

UCLA

Community Service Projects/Papers

Title

How Important are Cost Concerns?: Public Opinion on Immigrants in Southern California Part II

Permalink

<https://escholarship.org/uc/item/0609853d>

Author

Haselhoff, Kim

Publication Date

2010-03-24

PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRANTS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PART II: HOW IMPORTANT ARE COST CONCERNS?

March 24, 2010

Kim Haselhoff
Post-Doctoral Researcher
Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies
School of Public Affairs
University of California, Los Angeles
3250 Public Policy Building
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1656

Email: kim.haselhoff@ucla.edu

Funding for this project provided by the John Randolph Haynes and Dora Haynes Foundation

In the report “Are they Welcome? Understanding Public Opinion on Immigrants in Southern California” (Haselhoff, 2008), I found that perceptions of immigrant costs have a strong effect on public attitudes toward restricting immigration. This current report expands on the original by determining which type of people are most concerned with the economic impacts of immigration. For simplicity I focus primarily on illegal immigration. As a group, whites are the most likely to indicate concern with immigration costs, so I try to predict what factors explain these attitudes. Latinos are least likely to cite costs, but I also try to determine if the same factors predict cost concerns in this group as with whites. I find distinct differences between the groups when it comes to the factors underlying cost concerns.

Perceptions of the economic impact of immigration are a significant factor related to other opinions on immigration because some natives see immigration in terms of competition for resources. The literature identifies immigrant cost concerns in several ways, referring to it alternately as the “impact of immigrants” (generally referring to costs and labor market competition), as zero sum competition, and as group threat. In a zero sum game perspective, more gains for immigrants equal more losses for natives. Similarly group threat theory explains, “attitudes of dominant group members toward a subordinate group are influenced by fears among dominants that they will be put at a systematic disadvantage to subordinates” (Wilson, 2001, 485). Although the theory applies to any “ingroup” and “outgroup”, immigrants are often seen as an out-group that poses a threat to native jobs and resources.

There are several cost aspects related to immigration, as explained in the main report. These costs include increased taxes, competition for resources, and even labor market competition. Additional costs, particularly in California, include tax burdens for education, welfare, health and law enforcement. Many of the costs associated with educating children of immigrants, legal and undocumented, as well as medical treatment for uninsured immigrants are mandated federally but are borne locally or at the state level with little reimbursement from the federal government. Proposition 187, a ballot initiative passed in California in 1994 was an example of native resentment and reaction to the costs of immigration in the state. The Proposition intended to end state funded services for all undocumented immigrants, including health care services and K-12 education. The measure passed with significant support but was struck down in court. However anti-immigrant rhetoric continues to focus on these types of costs.

The Literature on Public Opinion and the Costs of Immigration

The existing literature examines how economic concerns influence public opinion on immigration policy more generally. Several have found that perceptions of immigrant cost strongly influence a respondent’s restrictiveness on immigration. Most find that those who believe that immigrants take away jobs, don’t pay their fair share of taxes, and more generally have a pessimistic view of the national economy are more restrictive on immigration.

One of the more recent studies (Fennelly & Federico, 2008) of national attitudes toward immigration finds that rural residents are more likely to support restrictive immigration policies than residents in other areas. However the authors explain that the perceived costs of immigration are actually the strongest predictors of restrictionist views (and actually explain rural residents' views).

Ilias, et al. (2008) examined national opinion data on both legal (general immigration policies) and illegal (guest worker program) immigration. In their study respondent perception of "costs", measured as the belief that immigrants take jobs away from Americans, proved to be the most important determinant of attitudes toward both legal and illegal immigration. They also find that those with a pessimistic view of economic conditions are more opposed to illegal immigration.

Wilson (2001) also finds perceptions of immigrants as an economic threat to be a factor in attitudes toward both legal and undocumented immigrants. Looking at national data from 1994 his findings show "not only that Americans overwhelmingly oppose policies benefiting immigrants but also that Americans who believe that immigrants threaten employment and economic growth are particularly likely to do so" (496).

Espenshade and Hemsstead (1996) examine several factors affecting national attitudes toward legal immigration and also find that the "impact" of immigration is key. Those who felt that new immigrants do not take jobs away and that immigrants contribute to the country were most supportive of immigration. Perceptions of the US economy were also a factor; those who foresaw a worsening economy were more restrictive on immigration policy.

Citrin, et al, (1997) find similar associations between the belief that immigrants would harm employment opportunities and negatively effect taxes, and support for restricting immigration. Additionally they find pessimism about national economic conditions (not personal economic circumstances) leads to more restrictionist views. Barkan's (2003) extensive analysis of public opinion on immigration (legal and illegal) in California finds that both of these conclusions "*may* have a broader application than just for the few issues they tested" (268).

Burns and Gimpel (2000) look at the effects of both racial prejudice and economic insecurity in explaining public opinion on immigration policy. Though they find a role for both factors, they find specifically that pessimism about the national economy is more important than evaluations of personal economic situations.

Chandler and Tsai (2001) also found that views of the national economy were related to attitudes toward immigrants, with those holding pessimistic assessments indicating more anti-immigrant views than those who were more optimistic.

Recent research by Buckler, et al. (2009) looks specifically at public opinion on illegal migration policy, testing several core hypotheses from the literature. They find the strongest predictors of support for increased controls on illegal immigration to be the cultural threat (migrants represent a threat to American culture) and the cultural affinity (measured here as Hispanic or non-Hispanic and

whether both parents were U.S. born) measures. Individuals who believe that migrants take jobs away and do not pay their fair share of taxes were much more supportive of increased controls on illegal immigration. These variables were significant in each of the four regressions. Education (also a measure of economic security) was also significant, with the more highly educated more supportive of increased immigration controls in three of the four cases (but were actually less likely to support a constitutional amendment denying citizenship to children of illegal immigrants).

Finally, at least one recent study has found that media coverage of immigration costs also boosts anti-immigration sentiment by increasing anxiety (Brader, et. al. 2008). Particularly negative effects were found when the news emphasized Latinos. “Our results show that, while news emphasizing the costs of immigration boosts the perception that immigration is harmful, ethnic cues strongly condition emotional reactions to this news. Stigmatized out-groups, in this case Latino immigrants, trigger negative emotions when costs are emphasized” (975). They note that even when harmful consequences of other groups were perceived, “hostile attitudes and actions flared only when group cues elicited anxiety” (ibid). This research lends more support to the contention that cost concerns strongly influence attitudes toward immigrants, particularly in southern California where most immigrants (particularly illegal immigrants) are Latino.

Latino Public Opinion

Although the volume of literature on Latino public opinion is much smaller than for whites, several studies have found that acculturation strongly affects Latino opinion on immigration, among other issues. The more acculturated are less supportive of immigrants. In a study of Latino opinion on legal immigration Hood, et al (1997), found the “most acculturated Hispanics expressing the most support for restricting legal immigration” (640). The most acculturated in their study include those born in the US, parents born in the US, and those who believe speaking English is important. They also found age and education to be significant, with older Hispanics and more highly educated Hispanics more opposed to immigration. As for the connection to costs, “Hispanic respondents who were highly educated felt more threatened by increased levels of legal immigration. Apparently, as education levels rise, sensitivity to the potential tax burden associated with increased immigration also rises” (640).

Branton (2007), examining the effect of acculturation on Latino attitudes on various policy issues, including immigration, found less acculturated Latinos more likely to support less restrictive immigration policies than more acculturated Latinos. She also used generational status (foreign born, native born with foreign born parents, or native born with native parents) as a measure, as well as language competence. She finds acculturation to be “significantly related to Latino attitudes toward immigration and illegal immigrants” (296).

Sanchez (2006) examined the effect of group consciousness on Latino public opinion and noted that nativity and length of time spent in the US significantly affect Latino political attitudes in several different policy areas.

Some of the previously cited studies that were not specifically focused on Latinos also support this literature, finding that, for example, those with foreign born parents and those with cultural ties to immigrant communities are more supportive of immigrants (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Buckler et al 2009).

The Connection Between Restrictive Attitudes on Immigration and Cost Concerns

An initial analysis of the 2007 Southern California Survey (SCS) used both in this report and the original report, also illustrates the link between cost concerns and restrictiveness on immigration. The three survey questions related to the cost burden of immigrants were as follows: 1) do you think that immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want? 2) do you think that immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not? 3) what do you think is the net effect of immigration on the southern California economy? These questions were asked for both legal and illegal immigrants. Table 1 illustrates the connection between concerns about the costs imposed by immigrants and a more restrictive attitude toward both legal and illegal immigration. We see that those who believe immigrants impose costs are more likely to feel that immigration should be decreased than those who don't believe immigrants to be costly.

Table 2 indicates the overall level of concern with each of these costs for both legal and undocumented immigrants. The table illustrates that there is significantly more concern regarding the cost of illegal immigrants. And in southern California at least, the possibility that undocumented immigrants take away jobs is a minor concern compared to worries that they use more in services than they pay in taxes and that they have a negative impact on the local economy. Among all respondents 55% say illegal immigrants cost more in services than they pay in taxes and 43% say they impose a net cost on the region (although an equal 43% said they are a net benefit). As much of the concern is directed at illegal immigrant costs, and also to simplify, I focus the regression analysis on explaining concern with illegal immigrant costs only.

Comparisons by ethnicity indicate that whites (94% of whom are native born) are more restrictive on immigration and also more likely to cite cost concerns than other groups. Latinos (56% of whom are foreign born) are most accommodating toward immigrants, particularly illegal immigrants. When we look at the response to these same cost questions among native-born whites we see an even greater level of concern. In this group 89% said that illegal immigrants cost more in services, and 72% said they impose a net cost to the region, while only 25% see them as a benefit. In contrast, among Latinos only 24% say illegal immigrants harm the economy while 45% say they cost more in services. As to whether illegal immigrants take away jobs, 20% of native whites agreed with this statement versus only 7% of

Latinos (see Table 3). The data also indicate an overlap in concern among these three issue areas. For example, of those who say that illegal immigrants cost more in services than they pay in taxes, 84% also say they harm the economy. It appears to be a core group of people who are most concerned about all of these costs.

Another aspect of this report is to see if the same factors influence cost concerns among whites and Latinos despite the disparity in opinion on this issue. Table 4 presents simple crosstabs between the cost question “do you think that illegal immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?” and several independent variables broken down by group. We see that there are different factors influencing cost concerns among Latinos and whites. For Latinos, income, education and ties to the immigrant community are key. For Whites, education, gender, ideology, and contact with immigrants are key. While not all of these results hold up when accounting for other factors, the regression analysis further establishes the validity of some of these relationships.

Methodology

The data used in this report comes from the same 2007 Southern California Survey (SCS) used in the previous report (see original report for more information on the survey). While there were 1502 total respondents in the survey the regression analysis here uses only whites (N=551) and Latinos (N=474) separately. (The Ns for each regression model are included in the tables). Descriptive statistics for each group are included in Table 5. Contextual data are 2006 Census estimates from Geolytics (2006) merged into the public opinion data by matching zip codes.

Dependent Variables

Three different dependent variables are used here as measures of the perceived cost of illegal immigrants. The first two dependent variables are based on the responses to the following questions: 1) do you think that illegal immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not? The responses were coded as a 1 for those who disagree (who think that illegal immigrants cost more in services than they pay in taxes) and 0 for those who agree or were neutral on this question. 2) what do you think is the net effect of illegal immigration on the southern California economy? Responses were coded as 1 for those who believe immigrants harm the economy, and 0 for those who believe they contribute or were neutral on this issues. Binary logit regressions are run for both of these dependent variables.

The third variable is an immigrant cost score assigned to respondents based on their responses to three questions: these two above (originally 5 point response scales) as well as the question about whether illegal immigrants take away jobs or take jobs Americans don't want. Scores range from 0 (low cost) to 6 (high cost) with a mean of 1.67, in increments of 0.5. Ordinary least squares regression is run for this variable.

Independent Variables

The independent variables (see Table 6) reflect some of the theories reviewed in the literature on public opinion and immigration, including economic security, ideology, contact with immigrants, context, culture ties (for Latinos) and demographics. Binary variables were generally coded so that “1” indicates the hypothesized result for higher immigrant costs.

The demographic variables include age, measured in years as well as gender (1=female, 0=male) as both have been shown to affect attitudes toward immigrants and immigration. Here initial crosstabs indicate that among whites women are more concerned with costs so in this dummy variable men are the excluded group.

Economic security is measured with three variables, “not employed” (1=yes, 0 = no), personal economic insecurity (1 = economically insecure, 0 = secure or neutral), and education, which includes three groups so a dummy variable is used. Some college and college degree were included, no college or less was the excluded group. (While income would have been a relevant economic security measure, the large non-response rate to this question forced me to drop the variable from the analysis).

Many of the studies in the literature also found that perceptions of national economic conditions had a significant effect on opinions of immigrants. Perceptions of future economic conditions particularly can be predictive of opinion on immigrant policies. Lacking a similar question I substituted a response to questions about quality of life in southern California now (1 = things are going badly, 0 = things are going well or neutral) and also in the next twelve months (1 = will get worse, 0 = stay the same or improve).

Ideological beliefs are measured by a dummy variable indicating those who identify as conservatives (1=yes, 0 = no).

Contact with immigrants was measured with three variables, whether the respondent has friends or relatives who are recent immigrants (1=yes, 0 = no), whether recent immigrants live in their neighborhood (1=yes, 0 = no), and whether the respondent works with any recent immigrant coworkers (1=yes, 0 = no).

The contextual level variables include three levels of foreign-born residents in the respondent’s ZCTA (low foreign born is the excluded category) and three education levels of the respondent’s ZCTA (low education is the excluded category). I should note that I also tested the median income for the ZCTA here and the results were not significant whereas the results for education were significant in some cases. I did not include both together because of multicollinearity (.691, $p < .01$).

Finally, for Latinos I looked at whether they are native born (1 = yes, 0 = no) or not and whether they have at least one parent who is foreign born (1 = no, 0 = yes).

Results

As the sample sizes in this analysis were not large, within each group I compare results across the three models, looking for consistency. For both whites and Latinos the results were fairly consistent. Additionally, results between the two groups, whites and Latinos, were quite distinct. For whites many of the same factors underlie cost concerns as underlie attitudes toward restricting immigration, such as ideology, education, and context. Perceptions of future quality of life in the region are also significant. For Latinos we also find similar results to the literature on Latino support for immigrants, including finding that more acculturated Latinos are more likely to cite cost concerns than others.

Native Whites

For whites there were several consistent predictors of cost concerns (Table 7). The strongest predictor was believing that quality of life in the region would get worse over the next twelve months. Although not directly comparable to other studies that used questions regarding perceptions of the national economy, combined with the lack of results for personal economic security it does replicate the finding that perceptions of the national or local economic environment can be more influential on attitudes toward immigrants than one's personal economic situation. Quality of life in an area is a subjective idea, but often includes such factors as transportation, education, pollution, population growth, open space, etc., all of which are impacted by immigration as well as the general economic health of a region.

Conservative ideology also predicted immigrant cost concerns, proving significant across all three models. Conservative ideology was a consistent predictor of restrictiveness on illegal immigration in the original report as well. This analysis indicates at least some of conservative opposition to illegal immigration is based on the economic impact.

One form of contact with immigrants, having a friend or family member who is a recent immigrant, predicts that one will be less likely to believe that immigrants cost more than they contribute. So those who lack immigrant friends or family will be more likely to have cost concerns. Having immigrant neighbors had no effect at all in these models, unlike in the original study where having immigrant neighbors actually made a respondent more restrictive on immigration. (In that report I hypothesized that immigrant neighbors may be viewed more in terms of an "outgroup" encroaching on an area, as opposed to providing for meaningful interactions between the two groups, which might make respondents more supportive of immigrants). And once again I found no effect from having co-workers who are recent immigrants. Taken together these results suggest that having immigrant neighbors or co-workers does not necessarily have the same effect on people as having a closer relationship such as with a friend or family member.

Female gender was positive and significant in two of the models here, validating the bivariate results that among whites women are more likely than men to believe that illegal immigrants are a net cost to the region. My original report found that men are more likely to favor tightening the border but otherwise results for gender were not significant so this is an interesting result. Perhaps men and women have different

objections to illegal immigration. Men may be more concerned with security while women worry about the economic impact.

And finally, one of the context variables was also significant in two of the models; those living in an area with a medium level of education are more likely to be concerned with the cost of illegal immigrants than those living in areas with higher or lower levels of education. This is similar to the results in the original study in which those with “some college” education were more restrictive on immigration than those with a college degree or higher, or high school or less education. Here I did find “some college” to be significant in one of the models as well. Again, I hypothesize that those with some level of education are more likely to be aware of the costs of illegal immigration than those with lower levels of education, and also perhaps feel the impacts of it more than those with higher levels of education. Notably the education level of the ZCTA has an effect independent of the foreign-born population of the ZCTA (I noted previously that I found no effect for median income of the ZCTA, though this model was not included in the final results).

Percent foreign born did not yield significant results here though it was significant in the original report, where those in a ZCTA with a low percentage of foreign born residents were more likely to oppose a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants. Additional research on contextual level factors could be useful in more accurately understanding these results, as well as the finding in the original report that having immigrant neighbors makes one less supportive of immigration. Sorting out contextual influences is tricky but could provide useful information.

Latinos

The three regression models for Latinos provide fewer significant variables but the two most significant results indicate that cultural ties are key (see Table 8). Native-born Latinos are most likely to be concerned with the costs of illegal immigrants, a result that was consistent across all three models. Those with at least one native born parent were also more concerned with costs. These results validate previous studies that found time spent in the U.S. to be influential on Latino attitudes toward immigrants. Although results were less consistent, the models also found that those without recent immigrant friends or family and those with at least some college were also more likely to indicate cost concerns. Both variables are also generally indicative of more time spent in the U.S.

These results indicate that as Latinos spend more time in the U.S. they tend to become more like whites in terms of their attitudes toward illegal immigrants and the costs these immigrants impose. It may be that ethnicity is not the driving factor here, rather immigrant status, or ties to an immigrant community. Unfortunately we do not have enough foreign-born whites in this sample to test this hypothesis but it is something to keep in mind for future research.

Conclusion

This study does validate the importance of cost concerns in relation to illegal immigration. The native born white population in southern California bases a great deal of their feelings toward immigrants and immigration policy on perceived costs and how these costs affect the region, and probably even the state. Given the current budget problems in the state of California and the deep recession and unemployment facing Californians it is likely that any reforms made at the present time would be tough on illegal immigrants. The importance that respondents place on cost concerns again leads me to emphasize that some of these cost perceptions may not be accurate. While immigrants, both legal and illegal contribute to the indirect costs and overall burden of population growth, traffic, overcrowding, and service costs, estimates of direct government costs, often cited by anti-immigrant groups, are difficult to estimate. Most research finds that immigrants use services to a much lesser extent than natives. A fair and balanced discussion in the media of the costs and benefits of immigration, both legal and illegal would be helpful, (particularly given the findings of the study cited here that media coverage of costs strongly influences attitudes toward immigration). If opinions on immigration are heavily based on cost perceptions, then the public should be provided more objective information.

On a positive note, the research again finds that contact with immigrants is a factor in attitudes toward immigrants; in this case we find that those with friends or family who are recent immigrants are less likely to cite cost concerns. This was true among both whites and Latinos. In fact, for Latinos, ethnicity may be less of a factor in attitudes toward immigration than simply their level of acculturation and degree of contact with recent immigrants. As the immigrant population continues to expand, both locally and nationwide, perhaps so will the opportunity for meaningful interactions among groups, which may lead to more support for immigrants, both legal and illegal.

Finally, one possibility is that some of the concern with costs stems from perceptions of what is “fair” as opposed to an outright rejection of immigrants. As noted in the original report (see p. 6), Californians in general are willing to provide a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants as long as there are stringent requirements to be met. There is not an overwhelming urge to simply deport them all (though the latest data from the Public Policy Institute of California (2009) indicates that the number of respondents who prefer to deport them has increased slightly from 23% in 2006 to 28% in 2009, perhaps due to the recession). Perhaps residents are not necessarily opposed to integrating undocumented immigrants, just to paying extra tax dollars to support them, and to the idea of these immigrants receiving citizenship and other benefits ahead of those coming here legally, both of which may be regarded as unfair. If congress could finally tackle immigration reform and provide a sensible plan to address illegal immigration it might go a long way toward changing attitudes toward illegal immigrants as well.

Table 1: Connection between perceptions of immigrant costs and restrictiveness	
	Percent choosing to decrease legal immigration
Legal immigrants take away jobs	
<i>No</i>	24%
Yes	43%
Legal immigrants use more in services than pay in taxes	
<i>No</i>	22%
Yes	39%
	Percent choosing to tighten the border
Non legal immigrants harm the southern California economy	
<i>No</i>	15%
Yes	64%

Table 2: Respondents agreeing that immigrants cost more		
Immigrant Costs	Percent of all respondents saying yes	
	<i>Legal immigrants</i>	<i>Non-legal immigrants</i>
Take jobs away	12%	14%
Cost more in services than pay in taxes	22%	55%
Harm Southern California economy	10%	43%

Table 3: Perception of costs by various groups			
	Percent agreeing with each statement		
	<i>Native Whites</i>	<i>Latinos</i>	<i>Foreign-born</i>
Cost more in services than pay in taxes	89%	45%	41%
Harm Southern California economy	72%	24%	20%
Take jobs away	20%	7%	5%

Table 4: Crosstabulation: Concern with cost by group and demographics*		
Percent in each group agreeing that illegal immigrants harm the region's economy		
	Whites	Latinos
Income	-	
Less than \$50K		17%
\$50K - \$100K		27%
More than \$100K		37%
Education		
High school or less	71%	14%
Some college	81%	38%
Bachelor's or higher	56%	19%
Age	-	-
Gender		-
Male	59%	
Female	73%	
Ideology		-
Liberal	50%	
Moderate	67%	
Conservative	78%	
Employed	-	-
Economically Secure	-	-
Friends or relatives recent immigrants		
Yes	58%	16%
No	70%	26%
Immigrant neighbors	-	-
Immigrant co-workers	-	-
At least one parent foreign born**	-	
No		40%
Yes		16%
Nativity (Latinos only)	-	
Native born		38%
Not native born		9%
*differences significant at p<.05		
**Too few foreign born parents for whites		

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (Means)		
	Native Whites	Latinos
Age	55	42
Female	0.59	0.53
Income	\$75,000	\$45,000
Education	Associate Degree	High school
Not employed	0.37	0.28
Economically insecure	0.27	0.35
QOL Today (going badly)	0.36	0.34
QOL Future (will get worse)	0.32	0.31
Conservative	0.35	0.29
Immigrant friends or family	0.25	0.43
Immigrant neighbors	0.77	0.82
Immigrant co-workers	0.42	0.47
Native born	-	0.44
One parent native born	-	0.33

Table 6: Variable Descriptions

	Description
Dependent Variables	For illegal immigrants only
Contribute more in taxes than use in services	1 = disagree or neutral, 0 = agree
Effect of illegal immig on So. Ca economy	1 = harm, 0 = contribute or neutral
Immigrant Cost score	<i>Scale creation questions: (higher score = more concern about costs)</i>
Scores range from 0 (low cost) to 6 (high cost) increments of 0.5	Do you think the legal (illegal) immigrants coming to this country today mostly take jobs away from American citizens, or do they mostly take jobs Americans don't want?
	Do you think that legal (illegal) immigrants contribute more in state and local taxes than they use in services, or not?
	What do you think is the net effect of legal (illegal) immigration on the southern California economy?
Independent Variables	
<i>Demographics</i>	
Age	Respondent's age measured in years
Female	0 = No, 1 = Yes
<i>Economic Security</i>	
Not Employed	1=Yes, 0 = No
Economic Insecurity	All in all, how economically secure do you feel at the present time? Coded 1 = insecure 0 = secure or neutral
Some College	0 = No, 1 = Yes (excluded group is no college)
College Degree	0 = No, 1 = Yes (excluded group is no college)
<i>Perceptions of quality of life</i>	
Quality of life today	1=things are going badly; 0 = things going well or neutral response
Quality of life future	1 = will get worse; 0 = stay the same or improve
<i>Ideology</i>	
Conservatives	0 = No, 1 = Yes
<i>Contact with Immigrants</i>	
Immigrant Friends	Do you have any friends or relatives who are recent immigrants? 1=yes, 0 = no
Immigrant Neighbors	Recent immigrants live in your neighborhood? 1 = yes, 0 = no
Immigrant Coworkers	Recent immigrants do you work with as co-workers? 1=yes, 0 = no
<i>Context (ZCTA or zip code)</i>	
Medium Foreign Born	1 = live in zip code with low proportion of foreign born residents; 0 = does not live area with low proportion of foreign born residents. (low foreign born is excluded category)
High Foreign Born	1 = live in zip code with high proportion of foreign born residents; 0 = does not live area with high proportion of foreign born residents (low foreign born is excluded category)
Medium Education Level	1 = live in zip code with medium proportion of residents; 0 = does not live area with with medium proportion of residents (low education ZCTA is excluded category)
High Education Level	1 = live in zip code with high proportion of residents; 0 = does not live area with with high proportion of residents (low education ZCTA is excluded category)
<i>Latinos Only (Cultural Ties)</i>	
Native born	1= Yes, 0 = No
Parents US Born	0 = No, 1 = one or both parents U.S. born

Source: 2007 SCS and 2006 Census estimates from Geolytics (zip code level variables)

Table 7: Regression Results for Native Born Whites									
	Cost more in services than pay in taxes			Net cost to local economy			Immigrant Cost Score		
	Logit Regression			Logit Regression			OLS Regression		
	Estimate	SE	p-value	Estimate	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Demographic									
Age	0.01	0.01		-0.01	0.01		0.00	0.01	
Female	0.09	0.28		0.62	0.22	***	0.45	0.15	***
Economic Security									
Some college	0.98	0.41	**	0.53	0.32		0.35	0.20	
College degree	0.13	0.35		-0.51	0.29		-0.36	0.19	
Not employed	0.36	0.34		0.27	0.26		0.08	0.17	
Economically insecure	0.06	0.32		-0.21	0.24		-0.03	0.16	
QOL perceptions									
QOL today	0.17	0.32		-0.10	0.24		-0.03	0.16	
QOL future	0.90	0.35	***	0.85	0.25	***	0.74	0.16	***
Ideology									
Conservative	0.70	0.31	**	0.81	0.23	***	0.66	0.15	***
Context (zip-code based)									
High Foreign Born ZCTA	-0.06	0.35		-0.36	0.28		-0.18	0.19	
Medium Foreign Born ZCTA	0.15	0.30		-0.08	0.24		0.15	0.16	
High Education ZCTA	0.23	0.40		-0.04	0.31		0.08	0.20	
Medium Education ZCTA	0.72	0.33	**	0.32	0.24		0.42	0.16	***
Immigrant Contact									
Immigrant Friend	-0.74	0.29	**	-0.51	0.25	**	-0.33	0.17	**
Immigrant Neighbor	0.05	0.34		0.37	0.25		0.11	0.17	
Immigrant Co-worker	-0.25	0.29		0.07	0.23		-0.03	0.15	
Nagelkerke R squared									
	0.16			0.19			0.14		
Adjusted R squared									
	0.16			0.19			0.14		
N									
	460			493			500		

Table 8: Regression Results for Latinos									
	Cost more in services than pay taxes			Net cost to local economy			Immigrant Cost Score		
	Logit Regression			Logit Regression			OLS Regression		
	Estimate	SE	p-value	Estimate	SE	p-value	B	SE	p-value
Demographic									
Age	-0.00	0.01		-0.00	0.01		-0.00	0.01	
Female	-0.07	0.26		-0.29	0.28		-0.08	0.15	
Economic Security									
Some college	0.11	0.29		0.91	0.31	***	0.32	0.17	
College degree	0.51	0.35		0.11	0.42		0.04	0.21	
Not employed	-0.51	0.32		-0.03	0.35		-0.01	0.18	
Economically insecure	-0.01	0.26		0.02	0.29		-0.09	0.15	
QOL Perceptions									
QOL today	0.45	0.27		0.54	0.29		0.33	0.16	**
QOL future	-0.21	0.27		-0.32	0.31		-0.07	0.16	
Ideology									
Conservative	0.32	0.28		0.39	0.31		0.16	0.16	
Context (zip-code based)									
High Foreign Born ZCTA	-0.59	0.34		-0.05	0.37		-0.05	0.21	
Medium Foreign Born ZCTA	-0.52	0.36		0.04	0.38		0.04	0.21	
High Education ZCTA	0.37	0.37		-0.13	0.40		0.13	0.21	
Medium Education ZCTA	0.60	0.37		0.30	0.39		0.05	0.22	
Immigrant Contact									
Immigrant Friend	-0.70	0.27	***	-0.26	0.30		-0.29	0.16	
Immigrant Neighbor	0.79	0.37		0.37	0.41		0.09	0.19	
Immigrant Co-worker	-0.36	0.27		-0.24	0.30		-0.18	0.16	
Cultural Connections									
Native Born	1.26	0.31	***	1.45	0.36	***	0.80	0.19	***
At least one parent native born	0.61	0.30	**	0.60	0.33		0.78	0.19	***
Nagelkerke R squared									
	0.28			0.28			0.21		
Adjusted R squared									
N	400			414			411		

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barkan, Elliott R. 2003. Return of the Nativists?: California Public Opinion and Immigration in the 1980s and 1990s. *Social Science History* 27, no. 2: 229-83.
- Brader, Ted, Valentino, Nicolas A., and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52, no. 4:959-978.
- Branton, Regina. 2007. Latino Attitudes toward Various Areas of Public Policy: The Importance of Acculturation. *Political Research Quarterly* 60, no. 2: 293-303.
- Burns, Peter., Gimpel, James G. 2000. Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on Immigration Policy. *Political Science Quarterly*, 115, no. 2:201-225.
- Buckler, Kevin, Swatt, Mark I., and Patti Salinas. 2009. Public Views of Illegal Migration Policy and Control Strategies: A Test of the Core Hypotheses. *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 37: 317-327.
- Chandler, C. R., and Y. M. Tsai. 2001. Social Factors Influencing Immigration Attitudes: an Analysis of Data From the General Social Survey. *Social Science Journal* 38, no. 2: 177-88.
- Citrin, Jack, Donald P. Green, Christopher Muste , and Cara Wong. 1997. Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations. *The Journal of Politics* 59, no. 3: 858-81.
- Espenshade, Thomas J., and Katherine Hempstead. 1996. Contemporary American Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration. *International Migration Review* 30, no. 2: 535-70.
- Fennelly, Katherine, and Christopher Federico. 2008. Rural Residence as a Determinant of Attitudes Toward U.S. Immigration Policy. *International Migration* 46, no. 1: 151-90.
- Geolytics. 2006. "Professional 2006 Estimates, 2011 Projections, Consumer Expenditures and Profiles" Data CD. East Brunswick, NJ: Geolytics Inc. www.geolytics.com.
- Haselhoff, Kim. 2008. "Are they welcome? Understanding Public Opinion on Immigrants in Southern California." <http://www.lewis.ucla.edu/special/index.cfm>.
- Hood, M. V. III, and Irwin L. Morris. Shirkey, Kurt A. 1997. "Quedate o Vente!": Uncovering the Determinants of Hispanic Public Opinion toward Immigration. *Political Research Quarterly*, 50, no.3: 627-647.

Illias, Shayerah, Fennelly, Katherine, and Christopher M. Federico. American Attitudes toward Guest Worker Policies. *International Migration Review* 42, 4:741-766.

Public Policy Institute of California. 2009. Statewide Survey Database. 8/26/2009-9/2/2009. <http://www.ppic.org/main/series.asp?i=12>.

Sanchez, Gabriel. 2006. The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public Opinion. *Political Research Quarterly*, 59 no. 3: 435-446.

Wilson, Thomas C. 2001. American's Views on Immigration Policy: Testing the Role of Threatened Group Interests. *Sociological Perspectives* 44, no4: 485-501.