best people who were here" (Cronovich 2013: 11-

12). Case in point was Ignacio Agüero, who took lead of the Comité Creativo. Agüero

was a documentary filmmaker who had participated in important clandestine political

work against the regime, but during the day he worked for a marketing firm owned

and administered by pinochetistas (Tironi 2013, Cronovich 2013: 12). In spite of the

leading role of media professionals in the NO campaign, it was not conceived through

what might be considered a media logic (Valdés 1988: 13).

The NO Franja campaign was initially formulated between January and March

of 1987 when Gabriel Valdés convened a small group of public intellectuals and social

scientists to attend a closed meeting in Santiago to explain to them that they would be

developing the framework for an electoral campaign to challenge Pinochet in late

1988. At that point they did not know if the electoral process would be a plebiscite

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[72] "…they were all survivors of the 1973 coup; all of them had successfully adapted to life under the new regime created by the dictatorship; and all of them had reached a unique moment in their lives [where they were willing to take risks]."

(via a "yes" or "no" vote) or a general election (a contest among candidates), though

they preferred the latter. At that point there was only a vague legislative possibility of

national access to television for the opposition. Furthermore, Valdés explained to this

group that consulting and research firms from the United States would be brought in to

provide essential advice and training on how to best frame this campaign and assist in

the development of the overall direction the anti-Pinochet process should take going

forward (Tironi 2013: 186).

The North American companies that G. Valdés was referring to were two

political consulting firms: the internationally famous Sawyer Miller Group (SMG) and

its prominent subcontractor Kennan Research & Consulting. SMG was known around

the world as having advised successful political campaigns in the Philippines (the

Aquino campaign to challenge Marcos) and Israel (Shimon Peres and the Israeli Labor

Party), and for maintaining governmental clients throughout Latin America that

included Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, and Peru (Tironi 2013: 186-192,

Siegel 1991, Harding 2008, Boas 2009b: 96).

Ultimately, the group that assembled in Santiago during the first part of 1987

became known as the *Taller de Análisis Politico*, and was composed of New York

based political consultants, Chilean politicians, psychologists, political scientists, and

sociologists. This was the forerunner to the NO Franja production team. From early

1987 to late 1988 this team maintained monthly meetings and was the initial source of

the political framework within which the entire NO campaign would be developed.

The cost of hiring SMG and Kennan was never openly discussed with the Chileans,

but it was understood to have been an extremely high cost that was paid for entirely through a direct undisclosed donation from George Soros (Tironi 2013, Boas 2009b: 96).

The NO Franja preproduction, production, and postproduction processes involved compartmentalizing and coordinating the work of approximately 150 people (Valdés 1988: 9). The *Taller de Análisis Político* was primarily an analytical, research, and consulting body, while the governing body of the entire campaign was the Comité Directivo, composed almost entirely of the individuals considered part of the political elite within the opposition coalition, foremost among them Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, and Ricardo Lagos, each of whom went on to serve as presidents of Chile after Pinochet. Gabriel Valdés participated in this body and served as the principle buffer between the political leadership of *la Concertación* and the operational leadership within the *Comando Por El NO*.

Next in the hierarchy of the NO campaign was the *Comando* itself, led by Genaro Arriagada, a leading political operative of the PDC. Arriagada was in charge of a Comité Ejecutivo that was composed of seven committee directorships: Electoral Procedure, Regional Director, Press, Finances, Propaganda, International Director, and the Franja Electoral. Each of these directorships was filled by more political figures drawn from the 16 different parties of *la Concertación*.

Two scholars/political operatives directed the Franja Electoral committee, political scientist Juan Gabriel Valdés (the son of Gabriel Valdés) and economist Patricio Silva. It was at this point that the line between politicians and media

professionals was drawn. Above this line, political operatives representing diverse parties of la Concertación and politically active academics/ public intellectuals were dominant, and understood the process they were involved in as one to end a military dictatorship.

Below this line, the media professionals were in charge of the process (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 113). They understood the process in which they were involved as a challenge of political marketing. Early on, the political veterans leading *la Concertación* agreed that TV industry professionals would be granted operational control over the Franja Electoral-phase of the campaign, and these media professionals clearly dominated the NO Franja production and post-production processes (Cronovich 2013: 5, Piñuel Raigada 1992, Tironi 2013). There was only one moment when the political leadership of *la Concertación* intervened in the production process established by the media professionals. Influential figures within *la Concertación* such as Eduardo Frei and Ricardo Lagos openly declared their dissatisfaction with the early NO Franja content arguing that it was "mucho jingle, baile y risas y poco discurso, dictadura y denuncia" (Delgado Criado 2013: 8). This intervention was narrow in scope and was swiftly handled by Gabriel Valdés and Genaro Arriagada in favor of the bounded autonomy of the media professionals to emphasize their operational control of the televised phase of the NO campaign.

The Franja production team itself was divided into three groups: the *Comité Creativo*, the *Comité Editorial*, and the *Comité Técnico* (Piñuel Raigada 1992: 21-22). The *Comité Creativo* was led by Ignacio Agüero and composed of professionals with

backgrounds in TV and film production. This committee took responsibility for the

general production of all segments and directing the daily postproduction work. José

Manuel Salcedo, publicist and the original author of the *La Alegría Ya Viene* slogan,

figured prominently within this committee (Delgado Criado 2013: 9). It was this body

that deflected issues related to internal struggles during the early stages of the NO

Franja campaign, especially during the development of the overall Franja strategy.

The *Comité Editorial* was a smaller committee that took charge of all Franja

guest presentations and directed the participation of the NO anchor Patricio Bañados,

whose interventions were produced separately from the rest of the production process

and according to their own distinct production schedule. The *Comité Técnico* was the

only group that was not dominated by TV and film production professionals. Instead,

this was a group whose membership overlapped with the *Taller de Análisis Político* to

be composed of social scientists working to keep up quantitative and qualitative

analysis of Franja thematic research, polling information, and focus groups. After the

televised Franja campaign began, it was this group that ran ongoing surveys to collect

data used to track public reaction to NO Franja content (Crofts Wiley 2006: 676-679,

Valdés 1988: 15).

The production schedule for the NO campaign was rigorous. The NO

campaign was required to submit its Franja programs to the CNTV 24 hours in

advance. This led to the development of a 48-hour production schedule within the NO

campaign for all time-sensitive content. Visual verification of this production schedule

can be observed in the fact that Patricio Bañados, anchorman of the NO Franjas, is

wearing the same suit and tie during every two Franja programs. This production

schedule resulted in a 48-hour delay of the NO campaign ability to develop Franja

content to respond to events on the ground. Evidence of this delay is observable in the

time it took for Patricio Bañados to explicitly refer to the censorship that took place on

Day 8 of the televised campaign.

Although the formatting, structure and production process of the NO campaign

was markedly influenced by a media logic and formatting principles, the dominant

production logic that framed all the work of the *Comando Por El NO* was political and

electoral, seeking to convince a majority of Chileans to vote NO. Again, if there was a

space within the production process where a media logic was dominant, it was only at

the bottom half of the *Comando* hierarchy, and was restricted to operating within a

political framework established by the *Taller de Análisis Político* and accountable to

the political bodies of the *Comité Directivo* and the *Comité Ejecutivo* established by *la

Concertación*.

The SÍ Franjas.

Descriptions of the internal workings of the SÍ Franja production team are

scarce, but what is known is that the configuration of the SÍ Franja production process

was structured differently from the outset (Boas 2009b: 104). By all accounts,

Pinochet and his advisors felt that investing heavily into the televised Franjas would

be a waste of time and resources. Because the military regime had total control of TV

content for all but those 27 late night 15-minute broadcasts, they felt that it would be

impossible for the NO Franjas to be anything more than a minor distraction for a small number of Chileans willing to stay up that late.

Furthermore, the regime felt that the NO campaign Franjas would inevitably revert to a series of "left-wing tirades" about how bad the regime had been to them – a message they felt would fail to convince the majority of the newly registered Chilean electorate to vote in favor of the NO. Pinochet and his regime advisors were also convinced that their obvious achievements in social/ political stability and economic growth since 1973 were more than enough to justify their continued rule of Chile, and that the majority of Chileans would reject the stale, ungrateful, Marxist inspired complaints of the NO and *la Concertación*.

Throughout the televised campaign, the dominant production logic within the *Comando Por El SÍ* was political/ ideological from the top to the bottom. There were two configurations of the organizational structure of the *Comando Por El SÍ* because the original structure did not survive a major internal struggle as the Franja campaign progressed.

The first configuration was constituted in mid-1988, and lasted only through the first week of the televised campaign. This first *Comando* had been assigned the task to develop the SÍ Franjas by Pinochet himself, and the tyrant had commissioned Orlando Poblete, a leading minister in the military regime and *Secretario General de Gobierno* to take the lead of SÍ Franja production. Poblete divided the production of the SÍ Franjas between the then-Director of DINACOS and a privately contracted

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Argentine publicity firm that had done previous work to clean up the image of other

Latin American dictatorships.

The sub-par quality of the SÍ Franjas during the first week, and the limited

resources that had been assigned to the televised campaign reflected the lack of

interest from the regime and the Franjas (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 110).

Furthermore, although all the major advertising firms in Chile were owned and

administered by Pinochetistas, most of the best publicists and creative people were, by

this time, already actively collaborating with the NO campaign (Cronovich 2013: 13).

When the manifest success of the early NO campaign became obvious, Pinochet

personally ordered the reconfiguration of the SÍ Franja production team (Piñuel

Raigada 1992: 25), Poblete and the Argentineans were sent home, and replaced with

the top political and media assets the regime could muster at that time (Cronovich

2013: 13).

The second version of the SÍ production team was composed of key

Pinochetista figures and led primarily by political leaders with close ties to Pinochet

himself. Pinochet remained the final word over the Franjas, but operational control

was passed to another minister, Sergio Fernández. Fernández brought in as many

influential political figures as possible to help in the development of the Franjas, as

well as to serve as featured on-camera guests: Joaquín Lavín, economist, influential

author[73] and leading member of UDI; Jovino Novoa, minister and Sub-Secretario de

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[73] Lavín wrote the book La Revolución Silenciosa that was used as the ideological screenplay for the SÍ
Franjas (Tironi 2013).

Gobierno; Carlos Alberto "El Choclo" Délano, powerful media executive; Hernán

Büchi, economist, UDI, and the youth face of the SÍ; and, finally, Manfredo Mayol the

most prominent media and political asset among them.

Inconsistencies Of The Franja Set

It is not an exaggeration to argue that the Franja Electoral content of 1988 is the most historically significant audiovisual material within post-Pinochet Chile. An Oscar nominated feature film was made about the Franjas. Multiple documentaries focus on this material. Chilean and international scholars have developed studies of the Franjas. Therefore, it would be safe to assume that a cultural artifact as important as the 1988 *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* would be relatively easy to access in Chile, especially in the context of the 25th anniversary of the 1988 *Plebiscito*, and after the release of a feature film that focused entirely on retelling the story of this audiovisual material.

Considering the historical prominence of the Franjas, when I began my Franja research, in 2011, I expected to find the full set of this material readily accessible online, or at least deposited within any North American university, or any Latin American collection worthy of the name. This was not the case. My Franja quest began online, and the most I could find were multiple copies of a limited number of NO Franjas that had been uploaded to YouTube by random individuals. These programs were not dated, were mostly of poor quality (low resolution), and only provided edited versions or just a few segments of content from one day. I never found an entire 15-minute NO Franja program online.

My search was inexplicably more difficult for SÍ Franjas, were I only found three or four individual segments online. It immediately became clear to me that the SÍ Franjas would be that much more difficult to secure than the NO Franjas.

Nonetheless, throughout 2012 I began to download and catalog all the material I could find online. I searched digital collections in Chile and throughout the United States. I searched databases and online catalogs maintained at the *Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos* in Santiago, at the *Universidad de Chile - Instituto de Imagen y Comunicación* (ICEI), *la Biblioteca Nacional de Chile*, and still nothing.

I physically visited the Latin American collections at UCSD and several times met with the subject librarian. Again, no luck there, not even solid leads. I realized that this problem represented something meaningful to my research project – how could this enormously significant historical material be so difficult to find? I brought the issue up to my advisor, Dan Hallin, and he was also surprised that the Franjas were not accessible online. I also found out that Professor Hallin had saved a VHS copy of this audiovisual material and became excited that I might have finally solved the puzzle of the missing Franjas.

When I reviewed the VHS tape it included only about 25% of the original Franja content, and 1/3 of the material could not be recovered at all from the damaged VHS. Nonetheless, I transferred this material to digital format and added it to the incomplete set I had been building. I also began to construct a written daily log of Franja content assembled from the bits of A/V material I had collected online, from Professor Hallin's VHS tape, and from numerous text descriptions of the franjas I had collected, as I advanced in my research. This log would turn out to very important later, further along in the process (see Appendix F).

I contacted dozens of people and searched multiple archives at UCLA, UCSB, and Berkeley; again, with no luck. I placed special orders and requests within my own library system and within the UC system as a whole to reach out to other institutions. I sent cold contact emails to all the names associated with this kind of material at institutions throughout the United States. Everyone I contacted was familiar with the material and would offer multiple suggestions for possible sources, and would invariably be surprised when I explained that I had already searched in those locations without success.

I finally reached out to my Chilean contacts within the US, a group largely composed of people belonging to the Chilean exile community. They did not have any new suggestions, and many of them had never even seen all of the Franjas themselves since they had not been in Chile for the original broadcast in 1988. I then followed up with numerous possible leads within Chile, as I prepared for my first field research trip in 2014. Everything I did I would come up short in my search for a complete set of the Franjas. It was clear that I would have to wait until I physically went to Chile to do my field research in order to be successful.

I visited Chile for the first time in June and July of 2014. During this trip I reached out to multiple sources and individuals who might help me find the full set, again with no success. I made a second visit to Chile during February and March of 2015, and started my search again. It was not until I met Amira Arratia at Television Nacional de Chile (TVN) that I finally found an archive that did indeed contain the full set.

Amira was the legendary director of the TVN archives. In 1973 she was already employed at TVN archive, and was instructed by the new military administrators of TVN to destroy all archived audiovisual material that related to Allende and the UP government. Amira removed the material slated for destruction from the archive, but instead of destroying it as directed, she hid the material in her home for 17 years, bringing it back to TVN only after Patricio Aylwin was handed the presidential sash in 1990.

During our very short meeting, Amira listened to my story of unsuccessfully searching for a complete set of Franjas for years, she asked me a few questions about my research plans, and then abruptly ended our meeting by signaling to her assistant to come in to her office. She instructed him to immediately provide me with my own copy of the 1988 Franjas that TVN had maintained in their own collection. I thanked her, and I was then ushered into another neighboring office where her assistant explained the elevated fee for providing me a copy of the Franjas ($1,013.00 USD). Furthermore, the analog to digital transfer process would take several weeks, and would extend beyond my stay in Chile. It did not matter to me, I agreed to everything he said.

The DVDs arrived in San Diego in July of 2015, four months after my meeting with Amira and four years after having initially started my search for the elusive *Franjas de Propaganda Electoral.*

Importation to digital files & the audio channels.

After having searched for a complete set of this material for four years, encountering incredible difficulties and dead ends at every turn, I finally had my complete set of Franjas. The challenge to secure a complete set of the Franjas had already set back the writing stage of my doctoral work significantly, and this was just the beginning of the delays. When I did finally have the set in my hands, I had to address a whole series of new problems.

Before I could begin my Content Analysis I had to digitally recover and repair the Franja material that had ben sent to me from TVN. Of course the archival material was still on the original ¾ inch analog tape, and a large part of what TVN had charged me was to cover the cost of the work involved in transferring the original analog material to a digital format.[74] The Franja set I received from Santiago in July of 2015 was in decent shape although far from perfect.

What was sent to me from Santiago was a collection of eight unlabeled DVDs, each containing two to four unnamed, unmarked 30-minute Franja programs. These DVDs were riddled with problems, and I could only assume that in the course of this transfer process at the TVN studios in Santiago, the video content was damaged, the audio was corrupted, and the original ordering of its broadcast was lost.

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[74] Handing with ¾ inch tape is a very risky endeavor. Decks needed to play back this tape are increasingly rare, and even the best decks are prone to having problems with the heads because they are easily rendered useless if the handler does not follow a specific procedure for handling material that has been in storage for too long. The tape is also very fragile, and becomes stretchy and/or brittle over time. The folks at TVN knew this, and were fearful that by handling their only precious copy of the Franjas for reproduction, the archival set could be more damaged than it already was.

I first imported this digital material from the DVDs into Final Cut, and quickly found that I was missing one day of Franja programming, so my incredibly rare complete set of 27 days of content was in fact an incomplete set, reduced by one day. At that point I did not know exactly what day was missing, but because I had already been building up my own set of Franjas during my search, I had hope that I might have the missing content within my own collection.

Next, I found that the audio embedded in the TVN set was in very bad condition. Something unexpected had happened to the a/v material at TVN that corrupted the original audio track. When these Franja programs were played, the only sound emitted was a terrible screech with the original audio faintly heard in the background. I became worried that I had once again failed to find a viable set of Franjas. Once loaded into the Final Cut editing window I found that this must have been a problem during the transfer process, with improper settings for the original mono analog content being transferred to multi-channel digital audio format.

The audio for 18 of the 26 programs had to be recovered and re-mastered. The digital versions sent to me came embedded with two channels of stereo sound, one channel contained the original Franja audio, and the second channel contained the screeching feedback that had rendered the DVD versions of 18 Franja programs useless. Using my Final Cut software I detached the corrupted audio signals from the video, muted the channel that contained the feedback, filtered and adjusted the remaining usable audio channel, reattached this audio to the original video file, and re-

rendered the content into a mono audio track to more closely resemble the original 1988 content.

This process was repeated for each of the 18 Franja programs to manually recover and remaster the audio in my Final Cut versions. Since the quality was less than ideal across the board, I filtered and adjusted the audio in the remaining 8 Franjas programs as well. Consequently, the audio - as it is now found within my data set - has been altered from the original audio as broadcast in 1988.

Deciphering the order of the files.

At this point the entire set was more or less ready for viewing, although still not ready for the Content Analysis. I began my work to decipher the original order of the 27 Franja programs by first referring to my Franja programming log. There were large gaps in my log, so this only took me so far before I had to seek out other sources to guide my investigation. Next, I spent days searching the content of each Franja program for temporal markers situating it in relation to other Franjas, or directly within the 27-day broadcast calendar. Again, this method did not get me too far. When these strategies failed, I referred to the Franja work of other scholars, and when all else failed, my last resource was to review the 2012 film *NO* for additional clues. After a few weeks of work I had reestablished the original order of my Franja set.

Inconsistencies Of The Data Set.

Once the qualitative problems found in my collection had been resolved and the set had been reconstituted and remastered, there were several additional inconsistencies of the data set that differentiate it from what would otherwise be considered a complete set of Franjas, according to the rules established during the 1988 *Plebiscito*.

Inconsistency #1: Recovery of gaps in content.

To begin, as sent to me from TVN, four Franja-days programs had multiple sections of content that had been scrambled beyond repair. These lost sections all were within the range of 30 seconds up to 2-minutes long. To make up for this lost material I reverted to my previous research, my Franja daily log, and my own incomplete collection of Franja content. For most of the lost content I was able to find alternative sources for these sections, which I then imported and pasted over the lost Franja sections in Final Cut. This recovery process reduced the impact of the lost content to a total gap that was under 25 seconds long, in the space of one NO segment on Day 20 of the Franja campaign. The relative significance of this scrambled segment is negligible with no perceptible impact on the final results of the Content Analysis.

Inconsistency #2: The Censored Franja Programs.

Next, the total number of Franja programs expected from a complete set would have been as follows: 27 days of content, each day comprised of two 15-minute

programs, one for each of two campaigns. This makes for a total of 54 fifteen-minute programs; that is 810 minutes, or a maximum of 13.5 hours of Franja content.

Returning to 1988, on Day 8 of the campaign (September 12, 1988), the NO Franja was censored by the military regime under a vague pretext of having violated the rules of *Plebiscito* campaign propaganda that required all material must show respect and honor the institutional neutrality of the Chilean judiciary. The *Comando Por El NO* was required to submit their Franja content twenty-four hours before airtime to the National Council of Television (CNTV), a council made up of Pinochet appointees, where the content was screened to ensure it met "technical specifications" necessary for national broadcast. Denis Lustig, executive secretary of the CNTV at the time, made assurances that there would be no censorship of content, and that the process of which he was in charge was only to ensure that technical requirements were met: "any abuses, such as libel, will be determined by law. Therefore, there will be no *control previo* (read: censorship) of the programs" (Quilter 1989: 299).

The real reason for the censorship was the incontrovertible proof of torture provided with the testimony of a sitting Chilean judge who had been interviewed by the *Comando Por El NO*. Judge Rene Garcia Villegas appears on the screen and speaks of 50 cases in his docket of torture perpetrated by the CNI (secret police) (Quilter 1989: 301). He graphically describes the torture of political prisoners, and finishes - "then they throw them on a cot in a cell like a piece of garbage to let them rest a few hours so they can go at them again." This interview was the featured segment planned for broadcast within the Day 8 Franja program, along with numerous

additional segments that focused on the theme torture (the only NO Franja program to address this topic). This was the only NO Franja that looked closely at the reality of torture in Chile.

In place of the NO Franja program of that day the following message was broadcast on Chilean TV screens for 15 seconds:

POR INCUMPLIMIENTO DE LAS INSTRUCCIONES ESTABLECIDAS EN EL ACUERDO DEL CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISION, SOBRE PROPAGANDA ELECTORAL EN EL PLEBISCITO, NO SE TRANSMITIRA HOY EL ESPACIO DE LA OPCION NO. [75]

Image 5.1: Screenshot of censored NO Franja.

Publically justified as a violation of the rules covering *Plebiscito* campaigning, the act of censoring the NO Franja during Day 8 was obviously decided according to a dictatorial political logic rooted within the *Comando Por El SÍ* and the military regime more broadly. As far as they were concerned, they would not tolerate such an open transgression of military rule and authority to be broadcast on national television on

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[75] *"AS A CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE AGREEMENT SET FORTH BY THE NATIONAL TELEVISION COUNCIL RELATING TO ELECTORAL PROPAGANDA IN THIS PLEBISCITE, THE SPACE ALLOTTED TO THE NO OPTION WILL NOT BE TRANSMITTED TODAY."*

behalf of the opposition. As a result of this intervention by the military regime against the NO campaign, only the SÍ Franja was broadcast on Day 8, September 12, 1988.

National and international repudiation of this censorship was swift, and the military regime quickly responded, hoping to contain the rapidly intensifying negative reaction at home and abroad. As a gesture towards "fairness and balance" in relation to the NO campaign *"...con el objeto de mantener la igualdad de condiciones en el debate público…"* the military regime self-censored its own Franja program of the following day, Day 9 of the campaign, September 13, 1988. Therefore, on that day only the NO Franja program was broadcast, and in place of the SÍ Franja program of Day 9 a booming voice-over read the following text as it was scrolled up the screen:

Image 5.2: Screenshots of self-censored SÍ Franja.

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[76] *"His Excellency the president of the republic has elected to not utilize today's corresponding space for the SÍ option, with the objective of maintaining the condition of equality within this public debate. This choice does not signal a lack of recognition nor a disagreement with the decisions made by the National Television Council as these relate to televised electoral propaganda."*

After this Pinochetista episode of censorship and self-censorship was performed by the military regime, there was a surprisingly muted response from the NO campaign. Within subsequent NO Franja programs, there was only one direct reference made about this act of censorship 48 hours after it had taken place. After that point this censorship was only indirectly referenced on two more occasions throughout the remainder of the televised campaign, and torture was never directly addressed again.

This subdued response amounted to an unexpected form of self-censorship within the NO Franja campaign, internally rationalized as in alignment with the agreement arrived at within the *Taller de Análisis Político,* where it had been decided that the televised NO Franjas would not become a space "to reproduce" the victimization of the opposition (Tironi 2013). Similarly, multiple forms of gentle self-censorship were present in the humorous and ironic content of the NO Franjas more broadly, with the true significance of some NO segments only understood by what *had not been said*. This element of Chilean political culture was based on a form of thinly veiled ironic humor developed during the 1980s, as a characteristic of restricted political reporting and political criticism under the military regime, and became a pervasive cultural subtext of the televised Franjas of the NO (Delgado Criado 2013: 9-10).

It is notable that this same incident of censorship and subsequent moments of self-censorship aligned along contrary production logics for the NO versus the SÍ. In other words, the original act of censorship by the military regime was justified on

television via a media logic, though internally rationalized according to a dictatorial political logic. On the other hand, the subsequent self-censorship of the SÍ Franja on Day 9 was justified publically on television as a gesture to a democratic political logic.

For the NO campaign, the censoring of its Day 8 Franja program was briefly denounced as a politically repressive act, but was subsequently self-censored according to an implicit media logic that had been defined politically by a decision made over a year earlier within a politically-oriented decision making body of *la Concertación*. This incident demonstrates how the media and political logics within the Franja production and postproduction process were fluid, unstable, hybridized, and circumstantial, though consistent with and dependent on overarching political frameworks.

In the end, this was to be the only direct intervention taken by the military regime to silence the televised Franja programs of the NO during the entire 27-day campaign, though there were multiple documented cases of physical attacks and/or threats of violence against individual members of the *Comando Por El NO* (Cronovich 2013: 11). One act of violence that stood out was a late-night firebomb attack against the house of *Demócrata Cristiano* Andrés Zaldívar, a leading political director for the *Comando Por El NO.* This attack was the focus of a "NO-ticias" segment of the NO Franja program for Day 7 of the campaign, September 11, 1988. Ironically, this late-night attack was dramatized in Larraín's film, although instead of the victim being the political figure of Zaldívar, in the film the victim was the professional ad-man Rene Saavedra, a change clearly intended to reinforce the fictional narrative of "a rainbow

that brought down a dictator." In reality, the NO Franja production teams did their creative work within a space of relative freedom (ibid).

The next question I had to address was how to quantify this episode of political censorship within the Content Analysis? These incidents of censorship and self-censorship reduced the total Franja-related time allotment by 30 minutes, to a new maximum total of 780 minutes (13 hours), or 390 minutes (6.5 hours) per campaign. In the end, this was in fact the final true allotment of time that was allowed for national broadcast of Franja content in 1988.

I decided that to simply reduce the total runtime of Franja content would inappropriately distort and conceal this part of Franja history. To quantify the contextual and politically motivated inconsistency of the censored Franjas within my database software, I entered "zeros" for the counts related to Day 8 for the NO Franja, and "zeros" for the counts on Day 9 for the SÍ Franja. This quantification of censorship is expressed as sharp drops found in the graphs and charts I developed to visually represent the result of this content analysis.

Another runtime-related factor was that neither the NO nor the SÍ campaign used every possible second of its allotted time during the 27-day campaign, so the final total runtime of the 1988 Franja campaign was in reality less than 13 hours. Moreover, for reasons I will highlight later in this section, it is impossible to know exactly how much time each campaign left unused at the end of each of its 15-minute programming allotment, although I am interested in being able to compare how the two campaigns managed their respective time allotments during postproduction

because this insight would be useful to understanding the dominant logics guiding the work of both Franja postproduction teams. This last insight will have to be looked at more closely in a subsequent research project.

Inconsistency #3: Missing Content For Day 25.

The third inconsistency with my 1988 Franja set is rooted in another problem of the A/V archive at Televisión Nacional de Chile (TVN) in Santiago. As previously described, this analog collection was damaged while in storage and/or during the transfer process from ¾" tape to digital. As a result of this damage, an entire Franja program went missing. After my detective work helped me identify the order of the other 26 days of content, only then could I identify the missing Franja content as Day 25, or September 29, 1988.

I had hoped to find this missing content within my own partial Franja collection, but again, luck was not on my side. I made numerous attempts to reach out to my contacts at TVN, first through Manuel Sarmiento García (Amira's assistant) and then directly to Amira Arratia Fernandez, to find out if they knew about this missing content, and to request a second look for the missing Franja program in the original archival version. Curiously, there was no response what so ever from either of them (see Chapter 9). I resigned myself to making do with what I had been sent.

After unsuccessfully hunting high and low for the missing content using the same strategies I had developed to mitigate the other content gaps with my Franja set, I could no longer postpone starting the Content Analysis in earnest. I came to the

conclusion that there were only two viable options for addressing the potential

problems that would emerge from proceeding with my Content Analysis without

addressing this problem of an entire day of lost content.

The first option was to simply enter "zeros" in all places related to Day 25; in

the same way I had quantified the censored content from Days 8 and 9. I resisted

choosing this option because, unlike the censoring of Franjas by the military regime,

this inconsistency was not a factor in the original 1988 Franja broadcasts (missing

content for Day 25 from TVN archive). By quantifying the lost content with "zeros" I

would augment the perceptible impact on the final results of the Content Analysis

away from what the true results would have been had I been working with a complete

and perfectly preserved set of Franjas.

The second option was to develop a plan to mitigate the quantitative impact the

lost content would have on the final results of the Content Analysis. To this end my

first step was to fill in all the repeating segments that could be reasonably expected for

broadcast on Day 25, basing my choices on content production patterns that emerged

within previous and subsequent days of Franja programming. These repeated segments

were duplicated within my database to include all the standard content and theme

coding/ counts as broadcast during other Franja Days. I used this method to fill in

about 40% of the missing content for Day 25.

Next, I entered averages representing the number of segments, the segment

categories, and probable number of "unique" segments for Day 25. I derived these

averages from the Franja programs before and immediately after Day 25, i.e. Days 23,

24 & 26. I excluded day 27 as an effort to avoid throwing off these averages, because this was the last day of Franja programming and both the NO and SÍ campaigns produced a greater percentage of unique content for the final day of the televised campaign, rendering the Day 27 Franja program a quantitative outlier.

Each of the derived averages was then entered into my database and embedded in empty placeholder segments that excluded thematic counts, thereby excluding Day 25 from the final Content Analysis results derived for only those categories of coding. I did this because, unlike my coding for segment format - which was paired one-to-one for each segment - thematic coding varied by segment, and one segment could be coded as containing up to five different themes.

Thus, by using this strategy I was able to mitigate the impact of the missing content for Day 25 in order to generate final results within my Content Analysis that would be closer to the true numbers that would have been derived from working with the complete set of 27-days of Franja content. I am convinced that this was done without incurring any perceptible changes in the overall averages relating to format, content and theme.

Inconsistency #4: Altered Runtime.

Finally, the forth inconsistency originates from problems that are organic to the process of handling and transferring the audio-visual material itself as a cultural artifact:

- the original postproduction process in 1988 (which included an unknowable

  number of jump cuts, seconds of black screen slugs, etc.),

- the stretching characteristic of ¾ video tape that is part of the aging process,

- the 2015 transfer of this material from analog to digital,

- the process of recovering damaged segments, and

- the process of repairing/ re-mastering the audio,

Through each of these points, multiple seconds of transitional and secondary Franja

content was lost or deleted. It is therefore expected that by the end of my recovery

process and the beginning of the Content Analysis these seconds of lost content had

accumulated into multiple minutes of lost content.

The final runtime of my data set came in at 12 hours, 43 minutes, 4 seconds.

This represents a 17-minute difference between my data set and the maximum

allotment of time for the Franja campaign in 1988 (13 hours), and represents the

runtime equivalent of more than one full Franja-day program. When the total runtime

of content is disaggregated by campaign, this time/content gap splits almost evenly

between the two sides. On the one hand, my final data set for the NO Franjas totals 6

hours, 22 minutes, 16 seconds of audio-visual content, just under an 8-minute gap

between my data set and the true 6.5-hour allotment of time for the NO campaign. On

the other hand, my final data set for the SÍ Franjas totaled 6 hours, 21 minutes, 18

seconds of audio-visual content. This is also just under a 9-minute gap between my

data set and the true 6.5-hour allotment of time for the SÍ campaign.

This time/content gap represents the cumulative result of the already noted inconsistencies within my data set, in addition to the unknown quantity of time that went unused by both campaigns at the end of each of their Franja-day program, back in 1988. There is no way I can account for this lost time, and therefore there is no way to disaggregate the true/ precise runtime of the Franjas as they were originally broadcast in 1988.

Obviously, this is a considerable list of inconsistencies. Nonetheless, I am convinced that I did everything I could to mitigate the discernible impact they had on the final results of my Content Analysis. Basing myself on the totals for runtime and segment numbers derived from my Franja set, I concluded that these gaps and inconsistencies did not substantially impact the final results of my Content Analysis. In other words, the final Content Analysis results derived from my dataset are very close to what would have been derived from a complete Franja collection.

After this extended months-long recovery process had been concluded, several weeks to establish original order of the Franjas, and another month to mitigate the inconsistencies of my data set, only then did I begin my Content Analysis in earnest.

Hypotheses & Methodology

I developed three sets of research questions that relate to my *mediatization of Chilean politics* theoretical framework and my intention to demonstrate the existence of a ZOPED-like gap between lived political struggle and mediated politics during and after the 1988 *Plebiscito*.

Research Question A: Prominent Franja Content.

- If the NO campaign was more effective at using television to convey its message, how is this effectiveness manifest in the content? It is commonly argued that in 1988 the Franja content developed by NO campaign helped convince a majority of the Chilean electorate to vote NO because it offered substantially more positive messaging when compared to SÍ content, which developed the majority of its content to be used as an attack against the NO campaign. Are there elements of the happy content of the NO Franjas that might better account for its success?

Research Question B: Prominent Franja Themes.

- Was the NO campaign really more positive? How did the "alegría" theme organize NO content more broadly? Was the NO campaign more future-oriented, rather than past-oriented? Did the NO campaign have better production value? Was the NO campaign more directed to ordinary people? Did the NO campaign reflect a better understanding of Chilean demographics at the time? Because of its position seeking to grow opposition to the continuation of the Pinochet regime, there is a

strong presence of politically critical themes in the Franja content developed by

the NO campaign. How are these politically substantive themes addressed? On the

other hand, how are these politically substantive themes addressed in the Franjas

of the SÍ?

Research Question C: The Dominant Logics.

▪ How are media logics – specifically marketing/ advertising logics – manifested in

the two opposing Franja campaigns? What is the balance/ relationship between

media and political logics within each respective campaign? Because of its

position opposing the continuation of the Pinochet military regime, the dominant

production and postproduction intentionality demonstrated in NO Franja content

should indicate the dominance of a *political logic* over a *media logic* in order to

help Chileans resist Pinochet's propaganda and to better inform the electorate in

preparation for the October 5th vote. On the other hand, since the military regime

was seeking democratic legitimation for its existing political power and a

continuation of Pinochet but as a democratically confirmed President, SÍ content

should indicate the dominance of a *media logic* developed to highlight the qualities

of the status quo and gloss over the violence of the previous 15 years.

Methodology.

Unlike most projects that involve a content analysis where a random sample of

content is collected and analyzed resulting in a representative sample of a larger body

of data, no sampling of Franja content was necessary because I worked with the full

set of 27 days of Franja programming. Instead, what I set out to do was to quantify the

televised Franja campaign programming as a whole in order to use this data as an

empirical baseline of Franja content to compare the results against a qualitative

analysis of the Franjas as an artifact of Chilean political communication and culture.

Having established this empirical baseline, I test my qualitative analysis of this artifact

of political culture against its relationship to the overall history of the 1988 *Plebiscito*

in Chile.

I am particularly interested in identifying "patterns in political communication

formats and of political discourse itself…" As Mazzoleni delineates, "The adaptation

of political language to the media's commercial patterns has been observed in three

domains: (a) the communication 'outlook' of political actors, be they the government,

the parties, leaders, or candidates for office; (b) the communication techniques that are

used; and (c) the content of political discourse" (251). These domains are readily

visible and quantifiable both within the historical context of 1988 *Plebiscito* and

within the content of the Franjas.

Four Levels of Franja Analysis.

From the outset I identified four different levels of analysis. The first was at

the level of individual segment as the principal unit of analysis. The second level was

at the 15-minute Franja program for each campaign. The third was the level of the

daily 30-minute Franja program for both the NO and the SÍ. The fourth, and final level

of analysis was for the entire 27 days of Franja campaign programming. The charts

and graphs developed from my data set are designed to represent results for one or

more of these four levels of analysis. Since each level of analysis potentially reveals

discrete characteristics and insight into the Franja content, each level was also

assigned a particular coding scheme that included categories for content, theme and

format. Most of my content analysis takes place at the level of the unit of analysis –

the individual segment - although I do switch between levels of analysis if the data

allows for it when doing so helps answer a particular question.

My final coding scheme has 13 format-related categories, 25 content-related

categories, and 47 theme-related categories (see Appendix B). Before any segment

coding was done, every individual segment was assigned to one of three broad

production related categories: "Recurring Segments," "Series," and "Unique

Segments." Finally, in order to more efficiently navigate the entire Franja campaign as

a single searchable text document, I developed a daily log for the 27-day campaign. It

is important to note that while undertaking my Content Analysis I found the most

substantive segments embodied multiple formats, content, and themes, often with

varying degrees of complexity and intensity - characteristics that were impossible to

quantify within my current coding scheme.

As a consequence of institutional time-constraints, I was not able to include an

important micro intra-segment content analysis to quantify segment complexity and

intensity. A micro level of analysis such as this would have been helpful for more

robust final results, and I have no doubt that it merits future research. Nonetheless, I

focused my attention on the most basic level of thematic, format and content

categorizations within each individual segment, and expect that this will be sufficient

for the current purposes of this project.

Segment Tallies & Formatting

As stated, the first level and the principal unit of analysis was the individual Franja segment and, therefore, most of my coding was done at this level. The total time allotted in 1988 to both campaigns for the 27-day Franja Electoral period was 13 hours, while the aggregate runtime of my final dataset was 12 hours, 43 minutes, 57 seconds. The number of segments from both the NO and the SÍ campaigns collectively broadcast during the 1988 Franja Electoral was 1006 segments. The total runtime of original Franja content (excluding all content broadcast more than once) for both campaigns was 8 hours, 55 minutes, 41 seconds, and the number of original segments produced was 599. This is the composition of my total data set.

To appreciate the scale of this Content Analysis, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide an overview of the segment totals for Franja content at the level of individual segment, divided by campaign. Together, these tables offer a general picture of Franja content that was *broadcast* during the 1988 campaign (i.e. TV runtime) and Franja content that was *produced* for the campaign (i.e. production investment). The numbers representing what was *broadcast* during the 1988 campaign reflect more closely how this material was viewed on Chilean televisions in 1988 - *at the point of consumption*.

The numbers for what was *produced* for the 1988 campaign are much lower and representative of segments and shorter runtimes that reflect more closely the dominant logics *at the point of production*. I have found no detailed record of the Franja production process for either campaign; therefore, it is impossible to know exactly how much content was produced and never broadcast, but as a consequence of

the limited production schedule required of a 27-day campaign, it is safe to assume that what was ultimately broadcast strongly coincides with what was produced. Furthermore, it is important to follow the distinction between content *broadcast* and content *produced* throughout the remainder of this Content Analysis because the same data point, within each of the categories, provides very different insight into the Franja material.

Table 5.2: Franja Electoral Segments

1988 Franja Electoral Segments Broadcast For Both NO And SÍ Campaigns

	Date	NO Total Runtime	SÍ Total Runtime	NO Individual Segments	SÍ Individual Segments
Day 1	9/5/88	14m 49s	14m 39s	16	18
Day 2	9/6/88	13m 55s	14m 50s	18	18
Day 3	9/7/88	14m 4s	14m 4s	14	12
Day 4	9/8/88	13m 42s	14m 45s	18	18
Day 5	9/9/88	14m 51s	14m 51s	16	16
Day 6	9/10/88	14m 58s	14m 34s	18	19
Day 7	9/11/88	14m 52s	14m 54s	19	9
Day 8 *	9/12/88	0	14m 47s	0	19
Day 9 *	9/13/88	14m 52s	0	17	0
Day 10	9/14/88	14m 31s	14m 49s	18	22
Day 11	9/15/88	14m 49s	14m 44s	19	19
Day 12	9/16/88	14m 50s	14m	19	27
Day 13	9/17/88	14m 51s	13m 59s	18	23
Day 14	9/18/88	14m 48s	14m 38s	17	30
Day 15	9/19/88	14m 40s	14m 48s	19	30
Day 16	9/20/88	14m 51s	14m 49s	19	28
Day 17	9/21/88	14m 51s	14m 51s	16	22
Day 18	9/22/88	14m 49s	14m 15s	19	21
Day 19	9/23/88	14m 50s	14m 36s	17	20
Day 20	9/24/88	14m 50s	14m 46s	19	24
Day 21	9/25/88	14m 51s	14m 54s	16	19
Day 22	9/26/88	14m 52s	14m 57s	19	19
Day 23	9/27/88	14m 53s	14m 49s	15	27
Day 24	9/28/88	14m 52s	14m 41s	18	18
Day 25 **	9/29/88	14m 33s	14m 48s	18	24
Day 26	9/30/88	14m 51s	14m 50s	23	25
Day 27	10/1/88	14m 41s	14m 40s	19	15
		6h 22m 16s	6h 21m 18s		
				Av # Segments: 17	Av # Segments: 20
				Ttl Segments: 464	Ttl Segments: 542

* Day 8 and 9 counts are marked as "0" as a result of the censuring of these programs
   by the military regime.

** These numbers represent averages of previous and subsequent day counts.

Table 5.3: Aggregate Totals & Averages

Aggregate Totals & Averages

	NO Campaign	SÍ Campaign
Total Segments Broadcast (+RS)	464	542
Total Broadcast Runtime	6h 22m 16s	6h 21m 18s
Average Broadcast Segment Runtime	49s	42s
Total Broadcast Runtime (- 5/5)	6h 4m 46s	5h 53m 45s
Average Broadcast Segment Runtime (- 5/5)	48s	39s
Total Original Segments Produced (-RS)	312	287
Total Original Content Runtime	4h 27m 43s	4h 27m 58s
Average Original Segment Runtime	51s	56s
Total Original Content Runtime (- 5/5)	4h 10m 10s	3h 59m 57s
Average Original Segment Runtime (- 5/5)	49s	51s

NO Segment Tallies.

Table 5.2 demonstrates that 464 segments were broadcast on behalf of the NO campaign, averaging 17 segments per Franja-day program. My final data set suggests that the NO campaign submitted at least 6 hours 22 minutes of programming for broadcast, or 8 minutes less than what was permitted under the Franja Electoral rules.

The average runtime for all NO segments that were broadcast was 49 seconds, while the average segment runtime for only original content was 51 seconds. The most

accurate figures for original content could only be derived when outlier segments (unusually long an/or short segments) were dropped from the calculations. When the median is calculated, broadcast runtime drops 17 minutes to 6h 4m 46s and the average segment runtime drops to 48s. This same adjustment yields a runtime for original content of 4 hours, 10 minutes and 10 seconds, while average segment runtime drops to 49 seconds.

The numbers presented along the bottom half of Table 5.3 represent totals for original NO content developed – *at the point of production*, excluding all content repeated after the first broadcast. The NO campaign produced 312 individually distinct segments for the entire Franja Electoral campaign for an original content runtime of 4 hours 28 minutes. This runtime represents the actual content produced by the NO campaign, and therefore provides a more accurate indication of the amount of time and resources invested into the production of the televised NO campaign. This original content runtime represents 70% of the total 6 hours 22 minutes of NO programming that was *broadcast* in 1988, and is therefore indicative of a high degree of collaboration/ cooperation/ unity of purpose between production and postproduction, editorial decision-making, and overall intentionality of content production.

Furthermore, the consistency between NO segments *at the point of production* and NO segments *at the point of consumption* confirms the presence of internal production and postproduction stability within the *Comando Por El NO* as an identical runtime average for both segment broadcast and the segment produced. This is evidence of the clear division of labor among media professionals working within the

NO campaign, and the adherence to the broad political logic that helped frame the creative production process.

Of the 464 segments broadcast on behalf of the NO campaign, the longest stand-alone segment runtime was 4 minutes 17 seconds, a "Unique Segment" (US) from Day 3, titled "El Niño Paulo," a piece that highlighted the story of a boy who had been living in exile in Western Europe, and was struggling with his recent return to Chile. Considering the time restrictions of the televised campaign, it would be safe to assume (according to a political logic) that the longest segment would also be the most important. This was not the case within the NO campaign. This particular segment was identified by Tironi as the "weakest" sample of NO production, representative of the internal indecisiveness that plagued the NO campaign during the first days, before it had consolidated a productive "rhythm." In other words, the development of the longest segment was internally viewed as an error pointing to the still, unstable configuration of the *Comando*.

The shortest stand-alone segment of the entire NO campaign was the 4-second "Recurring Segment" (RS), "El Pollito del NO," a short animation of a baby chick tweeting as it emerges from its N-O-shaped egg.

Image 5.3: Screenshot of "El Pollito del NO."

Day 3 of the NO Franja (September 3, 1988) had the lowest number of segments at 14, partially as a consequence of the long segment "El Niño Paulo." The dominant theme for that program was "El Exilio," the only day that focused on this issue throughout the 27-day campaign. Fourteen segments is not an unusually low number, and together with the narrative description of this content, suggests that there was no unique importance assigned to this theme within Day 3 content. That is to say, this low number was likely consequence of a random series decisions made during production (unique content not prioritized) and postproduction (long segment not edited for time). This sample underscores the media-centered campaign visualization from the *Taller de Análisis Político*.

Day 26 (September 30, 1988) had the highest number of segments at 23. Although this number is not unusually high relative to the overall Franja tallies, it is clearly linked to this being the second to the last day of the televised campaign. There are a series of important testimonies that were highlighted that day, and multiple dramatic references to the October 5th vote. The dominant theme that day was "El Futuro de Chile," a catchall theme for a program that incorporated multiple future oriented segment-specific themes.

Generally, the daily numerical range of NO segments was consistent and almost rhythmic throughout the 27-day campaign, suggesting the rapid emergence and consolidation of a general consensus in production and postproduction (see the blue line in Graph 5.1). This relative rhythm in segment number per Franja-day, demonstrated by the stable rhythmic pattern of the blue line in Graph 5.1, suggests an internal political stability, broad intentionality, and operational consensus for both political and media logics, and an effective division of labor within the *Comando Por El NO*.

Graph 5.1: Number Of Individual Segments Per Franja

SÍ Segment Tallies.

Tables 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrate that there were a total of 542 individual segments broadcast on behalf of the SÍ campaign throughout the 27-day period, averaging 20 per Franja-day. My final data set suggests that the SÍ campaign submitted at least 6 hours 21 minutes of programming for broadcast, or 9 minutes less than what was permitted under the *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* rules, and very close to the total runtime for the NO. Yet, this figure includes 78 more SÍ segments than the total number broadcast for the NO campaign; on average 3 more segments per day than the NO. This substantially higher total of SÍ segments is the equivalent of at least four Franja-day programs, and at least superficially suggests that, as a whole, the SÍ developed more content than the NO campaign.

Of course that would be an incorrect assumption, since the high number of SÍ segments belies the fact that the SÍ campaign broadcast one minute less content than the NO campaign. Furthermore, the SÍ produced 287 total original segments, 25 fewer original segments than the NO campaign. These substantially lower numerical values are significant because the SÍ campaign might otherwise have been expected to produce more original content than the NO, if for no other reasons than its politically unrestricted position in relation to the military regime and the unlimited resources available for SÍ Franja production. Superior SÍ Franja production numbers was not the case, and the internal suppression of SÍ Franja production is evidence of the political rationale, and even political conceit, as reported in the historical narratives that

describe the military regime as underestimating, at least up to through the first week, the significance of the televised Franja campaign as a whole (Tironi 2013, Arriagada and Navia 2011, Garretón 2013).

The average runtime for all SÍ segments broadcast was 42 seconds. This average drops to 39 seconds when the median is calculated - 9 seconds less than the average runtime of all NO segments produced for the campaign. The production of fewer original segments and the characteristic of these original segments being substantially shorter confirms the overall tendency within the SÍ of assigning prominence to shorter segment production and content repetition during postproduction. This tendency is underscored by the fact that the average segment runtime rises sharply to 56 seconds when RS content is dropped. This tendency was especially obvious during the first week of SÍ Franjas, though it was balanced out somewhat by a sharp increase in original segment (US) production with the arrival of the second SÍ production team and the restructuring of the *Comando Por El SÍ*.

The original prominence of short segments and content repetition also points to the initial low priority assigned to the Franja stage of the campaign, and reflects a vulgar political logic and a general underestimation of the importance of televised political communication rooted in the political logic of military regime more broadly. The production spike in original content that came in the form of aggressively negative segments used to attack the NO campaign as a threat to Chilean political stability, was a continuation and expansion of this same vulgar political logic and a general underestimation of the importance of televised political communication.

Furthermore, the incongruity between segment numbers, runtime, and total content production points to a tension within the SÍ campaign between a strong production preference for longer segments (averaging 56s runtime when repeated content is dropped) and postproduction indolence in favor of shorter repeating segments (averaging a 39s runtime).

Of the 542 segments broadcast for the SÍ campaign, the longest stand-alone segment was the extended length interview with Pinochet on Day 27, October 1, 1988, a segment that ran for 8 minutes 3 seconds on this the final day of the televised Franja campaign. This was by far the longest segment produced by either campaign and represented the epitome of what should be considered a "political logic."

Image 5.4: Screenshots of Pinochet interview.

The shortest stand-alone segment of the SÍ campaign was the ubiquitous 4-second "Un País Ganador" mini transition. This segment was broadcast 76 times during the entire campaign; on average, three times per Franja-day program, or every 5 minutes spanning the entire 6 hour 21 minute SÍ campaign. Easily, this was the single most prominent segment within both the SÍ and NO campaigns, so much that

the SÍ campaign developed three different versions of this transitional segment. In fact, after weeks of 8-12 hour days spent working on this Content Analysis, I have to admit that it was this 4-second "Un País Ganador" jingle that remained in my head for hours, much more so than any of the longer, higher quality, more musical, and widely celebrated campaign jingles developed by the NO campaign. I am sure this was as a consequence of its incessant repetition within the SÍ Franjas, more closely related to the formatting preferences and communicative strategies of traditional political propaganda than more contemporary media production logics.

The three distinct versions that were developed of this segment included the same short "Un País Ganador" jingle, while the first version (Image 5.5 v1) ended by flashing the SÍ campaign logo. The second version (Image 5.5 v2) ended with a still image of Pinochet holding an exaggerated smile, and the third version (Image 5.5 v3) opened with an oddly random aerial video clip of a fishing boat cruising across the Pacific Ocean.

v1   v2   v3

Image 5.5: Screenshots of three versions of "Un País Ganador."

In spite of its prominence in the SÍ Franjas, this segment provided no substantive political message and I, therefore, coded these mini transitions as "fluff." The combined characteristics of prominence and content frivolity suggest that this segment was preferred at the point of postproduction, primarily to serve as a simple transition used to burn time and not much more. The multiple versions produced by the SÍ were very likely created during postproduction as well, demonstrating a mechanical and forced creativeness within the SÍ Franjas.

Day 7 of the SÍ Franjas had the lowest number of segments at 9, reflecting the political prominence assigned to the unique content developed especially for that day in commemoration of September 11, 1988, the 15th anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état, again more evidence of a dominant political logic. Days 14 and 15 (September 18 and 19, 1988) both had the highest number of segments at 30 each, marking the first days of the internal shake-up of the *Comando Por El SÍ* (see the first section of this chapter).

As stated, the SÍ campaign submitted 287 total original segments for the entire televised campaign, totaling a runtime for original SÍ content of 4 hours 28 minutes. Coincidentally, this is the identical runtime for the original content produced by the NO campaign, although the NO produced 25 more segments than the SÍ. Again, this indicates a preference at the point of production for longer segments, and substantially lesser amount of time and resources invested into the production of the SÍ Franjas.

Furthermore, this original content runtime represents 63% of the total 6 hours 21 minutes of SÍ programming that was *broadcast* on behalf of the SÍ in 1988. A

lower percentage suggests a less significant degree of cooperation/ unity of purpose between production and postproduction/ editorial decision-making and a clear editorial preference for repetition. The relative scarcity of original content and segment repetitiveness may also point to more editorial power having been assigned to postproduction within the *Comando Por El SÍ* than within the NO.

The SÍ totals for each program average out to 20 segments per Franja-day, 3 more segments per day than the 17-segment average for the NO campaign. As can be clearly observed in Graph 5.1, unlike the daily numerical consistency of segments in the NO campaign with a maximum range of 9 segments between its low and high marks, the numerical range of SÍ segments was chaotic, with a maximum range of 21 segments between its respective low and high marks. This segment frenzy is especially sharp after Day 7 of the 27-day campaign.

Graph 5.1 also makes legible a pattern in the number of SÍ segments per Franja day nearly identical during the first seven days of the NO televised campaign, suggesting an internal coherence during the first week. Immediately after Days 8 and 9, after the episodes of censorship and self-censorship took place, the number of SÍ campaign segments begins to spike erratically, while the number of NO segments generally returns to its preexisting pattern. This abrupt change in SÍ programming points to a break and subsequent variation in the production and postproduction (non-media) logics within the SÍ campaign occurring between Day 7 and Day 9 of the campaign.

Segment Formats: Recurring, Serial & Unique Segments.

Having reviewed the dominant tendencies in frequency and runtime of Franja segments, I return to the three broad categories of these for a closer inspection of the most important differences between the two campaigns in segment formatting they tended to develop in order to advance the narratives of their respective Franja programs. Early on, I established three broad format/production related categories:

1) "Recurring Segments" or "RS" is the category of segment that were exactly the same content, or the same content only edited for runtime, was broadcast more than once in the same Franja or across multiple Franja-days. This category includes both mini-transitions between longer and/or more substantive segments, as well as longer stand-alone segments. By "stand-alone" segment I am referring to any segment that still makes sense when viewed by itself outside the context of its particular Franja program. Segments that are not considered "stand-alone" would, for example, include the opening and closing Rainbow banners of the NO franjas, all of which were categorized as RS, but are not "stand-alone" segment because they provide no substantive message when viewed outside the context of the Franja program. Generally, a higher frequency of this category of segment points to less investment of time, creativity, and campaign resources into the production and postproduction process, and a postproduction prominence given to message repetition.

2) "Series" or "SE" is the category established for segments that were produced using the same opening and/or closing format, but the content within each of these segments was unique for that particular Franja-day program, thus producing a serial segment that would appear across multiple Franja-day programs. This category points to a greater significance given to order, structure, and regimentation within the production and postproduction process, at times suggesting a fractured division of labor at the point of production. This category of content also suggests a narrower range of content choices for campaign directors and lower receptiveness to creativity at the point of production. This type of segment also points to an a priori message discipline around which all other processes of segment production were expected to accommodate and supplement.

3) "Unique Segment" or "US" is the remainder category used for segments that were broadcast only once and represented completely unique stand-alone segments that appeared in one Franja only. This category points to a fluid, more dynamic production process, a higher tolerance for creative license and/or content diversity at the point of production, and a greater intentionality of message within the content. Since all segments might be considered "Unique Segments" during their initial broadcast, I preferred to not code them in this category during the first day because it would have falsely inflated the presence of this category of segment. Moreover, I raised the threshold for assignment to this category enough to give prominence to individual testimonials, dramatizations, and musical/ cultural

presentations that clearly fell under the above description of a "US" and ended up

representative of the most common form of US segments.

Table 5.4: RS/SE/US Segment Totals

RS/SE/US Segment Totals For Both NO & SÍ

	NO	SÍ	Totals
RS Total Segments	197	327	524
RS Unique Segments	45	72	117
SE	159	146	305
US	108	69	177
Grand Total Segments Broadcast	464	542	1006
Grand Total Segments Produced	312	287	599
Total Runtime	6h 22m 16s	6h 21m 18s	12h 43m 34s
Average Segment Runtime	52s	52s	0h 0m 52s
Unique Runtime	4h 26m 48s	4h 27m 58s	8h 54m 46s
Average Unique Segment Runtime	56s	57s	57s

Table 5.4 offers a picture of the formatting preferences with the two

campaigns. Clearly, the SÍ campaign preferred RS segments, developing 27 more at

the point of production than the NO, and broadcasting 130 more repeated segments

overall, whereas the NO campaign clearly preferred US segments (See Appendix D

for segment category totals.).

Both the NO and SÍ campaigns chose a "variety show" program format

ranging between 9 to 30 individual segments. Some of the full-length segments would

reference a specific dominant theme for the Franja, but the most common segments

were broadcast as separate, stand-alone content stitched together with very brief transition segments. These segments often featured a campaign anchorman that guided the transition (for example, Patricio Bañados as anchor for the NO campaign) or more general RS transitional segments (for example the "Un País Ganador" mini-transition for the SÍ campaign).

As presented, it should not be assumed that these numbers are useful for elaborating qualitative comparisons of content developed by the two campaigns – indeed, the campaign process itself was too complex to be able to draw comparative conclusions based only on the respective segment tallies and patterns of preferred formatting categories of these segments.

Table 5.5: RS/SE/US Segments Broadcast

RS/SE/US Segments Broadcast Totals

	NO Campaign	SÍ Campaign	Totals
RS	197	327	486
SE	159	146	337
US	108	69	183
Total Segments	464	542	1006

Graph 5.2: RS/SE/US Segments Broadcast - NO (Left), SÍ (Right)

- NO Recurring Segments (RS)
- NO Serial Segments (SE)
- NO Unique Segments (US)
- SÍ Recurring Segments (RS)
- SÍ Serial Segments (SE)
- SÍ Unique Segments (US)

Again, as can be observed in the above table and graphs, both the NO and SÍ campaigns favored the repetitive messaging of "Recurring Segments" (RS) within their respective Franjas. The SÍ campaign was clearly intentional when it inserted

many more of these segments into its Franja program, with 60% of content broadcast on its behalf (327 segments) belonging in this category, versus 42% (197 segments) for the NO. Clearly, the preferred segment format was RS, and a cumulative interpretation of my data continues to suggest that this preference was rooted in SÍ postproduction, which would suggest that these segments were used primarily as filler to fill gaps between less common, more substantive segments.

Of the 327 repeating segments of the SÍ, 234 segments were positive with an average segment runtime of 26 seconds, and a total runtime of 1 hour 43 minutes (62% of total RS runtime). Furthermore, this prominence of positive RS content reflects 64% of the total positive segments for the entire SÍ campaign, although less than half of the potentially positive runtime. Due to variables within the process of coding segments as positive/ negative (longer segments tended to be coded as both positive and negative), these short RS best represent the majority of "positive" messaging broadcast on behalf of the SÍ campaign. Therefore, the best description of how Chilean viewers experienced the positive messaging of the SÍ is as multiple shorts bursts of random and decontextualized positive messaging scattered between longer more substantive segments that could be both positive and negative. The remaining 97 repeating segments of the SÍ were negative, and averaged out to a 43 second runtime.

Table 5.6: RS/SE/US Segments Broadcast Runtime

RS/SE/US Segments Broadcast Runtime

	NO Campaign	SÍ Campaign	Totals
RS	2h 38m	2h 47m	5h 25m 0s
SE	1h 24m	2h 11m	3h 35m
US	2h 19m	1h 24m	3h 43m
Total Runtime	6h 21m	6h 22m	12h 43m

Graphs 5.3: RS/SE/US Segments Broadcast Runtime - NO (Left), SÍ (Right)

Although the number of RS segments relative to the other categories of content within its own respective campaign is 18 points higher for the SÍ campaign than the NO campaign (60% versus 42%), it is important to note that the actual difference

between the RS runtime of the SÍ and NO campaigns is only nine minutes, or 3 points (44% versus 41%), underscoring the consistent brevity of SÍ Recurring Segments.

The NO campaign also preferred RS content, but on a lower scale than the SÍ. Although less prominent numerically in the NO than the SÍ, RS content had a similar runtime in both campaigns. Furthermore, NO campaign RS content was overwhelmingly positive (73%), and these positive NO RS segments were substantially longer than the corresponding RS segments of the SÍ (43 seconds versus 26 second respectively). Yet, the positive RS content only amounted to 26% of total NO content that was broadcast. In other words, in contrast to the SÍ Franjas, Chilean audiences experienced the positive messaging of the NO in multiple formats (RS, SE, and US) and in longer overall segments across the entire 27-day campaign.

In sum, Chilean audiences in 1988 viewed nearly 5.5 hours of recurring content from both campaigns, almost half of the entire 12.75 total hours reserved for the Franja Electoral. Both campaigns preferred positive RS content, although the SÍ broadcast a substantially higher number of short happy RS segments than the NO campaign that developed longer positive RS segments.

Table 5.7: RS/SE/US Segments Produced

RS/SE/US Segments Produced Totals

	NO Campaign	SÍ Campaign	Franja Electoral Totals
RS	45	72	486
SE	159	146	337
US	108	69	183
Total Segments	312	287	1006

Graphs 5.4: RS/SE/US Segments Produced - NO (Left), SÍ (Right)

Table 5.8: RS/SE/US Segments Produced Runtime

RS/SE/US Segments Produced Runtime

	NO Campaign	SÍ Campaign
RS	44m	53m
SE	1h 24m	2h 11m
US	2h 19m	1h 24m
Total Runtime	4h 27m	4h 28m

Graphs 5.5: RS/SE/US Segments Produced Runtime - NO (Left), SÍ (Right)

As these RS numbers relate to segment production, it is clear with the

development of 72 distinct RS segments (25% of total produced), that the SÍ

committed itself to the idea that different types of RS production would better serve its

goals, at least much more than the NO with 45 (14%) segments. Both campaigns broadcast a similar relative percentage of SE segments (34% for the NO and 27% for the SÍ), while the NO campaign developed nearly double the relative number of US content than the SÍ - 23% (108 segments) for the NO and 13% (69 segments) for the SÍ. Graphs 6.8 and 6.9 provide visual confirmation of the fact that the NO produced and broadcast over 60% more original content than the SÍ campaign throughout the 27-day *Franja de Propaganda Electoral*, proof of the overall greater importance assigned to the televised campaign by the opposition than the military regime.

Moreover, all SE content (both NO and SÍ) included a significant amount of recurring content as well. This is especially true for SÍ content because of its high number of serial segments and its substantially longer opening and closing banners. In other words, if we seek to identify both quantitative and qualitative presence of content repetition within the SÍ campaign, a strong argument can be made that RS and SE content should be combined. That said, then 87% of SÍ Franja programming can be considered repetitive, and only 13% of programming was unique.

The following graphs represent the numbers of individual segments developed and broadcast for both campaigns.

Graphs 5.6: RS/SE/US Segments Produced - NO (Top) & SÍ (Bottom)

Again, as was observable in the NO campaign segment tallies, in Graph 5.6 there is a clear consistency in formatting preferences across the 27 days. This

consistency is a reflection of the internal political consensus of the NO campaign that translated into the consistent delivery of a media logic. The lower Graph 5.6 demonstrates the segment formatting for the SÍ, on the other hand, as erratic, with a clear preference for RS segments (the blue areas) increasing as the campaign progressed, and the development of more unique content (the yellow areas) to attack the opposition during the last third of the campaign.

The following tables and graphs represent the runtimes of segments categories broadcast for both campaigns. In Graphs 5.7 and 5.8 below, the color distributions correspond to the formatting categories within each 15-minute Franja program. Again, there is an obvious pattern to the segment runtimes of the NO, while the SÍ is striking for the absence of any observable pattern.

Table 5.9: 1988 Franja Electoral Segment Category Runtimes

1988 Franja Electoral Segment Category Runtimes For NO & SÍ Campaigns

	NO RS Runtime	NO SE Runtime	NO US Runtime	Total	SÍ RS Runtime	SÍ SE Runtime	SÍ US Runtime	Total
Day 1	9m 5s	2m 7s	3m 37s	14m 49s	4m 17s	9m 36s	46s	14m 39s
Day 2	7m 55s	1m 17s	4m 43s	13m 55s	4m 22s	10m 28s	0	14m 50s
Day 3	4m 55s	1m 57s	7m 12s	14m 4s	3m 22s	6m 50s	3m 52s	14m 4s
Day 4	5m 10s	3m 3s	5m 29s	13m 42s	3m 38s	11m 7s	0	14m 45s
Day 5	4m 47s	4m 1s	6m 3s	14m 51s	1m 55s	11m 40s	1m 16s	14m 51s
Day 6	8m 58s	4m 12s	1m 48s	14m 58s	6m 45s	6m 38s	1m 11s	14m 34s
Day 7	7m 23s	3m 31s	3m 58s	14m 52s	4m 15s	2m 8s	8m 31s	14m 54s
Day 8 *	0	0	0	0	7m 53s	6m 54s	0	14m 47s
Day 9 *	6m 51s	3m 46s	4m 15s	14m 52s	0	0	0	0
Day 10	6m 26s	3m 23s	4m 42s	14m 31s	7m 1s	7m 56s	18s	15m 15s
Day 11	4m 44s	3m 31s	6m 34s	14m 49s	5m 20s	4m 50s	4m 34s	14m 44s
Day 12	6m 8s	3m 40s	5m 2s	14m 50s	7m 3s	6m 57s	0	14m
Day 13	6m 54s	3m 30s	4m 27s	14m 51s	10m 15s	3m 44s	0	13m 59s
Day 14	5m 45s	4m 38s	4m 25s	14m 48s	11m 26s	1m 17s	1m 55s	14m 38s
Day 15	4m 44s	3m 49s	6m 7s	14m 40s	11m 51s	1m 42s	1m 15s	14m 48s
Day 16	5m 18s	3m 3s	6m 30s	14m 51s	6m	3m 44s	5m 5s	14m 49s
Day 17	6m 28s	2m 33s	5m 50s	14m 51s	5m 28s	3m 25s	5m 58s	14m 51s
Day 18	7m 5s	4m	3m 44s	14m 49s	4m 54s	4m 11s	5m 10s	14m 15s
Day 19	2m 43s	2m 46s	9m 21s	14m 50s	7m 16s	2m 44s	4m 36s	14m 36s
Day 20	8m 26s	2m 47s	3m 37s	14m 50s	11m 5s	3m	41s	14m 46s
Day 21	9m 57s	2m 15s	2m 39s	14m 51s	10m 20s	2m 38s	1m 56s	14m 54s
Day 22	6m 40s	3m 14s	4m 58s	14m 52s	7m 47s	2m 20s	4m 50s	14m 57s
Day 23	3m 48s	4m 48s	6m 17s	14m 53s	6m 39s	4m 10s	4m	14m 49s
Day 24	3m 26s	3m 28s	7m 58s	14m 52s	3m 12s	5m 44s	5m 45s	14m 41s
Day 25 **	3m 26s	4m 29s	6m 38s	14m 33s	5m 49s	2m 15s	6m 44s	14m 48s
Day 26	4m 53s	3m 12s	6m 46s	14m 51s	4m 18s	3m 46s	6m 46s	14m 50s
Day 27	6m 28s	1m 55s	6m 18s	14m 41s	4m 34s	1m 14s	8m 52s	14m 40s
Total	2h 38m 23s	1h 24m 55s	2h 18m 58s	6h 22m 16s	2h 46m 45s	2h 10m 58s	1h 24m 1s	6h 21m 44s
	Ttl Segments: 197	Ttl Segments: 159	Ttl Segments: 108	Ttl Segments: 464	Ttl Segments: 327	Ttl Segments: 146	Ttl Segments: 69	Ttl Segments: 542
	% of total #: 43%	% of total #: 34%	% of total #: 23%		% of total #: 60%	% of total #: 27%	% of total #: 13%	

Graph 5.7: 1988 Franja Electoral Segment Category Runtimes - NO

1988 Franja Electoral Segment Category Runtimes For NO Campaign

Graph 5.8: 1988 Franja Electoral Segment Category Runtimes - SÍ

1988 Franja Electoral Segment Category Runtimes For SÍ Campaign

Graphs 5.7 and 5.8 are visual representations of Franja content formatting preferences as experienced by the viewers in 1988, and can be interpreted as a reflection of the internal strategic shifts within the campaigns. Graph 5.7 demonstrates the relative consistency of the NO campaign in terms of formatting, and if there was any strategic shift, it can be said that there was a growing preference for SE and US content, suggesting that they had hit a stride in production and increasing confidence in what they were doing as the campaign progressed.

For the SÍ it was the opposite, where there is a clear and dramatic shift in the campaign. The first half of the campaign (days 1 – 14) with SE and RS content (blue and green areas) clearly dominant, and then dramatically flips during the second half of the campaign (days 15 – 27) to more US and RS content (yellow and blue areas).

Chapter 6.
The Content Analysis Of The 1988 Franja Electoral:
Notable Segments, Segment Tone, Segment Content, And Conclusions

Notable Segments Within Each Category

The most celebrated segment of the entire *Plebiscito* is inarguably the "La Alegría Ya Viene" campaign jingle developed by the NO campaign. This RS is the most recognizable of all the Franja segments because of the success of its jingle and its almost mythical happy imagery. When there is a need to conjure memories of the 1988 *Plebiscito,* after the rainbow NO logo invariably the discussion turns to this happy little music video. I verified this during my numerous interviews in Santiago when I found this to be the most enduring memory that people recall when asked about the 1988 *Plebiscito* and the Franjas.

Image 6.1: Screenshots of *La Alegría Ya Viene* jingle developed by the NO campaign.

The text of this famous *La Alegría Ya Viene* jingle was politically substantive as far as jingles go, but when set against the curiously happy images and musical score, it became unforgettable for its almost irresponsible cheeriness.

Chile la alegría ya viene
Chile la alegría ya viene
Chile la alegría ya viene

Porque diga lo que diga, yo soy libre de pensar
Porque siento que es la hora de ganar la libertad
Hasta cuando ya de abusos, es el tiempo de cambiar
Porque basta de miseria, voy a decir que no

Porque nace el arco iris después de la tempestad
Porque quiero que florezcan mil maneras de pensar
Porque sin la dictadura la alegría va a llegar
Porque pienso en el futuro, voy a decir que NO

Vamos a decir que no (oho) con la fuerza de mi voz
Vamos a decir que no (oho) yo lo canto sin temor
Vamos a decir que no (oho) todos juntos a triunfar
Vamos a decir que no, por la vida y por la paz

Terminemos con la muerte es la oportunidad
De vencer a la violencia con las armas de la paz
Porque creo que mi patria necesita dignidad
Para el Chile para todos, vamos a decir que NO

Vamos a decir que no (oho) con la fuerza de mi voz
Vamos a decir que no (oho) yo lo canto sin temor
Vamos a decir que no (oho) todos juntos a triunfar
Vamos a decir que no, por la vida y por la paz
Vamos a decir que NO

Chile la alegría ya viene

Chile la alegría ya viene

Chile la alegría ya viene[77]

In spite of its enduring fame, this segment did not figure as prominently within the overall NO campaign as one might expect, with no more than one of its versions broadcast per day. Arguably this was the key segment that set the tone for most of the overall campaign, and served as the anchor segment around which most of the other content was organized. Of course it was one of many other important, and much more politically substantive segments developed by the NO campaign.

Three versions of this jingle were developed and broadcast 28 times during the campaign; roughly once per Franja-day. The full-length version had primarily male vocals and a runtime of 2 minutes 18 seconds. It was broadcast 11 times during the 27-day campaign. The other two versions were much shorter and had primarily female vocals. The total runtime for all versions of the "La Alegría Ya Viene" jingle was just over 50 minutes, about 13% of all NO campaign content.

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[77] "Chile happiness is coming to you (x3).
-- Let them say what they want to say, I am free to think as I want. And I feel that it is time for liberty to win. How many more abuses? This is a time of change. To bring an end to this misery, I will say no!
– A rainbow is born only after the storm clears, and with it I want 1000 different ways of thinking to flower all at once. Because without the dictatorship happiness will come, because I visualize the future, I will say no!
– Let us all say no – oho! With the strength of my voice, Let us all say no – oho! I sing it without fear, Let us all say no – oho! All together towards victory, Let us all say no – for life and for peace!
– We must overturn death, this is our opportunity, to defeat violence with the weapons of peace. Because I believe that my country needs its dignity, so Chile can be for all of us, Let us all say NO!
-- – Let us all say no – oho! With the strength of my voice, Let us all say no – oho! I sing it without fear, Let us all say no – oho! All together towards victory, Let us all say no – for life and for peace!
-- Chile happiness is coming to you (x3)."

A less famous but much more frequently broadcast RS segment for the NO was the 10-second "No Más" Boleta segment.[78] This segment would open with a blank ballot and a pencil. A soothing voice-over was piped in, "Sin odio, sin violencia, sin miedo, NO más – Vote NO"[79] while a hand would appear from the left side of the screen to mark NO on the ballot. This was often used as a transition between longer more substantial segments, although it was also a stand-alone segment in its own right.

This segment was hands down the most prominent segment of the entire NO campaign. Broadcast a total of 40 times across the 27-day campaign, this segment was not only a plea to the Chilean people to overcome their fears and vote NO, but also provided a sample ballot to show people how to do so, and for this reason I classified it as a "voter education" segment.

Underscoring its importance, the NO campaign developed three versions of this segment, which were identical in all aspects except for the hand of the voter. In the first version the voting was done by a man's hand, and was broadcast 13 times. The second version featured a married woman's hand (identified by the wedding ring), and was broadcast eight times. The third version featured an older woman's hand (this version usually followed the Doña Yolita segment), and was broadcast 19 times.

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[78] Although they were coded as RS and more numerous (roughly 2 per program), I excluded the opening and closing "Rainbow" banners from this section because of the lack of substantive content.
[79] "Without hatred, without violence, without fear, NO more – Vote NO."

Image 6.2: Screenshots of "No Más" Boleta segment developed by the NO campaign.

These two segments were the most prominent RS segments of the NO campaign, and were exceptional for their happy, unthreatening content and tone.

On the other hand (pardon the pun), the SÍ campaign was clearly more explicit and intentional than the NO about what they decided to include within the RS segments they prominently positioned to pepper their audience. As a direct response and counterattack against the "No Más" segment of the NO, the SÍ folks developed the "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne" recurring segments and broadcast it 10 times throughout the televised campaign. These 12-second segments used the same voice-over text from the NO version, but added its own message attacking *la Concertación*, "Sin odio, sin violencia, sin miedo, para que este hombre nunca gobierne – Vote SÍ."[80]

In place of unidentified hands moving across the screen in the process of voting, the SÍ segments had three different versions of shadowy masked individuals, presumably NO supporters, participating in some form of political violence. Immediately after the violence clip, a blank ballot would flash on the screen and a

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[80] "Without hatred, without violence, without fear, so this man may never govern – Vote SÍ."

hand would appear from the right side of the frame to vote SÍ, thus making this one of the few "voter education" segments developed by the SÍ campaign.

Image 6.3: Screenshots of "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne" recurring segments developed by the SÍ campaign in response to the "No Más" segment.

Of course this was not the most frequently broadcast RS segment of the SÍ, but figured prominently in the SÍ Franjas days after the tenth day of the campaign when the SÍ directors chose to focus more of their time on attacking the NO Franjas. The previously described 3-version "Un País Ganador" mini transition was not only the shortest segment developed for either campaign, but also by far the most common RS segment, appearing 76 times throughout the span of the SÍ campaign.

Not to be outdone by the *Alegría* jingle of the NO, for the first part of the campaign the SÍ developed an operatic campaign hymn. This hymn is memorable more because of its political content than the quality of its musical score. Relative to the remainder of the SÍ content, it was uniquely fascistic in form and content. Its imagery was eerily similar to a colorful civilian version of Riefenstahl's "Triumph of the Will," and it unabashedly celebrated the September 11 coup, and Pinochet as a

hero protagonist for Chilean democracy. The hymn also called upon all Chileans to stand firm to defend the gains of the 1973 coup.

Unlike the NO jingle that was largely performed by random supporters of the NO campaign, well-known and enthusiastic Pinochetistas performed the SÍ hymn. Among them were Chilean celebrities such as Ginette Acevedo, Patricia Maldonado, Antonio Zabaleta, Rodolfo Navech, and Benjamín Mckenna.

Image 6.4: Screenshots of the "Himno de la Campaña del SÍ" developed by the SÍ campaign.

Below is the letter of this "Himno de la Campaña del SÍ, 1988, Canto":

Un horizonte de esperanza,
Nace un septiembre inolvidado,
Nos hizo dueños de un legado,
Que prometimos defender.

-Coro-
Un horizonte de esperanza,
Nace un septiembre inolvidado,

Nos hizo dueños de un legado,

Que prometimos defender.

Como una voz que igual al viento,

Va creciendo el Sí de las conciencias,

Hay un país,

País Ganador - Sí

En democracia y libertad.

El pueblo y usted – Pinochet!

Harán posible la esperanza – Sí!

Hoy que la patria entera avanza junto a usted,

Con nuestra fe – Pinochet!

El dio su patria y su bandera – Sí!

Hoy la victoria tiene nombre, Presidente Pinochet!

Sí![81]

The investment of time and resources that went into the production of this hymn was clearly much higher than anything produced by the NO, although the text and musical score did not compare to the infective happiness transmitted by the *Alegría* jingle. Curiously, in spite of the obviously substantial investment of time and resources that went into the development of this hymn, it was only broadcast six times

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[81] "A horizon of hope, was born during one unforgettable September, and it made of us caretakers of a legacy, one we promised to defend. (x2)
-- Like a voice similar to the wind, it grows the Yes in our consciousness. There is a country, a country of winners – Yes! With democracy and liberty.
-- The people and you – Pinochet! You will make our hopes a reality – Yes! Today the entire country progresses by your side, and with our faith – Pinochet! He offered his country and his flag – Yes! Today victory has a name: President Pinochet! YES!"

during the first eight days of the SÍ campaign, and then abandoned, suggesting that this must have been the vision and preferred segment of the first SÍ production team, and then rejected by the second team.

The only musical segment for the SÍ campaign that survived the restructuring of the *Comando Por El SÍ* was a mini-jingle, single chorus *SÍ-SÍ-SÍ --- ¡Un País Ganador!* musical montage and voice over commentary. It was very similar to the happily innocuous *Alegría* jingle of the NO. This jingle was supplemented with a second *SÍ Que SÍ* jingle on Day 12, and after that another more elaborate *Todo Chile Quiere A Su Presidente* jingle was introduced on Day 22, close to the end of the televised campaign. This last jingle was the most musically and visually interesting, although it was an obvious imitation/ appropriation of a NO comedic jingle developed by Florcita Motuda. Thus, unlike the NO campaign, the SÍ never successfully anchored its televised campaign around a single successful musical score.

As previously noted, the two campaigns were relatively even in their respective percentage of serial segments (SE), with 34% (159 segments) for the NO and 27% (146 segments) for the SÍ campaign. The NO campaign developed only two distinct serials within its entire campaign.

Within the 159 SE segments of the NO, 29 segments came from the "NO-ticias" series, while the vast majority (129 segments) were commentaries made by the

NO anchorman Patricio Bañados.[82] By all accounts, the face and voice of Patricio

Bañados sitting in front of a rainbow backdrop is the individual embodiment of the

NO that most quickly evoked the difficulties of those moments in 1988 among my

research subjects. In surveys conducted by research teams supporting *la Concertación,*

Bañados was identified as the most credible media personality in Chile before the

1988 *Plebiscito* (Delgado Criado 2013: 13). After having refused the editorial control

of the military regime in 1983, he had been blacklisted from appearing on Chilean TV,

and was limited to directing a radio program on one of the few opposition radio

stations allowed to exist in Santiago, Radio Cooperativa. It is no mystery why the

Comando Por El NO invited Bañados to anchor the Franjas of the NO campaign.

Image 6.5: Screenshots of NO anchor Patricio Bañados.

During the first 14 days of the *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* the SÍ

campaign was much more comfortable with the sequential structure of SE segments,

suggesting that from early on the directors of the SÍ campaign had planned out

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[82] I coded opening and closing remarks by the Franja anchors within these SE counts as "Greeting or Signoff," because these generally followed a different format than mid-Franja commentaries by the anchors which were often transitions and more politically substantive.

(storyboarded) the entirety of the SÍ Franjas around multiple segment series to address every issue they had identified as important for convincing Chileans to vote for Pinochet to remain in power, and/or to reject the political aspirations of *la Concertación*. The SÍ campaign invested most of its production time and resources into developing 15 different segment series, each with a unique opening and closing, a specific format, and distinctive content.

1. "1973" – A series of five dark, ominous, and dramatic historical shorts developed to remind Chileans about how terrible everything was in the country when Allende was in power. This series was only broadcast one week, and was rejected by the second SÍ campaign production team.

Image 6.6: Screenshot of "1973" segment of the SÍ.

2. "Chile Líder" – A series of eight overwhelmingly positive segments that presented factoids about Chile under Pinochet via funny little computer animations that were undoubtedly very advanced and impressive in 1988. This series was developed by the original production team to be broadcast the first week, then reformulated by the second team only to be dropped after only two episodes.

Image 6.7: Screenshots of "Chile Líder" segments of the SÍ.

3. Daily Countdown With Boleta – A series of 40 transitional segments broadcast multiple times every day beginning on Day 6, September 10, 1988. This segment provided an image and voice-over of the number of days left for the October 5th vote. Unbelievably, the SÍ campaign made an error while numbering the days in these SE segments, and the countdown began with an end date of October 4th instead of the 5th. They did not correct this mistake until after this segment had been broadcast 18 times with the incorrect countdown.

Image 6.8: Screenshot of "Countdown" segment of the SÍ.

4. "Democracia SÍ" – A series of 15 segments that involved having segment production farmed out to the conservative political parties closest to the regime: Avanzada Nacional, Democracia Radical, Renovación Nacional, Social Democracia Chilena, and Unión Demócrata Independiente (UDI). These typically were the longest and most elaborate of the SÍ SE segments, and served to introduce

many of the most important Pinochetista political figures leading the work of the Franjas. Many of the people who appear in these segments remain very active to this day within Chilean conservative circles. Below are screenshots of youthful Pinochetistas who later ran for the presidency of Chile: Evelyn Matthei, 25 years before she was a candidate, Joaquin Lavin who ran and lost twice, in 1999 and 2005, and Hernán Büchi who ran against Aylwin in 1989. This series was broadcast one week, and then rejected by the second SÍ campaign production team.

Image 6.9: Screenshots of "Democracia SÍ" segments of the SÍ.

5. "El Presidente En Acción" – A series of five overwhelmingly positive segments produced as an ongoing journalistic report detailing the leadership qualities of Pinochet. This series was only broadcast one week and was rejected by the second SÍ campaign production team.

Image 6.10: Screenshot of "El Presidente En Acción" segment of the SÍ.

6. "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor" – A series of nine overwhelmingly positive segments produced as an ongoing journalistic report detailing areas of economic growth and social progress in daily lives of Chileans, while living under the Pinochet regime: employment, housing, computer education, security, vocational education, agriculture, road construction, food quality, and childcare. This series was only broadcast one week, and was rejected by the second SÍ campaign production team.

Image 6.11: Screenshot of "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor" segment of the SÍ.

7. "La Gente Del SÍ" – A series of seven overwhelmingly positive testimonials of supporters of the Pinochet regime. Some of these people were well known cultural or political figures but some were representing a sector of the Chilean electorate,

such as "un joven por el SÍ," or "un empresario por el SÍ."[83] This series was only

broadcast one week, and was rejected by the second SÍ campaign production team.

Image 6.12: Screenshot of "La Gente Del SÍ" segment of the SÍ.

8. "La Verdadera Cara Del NO" – A series of three dramatic and intensely negative

segments featuring video clips of former exiles returning to Chile as they arrived at

the Santiago airport. The former exiles highlighted in these SE segments were

primarily socialists or communists and had been leading members of the UP

government. The segments link the return of these individuals to a purported

hidden communist manipulation of the NO campaign. This series was developed

by the second SÍ campaign production team and only broadcast one week. The

individuals featured below are: a) Pedro Vuskovic & José Sanfuentes, b) Jaime

Suarez, c) Hernán Del Canto.

a.   b.   c.
Image 6.13: Screenshots of "La Verdadera Cara Del NO" segments of the SÍ.

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[83] "A Young Supporter Of The SÍ" or "A Businessman For The SÍ."

9. "Nuestro Compromiso" – A series of 24 overwhelmingly positive segments establishing medium to long-term campaign promises for the future Pinochet presidency. These included individual home ownership (Pinochet makes the important statement "Que cada trabajador… se convierta en un propietario y nunca más un proletario, ese es mi compromiso…" (Franja del SÍ, 09/08/1988).[84] This was the only series that survived the entire 27-day campaign (most likely because these segments featured Pinochet). The second SÍ campaign production team nonetheless reformulated the original version.

Image 6.14: Screenshot of "Nuestro Compromiso" segment of the SÍ.

10. "¿Sabía Usted Que…?" – A series of five segments to present factoids about the progress Chile had made under Pinochet, i.e. Chile as the largest exporter of fruit in Latin American; Chilean children having the greatest access to computer technology in Latin American. These were thematically similar to the "Chile Líder" series, although did not employ any computerized animations, opting instead for b-roll video clips. This series was only broadcast one week, and was rejected by the second SÍ campaign production team.

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[84] "To help every worker… become a proprietor and never again a proletarian – that is my promise…".

Image 6.15: Screenshot of "¿Sabia Usted Que…?" segment of the SÍ.

11. SÍ Anchor #1 Carlos Bombal – A series of nine almost evenly split positive and negative segments featuring commentaries and/or transitions from the former Mayor of Santiago Carlos Bombal. The second SÍ campaign production team did not incorporate anchors into their campaign until Day 16, when they suddenly and simultaneously introduced three of them. This was a direct reaction to the manifest success of Patricio Bañados as anchorman for the NO. The figure of Bombal was featured as a youthful and largely positive representative of the SÍ.

Image 6.16: Screenshot of SÍ anchor Carlos Bombal.

12. SÍ Anchor #2 Hernán Serrano – A series of 34 almost evenly split positive and negative segments featuring commentaries and/or transitions from the journalist Hernán Serrano. Serrano was the most aggressively negative of the three anchors. The intensity of his native segments was much higher than Bombal and Gardeweg.

Image 6.17: Screenshot of SÍ anchor Hernán Serrano.

13. SÍ Anchor #3 Carmen Gardeweg – A series of 8 almost evenly split positive and negative segments featuring commentaries and/or transitions from the journalist Carmen Gardeweg. Gardeweg was featured as a motherly figure, speaking about children, the family, and the future of Chile.

Image 6.18: Screenshot of SÍ anchor Carmen Gardeweg.

14. "Usted Pregunta – El Gobierno Responde" – A series of seven mostly positive segments produced as a Vox Pop question posed to the government, and then a report or individual testimony detailing the plan or official position of the military regime on that particular question. Questions focused on the economy, housing, terrorism, higher education/ vocational training, and agriculture. This series was broadcast just over one week, and was rejected by the second SÍ campaign production team.

Image 6.19: Screenshot of "Usted Pregunta – El Gobierno Responde" segment of the SÍ.

15. "Vox Pop Por El SÍ" – A series of ten overwhelmingly positive segments produced as a Vox Pop "the word on the street" interviews with statements made by random people in support of the SÍ campaign and Pinochet specifically. This series was developed by the second SÍ campaign production team and broadcast throughout the second half of the televised campaign.

Image 6.20: Screenshots of "Vox Pop Por El SÍ" segment of the SÍ.

This SE content represents the bulk of the SÍ campaign production time and resources, at least the production that took place before the October 5, 1988 start date of the televised campaign. Eighty percent of this content did not survive the restructuring of the SÍ production team, and therefore it was the initial poor planning of the SÍ televised campaign that accounts for the poor quality of the SÍ Franjas,

particularly during the first week of the televised campaign. The frantic restructuring

of the *Comando Por El SÍ* only exacerbated this weakness.

According to surveys conducted by Piñuel Raigada after the 1988 *Plebiscito,*

two NO segments were identified by Chilean audiences as the most memorable of the

entire Franja Electoral. One was "Doña Yolita" and the other was "Cueca de las

Mujeres Solas" (211). The segment of "Doña Yolita" was a 32-second RS

dramatization, set in 1988 Chile, with theatrical content and negative in tone. It was

broadcast a total of five times throughout the 27-day campaign, four times during the

first week, and then one last during the last few days of the campaign. The segment

featured a little old lady named Doña Yolita entering a small shop and asking the

shopkeeper for two teabags. When Doña Yolita opens her change purse, she realizes

she can only afford one teabag, and everyone in the shop reacts sadly to her poverty.

Without directly attacking the SÍ campaign, this segment intended to poke holes in the

SÍ campaign's constant celebration of "Pinochet's economic miracle" (Delgado Criado

2013: 12). The idea was to reach out to those sectors of the Chilean population that

had been excluded from Pinochet's economic model and convince them that only the

NO could better their economic state.

Clearly this segment deeply upset the political leadership of the *Comando Por*

El SÍ, and consequently they took upon themselves to broadcast multiple personal

attacks against the lady portraying Doña Yolita, as well as produce a SÍ version of the

Doña Yolita segment, although the SÍ version was set in 1973 to remind viewers of the

economic crisis and scarcity of that period.

Doña Yolita of the NO.   Doña Yolita of the SÍ.

Image 6.21: Screenshots of the "Doña Yolita" segments of the NO and SÍ.

The other most memorable segment was "Cueca de las Mujeres Solas." This segment was a 1-minute RS, set in 1988 Chile, with dramatic content and negative in tone. It was broadcast a total of four times throughout the 27-day campaign. The "cueca" is the national dance of Chile, and is the most traditional of all folkloric dances, normally performed by a couple, each dressed in culturally significant vestments from Chile's rural past (Cronovich 2013: 16).

The Chilean "cueca."   "Cueca de las Mujeres Solas"

Image 6.22: Screenshots Of Chilean Cueca And "Cueca De Las Mujeres Solas" Segment Of The NO.

In the "Cueca de las Mujeres Solas" segment, a group of women are standing together in a room, each with a picture of a man pinned to their blouses over their hearts. The women introduce themselves by saying their names, the names and the relationship to the men in their respective pictures, and the date they were "disappeared" by the military regime. One woman steps out from the group, and begins to dance the "cueca sola" – the lonely cueca. Among Chilean audiences this segment stood out as the most dramatic and evocative that was produced during the entire NO campaign, and the airing of this particular segment was challenged by some members of the NO production team that felt its "brutal dramatism" would be too much for their audience to handle, and it did not square with the overall campaign strategy (Tironi 2013, Cronovich 2013: 21). But precisely because it had been produced by Agüero himself, the segment was ultimately accepted and broadcast four times on September 9, 10, 15, and 20.

I came to identify the two broadcast days with the highest proportion of US segments as representing a greater significance for each production team at the point of production and postproduction. I believe this to be true because there would have been an unusual degree of coordination between both stages of production, underscoring the idea that the days in questions merited special attention.

For the NO campaign this was Day 19, with 7 of its 17 segments broadcast developed specifically for that day only. The special day was Friday, September 23, 1988, the 15th anniversary of the death of Pablo Neruda. Patricio Bañados explained to the audience that the beloved poet and political figure did not receive proper public

commemoration of his life at the moment of his death, as a consequence of the coup. One of the longest segments of the day was of Pablo Neruda reciting an excerpt from one of most famous love poems, *Poema 20*. The remaining US content that day featured labor-related testimonies and other random testimonies.

For the SÍ campaign the highest US count was Day 26, with 9 of its 25 segments broadcast developed specifically for that day. This was Friday, September 30, 1988, and would be the last standard Franja program for the SÍ since Day 27, the last official Franja campaign day, was reserved for the extended interview conducted with Pinochet. In light of this, the *Comando Por El SÍ* focused the content of Day 26 to launch a very serious attack against the NO, featuring extended commentaries from active members of the FPMR outside of Chile describing their plans to return and participate in a continued armed insurrection against Pinochet.

Overall, the format and structuration of the two campaigns could not have been more different. The SÍ Franjas were highly dependent on repetitive RS and rigidly structured SE content. These formatting choices were the preferred method for delivering a predetermined politically substantive set of messages from the perspective of the military regime, designed to reinforce the opinions of Pinochetista or Pinochetista-leaning viewers. These formatting choices ordered the SÍ Franjas – it directly reflected the structured political content and the intentions of the campaign leadership. This content was much more dependent on political substance than artistic talent.

The NO Franjas on the other hand, were more dependent on the talent of the producers and the celebrities featured within the Franjas, while the production value was more artistically inclined than dependent on any specific political substance. As if they were personally being attended to by Patricio Bañados, viewers of the NO Franjas were gently guided through the segments of the campaign. This feature of the NO Franjas demonstrates how they were formatted and paced more along the cultural needs of the Chilean electorate, versus through a political structuration or another more efficient formatting that would be dependent on one or more type of segmentation such as RS/SE/US.

Segment Tone & Content

There is a general consensus that the NO campaign was more successful than the SÍ campaign because the NO Franjas were so much more forward-looking, positive and open for change, while the SÍ Franjas were too negative, repressive and dark. (Hirmas 1993: 88) My research suggests that this is true, although I suspect not in the manner most observers have considered.

The following tables and graphs help illustrate the prevalent tones in the Franja segments. All segments were coded as "Positive," "Negative," "Neutral," or some combination of these three. A "Neutral" segment was usually some type of transitional or introductory segment containing no substantial content to be coded. It is curious that not a single SÍ Franja qualified as being "Neutral," unlike the NO Franjas within which 11% of the total number of segments were coded as Neutral. I attribute the absence of Neutral segments from SÍ content to the predominant political logic of the campaign, that privileged a message discipline that was intolerant of aesthetic justification of Neutral segments. Most of the Neutral segments in the NO content were short introductory or transitional statements by Patricio Bañados situated between more substantive segments to provide a more natural flow to NO Franja content. I attribute the inclusion of these segments to the priority assigned to the palliative qualities of NO content by the media professionals within the NO production team.

For both NO and SÍ content, segment counts do not match the number of tone counts because some segments had more than one prevalent tone. For example,

multiple segments would start out with negative content, perhaps attacking the opposing campaign, and then transition to a positive message hoping to convince the audience that their option was the better choice. These segments would therefore be coded as both negative and positive. Consequently, it was not possible to calculate precise runtimes for positive and negative content.

As demonstrated at the bottom of Table 6.1, to address the problem of quantifying multiple tones in segments and runtimes, I first listed "Total Runtime" for each campaign segments tones, including segments with multiple tones, which when added together surpass the actual runtimes for both campaigns. The figures for "Adjusted Runtime" represents only those segments with one tone (I dropped the multi-tone segments), and the percentages represent these single tone totals. In other words, I dropped the multi-tone segments from runtime counts and calculated relative runtimes using only segments that were coded as with one tone, and calculating this as a percentage of total runtime for each Franja campaigns (341 minutes for the NO, and 356 minutes for the SÍ).

Table 6.1: 1988 Franja Electoral Segment Tone

1988 Franja Electoral Segment Tone For Both NO And SÍ Campaigns

	NO # Negative Segments	NO # Positive Segments	NO # Neutral Segments	SÍ # Negative Segments	SÍ # Positive Segments	SÍ # Neutral Segments
Day 1	5	10	1	2	16	0
Day 2	4	12	2	3	15	0
Day 3	7	7	0	7	5	0
Day 4	8	12	0	3	15	0
Day 5	8	5	3	5	11	0
Day 6	8	8	1	3	16	0
Day 7	8	11	0	0	9	0
Day 8 *	0	0	0	5	14	0
Day 9 *	8	7	2	0	0	0
Day 10	5	13	1	8	14	0
Day 11	8	10	3	4	15	0
Day 12	8	10	3	9	19	0
Day 13	9	8	1	6	17	0
Day 14	2	15	0	10	20	0
Day 15	1	15	4	10	21	0
Day 16	7	9	5	14	16	0
Day 17	5	11	1	4	19	0
Day 18	6	14	3	11	14	0
Day 19	5	11	3	10	10	0
Day 20	7	10	3	11	14	0
Day 21	6	7	4	12	7	0
Day 22	9	12	1	12	9	0
Day 23	5	9	3	13	16	0
Day 24	6	12	1	9	10	0
Day 25 **	6	12	2	10	12	0
Day 26	7	13	3	9	17	0
Day 27	4	14	2	2	15	0
	Ttl Segments: 162	Ttl Segments: 277	Ttl Segments: 52	Ttl Segments: 192	Ttl Segments: 366	Ttl Segments: 0
	% of total #: 33%	% of total #: 56%	% of total #: 11%	% of total #: 34%	% of total #: 66%	% of total #: 0%
Total Runtime	3h 0m 34s	3h 41m 55s	0h 19m 35s	2h 52m 23s	3h 50m 13s	0m
Adjusted Runtime*	2h 20m 0s	3h 2m 0s	0h 19m 0s	2h 29m 0s	3h 27m 0s	0m
	% of total #: 41%	% of total #: 53%	% of total #: 6%	% of total #: 42%	% of total #: 58%	% of total #: 0%

Unexpectedly, the NO and SÍ Franjas registered strikingly similar negative segment tallies (33% versus 34% respectively) and runtimes (3h versus 2h 52m respectively) of campaign totals (Table 6.1). This contradicts the prevailing assumption that the SÍ Franjas were substantially more negative than the NO Franjas.

Table 6.2: NO & SÍ Segment Tone

NO and SÍ Segment Tone

	NO Campaign	SÍ Campaign	Franja Electoral Totals
Negative Segments	162	192	354
Positive Segments	277	366	643
Neutral Segments	52	0	52
Total Segments	491	558	1049

Graphs 6.1: Segment Tone - NO (Left) & SÍ (Right)

Graph 6.2: Segment Tone - NO & SÍ

Table 6.2, and Graphs 6.1 and 6.2, further demonstrate how both campaigns broadcast significantly more positive segments that negative ones. When the NO positive and neutral percentages are combined we see that these account for 67% of total NO segments, which is statistically the same as the 66% positive segments for the SÍ. The results are again confirmed when we compare the adjusted positive/neutral NO content runtime (59%) to the positive runtime of SÍ content (58%). Clearly, the two campaigns were quantitatively identical in tone. My results sharply contradict both the

dominant narratives and existing research that describe NO content as substantially more positive than SÍ content; both in the total number of individual positive segments broadcast and in the runtime total for positive content (Angell 2007, Arriagada and Navia 2011, Boas 2009, Boeninger 2007, Hirmas 1993, Larraín 2012, Portales and Sunkel 1989, Sunkel 1992, Tironi 2013, Crofts Wiley 2006).

My four-year search for another Franja Content Analysis generated only one scholar who has done a Content Analysis on the 1988 Franjas, whose work is cited by multiple other scholars (Arriagada and Navia 2011, Tironi 2013, Crofts Wiley 2006). Taylor C. Boas, a political scientist at Boston University, describes his research on the 1988 Franjas "As part of a larger study of presidential campaign strategies in Latin America… I conducted a content analysis of half of the episodes in Chile's 1988 *Franja* for both the 'Yes' and 'No' campaigns. Among other things, this content analysis involved classifying segments of advertising as to whether they conveyed criticism…" (Boas 2009a). "For Chile's 1988 plebiscite, I coded a systematic random sample of half the episodes…" (Boas 2009b: 475). Below I have gathered all the comparable data from Boas' Content Analysis in order to compare his results to mine:

- "Positive or neutral content":
    - Boas 2009a: 14:   NO: 80.7%
                              SÍ: 61.9%
    - Simón Salazar: NO: 67% or 329/491 segments.*
                              NO: 59% or 3h 21m/5h 41m runtime.*
                              SÍ: 66% or 366/558 segments.*
                              SÍ: 58% or 3h 27m/ 5h 56m runtime.*

- Content coded as "Light" or 'Fluff':
    - Boas 2009b: 113:   NO: 32%
                              SÍ: 16.7
    - Simón Salazar: NO: 31% or 147/464 segments.
                              NO: 22% or 1h 24m/6h 22m runtime.
                              SÍ: 46% or 249/542 segments.
                              SÍ: 22% or 1h 24m/ 6h 21m runtime.

* These figures are all adjusted to mitigate the presence of multi-tone segments.

Clearly, the results of his content analysis are substantially different from my results, though I am convinced that my results are more robust and a closer representation of the true content of 1988 Franjas. I attribute at least part of the differences in results to the fact that Boas uses only half of the Franja programs (presumably due to the difficulty in securing a full set) to develop his Content Analysis. The nature of the Franja campaign content itself could potentially render a sampling of this material inappropriate for a Content Analysis. Franja content tone and themes shifted dramatically between the first half and the second half of the 27-day campaign. As a consequence of this shift, any random sampling of Franja content might not be appropriate to account for this change, and subsequently compromise the

validity of the results of the analysis. Nonetheless, it is impossible for me to decipher the source of the differing results without comparing coding schemes and data sets.

As demonstrated in Graphs 6.4 and 6.5, there was a pattern to positive/negative tone of Franja segments for both campaigns that was linked to significant degree to a political logic informing just how positive and negative the campaign would be in response to the positive and negative Franja content of the opposing campaign. In other words, an inverse pattern of negative content emerged between the two campaigns, with the NO campaign becoming less negative as the SÍ campaigns went more negative.

One can interpret Graph 6.4 to argue that the NO campaign has a relatively high number of negative segments, that is, until it was censored on Day 8. Then there is clearly a pattern of overall decreasing negativity in NO programming through Day 14, where the NO campaign seems to switch to a clearly less-negative position. Within the SÍ programming the campaign clearly avoids going negative until Day 14, then there is a dramatic increase in negative content from the SÍ.

Graph 6.4: Negative Segments - NO & SÍ

The positive content on the other hand is more consistent throughout the campaign, although there is clearly more emphasis on positive messaging in the SÍ campaign between Days 14 to 24, perhaps considered necessary by the SÍ production team so as to serve as a counterpoint to its substantially more negative content that was broadcast during those days.

Graph 6.5: Positive Segments - NO & SÍ

Of course, a quantitative account of the tones found in individual segments does not tell the whole story. There is an undeniably more negative "feel" to the SÍ Franjas that is difficult to quantify. To begin, Graph 6.5 demonstrates how both campaigns produced segments to attack the other campaign, although the SÍ dedicated substantially more time directing negative attention against the NO, particularly during the second half of the televised campaign.

Graph 6.6: Segments Directed At Attacking The Opposing Campaign

Segments Directed At Attacking The Opposing Campaign

This does not necessarily square with the numbers I found that show how both the NO and SÍ campaigns broadcast an almost identical relative number of negative segments - 33% for the NO, 34% for the SÍ. The solution to this puzzle is that the qualitative *intensity* of negative NO segments did not compare to that of the negative SÍ segments.

One among numerous striking examples of the greater negative intensity of SÍ content is the "Steamroller" segment broadcast on Days 14 and 15 of the campaign. The segment opens with a steamroller crushing a series of household items. A voice

over warns "…cuando usted vote, piense en todo lo que puede perder…"[85] I could describe the segment in more detail, but a simple screenshot is more than sufficient to demonstrate what I mean by *qualitatively greater negative intensity*:

Image 6.23: Screenshot of "Steamroller" segment of the SÍ.

This is the best example of a SÍ segment that demonstrates a bordering unhinged negativity. The following are four more notable segments exemplifying similar levels of negative intensity:

1- "Guillermo, victima de quemaduras." A young burn victim explains on camera how he was victim of a terrorist attack perpetrated by supporters of the NO.

Image 6.24: Screenshot of "burn victim" segment of the SÍ.

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[85] "When you go to vote, keep in mind all the things that you risk losing."

2- "Señora Elsa." An older woman emotionally describes the homelessness and

hunger she and her daughter suffered while living under the UP government of

Salvador Allende.

Image 6.25: Screenshot of "Señora Elsa" segment of the SÍ.

3- "Nora Vargas." A young woman describes how on her birthday she fell victim to

an explosive device that was detonated next to her during a terrorist attack

perpetrated by supporters of the NO. The camera zooms out into a wide shot to

show that she lost her legs during the attack.

Image 6.26: Screenshot of "Nora Vargas" segment of the SÍ.

4- "La Muerte Ya Viene." This segment was produced in response to a NO segment featuring happy horseback riders passing a Chilean flag from one person to another. This terrifying SÍ version featured a hooded death/ grim reaper figure on horseback, draped in a red cloak and waving a giant red communist hammer and sickle flag set against nightmarish background music interspersed with short cuts from the NO "Alegría" jingle.

Image 6.27: Screenshot of "La Muerte Ya Viene" segment of the SÍ.

The NO campaign did not produce anything anywhere near as intense as these negative segments produced by the SÍ and used to attack the NO and *la Concertación*. What was additionally disconcerting about the SÍ content was how often these terrifying segments would be immediately followed by extremely happy and positive SÍ segments, marking the SÍ campaign with an unsettling bipolar character unique to its content.

Seeking to quantify this type of qualitative difference among Franja segments as well as to track other important differences in content/ tone, I coded some segments as "Humorous Content," "Dramatic Content," "Shocking Content," and "Ironic Content." Each of these content categories was set up in my database software as a

distinct field, thereby allowing for segments to be coded in more than one field, or in none. Finally, all "Shocking segments were also "Dramatic" segments, but not vice versa. For example, the "steam roller" segment was coded as both "dramatic" and "shocking." To differentiate between the two categories, I coded as "shocking" all explicit audio or visual references to violence and/or death. In the absence of explicitly shocking content, I coded all thematically severe segments as "dramatic" only. "Dramatic" segments were not all negative, and might include happy drama, or some form of complex humor.

Graphs 6.7: Segment Content Categories - NO (Left) & SÍ (Right)

Since some segments were coded as multiple types of content, and other segments for none at all, the actual runtimes are not possible to calculate. The two

Graphs 6.7 provide only a visual estimation of the relative percentages of these types of content within the total runtime of each campaign. Nonetheless, it is clear that the NO campaign did indeed produce significantly more humorous content, while the SÍ campaign was substantially more comfortable with dramatic and shocking content. Nonetheless, both sides developed very dramatic campaigns. The majority of NO campaign programming was dramatic, although its drama was developed for broadcast during the last part of the televised campaign. The typical content for the NO was ironic and humorous content. As Graph 6.8 suggests, the *Comando Por El NO* decided to respond to the censorship incident of their Franja of Day 8 with ironic content on Day 12 versus with an overt attack against the SÍ or the military regime. Humor was prominent in both campaigns, but it was not anywhere near the dominant form of content. As Graph 6.8 demonstrates, NO content was largely dependent on drama and humor.

Graph 6.8: NO Franja Content Categories

As Graph 6.9 demonstrates, SÍ Franja content on the other hand was overwhelmingly dramatic, especially after the Day 9, and much of this drama was intense enough to be considered shocking. The final third of the SÍ campaign was especially shocking and dramatic. The typical content for the SÍ was dramatic, shocking, and ironic. Graph 6.9 also suggests that the *Comando Por El SÍ* purposefully decided to unleash a barrage of highly evocative content later in the campaign that ended up being the defining characteristic of the campaign. Humor was present, but only during the second half of the campaign as well.

Graph 6.9: SÍ Franja Content Categories

SÍ Franjas: Humorous, Dramatic, Shocking & Ironic Content

Past, Present, & Future Segment Orientation.

I also coded all segments for time frame references; past, present and future. Some segments contained multiple time frames, and were coded accordingly. From a total number of NO segments broadcast of 464, I coded 675 distinct time frames within all Franja content. From a total number of SÍ segments broadcast of 542, I coded 872 distinct time frames. This difference suggests that the SÍ content was more temporally fluid, to bear out the idea that Pinochetistas were more confortable with Chilean history than the opposition, who preferred to keep their message focused on the present and the future.

This historical tension within the NO content was demonstrated on Day 7, September 11, 1988, the 15th anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état. That day the NO campaign broadcast 19 individual segments, not much more than its daily average number of 17, with this important day seeing a relatively high proportion of standard RS and SE content, suggesting an intentional avoidance of the significance of the day as a unique topic. In fact, the entire Franja day program of the NO only mentioned the 15th anniversary of the Pinochet-led coup d'état in two identical 16-second segments. I coded these segments as RS because they were repeated within Day 7, although they could qualify as US because they were developed for broadcast only on September 11th.

The September 11th NO segment was a video clip of a group of women dressed completely in black, standing silently in front of a government building, holding a long banner with the message "Hoy Día Es 11 De Septiembre." Carabineros (Chilean national police) approach the women and tear away the banner. Most of the segment is silent, except for a single solemn voice-over: "Hoy día es 11 de septiembre. Como ustedes saben, y pueden ver, hoy día es 11 de septiembre." Surprisingly, these two segments, totaling only 32 seconds of Franja time, are the only segments that directly refer to the coup d'état of September 11, 1973 among all 464 segments broadcast for the NO campaign.

Image 6.28: Screenshots of the "Hoy Día Es 11 De Septiembre" segment of the NO.

On the other hand, Day 7 of the SÍ Franja had the lowest number of segments at 9, reflecting the prominence of unique content developed especially for that day in commemoration of September 11, 1988, the 15th anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état. Unlike the NO campaign, the events of September 11, 1973 figured prominently throughout the SÍ campaign, and for the 15th anniversary of the coup d'état the SÍ dedicated almost the entire Franja program to celebrate the toppling of Allende's government. The second longest segment developed for the SÍ campaign was the US "El 11 de Septiembre 'Chile Entero Lo Pidió,'" a 6 minute 36 second segment which was developed specifically to commemorate that day with highly symbolic images and archival video of the 1977 Chacillas ceremony.

The NO Franjas contained 88 references to the past. Of these references to the past, 35 (40%) occurred in a positive context. The NO Franjas contained 391 references to the present, and among these, 222 (57%) occurred in a positive context. Finally, the NO Franjas contained 196 references to the future, and among these 167 (85%) occurred in a positive context. The SÍ Franjas contained 216 references to the past. Of these references to the past, 111 (51%) occurred in a positive context. The SÍ Franjas contained 453 references to the present, and among these, 325 (72%) occurred

in a positive context. Finally, the SÍ Franjas contained 203 references to the future, and among these, 168 (83%) occurred in a positive context.

Graphs 6.10: Segment Time Frames "A" - NO (Left) & SÍ (Right)

Another popular narrative often used to compare the two campaigns is that the NO Franjas primarily focused on the future, while the SÍ focused on the past. Contrary to this, both NO and SÍ Franjas were largely situated in what was the present, that is, 1988 Chile in the context of the *Plebiscito*. One important difference between the two campaigns was that the NO referred to the future more than twice as often as the past, while the SÍ was almost evenly split between the two time frames. The patterns that emerge demonstrate how the NO maintained a consistent prioritization of the present,

followed by the future, and lastly the past. The SÍ shows a clear preference for the

present, and an equal treatment of the future and the past.

Graph 6.11: Segment Time Frames "B" - NO

Graph 6.12: Segment Time Frames "B" - SÍ

Segment Themes.

My final thematic coding scheme included 47 individual segment themes. I started out with only about 10 themes but, as I progressed in the Content Analysis, I found recurring themes that would have to be added to the coding scheme. Having coded to about Day 14 of the televised campaign I accumulated well over 47 themes, and at that point started to combine related themes. The process of adding and combing themes stabilized after Day 14 of the 27-day campaign, at which point new themes became more unusual, and the thematic content of the Franjas began to repeat.

Table 6.3: 1988 Franja Electoral Themes

1988 Franja Electoral Themes For NO And SÍ Campaigns

	NO Franjas Total	Top Ten Themes	SÍ Franjas Total	Top Ten Themes
Life/ Death	56		28	
Order/ Security	64		120	#4
Chaos/ Anarchy	1		97	#7
Crisis/ Instability	9		85	
Peace	173	#3	84	
Reconciliation/ Unity	67		3	
Violence	116	#7	87	#10
Happiness/ Hope	195	#1	192	#1
Fear/ Pain	141	#5	90	#9
Terror or Related	9		52	
Democracy	94	#8	67	
Dictatorship	78	#10	10	
Freedom/ Liberty	138	#6	85	
Censorship/ Repression	94	#8	15	
Human Rights	30		2	
Torture	21		2	
Exile	9		1	
Economic Growth/Prosperity	18		105	#6
Employment	26		30	
Salaries	11		9	
Housing	15		18	
Poverty	41		47	
Crime	11		18	
Scarcity	33		35	
Political Change/ Diversity	193	#2	36	
Justice	39		7	
Impunity	54		10	
Faith/ Religion	7		29	
Healthcare	11		11	
Education	12		30	
Honesty	34		55	
Dishonesty	52		114	#5
Individual/ Property Rights	60		87	#10
Morality/ Values	17		42	
Women's Issues/Rights	17		23	
Sexual Reference	22		15	
Youth	24		79	
Seniors	6		16	
Allende/ UP	7		83	
Pinochet/ Military Regime	163	#4	136	#3
War	12		19	
Capitalism/ Market Economy	7		43	
Marx/ Socialism/ Communism	4		94	#8
Motherhood	41		28	
Family	55		52	
Children	57		83	
"We Are Winning"	80	#9	183	#2
	2424		2557	

Table 6.3 lists the number of occurrences for each given theme within both Franja campaigns. Drawing from this table, the top ten segment themes are numbered in this table and are ordered again below as follows:

NO Campaign:
1. Happiness/ Hope
2. Political Change/ Political Diversity
3. Peace
4. Pinochet/ Military Regime
5. Fear/ Pain
6. Freedom/ Liberty
7. Violence
8. Democracy
9. "We Are Winning"
10. Dictatorship

SÍ Campaign:
1. Happiness/ Hope
2. "We Are Winning"
3. Pinochet/ Military Regime
4. Order/ Security
5. Dishonesty
6. Economic Growth/ Prosperity
7. Chaos/ Anarchy
8. Marx/Socialism/Communism
9. Fear/ Pain
10. Violence

There is a striking thematic similarity between the two campaigns. Ironically, themes related to happiness and hopes were the dominant for in both campaigns. Only four of the top ten dominant themes featured in the NO campaign can be considered as intrinsically negative, and of these four negative themes, all were focused on providing viewers with a thematic criticism of, or direct attacks against the military regime.

The relatively low incidence in the mention of human rights (#25 of 47) within the Franjas of the NO is stunning. Had the *Comando Por El NO* imposed a political

logic on its content, perhaps they would have been swayed by the poll numbers

indicating that 57% of their supporters felt that human rights was the most important

factor for voting NO on October 5th (Matte Larraín 1988: 96). Instead, throughout the

27-day televised campaign, the NO Franjas contained only 21 references to torture

(#29 of 47), amounting to a cumulative runtime of only 29 minutes 34 seconds, that is

8% of the total NO franjas runtime, and all were indirect references or artistic

interpretations to the act of torture. The Franja program of Day 8 was the only one that

graphically described the act of torture, and it was the only one censored by the CNTV

as a violation of the rules set forth within the *Plebiscito*. Chilean exiles, still

representing a sector of up to one million citizens living abroad, and obviously still a

very important issue for Chileans in 1988, was very low in NO Franja thematic

prominence - #39 of 47 themes. This is evidence of the political self-censorship

applied internally at the points of NO Franja preproduction and production.

Five of the top ten themes for the SÍ campaign were related to attacks on the

NO campaign and *la Concertación*, although this coalition was never once directly

named in any of the SÍ Franjas. Less surprisingly, the three themes with the lowest

incidence in SÍ content were exile (#47 of 47), torture (#45 of 47), and human rights

(#46 of 47). Clearly, the thematic aspect of the televised Franjas represented a form of

political marketing on both sides avoiding the most controversial and emotionally

difficult themes, preferring to sweep them under the Franja rug, so to speak.

A more precise summary of the dominant themes featured in the SÍ Franjas

explained how happy Chileans are now when compared to the despair and instability

of the UP. Pinochet was celebrated as a hero and the best option to lead Chile into the future. SÍ Franja content also argued that the only responsible option and the only viable choice for order and security was the SÍ, while the NO would re-introduce chaos, communism, and anarchy to Chile. Positive SÍ themes featured the economic accomplishments of the government and housing improvement, a civilianized Pinochet, who intended to step down from military and run as civilian president, and a dark admonition of the 1973 coup and violence: "Is this the Chile you want?" In spite of the intense negativity in some of the SÍ content, the majority of the content was still quite positive.

I also coded the segments of both campaigns for two related fields: "politically substantive content" and "fluff." The presence of any substantial political idea within a segment merited being coded as the first, and the absence of the same was coded as the second. The NO ended up with 233 segments coded as "politically substantive" for a runtime of 3 hours, 59 minutes, 40 seconds; that is 63% of NO content that was broadcast. 147 NO segments were coded as "fluff" for a runtime of 1 hour, 55 minutes; that is, 30% of NO content that was broadcast literally had no political substance to it.

The SÍ ended up with 277 segments coded as "politically substantive" for a runtime of 4 hours, 48 minutes, 24 seconds; that is, 75% of SÍ content that was broadcast. 249 SÍ segments were coded as "fluff" for a runtime of 1 hour, 24 minutes; that is, 22% of SÍ content that was broadcast.

Results of Hypotheses

Research Question A: Prominent Franja Content - If the NO campaign was more effective at using television to convey its message, how is this effectiveness manifest in the content?

In 1988 the Franja content developed by NO campaign helped convince a majority of the Chilean electorate to vote NO because it offered qualitatively more positive messaging and more culturally relevant content when compared to SÍ content - which also developed a majority of positive content but was primarily repetitive and of a lower production value. The primary focus of the SÍ content, identified by the higher production value, was developed to attack the NO campaign. Thus *Hypothesis A* proved to be quantitatively incorrect although qualitatively accurate. Although the relative percentage of positive to negative segments was similar within each campaign, the SÍ broadcast substantially more positive content than the NO. Though the SÍ was more positive overall, it is also true that the intensity of its negative content was much more significant than the NO. Finally, it is not true that the majority of SÍ content was developed to attack the NO – only about a third of its content contained direct attacks on the opposition.

In contrast to the portrayal of political opposition in pre-Plebiscito TV produced by the military regime, the NO Franjas were saturated with messages of "alegría," "esperanza," and a singular political act - voting NO as the equivalent of rejecting the dictator (distinct from voting NO as an act in support of the politics

represented by *la Concertación*). The general intention was to win symbolic control over the symbolism of a democratic transition, and convince a majority of Chileans that they could to do this safely and in tranquility, overtly seeking to soothe the fears of the population. To do this the NO campaign utilized video-clips, original musical scores and testimonies from "non-political" people, as well as humor, news reporting, and a few political speeches. This type of messaging not only contrasted sharply with what the dictatorship had broadcast before the Plebiscito, but was also in stark contrast to what the SÍ Franjas broadcast as central themes during the campaign itself.

NO content did not focus on political policy. The logic behind this was based in the NO being political, or engaging in a serious, substantive political debate was seen as corrupting, or connected to a sad and/or losing story (the political reality of Chile under Pinochet), and therefore interpreted as a losing strategy for the Franjas. At one level, it illustrates how the televised Franjas – both SÍ and NO - presented to an absolute majority of the newly registered Chilean electorate an audio- visual representation of the most elementary forms of political contestation provided by the *Plebiscito* as a whole: not a transition to democracy per se, but a purported democratizing process culminating in a choice between two military-sanctioned versions of democratic legitimation.

The "principle of unity" for the SI campaign was in rationalizing and legitimating 15 years of dictatorship, ideological cohesion (anticommunism), and the threat of a return to the past, thereby engaging directly with the present and taking positive ownership of Chilean history between 1973 and 1988. The framing of the

dictatorship went through numerous transitions or iterations, beginning first as "savior" then as "reconstructor of the nation", and then as the most "functional" and responsible option for Chilean democracy (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 18). The SÍ campaign embraced existing frames of Chilean politics to cast the SÍ as the preemptive "savior" of Chilean society, highlighting "progress" made during the dictatorship. Demonizing the opposition in general and the No campaign in particular was its modus operandi. Thus for the SÍ campaign, a "procedural democracy" and political pluralism that included the NO itself needed to be stigmatized to become correlated to violence and insecurity.

The SÍ campaign did not successfully adopt a televisual marketing logic. Instead, it stayed focused on developing televisual representations of its own internal normative logic. There was only one discernible shift that took place within SÍ content that disrupted its political consistency. Once the Franjas began, and their significance to the majority of Chileans was confirmed, the military regime mobilized its near total control of TV and orchestrated a multi-channel blanket push back against NO campaign content, using all its televisual resources and airtime to attack and/or broadcast contrasting themes.

Reacting to the pressure of contested political legitimation, the dictatorship suddenly realized the content of TV had become more important than the form. In other words, from September 14, 1988 onward, the military regime found itself reacting to the success of the NO Franjas and was forced to develop a different "communicative strategy" to frame its televisual content within its 15-minute SÍ

Franjas, but also for all its TV channels throughout the broadcasting calendar (Portales and Sunkel 1989: 63). When a transition finally took place within the SÍ Franjas, it was to give space to messages and skits mocking NO content and seeking disqualification of the opposition by using its own Franja content against it.

Research Questions B: Prominent Franja Themes - Was the NO campaign really more positive? How did the "alegría" theme organize NO content more broadly? Was the NO campaign more future-oriented, rather than past-oriented? Did the NO campaign have better production value? Was the NO campaign more directed to ordinary people? Did the NO campaign reflect a better understanding of Chilean demographics at the time?

 Research Questions B proved to be largely incorrect. The NO campaign was not more positive, with the SÍ campaign having broadcast a substantially higher number of positive segments resulting in a longer runtime of positive Pinochetista content. The NO campaign broadcast both a lower percentage of politically substantive content and a higher percentage of "fluff" than the SÍ.

 The NO Franjas did indeed focus on themes that were consistently vague and referred to big ideas like happiness, hope, and peace in abstract terms much more than any specific political or policy ideas. The entire NO Franja campaign was structured around the "Alegría" jingle. Although it was much less dramatic than the SÍ, its dominant themes spent more time reaching out to people's emotions. The NO campaign intentionally did everything possible to avoid its identification with a return

to the previous period of Chilean democracy. References to Salvador Allende, the UP,
and to Chilean political history were conspicuously infrequent within the NO Franjas.

The NO Franjas did indeed reflect better production value and was much more
inclined to speak directly to address the priorities different demographic groups that
made up the Chilean electorate.

Research Questions C: The Dominant Logics - How are media logics – specifically
marketing/ advertising logics – manifested in the two opposing Franja campaigns?
What is the balance/ relationship between media and political logics within each
respective campaign?

The dominant logics manifested in NO Franjas were are primarily traced back
to media logics expressed within NO content at the point of consumption, though
bounded and subject to the overarching political logics expressed and imposed on the
production team at the points of preproduction and production. The SÍ Franjas on the
other hand relied primarily on the dominant political logics as expressed by the
military regime throughout the production process (Piñuel Raigada 1992: 25).

The configuration of the logics was rooted in the nature of the *Plebiscito* as an
electoral contest organized to take place within the context of a military dictatorship.
The SÍ campaigned for its democratic legitimation by seeking to win the support of a
majority of the Chilean electorate to confirm Augusto Pinochet and the existing
political order. The NO campaign, on the other hand, called on all Chileans to reject
Pinochet and the military regime. This act of rejection – voting NO - of and within

itself served as an affirmation of the opposition and its own democratic legitimation and confirmation of a changed political landscape. The Franjas became televisual symbolic extensions of the *Plebiscito* - a communicative construction representing the contest for democratic legitimation for both the NO and the SÍ.

This symbolic power is what the dictatorship sought to exploit in tolerating the Franja. Tolerating the NO Franjas on national TV, if even for just 15 minutes a day for 27 days, suggested a political reconciliation operating on a national scale well beyond any other pre-established reform or "opening" implemented by the military regime. The symbolic message of reconciliation was legitimate not because of the quality of the politics proposed within Franja content per se, but precisely because it was broadcast nationally on TV. The impact of broadcasting the first Franja has been described as a collective catharsis, and a cultural legitimation of the political opposition - perhaps even more than the legitimation of the dictatorship.

History & Memory

The Content Analysis demonstrates how history is a source of tension within the *mediatization of Chilean politics*. Within the Franjas, history is deployed as a thematic function of power. This historicized tension is apparent in the visual and cultural forms of resistance and political struggle that were historically linked to the UP and Allende. These tensions are not readily apparent in the NO Franjas, but they are essential to the SÍ Franja.

Within the *Comando Por El NO* significant care was to avoid reproducing the visual or ideological references to forms of struggle of the UP, with preferential treatment given to those forms that developed in Chile during the 1980s, within the context of the military regime. For example the NO+ imagery was developed as a popular political/ artistic campaign of political graffiti during the 1980s as an indirect reference to opposing Pinochet (Delgado Criado 2013: 10). The NO Franjas adapted and overlapped media and political logics, and - in doing so - introduced new symbols for Chilean democracy. The NO campaign intentionally did everything possible to avoid its identification with a return to the previous period of Chilean democracy. References to Salvador Allende, the UP, and to Chilean political history were conspicuously infrequent within the NO Franjas.

The only two moments when historical footage was used by the NO were on Day 15 "Día de las Fuerzas Armadas;" this was to invoke the Schneider doctrine calling on the Chilean electorate, including active Chilean military, to recover a time when there was a strict adherence to military discipline that respected the

constitutional order and civilian political leadership. The other moment was when the Pablo Neruda clips were broadcast.

Among the producers of the content used for the SÍ Franjas there was no motivation to differentiate enacted politics from its televisual representation. The SÍ Franjas were not intended to compel viewers to reject nor repress Chilean political history (since they had already done that), but to remind people of this history as a warning. This historical assessment was in fact exactly what the SÍ campaign focused on as the greatest threat to Chileans should they vote NO, and they consistently used archival footage from the 1970s to underscore this message. The prominent use of historical footage by the SÍ versus the near total absence of historical footage from the NO indicates the relationship of history and power. In fact, the politics of pre-1973, the last period of democratic rule in the country, was primarily referred to within the SÍ as a fundamental corruption of Chilean democracy, and a looming anti-democratic threat, should the NO campaign win the 1988 *Plebiscito*.

Many Chileans, especially on the political left, saw this entire process as a legitimation of the status quo. Arguably, they were correct. There was a remarkable consistency of political, institutional, and economic power before, during and after the transfer of presidency. Even in the Franja content there was a striking difference between consistency and difference. Many of the Franja ads used during the SÍ campaign had been recycled from earlier versions of political messaging and were already familiar to the viewing public. Even the SÍ logo and the "País Ganador" jingle had been developed and broadcast previously. These were representations of the

Plebiscito that could not be understood as distinct from the lived political reality, since there was no break or line demarcation between Chile outside and the Chile on TV, and the SÍ, and the SÍ Franjas.

The NO content was a totally new experience. This type of politics can only exist through its own representation of a lived/shared experience, but if one attempts to rationalize it, as it is represented on TV to circulate in the lived political life – it dissolves into a self-representation of a political fiction.

Finally, there is a limited and fragile relationship between functional democratic practice and mediatized democratic political culture. Furthermore, these can be decoupled, and even contradict each other. Ad-man René Saavedra suggested as much: "No hay que olvidar que la ciudadanía ha subido sus exigencias en torno a la verdad... en torno a lo que le gusta. Seamos honestos. Hoy, Chile piensa en su futuro." When politics are mediatized, truth is made the equivalent of personal preference, and looking to the future can, in fact, be the same thing as surrendering the past.

Recent student protests in Chile are evidence that perhaps, in spite of the best efforts of some in the government, the political and media elite, ideological struggle and political history retain a potency that may have already overwhelmed the fragile consensus of post-Plebiscito procedural democracy.

Conclusion

Chapter 7.
1990 to 2013: The Historical Arc Of *La Concertación*

Es mejor quedarse callado y olvidar. Es lo único que debemos hacer.
Tenemos que olvidar. Y esto no va a ocurrir abriendo casos, mandando
a la gente a la cárcel. OL-VI-DAR, esta es la palabra, y para que esto
ocurra, los dos lados tiene que olvidar y seguir trabajando.

Augusto Pinochet, 13 de septiembre, 1995[86]

Image 7.1: Pinochet and Aylwin in 1993.

Presidential Politics 1990 – 2010: Chile Learns To Forget

On March 11, 1990, a full 18 months after the magic of the *Plebiscito* electoral

victory had somewhat subsided, and three months after the *Concertación* Presidential

victory, Chilean presidential power was formally transferred from one of the most

violent dictators of Latin America, Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, to the most recognized

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[86] "It is better to remain quiet and to forget. That is the only thing we must do. We must forget. And that won't happen if we continue opening up lawsuits, sending people to jail. FOR-GET: That's the word. And for that to happen, both sides must forget and continue with their work" (Bucciferro 2012: I, and Alcazar 2014: 110).

representative of the reconstituted civilian political elite in Chile, the *Demócrata Cristiano* Patricio Aylwin Azócar. The political history of Chile between March 11, 1990 and March 11, 2010 covers the arch of *Concertación* democratic dominance.

Of course Patricio Aylwin was the official spokesperson of *la Concertación* during the 1988 *Plebiscito,* and his presidential victory is often attributed to his prominent role in the Franjas of the NO as the representative of the united opposition. Although he appeared only twice in the NO Franjas (versus his five featured appearances in the SÍ Franjas), his segments were among the longest NO segments produced, and Aylwin was the only person to have been introduced as the official voice speaking on behalf of *la Concertación* at any time during the campaign. As a consequence, Aylwin was already in a strong position to serve as presidential candidate when the NO vote defeated the Pinochetista SÍ in the October 1988 contest. After the NO had won, it became clear that Aylwin's voice and appearance were still linked to the successful NO campaign, and the propaganda developed for his subsequent presidential campaign aggressively exploited this connection.

Aylwin's prominence within the NO Franjas was no coincidence (Angell 2007: 38). He had been among the most ardent critics of the Unidad Popular (UP) government and was one of the earliest supporters of the 1973 coup d'état. He was by no means a man of the political left, and in many ways he was partially responsible for having entreated the Chilean military to overthrow the Allende government, in the first place. Ultimately, and not without a significant internal struggle, it was behind the figure of Aylwin that the majority of the opposition fell in line to unite their

opposition against Pinochet. Still, throughout the *Plebiscito, la Concertación* evolved as only "*una unidad coyuntural.*" The consolidation of *la Concertación* as a more durable coalition - not only contending, but the majoritarian political force – would only be confirmed in the years subsequent to the presidential victory of Patricio Aylwin, in December of 1989.

Chilean politics had, by early 1990, congealed into two opposing camps, more or less divided along the lines of the 1988 *Plebiscito* vote – on one side a majority of anti-Pinochet supporters supportive of *la Concertación* and vaguely representing a political center; on the other side, a minority of *Pinochetistas* clearly situated on the political right. Of course, there were other important political organizations and tendencies in Chile; yet but the configuration of two camps made up what was the bulk of the Chilean electorate that was to operate within a type of political holding pattern populated by "políticos renovados" – a political identification that became popular during the 1990s among people interested in the "democratic turn" that was taking place throughout Latin America.[87]

It was during this time that *la Concertación* initiated a period of demobilization for its popular bases of support. "Inspirados bajo el 'sacrosanto' principio de la gobernabilidad institucional, la coalición del arcoíris [*la Concertación*] contribuyó a reforzar una tecnología de políticas públicas que debilitaron los modos de

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[87] A "político renovado" was a "renovated politician," a label reserved for those who had been of one political vintage during the 1970s (usually from the left) and had reintroduced themselves to political life in the 80s and 90s, as from the center right, while still often claiming to be from the left.

acción colectiva…" (Salazar Jaque 2015).[88] *La Concertación* was seeking to establish a more representational political configuration for its bases of support to replace the position of active mobilization that had won it two electoral contests during the 1988 and 1989 campaigns. Aylwin preferred not to leverage the potential power of these bases of popular support, nor these electoral victories against Pinochet, and the still not demobilized military. Instead, Aylwin accepted the political terrain in Chile as it had been handed to him, and this political terrain remained remarkably undisturbed throughout his presidency.

The subsequent three presidencies of Chile, after Patricio Aylwin, were also elected as representatives of *la Concertación. Demócrata Cristiano* Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994 – 2000) succeeded Aylwin, in 1993. Frei Ruiz-Tagle had defeated the candidate of the right, Arturo Alessandri Besa (UDI), by over 34 points. Both of these men had played significant roles in the televised Franjas of 1988, and both were closely related to former Chilean presidents. Alessandri was the grandson of one Chilean president, and the nephew of another.

The father of Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle was Eduardo Frei Montalva, who had served as President of Chile from 1964 to 1970. An associate of Patricio Aylwin, the elder Frei had also been an ardent opponent of the UP and the principal leader of the congressional opposition to then President Salvador Allende. Similar to Aylwin, the elder Frei also became an active critic of the Pinochet regime during the early 1980s.

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[88] "…Inspired by the 'sacrosanct' principle of institutional governability, the rainbow coalition *[la Concertación]* contributed to reinforcing a technology of public policies designed to undermine all forms of collective action…" (Salazar Jaque 2015).

It is widely acknowledged in Chile that, as a consequence of his having turned his back to Pinochet, the elder Frei was assassinated in 1982, via poison injections delivered by CNI agents acting by order of the dictator. It was in reaction to the death of his father that the younger Frei entered politics as an aggressive opponent to the military regime (Bucciferro 2012: 39). Although the presidential victory of younger Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle carried with it a certain poetic justice, his presidential term has been largely understood as the continuation and expansion of the same basic policies introduced during the Aylwin presidency.

Although hard to believe, the responsibility to advocate on behalf of Pinochet also fell upon the Frei government after the aging dictator's October 1998 detention in London, and the subsequent international legal prosecution that ran until March of 2000. The Frei administration went so far as to sever ties with the UK in protest of Pinochet's detention. This episode had a profound impact on Chilean political culture, conjuring intense and conflicting sentiments across the political spectrum. Many Chileans were infuriated by the very idea of their "democratic" government defending the former tyrant from international prosecution, while others from the right demanded a more nationalistic rejection of this European incursion into Chile's internal affairs (Dorfman 2000, Angell 2007: 88-89). Pinochet's detention drama ultimately had a major impact on the 1999 presidential election, with some attributing the near defeat of *la Concertación* to the contradictory but simultaneously negative reactions generated among Chileans to this international crisis.

The next *Concertación* President of Chile after Frei was the declared socialist and former UP official Ricardo Lagos Escobar (2000 – 2006). In a second round of voting, Lagos had defeated Joaquin Lavín, an important figure from the Chilean right who had been prominently featured in the SÍ Franjas and was considered an important public intellectual of the Chilean right.

Lagos had been one of the most consistent and vocal opponents of the military regime from the beginning. As a consequence, he was forced into exile for a short period in the 1970s. Upon his return to Chile in the early 1980s Lagos became active in anti-Pinochet activities and during the mid 1980s the military government imprisoned him for his political activities. Because of his long history of struggle against the military regime, Lagos assumed a central role within the NO campaign and was also prominently featured in the televised 1988 Franjas.

In 2000 Lagos won the presidential election in the midst of the Pinochet international crisis, and again, the striking imagery and contradictory history of Chilean post-Pinochet presidentialism did not disappoint. Pinochet was released from his European detention because of his "deteriorating health" and flown back to Santiago on March 3, 2000. In a symbolic act, Pinochet was brought out from his plane in a wheel chair, and while still on the tarmac, defiantly stood up from his wheelchair in a show of strength for his supporters and the international media (Bucciferro 2012: 42). This theatrical event took place eight days before Lagos assumed the Presidency of Chile on March 11, 2000. During the presidency of Ricardo

Lagos the constitutional framework was subjected to reforms, eliminating some of the most egregious violations to procedural democracy.

In 2005 Michelle Bachelet (2006 – 2010) defeated the conservative millionaire businessman Sebastián Piñera, to succeed Lagos for the presidency of Chile. Her incredible personal history is laid out in the introduction to this project, and her story is the most compelling among the *Concertación* presidents. The first presidency of Bachelet was a time of remembering in Chile, although not of resolution, and ultimately not a time to end the impunity enjoyed by Pinochet and his cohort. Justice never found the old tyrant, and for the death of Pinochet in December 2006, the government of Bachelet presided over the formally sanctioned military funeral of the former dictator.

Situated within this biographical sketch of *Concertación* presidents, the symbolic continuity of the 1988 *Plebiscito* within the historical narrative of the 2013 presidential elections is more legible but no less shocking. The continued impunity for most of those who committed the horrific crimes against the Chilean people on behalf of the military regime was an ongoing dark mark on *la Concertación*. The prominent political and economic role of the military and Pinochet - the former dictator - still cast a large shadow on Chilean political landscape. Pinochet remained commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army until 1998; a "senator-for-life" until late 2000; and protected from accountability for his crimes against the Chilean people until his death.

The economic terrain of Chile also remained largely untouched, with the fundamental tenets of neoliberalization of the Chilean economy still dominant. The

political coalition of *la Concertación*, although representing a ruling majority for 20

years (1990-2010), dutifully maintained and expanded the neoliberal economic order

originally imposed by the dictatorship (Garretón 2013, Mayol 2013).

On the other hand, under *la Concertación,* Chilean TV followed an unexpected

course. Upon entering La Moneda, Aylwin assigned control of DINACOS to Eugenio

Tironi, a leading figure in the NO Franja technical team. Tironi recalls his role as

ushering in a media transition that would "continue serving the process of

democratization, but no longer as promoter of political change but as agents who

contribute to the stability of the system and the reconstitution of a climate of

democratic normality" (Bresnahan 2003: 43). In practical terms, this meant that the

post-Pinochet *Concertación* governments would honor the Pinochetista configuration

of dictatorial media for years to come, and self-censorship remained a central feature

of post-Pinochet *mediatization of Chilean politics.* "…Human Rights Watch charged

that progress in revising repressive [media] legislation had been so slow in large part

because 'the government has preferred to keep its political capital intact on behalf of

political objectives it considers more important" (Bresnahan 2003: 45).

The Pinochetista process of expansion and consolidation of private ownership

of TV and the rapid commercialization of university channels was almost entirely

overseen by *la Concertación* (Bresnahan 2003: 56). Within this context, private

commercial TV flourished, and "…Chilean broadcasting… [saw] the introduction

of… new private commercial television station, the growth of cable TV, and the shift

of the national television station in the direction of wider 'public' rather than

'government' control. It has also witnessed the entrance of foreign capital in the form

of Televisa, the owner of Channel 4… and Venevisión in the channel of the University

of Chile" (Fox 1993: 284). Total broadcast time of television programming exploded

"from 20,000 hours per year in 1990 to 49,000 in 1992" (Davies 1999: 158).

Lagos, although a leading member of the Socialist Party, in fact accelerated

many of these policies during his presidency. And during her first presidency of Chile,

Bachelet, also a member of the Socialist Party, never suggested reintroducing any

socialistic programs to the country, instead respected the constitutional framework and

economic order that survived a dying political minority, a minority that conquered

political power through the 1973, in violation of the previous constitution. This

institutional paradox simultaneously embodies the origin of *la Concertación,* as well

as an important source of its decline – and the ironies are striking. That was a time of

forgetting.

The political regeneration of Chilean democracy was at its core a mediated one

- mediated through television, through the tolerance of the military regime, and

mediated through the tolerance of *la Concertación* for an utterly undemocratic

configuration. There was a return of "procedural democracy" to channel political

opposition, but de facto state power was still in the hands of "una clase política de la

derecha" - and arguably remains so to this day. This period was defined as one with

Chile operating under a civilian government, yet in a perpetual balancing act between

the norms and "expectativas" of democracy, and the ever-present menacing power of

Pinochet as "commander-in-chief" the Chilean military and senator for life. *La*

Concertación was the fulcrum of this balancing act, reaffirming and retracting its tacit commitment to keep at bay the demands for "un rendimiento de cuentas" as needed to keep the arrangement stable - a collective agreement to forget (and selectively remember) on the scale of political culture.

Presidential Politics 2013: Chile Struggles to Remember

The loss of the presidency to Sebastián Piñera (his second run for the presidency), 2010 ushered in the beginning of the first civilian right-wing government in Chile since 1969, and marked the sunset for *la Concertación.* According to Piñera, he had never been a Pinochetista and was a vigorous, though not altogether pubic, adherent of the NO campaign in 1988 (Emol.com 2009). The formal dissolution of the historic *la Concertación* was announced later that year (Bucciferro 2012: 156). What this all meant is that the political consensus, the political calculus, and the political space that took shape in 1988 had run its course, and 2010 was a subordinate transition – a closing of the old and an opening of a new chapter for Chilean political history.

The rise, consolidation, decline and dissolution of *la Concertación* (1990-2013), is now a distinct historical chapter in Chilean political history. 2013 represents the initial moments for opening of a new chapter for Chilean political history that feverishly works to identify and reconcile with a crisis provoked by the now collapsing cognitive dissonance that once was a definitive feature of Chilean political culture. 2013 was the end of this unique moment in Chilean politics and political communication precisely because it was the 40th anniversary of the coup d'état, the 25th anniversary of the Franjas *and* simultaneously marked the formal demise of *la Concertación* as a viable political force in Chilean presidential politics. The convergence of these major political markers, in 2013, motivated a renewed and critically retrospective interest in the legacy and enduring consequences of the Chilean "transition to democracy" - and the influence this period in Chilean history continues

to have on the present – it represents a moment of critical reflection for Chileans more than ever. This took shape within political as well as cultural spaces.

The presidency of Piñera and the severe lack of popularity at the end of his term set the stage for the return of Bachelet while she was at the high point of her popularity. 2013 was the end of the first and only conservative government since the dictatorship, and it ended badly for Chilean conservatives. 2013 was a presidential election year with Bachelet now no longer associated with the dissolved *la Concertación* – this was the first "post-*Concertación*" presidential electoral cycle. The formation of a new political coalition developed around the second presidential candidacy of Michele Bachelet to win her a second term in office after a landslide victory in 2013. New is the fact that the Communist Party is part of the now governing Nueva Mayoria coalition.

Chile has since entered a period of sharp political struggle. In 2006 la revolución pingüina and La primavera de Chile in 2011 both had a profound impact on how politics were conducted in the country. Then of course, the student protests. The difficult time Chileans had thinking about the protests, understanding them through an historical lens that only recently had begun to come back into focus. The role of the Chilean Communist Party in the student protests was also significant.

Still, as Pablo Larraín's 2012 film *NO* to a certain degree demonstrates, retiring the nightmare of the military regime to the past involved externalizing the contradiction of Pinochet enduring into the Chilean present - remembering how democracy returned to Chile implies forgetting. Even in 2013, Larraín's too-good-to-

be-true, story-book quality of the *"rainbow that brought down a dictatorship"*

narrative remained extremely evocative, politically loaded, and culturally relevant,

while it underscores how many of the issues that defined the 1988 *Plebiscito* remain

close to the surface of Chilean daily life.

Indeed, Chileans retain a curious sensitivity about the Pinochet regime and the

issues it conjures, so much so that a set of cultural/ political norms has emerged to

help people navigate daily life in a country that only a short time ago was deeply

divided under a violent military dictatorship. The following are examples of residual

cultural norms that continue to help soothe the unresolved contradictions of the

Pinochet dictatorship that persist in the present – these are cultural norms that are part

of Chilean political culture and embody a process I have identified as the

mediatization of Chilean politics rooted in the 1988 Franjas.

The Impossible-To-Find Franjas.

The hard work of remembering after 17 years of violent repression implicitly

involves a significant amount of forgetting. One striking example of this process of

forgetting, in order to remember, relates to the story of how difficult it was for me to

secure a full set of Franjas for use, as a data set, for my research. As I described in

Chapter 5, it took me the better part of four years to secure a complete set of the 1988

Franjas. Throughout my research, a standard question of mine was how could it be

that such an important cultural artifact in Chilean political history could be so difficult

to find? Why was it the case that there did not exist (to my knowledge) a readily

accessible full set of Franjas publically available anywhere in Chile, nor in the world

for that matter? Answers varied, but they all referred back to the several key points.

While doing my field work in the audiovisual archives at the Museo de la

Memoria y de los Derechos Humanos in Santiago, the director of A/V archive José

Manuel Rodriguez Leal explained that there existed a 2001 copyright law instituted

during the Frei Presidency which requires that all A/V material broadcast in Chile be

duplicated and submitted for preservation in the Archivo Nacional de Chile, regardless

of the copyright status. Most interestingly, as it was explained to me, this law does not

apply retroactively, and A/V material developed during the military regime is

therefore protected under Chilean copyright law. Therefore, all media produced during

the military regime must include authorization from a formal copyright holder, or by

the original producer of the material, before it can be allowed to circulate, publically,

in the public domain, in this case, the A/V archive of El Museo de la Memoria or in

the A/V collection at the Biblioteca Nacional.

The SÍ franjas remain private copyrighted material, and not one of the original

participants in the development of the SÍ Franjas wants to take control of the copyright

and authorize their circulation within Chile. Precisely because of this, more than one

person suggested that the fact that I was an outsider from a North American university

was a positive factor that helped me secure the only set. The fact that it was Amira

Arratia Fernandez who got me the set was even more significant.

Consequently, I have multiple Franja-related future projects that I will have to

attend to in order to ensure that these Franjas circulate freely. This will settle a debt

with many friends and collaborators in Chile. It is entirely possible that the set I have might very well be the only complete set publicly available in the world.

No Una Dictadura… Mejor Dicho, Un "Régimen Militar."

While in Santiago, my research led me to several of the studios of major Chilean TV stations. At our first meeting in Santiago, Tatiana Lorca of the national television station Chilevisión made me aware of cultural/ political norms in Chilean professional communication when she suggested that I change the language used in my introductory material to present my field research to Chilean research subjects. I had developed a formal letter on UCSD letterhead introducing myself as a graduate researcher from San Diego and briefly described my project before I requested a meeting with people. (Appendix C). In this letter I also invited potential subjects to visit my personal webpage, where I had uploaded a more detailed description of my scholarship and research intentions. Throughout the original versions of my introductory letter, as well as on my website, I referred to the Pinochet's government as a "military dictatorship," and I often referred to Pinochet as a dictator.

Ms. Lorca explained to me that if I hoped to interact with people that worked in her profession, my choice of words would be non-starter. She went on to suggest that I change "military dictatorship" for "military government" and instead of referring to Pinochet as a "dictator," describe him as "head of the military government." She also included a series of other editing suggestions that related to Chilean "professional" norms. She explained that there where many economically and

politically powerful people who would resist my work because they did not want their past support for Pinochet and the SÍ campaign Franjas to be made public, in spite of the fact that in 1988 their support had been very public.

A Renewed Interest In This Period Of Political History.

While the Chilean political class was preparing for the 2013 presidential elections, many were also getting ready to mark the 40th anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état and the 25th anniversary of the 1988 *Plebiscito*. Chileans still struggle to remember, and it has been hard work. When so much of political struggle is taking place in the space of political culture, then history and memory become a contested space (Valdés 1988: 41).

The reemergence of versions of the symbols used by the NO Franjas in 1988, having been appropriated by presidential candidates of the right, is evidence of decontextualization.

> Ironically, Piñera did so by appropriating the language, aesthetics, and message of the Coalition for his own campaign when he saw that Frei had gone in a completely different direction with an intellectual, minimalist campaign. The 2010 campaign song 'Súmate al cambio' ('Join in the change') included the refrain 'Porque digan lo que digan' ('Because say what they may') echoing the opening lines of the jingle, 'La alegría ya viene' (Sánchez). Piñera's rainbow colored star brightened street corners, plazas, and downtown avenues, reminiscent of the 'No' emblem, which is ingrained in the collective memory as the symbol of a new dawn for Chile. (Cronovich 2013: 17)

More recently, Evelyn Matthei also mobilized *Plebiscito* symbolism for her presidential campaign.

Image 7.2: 1988 Logos Reemerge Among the Chilean Right.

The 1988 *Plebiscito* retains a powerful mystique, both within Chilean national politics and international perceptions about the country. An historical narrative has since emerged to solidify a democratic transition myth that is evocative, seductive, and inherently politically loaded.

Finally, there is 2013, understood as the final dissolution of *la Concertación.* As the old political class diminishes, the emergence (or re-emergence in some cases, such as the massive student protests) of a distinct and still-fluid balance of power has not stabilized within a Chile that is still coming to grips with its own history. For some people, it is the first time in 40 years they have to contend with the specters of the past. What has happened in Chile since the 2013 presidential elections points to the destabilized character of current Chilean politics, and the "desprestigio" suffered by the political class, broadly speaking, demonstrated by the collapse and general

rejection of many of the *Concertación* core beliefs. There is still no telling in which

direction this may track.

"Reconstituimos Las Historias Y Testimonios Silenciados…"

Tatiana Lorca was clearly enthusiastic about my project, and empathized with my struggle to collect audio-visual material from that period. She had dedicated the last five years of her life to reconstructing Chilean memories that had been disarticulated during the dictatorship. She had been working at Chilevisión as the lead investigator and co-producer for the primetime program "Chile, Las Imágenes Prohibidas," an important Chilevisión documentary miniseries released in August of 2013. She generously met with me on three separate occasions, and on her own impulse, arranged a meeting with her boss Claudio Marchant, *Director Audiovisual* of the miniseries, former director of the clandestine news program *Teleanálisis*, and participant in the development of the televised Franjas used for the NO campaign of 1988.

When the three of us met at the offices of ChileVisión, both Claudio and Tatiana underscored that it was essential that I change my language immediately or else I might find myself confronted with the same problems they had confronted during the previous four years when they had been working on the miniseries.

"Chile, Las Imágenes Prohibidas" consisted of four 1.5-hour episodes broadcast to mark the 40th anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état.[89] The series focused on collecting and broadcasting the most compelling audio-visual material that had been censored from Chilean TV during the military dictatorship. The series was one of the

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[89] I strongly suggest to readers of this project that you watch this miniseries. It focuses on that part of Chilean political life that was suppressed so that "la alegría" could live. "Chile, Las Imágenes Prohibidas" is available online for free. I have provided the link to the first installment in the text below the image.

highest rated programs of 2013, and according to Claudio and Tatiana, some political

circles in Santiago at least partially linked the landside victory of Michelle Bachelet in

December of 2013 to the August 2013 premiere of the series (Santiago 2015

interviews).

Image 7.3: "Chile: Las Imágenes Prohibidas, 40 Años Después."
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PIsmf8FeaZU>

The first episode of "Chile, Las Imágenes Prohibidas" opens with a voice-over

by Benjamín Vicuña and a dramatic visual montage covering 17 years of censored

images:

> 40 años pasaron desde el golpe militar, y aún, hay mucho que no
> sabemos. Historias y testimonios silenciados.
> Imágenes que durante los 17 años de la dictadura, estuvieron prohibidas
> en la televisión y que tras 23 años de democracia, aún siguen
> olvidadas… Un archivo inédito que rescatamos del olvido, y que por
> primera vez, sale a la luz.

Reconstituimos las historias de quienes fotografiaron y filmaron el duro drama de esos años, y también, la de quiénes protagonizaron esos días dolorosos.
Son imágenes que recorrieron el mundo, pero que en Chile fueron censuradas.
Encontramos a las personas tras señas, y desde hoy, revivimos su memoria… La fuerza y su crudeza aun sorprende.
A la luz de las imágenes que logramos rescatar, recordamos, los tormentosos años tras el golpe de estado… Son un registro y fragmentadas historias de vida, amor, y muerte, de Chilenos anónimos, que revelan fielmente lo que aquí ocurrió… Aquí comienza Chile, las imágenes prohibidas.
("Chile, Las Imágenes Prohibidas")

Literally, 40 years in the making, this was the first nationally televised production of its kind in Chile. When I asked Tatiana and Claudio how and why they were permitted to develop a project such as this, at this particular moment, they explained that when production first started on the series in 2010, there was a convergence of historical and political forces that destabilized Chilean norms of political culture and the media status quo just enough for their project to be approved.

In 2010 much of the Chilean political class was preparing for 2013 to mark the 40th anniversary of the 1973 coup d'état and the 25th anniversary of the 1988 *Plebiscito*. Executives at Chilevisión were already looking to intervene in the coming commemorations with the production of some form of related programming. Moreover, the January 2010 presidential victory of Sebastián Piñera pointed to the collapse of *La Concertación*, thereby disrupting the existing political landscape that had grown around the power of *La Concertación* since having won the presidency in 1990. Most interestingly, Claudio and Tatiana offered details about how in 2010 Chilevisión had just been acquired by Turner Broadcasting Latin America, which is

owned by Time Warner. The subsequent executive shakeup within Chilevisión was

interpreted as the key element that allowed for the green lighting of "Chile, Las

Imágenes Prohibidas." Under new North American ownership there was less editorial

deference to political norms and therefore an openness to deal with these issues head

on.[90] This was done in a manner that could never have been imagined just a year

before, while Chilevisión - still owned by the conservative President-elect Sebastián

Piñera and therefore operated in close proximity to the right wing Renovación

Nacional party.

The central theme of the miniseries is recovery and diffusion of important

video content censored within Chile, but that had been broadcast internationally to

expose the violence of the Pinochet regime. "Chile, Las Imágenes Prohibidas" gathers

this video content and narrates it by highlighting the most impactful scenes; often by

interviewing the original people in the scene and having them re-create the experience.

Commemorations, Movies & Research.

2013 was a convergence of political and historical symbolism, and the

disruption of a political consensus established in 1988 and that had runs it course.

Historical and political tensions converged in 2013 with dual commemoration of the

40th anniversary of the September 11, 1973 coup d'état and the 25th anniversary of

the 1988 *Plebiscito,* the 2013 presidential elections, and the first post-*Concertación*

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[90] I found this particular point very interesting and ironic, since throughout Latin America foreign
ownership of national media in general, and North American ownership in particular, has been
understood as generally contributing to censorship and/or the proliferation of frivolous content. In this
particular case the opposite is true. This clearly merits more research.

elections. Perhaps the popularity of the miniseries suggests that there is a larger shift-taking place in Chile. Maybe the cultural/ political norms that Tatiana had warned me about were being undermined? Pinochet had been dead for four years after all, since 2006.

While I was undertaking my field research in 2014 and 2015, throughout Santiago I felt an increasingly palpable sense that it was time to stop corralling the dictator's skeletons to stay within the closet. There were elections, commemorations, movies and research that tapped into the events of 1973 and 1988 - for 40th, 25th, the end of the military dictatorship and the end of *La Concertación*. Clearly, this marked the beginning of a new chapter of Chilean political history.

In 2010 Santiago celebrated the inauguration of the "Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos."

The 2012 film *NO* resurrected the narrative of how *"A Rainbow Brought Down A Dictatorship,"* but it did not originate there. This romantic notion points to the work of Chilean writer Antonio Skármeta, author of the 2011 novel Los Días Del Arcoíris and the play El Plebiscito – both stories used as the basis for the 2012 film *NO*. Both works sought to tell the story of the 1988 *Plebiscito*.

In 2013 the exhumation of Pablo Neruda to confirm his assassination captured the attention of people around the world.

Then in 2014 the movie "Allende en su laberinto" was released, but not before a free pre-screening of the film was offered at a small theatre located within the Museo de La Moneda, under the plaza in front of the famous presidential palace a few steps

away from where Allende was killed after the 1973 bombing of the palace by the

Chilean Air Force.

At times it was surreal how discursive representations of the dictatorship

circulate so freely in Chilean public culture, rubbing up against enduring institutional

and political residual manifestations of the dictatorship. Working to reconstruct

memory, or to erase memory, this was the evidence of the contested space of memory

and history as a contested space in Chilean political culture.

Mediatization: A Theoretical & Historical Process

The *mediatization of Chilean politics* provides a theoretical framework for better understanding the role and relative impact of the Chilean *Franja de Propaganda Electoral* in securing the NO victory, but also the nature of the shift political culture that began in 1988 and has endured for decades after the *Plebiscito*.

It is also an historical process linked to political ascendancy of television in Chile. Although the 1988 *Plebiscito* and the televised Franjas are historical events situated in the political context of the late 1980s and early 1990s, these events and the mediatization of politics that took place within this period point to a more expansive qualitative change in the meaning and enactment of democracy, within which mediatized politics (primarily through television) became politically ascendant. As suggested by Arriagada and Navia:

> …la Campaña por el NO reflejó el poder de la televisión el los procesos políticos, principalmente, al ser una herramienta que motivó la participación política de millones de chilenos en dicho plebiscito. De allí en adelante, la televisión se consolidó como el principal medio de comunicación a través del cual políticos y ciudadanos se relacionan en democracia.
> Precisamente porque la recuperación democrática se produjo a fines de los 80, cuando la televisión se consolidaba como el principal medio de comunicación en Chile, la historia de la democracia post Pinochet está profundamente ligada a la televisión. Las campañas políticas se realizan esencialmente por televisión. Los gobiernos se comunican con los electores y con la opinión pública en general a través de la televisión. Los partidos buscan promover sus ideales y visiones de país a través de la televisión, cuya masiva penetración ha consolidado a esa industria como una herramienta esencial del proceso de consolidación democrática en Chile. (11)

The Chilean case of the Franjas broadcast on TV was an historical fact, unique to Chile, but a case of mediatization that has theoretical implications, especially in a hyper-mediated political environment.

I found evidence to suggest that democratic norms in post-Pinochet Chile buttress normative notions of media professionalization and modernization, overlap, and in some cases are considered the equivalent of normative notions of political professionalization and modernization, and that these implicitly include self-censorship, renunciation of principles, political demobilization, decline of collective organization, etc. (Arriagada and Navia 2011: 11, Valdés 1988: 10, 59). Crofts Wiley described this fusion as such: "The pragmatic goal of winning the plebiscite led to a second key change in the logics of discursive production: a shift to what analysts (and opposition campaign strategists) called a 'professionalization' or ' modernization' of Chilean politics. Professionalization meant 'defining objectives and then utilizing specialized mechanisms to obtain results efficiently and effectively'… instead of repeating traditional political party stances and strategies. Professionalization implied handing over significant decision-making power to the *técnicos*… - sociologists, psychologists, political marketing consultants, campaign designers, audience analysts and television production teams" (678). This represents an historical, political, non-commercial rationalization of the reconfiguration of political logic and media logic within the process of Chilean political communication. Sunkel and Geoffroy propose the same argument articulated from the perspective of Chilean media: "En relación a la concentración económica de los medios de comunicación, la política asumida por

los gobiernos de transición ha operado bajo el supuesto de que el desarrollo mismo de la industria garantizará la libertad de expresión y el pluralismo. En otras palabras, que el Mercado sería el agente encargado de garantizar la libertad de expresión. …" (12).

What I found to be important about mediatization research is that there is indeed an history that needs to be considered, and that the situatedness of politics within a given historical moment demonstrates how political struggle remains a social process, and representations of these processes were only that, representations or misrepresentations of other processes. In other words, the foundations for the elaboration and enactment of politics were still primarily social in form, i.e. principles, political parties, struggle, mobilization, armies, etc. These are still the spaces through which politics are enacted, though mediatization can change the way people understand and react and engage, politically.

This change is historically unique to mediatization. Pre-mediatization formats or platforms used for political representation were neither developed enough, nor was the penetration wide enough, to attain or sustain this operational threshold. Within current media-saturated environments, what is a social process might not necessarily be understood as a social process through its representation, thereby marking the political ascendancy of the medium – the "medium becomes the message." The ubiquitous sustainability and massification of this fictive or disembodied political struggle is ultimately a characteristic of neoliberalism.

Future research on the mediatization of politics,

Latin American television history and policy.

This analysis was originally envisioned as forming part of a larger comparative

project, through which I sought to track the mediatization of politics and the political

ascendancy of television in Latin America, and compare the lasting consequences of

this ascendency on the enactment of politics in at least two different countries -

Venezuela and Chile, during the late 1980s and 1990s - and events which offer a

unique window into the relationship between a televised political communication and

political transition and how these may point to a co-evolution of a metabolic

relationship between political and media systems. What are the implications of the

mediatization of politics on political culture? In 1999 Mazzoleni and Schulz argued

for the need against any presumptive disqualification of democratic mediatization in

their article "Mediatization" of Politics: A Challenge for Democracy?:

> The catchwords of the debate about media power triggered
> especially in European political communication scholarship by such
> cases — "videocracy," "démocratie médiatique," and even "coup d'état
> médiatique" — all are symbolic depictions of the feared consummation
> of improper developments in the relationship of media and politics. In its
> concrete declension, a media-driven democratic system is thought to
> cause the decline of the model of political organization born with the
> liberal state, as the political parties lose their links with the social
> domains of which they have been the mirrors and with the interests the
> parties traditionally have represented…
> Critics argue that the media's presentation of politics in the
> United States, as well as in many other countries—as "show-biz" based
> on battles of images, conflicts between characters, polls and marketing,
> all typical frenzies of a journalism that is increasingly commercial in its
> outlook — has diminished, if not supplanted altogether, debate about
> ideas, ideals, issues, and people's vital interests and has debased voters
> by treating them not as citizens but rather as passive 'consumers' of
> mediated politics… Traditional democratic institutions of representation
> will be undermined or made irrelevant by direct, instant electronic
> communication between voters and officials; the new media will

fragment the electorate, eroding the traditional social and political bonds that have united the polity; political parties will lose their function as cultural structures mediating between the people and the government; shrewd, unprincipled politicians will find it easier than before to manipulate public opinion and build consensus by using new information technologies and resources; and the new media can facilitate the spread of populist attitudes and opinions…

In short, critics' regard conventional mass communication and new communication technologies as sharing what could be described as a "mutagenic" impact on politics, that is, the ability to change politics and political action into something quite different from what traditionally has been embodied in the tenets of liberal democracy… Without depreciating the validity of the critical, somewhat apocalyptic positions of those who see the media as one of the most crucial factors in the crisis of politics and political leadership in postmodern democracies, it is our argument here that the increasing intrusion of the media in the political process is not necessarily synonymous with a media "takeover" of political institutions (governments, parties, leaders, movements). Moreover, media intrusion cannot be assumed as a global phenomenon because there are very significant differences between countries, in this respect. Recent changes that have occurred in the political arenas around the world cannot be explained as reflecting some common pattern of "media-driven democracy." Instead, the concept of "mediatization" of politics is a more sensible tool for addressing the question of whether the media complex endangers the functioning of the democratic process. (248)

This summary criticism, though descriptively cogent and compelling, I think

misses the point. In other words, the 1988 Franjas remain important today not because

they influenced individual Chileans to vote one way or the other. The Franjas remain

important because as an *artifact of Chilean political culture* they initiated the

mediatization of Chilean politics and forever changed the meaning of Chilean

democracy to include the political economic remnants of a Pinochetista regime. Thus,

it is not so much of whether the dire critique from Mazzoleni and Schulz this is true or

not. Indeed, it has already come to pass, observable in the rise of Trumpism in the

United States. Perhaps the more important question is how broader forms of political power remain strikingly stable and increasingly concentrated in the hands governing elites.

Mediatization makes this process more visible as a focus of research. "The mass media are one of the most striking developments of modern Latin America. The spread of television… from experimental hobbies of small urban elites to the mass coverage of today rivals and surpasses the phenomena of urban growth and industrialization in terms of magnitude and speed of change. Within a generation after their introductions, radio and later television were ubiquitous, revolutionizing the way people got information and news, spent their leisure time, and consumed. The electronic media transformed the way information circulated about political leaders, parties and programs; how public opinion formed; political identities emerged; and elections were conducted." (Fox 1993: 4).

Furthermore, we again see the notion that the mediatization of politics is a process that transcends national boundaries and thereby presumes operation at a regional and international level. Within a single instance of the mediatization of politics, we may identify logics operating in a national and/or instrumental dimension, and we may further identify an increasingly dominant supra national normative and market logic more closely aligned to neoliberal doctrine and market fundamentalism operating at the regional level in Latin America.

While it is true that the media were impacted by these changes, it was not a substantive impact when looked at from a regional scale. Neoliberalism at the national

level (in Chile, Venezuela & most of Latin America for that matter) only removed the last obstacles to achieve a level of mediatization of politics that would have been impossible before the 1980s. So, in other words, my focus is the political ascendancy of TV, and neoliberalism (including the changes to the nation-state) was the context that helped realize this ascendancy.

During the late 1980s and the 1990s Latin American military dictatorships "were dropping like flies." Throughout the region, without exception, within all of these transitions the media played an historically unique central role. The historical placement of television was what can be described as the political ascendancy of Latin American TV.

The historical period of this investigation between the late 1980s and early 1990s is significant for Latin American television because this media system matured and was consolidated regionally as much as nationally. Across the region, the number of TV receiver sets increased nearly 500% within two decades, from approximately 16 million in 1970 to approximately 75 million in 1990.

This expansion had television achieve nearly 50% household penetration throughout Latin America (Graph 7.1). This spectacular regional expansion of TV was realized parallel to a stunning expansion of procedural democratic governance across the region (see Appendix H). From 1980 to 1990, voter rolls were expanded across Latin America to include nearly half of the population (Graph 7.1).

Graph 7.1: Population Growth & Electoral Rolls, 1950 to 2005.

Latin American Population Growth & Electoral Rolls, 1950 to 2005.

Persons in millions.

SOURCES: ITU, UNESCO, WDI, IDEA.
* Excludes voter rolls of non-procedural democracies, i.e. military dictatorships, colonies, and the socialist republic of Cuba.

The mediatization of politics understood as a political intervention, a non-social/human space that generates political frameworks within which the public then enacts politics. This, in its institutional form, can be observed as a theoretical and historical process to restrain politics, as was the case in Chile (McChesney 1999: 112), but can also be on occasion be a subversive process, such as with the rise of Chavismo in Venezuela. I am convinced that these are characteristics of neoliberal political culture, and they represent the cultural core of procedural democracies under neoliberalism. Indeed, the *mediatization of Chilean politics* understood as neoliberal fiction was always the subtext of my theoretical framework.

I believe these characteristics were observable within more recent movements. Not to say that it was planned, but the 2012 release of the film "NO" coincided with the Arab Spring, and other so-called social media "revolutions," to mutually reinforce the myth of a mediatized democratizing struggle. Genaro Arriagada, the lead director of the real *Franjas* of 1988, bemoaned how "he has been in demand ever since [the story of the *Plebiscito* was released] as an adviser to societies trying to effect a peaceful transition to democracy from dictatorship, first in Latin America and then in Arab countries" (Rother 2013).

The presumption that the "free-flow" of political information is inherently democratic is strikingly similar to the presumably intrinsic democratizing qualities ascribed to social media during the early days of what became known as the Arab Spring, "Yo Soy 132," and Occupy Wall Street. Since 1994, the EZLN was widely

regarded as having perfected a "new" form of media-centric politics, to advance

revolutionary change in Mexico. Narratives used to describe the rise of Anti-

Globalization struggles after Seattle in 1999, and even the "Tea Party" and

contemporary "Trumpism" on the right, have also contributed to the mystic of the

mediatization of politics.

I am not arguing that TV displaces what I believe is the only material source of

political power - that of the people in motion. But neoliberal procedural democracy

depends largely on large numers of people NOT in motion. As the political power of

the people remains latent, and the traditions and ceremonial pomp of bourgeois

neoliberal democracy usually wins the day, by convincing the people that they are

participants in a democratic process. As long as large numers remain media-consumer-

citizens, this is the new normal that arguably came into being in the late 1980s, not

just in Chile and Latin America, but also across the globe.

To historicize mediatization and its relationship to neoliberalism, one marker is

of the political ascendancy of television. I situate my argument more along the lines of

identification of mediatization of politics through TV as a technology of capitalist and

neoliberal power, saturated with an ideological based, market fundamentalism. This

comes to a climax in the late 1980s, so that people learn that modern politics is

consumed through the media, and political engagment becomes a commodity with

profit margins, and yield being, so-called, democratic representation. As this historical

and theoretical emerges and evolves, it refines the techniques to alter and manipulate

the evocative elements of political struggle while protecting and even expanding current institutional forms and existing political power.

Yet, oppression and inequality are intrinsically unstable and unsustainable. TV disrupts bourgeois neoliberal calculations - TV adds an "X" factor that can very rapidly change the political landscape, and send it off into different unexpected directions. Venezuela (among others) proves that it can be durable, but is largely unstable. As I continue this line of research, it has the potential to point to other utterly unexpected, hyper-mediated (and mostly not-so-durable) movements for political change (tea-party, "Arab spring", Yo soy, occupy, Zapatismo, etc.).

Marx described a moment in the development of capital, when all that is solid dissolves into the air. Perhaps understanding the mediatization of politics as both a theoretical and historical construction demonstrates this dissolution, as a process by which the representation of a political moment, begins to displace the lived experience of that same moment. The cultural artifact becomes more real, and relevant, than the historical fact, and lived experience.

Appendices

Appendix A – Logics Map

Dominant Political Logics in Plebiscito

Military Regime
- Gatopardismo - Above PP
- Have Plebiscito run its course - Above PP
- Personal attacks on NO Comando - Above PP

The SÍ Street Campaign

The SÍ Franja Campaign

Content
- Longest Segment produced - Pinochet Habla - 8m 3s - Above PP
- Highest US - 9/25 seg - FPMR attack on NO, Day 26. Random testimonies. - Above PP
- Lowest # segments by Franja day - Day 7, 09/11 special - PP
- General intensity of attacks on NO anchored entire campaign - PP
- Failed to anchor campaign around a musical score - PP
- Much more dependent on political substance than artistic talent - PP

Segment Tallies
- 56s Average Segment Runtime (-RS) - PP

Formatting
- RS/SE formatting was what gave order to the content, structured by political content and intention - PP

Franja Goals & Objectives
- Dissuade votes for the NO - PP
- Win More SÍ Votes - PP

Production
- Logic Behind 1st Comando Structure - Above PP
- Censorship of NO Day 8 - Above PP
- Low # Segment Production (267) - PP
- Original Content Runtime 4h (63% of total) - PP

Franja Goals & Objectives
- Win More NO Votes - PP
- Dissuade SÍ votes - PP

La Concertación
- Peaceful Transition to Civilian Governance - Above PP

The NO Street Campaign

The NO Franja Campaign

Production
Segment Tallies
- Original Content Runtime 4h 10m (70% of total) - PP
- High # Segment Production (312) - PP
- 49s Average Segment Runtime (-RS) - PP

Formatting
- Overall preference for US - PP

Post Production
- Highest US - 7/17 seg - Pablo Neruda 15th Anniversary, Day 19. Mostly random testimonies. Post PP

Content
- Highest RS - 40 - "Voting Boleta" - Voter Education - PP
- Subdued response to Day 8 censorship. - PP

Dominant Media Logics Plebiscito

The SÍ Franja Campaign
- High # Av. Daily Segments Broadcast (20 & 542 total) - Post PP
- Highest RS - 76 - "Un País Ganador" - Fluff - Post PP

Segment Tallies

Content
- Short bursts of random positivity - Post PP:

Theme
- Self-censorship of SÍ Day 9 - PP

Formatting
- 39s Average Segment Runtime (+RS) - Post PP
- Overall preference for RS - Post PP
- Logic Behind 2nd Comado Structure - Above PP

Franja Goals & Objectives
- Democratic Legitimation of Pinochet - PP

The NO Franja Campaign

Formatting
- Logic Behind Comando Structure - Above PP
- More about formatting than RS/SE/US, what guided viewer through campaign was Barbados and trust in him, a more cultural formatting than structural.

Content
- Longest Segment - Niño Paulo - 4m 17s - Post PP
- Lowest # segments (14) by Franja day - Day 3, 09/07, Random - Post PP
- Positive content was longer and delivered in multiple formats - PP
- "Alegria Ya Viene" jingle and video anchored entire campaign - PP
- Much more artistically inclined & dependent on the talent than on political substance - PP

Theme
- Low # Av. Daily Segments Broadcast (17 & 464 total) - PP
- 49s Average Segment Runtime (+RS) - Post PP
- Daily segment numerical range - stable/rhythmic - Post PP
- Highest # segments (23) by Franja day - Day 29, end of campaign special - PP

Segment Tallies

Franja Goals & Objectives
- Help NO supporters overcome fears of voting
- Assure SÍ supporters there is no threat from Concertación

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Appendix B – Chilean Franja Electoral Coding Scheme.

v. 10132015

Coding Scheme at the Level of Individual Franja Segment:

Coder: H. Simón   Campaign: NO _____ - SÍ _____   Date of Broadcast: _____

Title of Segment: _____

Segment: _____ of _____   Unique Segment: _____ Yes _____ No   Series: _____ Yes ___ No

Data Set & Subject (define).

- 10:45 pm or 11:00 pm (weekdays) /////// 11:30 am or 11:45 am (weekends).
- Elapsed time in minutes/seconds: _____/_____
- Location: _____ Santiago.   _____Other.   _____ Indiscernible.
- Gender of Subjects: _____ Female. _____ Male. _____ Indiscernible.
- Additional Dates Broadcast: _____
- _____
- Total Times Broadcast: _____

Categories of Segments:

1. Greeting or Signoff. Opening and closing commentary by campaign spokesperson/ anchor.
2. Jingle, theme song, recurring campaign musical transition/ opening/ closing.
3. Jingle, theme song, recurring campaign musical montage (full length segment).
4. Transitional/ opening/ closing commentary by campaign spokesperson or voice over between narratives.
5. Musical/ cultural presentation *only.*
6. Video montage (no music).
7. Detailed Journalistic Report, includes analysis of some specific issue.
8. Testimonials *not an interview*. A composed personal statement from an individual with subject *looking directly into the camera.*
9. Vox Pop. Interview *not looking directly into the camera.*
10. Motivational spots incorporating humor, fictional, etc. *Identify content – i.e. humor spot, dramatic spot, etc.*
    - i. *humor spot   -*   _____   _____
    - ii. *dramatic spot -*   _____   _____
    - iii. *_____ spot -*   _____   _____
11. Overt attack on opposing campaign.
    - a. *Identify if attack is against campaign _____ broadly speaking or the _____ opposing Franja.*
    - b. *Copy/ parody of opposing Franja/ campaign? _____*
12. Revision of previously broadcast segment.
13. Copy of opposing Franja style/ format.

14. News report.
15. Voter Education.
16. Commentary: _____ Anchor. _____ Guest. _____Spokesperson. Name: _____

_____

Manifest Subject & Thematic Keywords/ Images - Number of Instances:

1) 1a. Life. / _____ . 1b. Death. / _____ . 1c. Order/Security. / _____ . 1d. Chaos. / _____ .

2) 2a. Peace. / _____ .   2a. Violence/ Threat of. / _____ .

3) 3a. Happiness/ Hope. _____ .   3b. Fear/ Pain. / _____ .

4) 4a. Democracy. / _____ .   4b. Dictatorship. / _____ .

5) 5a. Freedom/ Liberty. / _____ .   5b. Censorship/ Repression. / _____ .

6) 6a. Human Rights. / _____ .   6b. Torture. / _____ .

7) 7a. Prosperity/ Economic growth. / _____ .

7b. Poverty/ Econ. Instability. / _____ .

7c. Employment. / _____ .

7d. Unemployment. / _____ .

7e. Salaries. / _____ .

7f. Housing. / _____ .

8) 8a. Political Change/ Diversity. / _____ .   8b. Status Quo/ 1 Candidate. / _____ .

9) 9a. Justice. / _____ .   9b. Impunity/ Intransigence. / _____ .

10) 10a. Tolerance. / _____ .   10b. Intolerance. / _____ .

11) 11a. Faith/ Religion. / _____ .   11b. Lack of Faith/ Godlessness. / _____ .

12) 12a. Health/ Healthcare. / _____ .   12b. Poor Health/ No Healthcare. / _____.

13) 13a. Education. / _____ .   13b. Lack of Education. / _____ .

14) 14a. Ref. Chilean future. / _____ . 14b. Chilean present. / _____ . 14c. Chilean past. / _____ .

15) 15a. Dignity/ Respect. / _____ .   15b. Shame. / _____ .

16) 16a. Honesty/ Truth/ Commitment. / _____ .

16b. Dishonesty/ Lies. / _____ .

16c. Transparency. / _____ .

16d. Opacity. / _____ .

17) 17a. Individual/ Property Rights. / _____ .   17b. State Power/ Bureaucracy. / _____ .

18) 18a. Women's Rights. / _____ .   18b. Women's Exploitation/ Repression. / _____ .

19) 19a. Chile under Allende. / _____ .

19b. Direct Reference to/ Image of Allende. / _____ .

19c. Indirect Reference to Allende. / _____ .

20) 20a. Chile under Pinochet. / _____ .

20b. Direct Reference to/ Image of Pinochet. / _____ .

20b. Indirect Reference to Pinochet. / _____ .

21) 21a. Refer. to Military/ Gov. Junta. / _____ .   21b. War. / _____ .

22) 22a. Ref. to Capitalism/ Lib. Market Econ. / _____ .

22b. Ref. to Socialism, Marxism, Communism. / _____ .

22c. Critique of Political Systems. / _____ .

23) 23a. Ref to "majority of Chileans". / _____ . 23b. Family. / _____ . 23c. Children. / _____ .

24) 24a. Voting/ Elections. / _____ .   24b. Protests/ Rallies. / _____ .

25) 25a. "NO". / _____ . 25b. Other NO Campaign Slogan/ _____ .

26) 26a. "SÍ". / _____ .   26b. Other SÍ Campaign Slogan/ _____ .

27) Key Images: _____ .

28) Other. / _____ . / _____ .

General Narrative Description & Notes Not Coded: _____

_____

_____

Time Frame of Segment: 1) _____ Past.   2) _____ Present.   3) _____ Future.   4) _____ Unclear.

Dominant Tone: 1) _____ Negative. 2) _____ Positive. 3) _____ Neutral.

Visual Coding.
1) ____ Happy images.   2) ____ Images of real violence.   3) ____ Portrayal of violence.
4) ____ Protest images.   5) ____ Individual portrayals.   6) ____ Group portrayals.
7) ____ Indiscernible/ Generalized Campaign Images.

Audio Coding.
1) ____ Happy Sounds.   2) ____ Scary/ Sad Sounds. 3) ____ Neutral   4) Other: _____.

Different People Appearing On Camera:

1)   Generic Young Man: _____ .

2)   Generic Young Woman: _____ .

3)   Generic Woman: _____ .

4)   Generic Man: _____ .

5)   Generic Housewife: _____ .

6)   Generic Professional: _____ .

7)   Generic "Empresario":   _____ .

8)   Generic Laborer: _____ .

9)   Generic Child: _____ .

10) Generic Soldier: _____ .

11) Generic Senior: _____ .

12) Generic Family: _____ .

13) Generic Group of Children: _____ .

14) Generic Mother & Child: _____ .

15) Generic Father & Child: _____ .

16) Generic Couple: _____ .

17) Generic Crowd: _____ .

18) Landscape (no people):   _____ .

19) Heavy Equipment (no people): _____ .

20) Mimes: _____ .

21) Military Official: _____ .

22) Politician/ Ministers: _____ .

23) Media/Cultural Personality: _____ .

24) Sports Personality: _____ .

25) Campaign Anchor: _____ .

26) Campaign Spokesperson: _____ .

27) Labor Union Rep.:   _____ .

28) Other: _____ .

Coding Scheme at the Level of 15-minute Franja:

Date: _____ . Day of Campaign: _____ . Campaign broadcast first: NO /// SÍ

These secondary categories will be the basis of a comparative analysis between the *No* and *Sí* campaigns. As a whole, then as is divided within the block, differentiate between the "spot" marketing material, and the commentary.

SEGMENT INFO	NO	SÍ
Exact time used for Franja		
Total # of Segments for Franja		
Time Frames: Past		
Time Frames: Present		
Time Frames: Future		
Time Frames: Unclear		
Dominant Tone: Negative		
Dominant Tone: Positive		
Dominant Tone: Neutral		
Gender Females		
Gender Males		

AUDIO/ VISUAL CODING	NO	SÍ
Happy images/ colors		
Images of real violence		
Portrayal of violence		
Protest/ Rally Images		
Individual Portrayals		
Group Portrayals		
Indiscernible/ Generalized Campaign Images		
Happy Sounds		
Sad/ Scary Sounds		
Neutral Sounds		
Other for each		

CATEGORY/ FORMAT TTLS	NO	SÍ
% of time with music (only).		
% of time with commentary.		
% of time positive		
% of time negative		
% original content		
% recycled content		
Broad/ dominant theme		

CATEGORIES OF SEGMENTS	NO	SÍ
1) Greeting or Signoff. Opening & closing commentary.		
2) Jingle, theme song, recurring campaign musical <u>transition</u>.		
3) Jingle, theme song, recurring musical montage (full length).		
4) Transitional commentary by campaign spokesperson or voice over between narratives.		
5) Musical/ cult presentation only.		
6) Video montage (no music).		
7) Detailed Journalistic Report, includes analysis of some specific issue.		
8) Testimonials not an interview. Composed personal statement from individual looking into camera.		
9) Vox Pop. Interview not looking directly into the camera.		
10) Motivational spots incorporating humor, fictional, etc. Identify content – i.e. humor spot, dramatic spot, etc. - humor spot NO____// SÍ____ - dramatic spot NO____// SÍ____ - _____ spot NO____// SÍ____ - _____ spot NO____// SÍ____		
11) Overt attack on opposing campaign.		
12) News report.		
13) Voter Education.		
14) Commentary: - Anchor NO____// SÍ____ - Guest NO____// SÍ____ - Spokes NO____// SÍ____ - _____ NO____// SÍ____		

Theme/ Keywords	NO	SÍ
1a. Life		
1b. Death		
1c. Order/ Security		
1d. Chaos		
2a. Peace		
2b. Violence/ Threat of		
3a. Hope/ Happiness		
3b. Fear/ Pain		
4a. Democracy		
4b. Dictatorship		
5a. Freedom/ Liberty		
5b. Censorship/ Repression		
6a. Human Rights		
6b. Torture		
7a. Prosperity/ Economic Growth/ Development/ Exports		
7b. Poverty/ Economic Instability		
7c. Employment		
7d. Unemployment		
7e. Salaries		
7f. Housing		
8a. Political Change/ Diversity		
8b. Status Quo/"Candidato Único"		
9a. Justice/ Social Justice		
9b. Impunity/ Intransigence		
10a. Tolerance		
10b. Intolerance		
11a. Faith/ Religion		
11b. Lack of Faith/ Godless		
12a. Health/ Healthcare		
12b. Poor Health/ No Healthcare		
13a. Education		
13b. Lack of Education		
14a. References to Chile Future		
14b. References to Chile Present		
14c. References to Chile Past		
15a. Dignity/ Respect		
15b. Shame		
16a. Honesty/ Truth/ Commitment		
16b. Dishonesty/ Lies		

16c. Transparency		
16d. Opacity		
17a. Individual/ Property Rights		
17b. State Power/ Bureaucracy		
18a. Women's Rights		
18b. Women's Exploitation/ Repression		
19a. Chile under Allende		
19b. Direct Reference/ Image of Allende		
19c. Indirect Reference to Allende		
20a. Chile under Pinochet		
20b. Direct Reference/ Image of Pinochet		
20c. Indirect Reference to Pinochet		
21a. Reference to Military/ Govern. Junta		
21b. War		
22a. Refer. Capitalism/ Lib. Market Econ.		
22b. Ref. socialism, Marxist, communism		
22c. Critique of political systems		
23a. References to "majority of Chileans"		
23b. Family		
23c. Children		
24a. Voting/ Elections		
24b. Protests/ Rallies		
25a. "NO"		
25b. Other NO Campaign Slogan		
26a. "SÍ"		
26b. Other SÍ Campaign Slogan		
27. Key Images		
28. Other		
29. Other		
30. Other		

People Appear On Camera:	NO	SÍ
1) Generic Young Man		
2) Generic Young Woman		
3) Generic Woman		
4) Generic Man		
5) Generic Housewife		
6) Generic Professional		
7) Generic "Empresario"		
8) Generic Laborer		
9) Generic Child		
10) Generic Soldier		
11) Generic Senior		
12) Generic Family		
13) Generic Group of Children		
14) Generic Mother & Child		
15) Generic Father & Child		
16) Generic Couple		
17) Generic Crowd		
18) Landscape (no people)		
19) Heavy Equipment (no people)		
20) Mimes		
21) Military Official		
22) Politician/ Ministers		
23) Media/Cultural Personality		
24) Sports Personality		
25) Campaign Anchor		
26) Campaign Spokesperson		
27) Labor Union Rep		
28) Other		

Appendix C – Field Research Introductory Letter.

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24/06/2015

Mi nombre es Harry Simón Salazar y soy candidato al doctorado en el Departamento de Comunicación de la Universidad de California San Diego. Estaré en Chile hasta el día 4 de julio próximo haciendo los contactos necesarios para avanzar en el trabajo de mi tesis doctoral. Con este fin hago llegar a Ud. esta nota de presentación.

Durante los últimos años he desarrollado una investigación comparativa sobre la relación entre los medios de comunicación y la cultura política en Chile durante las décadas de los ochentas y noventas. Desde el año 2009 mi trabajo ha sido llevado a cabo bajo la dirección de los Profesores de Comunicación Dr. Daniel Hallin y Dr. Michael Cole. Espero terminar mi tesis doctoral durante el primer trimestre de 2016.

Le agradecería mucho si me concediera una reunión o me hiciera alguna sugerencia que tenga sobre modos de avanzar con mi trabajo mientras esté en Chile. Esta es la primera de varias visitas que llevaré acabo en Chile durante los años 2014 y 2015. He incluido la dirección electrónica de mi pagina web que ofrecen más información sobre mi investigación. Si desea comunicarse conmigo lo puede hacer por email; si prefiere hacer una llamada puede marcar mi número de teléfono móvil de los Estados Unidos que recibe llamadas en Chile. Gracias por su atención.

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Appendix D – 1988 Franja Electoral Formatting Categories For Both NO And SÍ Campaigns.

1988 Franja Electoral Segment Categories For Both NO And SÍ Campaigns

	NO # RS Segments	NO # SE Segments	NO # US Segments	SÍ # RS Segments	SÍ # SE Segments	SÍ # US Segments
Day 1	8	6	2	9	8	1
Day 2	9	5	4	10	8	0
Day 3	6	5	3	5	4	3
Day 4	8	6	4	8	10	0
Day 5	7	7	2	8	7	1
Day 6	9	5	4	11	7	1
Day 7	8	6	5	6	1	2
Day 8 *	0	0	0	13	6	0
Day 9 *	8	6	3	0	0	0
Day 10	7	6	5	16	5	1
Day 11	9	6	4	14	3	2
Day 12	8	8	3	21	6	0
Day 13	7	7	4	20	3	0
Day 14	6	6	5	24	3	3
Day 15	6	7	6	25	3	2
Day 16	8	7	4	16	6	6
Day 17	8	5	3	12	6	4
Day 18	9	7	3	9	9	3
Day 19	4	6	7	9	7	4
Day 20	7	6	6	17	6	1
Day 21	8	5	3	12	5	2
Day 22	9	6	4	11	3	5
Day 23	6	6	3	14	7	6
Day 24	5	7	6	8	7	3
Day 25 **	5	7	6	10	7	7
Day 26	12	7	4	10	6	9
Day 27	10	4	5	9	3	3
	Ttl Segments: 197	Ttl Segments: 159	Ttl Segments: 108	Ttl Segments: 327	Ttl Segments: 146	Ttl Segments: 69
	% of total #: 43%	% of total #: 34%	% of total #: 23%	% of total #: 60%	% of total #: 27%	% of total #: 13%

Appendix E – Testimonio de Luis Maira A. – "La Violencia."

Franja Electoral #23, 27 de septiembre, 1988.

Hace 25 años, Chile junto a Uruguay y Costa Rica, era uno de los países menos violentos de América Latina. En ese tiempo yo era dirigente universitario, y recuerdo que el presidente de la republica Don Jorge Alessandri, caminaba todos los días sin protección, desde su casa hasta La Moneda.

En ese país, un marxista, que hacia poesía, preparaba un premio nobel de literatura para Chile.
Y una gran creadora popular, por su amor a nuestra patria, daba gracias a la vida.

Después las cosas cambiaron. Una mañana de octubre de 1970, el terrorismo aprecio.
Un comando de ultra derecha, hirió de muerte al comandante en jefe del ejercito el General Rene Schneider.

Pocos meses después, la victima fue el ex ministro Edmundo Pérez Zujovic. Y la violencia esta vez vino del otro extremo del arco ideológico.

Desde entonces la violencia se ha instado como una enfermedad de la sociedad Chilena, y las cosas se empeoraron mucho mas, luego de septiembre de 1973 cuando se instalo en el poder el General Augusto Pinochet, porque el trajo dos rasgos que acompañan en el mundo actual al desarrollo de la violencia.

La lógica de la guerra interna primero, que vivía el país entre amigos y enemigos.
Y el desarrollo de lo que se llama la teoría política del terrorismo del estado después.

Esto es la creación de cuerpos de seguridad totalmente ajenos a nuestra tradición.
Que son responsables de los desaparecimientos, de crímenes horribles ejecutados en el exterior; Prats Letelier, Leitan, y muchas cosas que hoy día quisiéramos olvidar.

Por eso, los chilenos optamos hoy día en contra de la violencia.
Hacemos una opción a favor de la paz, y para ello necesitamos construir un sistema político que en el mundo entero da garantías de ser capaz de desterrar la violencia.

Esa es la democracia. La democracia es un sistema que permite la expresión de todos los pensamientos, de todas las ideas, y establece un árbitro, un juez: el pueblo.

Que las elecciones dice quién debe estar en el gobernó y quién en la oposición.
Le da un espacio a cada uno.

Esa ha sido la experiencia de paso de la dictadura a la democracia, de otros pueblos en años recientes, España y Uruguay por ejemplo.

En España después de 36 de gestión del General Francisco Franco, se decía que si el desaparecía venia el caos y el comunismo. España pasó a la democracia, con la compresión y la generosidad de muchos españoles. Se instalo un sistema político que hoy día es ejemplo en el mundo de convivencia, y un país moderno, dinámico, y en pleno desarrollo económico. un gobierno socialista orgullosamente.

En Uruguay hubo un plebiscito en 1980, los militares dijeron también "o nosotros o el caos." El pueblo voto un 57% por la vuelta a la democracia. Y hoy día hay democracia en Uruguay, hay convivencia, hay paz.

Esa paz y esa convivencia la creemos para Chile.
Y el NO le dará a Chile convivencia política.

Appendix F - Franja Content Logged By Day

Notes: The campaign listed first in the log ran first that particular day.
• RS – Recurring Segment
• SE – Series
• US – Unique Segment.

- Day 1, Monday - September 5, 1988 – 10:45 pm & 11:00 pm:
    o All Franjas counted as all original segments because first day of campaign.

    o NO:
        ▪ Total Run Time: 14:59:27
        ▪ # individual segments:16,
        ▪ Dominant Theme: "NO" al candidato único.
        ▪ Segments List:
            1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
            2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
            3) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
            4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
            5) (RS) The Waltz of the Generals
            6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
            7) (US) Statement from Patricio Aylwin
            8) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
            9) (US) "NO" Drums "No-ticias" Intro/ Transition
            10) (SE) "NO-ticias"
            11) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
            12) (US) "¿Que Votaría En El Plebiscito?"
            13) (RS) "Me Cuesta Decir Que NO"
            14) (RS) Doña Yolita – "Bolsita de Té"
            15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
            16) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

    o SÍ:
        ▪ Total Run Time: 14:48:27
        ▪ # individual segments:18,
        ▪ Dominant Theme: País ganador, with economic growth building up exports.
        ▪ Segments List:
            1) (SE) "1973" or similar format (historical)
            2) (RS) "No Merecemos Volver Al Pasado"
            3) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #2 (La Moneda)
            4) (SE) "El Presidente En Acción"
            5) (SE) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
            6) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"
            7) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
            8) (SE) "¿Sabia Usted Que…?" - exportes
            9) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
            10) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí"
            11) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
            12) (SE) "Chile Líder"
            13) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
            14) (RS) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Trans. Rosa– No Pinochet
            15) (RS) Extendido Jingle del SÍ #2
            16) (SE) "Democracia Sí" – Renovación Nacional
            17) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #3 (La Moneda)
            18) (RS) Himno Del Sí Canto Completo

- Day 2, Tuesday - September 6, 1988 –10:45 pm:

- o SÍ:
  - Total Run Time: 14:59:13
  - # individual segments:18,
  - Dominant Theme: La vivienda en Chile.
  - Segments List:
    1) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (La Moneda)
    2) (SE) "El Presidente En Acción"
    3) (SE) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    4) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"
    5) (SE) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    6) (SE) "¿Sabia Usted Que…?"
    7) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    8) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí"
    9) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    10) (SE) "Chile Líder"
    11) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
    12) (RS) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Trans. Rosa – No Pinochet
    13) (RS) Extendido Jingle del SÍ #2
    14) (SE) "Democracia Sí"
    15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    16) (RS) Himno Del Sí Canto Completo
    17) (SE) "1973" o similar formato (histórica)
    18) (RS) "No Merecemos Volver Al Pasado"

- o NO:
  - Total Run Time: 14:13:04
  - # individual segments:18,
  - Dominant Theme: No central theme.
  - Segments List:
    1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
    2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    3) (US) Los Prisioneros
    4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    5) (RS) "¿Calza O No Calza?"
    6) (RS) Alejandro Hales Statement
    7) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
    8) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    9) (US) "Actividades del NO"
    10) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
    11) (US) Florcita Motuda Interview
    12) (US) Extended "NONONONO" Transition
    13) (RS) Couple in Bed
    14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    15) (RS) Liliana Mahn Statement
    16) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
    17) (SE) Patricio Bañados - sign off
    18) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 3, Wednesday, September 7, 1988 – 10:45 pm:

  - o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:10:26
    - # individual segments: 14,
    - Dominant Theme: "El exilio."
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (RS) "Putting On A Tie"

3) (SE) Patricio Bañados
4) (RS) "La Censura No Existe Mi Amor"
5) (SE) Patricio Bañados
6) (US) "El Niño Paulo" Documentary Excerpt
7) (SE) Patricio Bañados
8) (US) Moy Morales De Toha
9) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
10) (SE) Patricio Bañados
11) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
12) (US) "La Encuesta"
13) (SE) Patricio Bañados
14) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- o SÍ:
  - Total Run Time: 14:09:19
  - # individual segments: 12,
  - Dominant Theme: Terrorism and violence against the military government.
  - Segments List:
    1) (SE) "1973" or similar format (historical)
    2) (RS) "Street Riot"
    3) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (La Moneda)
    4) (US) "Operación Siglo 20"
    5) (US) Testimony of Wife, "Cajon del Maipu"
    6) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"
    7) (SE) "¿Sabia Usted Que…?"
    8) (RS) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink Trans – No Pinochet
    9) (RS) Extendido Jingle del SÍ #2
    10) (SE) "Democracia Sí"- Avanzada Nacional
    11) (US) "Dicen Que Ya Viene La Alegría"
    12) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #3 (La Moneda)

- :

  - o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:55:09
    - # individual segments: 18,
    - Dominant Theme: Computación y la economía que crece en Chile, para los jóvenes.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (La Moneda)
      2) (SE) "El Presidente En Acción"
      3) (RS) Full Length Himno Del Sí Canto
      4) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"
      5) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      6) (SE) "¿Sabia Usted Que…?"
      7) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      8) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí"
      9) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      10) (SE) "Chile Líder"
      11) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
      12) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      13) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet
      14) (SE) "Democracia Sí"
      15) (SE) Continuation of "Democracia Sí"
      16) (RS) Edited Corto Jingle del SÍ
      17) (SE) "1973" or similar format (historical)
      18) (RS) "No Merecemos Volver Al Pasado"

- o NO:
  - Total Run Time: 13:41:21
  - # individual segments: 18,
  - Dominant Theme: TV and press freedom, cultural freedom of expression.
  - Segments List:
    1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
    2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    3) (US) Silvio Rodriguez
    4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    5) (RS) "Putting On A Tie"
    6) (RS) Lion Tongue - "¿Que Le Diría Usted A Un Dictador?"
    7) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    8) (US) "Las Pequeñas Localidades Con El NO"
    9) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
    10) (US) Testimonios Por El NO
    11) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
    12) (SE) "NO-ticias"
    13) (RS) Doña Yolita – "Bolsita de Té"
    14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    15) (US) Actores Prohibidos
    16) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
    17) (SE) Patricio Bañados – sign off
    18) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 5, Friday, September 9, 1988 – 10:45 pm:

  - o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:00
    - # individual segments: 16,
    - Dominant Theme: La pobreza en Chile.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (RS) "La Cueca Sola"
      3) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
      4) (SE) Patricio Bañados welcome
      5) (RS) "Estos Hombres Son Chilenos"
      6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      7) (RS) Doña Yolita – "Bolsita de Té"
      8) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      9) (US) "La Realidad de la Pobreza en Chile"
      10) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      11) (US) Dr. René Cortazar
      12) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
      13) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      14) (SE) "NO-ticias" cont.
      15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      16) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

  - o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:53:20
    - # individual segments: 16,
    - Dom. Theme: Attack Aylwin.
    - Segments List:
      1) (US) Aylwin vs. Aylwin
      2) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (Kid w/ Hat)
      3) (SE) "El Presidente En Acción"
      4) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      5) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"

      6) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      7) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí"
      8) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      9) (SE) "Chile Líder" – life span in Chile
      10) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      11) (SE) "Democracia Sí" – Avanzada Nacional – Attack Aylwin
      12) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"
      13) (SE) Commentary Avanzada Nacional, Cont. "Democracia Sí"
      14) (SE) Commentary UDI, Cont. "Democracia Sí"
      15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      16) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #3 (Kid w/ Hat)

- Day 6, Saturday, September 10, 1988 – 11:30 am:

  o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:41:07
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: La Juventud por el SÍ.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (Kid w/ Hat)
      2) (SE) "El Presidente En Acción"
      3) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      4) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
      5) (US) "Deporte Es Salud Y Es Vida"
      6) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      7) (SE) "¿Sabia Usted Que…?"
      8) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      9) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí"
      10) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transition #1 – "Sí" Logo
      11) (SE) "Chile Líder"
      12) (RS) Full Length Himno Del Sí Canto
      13) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet
      14) (SE) "Democracia Sí"
      15) (RS) "Partido Del Sur – Desde El Sur"
      16) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (Kid w/ Hat)
      17) (SE) "1973" or similar format (historical)
      18) (SE) Day Countdown v1, Black Background/ Bad Font, "Un País Ganador-SI" – Day 26
      19) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"

  o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:18
    - # individual segments: 18
    - Dominant Theme: "NO" al candidato único.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      3) (RS) The Waltz of the Generals
      4) (RS) "Putting On A Tie"
      5) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      6) (RS) Doña Yolita – "Bolsita de Té"
      7) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      8) (US) Schwenke y Nilo
      9) (US) "Jóvenes Obedientes"
      10) (US) NO Chorus
      11) (RS) "La Censura No Existe Mi Amor"
      12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      13) (US) "Pesadilla del Sí"

14) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
15) (RS) "La Cueca Sola"
16) (SE) Patricio Bañados
17) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
18) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 7, Sunday, September 11, 1988 – 11:30 am:

  o NO:
  - Total Run Time: 14:59:26
  - # individual segments: 19,
  - Dominant Theme: Overall, no central theme. But the 16-second segments repeated twice are the only mentioning of 09/11, on this the 15th anniversary of the golpe. Bañados does not even mention the day. So by default, 09/11 is the dominant theme, even if only mentioned for 16 seconds, no commentary, and then repeated.
  - Segments List:
    1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
    2) (US) "Hoy Día Es 11 de Sept."
    3) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    4) (US) Los Prisioneros #2
    5) (RS) Unemployed Shoes
    6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    7) (RS) "¿Calza O No Calza?"
    8) (RS) Alejandro Hales Statement
    9) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
    10) (SE) "NO-ticias"
    11) (RS) "Me Cuesta Decir Que NO"
    12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    13) (US) Juan Downey "NO" Clip
    14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    15) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
    16) (US) "Hoy Día Es 11 de Sept."
    17) (US) "¡Me Lo Espantaste!"
    18) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    19) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

  o SÍ:
  - Total Run Time: 14:59:08
  - # individual segments: 9,
  - Dominant Theme: Todo Chile Pidió El 11 de Sept.
  - Segments List:
    1) (US) "Todo Chile Pidió El 11 de Sept."
    2) (US) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Boleta & Day Countdown (25)
    3) (RS) "Nació Un Nuevo País Ganador"
    4) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet
    5) (SE) "Democracia Sí" V2
    6) (US) "La Primavera de Chile"
    7) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (Kid w/)
    8) (US) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Boleta & Day Countdown (25)
    9) (RS) Editado Himno Del Sí Canto

- Day 8, Monday, September 12, 1988 – 10:45 pm:

  o SÍ:

- Total Run Time: 14:53:26
- # individual segments: 19,
- Dominant Theme: El SÍ es mejor para la economía.
- Segments List:
    1) (RS) "Chile, Los Marxistas Ya Vienen"
    2) (SE) "La Verdadera Cara Del No" o similar formato
    3) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1 (Kid w/)
    4) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"
    5) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    6) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
    7) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    8) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí"
    9) (SE) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Countdown w/ Boleta – Day 24
    10) (RS) Editado Corto Jingle del SÍ #1 (Celebra/)
    11) (RS) "Un Túnel Sin Salida"
    12) (RS) Himno Del Sí Canto
    13) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet
    14) (SE) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Countdown w/ Boleta – Day 24
    15) (RS) "Nació Un Nuevo País Ganador"
    16) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
    17) (SE) "Democracia Sí" v1.
    18) (RS) Lagos – vs – Aylwin
    19) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"

- NO:
    - Total Run Time: 00:00:00
    - # individual segments: 0,
    - Dominant Theme: NO Franja censored.
    - Segments List:
        1) On screen it shows for 15 seconds: "POR INCUMPLIMIENTO DE LAS INSTRUCCIONES ESTABLECIDAS EN EL ACUERDO DEL CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISION , SOBRE PROPAGANDA ELECTORAL EN EL PLEBISCITO , NO SE TRANSMITIRA HOY EL ESPACIO DE LA OPCION NO ."

- Day 9, Tuesday, Sept 13 – 10:45 pm:

    - NO:
        - Total Run Time: 14:59:29
        - # individual segments: 17,
        - Dominant Theme: "La Censura," but in general, not a single mention of the censorship of the previous Franja.
        - Segments List:
            1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
            2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
            3) (RS) Joan Manuel Serrat
            4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
            5) (US) Jorge Edwards
            6) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
            7) (US) "La Manivela" Del NO
            8) (RS) "La Censura No Existe Mi Amor"
            9) (RS) Unemployed Shoes
            10) (RS) "Estos Hombres Son Chilenos"
            11) (SE) "NO-ticias"
            12) (SE) Patricio Bañados

        13) (RS) "NO" Orgasm
        14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
        15) (US) Orlando Sainz
        16) (SE) Patricio Bañados
        17) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

- SÍ:
  - Total Run Time: 00:00:00
  - # individual segments: 0,
  - Dom. Theme: Self-censored.
  - Segments List:
  - On screen it shows for 40 seconds, with voice over narration: "SU EXCELENCIA EL PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA HA DISPUESTO NO UTILIZAR EL ESPACIO QUE CORRESPONDIA HOY PARA LA OPCION SI , CON EL OBJETO DE MANTENER LA IGUALDAD DE CONDICIONES EL DEBATE PUBLICO. LO ANTERIOR NO SIGNIFICA DESCONOCER LAS ATRIBUCIONES NI LAS DECISIONES QUE COMPETEN RESPECTO DE LA PROPAGANDA ELECTORAL TELEVISIVA AL CONSEJO NACIONAL DE TELEVISION."

- **Day 10, Wednesday, Sept 14 – 10:45 pm:**

  - SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:52:25
    - # individual segments: 22,
    - Dominant Theme: The responsible vote is for the SÍ – especially about the economy.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"
      2) (SE) "La Verdadera Cara Del No" o similar formato
      3) (RS) "Un Túnel Sin Salida"
      4) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
      5) (RS) "Un Chileno En Perú"
      6) (RS) Doña Yolita Copia – "Bolsitas de Té"
      7) (RS) Editado "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"
      8) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
      9) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet
      10) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      11) (RS) Jóvenes Del Sí En La Calle
      12) (SE) "Chile Líder"
      13) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
      14) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      15) (SE) "Recuerde" Back/ Boleta - Día 22
      16) (US) Suarez Baila Con Fidel
      17) (RS) "Un Túnel Con Salida"
      18) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      19) (SE) "Democracia Sí" v1.
      20) (SE) "Recuerde" Back/ Boleta - Día 22
      21) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"
      22) (RS) Editado Corto Jingle del SÍ #1 (Celebra)

  - NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:40:27
    - # individual segments: 18,
    - Dominant Theme: "La Censura" but indirect and with emphasis that there is no need for it if we agree to disagree. Very positive production.
    - Segments List:

1) (US) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening – CENSURA VERSION
2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
3) (US) Silvio Rodriguez
4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
5) (RS) Pinochet On Press Freedoms
6) (US) Nissim Sharim
7) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
8) (US) NO Mountain Caller
9) (SE) Patricio Bañados
10) (US) Tenison Ferrada
11) (SE) "NO-ticias"
12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
13) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
14) (US) Carolina Arregui
15) (RS) Florcita Motuda – "Nadie Lo Puede Ver"
16) (SE) Patricio Bañados
17) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
18) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 11, Thursday, Sept 15 – 10:45 pm:

  o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:27
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: Two Chiles, a divided country that wants to be united again.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      3) (US) Unidentified Singing Performer
      4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      5) (US) Poverty Report
      6) (US) Eugenio Tironi
      7) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
      8) (RS) Couple in Bed
      9) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      10) (US) Testimonios del NO
      11) (RS) "La Cueca Sola"
      12) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
      13) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      15) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta
      16) (RS) "NO" Orgasm
      17) (RS) Edited Florcita Motuda–"Nadie Lo Puede Ver
      18) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      19) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

  o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:47:23
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: The NO is a Marxist threat.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Lagos – vs. – Aylwin
      2) (US) "Voto Responsable"
      3) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 21
      4) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      5) (SE) "La Verdadera Cara Del No" o similar formato
      6) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 21
      7) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo

8) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
9) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
10) (RS) Jóvenes Del Sí En La Calle
11) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
12) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet
13) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
14) (RS) Sí Rally & Testimonies
15) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 21
16) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
17) (SE) "Democracia Sí" v2.
18) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 21
19) (RS) Doña Yolita Copia – "Bolsitas de Té"

- Day 12, Friday, Sept 16 – 10:45 pm:

  - SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 15:00:23
    - # individual segments: 27,
    - Dominant Theme: La agricultura chilena.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) "Más Alegría Del No" – The Blue Danubio
      2) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
      3) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
      4) (RS) Sí Rally & Testimonies
      5) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 20
      6) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet
      7) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      8) (RS) (EDITED) Jóvenes Del Sí En La Calle
      9) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      10) (SE) "Usted Pregunta. El Gobierno Responde"
      11) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      12) (SE) "Chile Líder"
      13) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      14) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor"
      15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      16) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 20
      17) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      18) (SE) "Democracia Sí" v2.
      19) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      20) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
      21) (RS) "Chile, Los Marxistas Ya Vienen"
      22) (SE) "La Verdadera Cara Del No" o similar formato
      23) (RS) Doña Yolita Copia – "Bolsitas de Té"
      24) (US) Bolsita de Té – Hace 15 Años – Text
      25) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 20
      26) (RS) "A Continuación" Banner Copia
      27) (US) Compañero & Alegría Dinamite Dance Copia

  - NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:19
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: La Pobreza main theme but censorship is prominent.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (SE) Patricio Bañados

3) (US) Isabel Aldunate – Song
4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
5) (US) Military on Pobreza & Testimonies
6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
7) (US) Sergio Wilson
8) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
9) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
10) (SE) Patricio Bañados
11) (US) Voting Vox Pop
12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
13) (RS) "Comunicado de Prensa" Making Fun of Pinochet Spokesman
14) (SE) "NO-ticias"
15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
16) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
17) (US) Federico Willoughby
18) (SE) Patricio Bañados
19) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 13, Saturday, Sept 17 – 11:30 am:

  o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:08
    - # individual segments: 18,
    - Dominant Theme: La Pobreza entre jubilados.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      3) (US) Selling Brooms – Poverty
      4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      5) (RS) Pinochet On Press Freedoms
      6) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      7) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
      8) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      9) (RS) Joan Manuel Serrat
      10) (US) Street Venders Vox Pop
      11) (RS) Florcita Motuda – "Nadie Lo Puede Ver" // v2
      12) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      13) (US) "Mujeres Que Dicen 'NO'"
      14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      15) (US) Jubilados de Chile
      16) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      17) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
      18) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

  o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:04:11
    - # individual segments: 23,
    - Dominant Theme: We struggled to get rid of the UP, now let us finish the job.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) "Ahora Más Alegría Del No"
      2) (RS) Doña Yolita Copia – "Bolsitas de Té"
      3) (RS) Bolsita de Té – Hace 15 Años –Text
      4) (RS) The Waltz of the NO - Blue Danubio
      5) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
      6) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      7) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
      8) (RS) Sí Rally & Testimonies
      9) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet

10) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
11) (RS) EDITED Jóvenes Del Sí En La Calle – Música
12) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 19
13) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
14) (RS) "Un Chileno En Perú"
15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
16) (SE) "En Este País Hoy Se Vive Mejor" v2
17) (SE) "La Gente Del Sí" – Patricia Maldonado testimonio.
18) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 19
19) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
20) (SE) "Democracia Sí" v2.
21) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
22) (RS) "Un Túnel Sin Salida"
23) (RS) "Un Túnel Con Salida"

- Day 14, Sunday, Sept 18 – 11:30 am:

  o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:52:20
    - # individual segments: 27,
    - Dominant Theme: La vivienda en Chile.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Babe del SÍ
      2) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
      3) (SE) SÍ Anchor Hernán Serrano Entra – First Time. For Chile Independence Day.
      4) (RS) NO Aplanadora
      5) (RS) The Waltz of the NO - Blue Danubio
      6) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
      7) (SE) SÍ Anchor. Esos son un violentos.
      8) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
      9) (SE) SÍ Spokeswoman. Nuestros hijos tienen que tener un futuro claro y definido.
      10) (RS) Dancing Sí Babies with Jingle.
      11) (SE) SÍ Spokesman. And testimonies about vivienda.
      12) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 18
      13) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
      14) (US) Carlos Podeles Michó (??) Agricultor por el Sí.
      15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      16) (US) Juan G. (racer) por el Sí
      17) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
      18) (US) Los Hombres del Campo
      19) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      20) (SE) Sí Spokespersons – La Vida y la Vivienda.
      21) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet, La Vivienda
      22) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
      23) (SE) SÍ Anchor. Las JAP.
      24) (RS) Doña Yolita Copia – "Bolsitas de Té"
      25) (RS) Bolsita de Té – Hace 15 Años –Text – Mención of MIR
      26) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 18
      27) (RS) Mocking Flor Motuda

  o NO:

- Total Run Time: 14:57:08
- # individual segments: 17,
- Dominant Theme: What divides Chile is less, national unity is primary for this Chilean Independence Day, Sept 18.
- Segments List:
    1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening – Special Flag Version
    2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    3) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
    4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    5) (US) Mi Barrio Pobre"
    6) (US) Carlos Ortiz
    7) (US) Flag Panoramic
    8) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
    9) (SE) "NO-ticias"
    10) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    11) (US) Music – Violeta Parra & Her Kids
    12) (SE) "NO-ticias" (Cont. special, non- title intro)
    13) (RS) Kites & Florcita Motuda
    14) (RS) "Comunicado de Prensa" Making Fun of Pinochet Spokesman
    15) (RS) Liliana Mahn Statement
    16) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    17) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

- Day 15, Monday, Sept 19 – 10:45 pm:

    o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:37:27
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: Unity and happy reconciliation, especially between civil society and the military.
    - Segments List:
        1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
        2) (US) Elementary School, Fiestas Patrias
        3) (SE) Patricio Bañados, 19-de septiembre.
        4) (US) "Fuerzas Armadas" Nota
        5) (SE) Patricio Bañados
        6) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
        7) (US) Ana Maria Gazmuri
        8) (SE) Patricio Bañados
        9) (RS) "NO" Kids Drawings
        10) (SE) "NO-ticias"
        11) (US) "NO" Indio
        12) (RS) Kites & Florcita Motuda
        13) (SE) Patricio Bañados
        14) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Yong Woman's Hand
        15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
        16) (US) German Riesco – PDTE Partido Nacional
        17) (SE) Patricio Bañados
        18) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
        19) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

    o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 15:02:09
    - # individual segments: 28,
    - Dominant Theme: Vivienda en Chile. This was repeated almost verbatim from the day before.
    - Segments List:
        1) (RS) Baby of the SÍ
        2) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música

3) (SE) SÍ Anchor, Día de las fuerzas armadas.
4) (RS) NO Aplanadora
5) (RS) The Waltz of the NO - Blue Danubio
6) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
7) (SE) SÍ Anchor.
8) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
9) (SE) SÍ Spokeswoman.
10) (RS) Dancing Sí Bebes con Jingle.
11) (SE) SÍ Spokesman.
12) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 16
13) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
14) (US) Mujer Ciega por el Sí.
15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
16) (US) Hombre Trabajador por el Sí
17) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
18) (RS) Patricia Maldonado Testimonio.
19) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
20) (SE) Sí Spokespersons
21) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – Pink – Pinochet, La Vivienda
22) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
23) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
24) (SE) SÍ Anchor.
25) (RS) Doña Yolita Copia – "Bolsitas de Té"
26) (RS) Bolsita de Té – Hace 15 Años – Text – Mención of MIR
27) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 16
28) (RS) Mocking Flor Motuda

- Day 16, Tuesday, Sept 20 – 10:45 pm:

    - SÍ:
        - Total Run Time: 14:56:24
        - # individual segments: 27.
        - Dom. Theme: Economy and Agriculture.
        - Segments List:
            1) (RS) Track & Field, Chilean obstacles.
            2) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
            3) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
            4) (SE) "Chile Líder"
            5) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
            6) (US) Juan González, Empresario, Testimonio
            7) (SE) Sí Anchor – Hernán Serrano – Sí Responsable
            8) (RS) Chancho Chino.
            9) (US) Mónica Izquierdo testimonio, que siguán las cosas igual.
            10) (SE) Sí Spokeswoman – El futuro político.
            11) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 15
            12) (RS) NO Cheerleaders & Miseria.
            13) (SE) Sí Spokesman – El campo Chileno
            14) (US) Jorge Prado board room. Agricultura.
            15) (US) Agricultura Chilena – Farmer testimonio.
            16) (RS) "Un Túnel Sin Salida"
            17) (RS) "Un Túnel Con Salida"
            18) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
            19) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 15
            20) (SE) Sí Anchor – Ganarle al Odio, Violencia.
            21) (US) Testimonio Burn Victim. Closes with commentary/ appeal.

22) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
23) (SE) Sí Anchor – Hernán Serrano
24) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
25) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"
26) (RS) "Balón Inflación."
27) (RS) Mocking Flor Motuda

- o NO:
  - Total Run Time: 14:59:26
  - # individual segments: 19,
  - Dominant Theme: Torture and disappeared in Chile.
  - Segments List:
    1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
    2) (RS) "La Cueca Sola"
    3) (SE) Patricio Bañados – "They Dance Alone"
    4) (US) Sting Performance, Sting, "Los Desaparecidos" -- "They Dance Alone."
    5) (SE) "NO-ticias"
    6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    7) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Young Woman's Hand
    8) (SE) "NO-ticias"
    9) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    10) (US) Jose Zalaquett – Abogado
    11) (SE) Patricio Bañados . "Testimonial."
    12) (US) Sra. Olga Garrison.
    13) (RS) "NO" Kids Drawings
    14) (SE) Patricio Bañados, "Jóvenes."
    15) (US) Carolina Toha, Testimonial
    16) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Young Woman's Hand
    17) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    18) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
    19) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 17, Wednesday, Sept 21 – 10:45 pm:

  - o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:25
    - # individual segments: 16,
    - Dom. Theme: Economy, Productivity and Creativity. Assassinations.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (SE) Patricio Bañados, "Buenas Noches". "A Serious Topic."
      3) (US) Empresas De Chile
      4) (US) Alejandro Foxley – Economics Professor.
      5) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
      6) (RS) Pinochet "Titles", Ironic Pinochet Homage.
      7) (RS) Lion Tongue, Gregory Cohen.
      8) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      9) (RS) Women Singing – "No Me Gusta"
      10) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      11) (RS) Pinochet Assassinations
      12) (US) Prats Daughter – Sofia Prats
      13) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
      14) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      16) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

  - o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 15:00:04

- # individual segments: 22,
- Dominant Theme: Vox Pop – the people are with Pinochet.
- Segments List:
    1) (US) Mother and son testimonial. Appeal to order and security.
    2) (SE) Sí Anchor - "Buenas Noches". "Think of your children."
    3) (US) Vox Pop, Yelling man, was communist youth, now with "Pinocho".
    4) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
    5) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 14
    6) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
    7) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí
    8) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
    9) (US) Ginette Acevedo testimonio
    10) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
    11) (SE) Sí Spokeswoman – Nuevas carreteras.
    12) (US) Montaje nuevas carreteras. Bruno Siebert, Minister of Public Works.
    13) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 14
    14) (SE) Sí Anchor
    15) (RS) Chancho Chino.
    16) (US) Testimonio Sra. Elsa.
    17) (RS) "Un Túnel Con Salida"
    18) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
    19) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí
    20) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
    21) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 14
    22) (SE) Sí Anchor

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    o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:24:04
    - # individual segments: 21
    - Dominant Theme: El futuro son los jóvenes, y están con el Sí.
    - Segments List:
        1) (US) Historical Footage of Pro-Pinochet Patricio Bañados
        2) (RS) Musical Montaje "Sí Que Sí" New. Ends with digital Sí Sign.
        3) (SE) Sí Anchor – Ese futuro es nuestro.
        4) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí
        5) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 13
        6) (SE) Sí Spokeswoman
        7) (US) Hernán Büchi Ministro de Hacienda.
        8) (RS) NO is a trash can.
        9) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
        10) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí en el norte
        11) (SE) Sí Anchor
        12) (US) Testimonial "Doña María".
        13) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 13
        14) (RS) Blind wedding with NO.
        15) (SE) Sí Spokesman, los pueblos necesitan rostros conocidos.
        16) (SE) "Este Es Nuestro Compromiso" – NO Pink entra – Pinochet
        17) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
        18) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí
        19) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 13
        20) (SE) Sí Anchor
        21) (US) Nora Vargas talks "atentado terrorista".

    o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:11

- # individual segments: 19,
- Dominant Theme: La crisis de la salud en Chile.
- Segments List:
    1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
    2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    3) (US) Claudio Arrau Performance and Short Commentary.
    4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    5) (RS) La Salud en Chile
    6) (RS) Dr. Jorge Jimenez, Magister en Salud Publica.
    7) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
    8) (RS) Pinochet "Titles"
    9) (US) Lady "Pains"
    10) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    11) (US) Valparaiso, Musical Montage.
    12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    13) (SE) "NO-ticias", Caravan por el NO.
    14) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
    15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    16) (US) Tomas Hirsch – Partido Humanista
    17) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    18) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
    19) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 19, Friday, Sept 23 – 10:45 pm:

    o NO:
      - Total Run Time: 14:59:29
      - # individual segments: 17,
      - Dominant Theme: Organized labor is with the NO.
      - Segments List:
          1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
          2) (RS) Pinochet Assassinations
          3) (SE) Patricio Bañados
          4) (US) Victor Manuel Performance and Commentary
          5) (SE) Patricio Bañados
          6) (US) La Voz de las Provincias
          7) (SE) Patricio Bañados, intro Pablo Neruda
          8) (US) Pablo Neruda, reciting Poema 20.
          9) (SE) "NO-ticias"
          10) (US) Tucapel Jimenez, Dirigente Sindical.
          11) (US) Ricardo Hormazabal, Abogado Laborista.
          12) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
          13) (US) "NO" Face Drawing
          14) (SE) Patricio Bañados, intro Enrique Silva Cimma.
          15) (US) Enrique Silva Cimma
          16) (SE) Patricio Bañados
          17) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

    o SÍ:
      - Total Run Time: 14:44:22
      - # individual segments: 20,
      - Dominant Theme: The NO is the source of Chilean violence.
      - Segments List:
          1) (RS) Cuba y La Alegría, "el camaleón".
          2) (US/RS) False Bañados intro/ Flor Motuda, "Programa de Gobierno del NO", Gregory Cohen does Lion tongue.
          3) (RS) Musical Montaje "Sí Que Sí" New. Ends with digital Sí Sign.
          4) (SE) Sí Anchor
          5) (US) Video montaje "Visita del papa" & testimonies.

6) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
7) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
8) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí
9) (SE) Sí Anchor
10) (US) Atacó Sr. Bañados sobre pensiones.
11) (US/RS) Testimonio
12) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
13) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 12
14) (US) Testimonial Montaje – "En El Norte El Sí Arrasa".
15) (SE) Sí Spokesman in Chair.
16) (US) Testimonial Commentary Juan Yaconi, Ministro de Salud.
17) (SE) Sí Anchor
18) (US) Oposición *Franja* Atacó, El Minero del NO, Sergio Shipley.
19) (SE) Sí Anchor – El NO miente – Sra. Olga Garrido.
20) (US) False Testimonios of Sra. Olga Garrido, ladies.

- Day 20, Saturday, Sept 24 – 11:30 am:

  - SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:54:27
    - # individual segments: 24,
    - Dominant Theme: El Sí "arrasa"
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Jóvenes del Sí En La Calle// Música
      2) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí – Sra. viejita
      3) (SE) Sí Anchor
      4) (RS) Ginette Acevedo testimonio
      5) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #2 – Pinochet
      6) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí – Taxi driver
      7) (RS) NO is a trash can.
      8) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 11
      9) (SE) SÍ Spokeswoman
      10) (RS) Track & Field, Chilean obstacles.
      11) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1
      12) (SE) Sí Spokesman, intro Ministro Büchi.
      13) (RS/US) Hernán Büchi interview.
      14) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #1 – "Sí" Logo
      15) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí
      16) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 11
      17) (RS) SÍ en la cama
      18) (RS) Testimonial "Doña María".
      19) (SE) Sí Anchor
      20) (RS) False NO "a continuación"
      21) (RS) "Balloon Inflation."
      22) (RS) False Bañados intro/ Flor Motuda & "Programa de Gobierno del NO", Gregory Cohen does Lion tongue.
      23) (RS) "Más Alegría Del No" – The Blue Danubio
      24) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"

  - NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:23
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: La Salud en Chile.
    - Segments List:
      1) (US) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening – Custom w/ Drawings
      2) (RS) Chile Flag on Horseback
      3) (SE) Patricio Bañados

4) (RS) Sting Performance
5) (SE) "NO-ticias"
6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
7) (RS) La Salud en Chile
8) (RS) Dr. Jorge Jimenez
9) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
10) (RS) Pinochet "Titles"
11) (US) "NO" Sneeze
12) (US) Laura Rodriguez
13) (SE) Patricio Bañados
14) (US) Vox Pop – Provincias
15) (US) "Cantando Por El No" – Music
16) (SE) Patricio Bañados
17) (US) Scrambled – Interviews?
18) (SE) Patricio Bañados
19) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

- Day 21, Sunday, Sept 25 – 11:30 am:

  o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:58:12
    - # individual segments: 16,
    - Dominant Theme: Salaries and the consequences of a poor economy.
    - Segments List:
      1) (US) Special Introduction/ Opening – Actors Assembling
      2) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      3) (US) VOX POP – Testimony re: salaries
      4) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
      5) (RS) Women Singing – "No Me Gusta"
      6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      7) (US) "Los Eradicados" Gral. Roberto Guillard
      8) (US) Sergio Wilson
      9) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
      10) (RS) Chile Flag on Horseback
      11) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      12) (US) Anita Gonzalez
      13) (US) NO Bombero
      14) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      16) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

  o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:21
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: El NO miente.
    - Segments List:
      1) (US) Frei Montalva Text
      2) (RS) "Compañero - La Alegría Ya Viene"
      3) (RS/US) "El Palestro de Hoy"
      4) (RS/US) Claudio Arrau counter-attack
      5) (SE) Sí Anchor – Las Mentiras del NO
      6) (RS) "Sergio Shipley" Atacó
      7) (RS) "Para Que Este Hombre Nunca Gobierne"
      8) (RS) Musical Montaje "Sí Que Sí" New. Ends with digital Sí Sign.
      9) (SE) Sí Spokesman, case of Arrau.
      10) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 10
      11) (RS) Testimonio
      12) (RS) Corto Jingle Del SÍ #1

13) (US) Vox Pop – Por el Sí
14) (RS) SÍ en la cama
15) (RS) Track & Field, Chilean obstacles.
16) (SE) SÍ Spokeswoman – El NO es Anti-Democrático 2.
17) (US) Viuda de Carlos Ursua
18) (SE) Sí Anchor – Así es el terrorismo.
19) (RS) Musical Montage "Sí Que Sí" New. Ends with digital Sí Sign.

- Day 22, Monday, Sept 26 – 10:45 pm:

  - SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 15:01:19
    - # individual segments: 18,
    - Dominant Theme: The violence and dishonesty of the NO.
    - Segments List:
      1) (US) Viuda of militar oficial
      2) (US/RS) Somos millones banderas.
      3) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 9
      4) (RS) Claudio Arrau counter-attack Parte I
      5) (RS) Claudio Arrau counter-attack Parte II
      6) (SE) Sí Anchor – Las Mentiras del NO
      7) (RS) Musical Montaje "Sí Que Sí" V2.
      8) (US) Katherine Salosny
      9) (US) ¿Que Pasa Si Gana El NO?
      10) (US) "Todos Con Pinochet"
      11) (US) Tenis Drama
      12) (US) Hans Gildemeister
      13) (SE) Sí Spokesman, Las amenazas del NO.
      14) (SE) Sí Anchor – El Sí serio y responsable.
      15) (RS) "Todos Con Pinochet" - Editado
      16) (RS) Cuba y La Alegría, "el camaleón".
      17) (US) Bañados – Volodia Attack
      18) (US) Allende – Violencia Revolucionaria

  - NO:
    - Total Run Time: 15:00:01
    - # individual segments: 19,
    - Dominant Theme: Chile is living under the most violent government in its history.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (SE) Patricio Bañados -
      3) (RS) A Violent Government
      4) (RS) Carolina Arregui – Edited
      5) (RS) "La Alegría Ya Viene" Actors Assemble
      6) (SE) "NO-ticias" – Valpo por el NO
      7) (SE) Patricio Bañados – Violencia del Hambre
      8) (US) El Hambre en Chile
      9) (RS) Doña Yolita – "Bolsita de Té"
      10) (US) Marta Cruz-Coke – Las Mujeres Que Quieren?
      11) (SE) Patricio Bañados – Votar Sí/NO
      12) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
      13) (RS) A Violent Government
      14) (US) Mocking Pinochet
      15) (SE) Patricio Bañados – Intro Frei
      16) (US) Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle
      17) (RS) Chile Flag on Horseback
      18) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      19) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Closing

- Day 23, Tuesday, Sept 27 – 10:45 pm:

  - NO:
    - Total Run Time: 15:00:00
    - # individual segments: 15,
    - Dominant Theme: La delincuencia en Chile, la marcha.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (RS) "Estamos En Una Guerra"
      3) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      4) (US) Lack of Security
      5) (US) Carlos Dupre
      6) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
      7) (RS) Claudio Arau
      8) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      9) (RS) Chile Flag on Horseback
      10) (SE) "NO-ticias" cont.
      11) (SE) "NO-ticias" cont.
      12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      13) (US) Luis Maira A
      14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      15) (US) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video – Special Version

  - SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:58:07
    - # individual segments: 27,
    - Dominant Theme: NO is a union between democrats and Marxists.
    - Segments List:
      1) (US) NO death horseman
      2) (RS) Allende – Violencia Revolucionaria
      3) (RS) Street Riot
      4) (RS) Bañados – Volodia Attack
      5) (RS) Allende – Violencia Revolucionaria
      6) (US) Mocking Palestro – Alegría ya viene song
      7) (US) "Para Que Nunca Regrese La UP."
      8) (SE) Sí Anchor – Unión entre demócratas y marxistas
      9) (US) ¡Sí Digamos Que Sí!
      10) (US) Patricio Cornejo
      11) (SE) Nuestro Compromiso V2
      12) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet
      13) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 8
      14) (SE) SÍ Spokeswoman – Masivo apoyo por el Sí.
      15) (US) William Thaver
      16) (SE) Sí Spokesman, Demócratas y marxistas.
      17) (US) "Todos Con Pinochet"
      18) (SE) Nuestro Compromiso V2 – school food.
      19) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet
      20) (RS) NO is a trash can.
      21) (US) Chile la Alegría Ya Viene – Parada el la calle skit
      22) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 8
      23) (SE) Nuestro Compromiso V2 – end unemployment.
      24) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet
      25) (SE) Sí Anchor – No se confunda!
      26) (RS) "Un Túnel Con Salida"
      27) (RS) Somos millones banderas.

- Day 24, Wednesday, Sept 28 – 10:45 pm:

- o SÍ:
  - Total Run Time: 14:50:08
  - # individual segments: 18,
  - Dominant Theme: El NO miente.
  - Segments List:
    1) (SE) Sí Anchor – Challenge NO for program.
    2) (US) Las mentiras del NO.
    3) (SE) Sí Anchor – La gran mentira del NO.
    4) (SE) SÍ Spokesman – Marxistas don't want democracy.
    5) (US) "Vocero de la nueva UP."
    6) (US) Lukas el monero del Sí.
    7) (SE) Nuestro Compromiso V2 – júbilos.
    8) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet
    9) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 7
    10) (RS) NO death horseman
    11) (RS) Allende – Violencia Revolucionaria
    12) (SE) Nuestro Compromiso V2 – Bajar inflación.
    13) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet
    14) (RS) Musical Montaje "Sí Que Sí" V2.
    15) (US) Arturo Jolito – El futuro es el Sí.
    16) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 7
    17) (SE) Sí Anchor – Cuidado con las mentiras del NO.
    18) (SE) SÍ Spokeswoman – Interview with Julio Philippi.

- o NO:
  - Total Run Time: 14:59:27
  - # individual segments: 18,
  - Dominant Theme: La Vivienda y el Negocio
  - Segments List:
    1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
    2) (US) "Estamos En Una Guerra" – La Mujer Version
    3) (SE) Patricio Bañados – El Cambio
    4) (SE) "NO-ticias" – Quien Gana?
    5) (SE) Patricio Bañados – Intro la vivienda
    6) (US) La Vivienda en Chile
    7) (US) Gonzalo Garcia-Huidobro
    8) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
    9) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    10) (US) VOX POP – Man Comments on Poor
    11) (RS) Chile Rainbow Animation
    12) (US) Italo Zunino
    13) (SE) "NO-ticias"
    14) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    15) (US) Gabriel Valdes
    16) (RS) Chile Flag on Horseback
    17) (SE) Patricio Bañados
    18) (RS) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video

- Day 25, Thursday, Sept 29 – 10:45 pm:

  - o ORIGINAL BROADCAST MISSING FROM TVN ARCHIVE, NOT INCLUDED IN DATA SET.

  - o NO:
    - Total Run Time: ~14:59:00
    - # individual segments:_____,
    - Dominant Theme:
    - Segments List:

- o SÍ:
  - Total Run Time: ~14:59:00
  - # individual segments:_____,
  - Dominant Theme:
  - Segments List:
  - Faltan 06.

- **Day 26, Friday, Sept 30 – 10:45 pm**:

  - o SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 15:02:02
    - # individual segments: 25,
    - Dom. Theme: Testimonies for the Sí.
    - Segments List:
      1) (SE) Nuestro Compromiso V2 – Si Pinochet gobierna usted gobierna.
      2) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet
      3) (SE) Sí Anchor – The polls have the Sí winning.
      4) (US) Gallup poll animation, 47% for Sí, 42% for NO.
      5) (US) Sergio Bushmann - FPMR
      6) (RS) NO death horseman
      7) (SE) SÍ Spokeswoman – Intro to D.C. people with Sí.
      8) (US) Juan De Dios Carmona testimonio.
      9) (US) Santiago Gajardo Peillardo testimonio.
      10) (US) Blanca Retamal testimonio.
      11) (RS) Musical Montaje "Sí Que Sí" V2.
      12) (US) Elias Figueroa
      13) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 5
      14) (US) Mountain Call Over Santiago.
      15) (US) Caravana del Sí
      16) (SE) SÍ Spokesman – El Sí es democracia.
      17) (US) Arturo Alessandri Besa – No regresar al caos de 1970.
      18) (US) Mas Caravana del Sí
      19) (SE) Nuestro Compromiso V2 – La paz/ seguridad/ progreso.
      20) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet
      21) (RS) Un Túnel con Salida.
      22) (RS) Somos millones banderas.
      23) (SE) Sí Anchor – Convocatoria.
      24) (US) Carmen Weber Aliaga – ex de Lagos.
      25) (US) Víctor Díaz Caro - FPMR

  - o NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:59:03
    - # individual segments: 23,
    - Dominant Theme: We represent the future of Chile.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (RS) "Estamos En Una Guerra"
      3) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      4) (RS) "NO" Kids Drawings
      5) (SE) "NO-ticias"
      6) (RS) "NO" Baby Chick
      7) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      8) (US) Carmen Frei
      9) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
      10) (SE) Patricio Bañados – Pinochet cut away.
      11) (US) Women Singing – "No Me Gusta" – Special Version
      12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      13) (US) Bastian Bodenhofer & Gonzalo Robles

14) (RS) Pinochet – "Vota Que No"
15) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
16) (US) Jose Manuel Barros
17) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Man's Hand
18) (SE) Patricio Bañados
19) (US) Ricardo Lagos
20) (RS) Chile Flag on Horseback
21) (SE) Patricio Bañados
22) (US) Edited "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video, Special Version
23) (RS) Rainbow "No" Closing

- Day 27, Saturday, Oct 1 – 11:30 am:

  - NO:
    - Total Run Time: 14:45:14
    - # individual segments: 16,
    - Dominant Theme: Happy closure of campaign.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Rainbow "NO" Introduction/ Opening
      2) (US) Maria Maluenda
      3) (RS) "La Alegría Ya Viene" Actors Assemble
      4) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      5) (RS) Chile Flag on Horseback
      6) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      7) (US) Vota Que No"
      8) (RS) "No Más" Voting Boleta – Old Woman's Hand
      9) (US) Actor Commentaries
         a. Jane Fonda, Richard Dreyfuss, Sarita Montiel, Robert Blake, Paloma San, Christopher Reeves, Isabel Allende
      10) (US) "NO" Baby Chick
      11) (US) Strings for NO
      12) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      13) (US) Patricio Aylwin
      14) (RS) Full Length "La Alegría Ya Viene" Jingle w/ Video
      15) (SE) Patricio Bañados
      16) (US) Boleta/ Chile Flag Special Closing

  - SÍ:
    - Total Run Time: 14:48:01
    - # individual segments: 15,
    - Dominant Theme: Pinochet interview.
    - Segments List:
      1) (RS) Bebe of the SÍ
      2) (RS) Somos millones banderas.
      3) (US) "Mañana a la calle – caravanas del triunfo."
      4) (RS) Lukas el monero del Sí.
      5) (SE) Sí Anchor – Last franja – Intro to la mujer.
      6) (US) "Mitty" Marckmann testimonial.
      7) (US) Mountain Call Over Santiago.
      8) (RS) "Mañana a la calle – caravanas del triunfo."
      9) (SE) "Recuerde" Boleta - Día 4
      10) (SE) Sí Anchor – Sign-off and convocatoria.
      11) (RS) "Mañana a la calle – caravanas del triunfo."
      12) (SE) Sí Spokespersons – intro to Pinochet interview.
      13) (US) Pinochet interview.
      14) (RS) Nuestro Compromiso V2 – .
      15) (RS) "Un País Ganador" Mini Transición #3 – Pinochet

END OF TELEVISED FRANJAS

- Sunday, Oct 2. Day 28.

  - o Faltan 3.
  - o The major final event for the NO and for the SÍ campaigns.
  - o

- Monday, Oct 3. Day 29.

  - o Faltan 2.

- Tuesday, Oct 4. Day 30.

  - o Faltan 1.

- Wednesday, Oct 5. Day 31:

  - o Faltan 0.
  - o Wednesday. Voting day. Early counts put the SI on top. As the night went on the NO starting to win, and coverage started to decline. By 10 pm there were only movies being broadcast on TV and people got very nervous that the result would not be respected. Later Pinochet appears on TV to offer concession speech.

Appendix G – Political Classification of Latin American Regimes 1945-2003

Country	Year	Regime		Country	Year	Regime
Argentina	1945	Dic		Guatemala	1945-1953	PD-P
	1946-1951	PD-P	Key:		1954-1985	Dic
	1952-1955	PD-A			1986-2003	PD
	1956-1958	Dic	- Dem, Democratic;			
	1958-1961	PD		Haiti	1945-2003	Dic
	1962	Dic	- PD, Procedural			
	1963-1965	PD	Democracy;	Honduras	1945-1956	Dic
	1966-1972	Dic			1957-1962	PD-P
	1973-1974	PD	- PD-A, Procedural		1963-1981	Dic
	1975	PD	Democracy –		1982-2003	PD
	1976-1982	Dic	Authoritarian;			
	1983-2003	Dem		Mexico	1945-1945	PD
			- PD-P, Procedural		1946-1952	PD-A
Bolivia	1945-1952	Dic	Democracy –		1953-1963	PD
	1953-1963	PD-P	Populist;		1964-1970	PD-A
	1964-1971	Dic			1971-1981	PD
	1972-1981	Dic	- Dic, Dictatorship.		1982-1999	PD-A
	1982-2003	Dem			2000-2003	Dem
			- Red, ISI;			
Brazil	1945	Dic		Nicaragua	1945-1979	Dic
	1946-1963	Dem	- Blue, Neoliberalism.		1980-1990	PD-P
	1964-1984	Dic			1991-2003	PD
	1985-2003	Dem				
				Panama	1945-1947	PD
Chile	1945-1972	Dem			1948-1955	Dic
	1973-1989	Dic			1956-1967	PD
	1990-2003	Dem			1968-1989	Dic
					1990-1993	PD
Colombia	1945-1948	PD-A			1994-2003	Dem
	1949-1957	Dic				
	1958-1973	PD-A		Paraguay	1948-1988	Dic
	1974-1989	Dem			1989-2003	PD
	1990-2003	PD				
				Peru	1945-1947	PD
Costa Rica	1945-1948	PD			1948-1955	Dic
	1949-1981	Dem			1956-1961	PD
	1982-2003	Dem			1962	Dic
					1963-1967	Dem
Dominican	1945-1965	Dic			1968-1979	Dic
Republic	1966-1973	PD-A			1980-1982	Dem
	1974-1977	Dic			1983-1984	PD
	1978-1993	Dem			1985-1987	Dem
	1994-1995	PD			1988-1991	PD
	1996-2003	Dem			1992-1994	Dic
					1995-2000	PD
Ecuador	1945-1947	Dic			2001-2003	Dem
	1948-1962	PD-A				
	1963-1967	Dic		Uruguay	1945-1972	Dem
	1968-1969	PD-A			1973-1984	Dic
	1970-1978	Dic			1985-2003	Dem
	1979-1999	Dem				
	2000	PD		Venezuela	1945	Dic
	2001-2003	Dem			1946	PD
					1947	Dem
El Salvador	1945-1983	Dic			1948-1957	Dic
	1984-1991	PD-A			1958-1979	Dem
	1992-2003	Dem			1980-1998	PD-A
					1999-2001	Dem
					2002-2003	PD-P

SOURCE: Adapted from Hagopian and Mainwaring 3.

NOTE: The year of a regime transition is coded as belonging to the new regime.

Appendix H – Latin American Electoral Rolls, 1950 – 2005.*

Electoral Rolls (excludes non-procedural democracies)

	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	
Argentina	8.6	0	10.2	11.5	0	15	0	18.7	20.3	22.2	24.3	26.1	Argentina
Belize	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.067	0.085	0.093	0.105	0.135	Belize
Bolivia	1	1.1	1.3	0	0	0	0	2.1	2.2	3	3.9	3.7	Bolivia
Brazil	0	15.1	18	0	0	0	0	0	83.8	100	110	124	Brazil
Chile	0.6	1.2	1.8	2.9	3.3	0	0	0	7.6	8.1	8.1	8.2	Chile
Colombia	2.8	0	4.4	6.1	7.7	10	13	15	13.8	18	22	26.5	Colombia
Costa Rica	0.166	0.295	0.4	0.55	0.675	0.95	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.2	Costa Rica
Cuba	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Cuba
Domin Republic	0	0	0	0	1.8	2.1	2.5	2.9	3.3	3.7	4.3	5.3	Domin Republic
Ecuador	0.432	0.7	1	0	0	0	2.1	4.1	5.3	6.5	7.7	9	Ecuador
El Salvador	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.8	1.7	2	2.8	3.3	3.6	El Salvador
French Guiana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	French Guiana
Guatemala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.2	3.7	4.6	5.5	Guatemala
Guyana	0	0	0	0	0.3	0.425	0.43	0.43	0.381	0.4	0.44	0.492	Guyana
Haiti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.3	3.7	4.2	3.5	Haiti
Honduras	0.3	0.411	0.65	0	0	0	0	1.9	2.5	2.8	3.3	4	Honduras
Mexico	3	8.9	10	13.7	21.7	25	28	35.3	39	47	58.8	70	Mexico
Nicaragua	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	1.6	1.8	2.4	2.8	3.7	Nicaragua
Panama	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.5	1.7	2	Panama
Paraguay	0.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2.2	2.7	Paraguay
Peru	0.776	1.6	2	2.7	0	0	0	8.3	10	12.4	14.6	16	Peru
Puerto Rico	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	Puerto Rico
Suriname	0	0	0	0	0	0.16	0.17	0.2	0.247	0.269	0.265	0.334	Suriname
Uruguay	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.8	0	0	0	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.5	Uruguay
Venezuela	0	0	3	4	4.2	5	7	8.5	9.5	10.5	11.7	14.3	Venezuela
	19.074	30.606	54.25	43.15	41.475	58.635	57.7	102.197	214.313	255.262	292.91	333.761	
LATI	19	31	54	43	42	59	58	102	214	255	293	334	

* Excluding non-procedural democracies.   *Sources: IDEA.*

Appendix I – Latin American Total Radio and Television Receivers, 1997 - 2003

	A	B	C	D	E	F
150						
151	Radio Receivers per 1000, 1997 - 2003 ITU					
152				pop millions	total tvs millions	
153		Argentina	697	38	26.5	
154		Belize	50	0.274	0.014	
155		Bolivia	671	8.8	5.9	
156		Brazil	433	181.8	78.7	
157		Chile	759	16	12.1	
158		Colombia	548	43.7	23.9	
159		Costa Rica	816	4.2	3.4	
160		Cuba	185	11.2	2.1	
161		Domin Republic	181	9.2	1.7	
162		Ecuador	422	12.8	5.4	
163		El Salvador	481	6.5	3.1	
164		French Guiana	25	0.175	0.004	
165		Guatemala	79	12.1	0.948	
166		Guyana	50	0.738	0.037	
167		Haiti	18	9	0.162	
168		Honduras	411	6.6	2.7	
169		Mexico	330	101	33.3	
170		Nicaragua	270	5.3	1.4	
171		Panama	300	3.1	0.93	
172		Paraguay	188	5.7	1.1	
173		Peru	269	26.6	7.2	
174		Puerto Rico	761	3.9	3	
175		Suriname	50	0.447	0.02	
176		Uruguay	603	3.3	20.8	
177		Venezuela	292	25.7	7.5	
178			8889		241.915	
179						

Sources: ITU

Appendix J – Latin American Total Population in Millions, 1950 - 2005

		1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005		
	Total Population in Millions														
	Argentina	17.2	19	20.6	22.3	24	26	28.1	30.3	32.6	35.8	36.9	38.7		Argentina
	Belize	0.069	0.08	0.091	0.107	0.12	0.129	0.146	0.166	0.189	0.217	0.25	0.292		Belize
	Bolivia	2.7	3	3.4	3.7	4.2	4.8	5.4	6	6.7	7.5	8.3	9.2		Bolivia
	Brazil	54	63	72.7	84.3	96	108.1	121.6	136.1	149.5	161.6	174.2	186.8		Brazil
	Chile	6.1	6.8	7.6	8.7	9.6	10.4	11.2	12.1	13.2	14.4	15.4	16.3		Chile
	Colombia	12	13.8	16.8	19.6	22.5	25.3	28.4	31.6	34.9	38.3	41.7	44.9		Colombia
	Costa Rica	0.966	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.1	2.3	2.7	3.1	3.5	3.9	4.3		Costa Rica
	Cuba	5.9	6.5	7.1	8	8.7	9.4	9.8	10.1	10.6	10.9	11.1	11.3		Cuba
	Domin Republic	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.9	4.6	5.3	5.9	6.6	7.3	8	8.7	9.5		Domin Republic
	Ecuador	3.4	3.9	4.4	5.1	6	6.9	8	9.1	10.3	11.4	12.3	13.1		Ecuador
	El Salvador	2.2	2.4	2.6	3	3.6	4.1	4.6	4.8	5.1	5.6	6.2	6.7		El Salvador
	French Guiana	0.025	0.029	0.032	0.04	0.048	0.056	0.068	0.088	0.116	0.139	0.165	0.202		French Guiana
	Guatemala	3.1	3.6	4.1	4.7	5.4	6.2	7	7.9	8.9	10	11.2	12.7		Guatemala
	Guyana	0.423	0.486	0.569	0.645	0.709	0.734	0.761	0.754	0.731	0.739	0.734	0.739		Guyana
	Haiti	3.2	3.5	3.9	4.3	4.7	5.1	5.7	6.4	7.1	7.8	8.6	9.3		Haiti
	Honduras	1.5	1.7	2	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.9	5.6	6.2	6.8		Honduras
	Mexico	27.7	32.3	36.9	43.1	50.6	59.1	67.6	75.5	83.2	91.1	98	103.1		Mexico
	Nicaragua	1.3	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.8	3.3	3.7	4.1	4.7	5.1	5.5		Nicaragua
	Panama	0.86	0.977	1.1	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.4	2.7	2.9	3.2		Panama
	Paraguay	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.7	3.1	3.6	4.2	4.8	5.3	5.9		Paraguay
	Peru	7.6	8.7	9.9	11.5	13.2	15.2	17.3	19.5	21.8	23.9	25.7	27.3		Peru
	Puerto Rico	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.6	2.7	3	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.7	3.8	3.9		Puerto Rico
	Suriname	0.215	0.25	0.29	0.332	0.372	0.364	0.356	0.383	0.402	0.416	0.436	0.452		Suriname
	Uruguay	2.2	2.4	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.9	3	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.3		Uruguay
	Venezuela	5.1	6.2	7.6	9.1	10.7	12.7	15.1	17.5	19.8	22	24.3	26.6		Venezuela
		163.858	188.022	214.782	247.224	281.349	318.083	357.331	397.691	437.738	478.011	514.685	550.085		
	USA	5	6	6.8	7	9.6	10	14.6	20	22.4	27	35.3	42.7		
		168.858	194.022	221.582	254.224	290.949	328.083	371.931	417.691	460.138	505.011	549.985	592.785		
	LATI	164	188	215	247	281	318	357	398	460	478	515	550		

Sources: UNdata and WDI.

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Appendix K – Latin America, Percent of Households with Television, 1950 – 2005.

% TVs per Household	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005
Argentina	0	1.2	6.3	22	44	46	54	64	75	86	95	95
Belize								14	16	37	35	93
Bolivia	0	0	0	0	3	4	22	27	44	47	46	63
Brazil	0	0.6	2	17	20	23	35	53	60	81	84	90
Chile	0	0	0	2	18	39	36	51	78	90	94	97
Colombia	0	0.7	2	6	12	22	28	30	50	70	80	85
Costa Rica	0	0	7	11	20	23	24	27	72	76	84	89
Cuba	2	5	9	12	15	21	44	62	38	64	68	70
Domin Republic	0	1	2	5	8	13	26	29	31	35	74	76
Ecuador	0	0	0.7	3	9	12	21	22	29	54	76	85
El Salvador	0	0	1	4	10	13	25	28	45	74	82	83
French Guiana	0	0	0	0	18	39	72	68	63	63	83	81
Guatemala	0	0	3	5	5	7	10	10	21	31	39	50
Guyana									12	15	31	59
Haiti	0	0	0	0	0.2	2	2	2	2	17	23	27
Honduras	0	0	0	0.3	3	4	7	27	30	36	44	57
Mexico	0	1	8	11	14	16	20	41	54	86	90	93
Nicaragua	0	0	1	4	11	15	24	25	31	53	59	60
Panama	0	0	11	21	34	42	46	62	65	67	78	79
Paraguay	0	0	0	8	9	10	11	12	26	68	75	79
Peru	0	0	4	8	13	18	23	34	42	63	67	66
Puerto Rico	0	18	28	36	41	57	61	68	72	88	87	97
Suriname	0	0	0	6	20	25	30	31	37	59	65	66
Uruguay	0	0	9	17	23	29	29	54	78	81	82	92
Venezuela	0	6	15	32	45	46	51	59	67	80	82	91
	0.09	1.456521739	4.739130435	10.01304348	17.18260869	22.86956522	30.47826087	37.5	45.52	60.84	68.92	76.92
LATI	0.09	2	5	10	17	23	31	38	46	61	69	77

Sources: UNESCO, WDI, and ITU.

Appendix L – Latin American Urbanization, 1950 – 2005.

% Urban	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005		
Argentina	65.3	69.6	74	76	79	81	83	85	87	89	90	91		Argentina
Belize	55.3	54.7	54	52.5	51	50.2	49.4	48.4	47.5	47.5	47.8	50.2		Belize
Bolivia	33.8	35.3	36.8	38.3	39.8	41.3	45.5	50.5	55.6	59.4	61.8	64.2		Bolivia
Brazil	36.2	40.5	45	50	56	62	67	71	75	78	81	84		Brazil
Chile	58	63	68	72	75	78	81	83	83	84	86	88		Chile
Colombia	33	39	45	51	55	58	62	66	68	70	72	74		Colombia
Costa Rica	34	34	34	36	39	41	43	46	51	56	59	62		Costa Rica
Cuba	57	58	58	59	60	64	68	71	73	74	76	76		Cuba
Domin Republic	24	27	30	35	40	46	51	54	55	58	62	67		Domin Republic
Ecuador	28	31	34	37	39	42	47	51	55	58	60	64		Ecuador
El Salvador	37	37	38	39	39	42	44	47	49	54	58	60		El Salvador
French Guiana	54	59	63	66	67	69	71	73	75	75	75	76		French Guiana
Guatemala	25	28	31	34	36	37	37	39	41	43	45	47		Guatemala
Guyana	28	29	29	29	29	30	30	30	30	29	29	28		Guyana
Haiti	12	14	16	18	20	20	20	23	28	33	36	43		Haiti
Honduras	18	20	23	26	29	32	35	38	40	42	44	46		Honduras
Mexico	43	47	51	55	59	63	66	69	71	73	75	76		Mexico
Nicaragua	35	37	40	43	47	49	50	51	52	54	55	56		Nicaragua
Panama	36	39	41	44	48	49	50	52	54	60	66	71		Panama
Paraguay	35	35	36	36	37	39	42	45	49	52	55	58		Paraguay
Peru	41	44	47	52	57	62	65	67	69	70	71	71		Peru
Puerto Rico	41	42	44	52	58	63	67	69	72	87	95	97		Puerto Rico
Suriname	47	47	47	47	46	50	55	64	68	70	72	74		Suriname
Uruguay	78	79	80	81	82	83	85	87	89	90	91	92		Uruguay
Venezuela	47	55	62	67	72	76	79	82	84	87	90	92		Venezuela
	40.064	42.564	45.072	47.832	50.392	53.1	55.716	58.476	60.844	63.716	66.104	68.296		
LATI	40	43	45	48	50	53	56	59	61	64	66	68		

Appendix M – Latin American Total TV Receivers in Millions, 1950 – 2005.

Total TVs in Millions	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	
Argentina	0.007	0.076	0.443	1.6	3.5	4	5.1	6.5	8.1	9.6	11.5	12.6	Argentina
Belize								0.023	0.031	0.039	0.044	0.12	Belize
Bolivia					0.035	0.045	0.3	0.42	0.75	0.85	0.99	1.4	Bolivia
Brazil	0.00002	0.141	0.76	5	6.7	8.4	14.8	25	30.8	38.9	58.3	67	Brazil
Chile		0	0.00005	0.052	0.509	1.2	1.2	1.8	2.7	3.6	4.2	5.1	Chile
Colombia	0	0.03	0.1	0.35	0.81	1.6	2.3	2.8	3.8	7.3	11.9	12.8	Colombia
Costa Rica	0	0	0.025	0.5	0.1	0.137	0.155	0.2	0.62	0.75	0.94	1	Costa Rica
Cuba	0.03	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.595	1.3	1.9	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.4	Cuba
Domin Republic	0	0.01	0.02	0.5	0.1	0.18	0.4	0.5	0.6	1.3	1.6	2	Domin Republic
Ecuador		0	0.01	0.042	0.15	0.252	0.5	0.6	0.88	1.7	2.8	3.4	Ecuador
El Salvador		0	0.01	0.035	0.092	0.135	0.3	0.35	0.6	0.97	1.5	1.6	El Salvador
French Guiana		0	0	0.00013	0.0024	0.0062	0.014	0.017	0.021	0.025	0.039	0.047	French Guiana
Guatemala		0	0.032	0.055	0.072	0.11	0.175	0.207	0.475	0.6	1.6	2	Guatemala
Guyana									0.028	0.035	0.07		Guyana
Haiti	0	0	0	0	0.011	0.015	0.017	0.019	0.028	0.25	0.38	0.586	Haiti
Honduras	0	0	0	0.00022	0.022	0.034	0.065	0.28	0.37	0.45	0.75	1	Honduras
Mexico		0.5	0.75	1.2	1.8	2.7	3.8	8.5	12.4	20	28	30	Mexico
Nicaragua		0	0.005	0.016	0.055	0.083	0.16	0.19	0.258	0.475	0.61	0.71	Nicaragua
Panama		0	0.03	0.07	0.13	0.185	0.225	0.35	0.4	0.47	0.55	0.65	Panama
Paraguay		0	0	0.035	0.045	0.054	0.068	0.085	0.22	0.75	1.2	1.4	Paraguay
Peru		0	0.1	0.21	0.395	0.61	0.895	1.5	2.1	3.3	3.8	6	Peru
Puerto Rico	0	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.41	0.63	0.725	0.85	0.93	1.2	1.3	1.3	Puerto Rico
Suriname	0	0	0	0.007	0.028	0.034	0.04	0.044	0.055	0.08	0.11	0.12	Suriname
Uruguay	0	0	0.1	0.2	0.28	0.351	0.363	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.3	Uruguay
Venezuela	0	0.08	0.25	0.65	0.95	1.3	1.7	2.3	3.2	3.7	4.5	5.6	Venezuela
	0.03702	1.087	3.08505	11.1755	16.5964	22.6562	34.602	55.135	72.666	99.644	140.283	160.133	
LATI	0.04	1.1	3.1	11.2	16.6	22.7	34.6	55.1	72.7	99.6	140.3	160.1	

Sources: UNESCO, WDI, and ITU.

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