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Bleeding Hearts: Religion, Violence, and the Tianjin Riots of 1870

By

JEREMIAH GREENLEAF JENNE
DISSERTATION

Submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

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2021

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**Bleeding Hearts:
Religion, Violence, and the Tianjin Riots of 1870**

Abstract

On June 21, 1870, rioters in the city of Tianjin killed 20 foreigners and a Chinese Catholic priest attached to the Lazarist mission in North China. The “Tianjin Massacre,” as it became known in the West, was the deadliest incident of anti-foreign violence in China until the Boxer Crisis of 1899-1901. Among the dead were the French consul and ten nuns who administered an orphanage in Tianjin as part of the Paris-based Holy Childhood Association. Word of the riots swiftly spread to other cities in China and then, via telegraph lines, around the world. In China, the news stoked fears in the international community that the riots in Tianjin might be the start of a coordinated campaign of violence targeting foreigners. The representatives of the foreign powers expressed outrage and demanded the Chinese government take steps to protect foreign nationals and foreign interests in China. As most of the casualties had been French citizens, Count Julien de Rochechouart, representing France, demanded reparations and the heads of the officials in Tianjin. Rochechouart threatened military reprisals if the government did not give in to his demands. For several weeks it looked like a war between France and China was inevitable, at least until events in Europe intervened.

The first two chapters examine the situation for Christianity in China through 1860 and the signing of the Beijing Convention. Chapter one also looks at Tianjin society and introduces several social groups which took part in the riots, including the *hunhunr*, flamboyant but violent gangs who engaged in low-level criminal activity and were an important source of muscle for the city’s fire brigade and militia. The third and fourth chapters describe the Lazarist mission in China in the 1860s and the establishment of the Catholic orphanage in Tianjin. Dispensing

medicine was a part of the nuns' mission, but what the nuns saw as the advantages of modern medicines and the healing power of the Christian Faith could, to others, appear like magic, even sorcery. The Holy Childhood Association baptized young children at the point of death, which raised suspicions among residents. Rumors and salacious stories, some spread by printed anti-Christian polemics, only added to the fear and loathing many Chinese felt toward the missionaries. French authorities in China expended a great deal of energy and defending missionaries when their activities led to conflict. Chapter six looks at how Count Julien Rochechouart (1831-1879) and his predecessors managed these cases and argue that their defense of missionary privileges worsened tensions leading to a cycle of reprisals and more conflict between Christians and non-Christians.

Chapters seven and eight describe the events leading up to the riots and use official reports, eyewitness statements, and other contemporary materials to reconstruct the events of June 21. The final chapters examine the aftermath of the riots, the official investigation carried out by the eminent statesman Zeng Guofan and the tense diplomatic standoff between France and China over the Chinese government's handling of the case.

To my parents,

For my mom who taught me to love reading and books, and to my dad who inspired me to never
give up on my dreams (or the Boston Red Sox)

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INTRODUCTION

On June 21, 1870, a riot erupted in the Chinese port city of Tianjin. By the end of the day, the French consulate, a cathedral, and an orphanage had burned, and more than 21 people were dead.¹ Many of those killed were foreign nationals, including 10 nuns, several of whom were dragged from the orphanage, stripped naked, and publicly executed. The level of violence shocked the world. Telegraph lines relayed news of the massacre around the globe. In the weeks and months that followed, newspapers published lurid accounts of bloody murder, rape, and the torture of foreign victims by savage and xenophobic Chinese people.²

Fourteen years earlier, in 1856, a misunderstanding over the identity of a ship seized by Qing customs officials had been sufficient to start the Arrow War (sometimes referred to as the Second Opium War, 1856-1860) between Britain, France, and the Qing Empire. The “Tianjin

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1. Paul A. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*, Harvard East Asian Series, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 275. Cohen cites 21 foreigners killed but does not give statistics for the number of Chinese killed. Hosea Morse cited 21 foreigners killed and “between thirty and forty Chinese employed in the mission or orphanage.” Hosea Ballou Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, 3 vols., vol. Volume 2 (London and New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910). There were 20 non-Chinese killed, including one French priest, six French nuns, two nuns from Belgium, one Irish nun, an Italian nun, the French consul, and his assistant, four other French citizens, and three Russians. Father Vincent Ou, who is usually listed among the foreign casualties, was a Chinese priest and native of Guangdong Province. Several bodies recovered after the riot were identified as being Chinese who worked for either the orphanage or the church although there was not a full accounting of Chinese casualties other than Vincent Ou. Lists of non-foreign casualties of the riot in Chinese-language secondary sources generally refer to the twenty men sentenced to death after being accused of taking an active role in the violence. See Liang Zonglin 廖宗麟, “Zai ‘Tianjin jiao’an’ zhong bei sha de zhongguo ren kaowu 在“天津教案”中被杀的中国人考数 [Errors in Calculating the Number of Chinese Killed in the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case],” *学术论坛 xueshu luntan* 12 (1985).
 2. Many of these tales were highly embellished and added to the growing corpus of anti-Chinese and anti-Asian misinformation published in North America and Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some publications also emphasized the religious martyrdom of the nuns and priests killed in the riot. See Tamar Allen, *Miss Tamar Allen's Narrative of the Tientsin Massacre in China* (Philadelphia.: C. W. Alexander, 1870); George Thin, *The Tientsin massacre: The Causes of the Late Disturbances in China and How to Secure Permanent Peace* (London: Blackwood, 1870); Alphonse Hubrecht, *Une effroyable hécatombe : les martyrs de Tientsin (21 juin 1870) d'après les documents contemporains* (Peking: Imprimerie des Lazaristes, 1928). Many newspaper accounts and editorials pushed the narrative that the riot had been planned as part of a larger conspiracy by anti-foreign Chinese government officials. For just two examples, see “Report from Tianjin,” *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 18, 1870.; “The Tien-Tsin Massacre,” *New York Times*, September 17, 1870.

Massacre,” as the international press dubbed the events of 1870, was a far worse outrage and an even more provocative *casus bello*. Rioters had killed foreign civilians on Chinese soil. Under such circumstances, revenge by France seemed inevitable, threatening to end nearly a decade of peace between the foreign powers and the Qing government. The imperial court sought accountability from local officials or at least deniability for the court. Officials in Tianjin sent reports to their superiors in Beijing, hoping to exonerate themselves. The *Zongli Yamen*, the office that acted as a sub-ministry clearinghouse for foreign affairs, advised the court to prepare for war.

The violence in Tianjin, as shocking and sensational as it was, was part of a pattern of resistance against the expansion of foreign interests and the presence of missionaries, especially Catholic missionaries, in China, which began in earnest with the Treaty of Tianjin of 1858 and the Beijing Convention of 1860. These treaties, signed at the conclusion of the Arrow War, opened new ports to trade and the establishment of concessions. The Treaty of Tianjin also granted foreign powers the right to maintain a permanent diplomatic presence in Beijing. Both agreements stipulated unprecedented privileges for foreign missionaries to travel, proselytize, and build churches and missions throughout the Qing Empire. For the Chinese people, particularly those living away from the coastline or in small cities, the missionary became the most visible representative of a system of foreign colonialism that many did not understand and deeply resented. The result was a dramatic increase in the number of conflicts between foreigners and Chinese starting in 1861.

The Tianjin riots differed from the majority of *jiao'an* (教案 anti-missionary incidents) found in the Qing archival records during this period. First, many of the other incidents occurred in rural areas or cities that were below Tianjin in the urban hierarchy. The Tianjin case also fits

awkwardly in the paradigms of anti-missionary violence suggested by earlier studies, as the riots in Tianjin do not seem to be a straightforward case of local elites stoking subaltern hostility against a meddlesome and potentially destabilizing challenge to the elites' traditional authority.³ Nor were the riots a clear example of a burgeoning or latent subaltern proto-nationalism or class consciousness.⁴

Understanding the causes of the Tianjin riots requires considering the social and historical conditions specific to the city and the larger context of anti-colonialist/anti-foreign resistance rising in China at the time. The Tianjin riots were the apogee for a decade of growing resentment and hostility toward foreigners, especially foreign missionaries. It remained the most famous incident of mass violence against the foreign community in China in the colonial era until the Boxer War of 1900. For nearly three decades, the "Tianjin Massacre" became shorthand for Chinese xenophobia, much in the same way the term "boxer" would become a symbol of anti-foreignism in the twentieth century.⁵

Although anti-foreign sentiment was part of the context for the riots, the actions of the Lazarist mission in Tianjin, especially the orphanage administered by the sisters of the Holy Childhood Association, were the spark that led to violent conflagration. The missionaries arrived in Tianjin with the best of intentions, but their attitudes and practices in the years following the opening of Tianjin as a treaty port would prove staggeringly and disastrously counter-productive. The riots may have only lasted a few hours, but they reflected nearly a decade of steadily

3. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*. John King Fairbank, "Patterns Behind The Tientsin Massacre," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 20, no. 3/4 (1957).

4. This the view held by many historians in the People's Republic of China into the 1990s. For example, see Qi Qizhang 戚其章 and Wang Ruhui 王如绘, eds., *Wanqing jiao'an jishi 晚清教案纪事 [A Record of Anti-Religious Incidents in the Late Qing]* (dongfang chubanshe, 1990).

5. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "'Civilization' and Its Discontents: The Boxers and Luddites as Heroes and Villains," *Theory and Society* 16, no. 5 (1987); Paul A. Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

building pressure. What only a few foreigners at the time realized is evident in hindsight—the missionary presence in the city introduced a highly volatile element to an already unstable environment.

Within the complex urban landscape of a Qing-era treaty port like Tianjin, there were many actors and stakeholders, most of whom had reasons for resenting and resisting the presence of foreigners in Tianjin. One such group was the *hunhunr* (混混儿), who figured prominently in the riots and appeared to be some of the main agitators for taking action against a perceived foreign threat.⁶ The *hunhunr* were local tough guys who adopted an identity as knights-errant protecting their turf. Their lodges were more organized than street gangs but lacked the religiopolitical ideology, sophisticated hierarchy, and transregional structure associated with Secret Societies or Triads. Their members came from the lower rungs of the socio-economic order, but *hunhunr* lodges could be formidable nodes of local power and quite capable of fomenting resistance against threats to their community.

This project situates the Tianjin riots within a broader context of colonialism, the French government's attempt to maintain a religious protectorate in China, the doctrine of the *mission civilisatrice*, and patterns of conflict, negotiation, and resistance against the expansion of foreign power and privilege in China. In a city that twice experienced military occupation at the hands of the British and French, first in 1858 and then again in 1860, many residents felt threatened by the growing presence of foreigners in Tianjin in the decade that followed. Tianjin's strategic position and proximity to Beijing made the city a target in the nineteenth-century wars between the Qing

6. For studies of *hunhunr* and their role in Tianjin society, see Lin Xi 林溪, "Jiu zhongguo tianjin hunhunr 旧中国天津混混儿 [The Hunhunr of Tianjin in Old China]," *湖南档案 hunan dang'an*, no. 9 (2002). Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin]," *文史资料 wenshi ziliao* 47 (1963); Man Bun Kwan, "Order in Chaos: Tianjin's Hunhunr and Urban Identity in Modern China," *Journal of Asian History* 27, no. 1 (2000).

Empire and the European powers. French ideology and European missionary and military activities disrupted the social order in Tianjin, perhaps more than in any other Chinese coastal city.

During the 1860 occupation of Tianjin, French military commanders chose an imperial villa built in 1773 for the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736–1796) as their headquarters. For over a century, the palace, known as Wanghailou, had served as an occasional imperial residence and government office.⁷ French officers selected the site, located just outside the city walls at the confluence of the Grand Canal and two other waterways, for its strategic advantages. However, the symbolic importance of the choice was not lost on either the French military or Tianjin residents.⁸ Even after the formal withdrawal of the allied occupation force in 1861, the French government continued to use the space as their consulate.

This choice of an imperial villa for a foreign consulate was provocative, and French diplomatic and ecclesiastical representatives in Tianjin compounded this provocation eight years later with the completion of the Cathedral de Notre Dame des Victoire. To finish the construction, workers razed a Chinese temple that was once part of the same compound. A massive stone church that towered over the surrounding area arose in place of the original temple.⁹ Tianjin's cathedral joined the Stone Church in Guangzhou and the North Church in

7. Qi Qizhang 戚其章 and Wang Ruhui 王如绘, *Wanqing jiao'an jishi* 晚清教案纪事 [A Record of Anti-Religious Incidents in the Late Qing], p. 105.

8. Morse, Hosea Ballou. *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*. Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910, p. 241.

9. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 229. Both Paul Cohen and Joseph Esherick have argued that church placement was one of many acts that demonstrated the power foreign missionaries had over local Qing officials. In several cases, because of the treaties, local officials had no choice but to overrule the protestations of the local populace and allow foreign missionaries to rent land and build churches. See also Joseph Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

Beijing as new monuments of Christian civilization towering over the skylines of Chinese cities.¹⁰

The building of religious sites like the Wanghailou church was just one of many friction points. The results of studies of anti-Christian sentiments in the mid-nineteenth century suggest that most conflicts pitted the missionaries against local Chinese elites.¹¹ Local stakeholders felt threatened by missionary attacks on Confucian cultural practices such as ancestor worship and indigenous religious festivals. Missionaries would sometimes discourage Christian converts from financially supporting local shrines. The establishment of schools, orphanages, and other charitable projects, activities that were traditionally the responsibility of leading families in a city or town, undermined the prestige of local elites.¹²

The tendency of missionaries to meddle in criminal cases or civil disputes on behalf of their converts was especially galling. Here the interests of the local elite intersected with those of Qing officials and non-Christian commoners. A recurring complaint was that many “so-called Christians” had converted as a way of avoiding justice or hiding in the penumbra of extraterritoriality that, in theory, shielded foreign residents from the harsher aspects of Qing law.¹³ By disrupting the web of activities and symbols that powerful families and lineages relied

10. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, p. 241. Morse argues, “It is not too much to say that, at Tientsin, the French nation and French (Roman Catholic) missionaries were detested.”

11. See Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*; Mary Clabaugh Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874*, Stanford Studies in History, Economics, and Political Science, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957). Here I use the term ‘local elite’ to refer to those families with a tradition of degree holding, land ownership, and leadership in charitable works and local affairs. The classic work on this subject is still Chang Chung-li Chang, *The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society*, University of Washington Publications on Asia, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955).

12. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 83.

13. In addition to Cohen, the depth of elite opposition to Christian missions can also be understood when we consider, after Prasenjit Duara, how foreign missionary activities destroyed the ‘cultural nexus’ which maintained the power and status of the local elites. See Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).

upon as markers of status, missionaries inadvertently subverted the influence and authority of local elites and so threatened the mediating structures that preserved the social order. In some cases, they did so quite deliberately. Such threats begged for a response. However, not all responses were the same.

A close reading of anti-missionary cases suggests the paradigm of local elite versus missionary, while true in many cases, was far from universal. These dichotomies of missionary and elite become difficult to find when examining incidents in urban spaces compared to those in more rural areas. Treaty ports like Tianjin represented a particularly tangled form of urban society. Foreigners' authority in the treaty ports was limited to areas set aside as concessions. Although the rights and privileges granted to the foreign powers and their representatives by a series of unequal treaties provided for a great deal of de facto control in the concessions, foreigners were still nominally within the jurisdiction of provincial, prefectural, and district authorities.

The Treaty of Nanjing, signed in 1842 following the First Opium War (1839-1842), compelled the Qing government to grant to foreign nationals the right to reside and trade in certain cities. The Treaty of Nanjing cleared the way for concession zones in five ports: Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, Ningbo, and, most famously, Shanghai. The treaties also contained clauses shielding foreigners from the Qing judicial system. The 1843 Treaty of the Bogue, negotiated by the British, and the Sino-American 1844 Treaty of Wanghia stipulated that their nationals were not subject to Chinese law and could only be tried in courts administered and supervised by representatives of their own countries or a suitably "civilized" substitute. This right of extraterritoriality was understood to cover almost all foreigners in China and was further reinforced by provisos included in the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin. As a result, foreign concessions

and settlements in the treaty ports became virtually autonomous zones of foreign control, albeit surrounded by much larger indigenous communities who chafed at the privileges too often and too eagerly flaunted by the foreigners.

There is a considerable body of literature on the different forms of colonialism and imperialism. In the simplest definition, colonialism involves a significant population settling in a defined geographic space and establishing structures of control that favor the colonials at the expense of the indigenous populations. Imperialism suggests domination without a large number of permanent settlers.¹⁴ Colonialism and imperialism can further be defined in terms of informal and formal control. Formal (or administrative) imperialism refers to the existence of mechanisms that allow for direct administrative and jurisdictional authority over space and its inhabitants.¹⁵ Informal imperialism suggests a lack of formal organizational structures and instead relies upon the support of a local privileged elite to maintain control.¹⁶

Although parts of these definitions remain useful, the system of foreign concessions and settlements along the Chinese coast defy easy categorization. Treaty ports in China have been described as forms of “semi-colonialism,” whereby a colonial social and economic structure administered by the local representatives of multiple foreign powers was grafted onto an existing political and administrative system. In her study of the Shanghai Municipal Council, Isabella

14. Colonialism Ronald J. Horvath, "A Definition of Colonialism," *Current Anthropology* 13, no. 1 (1972), p. 50.

15. Examples are the British in India and Singapore, or the French in Algeria. See David Prochaska, *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bone* (Cambridge, 1990). It is worthwhile to note as a further example of these processes, that China's own colonizing project in Central Asia represented a shift from an earlier 'informal' structure under the early Qing to direct administrative control following the defeat of the Muslim Rebellion by Zuo Zongtang in the 1880s. See Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Harvard University Press, 2009); James Millward, *Beyond the Pass: Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia, 1759-1864* (Stanford University Press, 1998); James Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang* (Columbia University Press, 2007).

16. Jürgen Osterhammel, "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis," (1986); Matthew Brown, *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008).

Jackson uses the term “transnational colonialism” to describe a type of authority not exercised entirely by the governments of the foreign powers but a collaboration of residents, including Westerners and elite members of the Chinese and Japanese communities. Transnational colonialism also helps us to understand how representatives of many different nations—even imperial rivals—could work in concert to reinforce foreign privileges and power in China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.¹⁷

Sizable foreign populations lived in foreign concession areas embedded inside Chinese cities, and some of these communities took on characteristics of permanent settlements.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the number of Europeans was statistically insignificant compared to the Chinese populations that surrounded them, and although European and American residents had considerable freedom to run their own affairs within the confines of the concession areas, the Qing government still maintained its administrative hierarchy and could claim de jure control over the area. It was the responsibility of Qing officials to preserve law and order in the larger city and surrounding region. The foreign powers and their representatives could enjoy nearly the full panoply of colonial privilege while outsourcing the onerous task of protecting and enforcing those privileges to local officials.¹⁹

The imperial court wanted to avoid another calamitous war with the foreign powers. In the wake of two military defeats to foreign armies and the existential crisis of the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the court wanted peace at all costs. The price for maintaining that peace would too often be paid by overworked and overwhelmed local officials who found themselves

17. See Isabella Jackson, *Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China's Global City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

18. Robert Bickers, "Shanghaianders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in Shanghai, 1843-1937," *Past & Present*, no. 159 (1998); Robert Bickers, *The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2011).

19. See Robert Bickers and Isabella Jackson, *Treaty Ports in Modern China: Law, Land and Power* (Routledge, 2016). In particular, essays by Jackson, Pär Cassel, and Dorotheé Rihal.

in a no-win situation. Qing authorities were aware of popular resentment toward foreigners and foreign privileges. They also knew that despite the anger and indignation of the common people, and the officials' personal misgivings, the foreigners and their treaties were backed by the threat of gunboats and military occupation. Nevertheless, by virtue of proximity, familiarity, and the need to protect life and limb, local authorities keenly felt the dangers of a popular uprising. The actions of the foreign powers and their representatives destabilized local society and impeded the ability of Qing officials to maintain law and order.

Not that the foreigners always got what they wanted. Although the foreign powers relied on the treaties to coerce the Qing government into accommodating the interests of foreigners in China, the threat of military intervention was a clumsy tool for negotiating local conflicts. The threat of force, implicit or explicit, was not always sufficiently persuasive. Qing officials calculated the risk of military intervention when contemplating any action that might lead to conflict with foreigners, and many officials chose to act against foreign interests anyway. The foreign community could not always depend on the ability or willingness of local officials to mediate the competing demands of the foreigners against other stakeholders.

One of the challenges was the inherently, although not unintentionally, cumbersome system of local Qing administration. With its overlapping spheres of authority, multiple jurisdictions, and rotating posts, the Qing administrative apparatus was designed to minimize the possibility of officials consolidating too much power, especially at the local level. The goal was not "efficiency" in the Weberian sense but social and political stability, and it was successful enough to preserve order in the empire for nearly three centuries.²⁰

20. T'ung-tsu Ch'ü, *Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962); Luo Xiaoxiang, "Urban Management in Late-Qing Dynasty: With Nineteenth-Century Nanjing City as a Case," *Journal of Nanjing University (Philosophy, Humanities and Social Sciences)* (2009); Zhang Limin 张

The presence of foreign missionaries, however, tested the authorities' ability to maintain control. As Paul Cohen argued, if the official "chose to oppose the foreigner or to abdicate his treaty responsibilities in any of a variety of less conspicuous ways, he excited the wrath of the foreign powers and, albeit to a somewhat less degree, of the Chinese central government. If, on the other hand, he chose to observe the treaties faithfully and energetically, he alienated powerful elements on the Chinese scene and imperiled his very position as an official."²¹ It was a near-impossible task. One that was even harder in times of social unrest and anxiety such as gripped the city of Tianjin in the spring and summer of 1870.

Within the city of Tianjin, there were clear tensions between the local Chinese officials and court appointees, who may have had a higher official rank but did not have a well-defined role within the local jurisdiction. In 1870, one such court appointee was Chonghou, the Imperial Commissioner of Trade for the Three Northern Ports, who failed to mediate the dispute that led to the Tianjin massacre.²² Chonghou was not part of the administrative hierarchy of Tianjin. His role was regional, and he answered to the throne. As a supervising official of trade for three treaty ports, Chonghou had the main responsibility of protecting the interests of the Qing court. In theory, this meant ensuring that both the foreign community and local authorities obeyed the treaties. In practice, Chonghou's position was a microcosm of the problem faced by the Qing

利民, "A Comparison of Local Autonomy in Shanghai and Tianjin in the Late Qing: From the Perspective of the Establishment of City Administrative Organizations," *Frontiers of History in China* 5, no. 2 (2010).

21. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 184.

22. The riot at Tianjin may have also exposed some lingering tensions between central and local officials that reflected ethnic divisions between Manchus and Han Chinese in the Qing government. For earlier studies of these divisions, see Inner James M. Polachek, *The Inner Opium War*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies/Harvard University : Distributed by the Harvard University Press, 1992).; Frederic E. Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate: Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861*, Center for Chinese Studies Publications, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).; Rhoads Edward J. M. Rhoads, *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861-1928*, Studies on Ethnic Groups in China, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).

court: how to prevent the foreigners from resorting to military force while not being seen as favoring foreign entitlements over the needs of the people. It was a delicate balancing act.²³

As foreign demands repeatedly conflicted with local interests, Chonghou's position, like that of the Qing court, became precarious. Chonghou had the symbolic weight of the Qing emperor behind him, but he stood outside a chain of command that included Zeng Guofan, the governor-general stationed at the provincial capital in Baoding, the circuit attendants, the provincial military commander, the prefect, and the county magistrate.²⁴ As one later historian observed, "Chunghow's position was one of influence and prestige and not of power; he could bring in the imperial authority but could not move a policeman."²⁵

Unfortunately for Chonghou and his fellow administrators, making the life of a Qing official easier was not part of the job descriptions for the representatives of the foreign powers in China. Whether acting on behalf of Great Britain, France, the United States, or any of the other countries with an economic or strategic stake along the Chinese coast, foreign diplomatic and military personnel protected the interests of the nation they served while helping to maintain the treaty system enjoyed by all the foreign powers.²⁶ In the case of French authorities, those national interests were often aligned with those of the Catholic Church. France's rival Britain maintained a strong commercial presence, which meant France could not well quit the Chinese

23. Chonghou was the only person to ever hold the post of Imperial Commissioner for the Northern Ports. He was the original appointee after the Qing court created the position in 1861, but after the riot, the position was eliminated, and the duties merged into the portfolio of the Zhili governor-general. See Hummel Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)*, 2 vols. (Washington, : U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1943), p. 209.

24. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Volume 2., p. 244.

25. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Volume 2., p. 252.

26. Particularly since some of the unequal treaties, beginning with the Treaty of the Bogue signed by representatives of the Qing Empire and Great Britain which included provisions for granting "Most Favored Nation" status, thus granting to Great Britain any privilege or concession granted by treaty to any other country.

coast.²⁷ Defending the prestige and dignity of the Catholic Church in China became the *raison d'être* for the French in China.²⁸ The result was an untenable situation in the best of circumstances, and the events that transpired in Tianjin in the summer of 1870—drought, a cholera epidemic, and a decade of pent-up resentment against the presence of foreigners—hardly qualified as the best.

There is a rich array of sources related to the event in Tianjin, only a portion of which has been utilized in the English-language scholarship up to this point. These sources include official documents collected by the Qing government and its agents, eyewitness accounts and dispatches sent by foreign diplomats and consular representatives in the city, depositions taken during the ensuing investigation, missionary records, second-hand interviews collected by writers and journalists in the months and years following the violence, and personal diaries and memoirs. The anti-religious cases curated by the Number One Historical Archives in Beijing have been particularly useful. The published collections of letters and biographies collected by the Society for the Propagation of the Faith and the Holy Childhood Association provided valuable insight into the attitudes and strategies of the largest group of missionaries working in Tianjin and the officials with whom they frequently came into conflict.

Much of our information, by circumstance, is derived from official sources—whether in the archives of the Qing government or collected by the governments of the different foreign

27. As one later account lamented, “La triste maxime: ‘La force prime le droit’ doit être appliqué dans toute sa rigueur en Chine: sinon, plions bagages.” Cordier Henri Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, 3 vols., vol. Volume 2 (Paris: F. Alcan, 1901), p. 390 Translated in Morse as “The sad maxim might makes right should be applied in all its rigour in China; otherwise let us quit, bag and baggage.” Morse Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Volume 2., p. 259.

28. Qi Qizhang 戚其章 and Wang Ruhui 王如绘, *Wanqing jiao'an jishi* 晚清教案纪事 [A Record of Anti-Religious Incidents in the Late Qing].p. 9. It was defense of Catholic missionaries that first drew the French military into Indochina in the early nineteenth century. Frederick Quinn, *The French Overseas Empire* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000), p. 119. See also Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 64.

powers. These must be considered carefully for biases of the official gaze, particularly when reading depositions.²⁹ Qing officials sought to obtain a confession, not necessarily the truth of the matter as understood by the deposed.³⁰ With little formal training in the law, officials relied on a staff of sub-officials to help them prepare cases and interpret the statutes appropriate to each case.³¹ Torture was frequently employed by officials to extract statements relevant to establishing guilt, but these statements often lacked information like motivation and mentalité. This is an even greater obstacle when dealing with groups otherwise under- or misrepresented in official sources.³² Nevertheless, a judicious examination of the official record augmented by the limited available non-official sources can form the basis for constructing a narrative of specific events and reconstructing the social and historical context in which the riots occurred.³³

Although several unofficial accounts of the events leading up to and including the riots do exist, these sources suffer from some of the same limitations as the official record. Many of these ‘unofficial’ perspectives come from members of the local elite, foreign residents, and

29. A further discussion on the availability of official versus non-official sources in researching social history during the Qing period can be found in Beatrice A. Bartlett, "True Confessions: Criminal Interrogations as Sources for Ch'ing History," in *Archives, Documentation, and Institutions of Social Memory: Essays from the Sawyer Seminar*, ed. Francis X. Blouin and William G. Rosenberg (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

30. For the challenges of using depositions as sources see Susan Naquin, "True Confessions: Criminal Interrogations as Sources for Ch'ing History," *Bulletin of the National Palace Museum (Taiwan)* 11, no. 1 (1976).

31. The most comprehensive study of the Qing legal system and the application of magisterial justice is Wei-jen Chang, *Qingdai fazhi yanjiu 清代法治研究 [Studies of the Qing Legal System]*, 3 vols. (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1983). See also Shiga Shuzo, "Criminal Procedure in the Ch'ing Dynasty--with Emphasis on Its Administrative Character and Some Allusion to Its Historical Antecedents," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 32 (1974).

32. These methodological problems are discussed at length by David Ownby in his study of secret societies in the mid-Qing. Ownby's research focused on individuals and groups whose position in the official sources is not unlike that of the *hunhunr* of Tianjin. David Ownby, *Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early and Mid-Qing China: The Formation of a Tradition* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), pp. 22–24.

33. There have been several excellent historical studies of this period which deal with subaltern groups, and which are based, at least in part, on research using official sources. Significant examples include Philip Kuhn, *Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Joseph Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Roxann Prazniak, *Of Camel Kings and other Things: Rural Rebels against Modernity in Late Imperial China*. (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999); and Matthew Sommer, *Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001)

traders, or from the diaries and memoirs of key figures, such as Zeng Guofan and Julien Rochechouart, who were, nevertheless, closely involved with either the event itself or the aftermath.³⁴ Local elites shared the same prejudices as local officials, especially regarding potentially disruptive subaltern groups, such as the hunhunn. This was also true of foreign residents, who, while not always in complete agreement with the policies of the legations in Beijing, remained cognizant that their continued fortune and the success of their enterprises, whether in pursuit of lucre or souls, depended upon their appointed representatives being prepared to do whatever was necessary to guarantee compliance with the web of treaty obligations that protected the foreign community and their continued presence in China.³⁵ Disparate sources should be read in conversation with each other, allowing the researcher to recreate and contextualize specific events.

Documentary collections are generally limited to official communications between the major officials in Tianjin, the Zongli Yamen, and the Qing court.³⁶ Additional materials were

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34. Examples include Zeng Guofan 曾国藩, *Zeng Guofan quanji 曾国藩全集日记* [The Complete Works of Zeng Guofan] (Changsha: Yuelu Publishing, 1989). *xiangxiang Zengshi wenxian 湘乡曾氏文献* [Documents of the Zeng Family of Xiang County], (Taipei: Taipei Student Press, 1965). 张锦文 Zhang Jingwen, *Zhang gong (Jinwen) 张公 (锦文) 襄理军务纪略 xiangli junwu jilue* [A Record of Zhang Jinwen's Handling of Military Affairs] (Taipei: Wenhai Press, 1983).
35. Eyewitness accounts collected from foreign residents of Tianjin by the traveler/journalist Baron Hübner in *A Ramble Round the World*, Translated by Lady Herbert. 2 vols. (London: MacMillan and Co., 1871) as well as those accounts and reports from correspondents published in *The North China Herald* and the *Shanghai Evening Courier*.
36. Du Shoutian, ed., *Chouban yiwu shimo di liu chuan: tongzhichao 筹办夷务始末第6卷: 同治朝* [Foreign Affairs in their Entirety, Volume 6: The Tongzhi Era], vol. 6 (Taipei: 国风出版社 guofeng chubanshe, 1963); Wu Shengde 吴盛德 and Zenghui 陈增辉 Chen, *jiao'an shiliao bianmu 教案史料编目* [A catalog of Historical Sources Related to Anti-Missionary Cases] (Washington, D.C.: Center for Chinese Research Materials, Association of Research Libraries, 1982); *Jiaowu jiao'an dang'an di er ji: Tongzhi liu nian - Tongzhi jiu nian 教务教案档. 第二辑: 同治六年 - 同治九年* [Archive of Religious Affairs and Anti-Missionary Cases, Volume 2: Tongzhi Year 6 to Tongzhi Year 9], (Taipei: 中央研究院近代史研究所 zhongyang yanjiu yuan: jindaishi yanjiu suo, 1974); *Qingmo jiao'an 清末教案* [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1, ed. Zhongguo di yi lishi dang'an guan and Fujian shifan daxue lishixi, 5 vols. (Beijing: 中华书局 Zhonghua Shuju, 1996). Collections in Western languages include Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament

available in the Number One Historical Archives in Beijing as well as in archives in Tianjin. French, Chinese, and British collections of diplomatic communications mention letters and notes between the *Zongli Yamen* (the Qing ‘foreign affairs’ bureau) and European and American diplomats that are also not found in the documentary collections but are included in archives in Taipei.

French consular records in Nantes, and the Foreign Ministry archives formerly held at Quai d’Orsay in Paris, also yielded background information on the French officials stationed in Tianjin and Beijing at the time, along with handwritten notes on the case and reports of the negotiations between French officials and the *Zongli Yamen*.³⁷ The archives contained Chinese anti-Christian placards, and deeds and titles that showed how the French secured the right to build a consulate and cathedral on the grounds of a former imperial villa.

In 1870, the foreign powers were just entering a new era of imperial competition. The Qing court, beset by internal discord and limited by ideological conservatism, saw diminishing returns in its “self-strengthening” projects. As Mary Wright and others argued, these projects were conducted during a time of détente and relative cooperation with the foreign powers, especially Great Britain. Wright argued that despite the talents and caliber of Qing officials to modernize China, “requirements for a modern state run directly counter to the requirements of

by Command of Her Majesty), (London: Harrison and Sons, 1871).; Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72* (Irish University Press, 1971).; *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*, (Paris).; Xavier Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895).; A.H. de Carvalho, ed., *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative* (Shanghai: 1870).; *A Reprint of Letters Regarding the Tientsin Massacre: From the ‘North-China Daily News’. No. 1-4*, (North China Herald, 2000).; Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2.

37. Dossier Mission au Tcheli, 1871–1883, Article 414, Series A, Peking Fonds Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Nantes, France.

the Confucian order.”³⁸ The violence in Tianjin jeopardized the “cooperative policy” between the Qing court and the foreign powers. The miscalculations by the Qing court and the mismanagement of the investigation and official handling of the incident in Tianjin indicated an incapacity of the state to present an effective challenge to the foreign powers.

In the years leading up to the Tianjin riots, colonialism had destabilized the social order in Tianjin and other nineteenth-century Qing ‘treaty ports.’³⁹ The actions of European and American diplomats, soldiers, missionaries, and traders weakened official forces of control and undermined non-official means of mediating social conflict leading to an increase in acts of collective violence, particularly attacks on foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians.

What happens when the legal, social, and ideological structures within a city break down and violence enters the repertoire of collective action? The violence in Tianjin demonstrated how resistance against aggressive foreign powers redefined and reconfigured previous divisions of class, social status, and occupation. Collective action in the late Qing Dynasty created spaces in which new urban, national, and ethnic identities were contested, negotiated, and deployed.

In Chapter 1, we meet Father Qiu Anyu (d. 1861), a Cantonese priest and pharmacist who helped establish the Lazarist mission in Tianjin. Even though Christianity had ceased to be a proscribed religion by imperial decree in 1846, missionaries took significant risks carrying out their activities outside the treaty ports established following the First Opium War. This was true even for a Chinese priest like Father Qiu. In Tianjin, Qiu Anyu had to be wary of official interference in his work, but he also needed to be mindful of other powerful forces within Tianjin

38. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874.*, p. 312.

39. By 1870, there were fourteen ports in which Europeans and Americans were allowed to reside, trade, and manage their own affairs within defined ‘concession’ areas. The European countries negotiated their control over these areas by treaties following the Opium War (Treaty of Nanjing, 1842) and the ‘Arrow’ War and occupation of Beijing (Treaty of Tianjin, 1858 and the Beijing Convention, 1860).

society, including groups like the *hunhunr*, colorful but violent characters who controlled the neighborhoods and docks of the city. This chapter also summarizes the challenges facing Chinese Christians and missionaries in the years preceding the Second Opium War.

Chapter two begins with the arrival of Bishop Joseph Mouly (1807–1868) in Tianjin during the Anglo-French occupation of the city in 1860. Mouly was one of the longest-serving and most influential Lazarist missionaries working in China in the nineteenth century. In this chapter, I describe the events that led to the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin and the Beijing Convention. These two agreements dramatically altered the landscape for the practice and propagation of Christianity in China and the Beijing Convention opened the city of Tianjin for international settlement. Living under occupation by foreign troops in 1858 and 1860 had a profound effect on the Tianjin's residents and left a legacy of resentment and hostility that persisted even after the establishment of foreign concessions. In this chapter, I also look at the evolution of the French mission in China and explore why missionaries from France pursued their interests more aggressively than their counterparts from other countries, particularly when claiming sacred spaces and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

In Chapter 3, I introduce the Daughters of Charity and the Holy Childhood Association. The establishment of hospitals, dispensaries, and orphanages was a significant part of the Christian missionary enterprise in China. These institutions offered sites for religious and charitable outreach, but they could become contested spaces where the line between medicine and magic could become blurred. One person's medical miracle could easily be interpreted by another as an example of sorcery or witchcraft. People's fears were reinforced by misinformation spread through rumors, placards, and printed polemics written to resist the missionary presence in China. In attempting to demonstrate their technological, cultural, and spiritual superiority,

missionary groups like the Daughters of Charity often inadvertently acted in ways that confirmed people's darkest suspicions.

Chapter Four looks at how missionaries in rural and urban areas interacted with the local authorities. Claude-Marie Chevrier (1821–1870) lived two lives, serving in the French military before becoming a missionary. Chevrier's first mission in China was on the wild and rugged country at the edge of the Mongolian steppe. His disputes with officials offer an example of the challenges both missionary and magistrate faced in managing religious conflict in the years following the signing of the Beijing Convention. After four years on the steppe, Chevrier was given a new assignment to head the mission in Tianjin.

In Chapter 5, we follow Chevrier to Tianjin and look at the evolution of the foreign settlements following the establishment of Tianjin as a treaty port and in this chapter, I elaborate on the physical and social landscape of Tianjin. Chevrier faced many of the same challenges in his new position that he encountered on the steppe, but he also needed to work within the structures of formal and informal power which governed this urban space. Tianjin was an intersection of overlapping jurisdictions under the supervision of a magistrate, a prefect, and a circuit intendant. Also posted to the city was an imperial commissioner, Chonghou, overseeing commerce and managing foreign relations in Tianjin and other northern ports. Chevrier and the other missionaries in Tianjin relied on Chonghou to assist them in expanding their mission and their footprint in the city without always realizing that doing so was exacerbating tensions between Christians and non-Christians. Chevrier's obsession with building a church in Tianjin would become a significant irritant in relations between the mission and the city.

Chapter Six introduces Count Julien Rochechouart, who served as French charge d'affaires in China during the Tianjin crisis. French policy in China during the 1860s reflected

the larger mission of supporting a French religious protectorate in China and East Asia. While not all French diplomats acted as aggressively as Rochechouart, many of his predecessors also implicitly—and sometimes quite explicitly—threatened military intervention on behalf of missionaries in cases of anti-Christian violence or conflicts.

Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 recount the events of June 21, 1870, and the weeks that led up to the violence. The spring and summer of 1870 was a time of natural disasters and growing tensions within Tianjin. In the spring, twin epidemics of typhoid fever and cholera swept Tianjin. Increased mortality rates at the Sisters' hospital and orphanage meant more graves and an encroachment on public burial lands. A prolonged drought forced rural residents to flee to the city, bringing strangers and rootless wanderers in Tianjin and a rash of abductions sparked fear and anxiety among city residents. The arrest of suspected kidnappers, some with alleged connections to the Catholic mission, inflamed suspicions about the missionaries and their activities. When local officials attempted to investigate the allegations, they were stymied by Chevrier and the French consul in Tianjin, Henri Fontanier. A dispute between the French consulate and local officials sent the city spiraling into a day of rage. Groups of *hunhunr*, many in their semi-official capacity as militia soldiers and fire brigade members, took to the streets and attacked the church and orphanage. Thousands of people participated in the violence and by the end of the day at least 21 people had been killed.

The final section of the book deals with the aftermath. The British consul in Tianjin, William Lay, took on the responsibility of collecting bodies and organizing the defense of the international settlement. The foreign powers mobilized their gunboats and prepared for possible outbreaks of violence in other treaty ports. Officials pointed fingers while the central government ordered Zeng Guofan, governor of Zhili Province, to proceed to Tianjin to investigate the

massacre. One of the most famous statesmen in the empire, Zeng Guofan was at the time very ill and unsure how to answer French threats of war and demands for retribution without appearing to be a quisling in league with the foreigners. Zeng Guofan's co-investigator, Chonghou, would later become one of the first envoys from China to Europe when he traveled to France in 1870–1871 on an ill-fated mission to apologize to the French government on behalf of the Qing emperor.

There has not yet been a full-length English-language study of the Tianjin Massacre, which is surprising for an incident that has been so frequently cited by scholars writing about this period. The first major work in English on the Tianjin Massacre was an article published in 1957 by John King Fairbank in which he argued that the riots in Tianjin reflected one of the most graphic examples of a set pattern involving the presence of foreign missionaries, instigation by the gentry leading to a violent reaction by local populations, the response of the Qing authorities, and the counter-response, usually in the form of 'gunboat diplomacy' employed by the foreign powers. Fairbank argued that missionaries, sometimes unwittingly but just as often not, interfered with local systems of power and control, antagonizing local elites, who in turn, responded through campaigns of innuendo and misinformation designed to provoke righteous indignation against the missionaries. Local authorities who sought to impose order and protect foreigners in their jurisdictions did so at the risk of losing the support of the local elite and residents. When violence erupted, as in the case of Tianjin in 1870 or Yangzhou in 1868, the foreign powers had no other recourse but to seek redress through the threat of arms. Though by 1870, it was becoming apparent that the fear of conflict with the foreign powers was not what it had been a decade earlier.⁴⁰

40. John King Fairbank, "Patterns Behind the Tientsin Massacre" *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 20 3/4 (Dec. 1957), pp. 480–511

Fairbank's student, Paul Cohen expanded on these themes in *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1861–1870*. Cohen argued that the primary motivation behind anti-missionary activities in the 1860s was the conflation of the missionary enterprise with the larger colonial project on the part of aggressive foreign powers. Nevertheless, he carefully demonstrated how cases of anti-Christian sentiment reflected official and elite hostility toward heterodoxy in general, and Christianity in particular. Cohen argued that Christianity fits into a pattern of elite suspicion of heterodoxy as irrational and upsetting to social harmony. "Like Buddhism earlier, [Christianity's] foreign origin, its fundamental non-adherence to Confucianism (particularly in its Sung and post-Sung guise), miraculous content of some of its doctrine and its suspected motives of political subversion all combined to case it in this undesirable role."⁴¹

Cohen looked at the intended and unintended consequences of missionary activity in the period following the signing of the Beijing Convention in 1860, the agreement which opened the floodgates for foreign missionaries to travel, live, and purchase property in the interior of the empire; and the Tianjin Massacre of 1870, which provided a bloody capstone to a decade of anti-religious and anti-foreign incidents. Cohen implicated local elites as the driving force behind anti-missionary activities during the nineteenth century. He argued, "Naturally we have no way of proving that the great majority of these cases were directly or indirectly inspired by the educated classes. But the evidence available and the almost unanimous opinion of contemporary foreigners both tend to support such an assumption."⁴²

41. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 21.

42. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 4

Cohen further suggested that the xenophobia of China's political class inhibited modernization by its rejection of all aspects of the missionary enterprise, including the building of hospitals and schools. According to Cohen, these charitable works might have been one of the most damaging points of contention between gentry and missionary as foreign charity upset the 'cultural nexus,' upon which elite families depended for their power and status in local society. Cohen argued that by disrupting the web of activities and patronage that these families used to designate and perpetuate status, the missionaries undercut local elites' cultural and political authority.⁴³

The xenophobic response on the part of elites ultimately played a role in the collapse of the Qing political order in the last part of the nineteenth century because the obligations of treaty enforcement squeezed local officials between rising public sentiment against the presence of foreigners in their community and the repeated imperatives from a nervous Qing court not to take all necessary measures to avoid antagonizing the foreign powers. For Cohen, this predicament was a key reason why, time and again, violent acts against missionaries were compounded by official paralysis and inaction.

Finally, Cohen framed mutual hostility between local elites and foreign missionaries as a "clash of civilizations." Essentially, who owns "civilization"? Missionary sources grumbled about "prideful" Chinese officials even as Chinese sources lamented the arrogance of the foreign missionaries and diplomats. On this point, Cohen wondered, "Can a missionary be *genuinely* tolerant of a society that, to a greater or lesser extent, he wishes to change? However sympathetic he may be, is not the element of rejection at the heart of the Weltanschauung? Timothy Richard

43. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 82

argued that the purpose of the missionary in China should not be ‘to destroy, but to fulfill’ But could he fulfill without at the same time destroying?”⁴⁴

This focus on the dynamic between local elites and local officials is the core of Cohen’s analysis, and while it is clear from both Chinese and foreign sources that local elites played a role in the writing and dissemination of anti-Christian tracts, the situation in Tianjin suggests a more complicated picture of anti-foreign collective action. Cohen’s work is heavily informed by a paradigm popular in the 1950s and 1960s, which emphasized a duality in Qing society between ‘gentry’ and ‘non-gentry.’ Since then, several studies have demonstrated how urbanization and commercialization of Qing society in the late nineteenth century resulted in a multitude of power nodes, particularly in urban areas. Bradly Reed and Melissa Macauley showed in their research that there was considerable diversity within a broad category of “local elite.”⁴⁵ Cohen argued that in some cases, upper-level gentry was involved in the dispute, but given how the presence of missionaries could disrupt local vectors of power, it stands to reason that upper-level elites, those with considerable financial resources or strong political networks, would be affected differently than a *xiuca* or *shengyuan* clinging to the bottom rung of gentry status.

Cohen’s focus on official and elite concerns about heterodoxy does not adequately explain why so many non-elites participated in the riots. Assuming they were all dupes or instruments of the gentry class and their official allies denies agency for the subaltern groups in Tianjin, many of whom would have had their own reasons to fear and loath the foreign missions. The missions in Tianjin did not directly challenge or destroy Confucian sites, which are usually

44. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 81.

45. Melissa Ann Macauley, *Social Power and Legal Culture: Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China*, Law, Society, and Culture in China, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).; Reed Bradley Ward Reed, "Gentry Activism in Nineteenth-Century Sichuan: The Three-Fees Bureau," *Late Imperial China* 20, no. 2 (1999). Frederic Wakeman Jr, "Boundaries of the Public Sphere in Ming and Qing China," *Daedalus* (1998).; Fong Tobie Meyer-Fong, *Building Culture in Early Qing Yangzhou* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003).

associated with elite interests, although they did raze a Taoist temple to build a church and converted a neighborhood Buddhist shrine into a hospital ward.

Mary C. Wright's classic, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism*, also contains an account of the Tianjin riots. For Wright, the Tianjin Massacre represented the final blow for those who hoped the Tongzhi Restoration of 1861 could bring about a new era of peace between the Qing and the foreign powers. "At a time when responsible Western diplomats were summoning every reserve of wisdom to allay Chinese suspicion, one French consul closed his eyes to everything except France's role as protector of the Church. At a time when high Chinese officials were eating wormwood to avoid international incidents, one stubborn district magistrate closed his eyes to everything except the swell of local Chinese feeling against missionaries. In an afternoon, a decade's work was undone."⁴⁶

In her study, Wright placed the incident within the context of the 'self-strengthening' era, arguing that the violence exposed the hollowness of attempts by reforming personalities within China and sympathetic foreign allies to overcome several decades of mistrust and construct a new future for Sino-foreign relations. Wright argued that the event ruined the career of Zeng Guofan, one of the main protagonists in her study, and that it severely undermined the credibility of foreigners such as Anson Burlingame, who sought to find a constructive basis for relations between the foreign powers and the Qing Empire. Notably, the failure of the Zongli Yamen, one of the principal agencies for change in this period, to successfully ameliorate the continuous demands on the part of the French, British, and other powers for intervention into local disputes (and for reparations when these interventions failed) weakened the institution and the standing of the Zongli Yamen.⁴⁷

46. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874.*, p. 297.

47. Wright, *The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874.*, p. 30.

Recent work on anti-missionary incidents in China has complicated earlier binaries of Chinese official/foreign diplomat, foreigner/Chinese residents, and missionary/gentry. In his 2003 study entitled *The Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860–1900*, Joseph Tse-Hei Lee argued that rather than being a “purely external imposition,” Christianity had by this time become indigenized in many areas. This contrasts with earlier depictions of anti-foreign incidents as purely a conflict between the local and an external other. Lee’s research on nineteenth-century anti-missionary cases in the southern region of Chaozhou suggests that most of such cases were not spontaneous responses to foreign incursion but “deeply rooted in preexisting communal disputes which had long predated the arrival of Christianity.”⁴⁸

Looking at rural anti-missionary during this period, Alan Sweeten has also challenged the idea that most incidents were ultimately ideological disputes between local elites and foreign missionaries. Sweeten argues that in rural communities in Jiangxi, Catholic residents were well integrated with their non-Christian neighbors. Conflicts, when they occurred, tended to be over non-religious issues, which were then exacerbated by the intercession of missionaries. Relatively petty village squabbles risked escalation into international incidents.⁴⁹ Tian Xiaoli, writing about the rise of anti-missionary rumors in the 1860s, argues that prurient and salacious stories persisted not because of missionary secrecy but because of the relative visibility of missionaries and the way their practices, particularly medical missionary activities, could easily lead to suspicion among residents.⁵⁰

48. Joseph Tse-Hei Lee, *The Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860-1900* (Taylor & Francis, 2014), p. xvi.

49. Alan Richard Sweeten, "Catholic Converts in Jiangxi Province: Conflict and Accommodation, 1860-1900," in *Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, ed. D.H. Bays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

50. Tian Xiaoli, "Rumor and Secret Space: Organ-Snatching Tales and Medical Missions in Nineteenth-century China," *Modern China* 41, no. 2 (2015), p. 197.

The questions of who was involved and the strong possibility that the anti-foreign violence in Tianjin represented part of a transition to proto-nationalist consciousness and a sense of anti-foreign resistance that transcended class and occupational differences are intriguing, but the answers to these questions are still far from conclusive. Along with Man Bun Kwan's work on Tianjin society, Japanese historian Yoshizawa Seiichiro has done some of the best research to date on the hunhunn in Tianjin.⁵¹

Historians from the People's Republic of China (PRC) researching the Tianjin "Anti-Missionary Incident" have placed the events of 1870 into a broader narrative of foreign imperialist aggression and Chinese resistance. During the Mao Era, scholars viewed anti-missionary cases through the lens of class struggle and anti-imperialist resistance. This tendency toward theoretical reductionism abetted somewhat in the 1980s as part of a general reassessment of modern Chinese history, including anti-missionary cases, beginning in the early years of the Reform and Opening Era. There was a new emphasis on the clash of cultures and how local responses to colonial aggression fit into the evolution of a Chinese national consciousness.

Scholars writing in the 1980s and early 1990s viewed the actions of the rioters in Tianjin as being in line with a proto-nationalist response that resulted from the people's anger and distress at being subjugated in a semi-colonial status. The foreign missionary, in this reading, acted as the 'spear point' for more overt forms of violent intrusion and the actions of missionaries to intentionally disrupt Chinese society and undermine the authority of the state.

51. Seiichiro Yoshizawa, "kaki to tenshin kyoan," *Rekishigaku kenkyuu* 698 (1997). Kwan Kwan, "Order in Chaos: Tianjin's Hunhunn and Urban Identity in Modern China."; Man Bun Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China* (University of Hawaii Press, 2001). Yoshizawa's assertion that the hunhunn were acting independently of the organized militia and fire brigades during the riot is hard to reconcile with the number of Chinese and foreign eyewitness accounts claiming otherwise.

Cases of anti-missionary violence were an inevitable result of these disruptions and the breakdown in order.⁵²

There was a surge in interest in anti-missionary cases in the 1990s, resulting in the publication of several articles that emphasized key actors in the event, especially Zeng Guofan, and his role in the aftermath of the Tianjin riots. This approach was a much-needed departure from earlier works that suffered from an unfortunate tendency to classify all resistance as ‘patriotic’ or ‘class-based,’ regardless of actual motivations. However, the character-driven studies also risk reducing nineteenth-century relations between the Qing and the foreign powers to a series of morality tales. For example, despite his rehabilitation in the past two decades in PRC historical writing, Zeng Guofan is still made to suffer for failing to adequately protect “Chinese sovereignty” and for “capitulating” to French demands for harsh justice against the alleged participants in the riots.⁵³

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52. 冯祖贻 Feng Zuyi, 范同寿 Fan Tongshou, and Daquan Gu, 顾大全, *Jiao'an yu jindai Zhongguo: Jindai Zhongguo jiao an xue shu tao lun hui wen ji 教案与近代中国：近代中国教案学术讨论会文集 [Anti-Missionary Cases and Modern China: Collected Works from the Conference on Anti-Missionary Cases in China]* (Guiyang: Guizhou ren min chu ban she, 1990).p. 18. Qi Qizhang 戚其章 and Wang Ruhui 王如绘, *Wanqing jiao'an jishi 晚清教案纪事 [A Record of Anti-Religious Incidents in the Late Qing]*., p. 22. Wang Jiping 王继平, "Jindai zhongguo jiao'an yu chuanjiaoshi zhi wenhua guanzhao 近代中国教案与传教士之文化观照 [Cultural Observations of Missionaries and Anti-Missionary Cases in Modern China]," *湘潭大学学报: 哲学社会科学版 xiangtan daxue xuebao: zhexue shehui kexue ban*, no. 1 (1994). This interpretation, which emphasizes the role of the peasant class in a struggle against foreign imperialism, is echoed in some western works on anti-foreignism in the Qing. See Joseph Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising* (Berkeley, 1987).
53. Sun Chunzhi 孙春芝, "Zeng Guofan banli Tianjin jiao'an zhong de youshang — lue lun Zeng Guofan dui Tianjin zhifu Zhang Guangzao, zhixian Liu Jie de chuzhi 曾国藩办理天津教案中的忧伤——略论曾国藩对天津知府张光藻、知县刘杰的处置 [The Sadness of Zeng Guofan's Handling of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case — A Brief Discussion of Tianjin Prefect Zhang Guangzao and Magistrate Liu Jii]," *西南大学学报: 社会科学版 xinan daxue xuebao: shehui kexue ban*, no. 5 (1998)., pp. 110–116; Qiu Zhanxiong 邱展雄, "Zeng Guofan chuli Tianjin jiao'an ban 曾国藩处理天津教案辩 [Zeng Guofan's Management of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case]," *湖南城市学院学报 Hunan chengshi xueyuan bao*, no. 2 (1997).; 廖一中 Liao Yizhong and 李德征 Li Dezheng, "Zeng Guofan yu Tianjin jiao'an [Zeng Guofan and the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case]," *湖南城市学院学报 Hunan chengshi xueyuan bao*, no. 3 (1989). Yi Mengchun 易孟醇, "Zeng Guofan zai banli Tianjin jiao'an zhong de xinli maodun 曾国藩在办理天津教案中的心理矛盾 [Zeng

The foremost authority on Zeng Guofan, Zhu Dong'an of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Modern Chinese History Institute, has attempted prove that Zeng's final report was also flawed by Zeng's unwillingness to investigate what Zhu feels to be the crux of the case: whether the Catholic sisters at the orphanage were, in fact, kidnapping children and killing them for their body parts.⁵⁴ Recent articles have seen the pendulum swing back a bit, offering a less negative view of Zeng's handling of the case and focusing instead on the enormous pressures that the great official was under to fulfill his duties while wrestling with his conscience.⁵⁵

Scholarship in the PRC has also benefited from a diversity of methodological and theoretical approaches, many of which are influenced by trends in Western historiography on religion, colonialism, and resistance. A few researchers have focused on the political response and the handling of the case by the state, particularly on policies and official attitudes toward Christianity in the years before, during, and after the Taiping War.⁵⁶ Authors of other studies have looked at implementation and enforcement of policies and how government officials

Guofan's Psychological Contradictions in Handling Tianjin Missionary Case], *jindai lishi yanjiu 近代史研究* 1 (1990).

54. Zhu Dong'an 朱东安, "Zailun Tianjin jiao'an de qiyan yu xingzhi -- jian ping changpian lishi xiaoshuo "Zeng Guofan" jinmen pian 再论天津教案的起因与性质——兼评长篇历史小说《曾国藩》津门篇 [Re-Examination of the Causes of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident], *近代史研究 [Modern Historical Research]* 102, no. 6 (1997).
55. Sun Shangyang 孙尚扬, "Zeng Guofan jiazu yu jidujiao 曾国藩家族与基督教 [Zeng Guofan's Family and Christianity], *中国农业大学学报: 社会科学版 zhongguonongye daxue xuebao: shehui kexue ban* 26, no. 1 (2009).; Li Wenzhao 李文钊, "Zeng Guofan chuli 'tianjin jiao'an' 曾国藩处理“天津教案” [Zeng Guofan's Management of the 'Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case'], *文史天地 wenshi tiandi* 9 (2010).
56. Mo Hongwei 莫宏伟, "Dao xian nianjian qing zhengfu de jidujiao zhengce shulun 道咸年间清政府的基督教政策述论 [The Qing Government's Policy toward Christianity during the reigns of the Daoguang and Xianfeng Emperors], *怀化学院学报 huaihua xueyuan xuebao* 23, no. 1 (2004). Zhao Shuhao 赵树好, "Taiping tianguo shiqi qingzhengfu jidujiao zhengce xintan 太平天国时期清政府基督教政策新探 [A New Exploration of the Qing Government's Policies on Christianity during the Taiping Era], *历史档案 lishi dang'an [Historical Archives]* 4 (2008).; Wang Lixin 王立新, "Wanqing zhengfu dui jidujiao he chuanjiaoshi de zhengce 晚清政府对基督教和传教士的政策 [Government Policy toward Christianity and Missionaries in the Late Qing], *近代史研究 jindaishi yanjiu*, no. 3 (1996). Dong Conglin 董丛林, "Boxers before their Prime Days and Countermeasures of the Qing," *Journal of Hebei Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)* 1 (2010).

responded to the pressures brought by the sudden surge in missionary activity beginning in the 1860s.⁵⁷ Although class struggle does not currently play a significant role in current interpretations of anti-missionary cases, there has been some very interesting work on the role of different social groups in these incidents. Some of this scholarship hearkens back to earlier Western interpretations of gentry-missionary conflict while also incorporating local archives to provide a more diverse picture of how elites in different parts of China, including Tianjin, responded to the missionaries.⁵⁸ Other articles have looked at local stakeholders, arguing that the Western missionary activities often impinged on local culture, beliefs, and economic activity provoking a response.⁵⁹

There are a number of works which have employed social psychology, looking at how the spread of rumors reflected pathologies within local society, and how stories of Christian atrocities were a natural response to the twin pressures of missionary encroachment in a time of

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57. 梁腾 Liang Teng, "Wanqing liangguang dufu chuli jiao'an taidu de yanbian yanjiu 晚清两广督抚处理教案态度的演变研究 [A Study of the Evolution of the Attitudes of the Governors in Guangdong and Guangxi in Managing Anti-Missionary Cases during the Late Qing]" (聊城大学 liaocheng daxue, 2018).; Zhang Huanhuan 张欢欢, "Lun wanqing zhongyang zhengfu chuli jiao'an de fangzhen zhengce 论晚清中央政府处理教案的方针政策 [On the Central Government's Policy of Handling Teaching Cases in the Late Qing Dynasty]," *佳木斯教育学院学报 jiamusi jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao*, no. 8 (2013).
58. 郭亚全 Guo Yaquan, "Qingmo tianjin jiao'an fadongzhe tanxi 清末天津教案发动者探析 [An Analysis of the Instigators behind the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case in the Late Qing Dynasty]," *历史档案 lishi dang'an [Historical Archives]*, no. 2 (2009).
59. 罗萍 Luo Ping, "Jindai xifang chuanjiao huodong yu wanqing xiangtu shehui zhixu de liebian 近代西方传教活动与晚清乡土社会秩序的裂变 [Western Missionary Activities and the Divides in the Rural Social Order during the Late Qing]," *湖北社会科学 hubei shehui kexue*, no. 12 (2005).; Zhao Yanling 赵燕玲 and Luo Tao 罗韬, "Qianxi zhongguo jindai jiao'an de minzhong xinli 浅析中国近代教案的民众心理 [An Analysis of the People's Psychology in modern Anti-Missionary Cases]," *韶关大学学报(社会科学版) shaoguan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 1 (2000).; Wen Wen Qinhu 温钦虎, "Cong jindai jiao'an kan jidujiao he zhongguo shehui xisu de chongtu 从近代教案看基督教和中国社会习俗的冲突 [A Look at the Conflict between Chinese Christianity and Chinese Social Customs in Modern Anti-Missionary Cases]," *甘肃社会科学 gansu shehui kexue* 3 (2000).

increasing famine, overpopulation, and war in many parts of the country.⁶⁰ Other authors have employed sociological research methods and quantitative analysis to look at the spread of anti-missionary cases in China in the decade leading up to the Tianjin Incident of 1870.

In Taiwan, the Tianjin riot was the subject of one book-length study entitled *Qingji Tianjin jiao'an yanjiu*, written by T'ang Jui-yu and published in 1993. Tang's book makes heavy use of the Grand Council Archive housed at the National Palace Museum in Taipei, and his conclusions and analysis closely hew to those of Paul Cohen and the earlier impact/response interpretation of nineteenth-century anti-missionary cases. This project owes a debt to Tang's rigorous combing of the Grand Council Archives in Taipei and the identification of key documents related to the investigation and aftermath of the Tianjin riots.⁶¹

Non-Chinese historians in the twentieth century tended to view modern Chinese history through the paradigm of a broad "impact" of Western modernity leading to a generalized "response" against foreign imperialism. In the 1970s, a later generation of historians sought to place the events of the period between 1842 and 1949, known in China as the "Century of Humiliation" (百年国耻 *bainian guochi*), within the context of global imperialism in the nineteenth century and earlier. Neither imperialism's impact nor China's response was unique,

60. Zhang Lisheng and Zhang Xiaoliu, "Research on the Emerging Reason of Missionary Cases in the Late Qing Dynasty from the Social Psychology Angle," *Journal of Dezhou University* (2007).; rumors 董丛林 Dong Conglin, "'Miguai' 'zhege' chuanwen yu tianjin jiao'an '迷拐', '折割' 传闻与天津教案 [Rumors of 'Abduction' and 'Dismemberment' and the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case]," *近代史研究 jindaishi yanjiu* 2 (2003); Lei Yi 雷颐, "'Tianjin jiao'an' yu yaoyan kongzhi '天津教案' 与谣言控制 [The Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident and the Control of Rumors]," *中国新闻周刊 China News Weekly* 42 (2012); Tang Baomin 唐宝民, "'guanyao' zai 'tianjin jiao'an' zhong de tuibozhulan zuoyong ji dangdai jingshi '官谣' 在 '天津教案' 中的推波助澜作用及当代警示 [The role of 'Official Rumors' in the 'Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident' and Contemporary Warnings]," *领导科学 Leadership Science* 12 (2014); Tang Baomin 唐宝民, "Tianjin jiao'an de 'guanyao' 天津教案中的“官谣” [‘Official Rumors’ in the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident]," *党政论坛 dangzheng luntan* 6 (2016).

61. Tang Ruiyu 唐瑞裕, *Qingji Tianjin jiao'an yanjiu 清季天津教案研究 [Research into the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case of the Qing Period]*, vol. 276 (Taipei: 文史哲出版社 wen shi zhe chubanshe [Literature, History, and Philosophy Publishing House], 1993).

but fit a pattern of capitalist aggression disguised in the rhetoric of modernization and civilization and local resistance which defied the privileging of Western forms of political, social, and economic organization as benchmarks of development. This led historians of China in the latter part of the twentieth century toward a China-centered approach that embedded the events of the nineteenth century in a dynamic narrative that emphasized internal political, social, and economic changes. The China-centered history recast the foreign powers and their representatives as nodes in a shifting power nexus, one the foreign powers often strained to comprehend and that their representatives in China sought to unravel through an unwieldy but brutally effective combination of hard and soft power strategies.⁶² As they did in much of the non-Western world, the vast majority of Europeans and Americans who arrived in China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries came bearing goods, God, or guns, and not necessarily in that particular order.

In writing about foreign imperialism in China, Chinese historians have adapted the impact/response framework that emphasized the destructive force of Western impact and the regenerative power of the Chinese response.⁶³ The violence in Tianjin represented just one day in a Century of Humiliation for China. Throughout the 1980s, historians attempted Marxist, or in some cases Maoist, interpretations of China's recent past and argued that Western imperialism had shredded the sprouts of capitalism and forced Chinese society into a "semi-feudal and semi-colonial state." Historians looked for examples of proto-class struggle and incipient nationalism among movements of resistance against elites, the ruling dynasty, and the foreign powers. The

62. Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*, Studies of the East Asian Institute, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Hanchao Lu, "A Double-Sided Mirror: On Paul Cohen's *Discovering History in China*," *The Chinese Historical Review* 14, no. 2 (2007); Xiao Jumei and Zhang Jie, "Education History: from Local View to Global View—Reading Cohen's *Discovering History in China*," *Journal of Yangzhou University (Higher Education Study Edition)* (2012).

63. Xuezhi Li, "Impact-Response Mode and China-Centered View: On Several Problems in *Discovering History in China* [J]," *Journal of Historical Science* 7 (2010).

lack of success of these movements was attributed to insufficient political consciousness on the part of leaders and participants. These failures were rectified by the victory of Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party and the founding of New China in 1949. Proper leadership and national transformation required proper class consciousness and the internalization of revolutionary thinking and Marxist ideology.

This narrative shifted in the years following the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre as Marxism and class struggle lost their power to excite a generation born after the revolution. The events of the nineteenth century and the Century of Humiliation became central to a new legitimizing narrative that would, in the 1990s, emerge as a cornerstone of the patriotic education curriculum in schools. In short summary, a revamped story glorified a splendid and rich civilization that existed for 5,000 years until foreign imperialists, in league with traitorous native collaborators, attacked the Chinese nation. During the Century of Humiliation, many tried to “save China,” but none were successful until 1949 when Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist Party finally redeemed China and its people. In recent years, this particular narrative has taken on an added significance as Mao’s redemptive role gives way to an oft-touted “Great Rejuvenation” taking place under current Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping.

To put it in quasi-religious terms, there can be no redemption – let alone a great rejuvenation – without the fall. A story of heroic triumph must also include villains. It is also convenient that many of the most vocal critics of China’s economic policies and human rights record hail from countries who were among the aggressors during the Century of Humiliation.

In the conclusion, I discuss how events like the Tianjin riots are deployed and perpetuated in China today and how institutional memory of the Century of Humiliation continues to be a powerful lens through which many Chinese people continue to see the world.

Finally, this project discusses a violent event in the context of colonialism and imperialism. It also makes use of first-hand accounts and writings from that era. Some of the sources contain images and text of a graphic violent or sexual nature, while a few also describe forms of sexual assault which may be upsetting for readers. There are also documents quoted in this project which use terms and phrases that are objectionable. These words have been retained in quotation because of their importance for establishing historical context and for what the terms reveal about the people who used them and the times in which they were used.

PART I

Chapter 1: The Pharmacist

On a busy street outside the eastern gate of the city of Tianjin in 1857, Qiu Anyu opened his pharmacy for the day. The middle-aged Cantonese man would have taken the boards off the windows and propped open the door to his medicine shop, the streets outside heaving with shoppers, sellers, workers, and loafers.¹

The dispensary was in a prime spot, right in the middle of the bustling market district wedged between the city walls and the banks of the Hai River. A warren of warehouses, wharves, market stalls, small stores, and temples lined the waterfront northward to where the river joined the Grand Canal just outside the northeast corner of the walled city. Heading in the opposite direction, the busy streets to the south eventually gave way to marshes and salt flats as the Hai River meandered through 65 miles of twists and turns before reaching the sea. At the mouth of the river, the Dagu Forts guarded the estuary where it met the Bohai Gulf. More than just Northern China's busiest port, Tianjin was a critical strategic node. If the imperial capital at Beijing with its massive city walls was built to be a fortress, then Tianjin was meant to be that fortress's water gate.²

The area around Qiu Anyu's pharmacy enjoyed high levels of foot traffic as people headed to Tianjin's most important temple: Tianhou Gong, one of the few shrines to the ocean goddess Mazu in North China. Each day, the sick and the lame streamed past Qiu's medicine

1. For a discussion of the commercial quarters of Tianjin in the late-Qing see Gao 高福美 Gao Fumei, "Tianjin wei qing dai yanhai maoyi yu Tianjin shangye de fazhan 清代沿海贸易与天津商业的发展 [Coastal Trade and the Development of Tianjin's Commerce in the Qing Dynasty]" (南开大学, 2010).

2. The most complete English language history and description of pre-revolutionary Tianjin remains Otto Durham Rasmussen, *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History* (Tientsin Press, Ltd., 1925).

shop hoping for a miracle from Mazu.³ Some found relief from the goddess, but for those who could not Qiu Anyu was prepared to offer something else. He had a reputation as a skilled physician well-versed in Chinese medicine who possessed a rudimentary understanding of Western remedies, but the southern sojourner was also a Christian, a Lazarist priest who believed his faith and his God could heal sufferers beyond the help of medicine or local deities.

Known to his foreign friends as Joseph, Qiu Anyu was in the city on behalf of the Congregation of the Mission, the order founded by Vincent de Paul in 1625 and often referred to as the Lazarists. The Paris-based organization was one of the leading European missionary societies of the era and had a strong presence in China. Prior to 1860, overseas missionaries were limited to the existing treaty ports, and the order asked Qiu to establish his pharmacy in Tianjin, a city that was officially closed to foreign residence and proselytizing.⁴ Father Qiu would dispense medicine to those whom he could save and administer last rites to those he could not. While a Chinese priest might be able to blend in better with local society and proselytize in places where foreigners were still prohibited by law, Tianjin was still a risky assignment.

As a Catholic priest, Qiu Anyu belonged to a religion banned over for over a century by the great-great-grandfather of the current emperor. In 1724, the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661–1722) decreed that, except for a few European priests serving lifetime appointments at the imperial court, all foreign missionaries were forbidden from setting foot in China. He also labeled Christianity an illegal heterodox sect. Subsequent emperors reinforced these bans, issuing edicts

3. Qian Jianhua, "The Folk Cultures of Tianhou Temple in Tianjin," *Journal of Fujian Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)* (2012).

4. Anthony Clark has done a great deal of work on the origins of the Lazarist China mission, and the history of the Vincentians in Asia and I am indebted to his research for providing much of the background to the Lazarists who were working in North China at this time. See especially Anthony E. Clark, "Vincentian Footprints in China: The Lives, Deaths, and Legacies of François-Regis Clét, CM, and Jean-Gabriel Perboyre, CM," *Vincentian Heritage Journal* 32, no. 1 (2014); Anthony E. Clark, *China's Christianity: From Missionary to Indigenous Church* (Leiden: Brill, 2017); Anthony E. Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral* (University of Washington Press, 2019).

urging their subjects to reject heterodoxy and ordering local officials to be vigilant against potentially subversive religious orders, false doctrines, or the infiltration of their districts by foreign priests.⁵

Just a year after his ascension, the Yongzheng Emperor (r. 1722–1735) promulgated the *Shengyu Guangxun*, (圣谕广训) an extension and amplification of the ‘Sacred Edict’ issued by his father, the Kangxi Emperor.⁶ The *Shengyu Guangxun* represents one of the most trenchant and firm denunciations of Christianity attributable to any of the Qing rulers. While the Yongzheng Emperor continued to employ Europeans, mostly Jesuits, at court as scientists, mathematicians, artists, and engineers, his commentary firmly placed Christianity in the same category as dangerous heterodox groups like the White Lotus Sect.⁷

“With respect to books which were not written by the sages, and unsanctioned records, which alarm the age, and astonish the vulgar, which promote irregularities, and eat the people as a canker, These all contain strange dogmas which should be rooted out... The sect of the Western Ocean which honors *Tianzhu* [天主 “The Lord of Heaven], also ranks among those that are corrupt; but because these men [Catholic priests] understand mathematics, therefore the government employs them: of this you ought to be aware. To walk in these byroads and deceive the people is what the law will not excuse. The impositions of conjurors have also a determined punishment. The intention of government in enacting these laws was none other than to prohibit

5. 冯尔康 Feng Erkang, "Two Problems on the Study of Kangxi Emperor and Western Culture," *History Teaching* (2012).

6. For the larger context around the Sacred Edict and its promulgation, see Wang Ermin 王爾敏, "Qingting 《shengyu guangxun》 zhi ban xing ji minjian zhi xuanjing shiyi 清廷《聖諭廣訓》之頒行及民間之宣講拾遺 [Issuance and Public Preaching of the “Sacred Edict” of the Qing Court]," *jindaishii yanjiusuo jikan 近代史研究所集刊 [Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History]*, no. 22 (1993).

7. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 13.

the people from doing evil and encourage them to do good; to induce them to degrade the corrupt and honor the pure; to retire from danger and advance to repose.”⁸

European missionaries served the court through the reign of the Yongzheng Emperor’s grandson, the Jiaqing Emperor (r. 1796–1820) although their numbers had significantly declined by the beginning of the nineteenth century. Following the dissolution of the Society of Jesus in 1773, members of the Lazarist order replaced the Jesuits in the emperor’s service, but events in Europe, including the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars, disrupted the flow of missionaries to China, especially from France.⁹ Anti-Christian—or at least anti-clerical—sentiment was growing at the Qing court as well. The ongoing campaigns against the White Lotus and other sectarian rebels, including the Eight Trigrams, were a reminder of the insidious nature of heterodox religious movements.¹⁰

Europeans employed at court needed to be careful about any activities that might raise suspicions about their intentions. In 1805, The Italian Augustinian Adeodato di Sant’Agostino (1760–1821) was caught trying to send a map of the Shandong-Zhili border to Macau via a courier. Sant’Agostino claimed the map was to help decide a jurisdictional question between different missionary orders. Court officials worried the map might be used to plot military contingencies against the Qing Empire.¹¹

8. This passage is based on the translation in Wang Youpu and William Milne, *The Sacred Edict: Containing Sixteen Maxims of the Emperor Kang-He, amplified by his son, the Emperor Yoong-Ching together with a paraphrase on the whole, by a Mandarin* (London: Black, Kingsbury, Parbury, and Allen, 1817), p. 72. See also Victor Mair, "Language and Ideology in the Sacred Edict," in *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China*, ed. David G. Johnson et al., Studies on China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).

9. Jean Charbonnier, "Chinese Catholics in the Early Nineteenth Century," in *Handbook of Christianity in China*, ed. R. G. Tiedemann (Leiden: Brill, 2010), p. 215.

10. Rolf G Tiedemann, "Christianity and Chinese ‘Heterodox Sects’ Mass Conversion and Syncretism in Shandong Province in the Early Eighteenth Century," *Monumenta serica* 44, no. 1 (1996).

11. Laamann, Lars. "Anti-Christian Agitation as an Example of Late Imperial Anticlericalism." *Extrême-Orient Extrême-Occident*, no. 24, 2002, pp. 47–63, p. 72.

Subsequent edicts issued by the Jiaqing Emperor in 1811 and 1814 reinforced the proscription of Christianity. Qing authorities responded by ordering harsh crackdowns on Christian communities and manhunts for foreign missionaries residing illegally in the interior. There were campaigns targeting Christians in Tibet and Guizhou in 1812, and in Hubei and Guangdong between 1813 and 1814.¹²

Despite these edicts and the campaigns directed against Christian communities, by 1858, over 336,000 Catholics were living in China, along with seven bishops and vicars apostolic, 167 Chinese priests, and 193 foreign missionaries. The most significant Catholic communities were in the southwestern provinces of Sichuan and Guizhou.¹³ Even though the first half of the nineteenth century was a grim time for Chinese Christians, the Catholic community added 150,000 new believers between 1800 and 1858.¹⁴

This rapid expansion of the Christian community, particularly those who identified as Catholic, came at a time when most foreign missionaries had to either confine their activities to the coastal treaty ports or risk arrest carrying out furtive underground missions in the interior.¹⁵ The French bishop Gabriel-Taurin Dufresse was executed and his head displayed on a pike in Chengdu in 1815.¹⁶ Authorities in the Yangtze River port of Wuchang ordered the executions of

12. Charbonnier, Jean. "Chinese Catholics in the Early Nineteenth Century." *Handbook of Christianity in China, Volume Two: 1800–Present*, edited by R. G. Tiedemann, Brill, 2010, pp. 214–237, p. 219.

13. Rolf G Tiedemann, ed., *Handbook of Christianity in China, Volume 2: 1800-Present* (Leiden: Brill, 2010)., p. 115. By 1949, when the Communists took control of China, there were over 3.5 million Chinese Catholics; See also D. E. Mungello, *The Catholic Invasion of China: Remaking Chinese Christianity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).; Robert E. Entenmann, "Catholics and Society in Eighteenth-Century Sichuan," in *Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, ed. D.H. Bays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

14. Tiedemann, *Handbook of Christianity in China, Volume 2: 1800-Present.*, p. 115.

15. Daniel Bays and others have noted that even in the era after 1842 and the opening of treaty ports to Christian missionaries, protestants lacked the clandestine experience of their Catholic counterparts and so rarely ventured inland. As we will see, many Catholic missionaries were willing to take great risks to reach communities in the interior. See Bays, D. H. (2012). *A New History of Christianity in China*. Chichester, West Sussex; Malden, MA, Wiley-Blackwell, p. 48.

16. Entenmann, "Catholics and Society in Eighteenth-Century Sichuan." pp. 191–192.

the French Lazarist Jean-François-Régis Clet in 1820 and Jean-Gabriel Perboyre in 1840.¹⁷ The harsh punishments were meant as a warning to foreigners who might also be inclined to defy the emperor's ban on proselytizing

Until the 1860s, and in some cases even long after, many Chinese Christians had never seen a foreign priest. Their communities, which usually consisted of multi-generational Christian families and congregations, led their own services, interpreted doctrines, performed rituals, and organized indigenous structures of leadership. Chinese priests like Father Qiu, who himself hailed from a prominent Christian clan in the highlands of Guangdong, were important liaisons between active, but often isolated, congregations and the wider world of nineteenth-century Christendom. They helped to negotiate the ritual and cultural spaces between an evolving and sometimes unruly Chinese Christianity and Church law as it was understood in Rome.¹⁸

Although the term “convert” was often used as a synonym for “local Christian” in the diplomatic and even missionary reports from this era, many Chinese Christians were not converts recently brought into the fold by a missionary but members of established communities who had their own understandings and experiences of faith.¹⁹ Joseph Tse-Hei Lee has argued,

17. Clark, "Vincentian Footprints in China: The Lives, Deaths, and Legacies of François-Regis Clét, CM, and Jean-Gabriel Perboyre, CM."

18. Sweeten, "Catholic Converts in Jiangxi Province: Conflict and Accommodation, 1860-1900.;" Qin Heping 秦和平, "Qingdai zhongye Sichuan guan shenshi ming dui tianzhujiao renshi zhi renshi 清代中叶四川官绅士民对天主教认识之认识 [The Understanding of Catholicism among Sichuan Officials, Elite, and the People in the Mid-Qing Era]," *宗教学研究 zongjiaoxue yanjiu [Research in Religious Studies]*, no. 1 (2000); Tao Feiya, "Suspecting the People from Afar: The Prohibition of Preaching Catholicism in the Early and Mid-Qing Dynasty and Its Influence in the Late Qing," *Fudan Journal (Social Sciences Edition)* (2009); Entenmann, "Catholics and Society in Eighteenth-Century Sichuan.;" Qin Heping 秦和平, "Qingdai zhongye Sichuan guan shenshi ming dui tianzhujiao renshi zhi renshi 清代中叶四川官绅士民对天主教认识之认识 [The Understanding of Catholicism among Sichuan Officials, Elite, and the People in the Mid-Qing Era].;" Wei Yu, "The Struggle for Mission Right in Sichuan in Early Qing Dynasty," *Journal of Southwest Agricultural University (Social Sciences Edition)* 5 (2009).

19. Alan Richard Sweeten, "Catholic Converts in Jiangxi Province: Conflict and Accommodation, 1860–1900," in *Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, ed. D.H. Bays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996);

“Christianity, rather than a purely external imposition, became more indigenous at the village level, in more complex ways, than has been acknowledged in the scholarly literature.”²⁰ Lee and others have demonstrated that Christianity’s roots in local communities meant that cases of religious conflict were not always based on simple Christian-Confucian or Chinese-Foreign binaries. “Frequent outbreaks of anti-Christian and sectarian violence,” writes Lee, “were deeply rooted in preexisting communal disputes and rivalries.”²¹

Christian communities worshiped in underground services by necessity, often gathering in congregants’ homes and businesses. The need for secrecy increased with proximity to the capital. In Northern China, organizing a worship service for fellow Christians was to risk official harassment or worse.²²

In 1842, Tianjin native Zhang Yusong was in Beijing plying his trade as a street-side barber. All day, men would sit on his small wooden stool and chat while Zhang used his razor to clean the scalps and foreheads of his customers’ pates. After a close shave in the front, Zhang would re-braid the long hair in the back into the queue that the Chinese had been mandated to wear since the early days of the Qing conquest. The barber chair banter was undoubtedly much like today, consisting of capital gossip, the rise and fall of food prices, and speculation about the weather and change of seasons. When the conversation dragged, Zhang would take the opportunity to share his faith with his clients. Zhang the Barber was also Zhang the Preacher.²³

20. Lee, *The Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860-1900.*, p. xv.

21. Lee, *The Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860-1900.*, p. xvi.

22. 冯尔康 Feng Erkang, "Qing dai qianqi de zhong duo yu jinjiao zhong tianzhujiao de yanjiu 清代前期的中铎与禁教中天主教的延续 [On the Transmission and Disciple of Catholicism during the Anti-Religion Movements of Yongzheng and Qianlong]," *安徽史学 Anhui shixue*, no. 1 (2018).

23. Engui, Memorial to the throne reporting the apprehension of criminal Zhang Yusong, April 25, 1842. *Qingmo jiaojian'an 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing]*, Volume 1., Doc. 1.

Zhang Yusong was head of a congregation made up mostly of his fellow barbers. They practiced Catholic rituals and worshiped out of a small courtyard home in the southern part of Beijing and knew to keep their meetings as quiet as possible. More than any other city in the empire, the authorities in the capital had eyes everywhere, and officials were always on the lookout for potential threats to political stability.

The Daoguang Emperor (r. 1820–1850) had, in his younger days, been personally involved in the armed repulse of a band of assassins who infiltrated the palace looking for his father. The attack failed, but before being executed the assailants were identified as religious rebels belonging to the Eight Trigrams sect.²⁴ Heterodox sects were responsible for some of the most damaging and destructive uprisings against the court in the early nineteenth century.²⁵ Imperial edicts and the Qing Legal Code lumped Christians in the same dangerous category as practitioners of White Lotus Buddhism and Eight Trigrams adherents.²⁶ Christianity was not only a proscribed heterodoxy, but it was also the professed faith of the same foreigners who were, at the time, fighting a war with China over the question of opium imports in the southern city of Guangzhou. In the eyes of the court, Christianity was a European religion, and Qing authorities saw Chinese Christians as disloyal and potentially seditious. Even though many Christians in China lived their whole lives without ever meeting a Westerner, the court suspected Christians of being a potential fifth column spying on behalf of hostile foreign forces.

24. Naquin, Susan. (1976). *Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813*, Yale University Press.

25. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 17.

26. Liu Qingyu, "On The Reasons of the Prohibition Against Catholicism in The Tenth Year of Jiaqing Dynasty," *Journal of Inner Mongolia University (Humanities and Social Sciences)* (2006). Wu Boya, "Qing's Policy of Western Culture in the Period of Qianlong and Jiaqing," *暨南史学 jinan shixue [Jinan History]* (2004).

Just after the Qingming Festival in April 1842, members of the capital gendarmerie smashed through the gates of the courtyard where Zhang Yusong was meeting with his congregation.²⁷ They arrested dozens of Christians and seized religious paraphernalia and icons, including wooden crosses, a portable stoup, and images that authorities claimed had been smuggled into China from abroad. Such items were evidence of contact with the hated foreigners. If not actively in league with the foreign navies who were attacking China's coast, Zhang Yusong was worshiping the barbarians' God in the very heart of the imperial capital.

By the time Qiu Anyu arrived in Tianjin over a decade later, things had improved marginally for those practicing the foreigners' religion in China. Four months after imperial guards hauled Zhang Yusong and his parishioners away in chains, British forces compelled representatives of the Qing government to agree to the Treaty of Nanjing as a condition for ending the First Opium War. This treaty, along with the Treaty of the Bogue (1843) and the Treaty of Wanghia, negotiated between the Qing government and the United States in 1844, opened new ports to trade and foreign residence. The treaty ports became beachheads for foreign missionaries to proselytize in China.

After the signing of the Sino-British Treaty of Nanjing, the French government grew concerned about France's relatively weak position in Asia. The problem was that France lacked a rationale for maintaining a presence on the Chinese coast. The Treaty of Nanjing and the Sino-American Treaty of Wanghia were primarily about commerce. British and American negotiators sought preferential policies on which to build a foundation for the development of trade. France's commercial interest with China was relatively small compared to the upstart Americans

27. Engui, Memorial to the throne reporting the apprehension of criminal Zhang Yusong, April 25, 1842. *Qingmo jiaozhan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 1.

and a pittance compared to the volume of trade done by British merchants.²⁸ The demands of the empire nevertheless required France to respond to the British advances or fall behind their longtime European rival. In 1843, King Louis Phillippe (1773–1850) dispatched Marie Melchior Joseph Théodore de Lagrené (1800–1862) to China to negotiate favorable terms for French merchants, collect information on shipping routes and commercial opportunities, and obtain the same privileges and rights—including establishing consular jurisdiction—enjoyed by the other powers.²⁹

Although there were no specific instructions for him to do so, Lagrené and his translator Joseph-Marie Callery (1810–1862), looked to expand the French missionary presence in Asia to counter the commercial advantages enjoyed by Britain and the United States.³⁰ The Sino–French Treaty of Whampoa of 1844 formally codified the rights of missionaries to spread their faith and for Chinese Christians to worship openly. Lagrené’s actions became the first significant act in establishing the French religious protectorate over China’s Catholics, a protectorate that would come to define and shape the relationship between France and China for nearly a century. As historian Ernest Young noted, it is ironic that Lagrené should have taken this step while negotiating as a representative of Louis Phillippe during a time when relations between the

28. A recent book by Susan Schopp argues that considering France an “also-ran” in the Canton trade misunderstands the differences between French commercial policy and that of the British and other foreign powers. Schopp suggest that France was more invested in the China trade than previous works (See Cohen, 1963) have assumed. Nevertheless, following the Opium War and the signing of the Treaty of Whampoa, French interests in China tended to emphasize the ecclesiastical at the expense of the commercial. See S.E. Schopp, *Sino-French Trade at Canton, 1698–1842* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2020), p. 5.

29. Works on the treaty negotiations between France and the Qing Empire include Herbert M Cole, "Origins of the French Protectorate over Catholic Missions in China," *The American Journal of International Law* 34, no. 3 (1940); John F Cady, "The Beginnings of French Imperialism in the Pacific Orient," *The Journal of Modern History* 14, no. 1 (1942).

30. Joseph-Marie Callery, *Correspondance diplomatique chinoise relative aux négociations du traité de Whampoa conclu entre la France et la Chine le 24 Octobre 1844* (Paris: Seringe Frères, 1879).

Church and state in France had reached a nadir, and Lagrené was reporting to Foreign Minister François Guizot, a protestant.³¹

Lagrené's efforts received a great deal of support from those missionaries already based in Greater China. Several Lazarists sought out Lagrené when he arrived in Macau, asking him to advocate on their behalf when meeting with the Qing court representatives. On November 1, 1844, Lagrené wrote to Guizot and surmised that "In the commercial trade aspect, the British and Americans left nothing for us to do; but in the spiritual culture aspect, I thought it was time for France and the French government to take action by turns."³²

During the talks which resulted in the Treaty of Whampoa, the Qing government was represented by the Manchu official Qiying (1787–1858), who had negotiated the treaties with Great Britain.³³ After asking for and receiving most of the concessions already granted to Britain and the United States, Lagrené pushed the Qing government to end restrictions on the practice of Christianity. Although this was a departure from earlier agreements signed with the other foreign powers, Qiying was not immediately dismissive of Lagrené's request. In memorials sent to the court in October of 1844, Qiying made a series of arguments advocating for the lifting of the ban on Christianity.³⁴ Qiying offered justifications for tolerance of Christianity by suggesting the edicts of the Kangxi Emperor and his successors could be interpreted as having been less than

31. Ernest P. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 24.

32. Angelus Francis J. Grosse-Aschhoff, *The Negotiations between Ch'i-ying and Lagrene* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1950); Louis Tsing-sing Wei, *La Politique Missionnaire de la France en Chine, 1842-1856. L'ouverture des Cinq Ports Chinois au Commerce Étranger et la liberté religieuse* (Paris: Paris Nouvelles Éditions latines, 1961).

33. For a complete biography of Qiying and details of his negotiations with Great Britain and other foreign powers, See Hummel, A. W. and P. K. Crossley (2018). *Eminent Chinese of the Qing Period: 1644–1911/2*, Berkshire Publishing Group, p. 497.

34. Qiying Memorial to the Throne, YWSM: DG, 73:2, pp. 117–136. Zhang Junzhe 张浚哲, "Faguo chuanjiaoshi yu zhongfa huangpu tiaoyue 法国传教士与中法黄埔条约 [French Missionaries and the Sino-French Treaty of Whampoa]," *中国天主教 Zhongguo Tianzhujiao [Chinese Catholicism]* 4 (1982).

full prohibitions on all Christian activities. Given the widespread promulgation of the Kangxi Emperor's original ruling and the subsequent broadside against heterodoxy in general and Christianity and particularly in the "Sacred Edict" by the Yongzheng Emperor, this was a tricky legalistic needle to thread. Qiyong persisted by pointing out that, unlike sects like the White Lotus and Eight Trigrams, who had been engaged in active rebellion against the throne, the Christians had been mostly peaceful. Finally, Qiyong made his most compelling case: Lagrené seemed to deeply care about the fate of Christianity in the empire, and Qiyong believed it entirely possible France might use the issue of religious liberty as a pretext for war.³⁵

The Treaty of Whampoa was signed by Lagrené and Qiyong on October 24, 1844, aboard the gunboat L'Archimède. Article 22 of the treaty expressly permitted French nationals to "establish churches, hospitals, hospices, premises and cemeteries" in the designated treaty ports.³⁶ Much to the surprise of Lagrené—and even Qiyong—the Daoguang Emperor went a step further, announcing on December 28, 1844, that he had lifted the ban on Chinese practicing Christianity so long as those who did so did not violate any other laws.

Lagrené was concerned that despite the emperor's pronouncement, the Qing code still classified Christians in the same category as religious rebels, sorcerers, and spiritual deviants. Lagrené pressed Qiyong to raise the issue with the emperor again.³⁷ In exchange, Lagrené

35. Qiyong memorials to the throne, YWSM: DG, 73:2, pp. 117–136; Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate*.

36. Cordier, H. (1901). *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales: 1860–1902*, F. Alcan, p. 17. Grosse-Aschoff, A. (1950). *The Negotiations between Chi-ying and Lagrené, 1844–1846*. Louvain, Belgium, The Franciscan Institute; Cady, J. F. (1954). *The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia*, Cornell University Press; Wei, T. L. (1961). *La Politique Missionnaire de la France en Chine 1842 1856 l'ouverture des cinq ports chinois a commerce étranger et la liberté religieuse*, Nouvelles Éditions latines..

37. In addition to the memorials collected in Shoutian Du, ed., *筹办夷务始末 chouban yiwu shimo [A Complete Record of Managing Barbarian Affairs]* (Taipei). DG 73:2, See also the collection of letters and correspondence (with French translation) in Callery, J. M. (1879). *Correspondence diplomatique chinoise relative aux négociations du traité de Whampoa conclu entre la France et la Chine le 24 Octobre 1844*, Seringe Frères. Callery served as Lagrené's translator during the negotiations in 1844 and 1845.

dangled a tantalizing carrot by hinting that France might be willing to support China against the British in any future negotiations or confrontations. Qiyong was skeptical, but relayed Lagrené's message to the throne and the Qing court—more out of hope than experience—acquiesced to the additional French demands. In February 1846, an imperial edict removed Christianity from the list of harmful teachings and ordered local officials to post notices announcing the reversal of the ban on Christianity.³⁸ Lagrené scored another coup when the emperor further announced foreign missionaries would be allowed to build and consecrate churches in the treaty ports.³⁹

The agreements signed between 1842 and 1844 forced the door open for missionaries to openly work in China while also providing partial legal sanction for the activities of Chinese Christians.⁴⁰ Non-Chinese missionaries enjoyed extraterritorial status, but these rules only applied to the areas where foreigners were allowed to reside and travel, limiting missions to the five treaty ports established by the Treaty of Nanjing: Shanghai, Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Ningbo. Foreign missionaries who ventured into the hinterlands did so at their own risk, and although a foreigner might be able to hide in the wild valleys of Southwest China or at a remote outpost on the Mongolian steppe beyond the Great Wall, infiltrating a city like Tianjin was quite another matter. Even wearing Chinese dress and a false queue—the standard disguise for undercover foreign missionaries—a European could not hope to go unnoticed in an urban area for very long, and the consequences of discovery were dire.⁴¹

38. Edict addressed to Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi Qiyong, February 20, 1846. *Qingmo jia'ao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 11.

39. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 18.

40. Kenneth Scott Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929)., p. 270.

41. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate*; Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral*.

Article 23 of the Treaty of Whampoa stipulated that a missionary arrested for violating the ban on interior travel be handed over to the nearest French consul, but not every local official was aware of—or cared about—the specific wording of the treaties.⁴² The primary concern of Qing authorities was to maintain social and political order within their jurisdictions. Many missionaries, especially Catholic missionaries, were eager to connect with existing communities in the inland provinces, and willfully ignored portions of the treaties they found inconvenient. This commitment to forcing religious tolerance on the Qing Empire met with firm opposition from officials tasked with enforcing the law. The fate of the French priest Auguste Chapdelaine (1814–1856) became a cautionary tale for future missions in China and a rallying point for those who advocated another war as a way to wrest more concessions from the Qing government.

Born in La Rochelle in the diocese of Coutances, Father Chapdelaine joined the Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris in 1851 and traveled to China a year later via Antwerp. He arrived in Guangdong Province just as Hong Xiuquan (1814–1864), the self-anointed younger brother of Jesus Christ, was beginning a crusade that would lead to the catastrophic Taiping War (1850–1864). In some ways, the two men were more like one another than either might have been willing to admit. They were the same age, felt possessed by a holy spirit too radiant not to share with others, and both believed—erroneously as it would turn out—that their faith could act as a shield to protect them from their enemies, if not their own hubris.⁴³

42. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 66.

43. Xie Ming 谢铭, "Taipingtianguo chuqi qingchao de jidujiao zhengce dui xilin jiao'an fasheng de yingxiang 太平天国初期清朝的基督教政策对西林教案发生的影响 [The Influence of the Qing Dynasty policies toward Christianity and the Xilin Anti-Christian Incident]," *Guangxi shehui kexueyuan* 广西社会科学院 11 (2005); Xie Ming 谢铭, "Lun Malai yu Tianzhujiào zài Guangxi de chuāngbō 论马赖与天主教在广西的传播 [Ma Lai (Chapdelaine) and the Spread of Catholicism in Guangxi]," *Shoucang* 收藏 12 (2009).

Between 1852 and 1854, Chapdelaine made secret forays into the mountainous regions of Western Guangdong and Guangxi provinces. Most of Chapdelaine's sorties ended after he was discovered by local officials, detained, and then sent back to the treaty port at Guangzhou with an expectation that the French consul would keep a tighter rein on his fellow countryman.

In the spring of 1854, an undeterred Chapdelaine embarked on his most ambitious mission yet, setting out from the coast to minister to rural Catholic communities scattered across the wild areas in Western Guangxi. Even before the emergence of Hong Xiuquan and his followers, the region had a reputation among officials as a violent and unstable place. It was a frontier area where the boundaries of Guangxi, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces met among high peaks and deep river gorges. Much of the population—including many of the Catholic communities Chapdelaine hoped to visit—were communities of Zhuang and other non-Han people who fiercely maintained their autonomy and independence against encroachments by the Qing state. Power rested in diverse and dangerous groups and clans who controlled the hills and hollows. Religious rebels, secret societies, brigands, river pirates, and smugglers took advantage of unclear jurisdictional lines and tested the ability of the local government to maintain order. Those officials assigned to the region had to adapt or risk not surviving long enough to see their next posting. They often eschewed proper procedures and rules in favor of confrontational and sometimes brutal strategies they felt were necessary to preserve their authority and their personal safety.

In December, local officials arrested Chapdelaine just after he gave mass for 300 local congregants in rural Xilin County. Chapdelaine was held in the local jail for nearly three weeks before being released, expelled from Guangxi, and ordered to return at once to Guangzhou. As

Chapdelaine was being run out of town, the Xilin County magistrate gave the priest a stern warning about the dire consequences that awaited him should the priest try to return to the area.⁴⁴

Chapdelaine chose to ignore the threats and returned to Guangxi in December 1855. Three months later, a concerned relative of a Christian convert reported Chapdelaine's presence to the authorities. Zhang Mingfeng, the newly appointed magistrate for the county, arrested Chapdelaine and two of his associates, Lawrence Bai Xiaoman (1821–1855) and Agnes Cao Guiyang (1821–1856), outside of the town of Dingan. At the trial, Magistrate Zhang accused Chapdelaine of disturbing the peace and being a foreign spy secretly in league with Hong Xiuquan and the Taiping rebels. Chapdelaine denied the charges, saying that he “merely wished to encourage the people to be virtuous.”⁴⁵ The magistrate ordered Agnes Cao and Lawrence Bai to apostatize and then had them flogged when neither was willing to renounce their faith. After being sentenced to death, Chapdelaine, Cao, and Bai were beaten, tortured, and displayed in a small cage outside the local jail while awaiting decapitation. Chapdelaine died from his ill-treatment before he could be executed, although the magistrate kept his word and had the priest's body beheaded postmortem. There are gruesome accounts that Chapdelaine's heart was taken from his body, stir-fried with pork fat, and then eaten.⁴⁶ Agnes Cao also died because of the conditions of her captivity, while Lawrence Bai was later executed.⁴⁷

44. Mungello, *The Catholic Invasion of China: Remaking Chinese Christianity.*, p. 100.

45. Anthony E. Clark, *China's Saints: Catholic martyrdom during the Qing (1644-1911)*, Studies in Missionaries and Christianity in China, (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011), p. 167.

46. Mungello, *The Catholic Invasion of China: Remaking Chinese Christianity.*, p. 104.

47. Clark, *China's Saints: Catholic martyrdom during the Qing (1644-1911)*, p. 167. In 2000, Pope John Paul II angered Chinese Communist Party leaders by canonizing Auguste Chapdelaine, Agnes Cao, and Lawrence Bai. In response, Chinese state media accused Chapdelaine of being a spy and a serial rapist preying on young female converts. Officials in Dingan County, where Chapdelaine died, also built a museum celebrating the priest's execution as an act of patriotism and resistance against the “spiritual opium of religion.” See “China demonizes French saint in patriotic propaganda,” *Agence France-Presse*, July 10, 2016.

In early 1856, the Count de Courcy, the French Chargé d'affaires in Guangzhou, wrote a scathing letter to Governor-General Ye Mingchen (1807-1859) demanding compensation for the murder of Chapdelaine. He complained that the priest's execution was in violation of Article 23 of the 1844 Treaty of Whampoa and insisted that the Guangxi County magistrate and other officials responsible for the death of Chapdelaine be punished. "The captivity of Mr. Chapdelaine, the tortures he has suffered, his cruel death, the violence that was done to his body constitute, noble Imperial Commissioner, a flagrant and odious violation of the solemn commitments you consecrated. Your government, therefore, owes France a resounding reparation which you will not hesitate to give to me in full and whole. It is naturally up to your Excellency to propose the terms; I will then have to decide if the honor, dignity, and interests of the Government of my great Emperor allow me to accept them."⁴⁸

Ye responded that Chapdelaine had violated the law and traveled to a sensitive area where, he implied, mishaps could also easily happen. "I have taken a careful knowledge of all these facts, and I find, after examination, that the Imperial Edicts, received with sovereign respect, have prescribed that the propagation of the Christian religion would be authorized only in the five ports open to Commerce, and that it would be forbidden to enter the interior of the country to preach religion there, which is moreover clearly defined in the treaty itself, as one can easily be convinced. However, the district of Si-lin is not one of the markets open to trade, and in going there, in defiance of these provisions, the priest Ma and others made a mistake. It is also necessary to consider that it is in Kouang-Si that the bandits with the red turbans first rose up, that the troubles (fomented by them) are not yet entirely appeased, since, although they are on one side, they extend on the other, and that a large number of these bandits, arrested in the

48. Quoted in Yen-yu Huang, "Viceroy Yeh Ming-Ch'en and The Canton Episode (1856-1861): 4. The Canton Episode," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 6, no. 1 (1941), Appendix IV, page 106.

provinces, declared untruthfully in their interrogations, that they were Christians: they therefore had to be severely punished, and they were indeed, but for their misdeeds only, which has nothing in common with the preaching of Religion.”⁴⁹ Ye Mingchen’s refusal to capitulate to the demands of Count de Courcy would later become the primary rationale given for France joining the British in fighting the Second Opium War.⁵⁰

The fates of Agnes Cao and Lawrence Bai were also examples of the potential trouble that awaited native Catholics who became mixed up in disputes between the foreign missions and local authorities. For a Chinese priest like Father Qiu, the treaties theoretically meant he could be open about his activities in Tianjin, but he had good reasons to avoid attracting too much official attention. Fortunately for Father Qiu, Tianjin’s unruly denizens kept the authorities in Tianjin very busy.

In 1858, Tianjin had between 700,000 and 1 million residents, and like many river ports around the world, it could be a tough town to govern. Founded in the early fifteenth century, the city began as a military garrison guarding the waterways and approaches to Beijing following the relocation of the capital there by the Yongle Emperor (r. 1402–1424).⁵¹ On December 23, 1404,

49. Governor-General of Guangdong and Guangxi Ye Mingchen to Chargé de Affaires de France en Chine, August 20, 1856. Henri Cordier, *L’Expédition de Chine de 1857-58: Histoire diplomatique: Notes et documents* (Paris: Alcan, 1905), p. 30–31.

50. Cordier, *L’Expédition de Chine de 1857-58: Histoire diplomatique: Notes et documents.*, p. 29., See Chapter 3.

51. In 1404, the future Yongle Emperor, Zhu Di (1360–1424) had forded the Hai River near modern-day Tianjin as he led his armies south to the Ming dynastic capital in Nanjing. Zhu Di’s nephew, the Jianwen Emperor [1398–1402] had been in power for just two years and the young emperor had been at war with his uncle the entire time. For nearly twenty years, Zhu Di had faithfully served his father as the guardian of the northern frontier. He had used his armies to push the Mongols back into the steppe. It was Zhu Di’s generals and engineers who surveyed what had previously been rather crude earth and stone border markers and barrier walls and recommended rebuilding those defenses using bricks and placing towers at regular intervals in the integrated system of military defense which is the Ming Great Wall. Zhu Di did not take kindly to being passed over. Almost immediately after being notified that his nephew, the son of Zhu Di’s elder brother, would inherit the throne, Zhu Di began preparing for war. Zhu Di’s power base was in the north, in the former capital of Kublai Khan, renamed Beiping (“Pacified North”) when the last Mongol rulers had been forced out of China in 1368. His nephew was ensconced in the Ming dynastic capital of Nanjing, 1000 kilometers to the south. To send his armies southward, Zhu Di needed to gain control over the river crossings

the new Yongle Emperor ordered an outpost built at the site where he crossed the Hai River four years earlier as he was leading his armies southward to claim the Ming dynasty throne from his nephew, the Jianwen Emperor (r. 1398–1402). The new outpost was named Tianjin, “Heaven’s Ford,” to commemorate the “Son of Heaven” who had “forded” the river. A second garrison was added in 1405, and a full Tianjin Guard was established in 1406. The court noted the area was important for its oceangoing ships and trade, and because the fertile land around the garrison was suitable for the establishment of a military colony. The new regiment was fortified with troops from Anhui and Jiangsu, and a city wall was constructed, originally of pressed earth which was later reinforced by stouter ramparts made of brick.

One of the earliest Western descriptions of Tianjin was by the first Dutch Embassy to China, led by Peter de Goyer and Jacob de Keyzer in 1655. De Keyzer wrote: “On July 5, we arrived at the sea-port of Tien-cien-wey [Tianjinwei], accounted for the most famous Sea Town of all of China...situated upon the further confine toward the east of this Province of Peking, near the arm of the Sea Kang [Hai River], in a corner, where three of this Province meets, and upon which stands a strong Fortress: the country round about lyes very low but Marshy... The city [is] built with Strong Walls, twenty-five foot high, full of Watch Towers and Bulwarks, and the place much set forth with Temples, very populous and so full of Trade that hardly the like

between his Beiping base and the southern cities loyal to his nephew. One of the most important of these fords was where the Hai River and the Grand Canal met. Barely two centuries old (previous settlements had been washed away), the town known in 1400 as Zhiguzhai was more of a village surrounded by makeshift stockade atop an earthen berm. Eventually, Zhu Di’s engineers constructed a pontoon bridge that allowed the prince’s armies to continue their march south. In 1402, Zhu Di’s soldiers sacked Nanjing and removed the Jianwen Emperor from power. By most accounts, the deposed emperor died when his uncle’s troops burned down the royal palace while the nephew was still inside. With the death of his young rival, Zhu Di began his reign as the Yongle Emperor [r. 1402–1424] and set about consolidating his power including plans to rebuild the primary dynastic capital in the north. Beiping was rechristened Beijing, the Northern Capital, and over one million laborers and 100,000 artisans, architects, and craftspeople worked to build a new palace, today’s Forbidden City, in the city center. The decision to move the Ming capital to Beijing also raised the strategic importance of the rivers and the crossings Zhu Di’s troops had forded in their campaign against the Jianwen Emperor.

Commerce is to be found in any other city in all China; for whatever Vessels are bound for Peking from any other part of China must touch here.”⁵²

The city’s position near the intersection of five rivers and canals—including the Hai River and the Grand Canal—and proximity to Beijing contributed to Tianjin’s rise as an entrepot. The city was the economic core of a trading network that spread out across the North China Plain into the Mongolian steppe and north to Manchuria.⁵³ Traders and merchants from all over Northern China could be found plying their wares in Tianjin’s markets.

During the trading season, the population swelled with barge pullers and other itinerant workers. These were stout men, many from Shandong and Henan provinces in the south, who used strength and sturdy rope to tow heavy loads along the Grand Canal and its feeder streams. Equally tough and of even more fearsome reputation were the men hired by officials and merchants to guard precious caravan cargoes. After the work was done, many of these bravos stayed in Tianjin looking for their next job if they were not busy brawling in the city’s wineshops. Tianjin was a town of transients, tramps, and thugs that made it difficult for the authorities to keep track of troublemakers. Local soldiers, dock workers, and gangs all competed with the sojourners for a piece of the action. Alexander Michie, who would later edit Tianjin’s first English newspaper *The Chinese Times*, wrote in his memoir that the people of Tianjin “were reputed be the most turbulent, predatory, and wicked race in the Empire... Undiscovered crimes in other cities were generally debited to Tientsin ‘bullies.’”⁵⁴

Responsibility for the city fell on a group of officials who managed Tianjin in a complicated and intentional tangle of mandates. Qing administrative practice favored

52. Quoted in Rasmussen, O. D. *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History*. Tientsin: The Tientsin press, 1925, p. 9.

53. See G. William Skinner, "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China," in *The City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977).

54. Rasmussen, *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History*., p. 39.

overlapping jurisdictions staffed by non-local personnel supervised through different channels. The system made it harder for officials to cultivate troublesome local power bases, and provided a way for the central government to regulate officials' behavior. Everybody watched everyone else. Fear of being reported by their fellow officials kept bureaucrats in line and preserved the centralized power of the Qing court, although the system made for messy lines of command and communication. In times of crisis, the structure could break down entirely as officials sought to avoid responsibility.⁵⁵

In this environment, Father Qiu did well to keep his mission going for as long as he did especially because his faith made him a potential target for either an overzealous official trying to maintain social harmony or an unscrupulous yamen runner looking for an opportunity to extort money. Chinese Christians, particularly those with leadership roles in the Church and known connections to foreign missionaries, were aware of the risks. Local authorities had little patience for foreign cults, despite the imperial edicts endorsing tolerance. Few officials knew very much about Christianity, and what little they did know or had read on the subject was not likely to engender warm feelings about the religion or its adherents.

In the early eighteenth century, around the time of the Kangxi Emperor's proscription, writer Zhang Zhentao (1713–1780) published a treatise entitled *Zhiyu aoyi lun* [制馭澳夷論 Managing the Barbarians of Macau]. The treatise included a section on Christianity that prefigured later anti-Christian polemics in its jumble of truth, fiction, and sensationalism.⁵⁶ Zhang served as an official in Guangdong, and his postings in that province also encompassed

55. For a longer discussion of the challenges faced by local officials in Qing society see Ch'ü, *Local Government in China Under the Ch'ing.*; John R. Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972)..

56. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 32.

the area around the Portuguese colony of Macau, which had long been the center of theological study for Chinese priests and a gateway for Catholic missionaries looking to enter China. More so than most officials in the Kangxi and Yongzheng eras, Zhang Zhentao was able to observe and comment on Christianity and the practices of its followers, both Chinese and foreign.⁵⁷

Zhang argued that “while other heterodox sects made use of their religions to acquire wealth, the barbarians alone used wealth to spread their religion” and did so by nefarious means. “When a Chinese convert was on the verge of death, the Catholic priest came and, covering the convict’s head with a piece of cloth, pretended to pronounce the absolution. In reality, however, he secretly made off with the eyes of the dying man. These were then mixed with lead and mercury to create silver, none of the original quantity of lead being depleted.” Zhang further explained European eyes were not suitable for this technique, thus requiring the missionaries to harvest the eyes of others continually.⁵⁸

In the early nineteenth century, writers and scholars Liang Tingnan, Wei Yuan, and Xu Jiyu included descriptions of Christianity in their attempts to describe and explain the history, culture, and origins of the foreign nations aggressively pursuing their interests on the Chinese coast. In the 1852 edition of his *Illustrated Guide to the Maritime Countries* (海国图志 *haiguo tuzhi*), Wei Yuan ascribes to Christianity a number of exotic and salacious practices and accused the missionaries of exploiting Chinese Christians. He explained how Christian converts were forced to live in mix-gender lodgings near the foreigners so that, when the time came, the foreign missionaries could harvest the eyes of the converts for use in alchemy. In another anecdote recounted by Wei Yuan, a potential convert is given a special medicine by the missionary, which

57. Tang Kaijian, *Setting off from Macau: Essays on Jesuit History during the Ming and Qing Dynasties* (2016), p. 74.

58. Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 31.

causes the would-be convert to act irrationally, destroying the family's ancestral tablets and cursing the spirits. When his wife gives him an antidote, the man evacuates a tiny wriggling figure from his bowels, identified later as the "Holy Mother of God."⁵⁹

Wei Yuan also included a story of a Chinese man who infiltrated the Christian Church. The man feigned an illness, and when the pastor came to remove his eyes, the Chinese man attacked the pastor, beating the foreigner and escaping. The story ends with Wei Yuan describing, in language remarkably like those in the writings of Zhang Zhentao a century earlier, how the foreigners mixed human eyes with lead to make silver. Wei Yuan embellished Zhang's theory of why the Europeans used Chinese eyes. "The eyes of Chinese are used," reported Wei, "for the same reason the foreigners sell opium to the Chinese, but not to their own people."⁶⁰ Wei Yuan claimed to be simply repeating facts, or at least tales commonly told, about missionaries, but much of Wei Yuan's "information" perpetuated and reinforced common misperceptions of Christianity.

Tales of missionaries using medicine to muddle the minds of victims and harvesting body parts for sinister purposes were well known and widely believed. Often, it was the only thing most people knew about Christianity. Eventually, these stories would become the basis of anti-Christian polemics published and widely disseminated in the 1860s. Misinformation did not make it easy for Christians to openly worship and organize in cities like Tianjin.

Father Qiu's position was doubly precarious. Not only was he a Christian, but Qiu hailed from Guangdong and was Hakka, a group closely associated in the minds of both officials and

59. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 40. See also Lutz, J. G. (2012). "China's View of the West, A Comparison of the Historical Geographies of Wei Yuan and Xu Jiyu." *Social Sciences and Missions* 25(1-2): 35-52.

60. "惟其銀必以華人睛點之乃可用。而西洋人睛不濟事，故西洋病終無取睛之事，獨華人入教則有之也。亦鴉片不行於夷，而行於華之類也。" Wei Yuan, *Haiguo tuzhi 海國圖志 [An Atlas of the Oceanic Countries]* (Changsha: Yuelu Shushe, 2011).; Translation based on Cohen, *China and Christianity*, p. 40.

Tianjin residents with the ongoing threat posed by the Taiping rebels. Hong Xiuquan and many of his followers were also Hakka, and the prejudice against Christians, southerners, and Hakka only increased during the 1850s as the Taiping armies made repeated forays into the region around Tianjin and menaced the city.

The Taiping movement emerged from the hills of Guangdong and Guangxi in 1853. As the Taiping ranks swelled with the poor, the disaffected, and the desperate, their armies marched northward, eventually carving out a rival state in the heart of the Qing Empire. Taiping control stretched broadly over several provinces in the agriculturally rich regions along the middle stretch of the Yangtze River. From their newly captured capital at Nanjing, rechristened Tianjing, the Heavenly Capital (not to be confused with Tianjin, “Heaven’s Ford”), Taiping forces fanned out east toward the treaty port of Shanghai and north in the direction of the imperial capital Beijing.

The regular armies of the Qing government failed to contain the Taiping Rebellion, leaving the Qing court dependent on semi-private armies led by local elites. One of the most famous of which was the Xiang Army, named for the Xiang River in Hunan, and led by Zeng Guofan (1811-1872), a scholar-official turned general.⁶¹ As Paul Cohen and others argued, “Although it is often stated that the rebellion failed partly because its bizarre ideology lacked appeal for the educated classes, it is less frequently noted that the traditional antagonism of these

61. An excellent overview of the Taiping War in the context of both Chinese and world history is Platt Stephen R. Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, The West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War*, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012). Also see Franz H. Michael, *The Taiping Rebellion* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966); Jonathan D. Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan*, 1st ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996).

classes toward Christianity was hardened by the Taiping experience.”⁶² Zeng’s participation in the war against the Taiping would have a profound influence on his views regarding Christianity.

Among the missionary community in China, there was ambivalence about the success of the Taiping. In the early years of the rebellion, some missionaries saw Hong Xiuquan as a possible savior, a chance for China to finally crown a Christian king.⁶³ As missionaries began to hear details about Hong’s unique brand of Christian theology and as his armies threatened the areas around Shanghai, the mood shifted. “The Protestants, especially their ministers, perhaps also some Catholics, have often applauded the success of the rebels,” Bishop Anouilh wrote in a letter back to Paris, “They were thought to be Christians and very good Christians: they were seen praying, burning the pagodas, accepting and distribute Protestant Bibles. But today there is no longer any mistake: the rebels are only a company of brigands, thieves, arsonists, and murderers.”⁶⁴

Although much of the fighting was confined to the middle and lower Yangtze regions, the Taiping army advanced to the North China Plain in 1853 and 1854, imperiling Tianjin and putting the city on high alert. As was the case in the stricken southern provinces, members of the local elite and scholar-officials, some forced out of retirement, organized the defense of Tianjin. Initially, the imperial court entrusted the job to Liang Baochang, a Tianjin resident who had previously served as governor-general for Guangdong and Guangxi Province. Liang proved

62. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 31; Xie Ming 谢铭, "Taipingtianguo chuqi qingchao de jidujiao zhengce dui xilin jiao'an fasheng de yingxiang 太平天国初期清朝的基督教政策对西林教案发生的影响 [The Influence of the Qing Dynasty policies toward Christianity and the Xilin Anti-Christian Incident]." 李传斌 Li Chuanbin, "Shixi Zeng Guofan de jidujiao guan 试析曾国藩的基督教观 [An Analysis of Zeng Guofan's View of Christianity]," *Hunan renwen keji xueyuan bao 湖南人文科技学院学报* 1 (2012).

63. John E. Wills, *Mountain of Fame: Portraits in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012)., p. 273.

64. J.B. Anouilh to the Director of the Holy Childhood, August 29, 1860. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. 1862, p. 357.

unworthy of his commission, using the funds earmarked for raising and arming a local militia to line his own pockets.⁶⁵ Frustrated by the corruption of Liang and his cronies, merchants involved with Tianjin's influential salt commissions took up the job of defending the city.

By the autumn of 1853, the Taiping armies had reached the outskirts of Cangzhou, about 100 km south of Tianjin along the Grand Canal. Zhang Jinwen (1795–1875) was a prominent member of the Changlu Salt Merchants and an ambitious and well-connected figure in Tianjin's merchant community. He received authorization from the local magistrate Xie Zicheng to recruit and train 3,000 men, who became known as the Pu Braves, to augment the official troops garrisoned in Tianjin. Zhang organized the city's fire brigades and even groups of convicts to help raise barricades, dig trenches, and fortify a wide perimeter around the city. Magistrate Xie commanded the troops and Zhang paid for whatever was needed: ammunition, guns, binoculars, and even spicy snacks and hot chili peppers for the garrison regulars, many of whom hailed from Sichuan.⁶⁶

Zhang also had powerful friends close to the court in Beijing. He began his career as a kitchen helper in the household of Linqing (1791–1846), a prominent Manchu official from the Wanyan clan who became a mentor for Zhang, and Zhang rose to be a kind of wealth manager for the family's considerable fortune. Linqing served the court primarily as an expert in water management, including stints supervising the Grand Canal.⁶⁷ These were lucrative assignments, and Zhang Jinwen's acumen enabled his patron to build up a sufficient fortune such that even

65. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China.*, p. 95.

66. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China.*, p. 95. Tianjin Fuzhi, Juan 1, 15A, Gao Ningwen, et al. *Tianjin Xian xinzhì (New Gazetteer of Tianjin County)*, 1931 ed., Juan 21.3 25b Kwan mentions that "In preparation for the city's defenses, no silver was spared, no details missed—including two catties/piculs of garlic to protect against Taiping witchcraft."

67. See the entry for Linqing in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)*. Linqing was also—the levee failure which ended his career notwithstanding—a recognized expert on hydrology and published two important manuals on river conservancy and the history of the Yellow River Basin.

after being relieved of his titles following a disastrous levee failure along the Yellow River, Linqing was able to retire in relative comfort to Beijing.⁶⁸ Linqing had two sons who both followed their father into official service. Chongshi (1820-1870) and Chonghou (1826-1893) would serve the dynasty in a variety of capacities throughout their career. Chongshi was posted mostly in Sichuan and the southwest, while Chonghou, fatefully, was to become the Commissioner of Trade based in Tianjin from 1861 until he was relieved of his duties in late 1870 following the Tianjin Massacre.

With the backing of Linqing, Zhang Jinwen used a variety of corporate names to accumulate valuable salt monopolies in Northern China and even after Linqing's death, Zhang's association with the family continued. For example, Linqing's son-in-law Wenqian was the head of the salt commission of which Zhang Jinwen was a member. These connections made Zhang and, presumably, the family of Linqing very wealthy. It was the kind of wealth that could attract unwanted attention from jealous business rivals or officials looking to crack down on corruption. One way to deflect this kind of attention was to generously support noble causes like defending a city from an army of hostile religious rebels. In other regions, an established elite of scholar-gentry families might have resisted a merchant taking such a leading role, but Tianjin was a young city (by Chinese standards) and lacked a well-established elite. Merchants like Zhang Jinwen stepped in to fill the void. During the campaigns against the Taiping in 1853, Zhang contributed nearly 40,000 strings of cash.⁶⁹

68. Linqing was an aesthete and man of culture, and he spent his final years writing his memoirs and enjoying an 85,000-volume library that he kept in a lovingly restored garden known as 半亩园 (*banmu yuan*). His mother had been Chinese, not Manchu, with a reputation as a poet who traveled in the lofty literati circles of Beijing. A collection of her poetry was edited by Gao E (1738–1815), the author who completed Cao Xueqin's novel *Dream of the Red Chamber*. See Susan Mann, *Precious Records: Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), pp. 94-95.

69. Zhang Jingwen, *Zhang gong (Jinwen) 张公 (锦文) 襄理军务纪略 xiangli junwu jilüe [A Record of Zhang Jinwen's Handling of Military Affairs]*.

The militia, including Zhang Jinwen's braves, dug in as best they could in the flat, marshy terrain that surrounded Tianjin. Local hunters handy with a rifle and familiar with the region's many backwaters and bayous set up ambushes near stream crossings. The hunters concealed small skiffs and built sniper nests to harass enemy soldiers. Magistrate Xie organized another 10,000 men to build earthen berms along skirmish lines set up to the south and west of the city. Militia members even took up defensive positions behind and on top of the ubiquitous piles of salt that dotted the landscape. Once in place, they covered themselves with the same type of drab matting workers used to hold the salt in place.⁷⁰

On October 30, 1853, the rebels under the command of Taiping officer Lin Fengxiang threw themselves in human waves at the militia units defending Xiaoshaozhikou, a river crossing about 40 km west of Tianjin. The Tianjin Militia put up fierce resistance and forced the Taiping troops to fall back, but the defenders lacked sufficient numbers to press home their advantage.⁷¹ General Lin regrouped his Taiping soldiers at Dulizhen, a walled town about 30 km south along the Grand Canal. Every day, the Taiping foothold in northern China at Dulizhen was strengthened while Tianjin's beleaguered militia could only hold their positions and await reinforcements.

Those reinforcements appeared a week later on November 7, 1853. Sengge Rinchen (1811-1865), a cavalry officer and Mongolian prince, arrived with troops to chase down the Taiping forces and push them back across the Yellow River. Sengge Rinchen had served in several military and courtly roles in his career, but coming to the aid of the Tianjin militia against

70. Junshi lei 戰事類” in Xu Ke 徐珂, *Qing bai lei chao 清稗類鈔* [Categorized Anthology of Petty Matters from the Qing Era] (Beijing: Zhonghua shu ju, 2010). Juan 25:4

71. Junshi lei 戰事類” in Xu Ke 徐珂, *Qing bai lei chao 清稗類鈔* [Categorized Anthology of Petty Matters from the Qing Era]. Juan 25:4 The militiamen's stout defense of the Taiping advance earned a name change for the nearby village from Xiaoshaozhikou (小稍直口) to Deshengkou (得勝口) meaning “Victory Gap.”

Lin Fengxiang was the prince's first major command. Sengge Rinchen was not the only high-ranked bannerman being tested in the field. Linqing's younger son, Chonghou, was a brigade-general serving in Sengge Rinchen's officer corps. It was an odd situation in which Chonghou was assigned to be an officer supporting a Tianjin militia funded by Zhang Jinwen who happened to also manage the fortune of Chonghou's family.

Sengge Rinchen took his armies and surrounded Dulizhen and engaged General Lin in fierce but inconclusive fighting. The Qing forces and the Tianjin militia could not dislodge the Taiping from Dulizhen, but the northern troops had an ally in the weather. By December, winter was settling in on the North China Plain and the Taiping armies, made up mostly of southerners from the subtropical regions of Guangdong and Guangxi, found the cold winds a more bitter and implacable foe than the Tianjin militias or Sengge Rinchen's cavalry. The Taiping at Dulizhen ran low on provisions, their supply lines stretched to their breaking points and in constant danger of being severed. One Taiping brigade after another slipped away and fled southward. Sengge Rinchen and Chonghou would continue their defense of the area around Tianjin and Beijing, but the Taiping never again seriously threatened the northern cities. Sengge Rinchen's troops finally captured Lin Fengxiang a little over a year later. Lin was executed in Beijing in April 1855.⁷²

Sengge Rinchen would become one of the most important military commanders in the service of the Qing court, somebody the emperor could rely upon for the most complex and dangerous assignments. Also on the rise was Chonghou. For his service in the campaign against the Taiping in 1853, and likely out of gratitude for the donations made by Zhang Jinwen on behalf of Chonghou's family for the defense of Tianjin, Chonghou received the right to wear a

72. Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan.*, pp. 210–211.

peacock feather in his cap and began an ascent through the ranks in Qing administration that would eventually lead him back to Tianjin.⁷³

Even after the Taiping armies ceased to be a direct threat to Tianjin, the notoriously protective residents of the city remained wary of possible spies and saboteurs supporting the ‘Cantonese bandits,’ ‘Hakka bandits,’ or ‘Christian bandits.’ Qiu Anyu might not have been a bandit, but he could not hide his accent and he refused to hide his faith. Avoiding unwanted attention from local officials was sometimes a secondary concern to not being targeted by self-appointed city guardians and *soi-disant* rogues spoiling for a righteous fight. The military mobilization of Tianjin against the Taiping in the 1850s ensured that an uncomfortable number of Qiu Anyu’s neighbors fit this description.

Most of the men who served in the irregular militias of Zhang Jinwen and Xie Zicheng had been recruited from the ranks of Tianjin’s lower classes. This included many *hunhunr* [混混儿], a local term that means “ruffian,” and in Tianjin had come to denote a type of street-wise low-level gangster.⁷⁴ The *hunhunr* were prone to violence by circumstances and the brutal demands of surviving the Tianjin underworld. Following the battles with the Taiping, they returned to their homes and lives, but still served as reservists keeping their weapons handy while enjoying semi-official status as city defenders.

There are parallels to this experience from other historical and cultural contexts. A few of the men who fought in World War I returned home to use the skills they learned on the battlefield to fight gang wars in places like Chicago and Birmingham, England. Some American veterans of the ‘War on Terror’ employed military tactics to storm the U.S. Capitol Building in

73. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China.*, p. 97.

74. The best English-language article on the *hunhunr* is Kwan, "Order in Chaos: Tianjin’s Hunhunr and Urban Identity in Modern China.", pp. 75–91.

2021. Similarly, the experience of being mustered in defense of Tianjin against the Taiping in the 1850s and the Nian Rebels in the 1860s militarized large numbers of *hunhunr* and other members of the city's criminal underclass. Militia organizers sought out men of violence with little to lose and then trained them in weapons and tactics. The short-term demands of civil defense meant that few considered the complications of eventual demobilization.

The *hunhunr* deputized themselves as protectors of the local community—their 'turf'—and they terrorized outsiders who violated standards of community behavior or threatened the safety or security of residents.⁷⁵ The challenge for city officials charged with keeping order in Tianjin was that the *hunhunr* definition of threat, as well as their notion of a proportional response, had more in common with the mythology of knights-errant and codes of martial valor than peaceful mediation or legal nuance. Stories of epic waterfront battles between Tianjin *hunhunr* and gangs of Shandong barge pullers or Anhui grain boat sailors were an oft-repeated and officially lamented part of Tianjin lore.

The origins of the *hunhunr* are murky, and the *hunhunr* lodges lacked a consistent story of where the *hunhunr* began.⁷⁶ Tianjin legends suggest they originated in the early Qing Dynasty, possibly as an offshoot of the *gelaohui* (哥老会 the Society of Elder Brothers) but there is little in the *hunhunr* public image or organization during the later Qing Dynasty that connected them to the *gelaohui* or anti-Qing ideology.⁷⁷ The *hunhunr* were more organized than a simple street gang but lacked the hierarchical structure or transregional associations of the larger secret societies or triads.⁷⁸

75. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin]."

76. See Kwan, "Order in Chaos: Tianjin's Hunhunr and Urban Identity in Modern China.", pp. 75–91.

77. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin].", p. 62.

78. Kwan, "Order in Chaos: Tianjin's Hunhunr and Urban Identity in Modern China.", p. 76.

Most *hunhunr* were affiliated with lodges led by a lodge chief. The lodge was often quite simple and based around a shared kitchen and sleeping rooms similar to the communal dwellings used by lower-class and migrant laborers. There were a few seats for the lodge chief and some senior members while ordinary members sat on a large communal *kang* (bench) that also doubled as sleeping quarters for those who needed a place to stay. There were also some basic cooking utensils, pots, tables, and stools, as well as a handy cache of weapons hidden away. The arms included wooden cudgels, staffs, short spears, swords, axes, and other handheld instruments of mayhem.⁷⁹

Depending on the size of the lodge, the lodge chief might have two or three deputies in charge of planning, often including somebody who was literate. Apart from these positions, there were no set ranks, and lodge members generally behaved in a way compatible with other forms of fictive kinship. Fellow members were referred to as brothers with appropriate deference for lodge members who had seniority based on the length of service, age, or accumulated wealth and social standing outside of the lodge.⁸⁰ Unlike joining the Triads, who favored elaborate initiation rituals, becoming a member of a *hunhunr* lodge was straightforward. Prospects could join the lodge for meals as needed. Members were free to come and go. Candidates who impressed senior members with their bluster, toughness, style, or by being helpful in assisting lodge activities were asked to do more and given greater responsibility.⁸¹

79. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin].", p. 62

80. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin].", p. 62; Kwan, Man Bun. "Order in Chaos: Tianjin's Hunhunr and Urban Identity in Modern China." *Journal of Urban History*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2000, pp. 75–91.

81. Lin Xi 林溪, "Jiu zhongguo tianjin hunhunr 旧中国天津混混儿 [The Hunhunr of Tianjin in Old China]."; Lin Xi 林溪, "Jiu zhongguo tianjin hunhunr 旧中国天津混混儿 [The Hunhunr of Tianjin in Old China]."; Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin]."

Although some *hunhunr* achieved sufficient wealth to retire or move into legitimate occupations, most others survived on the brink of poverty. One of the benefits of lodge membership was the promise of a free—but simple—communal meal each day and a place to sleep when times were rough. Despite unstable employment and a lack of funds, *hunhunr* endeavored to maintain a certain style. They paraded through the streets while wearing bright blue trousers and crepe gowns, sometimes conspicuously feigning injuries by dragging one foot behind them.⁸² They were fond of keeping their tunics open at the front, exposing muscular chests and torsos. They wore hats at a rakish angle and coiled their queues into elaborate thick braids that draped over their chests rather than hanging down their back. Flashy members would sometimes decorate their braids with flowers, especially jasmine, on occasions like a festival or when facing execution. The *hunhunr* also frequently wore brightly colored cloth shoes (more successful members preferred silk) with elaborate embroidery. The sleeves of a *hunhunr* gown were a few inches longer than might seem necessary for fashion, but the extra length was useful for hiding weapons. Many *hunhunr* also strapped a small dagger, known locally as a *nangzi*, to their ankles.⁸³

Part of their image was a reputation of fearlessness in the face of great personal peril. If a lone *hunhunr* found himself in a fight he could not win, then his next course of action was to lay prone, allowing his attackers to beat him, shouting “*hao!*” (“good!”) after each blow. To run away or cry out in pain was seen as a loss of face and could lead to a member being excommunicated from his lodge.⁸⁴ At the same time, the attackers—usually rival groups of

82. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin].", p. 62.

83. Lin Xi 林溪, "Jiu zhongguo tianjin hunhunr 旧中国天津混混儿 [The Hunhunr of Tianjin in Old China]."

84. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin].", p. 62; Kwan, Man Bun. "Order in Chaos: Tianjin's Hunhunr and Urban Identity in Modern China." *Journal of Urban History*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2000, pp. 75–91.

hunhunr—followed a careful code in delivering the beating. They did not strike the back of the head or genitals and tried to avoid any potentially fatal blow out of consideration for the next time one of their own was caught unaware. *Hunhunr* culture valued toughness and panache, and *hunhunr* jealously guarded their reputation. Physical wounds were seen as part of life. A *Hunhunr* who took a brutal beating earned credibility from presenting a stoic response and felt no need to retaliate or escalate the feud with his attackers. However, a *hunhunr* who had been insulted (common insults included taking another *hunhunr*'s shoes or urinating on a prone victim) would be forced to avenge his honor, sometimes taking extreme measures to rectify the situation. Such incidents could, and did, lead to bad blood between lodges that lasted for generations.⁸⁵

Lodge members worked as cart drivers, barge pullers, security guards, warehouse workers, and manual laborers or as members of the city's militia and fire brigades, but the majority of their earnings were from gambling, protection rackets, and extortion. Most lodges operated gambling parlors, usually run by a senior member, which provided employment for other members who worked the tables or guarded the door. Everyone involved in the game got a share of the take, with the remainder going to the lodge to help fund the communal kitchen and facilities.

Tianjin's busy waterfront also provided the *hunhunr* with plenty of moneymaking opportunities and the *hunhunr* fought to control the warehouses and docks. Although grain storage and barges were supervised by merchants who had purchased government licenses, operating the warehouses required the assistance of the *hunhunr* lodges who held sway over both

85. Lin Xi 林溪, "Jiu zhongguo tianjin hunhunr 旧中国天津混混儿 [The Hunhunr of Tianjin in Old China]."; Kwan, Man Bun. "Order in Chaos: Tianjin's Hunhunr and Urban Identity in Modern China." *Journal of Urban History*, vol. 27, no. 1, 2000, pp. 75–91.

local laborers and the transport networks that brought grain and other goods to Tianjin. In a city surrounded by rivers and canals but with few bridges, the *hunhunr* could also earn a living by muscling in on ferry terminals and boat routes. Lodges would stretch heavy ropes across a narrow place in a river and charge boats a toll (based on the size of the vessel) for passage. A local rhyme references the name of a particularly well-known lodge that engaged this practice: “Give a bit, and then another bit, to the Chengjiagouzi (lodge) and to the Niangniang Temple. Small boats cost 500 coins, but big barges cost a whole string (1,000).”⁸⁶ Groups took advantage of the marshy wasteland south of the city to hide counterfeiting and bootlegging operations.

Hunhunr would also shake down shops, stores, and restaurants for protection money, and the lodges waged frequent and chaotic campaigns to defend their clients’ interests and to claim additional turf in the city’s diverse neighborhoods. It is likely that a businessman like Qiu Anyu had to make regular donations to his local *hunhunr* lodge as well as small bequests during the festival seasons to the lodge chief’s preferred charities. Refusing to support temples and fairs was a frequent point of contention between Christians and their non-Christian neighbors, but the *hunhunr* could be very persuasive.

The *hunhunr* also infiltrated the seafood markets for which Tianjin is famous, even today. The family of the warlord Li Chun (1867–1920) was rumored to have been a *hunhunr* clan that eventually earned their way out of the rackets. A *hunhunr* who served his lodge with loyalty (and still had his health) could retire on his earnings, and many former lodge members did just that. Those who had earned well might even be able to afford to purchase a degree or title and ape the

86. “打一套，又一套，陈家沟子娘娘庙，小船要五百，大船要一吊” *dayitao, youyitao, chenjiagou, ziniangniang miao, xiaochuan yao wubai, dachuan yao yi dai*. Quoted in Li Ranxi 李然犀, “Jiu Tianjin de hunhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin].”

lifestyle of the local elite. They would support public welfare projects, fund local temples, settle disputes, and loan money.⁸⁷

The relationship between the *hunhunr* and the forces of law and order was understandably complicated. *Hunhunr* lodges maintained loose relationships with local officials and made regular payments to ensure the cooperation—or at least acquiescence—of the city’s constabulary and the local magistrate. Lodges also ensured that a festival or holiday never passed without some gift or offering being sent to all the correct people, and lodge chiefs might entertain local officials at the restaurants or brothels they controlled, discreetly of course. The collusion, some might say complicity, of local officials in the activities of the *hunhunr* is captured in a saying from early-twentieth-century Tianjin: “What officials won’t notice, they won’t investigate.”⁸⁸

Lodges sometimes forced the hand of local officials, especially when they threatened critical supply lines of grain or when the *hunhunr* sense of “shared ownership” left too little for the state coffers. At such times, officials consulted with lodges before rounding up a negotiated quota of suspects chosen from lists of names provided by the lodge chiefs. Scores were settled, undesirable members were weeded out, and the officials could submit a report of their success to their superiors. The families of members who were imprisoned, executed, or otherwise met untimely deaths in service to their lodge brethren could expect some consideration from the lodge concerning food or financial support. This seems to be the case for the men executed in October 1870 for their alleged involvement in the Tianjin riots.

87. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin]."

88. “吏不举，官不究” *libuju, guanbujiu*. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de huhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin]."

Despite official and elite exasperation with the *hunhunr* lodges and their flexible interpretation of legal statutes and social norms, the *hunhunr* were an important source of manpower in preserving the safety and defense of Tianjin. As was the case against the Taiping in 1853 and 1854, local officials would recruit *hunhunr* to serve as security whenever the task of managing the city required a little muscle. Some *hunhunr* became semi-regular employees of the civil administration or the military garrisons in Tianjin and a few *hunhunr* even took jobs as *yamen* runners. One of the most important institutions to rely on *hunhunr* was the city's fire brigades. These extra-official public safety organizations were funded, and nominally led, by commercial elites and were an example of the partnerships between literati, merchants, and subaltern groups like the *hunhunr* that were common in Tianjin.

Somehow Father Qiu managed to avoid trouble until 1858, when British and French gunboats fighting in the Second Opium War appeared off the coast near the Dagu Forts and were preparing to sail upriver to attack Tianjin. On March 4, Zhili Governor Tan Tingzhen reported to the throne that the Tianjin prefect suspected a Catholic priest named Qiu Yunting (Qiu Anyu) of espionage. When the authorities raided Qiu's medicine shop, they found foreign crosses and numerous letters written in a barbarian language.⁸⁹ Local officials demanded that Qiu explain why he had these letters in his possession. What did the letters say and what secrets was he communicating to the foreign invaders?⁹⁰

The letters were written by two of Qiu's fellow Lazarists, Bishop Anouilh and Bishop Mouly. These two missionaries would play large roles in the expansion of the Catholic missionary presence in Tianjin and north China. Joseph Mouly in particular had lofty ambitions

89. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 140 and 141.

90. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 140 and 141.

for the Lazarists in China. Father Qiu was a pawn about to be sacrificed in order to advance a bishop.⁹¹

91. Letter from Monsignor Anouilh to Members of the Central Councils for the Propagation of the Faith. Province of Tché-ly, January 25, 1860, *Annales Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1860, p. 167.

Chapter 2: The Bishop

Joseph Martial Mouly (1807–1868) was a Lazarist priest and French member of the Congregation of the Mission. Since 1836, he had been the superior for the French Lazarists in Northern China and served as the first bishop of the Mongolian Vicariate Apostolic, an area that included much of what is today Shanxi and northern Hebei Provinces. Mouly was an aggressive missionary, wiser than Chapdelaine but bolder than the Protestants who seemed content to remain safely ensconced on the coast working on their dictionaries and translation projects. It was one thing to lead a mission from a cushy desk in a treaty port, eating roast beef, and drinking good European wine every day, but for Mouly, the mission was in the interior, and that meant living and preaching in remote villages and outposts. It could be tough work.

“It was with great pleasure I saw again Monsignor Anouilh, my coadjutor, after an absence of nine months,” Mouly wrote in a letter back to the Lazarist house in Paris. “During that time, he had been exposed to immense dangers and had suffered so much. We rejoice together to see the end of our evils and the probable beginning of a future more advantageous to our holy religion.”¹

In August 1860, Mouly was in Tianjin as the soldiers from the Anglo-French Expedition began their occupation of the city and were preparing to march on Beijing. British troops commanded by James Bruce, the 8th Earl of Elgin (1811–1863), had taken the Dagu Forts guarding the mouth of the Hai River and the water approaches to Tianjin. A multinational force of British, French, and Indian soldiers, supported by several hundred Cantonese laborers, now controlled the city. While in Tianjin, Bishop Mouly was a guest of Baron Jean-Baptiste-Louis

1. Bishop Mouly to the Congregation of the Mission, January 21, 1860. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Volume 27, 1862.

Gros (1793–1870) and Charles Cousin-Montauban (1796–1878), the commander of French forces. Mouly needed their support to help him to get to Beijing, a city where the Lazarist order had some unfinished business.

Bishop Mouly's fellow missionaries celebrated the arrival of the expeditionary force, hoping this demonstration of European military might and unity would strike a decisive blow against the intransigence on the Qing court on the issue of religious freedom. Bishop Mouly's coadjutor, Jean-Baptiste Anouilh (1819–1869) summed up the feelings of the Lazarist community in a letter written just after the storming of the Dagu Forts and the occupation of Tianjin: "On August 21 the Anglo-French won a brilliant victory over the Tartar-Chinese troops of the Emperor of China. They nobly avenged the disastrous defeat of last year. The forts were attacked simultaneously by land and sea, the combat was terrible on both sides: the Tartar cavalry fought very well. After three hours of fighting, a French officer was the first to fly the flag on one of the forts; soon the Chinese lose heart, they raise the white flag, the battle ceases for a moment, the viceroy writes to the Anglo-French generals: 'We send you men to show you the powder mines and the dangerous places of the river, so that your soldiers and your ships may not be hurt; the doors of Thien-Tsing [Tianjin] are open to you.'"²

The Anglo-French Expedition of 1860 was the culmination of the Second Opium War, sometimes known as the "Arrow War," fought by France and Britain against the Qing Empire between 1856 and 1860. Tianjin residents experienced that war intimately. Twice their city was invaded and occupied by foreign troops and Tianjin's status as a treaty port was a direct result of

2. Bishop Anouilh to the Congregation of the Mission, Shanghai, August 29, 1860. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Volume 27, 1862, p. 357.

the conflict.³ It is impossible to consider the relationship between the city and the foreign powers without at least some discussion of the war and its impact on the people of Tianjin.

The war began in 1856 when a Chinese customs official in Guangzhou seized *The Arrow*, a smuggling ship of ambiguous registration although flying the British flag. Harry Parkes (1828–1885), the British consul in the city, demanded the release of the ship and its crew. He began an aggressive exchange of diplomatic correspondence, followed by an even more aggressive exchange of cannon fire, with Ye Mingchen, the governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, and the war was on.

Consul Parkes' impetuosity was not without political cost. On March 3, 1857, opposition leader William Gladstone (1809–1898) rose in parliament and condemned Parkes for recklessly freelancing. "War taken at the best is a frightful scourge upon the human race; but because it is so, the wisdom of ages has surrounded it with strict laws and usages and has required formalities to be observed which shall act as a curb upon the wild passions of man... You have dispensed with these precautions. You have turned a consul into a diplomatist, and that metamorphosed consul is forsooth to be at liberty to direct the whole might of England against the lives of a defenseless people."⁴

Debate over the China war deadlocked parliament and led to the unseating of the British government under Lord Palmerston (1784–1865). Despite criticism of the government's China policy by Gladstone and the opposition, Palmerston was returned in the election. With a mandate to act with a freer hand regarding China, he dispatched Lord Elgin to command the expeditionary force. Palmerston instructed Elgin to seek reparations for any injuries done to British subjects, to

3. Zhang Limin 张利民, "Di erci yapian zhanzheng zai Tianjin 第二次鸦片战争在天津 [The Second Opium War and Tianjin]," *天津教育 Tianjin jiao'yu [Tianjin Education]* 1 (1982).

4. John Morley, *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone in Three Volumes, Vol. 1 (1809-1859)* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1911), p. 563.

force China to allow diplomatic representation in Beijing, to enforce concessions granted in the earlier Treaty of Nanjing and other agreements signed at the end of the First Opium War in 1842, and, if possible, expand the number of Chinese cities and open to trade.

With the Taiping Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan still posing an existential threat, the Qing court was in an impossible situation, fighting wars on two fronts. Its most capable generals were forced to shuffle between commands, seeking to dislodge the Taiping in Central China, while also supervising coastline defenses against approaching British and French gunboats.

Between Christmas and New Year's Eve 1857, Elgin's forces bombarded the city of Guangzhou. Entering the city in the first days of 1858, British troops raided the governor-general's office, arrested Ye Mingchen, and shipped the unfortunate Chinese official to Calcutta as a prisoner of war. Governor Ye would never return to China, dying a year later in a British prison. After occupying Guangzhou, Lord Elgin sailed north, blockading ports along the way. By May 1858, the British fleet was anchored off the North Coast of China having captured the Dagu Forts, the enormous stone fortresses that guarded the mouth of the Hai River and protected Tianjin and the water route to Beijing.

It was at this time that Father Qiu Anyu's luck avoiding official entanglements ran out. Hundreds of Qiu's fellow Cantonese played an active role as laborers and porters assisting the Anglo-French war effort making Qiu's position as an outsider with a southern accent even more precarious than before. The priest was arrested at his pharmacy and taken to the magistrate's yamen. Following the unfortunate priest's arrest, local *hunhunr* and runners from the yamen looted the house and pharmacy. The letters from Qiu's missionary colleagues, mostly written in French, seemed to confirm suspicions that Qiu was another disloyal Cantonese, and officials

questioned Qiu under torture on suspicions of espionage and treason.⁵ He was then taken in chains to the provincial capital at Baoding for further interrogation and a trial. A memorial to the throne from Zhili governor Tan Tingxiang stated that “Qiu Yunting [Qiu Anyu], a person from Nanhai County, Guangdong opened a medicine shop in Tianjin. He practiced Catholicism and was found in possession of barbarian books and letters written in the barbarians’ languages.”⁶ Things looked bleak for the pharmacist.

As Qiu Anyu languished in a dank government cell, British and French troops consolidated their occupation of Tianjin and took control of the land and water routes to Beijing. Fearing for the safety of their capital, the imperial court sued for peace and dispatched two senior officials to Tianjin to negotiate a settlement. Guiliang (1785-1862), a grand secretary in his seventies and a man of gravitas, and Huashana (1806-1859), only in his fifties but who had served in progressively senior positions in the Qing central government, were tasked with dealing with the foreigners.⁷ They were joined by another official: Qiying, the Manchu courtier who had negotiated the Treaty of Nanjing with the British and the Sino–French Treaty of Whampoa with Théodore de Lagrené.

Qiying promoted himself at court as something of a “Barbarian whisperer” and recorded many self-penned plaudits touting his ability to charm and fool the dimwitted foreigners. Unfortunately for Qiying, some of his writings boasting of his barbarian management skills were found filed away in Governor Ye Mingchen’s office in Guangzhou when British troops seized

5. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 141.

6. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 141.

7. Despite the emperor’s displeasure with their work as negotiators, and the coincidence that Guiliang and Huashana died soon after the war, both men are recorded as having died of natural causes. Qiying, famously, did not.

the *yamen* and captured the governor. Those papers were about to make a dramatic reappearance.⁸

With Lord Elgin were two interpreters attached to the British delegation. One was Thomas Wade (1818-1895), who first arrived in China as a young officer fighting in the First Opium War and had worked in consulates in Hong Kong and Shanghai. As the acting British minister stationed in Beijing in 1870, Wade would play an important role in the aftermath of the Tianjin Massacre.⁹ The other translator, Horatio Nelson Lay (1832-1908), had been working in China since he was 15 years old and was part of a distinguished line of British China hands that also included his younger brother William Hyde Lay (1836-1876). William Lay would later serve as acting British consul in Tianjin, and was also involved in managing the fallout from the riot.¹⁰

Horatio Lay was a skilled linguist but had little patience for what he felt were the bloviating pomposities of the Qing negotiators. In Horatio Nelson Lay's career, both with the British government and as part of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, he became notorious for his lack of tact and limited understanding of the nuances of working with the Chinese.¹¹ Lay particularly disliked Qiying. When it became clear that the Manchu was pulling from his bag of tricks by flattering the British negotiators, Lay produced the writings which had been removed from Governor Ye's files. Mortified, exposed as a fraud, and having lost immense face, Qiying withdrew from the negotiations. So complete was his disgrace that Qiying was dragged before

8. See John Yue-wo Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 124; James L. Hevia, *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China* (Chapel Hill: Duke University Press, 2003), p.38.

9. In his later career, Wade also made important contributions to the study of the Chinese language as one of the creators of the eponymous Wade-Giles System of transliterating Chinese characters.

10. Their mother was Mary Nelson, the niece of Horatio Lay's namesake, the famous British admiral.

11. For more on Lay's career, including details of the famously botched deal to purchase a navy, the Lay-Osborn Flotilla, for the Qing government see Jack J. Gerson. *Horatio Nelson Lay and Sino-British Relations, 1854-1864*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972.

the imperial court and accused of having shamed the emperor. For his crimes, the court ordered Qiying to commit suicide.¹²

After a disastrous start to the parley, things did not get much better for the Qing representatives. Lord Elgin was inclined to be conciliatory, but his secretary and translator, Horatio Lay, was not. Despite Lay's junior status in the delegation, he was given great latitude to press home demands from the British side, particularly over the permanent stationing of foreign diplomatic representatives in Beijing. This was the issue that Guiliang and Huashana feared the most. Guiliang protested that there was no precedent for such a system in China and that the mere suggestion to the emperor that he allow diplomats to reside in Beijing could cost Guiliang his head.¹³

There was also trouble in the city forced to host the negotiations. The people of Tianjin were frightened and angry and they resisted the occupation by foreign troops. The canals and waterways that surrounded Tianjin, usually crowded with boats, suddenly emptied of all water traffic except for the British and French gunboats. In the first few days of the occupation, Tianjin residents kept a healthy distance from the foreigners, but as the talks dragged on, bolder members of the local community grew hostile to unfamiliar faces riding or walking around the city.¹⁴

In one incident, an enraged crowd threw rocks and harassed three British naval officers near the city's West Gate, resulting in the loss of an officer's dog and hat. The response by the British forces was to escalate the dispute, seeking redress for the "insult." A detachment of

12 Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856-1860) in China.*, p. 124.

13. Immanuel C. Y. Hsü and William L. Langer, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations : The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014)., p. 54

14. Zhang Jingwen, *Zhang gong (Jinwen) 张公 (锦文) 襄理军务纪略 xiangli junwu jilue [A Record of Zhang Jinwen's Handling of Military Affairs]*., p. 373.

marines, along with Horatio Lay acting as translator, promptly mustered and marched to the city wall. When they arrived, the soldiers found the gates shut and the gatekeeper unwilling to open the passage. Several of the soldiers scrambled on rooftops adjacent to the wall, free-climbed the rest of the way to the top and then jumped down onto a street full of startled shoppers. Once inside the walls, The soldiers opened the gates from within. The detachment rampaged through the city looking for the group that had insulted their navy brethren or, if that failed, six or seven other people they could punish instead. At the West Gate, one of the gatekeepers gave back the hat snatched from the naval officer, and the marines promptly arrested the gatekeeper.¹⁵

Horatio Lay announced to the crowd in Chinese that because British officers had been disrespected in that general area, and because those same officers could not be bothered to identify their attackers, it was necessary to take six other men prisoner. The British marines paraded randomly chosen captives through the streets of Tianjin, forcing them to repeat “It is very wrong to insult an Englishman; I will never insult an Englishman” to all they passed. The men were only held overnight but the experience was humiliating, and the actions and attitudes of the foreign soldiers reinforced the hostility of residents.¹⁶

Over the next few days, British and French delegation members were routinely harassed and jeered as they moved around the city. In another incident, a valet—described as African or an African American—working for an American delegation was accosted by a mob. The man had his clothing stripped before being rescued by local officials who graciously gifted him a set of silk trousers to replace those torn off in the incident.¹⁷ The disturbances ended when another

15. Laurence Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, '58, '59* (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1860), p. 381. Oliphant served as private secretary to Lord Elgin during the first phase of the war and the initial negotiations for the Treaty of Tianjin signed in 1858.

16. Laurence Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, '58, '59.*, p. 380.

17. Rasmussen, O. D. *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History*. Tientsin: The Tientsin press, Ltd., 1925, p. 15.

two gunboats and an additional 120 marines landed in the city, forcing residents to back down for fear of being shot or their homes bombarded.¹⁸

At the negotiating table, Lay threatened Guiliang, informing the Qing representative that, one way or another, the treaty—with its guarantees of diplomatic residency—would be signed. If an agreement could not be reached in Tianjin, he warned, then the troops would continue their march and the pact would be finalized in an occupied Beijing. Unwilling to put the capital at further risk, Guiliang had no choice but concede to British demands.

The Treaty of Tianjin signed in June 1858 gave Britain a permanent diplomatic presence in Beijing, opened 10 new cities to trade, including river ports in the interior, and other commercial and financial concessions. Because the foreign powers negotiated these treaties under the conditions of Most Favored Nation, any concession by China granted to one of the foreign powers was shared by all of them. Over the next few weeks, the United States, France, and Russia signed their own treaties with the same terms. Subsequent trade agreements negotiated a few months later in Shanghai between Guiyang and Lord Elgin effectively legalized the import of opium by including the drug in the list of products to be charged a tariff.

The problem was that somebody needed to brief the emperor about the concessions contained in the treaty, and the unfortunate Guiliang drew the shortest straw. He met with the Xianfeng Emperor (r. 1850-1861), and pleaded for the emperor to see both the benefits of ratifying the treaty and the relative merits of not decapitating Guiliang.¹⁹ It was a hard sell. The emperor was apoplectic and only partially mollified by Guiliang's suggestion that the treaties

18. Laurence Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, '58, '59.*, p. 381.

19. Lydia H. Liu, *The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 70–71.

“should not be taken as true certificate and real contracts, but a few pieces of paper by which their warships could be made to withdraw temporarily.”²⁰

Unaware of the emperor’s opposition, the treaty was hailed by foreign diplomats in China and missionaries as marking a new era of openness. For the first time, diplomats would have access—so they thought—to the imperial court, bypassing the layers of annoying and intransigent “mandarins” who could be counted on only to misunderstand the accepted rules of civilized commerce.

While France had allied with Britain in the conflict, the French government had their own reasons for declaring war on the Qing Empire. French negotiators were less interested than their British counterparts in expanding trade and securing commercial rights. For France, the war was about protecting the honor of the nation and standing up for civilization, generally understood as being synonymous with Christendom. More immediately, the French government wanted reparations for the death of the Catholic priest Auguste Chapdelaine.

In the main text of the Treaty of Tianjin signed by France and China on June 27, 1858, two articles specifically addressed Christianity and foreign missionaries in China. Article 8 granted French subjects, including missionaries, the right to travel in the interior of the Qing Empire provided they carried with them passports issued by French consular authorities. Although the treaty refers to French subjects, the agreement made France the only Catholic nation with the right to issue passports for inland travel. As part of France’s ambitions to establish a protectorate in China, French consuls approved passports for all Catholic missionaries who sought to proselytize or reside in the interior regardless of nationality. This abuse of Article

20. Immanuel Hsü and Langer, *China's Entrance into the Family of Nations : The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880.*, p. 67.

8 irked Qing authorities, but local officials were ill-equipped to prove the country of origin of a missionary operating in their jurisdiction.

Article 13 addressed the right of all people in China to practice Christianity openly and freely. “The Christian religion having as its essential object to bring men to virtue, the members of all Christian communions will enjoy complete security for their persons, their property and the free exercise of their religious practices; and effective protection will be given to missionaries who go peacefully in the interior of the country, provided with the regular passports mentioned in Article 8. No obstacle will be brought by the authorities of the Chinese Empire to the right which is recognized for every individual in China to embrace, if he wishes, Christianity and follow its practices without being liable to any penalty inflicted for thereby. All that has been previously written, proclaimed or published in China, by order of the Government, against the Christian worship is completely abrogated, and void in all the provinces of the Empire.”²¹

Article 13 prohibited persecution of Christians, but many missionaries interpreted it as a blanket ban on officials prosecuting Christians regardless of circumstances. To be sure, before and after the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin, officials often found—or invented—charges against people suspected of being Christians, particularly Christian clergy. Such was the case of the unlucky Father Qiu Anyu in Tianjin. Nevertheless, the idea that the treaty offered an implied legal immunity for Chinese Christians set the stage for many confrontations between missionaries and Christians on one side and their non-Christian neighbors and local officials on the other.²² Finally, Baron Gros and the Qing negotiators concluded a separate agreement that

21. Cordier, H. *L'expédition De Chine De 1857–58: Histoire Diplomatique, Notes Et Documents*. F. Alcan, 1905, p. 445.

22. Despite the potential Pandora's box of local governance problems forced open by Article 13, the Qing negotiators were primarily concerned with being sure the phrase “by order of the Government” was included in the final draft so that the repeal of edicts proscribing might be seen as an act of the emperor's mercy and largesse rather than an act of the court's submission to the foreign powers. Cole, H. M. “Origins of the French Protectorate over Catholic Missions in China.” *The American Journal of International Law* 34.3, p. 15.

dealt with the murder of August Chapdelaine. Articles 1 and 2 of the supplementary treaty ordered the county magistrate responsible for the arrest and death in custody of Chapdelaine removed from office and an additional indemnity of 2 million *taels* to be paid to France as compensation for Chapdelaine's death and for other costs associated with the conflict.²³

The Treaty of Tianjin firmly established France as the guarantor not just of the rights of foreign Catholic missionaries of all nationalities in China but of Chinese Catholics generally. The goal of constructing a French protectorate in China intimately linked the French imperial and colonial project in East Asia to ecclesiastical politics in Europe.²⁴ As Paul Cohen argued, "The fact that her course in China was dictated more by European power rivalries—an inherently unstable basis for the formation of policy—than it was permanent and enduring interests in China itself account, to a large extent, for the indecisiveness and secrecy that marked France's actions. A further consequence of her lack of real interests in the empire was that she was forced to create unreal ones to counter the prestige and influence of Great Britain. The French protectorate of Roman Catholic missions was established, then, less because these missions were Catholic than because they were French."²⁵

France's relationship with China dated to 1698, when a French trading factory was built in Guangzhou. Although the French were able to develop a commercial presence on the Chinese coast, their approach to trade differed from their British competitors.²⁶ As a result, France's influence in China began to focus as much on the activities of Catholic missionaries, especially those based in Beijing, than on the economic possibilities of the China trade.²⁷

23. Cordier, H. *L'Expédition De Chine De 1857–58: Histoire Diplomatique, Notes Et Documents*. F. Alcan, 1905, p. 456.

24. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, p. 31.

25. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 64.

26. Schopp, *Sino-French Trade at Canton, 1698–1842*.

27. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*. F. Alcan, 1901.

Many of the early Catholic missionaries to China had been Jesuits, in a tradition that dated back to the late sixteenth century and the Italian priests Michele Ruggieri (1543–1611) and Matteo Ricci (1552–1610). Although most Jesuit missionaries at this time worked in Macau or in remote and rural areas of China, there were a few who served in the imperial court in Beijing acting as translators, scientists, artists, and engineers.²⁸

Not everyone in the imperial government appreciated the Jesuit presence. Yang Guangxian (1597–1669) was a scholar of sorts, a former guardsman, and a self-taught astrologer with aspirations of service in the court of the Kangxi Emperor. He was also an early anti-Christianity activist. In a series of memorials sent to Oboi (1610-1669), the uncle and regent of the young Kangxi Emperor, Yang accused the Jesuits at court, including the German Jesuit Johann Adam Schall von Bell (1591–1666) and Schall’s Flemish protégé, Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688) of high treason, of leading a dangerous heterodox cult, and of making critical errors in the selecting of auspicious dates for court ceremonies. A sympathetic Oboi imprisoned Schall, Verbiest, and their associates and appointed Yang Guangxian to head the astronomical bureau.

Yang proved incompetent. Even the 13-year-old Kangxi Emperor could see Yang’s calculations were incorrect. The emperor defied the regency and invited Verbiest, Schall’s principal assistant (Adam Schall had passed away a few months before), to the court for a trial by mathematics. Verbiest and Yang submitted to a series of tests to see who could produce the most accurate calendar for the coming year. Verbiest’s computations were chosen and promulgated throughout the empire while Yang was dismissed from his posts and died soon after.²⁹ For over a

28. See Catherine Jami, *The Emperor's New Mathematics: Western Learning and Imperial Authority During the Kangxi Reign (1662-1722)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).; Charles E. Ronan and Bonnie B. C. Oh, *East meets West: The Jesuits in China, 1582-1773* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1988); R. Po-chia Hsia, *A Jesuit in the Forbidden City : Matteo Ricci 1552-1610* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

29. Jeremiah Jenne, “Astronomy Domine,” *The World of Chinese Magazine*, 2018, Issue #1

century following the emperor's Astronomy-off-to-the-death, Jesuits would be employed by the Imperial Observatory.

One of the first French missionaries to China was also a Jesuit. Alexandre de Rhodes (1591–1660) traveled to East Asia in 1624 and lived in Macau for 10 years after being expelled from today's Vietnam. His experience convinced him that greater organizational and financial was needed for Catholicism to gain ground in East Asia from Portugal and Spain, who had been granted an exclusive right to evangelize the non-European world. Rhodes would become a founder and early leader of the Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris (MEP), established between 1658 and 1663 as an organization of clergy and laypersons dedicated to overseas missions.³⁰ French evangelists soon joined missionaries from other Catholic countries looking for a way to spread their faith to China, although some of their early efforts would be counterproductive.

The decision by the Kangxi Emperor to ban Christianity in 1721, and the extension of that ban by subsequent rulers, are discussed in detail in Chapter 1. The ban reflected anxieties at court about the potential for heterodox religious groups to metastasize into revolutionary societies, but the Kangxi Emperor was also reacting to persistent attempts by missionaries, especially Catholic missionaries, to be granted special treatment and privileges for the Church and its followers in the Qing Empire.

In one particularly vexing episode from 1706, Charles Maigrot (1655–1730), a twenty-year veteran of missionary work in China on behalf of the MEP, attempted to lecture the Kangxi Emperor about Confucianism and ritual as it applied to Catholic converts. Maigrot had been charged with informing the emperor of the edict by Pope Clement XI (1649–1721) prohibiting

30. See Peter C. Phan, *Mission and Catechesis: Alexandre de Rhodes & Inculturation in Seventeenth-Century Vietnam* (Orbis Books, 2015).

Chinese Catholics from participating in civil or family rituals honoring Confucius, the sages, or their ancestors. Unfortunately for Maigrot, under questioning from the throne the French missionary revealed himself to be barely literate in Chinese. The emperor, who was amused at first and then annoyed, expelled Maigrot from China, and set a new red line for Catholic missionaries: Those who wanted to stay had to be registered with imperial authorities and conform to the positions held by the emperor—not the Vatican—on issues of rites and ritual.³¹ It was a collision of cosmic forces: The Seat of St. Peter battling the Son of Heaven for the souls and loyalty of China’s Catholics. Chinese Catholics wrote letters of protest and published pamphlets, books, and essays supporting the Vatican’s position, but this only confirmed imperial concerns about the perfidy of these worshippers of a foreign religion who divided their loyalties between Rome and Beijing.³²

The MEP and the Jesuits were the main early sponsors of French missionary work in Asia, but it was the Lazarists, followers of Vincent de Paul, who would eventually emerge as the face of French Catholicism in China and Vietnam. Within four decades of their founding in 1625, the Lazarists had opened missions in Europe, North Africa, and Asia. Following the dissolution of the Jesuit order in 1773, Pope Clement XIV asked the Congregation of the Mission to replace the Jesuits in Beijing, and the decision was confirmed by a Papal decree in 1783. Three French Lazarists led by Nicolas Joseph Raux (1754–1801) arrived in Beijing via Macau and were presented to the Qianlong Emperor (r. 1736–1796) on April 29, 1785.³³ It was, however, to be the end of an era. European influence at court diminished following the 1811 and 1813 proscriptions against Christianity by the Jiaqing Emperor. The death of Gaietano Pires-

31. Jeremiah Jenne, “The Rite Stuff,” *Los Angeles Review of Books China Channel*, August 7, 2018.

32. Jeremiah Jenne, “The Rite Stuff,” *Los Angeles Review of Books China Channel*, August 7, 2018.

33. W.F. Vande Walle and Noël Golvers, eds., *The History of the Relations Between the Low Countries and China in the Qing Era (1644-1911)* (Leuven University Press, 2003), p. 191.

Pireira, a Portuguese Lazarist, in Beijing in 1838 effectively ended a period of Sino–Western cooperation at court that had lasted nearly 240 years and spanned two dynasties. Denied access to Beijing, the Lazarists and other missionaries pursued their missions along the fringes of the empire.

In 1851, only a few years after the signing of the Treaty of Whampoa, a Catholic missionary conclave convened in Shanghai and sent a letter to Pope Pius IX (r. 1846–1878) asking the pope to assign France the role of protector of the Catholic Church in China. The clamor from the French missionaries in China was echoed by the clerical establishment in France, who directed their appeal to President Louis Napoleon-Bonaparte (1808–1873), at the time in desperate need of the Church’s support in his bid to become Emperor Napoleon III.³⁴

Joseph Mouly, who attended the conclave, wrote to Alphonse de Bourboulon, the French minister to China from 1851–1861. Mouly requested de Bourboulon provide official protection for missionaries operating in China and pressure the Qing government to allow French missionaries to recover those Catholic properties seized by the state during the preceding century when Christianity had been banned. This was not an easy task. For much of his time in China, de Bourboulon was forced to carry out his diplomacy from the Portuguese colony of Macau, nearly 3,000 km from where the emperor sat in Beijing.

For Bishop Joseph Mouly, reestablishing Lazarist jurisdiction in China was of utmost importance. The end of the Beijing mission meant that missionaries like Mouly were forced to administer their vicariates apostolic either remotely from the coast or risk the fate of Auguste Chapdelaine by residing illegally in the interior. Mouly had spent a great deal of his career in wilderness postings in impoverished valleys beyond the Great Wall north of Beijing.

34. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 67

Although the Lazarists retained their claim on the moribund Beijing mission, Mouly was aware of the powerful historical ties the Jesuits had with the Qing court. Pope Pius VII (r. 1800–1823) had restored the Jesuit order in 1814, and Mouly wanted to head off any possible challenges to Lazarist jurisdiction by being the first to take physical possession of former Church property now that the Treaty of Tianjin, at least on paper, allowed foreigners limited access to the capital.³⁵

Reclaiming the churches would also a powerful signal to the court about religious liberty, a signal Mouly believed needed to be made forcefully and without equivocation. Despite the provisions in the Treaty of Tianjin opening the empire for foreign missionaries and reiterating the right of Chinese Christians to worship without harassment, the arrest of missionaries and persecution of Christians by local officials continued.³⁶ Three Chinese Christians were killed in Guizhou in 1858, and violent clashes between Christians and non-Christians also occurred in Zhejiang, Fujian, and Jiangxi the following year. A foreign missionary was detained in Hunan, also in 1859, and anti-Christian riots broke out near Wuhan in Hubei Province in 1860.³⁷ Meanwhile, Father Qiu Anyu was still in prison.

In late 1858 or early 1859, Jean-Baptiste Anouilh, wielding copies of the newly signed Sino-French treaty, traveled to the Zhili provincial capital Baoding where Father Qiu was awaiting trial. Anouilh had a reputation for brash behavior and had supported the war. If brute force and violence were necessary to spread the word of God's Mercy, then Anouilh was all for it. He insisted on seeing Qiu Anyu and participating in his trial. In poor health and charged with

35. Alan Richard Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*, Studies in the History of Christianity in East Asia, (Leiden: Brill, 2020), p. 89.

36. Joseph Mouly to Members of the Central Councils for the Propagation of the Faith, January 25, 1860, *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1861, p. 192.

37. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Volume 28 (1863), p. 81.

treason, Qiu faced the possibility of a painful execution if convicted. Whether it was Anouilh's audacious appearance in the provincial capital or, according to Anouilh, the brilliant defense put forth by Qiu Anyu in his audience with judicial authorities, Qiu was released sometime in the summer of 1859. Nevertheless, Anouilh, long an illegal resident of the Zhili backcountry, was expelled from the province and sent back to Shanghai.

“Mr. Kiou Joseph, director of the Holy Childhood in the province of Peking and laden with irons in his shop at Tien-Tsing, is my companion in exile. Thanks to divine Providence which watches with such care over the days of missionaries, to the protection of Mary conceived without sin, of our holy guardian angels and no doubt of the thousands of little blessed that the Holy Childhood has sent to paradise, we arrived safe and sound at the end of our exile, after four months of travel and countless perils, from which we were often delivered almost by miracle.”³⁸

Anouilh and Qiu were lucky. Even as the pair traveled south along the Grand Canal toward the relative security of the treaty port, the imperial court was preparing for the possibility of renewed hostilities with Britain and France. More than anything, the Qing court wanted to prevent the installation of permanent foreign diplomatic residences in the capital. As the emperor pointed out in one of his many tirades, such an arrangement would cause all kinds of problems. What kinds of buildings would the foreigners build? Beijing was mostly one-story structures, and no residential building was built such that it could look down over the walls of the Forbidden City. Would the “foreign” diplomats—the treaty specifically forbade the court from continuing to use the word 夷 *yi* (‘barbarian’) in official communications —insist on meeting with the emperor and, if they did, what would happen when these barbarians refused to bow in the

38. Joseph Anouilh to the Central Council of the Work of the Holy Childhood, July 29, 1859. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1861, p. 195.

Chinese fashion to show appropriate subservience to the Son of Heaven?³⁹ The emperor wanted Guiliang to rewrite the treaties or, failing that, stall the foreigners and delay the implementation of the treaties indefinitely.

In August 1859, British Admiral Sir James Hope (1808–1881) sailed to China with 21 ships, 2,100 soldiers, and the new plenipotentiaries for the emperor's court, including Elgin's brother Frederick Bruce (1814-1867) representing Britain, and Alphonse de Bourboulon and Baron Gros on behalf of France. The delegations hoped to proceed directly to Beijing for a formal ratification of the treaties and begin the process of selecting sites to establish permanent legations in the Qing capital.

The fleet arrived in China to a chilly reception. Guiliang was barely hanging on to his job and was ordered by the court to make the foreigners go away. He tried to convince Frederick Bruce and Baron Gros to ratify the treaty in Shanghai rather than in Beijing, with an idea to divert the foreigners to an already established treaty port and stall them there. The foreign delegates, Frederick Bruce especially, were having none of it. Bruce ordered Admiral Hope to take them north despite Guiliang's protests.

When the British and French ships appeared off the coast of Tianjin, Admiral Hope discovered the Qing military had been busy since the British fleet departed the previous autumn. The river was now protected by heavy iron chains, spikes, and other submerged obstacles to prevent his ships from navigating the channel to Tianjin. Qing officials suggested the foreign

39. The exact translation of the term 夷 *yi* has been debated by scholars, notably Lydia Liu. Nevertheless, most missionaries and diplomats at the time translated the term as “barbarian” with all the cultural baggage associated with the word. Canceling the use of this word in official discourse was a longstanding desire of the foreign powers operating in China. See Liu, Lydia He. *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity--China, 1900–1937*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University; 陈国兴 Chen Guoxing, “Fei Zhengqing “yi” zi fanyi de huayu jiedu 费正清 “夷” 字翻译的话语解读 [The Discourse of Interpretation and John King Fairbank's translation of ‘Yi’],” *聊城大学学报: 社会科学版 liaocheng daxue xuebao: shehui kexue ban*, no. 1 (2011).

diplomats take an overland route to the capital, but again Frederick Bruce raised objections. He insisted that traveling by boat and canal from Tianjin to Beijing was the only honorable way to arrive in the capital.

The chains in the river were not the only threat. Although they appeared empty, the Dagu Forts loomed menacingly over the mouth of the river. British and French troops had captured Dagu during the 1859 campaign, but the forts were returned to the Qing military under the condition that they would not be rearmed. Admiral Hope doubted the Qing side could keep such a promise. The forts looked dark and abandoned, but a wary Hope ordered British ships to lay down cover fire on the ramparts as he dispatched a group of several hundred marines and engineers to blow up the chains and other debris blocking the river.

Admiral Hope's ships slowly proceeded forward, firing their first salvos against the Dagu Forts, but the marines and engineers bogged down in the thick mud along the banks of the river. At that moment, the forts roared to life. Inside the battlements were thousands of troops led by Sengge Rinchen, the hero of the Nian and Taiping campaigns, who had become one of the most formidable military commanders in China. His early successes defending the region around Beijing and Tianjin from the Taiping northern advances in 1853 had earned the Mongolian prince the faith of the court. The emperor now called upon him to defend the capital against the foreign menace.

The ferocity of Sengge Rinchen's repulse surprised Hope. The fort's guns sank four ships and crippled two more, killing 89 foreign troops and wounding another 345, including Admiral Hope, while Sengge Rinchen's forces escaped mostly unharmed. The day might have been a rout for the Qing military without the last-minute intervention of Josiah Tatnall of the U.S. Navy. Commodore Tatnall (1795–1871) was aboard a chartered steamship *The Toey-wan* tasked with

delivering the American minister to China, John Elliott Ward (1814–1902), to Beijing. Officially the U.S. ship was a neutral observer, but seeing the British and French vessels floundering, Tatnall asked fellow Georgia native Ward if he had permission to break neutrality. Ward nodded his consent, and with a battle cry that would later give Commodore Tatnall some measure of fame in the naval world, “Blood is thicker than water,” the American captain sailed his ship into the fray and rescued the survivors of Hope’s mission.⁴⁰

British Foreign Secretary John Russell, 1st Earl Russell (1792-1878) reprimanded Frederick Bruce for insisting on the water route. Bruce’s instructions had not included forcing the issue of how they would travel to the capital and his unwillingness to endure the indignities of a bumpy overland journey to Beijing jeopardized the treaties and the mission.⁴¹ For Lord Russell, Bruce had succumbed to pomposity and grandstanding and set back plans to install a representative in Beijing. In response, Bruce curtly suggested the Foreign Secretary was ignorant of certain political realities in China. “It may be very difficult to justify in England the course adopted,” wrote a testy Bruce, “but I have no doubt that it will be met with the approbation of those Chinese who are enlightened enough to know that the true policy of China is to conciliate,

40. Letter sent by Commodore Josiah Tatnall to Issac Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, July 4, 1859, in Charles C. Jones, Jr., *The Life and Services of Commodore Josiah Tatnall* (Savannah: Morning News Steam Printing House, 1878), p. 99. Despite Tatnall’s refusal to remain neutral, John Ward, the U.S. Minister, was able to take up residence in Beijing in 1859 after the Americans consented to take the overland route first proposed by the court, much to the annoyance of Bruce and the British delegation. Ward reached Beijing on July 27, 1859, although once there he found himself virtually a prisoner of his lodgings without the freedom to move about the city. An early attempt to present his credentials directly to the emperor also fizzled when Ward, to nobody’s surprise, let it be known that under no circumstances would he kowtow during the audience. Ward’s recalcitrance only added to the worries at court over the potential pitfalls of having foreign diplomats in permanent residence in the capital. Soon after his mission to China ended, Tatnall returned to America to fight in the US Civil War as a flag officer in the Confederate Navy on behalf of his home state of Georgia. See correspondence and notes on Ward’s mission in D.H. Miller, ed., *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America: Documents 173-200: 1855-1858* (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 912–913.

41. Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce, Foreign Office dispatch dated February 10, 1859, in *Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons*, Vol. 69.

by a seasonable surrender of her prejudices, that foreign element which she can no longer hope to repel by force.”⁴²

In Beijing, the emperor was elated by news of the ambush and bestowed additional titles on Sengge Rinchen, hailing him as one of the finest officers in the imperial service. Chonghou was again serving as a staff officer for Sengge Rinchen, and he and his fellow commanders also received their share of honor and rewards. The foreigners had finally been bested. Surely having tasted the full measure of Qing imperial mettle, the British and French would adjust their attitude of superiority. The imperial court was ebullient, but that joy rested on a false hope.

Indeed, far from cowing the foreigners, the debacle at the Dagu Forts only raised the stakes for the British and French governments and their representatives in China. Monsignor Anouilh, enraged at the perfidy of Sengge Rinchen and the Qing military, wrote to a colleague: “You have learned of the defeat, the complete rout of their escort: no doubt God wanted to give them a little lesson on the virtue of humility. The Europeans, and especially the English, despise the Chinese too much; however, I hope for a happier result from the next expedition.”⁴³

In August 1860, a much larger force of 41 warships as well as 143 transports carrying Lord Elgin and 10,000 British troops appeared at the mouth of the Hai River near Tianjin. An additional 7,000 French soldiers under the command of Charles Cousin-Montauban reinforced the British. The 1860 Anglo-French Expedition resulted in the signing of the Convention of Peking, sometimes known as the Beijing Convention. This agreement gave missionaries unprecedented access and rights in China and made Tianjin a treaty port. The invasion also once again subjected people living in Northern China to foreign occupation and war. Although the

42. Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell, December 5, 1859 (Received January 29, 1860) in *Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons*, Vol. 69.

43. Letter from Mgr. Anouilh to M. Salyayre, Shanghai. November 16, 1859. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1860, p. 161

story of that summer is well known, the events of 1860 set the stage for the Tianjin massacre a decade later and are worth summarizing here.

As the 1860 invasion began, Lord Elgin, British field commander General Hope Grant (1808-1875) and French General Montauban ordered a sustained attack on the Dagu Forts. The British deployed a new weapon, the Armstrong gun, a rifled breech-loading heavy gun first manufactured in 1855 that proved particularly effective in colonial wars in which the British found themselves at a numerical disadvantage. The Anglo-French Expedition might have been outnumbered, but it would not be outgunned.⁴⁴ Lord Elgin's secretary Henry Loch (1827-1900) was impressed by the success of the new weapons. "More special interest attached to the artillery in this campaign, as this was the first occasion in which Armstrong guns had ever been employed. The practice was very accurate and destructive; the batteries advanced...three times, and finally opened fire at under 500 yards from the intrenchment, so close that the enemy could not depress their guns sufficiently to harm them."⁴⁵

British and French artillery pummeled the forts, which were further damaged when one of the attacking shells detonated a gunpowder magazine inside the Qing barricades. Ears ringing, French and British troops scaled the walls and the guns of the Dagu Fort fell silent. According to one British officer, the scene inside "bespoke all the manner in which our artillery had done its part, and the debris caused by the explosion of the magazine lay in heaps everywhere, intermingled with overturned cannon, broken guncarriages, and the dead and wounded of the

44. Marshall J Bastable, "From Breechloaders to Monster Guns: Sir William Armstrong and the Invention of Modern Artillery, 1854-1880," *Technology and Culture* 33, no. 2 (1992).

45. Henry Brougham Loch, *Personal Narrative of Occurrences During Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China in 1860* (London: J. Murray, 1900), p. 72.

garrison. Never did the interior of any place testify more plainly to the noble manner in which it had been defended.”⁴⁶

Robert Swinhoe (1836-1877), a translator with the British task force who would later be named the first European consular representative to the island of Formosa, remarked on the deadliness of the Armstrong guns, “The delight was general to see how repeatedly it reached the wall of mounted men, who stood so long and so bravely discharging their wretched gingals at us without the slightest effect... Numbers of dead Chinese lay about the guns, some most fearfully lacerated. The wall afforded very little protection to the Tartar gunners, and it was astonishing how they managed to stand so long against the destructive fire that our Armstrongs poured on them; but I observed, in more instances than one, that the unfortunate creatures had been tied to the guns by the legs.”⁴⁷

With the forts subdued on August 21, 1860, the water route to Tianjin was now open for the Anglo-French Expedition to push onward. As in 1858, Lord Elgin met with Guiliang, but the British and French commanders were in little mood to negotiate, and Elgin had serious doubts about whether Guiliang even had the authority to speak for the emperor.⁴⁸ Elgin insisted the capital was the only suitable place to exchange ratified treaties. Although Guiliang attempted to again stall the Anglo-French forces, this time at Tianjin, Elgin had already dispatched Harry Parkes, the British consul whose actions in Guangzhou in 1856 had led to the war, to survey the

46. Garnet Wolseley, 1st Viscount Wolseley, *Narrative of the war with China in 1860*. (Longman, Green, 1862), p. 132.

47. Robert Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North China Campaign of 1860: Containing Personal Experiences of Chinese Character, and of the Moral and Social Condition of the Country Together with a Description of the Interior of Peking* (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1861), p. 105.

48. Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North China Campaign of 1860: Containing Personal Experiences of Chinese Character, and of the Moral and Social Condition of the Country Together with a Description of the Interior of Peking.*, p. 197

route between Tianjin and Beijing. Parkes also had orders to parley with Sengge Rinchen and make necessary arrangements to establish a forward camp.

As the Anglo-French Expedition was preparing to march on the capital, Bishop Anouilh and Father Qiu headed back to Baoding. Like Elgin, Anouilh was planning an offensive, and, like Parkes, he was willing to provoke his opponents and humiliate them if necessary to achieve his goals. Anouilh's objective was to force Zhili officials to compensate Qiu for the property the Chinese Lazarist had lost during his arrest two years earlier. Anouilh was taking an enormous chance. Despite the military setbacks at the hands of the invaders, many members of the Qing establishment were not yet ready to surrender to the foreigners, something Harry Parkes and his delegation were about to discover in the worst way possible.

On September 18, Harry Parkes met with Sengge Rinchen and, Zaiyuan (1825-1861), an imperial relative known as Prince Yi, to negotiate the terms of surrender and locate a promising site on which to establish an encampment for the Anglo-French forces. Accompanying Parkes on his mission was Elgin's secretary Henry Loch, several officers from the British and French task forces, a journalist from the *London Times*, Thomas Bowlby (1818-1860), and a military escort made up mostly of troops from the Indian city of Kanpur. In all, about three dozen men set off for Tongzhou, a canal town and garrison about a five-hour march from the city walls of Beijing.

Negotiations stalled over the exact placement of the British and French military campsite when the spot favored by Harry Parkes was already occupied by members of the Qing army. When Parkes asked Prince Yi to move them, the prince refused. In the ruckus that followed, Parkes, perhaps the most hated foreigner in China, and his companions were seized by Qing troops and thrown into prison. For nearly three weeks, they were beaten, tortured, and kept chained in cramped and dangerously unsanitary cells.

Henry Loch tried his best to maintain the expected stiff upper lip: “Had it not been for the starvation, the pain arising from the cramped position in which the chains and ropes retained the arms and legs, with the heavy drag of the iron collar on the bones of the spine, and the creeping vermin that infested every place, together with the occasional beatings and trouts which the prisoners were from time to time taken away for hours to endure—returning with bleeding legs and bodies and so weak as to be scarce able to crawl—there was no great hardship to be endured.”⁴⁹ Messengers hurried to Tianjin to notify Lord Elgin of the capture of Parkes, Bowles, Loch, and the rest of the party. Fearing the worst, Elgin rushed the expeditionary force westward toward the capital.

Sengge Rinchen’s troops threw themselves at the advancing foreign armies only to be cut down by British artillery fire. On September 21, 10,000 of Sengge Rinchen’s best troops, including most of his vaunted Mongolian cavalry, died at the Battle of Baliqiao, 16 km east of Beijing. The Qing troops repeatedly charged into the teeth of the British Armstrong guns to devastating results. The battle was decisive for the Anglo-French Expedition, and the French commander Montauban would later receive his title, Count of Palikao, from Napoleon III in commemoration of the victory.

As Elgin and Montauban made plans for the capital’s occupation, the Xianfeng Emperor fled to his mountain villas in Rehe, north of the Great Wall and far removed from the battles going on just outside the walls of Beijing. Left behind in the capital was the emperor’s younger brother Yixin (1833–1898), better known as Prince Gong. Although he was still quite young, Prince Gong was seen by many as an intelligent and capable member of the imperial clan. Baron Gros described him as having “a very pleasant expression, his features are of the true Tartar type;

49. Loch, *Personal Narrative of Occurrences During Lord Elgin's Second Embassy to China in 1860.*, p. 180.

the right cheek is lightly marked with two scars, close together, apparently the marks of two small nails. His face and his hands are small, the fingers being delicate and effeminate in appearance, of medium height, and slender in shape.”⁵⁰ It was Prince Gong’s unfortunate duty to clean up the mess left by his older brother’s intransigence and the bad advice of more militant members of the emperor’s inner circle.

At Rehe, the emperor was surrounded by officials filled with the bravery that comes from being safely out of range. They urged the emperor to take revenge on the foreign prisoners, especially Parkes, and the emperor agreed. Aware of the sentiment at the court-in-retreat, Prince Gong knew he had little time to act before he received an order to terminate the prisoners.

On October 8, a day after the emperor sentenced the prisoners to death, but before the order could reach the capital, Prince Gong ordered the release of Parkes, Loch, and the other surviving hostages. Parkes described his mix of euphoria and trepidation at being told he would be freed that day. “It is impossible to describe our feelings—our hopes were raised—and yet we felt how much still lay between us and safety... It seemed as if we should never reach the gate; at last we had a good view of the massive heavy doors, which, with a sinking feeling, we saw were closed, but when within thirty yards they were thrown open, and we heard the heavy bang of their being shut behind us with a sensation of intense relief. The outer gate was opened, and closed, in the same manner, and we found ourselves once more outside the walls of Peking and in the open country.”⁵¹

50. Jean-Baptiste Louis Gros, *Négociations entre la France et la Chine en 1860 ; Livre Jaune du Baron Gros, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Haut Commissaire de L'Empereur en Chine, en 1858 et en 1860: extrait de sa correspondance et de son journal, pendant la seconde mission qu'il a remplie dans l'extrême Orient* (Paris: Dumaine, 1864)., p. 193.

51. Recorded in Stanley Lane-Poole and Frederick Victor Dickins, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes: Consul in China* (London: MacMillan and Co., 1894), p. 391. The remaining bodies of the British, Indian, and French captives were returned to the expeditionary force were returned on October 16. Of the 39 men taken into custody in Tongzhou, only 19 survived their incarceration. The expedition briefly paused to identify the bodies (Thomas

Following the destruction of the Yuanmingyuan and British and French troops taking control of Beijing in late October, Lord Elgin met with Prince Gong who had taken over from Guiliang the unenviable job of preventing the foreigners not to do any more damage to the dynasty or its capital.⁵² Prince Gong had little leverage and all he could do was agree to the terms of surrender as dictated to him by Lord Elgin, Baron Gros, and Harry Parkes.

The Beijing Convention was finalized on October 25, 1860. In addition to requiring the formal ratification of the 1858 treaty signed in Tianjin, the Convention included an additional indemnity of \$8 million. The Qing court also agreed to cede in perpetuity to Britain all the land on Kowloon Peninsula, located just across the harbor from the British colony on the island of Hong Kong, south of what is today Boundary Street.⁵³

During the drafting of the French version of the treaty, French translators changed the language of two articles. Article 7 of the French text reads: “In accordance with the imperial

Bowlby’s corpse was in such terrible condition that he could only be recognized by a monogram on one of his socks) and arrange for the burial of the non-Indian victims in a cemetery used by the Russian community in Beijing that was located just outside the city’s Andingmen Gate. The cemetery was later converted into a public park. Today, a driving range for Beijing’s growing community of golf enthusiasts sits atop the graves of Bowlby and the other victims. See Jeremiah Jenne, “Skeletons in the Golf Course,” *China Channel*, April 26, 2018.

52. The occupation of Beijing and the decision by Lord Elgin and Baron Gros to sack the emperor’s residence and gardens at Yuanmingyuan have been well-documented and need not concern us here. The best recent work on the subject is Ines Eben v. Racknitz, *Die Plünderung des Yuanmingyuan. Imperiale Beutenahe im britisch-französischen Chinafeldzug von 1860* (The Plundering of the Yuanmingyuan: Imperial Prize in the Wake of the British-French Capture Expedition of 1860). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2013.

53. While the Kowloon Peninsula was a major concession for the British, in terms of total area ceded it was a mere speck on the map when compared to the territorial coup orchestrated by the Russian Count Ignyatev. Russia had designs on sections of Central Asia under Qing control, part of what is today the “Autonomous Region” of Xinjiang in the People’s Republic of China, but more than the desert oasis cities of the Silk Road, the real prize was the coastline of Manchuria. Count Ignyatev had been stymied in his attempts to negotiate Russian control over these areas by hardline members of the Qing court, most of whom were now in semi-exile beyond the Great Wall. With Prince Gong desperate for the Russian’s help—or at least neutrality—in dealing with the British and French, Ignyatev seized the advantage. With a swish of a writing brush and the stroke of a pen, nearly 350,000 square miles north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River as far south as the border with Korea became Russian territory. Today these are Amur and the Maritime Provinces of the Russian Federation. Even as the Anglo-French expedition was fighting its way from Tianjin to Beijing in the summer of 1860, Alexey K. Shefner of the Russian Imperial Navy was landing at Golden Horn Bay with 28 soldiers to establish a new outpost at what would become Vladivostok. See John L. Evans, *Russian Expansion on the Amur, 1848–1860: The Push to the Pacific* (Edwin Mellen Press, 1999).

edict issued on March 20, 1846, by the August Emperor Tao-Kouang, the religious and charitable establishments which were confiscated from Christians during the persecutions of which they were the victims, will be returned to their owners by through His Excellency the Minister of France in China, to whom the Imperial Government will deliver them along with the cemeteries and other buildings which depended on them.”⁵⁴ The Chinese copy of the treaty included text inserted by the French side that went a step further, adding the line: “It is, in addition, permitted to French missionaries to rent and purchase land in all the provinces, and to erect buildings thereon at pleasure.”⁵⁵ The change apparently went unnoticed by Qing representatives and gave French nationals near *carte blanche* to claim properties in China’s interior provinces, and missionaries often chose sites of local importance. The result was that officials were compelled by the missionaries, citing the terms of the Beijing Convention, to turn over guild halls, temples, imperial villas, and even the God of War temple in Shanghai, for conversion into churches, schools, and missions.⁵⁶

The decision to include the additional language seems to have been done by Baron Eugene de Méritens, who would later work for the Qing Imperial Maritime Customs Service in Fuzhou, and the French missionary Louis Charles Delamarre (1810–1863), who was assisting

54. Cordier, H. *L'expédition De Chine De 1860: Histoire Diplomatique, Notes Et Documents*. F. Alcan, 1906. Print, p. 438.

55. Qi Qizhang 戚其章 and Wang Ruhui 王如绘, *Wanqing jiao'an jishi 晚清教案纪事 [A Record of Anti-Religious Incidents in the Late Qing]*, p. 107. See also Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 1860–1900 (The History of China's Relations with the Western Powers, 1860–1900)*, p. 53 and Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 69. French and Chinese text of the Convention of Beijing (1860) can be found in *Treaties, Conventions, Etc., between China and Foreign States, ed. Order of the Inspector General of Customs, Second ed., vol. I: Russia, International Protocol, Great Britain, United States of America, France, Import Tariff Agreement* (Shanghai, 1917), p. 885. One of the junior translators who assisted in the treaty preparation was Henri Fontanier, later the French consul in Tianjin.

56. See Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 129.

with translation.⁵⁷ Louis Wei argues that it was likely Delamarre who made the changes in the Chinese draft.⁵⁸ Baron Gros was unaware of the ruse when he signed the convention. Having been informed afterward, he felt the matter, having already been settled, was best left as written.⁵⁹

The problems of such a broad concession became obvious to all who worked on the Chinese coast. American W. A. P. Martin (1827–1916) was an interpreter for the United States delegation during the 1858 Sino-American treaty negotiations, and would later serve as principal translator at the American legation in Beijing and then president of the *Tongwenguan* (京师同文馆), the Qing imperial translation college. Martin was known for his strong views about the actions of the foreign powers in China, opinions that earned him the enmity of many in the international community.

Martin, who also advised the Qing during the Sino–French War of 1884–1885, wrote of the Beijing Convention: “In 1860, a convention was added which was, moreover, only the reproduction of the imperial edict of March 1846, stipulating the surrender of confiscated Christian establishments as well as cemeteries with their outbuildings, but it happened that the

57. De Méritens worked for the Custom Service until his dismissal in 1871. “De Méritens has made a monstrous mistake in F’chow” wrote the Maritimes Custom Service IG Robert Hart in a letter dated March 15, 1871. Although Hart never elaborated, de Méritens resigned from the service that year. See Hart, R., et al. *The I. G. In Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868–1907*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 65. De Méritens would later advise the French government following the Tianjin riot.

58. See Standaert, N., and R.G. Tiedemann. *Handbook of Christianity in China*. Brill, 2009, p. 299. For the French version of the text, see Wei, T.L. *La Politique Missionnaire De La France En Chine 1842 1856 Wei Louis: L’ouverture Des Cinq Ports Chinois a Commerce Étranger Et La Liberté Religieuse*. Nouvelles Éditions latines, 1961, p. 457. The Chinese text can be found in YWSM XF, 28:21. See also Geng Sheng, “Missionaries and Expeditionary Armies—French Missionary Delamarre in the Second Opium War,” *Hangzhou shifan xueyan xuebao (shehui kexue ban) 杭州师范学院学报 (社会科学版)* 4 (2005).

59. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*. F. Alcan, 1901, p. 54; Gros, J.B.L. *Négociations Entre La France Et La Chine, En 1860: Livre Jaune Du Baron Gros, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire Et Haut Commissaire De L’empereur, En Chine, En 1858 Et En 1860. Extrait De Sa Correspondance Et De Son Journal, Pendant La Seconde Mission Qu’il a Remplie Dans L’extrême Orient*. Librairie Militaire, 1864, pp. 3–4

interpreters called upon perhaps by senior missionaries, added...the clause according to which it would be open to French Catholic priests to buy land wherever they wished and to establish buildings there as they saw fit. This clause distorted the excellent spirit which inspired M. de Lagrené on the subject of the religious protectorate; it offended the feelings of the Chinese and made them therefore conceive of the idea of avoiding observance of the treaty.”⁶⁰

The French missionary community was understandably more enthusiastic than Martin about the outcome of both the Anglo-French Expedition and the subsequent Convention of Peking. One priest who landed in China in 1860 remarked, “It is peace in China, and it is freedom for the missionary to circulate in the Celestial Empire, to teach the slaves of Satan the means to break their heavy chains and to become the cherished children of the true, one and only God.”⁶¹

Bishop Joseph Mouly, with help and permission from Baron Gros and General Montauban, arrived in Beijing just a few days after the city’s capture by the Anglo-French Expedition. “The position of Europeans in China and Beijing was then more critical than ever,” Mouly wrote in a report prepared for his superiors in Paris the following year. “They had, it is true, always been victorious, they were masters of the position: but they did not want, and they could not wish to dethrone the emperor and rule in his stead his vast empire. They wished only to have the treaty of 1858 ratified, with a few additional articles, more advantageous to commerce on the part of the English and more useful to the Catholic religion on the part of the French.”⁶²

60. W. A. P. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay; or, China, South and North with personal reminiscences* (New York: F. H. Revell Co., 1896), W.A.P, p. 109.

61. Claude Marie Chevrier to Jean-Louis Chevrier, November 9, 1860. Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tientsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 109.

62. Joseph Martial Mouly to the Presidents and Members of the Two Central Councils for the Propagation of the Faith. October 1861. *Annales Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1862, p. 5.

Mouly, never shy about expressing his opinions to French authorities, also reminded Baron Gros that the clerical establishment in France was upset with Emperor Napoleon III over the latter's less than robust reaction to the planned annexation of the Papal States of Romagna, Marche, and Umbria by the Kingdom of Italy and the ongoing persecutions of Christians in Indochina. Mouly suggested that a forceful response to the provocations of the Qing government and local officials would go a long way to restoring Napoleon III's support and loyalty by French Catholics.⁶³

Bishop Mouly staked a claim for the Lazarists on the abandoned churches and cathedrals in Beijing. Some of the church sites dated to the seventeenth century and the intervening years had not been kind to the formerly Catholic properties. Mouly inspected the South Cathedral near Xuanwumen, first established by Matteo Ricci in 1605. "Of the original church building, only the four walls remained with none of the exterior dwellings or the outer walls. "Pictures, altars, pulpit, episcopal seat, furniture, wooden ornaments... everything had completely disappeared inside," lamented the bishop.⁶⁴ The church "suffered little outside," noted a French priest named Dovergne, "but as the door was walled up and there was a lot of rubble, two days had to be spent clearing it inside and out. Then it was covered inside with huge pieces of black silk dotted with white crosses."⁶⁵

With the tools and energy of the French army engineers, Mouly began preparing the space to hold a funeral for the British and French nationals who had been killed in the campaign. On October 29, 1860, a mass was held with the French minister, members of the British and

63. Émile Bourgeois, *Manuel Historique de Politique Étrangere, Volume 3* (Paris: Librairie Classique Eugène Belin, 1931), 632–633.

64. Joseph Mouly, November 1861 *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*, 1862, p. 44.

65. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, Volume 2*, p. 53

Russian embassies, local Chinese Catholics, and a crowd of curious onlookers all in attendance. Bishop Mouly presided, and Bishop Anouilh assisted along with Father Qiu and a few other Chinese priests. “A solemn service was celebrated there for the victims of the last betrayal,” recalled Father Dovergne, “We had the bodies of six of them there; then the burial took place in the cemetery; two bishops and twenty or so ecclesiastics, either Europeans or Chinese, priests or seminarians, with a long series of catechists dressed in choir garb (more than 150), all this procession in which several characters from the embassy mingled Russian was most imposing.”⁶⁶

Mouly’s gamble of traveling with the vanguard of the expedition paid off. On November 5, 1860, Prince Gong sent correspondence to Baron Gros formally returning the churches and other Catholic properties to French representatives who, in turn, turned their management over to Bishop Mouly. “With regard to the churches in the North and the South and the lands which depend on them, and which I must give to Your Excellency with an authentic document so that she can in turn entrust them to Mouly, the bishop of the place, I am announcing to you that I am returning to you, as of today, the Church of the South with the land which depends on it, and I am sending you an authentic title which confirms this delivery so that you yourself can deliver this church to the bishop. As for the northern one, as a great number of years have passed since it disappeared, I ordered the local authorities to make a scrupulous investigation into it, and, as soon as it is completed, I will give Your Excellency this church or its outbuildings, and with them a document which will record this restitution.”⁶⁷

66. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2..., p. 53

67. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 146, Enclosures 1–3.

Bishop Anouilh reported on these fast-moving developments, which he believed would forever change the nature of mission work in China. No longer would missionaries go forth unguarded. Anouilh wrote that the French minister Alphonse de Bourboulon, “has provided all the apostolic missionaries with valid passports, the writing of which in Chinese was very flattering to ministers of religion. Later His Excellency sent each of us a printed matter in the form of a decree, giving the text of the articles of the treaty concerning religion and bearing the imprint of the seals of the legation and the ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, chaired by Imperial Prince Koung-tsing-ouan (Prince Gong). The same legation then also engraved the plate of the French treaty with magnificent characters and sent several copies of it to each Mission to be displayed in our residences. But the most glorious document for Religion and the most suitable for the conservation of religious freedom is the imperial decree, in Chinese, that M. de Bourboulon, after many fights and pains, finally gave us.”⁶⁸

Just four days after the signing of the Beijing Convention, the newly established French Legation began issuing passports. Eight missionaries—one of the first was Louis Delamarre—received their documents, signed by Baron Gros, and stamped by Prince Gong, proclaiming the right to lawfully access China’s interior.⁶⁹

Father Delamarre’s passport read: “*The undersigned, Ambassador and High Commissioner of His Majesty the Emperor of France in China, requests the civil and military authorities of the Chinese Empire, in accordance with article 8 of the Treaty of Tien-Tsin, ratified at Beijing on October 25, to allow free movement in the empire, and to give it help and*

68. J.B. Anouilh to the Directors of the Work of the Propagation of the Faith, March 10, 1862. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, p. 22.

69. Yang Dachun 杨大春, “Wan qing zhengfu guanyu waiguo chuanjiaoshi huzhao zhengce gaishu 晚清政府关于外国传教士护照政策概述 [An Overview of the Government’s Policy on Foreign Missionary Passports in the Late Qing],” *历史档案 lishi dang’an [Historical Archives]* 2 (2004).

*protection in case of need, Mr. Delamarre, a French missionary, is going to the province of Szech'ouen (Sichuan) to exercise his holy ministry. Mr. Delamarre being known at the French embassy for a good man, who only takes care of Works of piety and charity worthy of praise, the present passport, which must be endorsed by the Chinese authority of the place where it was issued, was given to him in Beijing on October 29, 1860, on condition that the Mr. Delamarre will not go, under any pretext, in the towns or villages occupied by the rebels.”*⁷⁰

Missionaries placed a great deal of faith in these passports, and it was a widely held belief that French passports carried added authority when used to travel beyond the treaty ports based on the presumption that France would take up the sword to protect the Cross. This belief incentivized Catholic missionaries from other countries working in China to petition French authorities to carry a French passport regardless of the missionary's country of origin.⁷¹ While the documents offered some measure of protection, missionaries throughout China soon learned that there were limits to the power of the printed word when faced with angry residents violently resisting the presence of Christian missionaries in their cities and villages.⁷²

With the conventions signed and ratified, Elgin and Baron Gros ordered their troops to withdraw from Beijing on November 8, 1860. The soldiers of the Anglo-French Expedition were replaced by a new foreign presence in the capital: Diplomats. Along a narrow street southeast of the Forbidden City, the foreign powers converted former palaces and villas into offices and residences for diplomatic work. By the summer of 1900, when the legations were besieged by anti-foreign insurgents known in the West as “Boxers,” there were 11 countries represented in

70. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*. F. Alcan, 1901, p. 61. For the correspondence between Prince Gong and Baron Gros on the issuance of passports, see also QMJA Volume 1, Numbers 146 and No. 147. Rebels here refers to areas controlled by the Taiping.

71. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, p. 29.

72. J.B. Anouilh to the Directors of the Work of the Propagation of the Faith, March 10, 1862. *Annales Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1865, p. 23.

Beijing's Legation Quarter: Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Italy, Spain, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United States.

To better manage relations, and to keep the foreign representatives from insisting on meeting at the imperial palace, Prince Gong established the Office for the General Management of Affairs Concerning the Various Countries (总理各国事务衙门 *zongli geguo shiwu yamen*), a name shortened in Western writings as "Zongli Yamen," or sometimes, less accurately, as the Qing Foreign Ministry.⁷³ Over the next decade, the fallout from the Second Opium War and the subsequent treaties kept Prince Gong and the staff of the Zongli Yamen busy as they fielded complaints from local officials, representatives of the foreign powers, and much to the annoyance of Qing authorities, sometimes directly from missionaries.⁷⁴

One of the last stipulations in the Beijing Convention of 1860 was that Tianjin, the city that had been the site of some of the earliest and bloodiest battles of the campaign and had served as a staging area for the sacking of the capital, would become the newest port opened to trade and settlement by foreigners. The foreign powers were granted the right to build a concession area in which Tianjin authorities would have little de facto jurisdiction. This system of treaty ports shaped the development of many cities along China's coast, most notably Shanghai, and by the early twentieth century, Tianjin would become Shanghai's northern rival as a center of trade and business.

73. The Zongli Yamen was replaced with a Foreign Office, the Waiwubu 外务部 following the signing of the 1901 Boxer Protocol. See Meng S. M. Mêng, *The Tsungli Yamen: Its Organization and Functions*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 80-81. For the development of Prince Gong's ideas on diplomacy and international law, see Zhao Zengyue 赵增越, "gong qinwang shixing 'guojifa' 恭亲王试行 '国际法' [Prince Gong's Experiments with 'International Law']," *zhongguo dang'an 中国档案* 1 (2016).

74. Jennifer M. Rudolph, *Negotiated Power in Late Imperial China: The Zongli Yamen and the Politics of Reform* (East Asia Program, Cornell University, 2008).

Even today, many neighborhoods of Tianjin reflect the faded influence of their foreign builders. European houses, Art Deco hotels, and the great columned facades of former bank buildings line the broad streets and avenues of former concessions built by the British, French, and other foreign powers in Tianjin. Some of these sites have since become desirable homes or been remodeled into commercial enterprises that recall a time of glitzy, if forced, cosmopolitanism, but in 1860, Tianjin was a very different place. The area where the foreign powers established the concessions was along muddy riverbanks outside the walls of the city proper. The first foreigners to settle permanently in Tianjin would also find themselves very much uninvited and generally unwelcome.

The court dispatched Chonghou, who had helped defend the city as a member of Sengge Rinchen's staff, to supervise foreign affairs in the new treaty port. In theory, Chonghou was the highest-ranking official in Tianjin, but his actual authority was murky, and he did not have a defined role in either the military or civilian administrative structure of the city or the surrounding area.

As Chonghou was taking up his new post, Bishop Anouilh arrived in Tianjin aboard a French gunship. Anouilh was elated to learn that Qiu Anyu would finally be receiving compensation for his damaged property. Four men, who officials claimed had been involved in the looting, were dragged before the French missionary. Each man wore a cangue and carried 50 ounces of silver. "Four others," wrote Anouilh, "carried a thousand francs of clothes on a magnificent litter." Finally, a "procession of more than fifty scholars and mandarins in red, blue, white, and gold buttons came forward to apologize and we ended thus, in a very honorable

manner, this trial which had lasted more than two years and had almost cost M. Keou [Qiu] his neck.”⁷⁵

Qiu Anyu used the money to rebuild his house and pharmacy. For the next year, he resumed dispensing medicines and baptizing children, but he was also unwell. His time in prison had weakened him, and a cancerous sore appeared on his back. He needed help with his mission and sent word to a nephew, Vincent Ou, also a Lazarist priest, to travel to Tianjin and assist him, but Vincent arrived too late.

Joseph Qiu Anyu died on August 12, 1861, bequeathing his home to the Church. His successor in Tianjin, Leon-Vincent Talmier (1815-1862), soon started work preparing the dwelling for new occupants: a group of nuns from the Holy Childhood Association scheduled to arrive in China the following summer.

75. J.B. Anouilh, August 22, 1861. *Annales Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1862, p. 376.

Chapter 3: God's Geese

On July 2, 1862, five nuns from the Daughters of Charity stepped down a plank and onto the teeming wharf outside the East Gate of the city of Tianjin. Their appearance on the banks of the Hai River certainly attracted the attention of the throngs of people who regularly crowded along the riverside. Bishop Mouly, who accompanied the nuns on their long journey from Europe to China, was there too, but like most male members of the Lazarist mission Mouly dressed and groomed his appearance in an approximation of Chinese attire for an elite man. The nuns preferred to wear the habits of their order, and these must have made quite an impression. The Daughters of Charity were known—even in Europe—for their distinctive look. Gray gowns and wide white wimples spreading like wings from their cornetts inspired the gently mocking nickname: “God’s Geese.”



Figure 3.1. Portraits of the Daughters of Charity killed during the massacre of June 21, 1870. Sister Superior Marquet (Belgium), Sister Andréoni (Italy), Sister Viollet (France), Sister Adam (Belgium), Sister Pavillon (France), Sister Legras (France), Sister Clavelin (France), Sister Tillet (France), Sister Lenu (France), Sister O'Sullivan (Ireland). Note the distinctive wimples that inspired the nickname “God’s Geese.”

If Tianjin was not sure what to make of the nuns, the nuns had an equally challenging time knowing what to think about their new home. Descriptions of the city in the nineteenth century often relate the writers' feelings of sensory overload. The noise of the crowds. The smells of the market mingled with the river. The sharp, acrid whiff of honey carts passing by with their precious cargo of human waste. It could be a lot to process.¹

In 1816, while accompanying Lord Amherst on a mission to meet with the Jiaqing Emperor, George Staunton commented that in Tianjin, "The houses are better looking and rather larger than in the neighborhood of Canton...the banks were crowded with people, and these chiefly well-dressed and better looking than we had seen upon the coast—and indeed superior to those of Canton."²

As was with many other Western visitors to the city, the nuns must have been impressed by the abundance of Tianjin's markets and evidence of commerce. Busy stalls were filled with melons, apricots, peaches, melons, and other mid-summer delights. The opposite bank was lined with enormous piles of salt, towering pyramidal monuments to this staple of Tianjin's economy.³ Even though North China in June and July could be sweltering, they would have seen local merchants disappearing into stout wooden houses only to reemerge with blocks of ice. The city did a brisk business carving up the frozen rivers and canals each winter and storing the ice in underground cellars to use during the hot summers. Sanitation was a problem, and the nuns and other Europeans who indulged in fruit or took advantage of river water ice without taking precautions might find themselves in a state of acute gastric distress.⁴

1. Lovett, R. *The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795–1895*. H. Frowde, 1899, p. 546.

2. Quoted in Rasmussen, O. D. *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History*. Tientsin: The Tientsin press, 1925, p. 12.

3. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China*.

4. Rasmussen, O. D. *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History*. Tientsin: The Tientsin press, ltd., 1925, p. 35.

Laurence Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, '58, and '59*. (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1860),

The protestant missionary William Lockhart (1811–1896) wrote this description of the city in the 1860s. “Tientsin is a large, busy, active city, but one of the filthiest places I ever put foot in. The streets are unpaved, and the rain softens the earth, which is worked up by the mule carts of the country into a state that is something surprising but rather unpleasant to stumble into. The filth of the place makes it very unhealthy during the hot season, and it is not a good climate, fearfully hot in summer and shockingly cold in winter; but it is a crowded, thriving, active place.”⁵

For five nuns raised in Europe, to live and work in Tianjin would require some adjustment and a strong dedication to their assignment.

The Sisters were in Tianjin in the service of the L’Oeuvre de la Sainte Enfance, known in English as the Holy Childhood Association and founded in 1843 by Charles-Auguste-Marie-Joseph de Forbin-Janson (1785-1844). Forbin-Janson had heard tales of infanticide being practiced in China and envisioned a spiritual army of Christian youth banding together materially and spiritually to rescue Chinese infants and children from eternal damnation. The Association would send good Christians to China to build schools, raise orphans to be missionaries, and baptize unwanted children to bring them into a state of Grace.⁶

5. Quoted in Richard Lovett, *The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795-1895* (London: H. Frowde, 1899)., p. 546.

6. See Henrietta Harrison, "‘A Penny for the Little Chinese’: The French Holy Childhood Association in China, 1843–1951," *The American Historical Review* 113, no. 1 (2008).



FIGURE 1: "Chinese Children Rescued by the Holy Childhood." The work of the Holy Childhood as it was imagined in nineteenth-century France. From A.-M. Touzé, "La Sainte Enfance," *Musée des Familles: Lectures du Soir* 16 (1848–1849): 213.

Figure 3.2. "Chinese Children Rescued by the Holy Childhood" is a graphic printed in a Catholic journal from 1848, the same year the first group of nuns arrived in Macau. The image shows an idealized version of the Association's mission. Catholic priests smile mercifully and bless unwanted children brought to them, voluntarily it would seem, by the children's parents.⁷

Between 1843 and 1870, the Holy Childhood Association experienced rapid growth, with annual contributions rising from 250,000 francs in 1851 to nearly 2 million francs by 1870.⁸ Many of the nuns working with the Holy Childhood in China were French, but Belgian, Italian, and Irish sisters were among those sent to Tianjin between 1862 and 1870. Financial support came from Catholic communities in Europe and the Holy Childhood was also active in North America, soliciting donations from students and parents at parochial schools in Baltimore, New York, and Boston. Organizing efforts and outreach would reach a peak in the years between

7. Image from Harrison, "A Penny for the Little Chinese': The French Holy Childhood Association in China, 1843–1951."

8. Harrison, "A Penny for the Little Chinese': The French Holy Childhood Association in China, 1843–1951."

1860 and 1870 as membership expanded and the Association extended their activities to French Indochina, India, and Africa.⁹

The first Holy Childhood mission to China arrived on June 21, 1848, 22 years to the day before the Tianjin Massacre in 1870. Eleven French nuns and three male missionaries landed first in the Portuguese colony of Macau. It had taken eight grueling months to travel from Marseilles, and one of their companions did not survive the journey. Within a month of arriving in China, the group's Sister Superior would also succumb to illness. The Lord's work was not without its objective hazards. The surviving nuns confronted a daunting task. They did not speak the language and had only the most elementary understanding of the culture. Moreover, they found themselves unwanted guests in Macau, victims of the ongoing territorial squabbles, political gamesmanship, and interdenominational disputes that bedeviled missionary initiatives in Asia.

In the first decades of the nineteenth century, China was divided ecclesiastically between Catholic orders acting as religious proxies for rival powers in Europe. Despite the official proscription of Christianity in China and the ban on foreign missionaries, the Portuguese crown claimed rights as the "Vicar of the Church" and jurisdiction over the three full bishoprics in China: Beijing, Nanjing, and Macau. There were also several large territories called Vicariates led by apostolic vicars from the different missionary orders, including Lazarists, Franciscans, Dominicans, and the Jesuits.¹⁰

Napoleon's defeat and Pope Pius VII's reinstatement to the Vatican in 1814 spurred a revival of Catholic missionary energy that rapidly spread to every corner of the world but also

9. Harrison, "A Penny for the Little Chinese': The French Holy Childhood Association in China, 1843–1951."

10. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, p. 15; Cady, "The Beginnings of French Imperialism in the Pacific Orient.", p. 475.

led to an escalating series of jurisdictional disputes. The Congregation of the Mission had moved swiftly into the vacuum left in China following the temporary dissolution of the Jesuits in 1773 and the Lazarists tenaciously held on to their claims over formerly Jesuit properties and territories even after the restoration of the Jesuit order in 1814. The mostly-French Lazarists also faced competition in Asia from Italian Franciscans, the Spanish priests of the Dominicans (who focused their attention on the Philippines), and a national rival—the MEP, Mission Étrangers de Paris.¹¹

The intra-faith feuding meant the nuns from the Holy Childhood who arrived in 1848 found a chilly reception from Portuguese authorities in Macau unhappy about the Lazarists and France possibly trying to undermine Portugal’s protectorate in China. Political turmoil, including the exile of the Portuguese court to Brazil between 1807 and 1821, had reduced Portugal’s influence in ecclesiastical matters, but authorities in Macau could still make things difficult for the Sisters and they thwarted the nuns’ plans to establish an orphanage in the colony.¹²

The nuns departed Macau on a French gunboat in 1852, bound for the port of Ningbo. After arriving in the city, the captain of their ship personally escorted them to their new house while a representative of the French government paid a call on Ningbo officials reminding them of their duty to protect the nuns from superstitious members of the local community.¹³ In Ningbo, the nuns were able to open an orphanage and a pharmacy under the protection of the treaties that allowed for religious activities in the ports open to foreign trade and residence.

11. Ernest P. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China’s Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate*. (Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 15–16. In 1860, Joseph Mouly had been eager to accompany the Anglo-French Expedition to Beijing, and asked for logistical and other support from the French military command because of his intense desire to lay physical claims on what was left of the capital’s churches, cathedrals, and Catholic cemeteries for the Lazarist order. See Chapter 2.

12. Mungello, *The Catholic Invasion of China: Remaking Chinese Christianity.*, p. 110.

13. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 174.

When Joseph Mouly visited Europe in 1861, he had on his mind the success of this first Daughters of Charity mission in Ningbo and the possibilities for expansion to the cities newly opened by the Treaty of Tianjin and Beijing Convention.

As a Vicar Apostolic, Mouly had the title of bishop and was responsible for supervising mission activities, priests, and catechists in the recently reorganized Vicariate of Zhili. Unlike a diocesan bishop, Mouly was beholden to what was at the time still called the Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith, often abbreviated as “The Propaganda,” the Vatican authority that superintended overseas Catholic missions. Mouly was required to submit an annual report demonstrating quantitative progress in the field, respond to regular questionnaires describing his vicariate and its activities, and return to Rome every 10 years for an in-person debriefing.¹⁴

For reasons of Vatican politics and the practical difficulties of managing missionaries in the field on the other side of the world, the Propaganda’s authority over the diverse—and frequently squabbling—missionary orders working in China waxed and waned. Missionary societies liberally appointed priests, named bishops, and decided policy while jealously guarding their claims to different parts of the Qing Empire.¹⁵ The weakening of the Portuguese monarchy and the opening of the interior provinces due to the Treaty of Tianjin and the Beijing Convention set off an indecorous scramble in China to claim or, in the case of the Jesuits, reclaim, influence, properties, and jurisdictions. One tactic that the Propaganda in Rome could employ was the reshuffling of territories assigned to each society. This was a fraught process that elicited heated and emotional responses from missionaries, but which, nevertheless, provided the Vatican with

14. For a description of the administrative structure of the Catholic mission in China, see Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, pp. 37–39.

15. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony*, p. 38.

at least some power to check the autonomy of the China missions. While in Rome, Bishop Mouly was ordered to preside over negotiations to cede Lazarist responsibility for large sections of the Mongolian vicariate to a group of missionaries led by the Belgian priest Theophile Verbist (1823–1868). Mouly put on a good show of remorse over losing this territory, but he also knew that it was one of the most challenging postings for foreign missionaries in China. Verbist would die of typhoid in 1868, only a few months after arriving at his station on the steppe.¹⁶

Following his visit to the Vatican, Mouly traveled to Paris to meet with his superiors at the Congregation of the Mission. He requested several more sisters be dispatched to Asia, and when the bishop returned to China in 1862, he brought with him fourteen Daughters of Charity who could expand the Holy Childhood's mission into Northern China by founding orphanages in Tianjin and Beijing.¹⁷ Mouly arranged for five of the fourteen nuns to stay in Tianjin under the protection of Father Talmier, Qiu Anyu's successor. The Sisters took charge of the late priest's home, moving into Qiu's former residence and pharmacy on the street just outside the city's east gate. The location was also about a 15-minute walk across a pontoon bridge to Father Talmier's vicarage and the newly established French consulate, both of which were located at the former imperial villa, Wanghailou.

16. Vande Walle and Golvers, *The History of the Relations Between the Low Countries and China in the Qing Era (1644-1911)*.

17. Two Lazarists who would become famous in the latter part of the nineteenth century also accompanied Mouly on his return voyage. Alphonse Favier (1837–1905) was later one of the most influential Catholic missionaries in China and would play a large role in rebuilding the Lazarist mission in Tianjin following the events of 1870. Armand David (1826–1900) became well known for his work in the natural sciences and curated an impressive collection of botanical and zoological specimens in a museum attached to the North Cathedral in Beijing. Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral.*, p. 92. Armand David was also the first non-Chinese naturalist to describe the large species of deer *Elaphurus davidianus*, known commonly in Western languages as Pere David's deer.

The nuns had been given 45,000 francs to establish an orphanage, revive the dispensary, and eventually start a hospital for the sick and dying.¹⁸ Their new establishment, known locally as Rencitang (The Hall of Benevolence and Compassion), was in an ideal area for their work, but the living conditions were spartan. Even nuns who had taken vows of poverty had limits, and the cramped quarters, local sanitation regimen, and lack of furnishings sometimes tested their resolve.¹⁹ For a long time, their only furniture was a large table and five chairs that served both as communal seating for meals in the refectory and services held in the tiny, attached chapel. Cookware was limited to two large woks. Father Talmier helped enliven the situation by bringing the nuns a small cask of wine, which, absent bottles, was served in a large terrine placed at the center of the refectory's table.²⁰

Father Talmier also provided more than wine. He used his connections among the city's Christians to help introduce the Sisters to Tianjin's Catholic communities. Just days after the nuns arrived, a family asked them to accept their three-year-old daughter. Over the next few weeks, several other children and infants—almost all girls—were placed under the Sisters' care. As the nuns in Tianjin lamented in their letters home, daughters were far more likely than sons to be abandoned, sold, or simply killed by their parents.

The Sisters wished to demonstrate the power of their faith by ministering to the sick and dying, and they immediately had an opportunity to show their sincerity. The nuns had arrived in Tianjin in the middle of a cholera epidemic. Nearly four hundred people a day in Tianjin died of

18. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*

19. Rencitang 仁慈堂 was a common—almost generic—name for benevolent houses, especially those run by overseas missionaries.

20. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*

the disease in the summer of 1862. Although some residents sought out traditional medicine or local religious institutions for healing and prayers, others—perhaps more desperate or having not found a cure through conventional channels—turned to the Sisters for help.²¹

One of the nuns' first patients was a worker dying of cholera in the street just outside their dispensary. Joseph Mouly was in Tianjin to assist in the establishment of Rencitang, and the presence of the bishop allowed the sisters to treat their male patient. Miraculously, or so recalled the Sister Superior, Sister Dutrouilh, the man recovered, and being thankful to the nuns for saving him, he returned to his neighborhood spreading the word of the Sister's medical efficacy. "One of them was brought dying in a basket. A few drops of chartreuse were given, and the poor man came back to life a few moments later; the pagans who had brought him were so astonished that they asked each other if it was not an effect of magic."²²

The Rencitang was soon so besieged with patients wanting to try the nun's magical cures that the Sisters had difficulty keeping the pharmacy stocked. Their medicine cabinet contained little more than the chartreuse, a high-proof spirit distilled by Belgian monks, camphorated alcohol rubs, and herbs. Sister Azaïs was the Visitor Sister destined for Beijing, but had been reassigned to Tianjin during the cholera epidemic. She described how the nuns were able to earn respect from the local neighborhood by dispensing their limited remedies, although Sister Azaïs had a different interpretation for why the Sisters had succeeded where local practitioners and religious institutions had failed: "Father, it is indeed the case to think that Heaven helps us. We take a Chinese virgin, who barely understands us, and who serves as our interpreter. And then,

21. Ruth Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), p. 99.

22. Dutrouilh recollection, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 184.

what remedies do we have? A little mustard flour, oil, black tea, rice water. Could we not affirm that the good Lord works miracles in favor of your poor daughters?”²³

Jean-Baptiste Étienne (1801–1874) was the fourteenth successor to St. Vincent de Paul and the superior general of the Congregation of the Mission from 1843 until his death in 1874.²⁴ In his end-of-year report for 1862, Étienne lauded the Sisters’ work in Tianjin and Beijing. “They land on the distant shores of China; they are going to plant the banner of charity in the Capital of this vast Empire, subjected for so many centuries to the powers of hell. They are found, touching the earth at Tientsin, grappling with the terrible ravages of cholera. This is the worthy solemnity of their installation, and it is a rich harvest of good works that they hasten to collect; it is a crowd of children and dying they baptize and send to people Heaven.”²⁵

French authorities in China also approved of the sister’s efforts. Count Michel Alexandre Kleczkowski (1818-1886), the recently installed French Charge d’affaires in Beijing, sent them three cases of expensive Bordeaux wine, while the French consulate in Tianjin delivered a box of tea and a letter promising their support for whatever the Sisters might need. The cholera epidemic, whatever the cost in lives for the residents of Tianjin, was considered something of a blessing for the mission in its early days. The Sisters and their assistants worked hard to save people from illness and privation, but miraculous recoveries that the Sisters understood to be

23. Sister Azaïs to the Superior General in Paris, July 8, 1862. Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 186.

24. Udovic, Edward R. C.M., Ph.D. (2012) “Jean-Baptiste Étienne, C.M. and the Restoration of the Daughters of Charity,” *Vincentian Heritage Journal*: Vol. 31: Iss. 2, Article 5.

25. Jean-Baptiste Étienne to the Conference of the Congregation of the Mission, December 8, 1862. Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 188

evidence of the power of faith, might just as easily be interpreted by the local community as proof of the efficacy of a novel form of foreign sorcery.

Early in their mission, the nuns encountered a patient who required more than conventional care could offer. A widow brought her sick daughter to the Rencitang. The girl was quite ill and reed-thin, and the Sisters doubted there was much they could do to save her, but the mother promised to convert if the Sisters could work their magic and heal her daughter. The Sisters examined the daughter again and decided that her symptoms revealed something beyond a mere medical malady; the girl showed signs of demonic possession.²⁶

Joseph Mouly had remained in Tianjin as temporary head of the mission following the untimely death of Father Talmier that summer, and Sister Dutrouilh asked the Bishop to see the two women.²⁷ As the male Lazarist walked into the room, both the mother and daughter became hysterical and had to be physically restrained. Mouly and the Sisters understood the women's response as proof of possession, and Mouly decided to perform an exorcism. Despite their different theological understandings of the phenomenon, belief in demon possession was shared by the Catholic missionaries and their non-Christian Chinese neighbors, and the records of the French mission contain numerous accounts of spiritual warfare and exorcisms performed by missionary priests.²⁸

As Regina Ganter and others have argued, the Catholic practice of exorcism was not uncommon in colonial encounters. Non-Christians often expressed an interest in learning new tools for navigating the physical and spiritual worlds, and rituals that claimed power over the

26. For a discussion on the overlap between Western and Chinese cultural understandings of spiritual possession, see Eric Reinders, *Borrowed Gods and Foreign Bodies: Christian Missionaries Imagine Chinese Religion* (University of California Press, 2004), p. 96.

27. Although I could not find a source confirming the cause of death, it is possible that Father Talmier, only 47 at the time, was a victim of that summer's cholera outbreak.

28. Latourette, *A History of Christian Missions in China*, p. 342.

supernatural, what Ganter calls the “supramaterial world,” had a powerful resonance in cultural contexts, like China, populated by ghosts, demons, and indigenous ritual masters endowed with the power to fight spiritual battles. Catholic missionaries came equipped with their own body of knowledge about demon possession and traditions of exorcism, and priests like Mouly could draw from an array of divine weapons in the form of rituals, incantations, and material objects that claimed mastery over the material and supramaterial worlds.²⁹ Taking on cases of demonology added to the cloud of mystery and supernatural fear that perpetually shrouded foreign missions in the eyes of many Chinese, and missionaries who involved themselves in spiritual warfare sometimes had to worry about more mundane threats. In 1865, Hungarian Lazarist Ignace Erdely was nearly killed by a crude homemade bomb when he arrived at a local farmer’s home to perform an exorcism.³⁰

Throughout the night, Mouly attempted to communicate with the demon who possessed the Sisters’ two patients. The women continued to be agitated, alternating between sobbing uncontrollably and laughing hysterically.³¹

“Why are you laughing,” Sister Dutrouilh asked the girl while intending to address the demon who Mouly and the Sister believed was possessing her.

“Because I’m happy,” was the reply.

“You lie,” Mouly responded, “You could not be happy because you have been burning for thousands of years in hell.”

29. Regina Ganter, *The Contest for Aboriginal Souls: European Missionary Agendas in Australia*, Aboriginal History Monographs, (Acton: Australian National University Press, 2018), p. 82.

30. Martin, W.A.P. *A Cycle of Cathay: China, South and North, with Personal Reminiscences*. Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson and Ferrier, 1896., Cordier Henri Cordier, *Revue de l'Extreme-Orient* (E. Leroux, 1884), p. 105.

31. Sister Dutrouilh to Director of the Holy Childhood Society, September 28, 1863. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Volume 1865.; For a further detailed analysis of this scene, see Nicola Cooper, "The Tientsin Massacre: a New Narrative of Intercultural Conflict" (Swansea University, 2013).

In between the taunts, the girl would spit at the priest and the Sisters.

“I am happy, very happy,” said the girl. “You people don’t know what’s going on here; you are foreigners, you don’t know that in this country millions of men adore me. Why did you come?”

The exorcism continued over many days, and the Sisters used all the tools in their spiritual arsenal. They presented crosses, images of Mary, rosaries, and holy water. The possession continued until the nuns took the step of sewing an image of the Immaculate Conception onto the child’s clothes to ward off the demons. Now under the protection of the Church, the child recovered. According to Sister Dutrouilh, the widow was so grateful that she pledged herself and her child to the service of the Holy Childhood Society.³²

Although the widow expressed her gratitude to the mission, it is worth imagining this event from the perspective of the widow’s neighbors or family. A child was ill, and the mother brought the child to foreigners. The foreigners used rituals, incantations, and finally a talisman to exorcise demons afflicting the child, for which the woman then promised her child to their strange religion.

Many of those residing in the area around the newly established Rencitang unsurprisingly began believing the missionaries possessed paranormal powers. “The beginnings of the Sisters were difficult,” Bishop Mouly wrote to the treasurer of the Holy Childhood Society, “the most absurd calumnies were spread against them.”³³ As with the efficacy of their medicine, the Sisters attributed their triumphs in spiritual warfare to faith, providence, and the power of God, while their neighbors continued to see unnatural forces.

32. Sister Dutrouilh to Director of the Holy Childhood Society, September 28, 1863. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Volume 1865.

33. Mouly to Furese, December 30, 1865. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Volume 1866.

Jean-Baptiste-Raphaël Thierry (1823-1880), who replaced Father Talmier as the head of the mission in Tianjin in 1863, was concerned about the Sisters' treatment as they traveled around the city visiting homes to seek out sick or abandoned children. Everywhere the nuns went, Thierry complained, they attracted a trail of onlookers who pointed, commented, laughed, and cursed the foreign women. "How many insulting and bad-sounding words strike their ears! Fortunately, they do not understand them all! The sweetest name addressed to them is to call them devil-women (Niu-mao-tze), and this name has become so familiar to the people that very often good village women who want to show them their sick children do not call them by another name."³⁴

"The recent occupation of the city," Sister Dutrouilh admitted later, "left such a bad impression, especially among the women, that as soon as we set foot in the streets, it looked like they saw the devil. The panic was such that they could not hurry enough to close the doors of their houses."³⁵

The nuns' dress and—at least to local sensibilities—brazen visibility made the Sisters a highly conspicuous presence in the city. The long gowns, which Chinese associated more with male scholars than with female clergy, and the nuns' apparent asexuality confused and disturbed residents. Rumors they were men in disguise ranked among the more tepid stories. "In this great city," Thierry wrote, "women never leave their houses, or very few appear in the streets; if they need to go out, they are carried well hidden in a chair that two men support on their shoulders.

34. Letter from Thierry to Daughters of Charity Paris, October 30, 1864. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 119.

35. Dutrouilh recollection, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 183.

Astonished to see these Europeans trotting so well and putting on such good countenance in front of everyone, they wonder among themselves if they are men or women.”³⁶

The magic and masculinity of the nuns in Tianjin seemed to confirm the worst suspicions about foreign missionaries and their designs for Chinese bodies. The same year the Sisters landed in Tianjin, a crowd in Nanchang in Jiangxi Province attacked and destroyed a Catholic orphanage and cathedral inspired by similar lurid rumors. The Nanchang orphanage’s policies did little to dispel the gossip. Local officials reported that the orphanage was closed to outsiders and exchanged cash for orphans. Equally disturbing, young girls vastly outnumbered boys among the orphans raising questions about whether the orphanage was a front for prostitution.³⁷

Many of these stories and rumors circulated orally. Some, however, found their way into anti-Christian writings that appeared throughout China in the 1860s. The most notorious of these was the *Bixie Jishi* (辟邪纪实 “Record of Heterodoxy”) attributed to Tianxia Diyi Shangxin Ren (天下第一傷心人 “The Most Heartbroken Man in the World”). The tract was published first in 1861 and subsequently reprinted many times, including as an abridged version.³⁸ The exact identity of the author is unknown, although the sophistication of the language indicates the writer was a member of the elite, and the strident anti-Christian tone of the pamphlet suggests that it was first published in Hunan, a province ravaged by the Taiping War. There was even a theory

36. Letter from Thierry to Daughters of Charity Paris, October 30, 1864. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 119.

37. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 90.

38. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860-1870*, p. 45; Anthony E. Clark, "Early Modern Chinese Reactions to Western Missionary Iconography," *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 30 (2008); Anthony E. Clark, "Early Modern Chinese Reactions to Western Missionary Iconography," *Southeast Review of Asian Studies* 30 (2008), p. 6. Anthony Clark and Paul Cohen describe the context and contents of the *Bixie Jishi* in great detail. Here, I deal only with the main themes based on the analysis by Cohen and Clark.

that the author was on the staff of Zeng Guofan who commanded a large army of his fellow Hunanese during the war and who would later lead the official inquiry into the Tianjin riot.³⁹

The *Bixie Jishi* presented a mélange of fact and fiction in the guise of a compilation of Christian teachings.⁴⁰ Its text was devoted to grotesque and sensationalized stories involving foreign missionaries and Chinese Christians and included graphic sexual and scatological imagery calculated to be both titillating and at the same time repulsive to a Chinese audience. These pamphlets, and a slew of similar publications and placards, were instrumental in spreading anti-foreign and anti-Christian propaganda and stories throughout China.⁴¹ Some of the tracts used satirical images playing on the similarity in sound between the characters 主 *zhǔ* (master, lord) and 猪 *zhū* (pig). The most common term for Catholicism (i.e., 天主教 *tiānzhǔjiào*) would be written as 天猪叫 *tiānzhūjiào* (“the religion of pig grunts”). In the image below, a pig is crucified above a caption that translates as “Propagating the ‘pig grunt’ religion.”⁴²

39. 陆辰叶 Lu Chenye, "Cong “bixie jishi” kan dui jidujiao de wu du 从《辟邪纪实》看对基督教的误读 [Wise Men Stopping Rumors: Pi Xie Ji Shi and Christianity Misread]," *Ningbo jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao* 宁波教育学院学报 15, no. 2 (2013), p. 97.

40. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 45

41. See Clark, "Early Modern Chinese Reactions to Western Missionary Iconography."

42. Except where noted, images and translations are excerpted from Anthony E. Clark, *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books Views of China, Japan and the West* (Association for Asian Studies, 2010).




Figure 3.3. A pig is crucified with a caption that translates as “Propagating the ‘pig grunt’ religion.”⁴³

Christian practices, especially those that ran counter to Chinese culture norms, inadvertently reinforced the stories, or gave rise to misunderstandings that, with a little rhetorical flourish, metastasized into truly monstrous tales.⁴⁴ The *Bixie Jishi* attributed the relatively higher status of women in Christian communities to a penchant for hematophagy. “Women are esteemed in Western society, and many rulers in West are women. Why? Well, it has to do with menses: ‘the most precious gift conferred by God on mankind.’ The barbarians drink the menses; this also explains why they smell so badly.” The pamphlet’s author also describes Christians smearing menses on their faces to prepare for mass.⁴⁵

43. Image and translation from Clark, *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books Views of China, Japan and the West*.

44. Lu Chenye, “Cong “bixie jishi” kan dui jidujiao de wu du 从《辟邪纪实》看对基督教的误读 [Wise Men Stopping Rumors: Pi Xie Ji Shi and Christianity Misread].”

45. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 51.

Like polemics in other historical contexts, the anti-Christian writings in nineteenth-century China focused considerable attention on accusations of sexual incontinence and the breaking of taboos. For example, some Christians chose to eschew traditional matchmakers to marry a person of their choice. Such a flagrant transgression of conjugal propriety—in the setting of Chinese village life—easily gave rise to wild tales of immorality and rumors that the bride in these marriages had to first spend the night with a foreign missionary or that incest was the inevitable result of Christian sexual permissiveness.

“During the first three months of life the anuses of all (Christian) infants—male and female—are plugged up with a small hollow tube, which is taken out at night. They call this ‘retention of the vital essence’ [liu-yuan]. It causes the anus to dilate so that upon growing up sodomy will be facilitated...to say that it is in preparation for committing sodomy when full-grown is particularly monstrous...When fathers and sons and brothers indulge in mutual license, the principles underlying human relationships are utterly destroyed. To call [this sort of activity] ‘the joining of the vital forces’ is to beautify unduly its name. All such evils are indeed things which [even] beasts do not do. It is utterly amazing.”⁴⁶ The printed word reinforced and reflected rumors spread orally. By 1870, many people at all levels of society assumed even the most shocking and salacious stories about Christians to be true.⁴⁷

46. Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 53.

47. See Clark, A.E. *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books: Views of China, Japan and the West*. Association for Asian Studies, 2010.




Figure 3.4 Anti-Christian polemics from the Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes. Author photograph.

Particularly dangerous for the Sisters in Tianjin and other missionaries who relied upon their medical miracles and “magic” to attract converts, were the pamphlet’s dire warnings regarding Christian witchcraft and sorcery. The *Bixie Jishi* describes Christians as using “charms and strange pills they bewitch people into becoming Christians joyfully and cause women to indulge in promiscuous relations. Similarly, “by gouging out the eyes of dead converts, concealing the hair and nails of women under mats doing bodily injury to little boys and girls,

they implement their evil designs.”⁴⁸ Descriptions of Christian sorcery were influenced by analogous tales of deviant witchcraft and heterodoxy in Chinese society. In particular, the use of hair and nails was reminiscent of the eighteenth-century sorcery scare described by Philip Kuhn in his book *Soulstealers*.⁴⁹

Many polemics carried images of missionaries representing the “pig grunt religion” carving out the eyes of Chinese victims. Using eyes in the production of medicine or to cast spells was among the most common and long-standing tropes about foreigners in China. In the sixteenth century, the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci, later held up as a model missionary by Chinese historians, was dogged by whispers he practiced a form alchemy that required Chinese eyes.⁵⁰ In the nineteenth century, the first hospitals established by Protestant missionaries specialized in ophthalmic surgeries. The Scottish physician Thomas Colledge (1796-1879), founder of the Medical Missionary Society of China, opened a clinic in Macau in 1828 that treated eye diseases. The Canton Hospital opened by American missionary Peter Parker (1804-1888) in 1835 was long known as the “Ophthalmic Hospital in Canton.”⁵¹

48. Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 51.

49. See Kuhn, Philip A. *Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990.

50. R. Po-chia Hsia, *A Jesuit in the Forbidden City: Matteo Ricci 1552–1610* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 121. Later writers, including Zhang Zhentao and Wei Yuan, included these stories of foreign alchemy and the use of Chinese eyes in their writings on Christianity. See Chapter 1.

51. Tian, Xiaoli. “Rumor and Secret Space: Organ-Snatching Tales and Medical Missions in Nineteenth-Century China.” *Modern China* 41.2 (2015), p. 200.



Figure 3.5. A group of foreign missionaries is removing the fetus from a kidnapped, presumably Chinese, woman.⁵²

In another passage, the author of the *Bixie Jishi* described a rebel, likely Taiping and by implication a Christian, using his powers to “make himself invisible and...by means of black magic, cut off the queues of men, the nipples of women, and the testicles of little boys... Were you to ask [the victims] about this, they would in some cases say, ‘I saw a priest wearing a cross on his chest. When he struck me, I fell to the ground and, immediately becoming dizzy, could not stop him from doing what he did.’”⁵³ Zuo Zongde, a Chinese disciple of the protestant missionary Griffith John (1835–1912), was accused of bringing his master “ten or so young girls from people who were in distressed circumstances. He placed them in a large residence. Each night, shortly after midnight, Tso [Zuo], accompanied by two others, lit a lantern, and stood in the middle reciting charms while all the young girls took positions around them. Presently blue

52. Image and translation from Clark, *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books Views of China, Japan and the West*.

53. Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 53.

smoke would emanate from the mouths of Tso and the others, the lantern light would suddenly brighten, and all of the young girls' clothing would fall off [mysteriously]. Tso and his associates, while standing, would then copulate with each of them in turn and blow on the girls' genitals." John was a special target for polemicists, and the Welshman would later publish a point-by-point rebuttal of the *Bixie Jishi*.⁵⁴

A placard posted in Hunan in 1866 read, "Baptism is an ordinance of that religion. For the performance of this rite, they take the corpses of priests and superiors which are boiled down to make ointment; this being mixed with stupefying medicine of baneful influence, the application is accompanied with a charm, under the direction of the spiritual father. When the neophyte has finished the oath, the liquid is dropped on his head. A little of it is also dropped in water and given him to drink, this being called 'heart-purifying' water. From that moment, he has a little urchin in his breast, who annexes himself to the heart; and though he be severely punished and bitterly exhorted, he cleaves tenaciously to his depraved infatuation, willing to suffer death rather than change."⁵⁵

Another poster warned, "When a member of this religion is on his deathbed, several of his co-religionists come and push his parents away while they read prayers for his salvation. While the body is still breathing, they remove their eyes and tear out its heart, which they use in their country to make fake money."⁵⁶ According to the placard, common people needed to be mindful of Christian sorcerers and kidnappers who prayed on the unwary: "The promoters of this religion engage many fortune tellers and physiognomists, men and women, to go in all

54. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 55.

55. "The Hoonan Proclamation," translated and published in *The North China Herald*, October 6, 1866. Compare the placard's heart-purifying urchin with the introduction into the body of the "holy spirit" as a worm described by Wei Yuan in Chapter 1.

56. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860-1902*. F. Alcan, 1901, p. 338.

directions, to draw and reveal the spell, extolling and flattering beyond measure, complacently attracting the people with their words. They also have people who seek to attract, and who employ actors, charlatans and all kinds of individuals to get hold of the unwary and they hijack men and women and sell them to the evil barbarians.”⁵⁷

Accusations of kidnapping people had also long plagued foreign missionaries in China. Matteo Ricci was suspected of being involved in a child-snatching ring while serving in Guangdong in 1583. Ricci and a Bengali clockmaker were harassed by neighbors who thought “White Devils” and “Black Devils” had come to abduct their children. Ricci was arrested and dragged before the prefectural court, although the magistrate determined the witness testimony against Ricci was unreliable, and the Italian priest was later released.⁵⁸

A popular song circulating in the Yangtze River watershed in the 1860s uses many of the same tropes found in elite writings such as the *Bixie Jishi*.

Ghost-busting Song⁵⁹

“The hog of heaven
Dopes its followers
Their wanton deeds
Are all unspeakable
Men of every family must beware
Or the hat of a cuckold you will wear

57. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*. F. Alcan, 1901, p. 339.

58. Hsia, *A Jesuit in the Forbidden City : Matteo Ricci 1552-1610.*, p. 86.

59. “Ghost Busting Song” translated by Hung, Eva, and Pak Shan Tam. “Anti-Christian Propaganda.” *Renditions: A Chinese-English Translation Magazine*. 53 & 54 (2000): 250–55.

The hog of heaven
Cuts open your wombs
Drags out your fetuses
Slices off your nipples
All goes into potions they prepare
Women of every family must beware

The hog of heaven
Goes for kidneys
Who knows how many kids
Their knives have killed?
Children of every family must beware
Or else your lives they will not spare

The hog of heaven
easy to tell
The worship Jesus, the only hog
Emperor and parents they need not
In their temple's there's no incense at all
In their homes there's no ancestral hall"

The song also informs people of what to do in the event that one of their friends or family has become a Christian:

“Anyone in your district behaving like this
Has turned himself into a grandson of the ghosts
Have him tightly bound,
Force some shit down his throat⁶⁰
And search his house all around
Any ghost-book should go in the fire
Then draw a cross on the ground
With a demon hanging down
And tell him to piss on this thing,
If he wants to be unbound⁶¹

Should he dare to disobey
Throw him in the waterway
And see how he’ll scream in dismay

Fathers and brothers who teach this song
Will reap blessings and virtue aplenty;
Boys and girls who learn this song
Will be free from menace their whole life long.
Though the ghosts may come in a horde

60. Chinese folk tradition believed excrement, like menses, was imbued with magical properties. “Ghost Busting Song” translated by Hung, Eva, and Pak Shan Tam. “Anti-Christian Propaganda.” *Renditions: A Chinese-English Translation Magazine*. 53 & 54 (2000): 250–55, p. 252n5

61. This was a common method that officials used to force suspected Christians of either confessing or else perform an act of apostasy.

We're sure to put them all to the sword.”

The *Bixie Jishi* ends with a call to arms urging the author's fellow Chinese people to organize militia, store weapons, and seek out and destroy anyone who promoted the heterodoxy of Christianity, or, as another anti-Christian print encouraged, “Beat the devils while burning their books.”⁶²



Figure 3.6 Anti-Christian placard encouraging people to “Beat the devils while burning their books.”⁶³

These pamphlets, placards, and polemics, already in circulation by the time the Sisters arrived in China in 1862, include many elements that would contribute to a climate of fear and suspicion in Tianjin. Christians and foreign missionaries were assumed to have designs on Chinese bodies. They employed magic to bewitch their victims, including the use of stupefying substances and powders. Particularly susceptible were women and children, two groups that were the primary focus of the Sisters and the Holy Childhood mission in China.

62. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Anti-Foreignism, 1860–1870*, p. 54. Clark, *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books Views of China, Japan and the West*.

63. Image from Clark, *Beating Devils and Burning Their Books Views of China, Japan and the West*.

The Sisters demonstrated a zeal for saving souls that too often took precedence over their medical efforts to save lives. They trumpeted their success at curing ailments, but the achievement that mattered most was the number of individuals, especially infant children, baptized and redeemed from eternal damnation. This fixation on the metaphysical at the expense of the corporeal was not lost on Chinese observers, who further interpreted the application of holy water and accompanying chants and prayers during last rites as another form of incantation and sorcery. Even the order's crest, a heart pierced with an arrow, conjured up images of death.⁶⁴ In a letter dated September 28, 1863, Sister Dutrouilh complained, "A thousand rumors surround us, and the numbers of Christians are too few to refute them."⁶⁵

Chinese writers of anti-Christian placards were not the only ones capable of skillfully blending fact and sensationalist fiction for propagandistic purposes. The Holy Childhood's fundraising appeals reinforced tropes of Chinese barbarity and callousness, and their mission in China was predicated on the widely held perception in the West that in China "idolatry suffocates nature in the wombs of mothers, who too often kill their children."⁶⁶

A cartoon published on May 9, 1857, in the British weekly magazine *Punch* was characteristic in its depiction of "John Chinaman" in Europe. The Chinese person being beaten by Mr. Punch is portrayed as morally inferior and explicitly labeled as a "Destroyer of Women and Children." If the only thing Chinese people knew about Christians was their propensity for sorcery and bodily mutilation, then it was equally the case that Westerners assumed all Chinese practiced infanticide.

64. Cooper, "The Tientsin Massacre: a New Narrative of Intercultural Conflict."

65. Sister Dutrouilh, September 28, 1863. Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 202.

66. Bishop Mouly Work Report to the Holy Childhood Association, May 30, 1865. *Annales Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1866, p. 18.

“Orphanages are the most precious fruit of Holy Childhood,” Bishop Mouly wrote to Paris, “And it is there that the expansion of Christian charity shines in its most vivid splendor. In China, idolatry suffocates nature in the wombs of mothers, who too often kill their children, and here are strangers who come across the seas, from five thousand leagues away, to save and take in these children.”⁶⁷



Figure 3.7 “Destroyer of Women and Children” published on May 9, 1857, in the British weekly magazine *Punch* was characteristic in its depiction of “John Chinaman” in Europe.⁶⁸

Despite Western misperceptions and the fundraising literature of the Holy Childhood, many Chinese cared a great deal about orphans. In Tianjin, for example, the Yuyingtang was a founding home established and supported by members of the powerful Changlu Salt Commission.

Tianjin was home to many transients and sojourners. Other cities in China, especially those with longer histories, had ways to distinguish clearly between inhabitants and non-residents. Family tombs, temple registries, lists of academy graduates identified members of the elite as belonging to a particular locality. Even non-elites could develop strong ties to their native

67. Mouly to Furese, May 30, 1865. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Volume 1866.

68. Image from Mungello, D. E. *The Catholic Invasion of China: Remaking Chinese Christianity*. Critical Issues in World and International History. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015.

place, expressing those loyalties through local guilds, militias, or secret societies. Tianjin's relatively short history and successive waves of soldiers, settlers, and itinerant merchants meant that many residents owed their loyalties to distant "native places." The author of a gazetteer published in the early Qing Dynasty wrote that "Tianjin did not have natives."⁶⁹

In Tianjin, merchants involved in the city's lucrative salt industry provided much of the funds for charitable establishments just as they did for the city's defense and public safety organizations.⁷⁰ They developed local networks and became active stakeholders in the community filling a role analogous to those of the landed local gentry in rural areas or the urban literati of the Jiangnan region.⁷¹

Salt had been harvested from the brackish waters and briny soil around modern Tianjin dating back to the Spring and Autumn Period (770–476 BCE) with industrial salt production beginning during the Tang Dynasty (618–906 CE) when officials opened a salt field and established a warehouse for salt in the settlements along the Hai River. Tianjin remained a center for the manufacture and storage of salt into the twentieth century and many of the city's wealthiest families earned their fortunes in the trade. Nineteenth-century European travelers commented on the high white mounds that lined the banks of Tianjin's myriad waterways. Salt brought wealth and prosperity, if not always respectability, to Tianjin.⁷²

The affluence of the salt merchants compensated for their lack of social capital. As the provincial and local administrations struggled with the demands of a growing city and threats of

69. Quoted in Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China.*, p. 26;

70. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China.*, p. 24; Zhang Shaozu, "Contribution of Changlu Salt Merchants to Tianjin Education," *Salt Industry History Research* 3 (2012).

71. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China.* Zhang Limin 张利民, "Changlu Salt Industry for Upgrading of Tianjin Political Status and Economic Development," *Salt Industry History Research* (2012).

72. Ren Yunlan 任云兰, "Tianjin Salt Merchants and Philanthropy," *Salt Industry History Research* (2012).

internal rebellion and foreign occupation, salt merchants underwrote a wide range of activities, including infrastructure projects, disaster relief, and firefighting. They supervised city defense forces, often employing large groups of hunhunn as militia.⁷³ Salt Merchant families also supported charitable organizations to combat famine and provide medical care and shelter for the less fortunate.⁷⁴

Englishman Alexander Michie, who rarely missed an opportunity to disparage his adopted city of Tianjin, found local civil society one area worthy of grudging praise. “In many ways, the ill-appearance was deceptive,” wrote Michie, “though the streets were horrible quagmires at all times, impassable after a few hours’ rain and between the hours of sunrise and sunset blocked with the enormous traffic carried on by cattle drays, carts, and wheelbarrows, great and luxurious houses were numerous; there was a large and influential official society, the guilds were splendid and powerful, and scarce any city in the Empire contained more numerous and better endowed charitable institutions, such as orphanages, school of the poor, refugees, food distributaries, etc.”⁷⁵

Following a devastating 1794 flood in the city, Tianjin native and former government official Zhao Nanqiao reached out to his friend Ji Chengzhi, the head of the Changlu Salt Commission, telling him about the number of children left orphaned and homeless in the wake of the tragedy. With the blessing of the court and local officials, the Yuyingtang was opened on Jinshui.⁷⁶ The sponsors hired local women to act as live-in caretakers and nannies. 70 staff

73. See Chapter 2.

74. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China.*, p. 10.

75. Rasmussen, O. D. *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History.* Tientsin: The Tientsin press, Ltd., 1925, p. 39.

76. In 1906, when Yuan Shikai (1858-1916) was provincial governor in Zhili, the Yuyingtang became the Women’s Medical Bureau, with a donation of over 40,000 taels from salt merchants. The expanded orphanage and clinic had over 500 beds. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the municipal government of Tianjin assumed direct control of the Yuyingtang, and the remaining orphans were dispersed to adoptive families or other facilities. The grounds later became the Tianjin Municipal Nursery School.

members cared for about 140 orphans under the supervision of one of the merchants or another member of the Tianjin elite.⁷⁷

The nuns at Rencitang were aware of the competition. “There is a pagan hospital in Tien-tsin intended to receive children abandoned by their parents,” wrote Sister Dutrouilh, “if it cannot be compared with those of this kind that we have in Europe, we must at least admit that, by an exception perhaps unique in China, it pleasantly surprises those who visit it, and that the children are undoubtedly better off than they would be in their families.”⁷⁸

In fact, at the time, the Yuyingtang was larger and had greater resources than the Sister’s small start-up at Rencitang. There were however ongoing issues that presented an interesting opportunity for the Lazarist mission. Like many official-merchant partnerships, the finances of Yuyingtang were murky. The family of Li Tongwen, who served as circuit intendant during the Sisters’ first few years in Tianjin, was forced to look the other way repeatedly as his relatives raided the endowment of the orphanage.⁷⁹

The Sisters were eager to visit, but the Yuyingtang staff were reluctant to allow foreign nuns to tour their facility or give them unfettered access to the children residing there. They were especially resistant when they learned the Sisters planned to perform a ritual (baptism and holy rites) over any child they encountered who might need saving. The French consulate petitioned Chonghou who, as Imperial Commissioner, prevailed upon the director to grant the Sisters

77. Ren Yunlan 任云兰, "Cong Tianjin changlu yuyingtang de bianqian kan cishan shiye zhong guojia yu shehui de guanxi 从天津长芦育婴堂的变迁看慈善事业中国家与社会的关系 [The Relationship between state and society and the evolution of the Changlu’s Yuyingtang in Tianjin]," *lilun yu xiandihua 理论与现代化* 5 (2009).

78. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 200.

79. Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin*, p. 92.

permission to visit the Yuyingtang.⁸⁰ The Sisters' tour was apparently a success, and they were invited to return on a regular basis to minister to the children. Either the staff was persuaded that the Sisters meant no harm, or the official intervention of Chonghou made it difficult for the Yuyingtang to refuse the Sisters' subsequent entries.

The result of the sister's efforts in their first year, reported Sister Dutrouilh, was "six hundred little angels to Heaven" saved by the nuns through their dispensary, home visits, or ministering at the Yuyingtang.⁸¹ House calls, either in the city or in the surrounding countryside, were important for the Sisters' mission. The Sisters' gender, despite their oddly masculine attire, enabled them access to homes, which decorum would have denied to male missionaries. Each day, several of the nuns would go into town to visit those who were ill but unable to travel to the Sisters' facility. The nuns also made regular sorties out of the city to surrounding villages.

"Often still, when the occupations allowed it," Sister Dutrouilh later recalled. "Two companions go to the surrounding villages in search of the poor sick. The novelty of these visits attracted everyone, and knowing that we loved to treat children, they took pleasure in showing us even those who were only indisposed; usually in the evening we had the consolation of counting eight, ten and more baptisms; those were beautiful days, and fatigue counted for nothing."⁸²

Due to the limitations of space at Father Qiu's former home, and their own sense of propriety, the Sisters usually took in only minors or women, but the nuns were moved by the

80. Sister Dutrouilh to Director of the Work of the Holy Childhood, September 28, 1863. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1865, p. 232.

81. Sister Dutrouilh recollections, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 200.

82. Sister Dutrouilh recollections, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 200.

harsh conditions of male laborers. The city's large population of manual workers who toiled on the canals, barges, and wharves lived transient and often unstable lives. Forced to work long hours with insufficient rest or food and living in overcrowded unhygienic barracks, laborers were especially susceptible to the waves of epidemics that swept through the city. Many of these young men were far from their families or other support systems. When they became too ill to work, many just died.

During the cholera epidemic, the nuns discussed taking in more of these patients but worried the house was too small to find a place for large numbers of sick men. This led to the first significant expansion of the Sisters' facilities, the rental in 1863 of a small section of a temple adjacent to Father Qiu's former residence. "God came to our course," recalled Sister Dutrouilh. "Next to our house was a small pagoda inhabited by two old bonzes [monks], not very concerned about their Pou-ssas [Buddhist icons], who willingly agreed to rent us a room that could hold twelve people." The nuns converted the space into bed space for male inpatient care.⁸³

The temple rental was only a stopgap measure, and the mission's activities were rapidly outgrowing the property bequeathed to them by Qiu Anyu. Father Qiu had run his pharmacy mostly alone. Now five nuns were living there caring for an increasing number of orphans and adult patients. The Sisters started looking for a larger and more permanent establishment but finding a motivated seller proved challenging. The mission was unwilling to be gouged or overcharged, and Bishop Mouly, aware of his limited budget, refused to authorize any purchase that seemed to exceed the understood market value for a property. Some sellers were willing to

83. Sister Dutrouilh, September 28, 1863. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 202.

offer a fair price, but faced pressure from family members who demanded that they ask for more money from the foreigners. Other properties had neighbors concerned about a coven of child-snatching sorceresses moving onto their street.

Finally, with a little help from the consulate and Chonghou, the mission took possession of a compound not far away from Father Qiu's house. The new space had barracked British troops during the occupation and the mission was able to purchase the property and structures for 48,000 francs.⁸⁴ The Sisters were elated, although not nearly as excited as their ever-growing number of young wards. By 1864, the nuns were full-time caregivers for dozens of orphans who slept crowded on *kangs*, brick benches heated from the inside.

“Our poor little ones had so little room that each encroached a bit on the land of its neighbor, which sometimes caused rather singular debates,” recalled Sister Dutrouilh. “Every morning, they have to clear their blankets quickly so as to transform the dormitory into a workroom, which then at noon becomes the refectory, and finally, after dinner, the classroom.”⁸⁵

On December 8, 1864, the Day of the Immaculate Conception, the Sisters organized their charges into a festive procession marching ostentatiously from Father Qiu's old home to the new, larger Rencitang. The distance was short, less than a kilometer, and the Sisters intended the parade to take only about 20 minutes. Unfortunately, they had not factored in the trouble that many of the girls, including several with bound feet, would face trooping along the uneven streets.

Sister Dutrouilh wrote: “They put on a good countenance, however, and the pagans, little accustomed to this spectacle, turned away to look at these little people, neatly dressed, walking

84. Mouly to Holy Childhood Association, May 30, 1865. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Volume 1866, p. 18.

85. Sister Marthe to Holy Childhood Association, June 30, 1865. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Volume 1866, pp. 665–666.

in order, two by two, looking modest and silent. Every pagan who watched then had their own reflection:

‘What is that?’ said one.

‘They are the children of Jen-sse-Tang,’ replied a scholar who had seen these characters on our door.

‘And what is this Jense-Tang?’ asked a third interlocutor.

Said a fourth, ‘Isn’t that where the white devils are keeping children?’”⁸⁶

86. Sister Dutrouilh to Director of the Holy Childhood in Paris, September 8, 1865. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. 1866, p. 672.

Chapter 4: The Warrior Priest

As the Daughters of Charity paraded their charges through the crowded streets of Tianjin, 400 kilometers away in a desolate region just north of the Great Wall, two robed men were riding ponies across the arid plain. One of the men was a foreigner, distinguishable by his larger build and a long beard. The other was Chinese. He was less comfortable in the saddle, but kept up with his associate as best he could.

Claude-Marie Chevrier (1821–1870) and Vincent Ou (Wu Wensheng, 1821–1870) were Lazarist priests attached to the mission station at Xiwanzi, a remote outpost that was part of the Mongolian Vicariate. Although most people living in the area were Chinese, the Lazarists called the area Mongolia due to the mission's location outside the Great Wall and at the edge of the great steppe that swept to the north and west.¹ It was wild country where Chinese villages and farms slowly faded into the herds and plains of the grasslands.² Today, Xiwanzi is part of Hebei Province and is close to the site of the 2022 Winter Olympics, but in 1864, it was an impoverished area, sparsely populated, and a notoriously tough assignment for missionaries.³

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1. Zhang Qin 张欣, "Wan qing Zhangjiakou diqu chuanjiao yanjiu 晚清张家口地区教案研究 [Research into Missionaries in the Zhangjiakou Region during the Late Qing]" (河北师范大学 Hebei Shifan Daxue, 2015). Luo Wei 罗薇 and 吕海平 Lü Haiping, "Saibei Tianzhujiao shengdi Xiwanzi zhujiaozuotang jiantang shimo 塞北天主教圣地西湾子主教座堂建堂始末 [The Complete Story of the Construction of the Xiwanzi Cathedral]" [The construction of the Xiwanzi Cathedral.] *南方建筑 Nanfang Jianzhu* 4 (2019).
 2. Xiaohong Zhang, Tao Sun, and Jianping Xu, "The relationship between the spread of the Catholic Church and the shifting agro-pastoral line in the Chahar Region of northern China," *CATENA* 134 (2015/11/01/ 2015). Patrick Taveirne, *Han-Mongol Encounters and Missionary Endeavors: A History of Scheut in Ordos (Hetao) 1874-1911* (Coronet Books, 2004), p. 200.
 3. Tiedeman Rolf G Tiedemann, "Catholic Mission Stations in Northern China: Centers of Stability and Protection in Troubled Times," in *The Church as Safe Haven: Christian Governance in China*, ed. Lars Peter Laamann (Leiden: Brill, 2019).



Figure 4.1 Claude-Marie Chevrier and Vincent Ou in undated photographs.

Claude-Marie Chevrier had been assigned to the Mongolian Vicariate for over three years. Along with Vincent Ou, he spent long days—sometimes weeks—on horseback, riding between villages dodging bandits, hostile soldiers, and unsympathetic officials. Xiwanzi was far from the pleasant life of the treaty ports, and there were few comforts. Missionaries in Xiwanzi slept on a *kang* and ate the local food. They suffered from frostbite and the maladies of the cold in winter while swarms of insects, vermin, and periodic outbreaks of cholera and dysentery plagued their summer months.⁴

4. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*. See especially Chapter Six, "Old Churches in Hebei's Small Cities, Towns, and Villages," pp. 226–287.

Despite the remote location, Xiwanzi was not removed from the rumors and persecutions of Christians found in the more populated parts of China.⁵ A missionary stationed in Xiwanzi recalled that in the 1850s the mission, “had been accused of magic, and I was appointed chief magician. We were alleged to have made men and horses out of paper and donkey skin who, by enchantment, had received life and were preparing to take His Majesty the Emperor of China from the throne... It was said that our pews went every night, with those who sat on them, to Europe, to look for money, European rifles, sabers and pikes; that the chief magician climbed every day to the moon and the stars, to prevent rain and send out heat and dryness; that he trained Christians for combat, and that the army most to be feared was the army of women, and that our forty virgins had learned to fly to examine the terrain of combat.”

Local officials had been sufficiently alarmed by the stories to order their soldiers to expel the missionaries. An attack was thwarted only after an urgent summons from Beijing redirected the same soldiers southward to fight the Taiping.⁶

In a letter to his younger brother Jean-Louis, dated November 30, 1864, Father Chevrier wrote “I can struggle as best I can, starboard to port, against the Gobi’s devils, but I am hardly making progress.”⁷ Even with the hardships, Chevrier remained committed to the life of a foreign missionary. Only 43 years old in 1864, the French Lazarist had already lived two lives,

5. Even today, the presence of the Catholic Church and the legacy of evangelism in the region continue to make Xiwanzi a focus of state surveillance and occasional religious persecution. See Annual Report, International Religious Freedom: Report Submitted to the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by the Department of State, in Accordance with Section 102 of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), p. 143.

6. Jean-Baptiste Göttlicher, July 21, 1861, in *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Volume 28, 1863, p. 334.

7. C.M. Chevrier to J. L. Chevrier, November 26, 1864. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance*. p. 149.

having spent over a decade as a soldier before retiring from the French military to become a priest. Chevrier's military service gave him grit that enabled him to endure the harsh life of the steppe and reinforced his natural tenacity and stubbornness. He was also handy with a rifle, a skill that was sometimes necessary in the wild terrain of the Mongolian Vicariate.

Claude-Marie Chevrier's journey to China began near the city of Lyon, one of seven children born to the farming family of Jacques and Marie, née Giradet. After a limited education, much of it under the watchful eye of his maternal uncle and godfather who was a priest in a nearby parish, Claude-Marie enlisted in the Fourth Infantry Regiment based in Toulon.⁸ The life of a soldier suited the impetuous young man, and in 1845, now Sergeant Chevrier was sent to Cayenne, in the colony of Guyana. Chevrier attended masses in Cayenne held by the Lazarist missionaries working in the settlement. His uncle may have influenced Chevrier's interest the priesthood, and it was likely in Guyana that the young man encountered his first overseas missionaries.⁹

In 1850, Chevrier left the service to enroll in seminary, first at Largentière and then in Lyon. It was not an easy transition. Chevrier was older than many of the other students, and it is hard to imagine his settling easily into the contemplative life of a seminarian after his time overseas. Chevrier soon left Lyon bound for Algiers, where he completed his training and was finally ordained as a priest in 1854.

Chevrier worked as a missionary in Lambaesa, an old Roman town that also served as a penal colony. It was one of the most isolated and dangerous postings in North Africa, where

8. See the entry in J. Van Den Brandt, *Les Lazaristes en Chine, 1697-1935, notes biographiques recueillies et mises à jour par J. Van den Brandt* (Impr. des Lazaristes, 1936).

9. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.* p. 84.

rebels, bandits, and tribal leaders violently contested efforts by the Foreign Legion to uphold French colonial authority.¹⁰ As would be the case in Mongolia, Chevrier was responsible for long sorties across hostile terrain, including stretches of inhospitable Sahara Desert. At times he ranged as much as 100 miles to find and meet his converts.

In 1858, Chevrier was formally accepted into the Congregation of the Mission and returned to Paris to participate in an ecclesiastical retreat and receive his next assignment. When he arrived in France, Chevrier was greeted with a sartorial requirement that almost ended his association with the Congregation before it began. The Lazarists had a rule that all members be clean-shaven, but for Father Chevrier, his soldier's beard had been a point of pride since his days in Guyana and one that had served him well among the different groups in Algiers. His superiors in Paris insisted. According to one account, his immediate supervisor, Father Dumont, took a pair of scissors and while Chevrier was sleeping, lopped off a large section of the offending facial hair. When the enraged novitiate awoke, he saw the result in the mirror and resigned himself to shaving the remainder.¹¹ Later descriptions of Chevrier in China suggest he grew the beard back once he was out of sight of Father Dumont.¹²

Chevrier left France for China in 1859, arriving in Shanghai on February 17, 1860, during the tense months between the Dagu Repulse the previous year and the arrival of the Anglo-French Expedition under Lord Elgin and Baron Gros. With the status of missionaries in

10. This is the modern spelling. The city was known as Lambesé (sometimes spelled Lambessé) while under French colonial rule, including during Chevrier's time at the post. For a history of the mission, see J.B. Piolet and E. Lamy, *Les missions catholiques françaises au XIXe siècle* (A. Colin, 1901), p. 81. For an overview of the Lazarist mission in Algeria and the area around Lambaesa, see Michael Greenhalgh, *The Military and Colonial Destruction of the Roman Landscape of North Africa, 1830-1900* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

11. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 91.

12. Mouly to Superior General Paris, October 27, 1868., *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Annales CM 1869., p. 78.

the interior provinces still unsettled by the refusal of the court to ratify the Treaty of Tianjin, Chevrier and his fellow new arrivals prepared to make the dangerous overland journey from Shanghai to Xiwanzi disguised as Chinese travelers.

“The day after our arrival,” Chevrier wrote, “Mr. Aymeri thought of transforming us into Chinese. He brought in half a dozen tailors, whom he kept for a whole week to make our costumes; this first work finished, a wigmaker presented himself to proceed to our toilet; the artist made three-quarters of my beard fall mercilessly, two-thirds of my hair, and one-eighth of the eyebrows; but on the other hand, he gave me a superb tail more than a meter long.”¹³

The elaborate measures to conceal Chevrier’s foreign identity went unused. Just after setting out from Shanghai, Chevrier received word that the security situation in Central and Northern China had deteriorated with bands of Taiping and Nian rebels battling government troops. There was also news of foreign troops – the Anglo-French Expeditionary Force – along the coast. The Lazarists decided it was too dangerous for the foreign missionaries to travel.¹⁴

Chevrier turned back to Shanghai and stayed there for most the year. He and his colleagues did take a short trip down the coast to visit the sisters and their orphanage in Ningbo. The visit was mostly a social one. While there, Chevrier caught up with a few former army

13. Chevrier to Procurer General Lazarists in Paris, May 14, 1860, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 95. Ange-Michel Aymeri (1820-1880) was an Italian priest based in Shanghai and was the longtime procurer for the Lazarists in China. It also seems from this letter that once aboard ship, Chevrier wasted little time growing his beard back.

14. C. M Chevrier to J. L. Chevrier, May 28, 1860. Chevrier to Procurer General Lazarists in Paris, May 14, 1860, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 98.

buddies, and a night of excessive conviviality and camaraderie nearly caused him to miss his boat back to Shanghai.¹⁵

The signing of the Beijing Convention in October 1860 made it possible for Chevrier to finally reach his assigned posting, and he arrived in Xiwanzi in the spring of 1861. Soon after, Chevrier set out on his first sortie into the westernmost sections of the Mongolian Vicariate. Out on the steppe, the priest and a Chinese translator named Fan rode from village to village, sometimes staying in different hamlets to avoid overburdening the local Catholic households who might have felt obligated to provide precious food and accommodations for both visitors. Chevrier's appearances in the villages were a spectacle. At each stop, villagers gathered to watch the bearded foreigner parade his horse into town. Few of these communities had ever seen a priest, let alone a French missionary.¹⁶

Chevrier often had a hard time keeping up his spirit. "Our fatigue is due to two causes," Chevrier wrote to his godfather in Lyon, "The ignorance of Christians so rarely visited (these had not been visited for three years) and their scattering over vast spaces."¹⁷ Chevrier grew frustrated at the amount of official resistance to his presence and what Chevrier believed was the unprovoked hostility toward Christians on the part of Qing authorities. He was not entirely wrong, although his understanding of local administration lacked nuance, and his attempts to

15. C.M. Chevrier to J.L. Chevrier, November 9, 1860. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*109.

16. See Taveirne, *Han-Mongol Encounters and Missionary Endeavors: A History of Scheut in Ordos (Hetao) 1874-1911*; Zhang, Sun, and Xu, "The relationship between the spread of the Catholic Church and the shifting agro-pastoral line in the Chahar Region of northern China."

17. Chevrier to Abbé Giradet, October 6, 1862. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 131.

interfere and protect the Christians in his area often led to short-term solutions and long-term resentment.

On an early excursion through the steppe, Chevrier and Fan made plans to celebrate Holy Week in a nearby town. Chevrier arrived ahead of Fan to find a messenger waiting for him who told Chevrier that Fan and several converts had been seized by the authorities. When Chevrier finally located his colleague, Fan told him the story of their capture. Fan and his party were staying at the village inn when a group of soldiers employed by the local magistrate arrested them. Fan protested that he was a priest of the “Master of Heaven Religion” [Catholicism], and the emperor had issued a decree two years earlier permitting the practice of his religion. The soldiers were unmoved by Fan’s arguments, and soon Fan realized that he was the victim of a shakedown. They wanted money to release the prisoners. When Fan failed to provide sufficient funds, the soldiers began to torture Fan and the Christians to force them to apostatize.

After Chevrier heard Fan’s account, the priest set out for the magistrate’s yamen. Serving in colonial redoubts in Algeria and Guyana had convinced Chevrier that, priest or not, sometimes the best defense was a good offense, especially when up against a recalcitrant local satrap. The magistrate initially refused to deal with the irate French priest, but when Chevrier threatened to take his complaints to the circuit intendant, the magistrate relented. In a foreshadowing of events in 1870, the magistrate turned out to be an elderly Manchu who complained to Chevrier about the unruliness and insubordination of the Chinese sub-officials with whom he was forced to work. The magistrate then promised Chevrier that restitution would be made the next day.

The following morning, Chevrier had Fan draw up an account of all the items stolen by the soldiers during Fan and the Christians’ incarceration. The magistrate ordered the offenders brought before the tribunal where the miserable soldiers knelt and begged for the forgiveness of

the court. The magistrate ordered that the runners receive the same number of beatings and tortures they had administered to the Christians only to have Chevrier intercede. The French priest was interested in procuring a different pound of flesh. He demanded a copy of the judgment against the soldiers as proof of the incident and their guilt, return of stolen objects, and reimbursement of expenses.

The officials were horrified by the idea of turning over a copy of the judgement, so much so that Chevrier abandoned his request. The officials feared that such a document would eventually find its way to higher authorities in Beijing with dire consequences for all involved. Chevrier, therefore, insisted the magistrate and his soldiers make good on his other two conditions. Return of stolen goods was simple enough, but with the demand for reimbursement of expenses plus punitive damages, the priest showed that he was not above a little extortion of his own, imposing a price of over 400 francs on the local officials. The sum was raised after much protest, and Chevrier and Fan returned to Xiwanzi.¹⁸

Chevrier's activist approach was part of a larger problem. One of the most common complaints by local officials in the 1860s concerned foreign missionaries intervening on behalf of congregants, even acting as "Litigation Masters" (讼师 *songshi*).¹⁹ A magistrate was charged with maintaining social order, a difficult job at best out on the frontier, and even more challenging when the government was fighting a bloody, ongoing civil war against the Taiping Kingdom. Suddenly a group of Christians whose accents mark them as non-natives appears in

18. Chevrier to Abbé Giradet, October 6, 1862. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 131.

19. Lee, *The Bible and the Gun: Christianity in South China, 1860-1900.*, p. 104. For more on the historical role of "litigation masters" and the problems of foreign missionary interference in civil and criminal cases, see Macauley, *Social Power and Legal Culture: Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China.*

the jurisdiction. Local soldiers swiftly identify the newcomers as possible threats to be neutralized or targets of opportunities for a little petty extortion. The intercession of a French priest in such a case could seriously complicate matters and raise the stakes for everyone involved.²⁰ Even beyond the Great Wall, the magistrate and his staff were aware of the humiliating defeat inflicted on the dynasty at the hands of these foreigners. No official wanted to be the cause of another war or occupation. The foreigners had used military force to compel the Qing government to remove the proscriptions on Christianity, but treaties and proclamations could not change the deep-seated prejudices felt by many people, including officials. Coming to the defense of his fellow Christians, however justified Chevrier might have felt in doing so, compounded the antipathy and prejudice of officials and the local people.

Chevrier's Lazarist colleague, and Father Qiu Anyu's former benefactor, Jean-Baptiste Anouilh was known for his blustering tactics on behalf of 'his' flock.²¹ In one incident recorded in 1863, Anouilh accused a local magistrate of persecuting Christians in a district south of Tianjin. According to Anouilh, the magistrate arrested a group of Christians on trumped-up charges, had them beaten, and forced them to apostatize or be executed. When Anouilh heard what happened, he immediately intervened, escalating the case all the way to the highest levels of the Qing administration.

“At the news of these disasters, I felt my entrails torn like those of a mother from whom her children would be torn away. Following the example of the Good Shepherd, I rushed into the midst of the wolves: their fury was at first appeased; the timid herd regained courage. Not being

20. For a similar case, see Patrick Taveirne, "The Religious Case of Fengzhen District: Reclamation and Missionary Activities in Caqar in the Late Qing Dynasty," in *The History of the Relations Between the Low Countries and China in the Qing Era (1644-1911)*, ed. W.F. Vande Walle and Noël Golvers (Leuven University Press, 2003), p. 389.

21. Anouilh had been active in forcing provincial authorities in Baoding to release Qiu Anyu during the Father Qiu's imprisonment in the early years of the Second Opium War. See Chapter 1.

able myself to drive this persecuting Mandarin out of the country, decrees in hand, I immediately went to the capital of the province, and I asked the viceroy, in the name of the treaty, to reparation for the insults that the religion of the Lord of Heaven had just received in my Vicariate. The great mandarins of the province's capital promised to examine the facts and do me justice. But, as thirteen years of experience have taught me to count for little the fine words of the mandarins, I went to Peking, and I drew up a report of the facts which had happened to M. le Comte. Kleczkowski, then chargé d'affaires of France in the absence of His Excellency M. de Bourboulon, our very devoted Minister at Peking. Monsieur le Chargé d'affaires addressed his complaints to Prince Koug, who wrote to the Viceroy so that he might deal with my case according to justice.”²²

At the time, Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen were engaged in tense negotiations with Count Kleczkowski over anti-missionary violence in Guizhou and Sichuan.²³ The central government had little interest in opening another case with the French Legation and ordered the Zhili governor in Baoding to settle the matter in favor of the Christians. As a result of Anouilh's interference, the magistrate was sacked, and the governor ordered reparations be paid to the Christians named in the lawsuit. “The conditions of peace have also been very profitable to religion,” Anouilh concluded. “I was given all the pagodas in the village, thirteen in number, and the six hundred arpents of land belonging to the pagodas: this will suffice to build a chapel, erect a school, and for the expenses of the Mission.”²⁴

22. J.B. Anouilh, January 20, 1863, *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Volume 31, 1866, p. 34.

23. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document Nos. 209–211.

24. J.B. Anouilh, January 20, 1863, *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Volume 31 1866, p. 34.

Missionaries like Anouilh seemed willing to overlook how these actions would be received by the communities they intended to serve, blaming the gentry and officials for holding China back, oppressing the non-elite, and preventing the people from exercising their freedom to practice Christianity. The elite, so went this way of thinking, were vain, conservative, anxious, and jealous of the modernity and power of the Westerners. Trapped by outmoded ideas and discredited ideologies, ignorant of the modern world, they continually sought to obstruct China's entry into the comity of civilized Christian nations.

The common people, in the eyes of the missionaries, were beholden to the elites and too often were unwitting stooges duped into anti-foreignism by the propaganda of their political and social betters. As a result, Catholic missionaries in China like Anouilh and Chevrier tried to publicly shame and humiliate officials by challenging their authority, aping their mannerisms, and appropriating their privileges. These tactics riled the officials, but they also failed to elicit the gratitude of the "oppressed" masses. Although many non-elites in Chinese society felt marginalized, what the missionaries failed to see was that the common people often had their own reasons to fear and loath the foreign presence. People in cities like Tianjin thought of foreign missionaries as "White Devils" not white saviors, and in times of crisis, they were more likely to side with the devils they knew than the devils who had arrived in gunboats to occupy their city.

Qing government leaders were aware of the missionaries' tactics and the dangerous implications of attempts by foreigners to sow division between elites and non-elites. In a memorial dated February 7, 1862, Chongshi, the older brother of Chonghou, briefed the Zongli Yamen on the question of why anti-Christian and anti-missionary cases were on the rise in many provinces across the empire. Chongshi had spent most of 1862 investigating a series of violent

incidents in Guangxi and Sichuan and as much as anyone had developed a sophisticated understanding of the complex forces at work in these cases.²⁵

Chongshi argued that prior to the imposition of the Treaty of Tianjin and the Beijing Convention, clashes between Christians and non-Christians had been rare. The new element was the foreign missionaries now entitled to live and work in local communities where they used the treaties as a cudgel to bully officials and non-Christians on behalf of “their” congregations. Christianity already had a bad reputation, wrote Chongshi, and the willingness of the missionaries to convert “unworthy people” had resulted in boastful cells of pseudo-Christians taking advantage of foreign protection to pick quarrels and disrupt the social order.²⁶ Although Chongshi and other officials had a better perspective on anti-foreign, anti-missionary, and anti-Christian sentiments in local society than did foreign missionaries like Anouilh, Mouly, or Chevrier, these officials also failed to ask why Christianity might appeal to marginalized groups—especially those referred to as “unworthy” in official correspondence—and why the marginalized would be willing to ally with outsiders.²⁷

Another group affected by the right of foreign missionaries to travel freely in the interior provinces were Chinese Christian leaders, including Chinese priests. Although they were suspect in the eyes of officials, native Christian leaders acted as important intermediaries helping to settle disputes, negotiate spaces for the practice of Christianity in different jurisdictions, and

25. Chongshi memorial dated February 7, 1862 in *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 222.

26. Mark W. Driscoll, "The Whites Are Enemies of Heaven," in 2. *Ecclesiastical Superpredators* (Duke University Press, 2020), p. 86.

27. There have been many studies of this phenomenon. For example, see Nicholas Tapp, "The Impact of Missionary Christianity upon Marginalized Ethnic Minorities: The case of the Hmong," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 20, no. 1 (1989), pp. 70–95. See also Guo Wenjing, "Rethinking History of Subalterns in China from Late Qing to Nanjing Decade: Postcolonial Approach on Studying the Power Asymmetry between Chinese Subalterns and Western Missionaries within Christian Educational Institutions" (Masters Thesis University of Oslo, 2019).

helping to localize Christianity to make it more compatible with community standards and expectations. Many Chinese Christian leaders welcomed the provisions of the treaty that abrogated previous laws and statutes proscribing Christianity, but the sudden appearance of foreign missionaries in their towns and cities proved a mixed blessing.²⁸ For over a century, Chinese priests and lay leaders had worked under the threat of arrest and execution to keep the faith alive and communities together. Now they were being pushed aside from leadership positions in favor of European priests, many of whom had little Chinese language ability or experience working in China.²⁹

Chevrier was still learning Chinese and had to depend on his Chinese colleagues to communicate with congregants and officials. The French priest would struggle with the language for the duration of his time in China, writing to his superiors in Beijing, "I am endeavoring to improve my sad pronunciation a bit and to add just a few words to my poor Chinese repertoire. I am also trying to introduce a tiny bit of English into my miserable noggin."³⁰ Chevrier persisted, and within a year of arriving in the country, he was, in keeping with a long tradition of novice non-native learners of Chinese, peppering his communications with Chinese phrases. In one letter, he mentions the missionary's job to fight against the Devil who, from time to time, still gives me some 'my-fan' [麻烦 *mafān*].³¹

28. Sweeten, "Catholic Converts in Jiangxi Province: Conflict and Accommodation, 1860-1900.;" Ambrose Mong, "Catholic Missions in China: Failure to Form Native Clergy," *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 19, no. 1 (2019).

29. Ambrose Mong, "Catholic missions in China: failure to form native clergy," *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church* 19, no. 1 (2019/01/02 2019)

30. Chevrier to Monsignor Guierry, December 1866. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 255.

31. C.M. Chevrier to J.L. Chevrier, December, 23, 1863. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 146.

Chevrier often worked with Vincent Ou, even though the Cantonese priest had almost as hard a time as his French colleague communicating with Northern Chinese people in their language. Despite this, Chevrier could not have wished for a better partner. Father Ou was a stalwart supporter of the Lazarist mission, an outspoken writer on social and religious issues, and the nephew of the pharmacist-priest Father Qiu Anyu.³²

Born in 1821 in Guangdong, Ou had studied at a seminary in Macau and became a priest in 1842, just as the British were concluding the First Opium War. A year later, he undertook his first mission to Northern China. From the Lazarist base in Xiwanzi, Father Ou traveled the circuit translating and covering for the European priests working at the mission. Language issues were not the only hardship for a southerner, and the winters were bitterly cold, a far cry from the heat and humidity of Guangdong. Nor was Ou entirely convinced of the faith of his converts. European priests liked to count their successes, but Father Ou lacked the optimism of his colleagues. “What will I tell you about our dear Christians?” Ou wrote, “They are not very proud and very fond of money like in all the rest of China.”³³

Chevrier formed a particular bond with Father Ou, and the two were frequently paired for long sojourns in the semi-wilderness. Father Ou finally managed to master the Northern language, although his accent still marked him as a native of the South, and his experience and mastery of the principles of the Catholic faith meant Ou was also very much in demand among the missionary outposts in Northern China. He shuttled between Beijing, Xiwanzi, and Tianjin

32. Vincent Ou was generally referred to as Qiu Anyu’s nephew and they both were from the same area, probably even the same village. The actual family relationship between the two was never made clear and it is possible that “uncle” was a term Father Ou used out of respect for somebody who was an elder member of the community.

33. Vincent Ou to Joseph Mouly, December 1852. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.* p. 66.

but spent most of his time beyond the Great Wall riding with Chevrier. The two men were the same age, and although their backgrounds could not have been more different, they shared a common faith as well as a revulsion for infanticide and foot binding.³⁴ Father Ou supported the missionaries who sought to abolish foot binding among their followers. Ou's views on foot binding, his family's Christian faith, and his Guangdong origins are all indications that Ou and his uncle Qiu Anyu were Hakkas.³⁵

Working on the steppe could be a hard existence, even for an ex-soldier. Chevrier frequently complained of his health. His back—he suffered from sciatica—occasionally prevented him from riding, and Chevrier would regularly dose himself with quinine. The arrival of his brother Jean-Louis to China in 1862 boosted his spirits. The younger Chevrier had followed Claude-Marie into the priesthood after much fraternal coaxing and cajoling. Claude-Marie's letters do not go into detail, but he expressed concern—perhaps also reflecting his personal temptations while a soldier—about his brother living a *louche* existence in Lyon.

“Are you familiar with the all too famous language of the Celestial Empire? Do you get used to its inhabitants?” Claude-Marie wrote to his brother. “Finally in the midst of the river of life, do you still row with force against the current which leads to the abyss?”³⁶

34. Vincent Ou to J.B. Etienne, August 4, 1843. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 60; and Vincent Ou to the Holy Childhood Association, September 4, 1865. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

35. Nicole Constable, "Christianity and Hakka Identity," in *Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present*, ed. D.H. Bays (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

36. C.M. Chevrier to J.L. Chevrier, December 1862, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p 140. The letters between the Chevrier brothers hint at Jean-Louis' life in Lyons, and suggest the younger brother had been involved in behavior, never explicitly described, of which his older brother disapproved.

By the end of this third year in Xiwanzi, Chevrier's zeal was flagging. His health worsened and the demands of being a missionary—one part priest, two parts fundraiser—frustrated Chevrier. “The body is strong enough, but the soul is languishing. A little while longer, and if ‘Monsieur le Superieur’ does not summon ‘Monsieur le Bursar’ to open his cash register in my favor, all I must do is put all my little marmots to sleep until the next harvest. All I have in a rag is a trifle of fifty taels, which on the first day will never disappear.”³⁷

It may have been fortunate that in 1866, Chevrier and his fellow Lazarists at Xiwanzi finally received the news that the Vicariate of Mongolia had been transferred to the pastoral care of Theophiel Verbist and the Belgian Congregation of the Immaculate Heart of Mary.³⁸ Chevrier spent his last few weeks in Mongolia accompanying a scientific expedition sponsored by the Natural History Museum of Paris and ministering to sick colleagues as the cholera epidemic that had afflicted Tianjin and the coastal cities in 1862–1863 finally reached the villages north of the Great Wall.

In September 1866, Father Chevrier and Vincent Ou left Xiwanzi for Beijing, about 80 kilometers to the south. The French priest did not linger in the capital. Upon arrival, Bishop Mouly took Chevrier aside and gave the priest his new assignment as the head of the Lazarist mission in Tianjin.

37. C.M. Chevrier to J. L. Chevrier, November 26, 1864. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 149.

38. Taveirne, *Han-Mongol Encounters and Missionary Endeavors: A History of Scheut in Ordos (Hetao) 1874-1911.*, p. 212. The transfer had been some years in the making and was the result of the negotiations between Joseph Mouly and representatives at the Vatican during Mouly's trip to Europe from 1861-1862. (See Chapter 3)

PART II

Chapter 5: The Settlement

Father Chevrier arrived in Tianjin in 1866 to take up a position very different from the one he left behind on the remote edges of the Mongolian steppe. For his new assignment, Chevrier would be working in a busy treaty port with almost one million people. Like most treaty ports, Tianjin was a complex urban space.¹ The 1860 Beijing Convention forced open Tianjin to international trade and residence, and the foreign powers wasted little time building their homes, churches, and offices in new concessions at Zizhulin, located a short distance downriver from the Chinese city.




Figure 5.1 Map of Tianjin and its concessions ca. 1870.²

1. See Isabella Jackson, "Habitability in the Treaty Ports: Shanghai and Tianjin," in *The Habitable City in China: Urban History in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Toby Lincoln and Tao Xu (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2016), p. 169–193. See also Lin Jingzhi 林京志, "Tianjin zujie dang'an shiliao xuan 天津租界档案史料选 [Selected Archives related to the Tianjin Concessions]," *Lishi Dang'an* 1 (1984); Yang Shengxiang, "Tianjin Zujie Jianlun [A discussion on the concessions in Tianjin]," *Scholarly Journal of the Tianjin Communist Party School* 1 (1994); Wan Lujian 万鲁建, "Tianjin zujie yanjiu xianzhuang 天津租界史研究现状 [The Status of Research on the History of Tianjin's Concessions]," *lilun yu xiandaihua* 5 (2013); Yang Daxin 杨大辛, "Tianjin zujie dui chengshi fazhan de yingxiang tianjin 天津租界对城市发展的影响 [The Influence of Tianjin Concessions on Urban Development]," *Tianjin Renda* 11 (2017).
2. Q. Lu, "The Hai River waterfront : a framework for revitalizing the foreign concession landscape in Tianjin" (2015).

The boundaries of the concessions had been mapped in the winter of 1860, just a month after the departure of Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, with the chief surveying done by the British army captain Charles Gordon (1833-1885).³ The French concession extended back from the riverfront for about a quarter mile, and a wide bend in the river gave the French zone an irregular shape compared to the areas mapped out for the British and the Americans. Official possession of the French concession was signed and confirmed on October 25, 1862, by Chonghou, acting as Imperial Commissioner, and representatives of the French Legation in Beijing.

Alexander Michie recorded the delineation of the treaty settlements by “the two officers [Captain Gordon and the French engineer] who placed the boundary stones in the dreary ground which contained within their areas junk docks, small vegetable gardens, mud heaps, the hovels of fisherman, sailors, and others, whose wretched groups of squalid huts were divided from each other by narrow title ditches... the sites of the two settlements were foul and noxious swamps, and around them on the dryer grounds, were the numerous graves of many generations of people.”⁴

At the time of Chevrier’s arrival, the international population of Tianjin was quite small. A few foreign merchants and a handful of protestant missionaries had chosen to settle inside the walled Chinese city where crowds gathered, business was done, and trade boomed. By contrast, the international settlement area was an inconveniently placed suburb and few roads connected it to the city. People who lived in the foreign concessions often commuted up the river to the Chinese settlement for work, business, or to tend their chapels and missions. The marshy banks

3. Gordon would spend nearly two years in Tianjin before moving to Shanghai where he would later take over command of the “Ever Victorious Army,” the anti-Taiping militia organized first under the American adventurer Frederick Townsend Ward. Rasmussen, *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History.*, p. 36.

4. Rasmussen, *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History.* p. 39.

of the Hai River also made for a poor site on which to build a settlement and frequent flooding added to the challenges of digging foundations erecting permanent structures.⁵ Into the 1870s and 1880s, marshland pushed up against the boundaries of the settlements at Zizhulin.

The British consulate was built in the concession area, but their French counterparts felt that the new settlements were too far away from the action. The French chose as the site of their consulate the grounds of the imperial palace known as Wanghailou. The complex, originally built for the Qianlong Emperor a century prior, had been the headquarters of the Anglo-French occupation authorities. Situated at Sanchahekou, the point at which the Hai River and Grand Canal met just outside the city walls, Wanghailou had a commanding view of the water traffic passing by Tianjin and the busy wharf district. It was a highly visible and prestigious site but at a distance from the relative safety of the international zone.

The Tianjin concessions slowly developed the trappings of other foreign settlements on the Chinese coast. By 1866, foreigners and a few locals in Tianjin were participating in the sport of horse racing, an activity that came to define society and civilization for many international residents in China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.⁶ The firm of Dent & Company constructed a solid office in the heart of the British settlement, where a permanent protestant church was also built in 1868.⁷ A municipal council, modeled after the one that administered the international settlements in Shanghai, was established. During Chevrier's time in Tianjin, the council ordered a permanent bund built to stabilize the riverbank and hold back

5. See Luo Shuwei, "Qianxi Haihe yu Tianjin lishi wenhua de guanxi 浅析海河与天津历史文化的关系 [Analysis of the relationship between the Hai River and the History and Culture of Tianjin]," *理论与现代化 lilun yu xiandaihua* 6 (2003).

6. See Carter, James. *Champions Day: The End of Old Shanghai*. W. W. Norton, 2020.

7. Wu Guo, *Zheng Guanying: Merchant Reformer of Late Qing China and His Influence on Economics, Politics, and Society* (Cambria Press, 2010)., p. 36; Yu Xueyun 于学蕴 and Liu Lin 刘琳, *Tianjin lao jiaotang 天津老教堂 [Old Churches of Tianjin]* (Tianjin: 天津人民出版社 Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2005).

some of the seasonal flooding, as well as a “smooth road” connecting the customs building with the new Astor House Hotel.⁸

Ironically, despite the marshes and annual flooding, a frequent complaint among the foreign community was the lack of water. The mounds of industrial salt along the banks of the Hai River spoke to the brackish nature of the area’s water supply. “There is one drawback to Tientsing,” wrote an early resident, “All the wells are salt, and the inhabitants are obliged to drink loathsome water out of the river. In order to cleanse it, it is first placed in large jars that the impurities might settle at the bottom and then be filtered.” Little wonder that cholera and other waterborne diseases were a perennial problem in the city.⁹

As Chevrier began his posting, he would wander the city on foot and, where possible, on horseback. Traveling around Tianjin, Chevrier could pass numerous government offices each with their own jurisdiction and official responsibilities. The structures of official power in Tianjin remained as they had been prior to the military occupations of 1858 and 1860. The only major change was the imposition of Chonghou and his staff to manage the needs and complaints of the foreigners. Chonghou’s yamen was located outside the city walls, just a short distance from Wanghailou and the river junction at Sanchahekou. Most of the other important offices were located within the walled city

Just inside the North Gate was the office of the Prefect, who had jurisdiction over the urban core, including the walled city and its environs, as well as several rural counties.¹⁰ The

8. This was the beginning of Victoria Road, a long north-south street which remains a Tianjin landmark now known as Jiefang Beilu (North Liberation Street). For more on the function of bunds and quays for remapping riverfront terrain in colonial contexts, see Jeremy E. Taylor, "The Bund: Littoral Space of Empire in the Treaty Ports of East Asia," *Social History* 27, no. 2 (2002/05/01 2002).

9. Rasmussen, *Tientsin: An Illustrated Outline History*., p. 44.

10. 郭蕴静 Guo Yunjing, *Tianjin gudai chengshi fazhan shi 天津古代城市发展史 [The Development of Tianjin in Ancient Times]*, ed. Yunjing Guo (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1989)., pp. 100–101

office of the Changlu Salt Commissioner was just a short walk south from the Prefect's yamen. The salt commissioners and his staff were appointees from the Ministry of Revenue who answered to the central government and were responsible for supervising merchants who had purchased government licenses for the production, sale, and distribution of salt. Salt was one of the twin pillars of the city's economy, along with the storage and transshipment of grain for the capital, making the head of the salt cabal a position of considerable influence in Tianjin.¹¹

Next came the office of the county magistrate, a position with which Chevrier already had some familiarity from his time on the range. The city magistrate was one of the most important—and grueling—jobs in the Qing administrative apparatus. By the late Qing Dynasty, a magistrate was sometimes responsible for supervising and managing 300,000 or more people for whom he was principal criminal investigator, arbiter, judge, jury, and public works administrator and was accountable to the central government in two aspects: the timely and complete fulfillment of tax quotas and the maintenance of order.¹² The magistrate's yamen inside the walled city was responsible for managing a wide range of affairs in the city, and in carrying out these duties, the magistrate required the cooperation of his fellow officials and the support of other powerful stakeholders in Tianjin.¹³

Chevrier's move to Tianjin meant a significant change in lifestyle and responsibilities. He was officially the director of the Rencitang as well as the head of the Tianjin mission and procurator for the Lazarists in his region, the kind of desk job that Chevrier, despite his ailments, had previously resisted. Ever the soldier, Chevrier carried out his duties as best he could and

11. For a detailed look at the salt merchants of Tianjin and their role in local society see Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State-Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China*.

12. Watt, *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China*.

13. Zhang Limin 张利民, "A Comparison of Local Autonomy in Shanghai and Tianjin in the Late Qing: From the Perspective of the Establishment of City Administrative Organizations."

maintained a military schedule and a spartan lifestyle. He inherited from his predecessors a small wooden chapel and cottage. Each morning, Chevrier arose at 4:00 am and began his prayers and meditation and then walked to the Rencitang, a journey of about 20 minutes strolling past the produce stalls along the riverbanks and the side-street markets of the quarter.

In the afternoon, Chevrier held classes—information and orientation sessions—for prospective converts or the merely curious. Then there were clerical matters. It was a great annoyance to Chevrier that much of his day was spent at a desk performing the duties of a mid-level branch manager drafting requests, filing reports, and recording purchases and other expenses. “I have become a great writer: paper, feathers, ink, even Spanish wax,” he complained to his sister back in Lyon, “Everything goes with astonishing rapidity.”¹⁴

During his visits to the orphanage, Chevrier met with the nuns and listened patiently as they listed the budget shortfalls, material needs, and other mundane challenges that came with running a clinic, a school, a pharmacy, and an orphanage in an increasingly hostile city. The Sisters had been in their new space for two years. The expanded Rencitang had separate areas for the refectory and dormitory, but the children still slept communally on heated *kang* forcing the Sisters to settle nighttime territorial squabbles by placing wooden partitions at regular intervals. The new site nevertheless boosted the morale of the Sisters and Lazarist leaders in China were optimistic about the potential for growth. “It is a spacious, extensive, and it will easily be found to be filled if the development of the Work continues. We will have on hand a hospital for poor

14. Claude-Marie Chevrier to Jean-Louis Chevrier, December 4, 1866, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 255

Chinese, a hospital for Europeans, and a dispensary, all well adapted to use,” Bishop Mouly reported in 1867.¹⁵

The Sisters also opened a small school. “Each day filled with blessings,” wrote the fourth-year students to the superiors of the Holy Childhood in Paris, “We are guilty of having delayed so long in thanking you, you who have established in this kingdom of China a new house of Mercy, where many children, girls and boys are brought up. If they are hungry, you feed them; if they are cold, you give them clothes; if they are sick, you comfort and heal them; if they die, you bury them, and you use all kinds of means to baptize the infidels.” The letter was signed by Jan, Jean, Tcheo, Tou, Jacob, Ho, Cécile, Hou, Agathe, Lieou, and Paola¹⁶

The Sisters continued their energetic collecting of souls. At the end of 1864, Sister Dutrouilh dutifully reported the Rencitang had adopted 156 children including 32 boys and 35 girls residing in the dormitory, 13 infants in the nursery, and an additional 76 in foster care. There had been, however, a slight decline in last rites and baptisms. This was the main indicator of the mission’s success and a critical part of the Holy Childhood’s fundraising campaigns back in Europe and North America. “There were no reigning epidemic diseases on the children. So, it only amounts to 350. We hope to be richer next year.”¹⁷ Indeed they were. In 1865, Sister Dutrouilh triumphantly reported 410 new souls claimed for Heaven “including six adults.”¹⁸

It was in 1865 that the mission also suffered its first major loss. Sister Cecile Dodat, aged 35, died of a sudden fever, probably typhoid. Although her death was keenly felt by all members

15. Letter from J.M. Mouly to J.B. Etienne, January 13, 1867. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM 1867., p. 407.

16. Fourth Year Class (Jan, Jean, Tcheo, Tou, Jacob, Ho, Cécile, Hou, Agathe, Lieou, Paola) to the Holy Childhood Association, September 8, 1865. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM 1866., p. 672.

17. Sister Dutrouilh to Director of the Holy Childhood, December 8, 1864. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM 1866., pp. 665–672.

18. Sister Dutrouilh to Director of the Holy Childhood, October 1, 1866. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM 1867., pp. 473.

of the community, it was an opportunity. Once again, a parade was arranged. A solemn procession of nuns and children, some beating Chinese drums and others carrying candles, marched solemnly through the streets of Tianjin. Behind followed Sister Cecile's coffin—draped in the French flag, a gesture suggested by the French consul.¹⁹

The purpose was to create a spectacle, and it was sufficiently bold that Sister Dutrouilh felt compelled to write to the director of the order in Paris and justify the procession on the grounds that it demonstrated the power of the Holy Spirit and that the mourners were received along their route with a grave and respectful silence. “This French pavilion placed on the coffin of a humble Daughter of Saint Vincent de Paul; this tom-tom which resounds loudly to signal the passage of the cross through a Chinese city of a procession of little orphans and Sisters following, a candle in hand, the remains of their mother or their venerated companion; this respectful silence finally of a whole population in front of the cross and Catholic funeral pomp... what an extraordinary spectacle! Doesn't it move the soul deeply and opens it to a holy hope for the future of religion on this unfaithful beach?”²⁰

Whether the onlookers were silent or not, the Sisters' actions seemed to blithely feed into the worst fears of their detractors. Sister Cecile's funeral procession—including the incorporation of Chinese mourning custom—reinforced the association of the Sisters with death while the French flag adorning her coffin convinced an already suspicious populace that the missionaries were fully in cahoots with the French government and, by extension, the French military.

19. Sister Dutrouilh to Director of the Holy Childhood Association, September 8, 1866. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*, Annales CM 1867., p. 529.

20. Sister Marthe to Etienne Superior-General in Paris, September 8, 1866, *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*., Annales CM 1867., p. 529

It did not help that the Sisters continued to be the topic of local gossip, some of it informed by misinformation spread through pamphlets like the *Bixie Jishi*.²¹ Within weeks of arriving in Tianjin, the ex-soldier Chevrier was pressed back into sentry duty after he received reports of nocturnal prowlers in the area around the new Rencitang. “For some days, evil and strange people have been trying during the night to disturb the peace which reigns in the house of the Sisters. The Tche-shien [magistrate] has been informed for eight days and yet they seem to continue. Tomorrow the Consul of France will write to this mandarin, and then we’ll see. In truth, the sisters have not seen anything so far, although they have already stood up several times, but their servants say they have seen the criminals.”²²

The rumors surrounding the Sisters were also growing darker. While doing their rounds in the rural villages around Tianjin, the nuns reported family members of their catechumens trying to dissuade converts from joining the new faith, telling them that if they did so, the priests would return after their death to claim the converts’ hearts and eyes. One of the more spectacular rumors against the Catholics came from a village that paid homage to a large snake who they said spoke through a female villager. Several converts became alarmed and asked the mission in Tianjin to send help when the snake oracle began inveighing against the Catholics, menacingly urging them to “be rid of the Christians soon because later it would not be possible, and we will suffer a great deal because of them.”²³ For the missionaries, most non-Christian rituals and beliefs were dismissed as “superstition” or “paganism,” an attitude that worked against

21. See Chapter Three

22. Chevrier to Thierry, December 4, 1866. X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 210.

23. Chevrier to Guierry, February 26, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 328.

developing a more sophisticated or nuanced understanding of the spiritual terrain in which they were operating.²⁴

Gossip did not have to involve the supernatural to raise suspicions. With the Nian Rebellion spreading throughout the North China Plain, accusations that the Christians were another heterodox sect seeking to spread rebellion and disorder had nearly as much power as those involving acts of sorcery and witchcraft. Chevrier and his converts were often accused of spreading false doctrines and being a branch of “Pey-ling-Chiao” [*bailianjiao* / “White Lotus”] or “mid-mid-chiao” (*mimijiao* / “Secret Societies”).²⁵

There are continuities between the mistrust of Buddhism by Chinese elites in earlier eras and suspicions about Christianity in the nineteenth century. As early as the Tang Dynasty, Confucian officials labeled Buddhism a heterodoxy using terms that would recur later to denounce Christians.²⁶ Buddhism and Christianity were religions of foreign origin whose doctrines ideologically undermined the elite by challenging precepts of Confucian orthodoxy. Both religions represented a challenge to the superstructures of elite power by appealing, and in many cases empowering, those on the margins of society.²⁷

B. J. Ter Haar and others have shown that many people conflated Christianity with other heterodox sects within Chinese society, especially the White Lotuses.²⁸ By the late nineteenth

24. See Reinders, *Borrowed Gods and Foreign Bodies: Christian Missionaries Imagine Chinese Religion*.

25. Chevrier to Guierry, February 26, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 330.

26. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 6.

27. See Susan Naquin, "The Transmission of White Lotus Sectarianism in Late Imperial China," in *Popular Culture in Late Imperial China*, ed. Andrew Nathan, David Johnson, and Evelyn Rawski (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

28. Barend J Ter Haar, *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999).

century, “White Lotus” had become something of a generic term for non-orthodox societies espousing magical thinking or other beliefs that deviated from the norm.²⁹ There were also superficial and theological and ideological similarities between White Lotus teachings and Christianity, which might cause confusion for non-believers. For example, the tendency of Catholic missionaries to emphasize the divine cult of Mary and the Holy Mother recalled the way White Lotus groups venerated female deities or figures. Both groups also appealed to a similar class of converts: the landless poor, sojourning workers, itinerant tradesmen, soldiers, and rogues. These marginalized groups often attracted negative attention from authorities and law-abiding citizens in times of strife and hardship regardless of religious affiliation. Suspicions of being involved in a heterodox cult only increased the likelihood the marginalized and dispossessed would suffer from harassment and persecution.³⁰

The conflation of Christianity with rebellious religious groups presented legal challenges. Eighteenth-century statutes labeling Christianity a heterodoxy had been rescinded by the court following the Treaty of Nanjing and the Treaty of Tianjin, but the Qing code retained laws that targeted heresies of religious leaders or instructors and priests.³¹ These laws explicitly cited the teachings of the White Lotus, but the description of prohibited rites and heterodox activities gives some idea as to why Christianity in general, and Catholicism in particular, alarmed officials.³² Article 1 of the law stipulated severe punishments including strangulation, exile, or flogging for any “who in secret places have prints and images, and offer incense to them, or hold meetings which take place at night and break up by day, whereby people are stirred up under the

29. Daniel H Bays, "Christianity and the Chinese Sectarian Tradition," *Ch'ing-shih Wen-t'i* 4, no. 7 (1982).

30. Ter Haar, *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History.*, p. 220.

31. See Chapter 1 for the background to the proscription of Christianity in the eighteenth century and the evolution of legal statutes related to Christians and heterodoxy.

32. Ter Haar, *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History.*, p. 129.

pretext of cultivating virtue.” Article 2 bans the dressing or ornamenting any “image of a god” or “receiving that god with the clang of symbols and the beating of drums” as well as the “holding of sacrificial meetings.”³³

Consider the way that missionaries like Chevrier and the Sisters leaned into the material culture and rituals of Catholicism: lighting incense, distributing medallions engraved with pictures of saints, and handing out pictures and images. Everyone—elite, commoner, and Christian—would have made associations with the practices of other religious sects, including the White Lotus.³⁴ Few missionaries took these accusations seriously. They were insulted by the notion that the White Lotuses or any other indigenous sect was in any way comparable to Christianity. The suspicions only died down after new stories began circulating that the Christians were involved in something far worse than sectarian rabble rousing.

As he had in previous assignments, the experienced horseman Chevrier frequently left the city and ranged widely through the towns and villages near Tianjin. “I already see that here, there is something to occupy a man less of a loafer and more zealous than me. Please pray to the good Lord so that I can stretch my muscles and do something passable.”³⁵

In January 1867, Chevrier wrote to Father Guierry, who was based in Beijing, asking permission to include the village of Liujiapu within his jurisdiction. By using distances calculated from a map of the region, Chevrier showed that the tiny town was closer to Tianjin

33. Cited and translated in J.J.M. de Groot, *Sectarianism and Religious Persecution in China; a Page in the History of Religions* (1903), p. 137.

34. Ter Haar, *The White Lotus Teachings in Chinese Religious History.*, p. 284.

35. C.M. Chevrier to J.L. Chevrier, November 13, 1866. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 254.

than Beijing, where jurisdiction previously resided.³⁶ Chevrier also reported a cursory accounting of the district, calculating 202 Christians in and around the walled city, along with 90 catechumens. Of the 202 Christians, Chevrier noted that only 183 came to confession, and he suspected a few of them were “Christians” only in the sense they had been baptized at some point in the past by one of his predecessors.³⁷

Chevrier spent a great deal of time at the village of Liujiapu. There he would deliver a simple message—translated by a Chinese catechist but occasionally delivered in halting Chinese by Chevrier without interpretation. Chevrier and the catechists would distribute gifts, usually prayer books, rosary beads, or calendars. The giving of gifts was an important part of the visits and served as both a way for Christians to display a tangible connection to their faith and as an enticement for listeners to stay for the entire oratory. Many of the letters Chevrier or Vincent Ou wrote to their superiors and supporters in Beijing and Paris included small requests for beads or other objects to resupply their stock of gifts and handouts.³⁸ Chevrier displayed a stout sense of competitiveness on his missions. On a visit to the village of Baodixian, about 15 miles from

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36. Chevrier to Bishop Guierry, January 13, 1867. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 256. It was also in this letter that Chevrier first mentions meeting M. Simon and M. Coutris. “Tomorrow, M. Simon is leaving for Peking in order to get some information from M. Smoremburg about the soap making that he, M. Coutris and an Englishman are going to start in Tien-tsin.” Coutris would be the only French survivor of the massacre, and Simon one of the first victims.
37. Chevrier to J.M. Mouly, January 28, 1867. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 267.
38. Vincent Ou to the Holy Childhood Association, September 4, 1865. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 73

Tianjin, Chevrier managed to recruit 29 prospective families to begin catechism. “But I was not yet satisfied,” he later reported to Bishop Mouly, “I wanted to reach thirty!”³⁹

The annual Chinese New Year celebrations were an opportune time to meet with local officials under the pretext of wishing them the compliments of the season. In February 1867, Chevrier visited Imperial Commissioner Chonghou and used the occasion to highlight the good works being done by the Sisters at the Rencitang. Chonghou’s response was positive because the next day, Chevrier recounted his conversation with Chonghou in a letter to Bishop Mouly in Beijing. “This morning at ten o’clock, I went to do a formal visit to Tch’oung ta-jen (Chinese New Year was February 5, 1867), and now, at three in the evening, he has just delivered it to me. In these two meetings, he was always friendly, and among other good words, he praised our Je - tse-t’ang, to which he sent ten tans of millet a few days ago (twelve hundred pounds) for the poor.

I asked him if China has establishments like this.

‘Yes,’ replied Chonghou, ‘but they’re not that well cared for.’

I took the liberty of adding that it was quite natural for the Sisters to discharge their office fairly well since they had left their homeland to devote themselves solely to the care of the poor.”⁴⁰

Holidays were not the only occasions for the French priest to present himself at Chonghou’s gate. A few weeks after the Chinese New Year, a Catholic villager named Zhao had

39. Chevrier to J.M. Mouly, August 8, 1867., Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.* p. 266

40. Chevrier to J.M. Mouly, February 5, 1867, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.* p. 220.

been arrested in Liujiapu. Having been granted ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the village, Chevrier was determined to demonstrate that he could protect the interests of the small Catholic community there. Chevrier and Jean-Gabriel Devéria (1844-1899), who worked at the French consulate in Tianjin, called upon Chonghou, who summoned both the convert Zhao and the official who arrested him. The official claimed that Zhao had not been arrested because of his religion but because he had been found gambling. Chonghou concluded that the evidence was far from clear and announced (somewhat characteristically) that he would recuse himself from the dispute to allow the two sides to work things out amicably. Far from satisfied, Chevrier urged Devéria to help him pressure local officials for at least two to three copies of an edict declaring that everyone was free to practice Catholicism.

Father Chevrier enjoyed a positive working relationship with his diplomatic counterpart. Gabriel Devéria was significantly younger than Chevrier and had been only 16 when posted to Tianjin as an interpreter in 1860. Despite his youth, Devéria performed most of the responsibilities normally assigned to the consul and was known for his conscientious attention to his duties and a preternatural talent for diplomacy. Moreover, the two men were neighbors. Both lived at the Wanghailou compound with a single low wall separating the vicarage from the consulate.

Devéria had also been friendly with Chevrier's immediate predecessor, Father Thierry, now in Beijing. After their joint meeting with Chonghou, Devéria wrote to Thierry praising Chevrier for being open-minded enough to allow the much younger man to coach him on his language and intercultural communication skills. "The good Abbé Chevrier is an excellent neighbor: I qualify him that way because, like you, he is extremely helpful to me. Father Chevrier is animated by the sacred fire and wants to preach everywhere. For that, he will retype

his sinology; I proved to him, in a walk I took with him the other day, that there were a thousand ways to make the Chinese listen to them and that it was only a question of knowing how to do it.”⁴¹

As Chevrier was expanding his mission outside of the city, the work of the Sisters carried on at Rencitang. Part of their success was due to the assistance of Chinese women working for the Sisters at the orphanage and school. In 1866, the nuns had 20 female students, most of whom, the Sisters said, wished to remain virgins. “To see them in the chapel praying,” wrote Sister Dutrouilh, “you would say they are real nuns. We have nicknamed them the ‘Little Community.’”⁴²

Many of the virgins, a term commonly employed by missionaries to describe women in this role, were former orphans or students at the Rencitang school. They performed functions similar to those Father Ou filled in the mission of Father Chevrier, and acted as translators, intermediaries, and sources of local knowledge. They were often the initial points of contact and principal liaisons for parents looking to give children up for adoption and the second line of defense, after the porters and doorkeepers, against curious or possibly hostile neighbors. The virgins served as part-time nurses’ aides, part-time teachers, and full-time public relations officers for the non-Chinese Sisters.⁴³ The nuns also hoped that some of these young women

41. G. Devéria to Thierry, February 15, 1867. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.* p. 262.

42. Sister Dutrouilh to J.B. Etienne, October 1, 1866 1867. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM., p. 473.

43. See Li Ji, "Chinese christian virgins and catholic communities of women in northeast China," *The Chinese Historical Review* 20, no. 1 (2013); Eugenio Menegon, *Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars: Christianity as a Local Religion in Late Imperial China* (Brill, 2020); Robert E. Entenmann, "Christian Virgins in Eighteenth-century Sichuan," *Christianity in China: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present* (1996).; Tiedemann Rolf G Tiedemann, "Controlling the Virgins: female propagators of the faith and the Catholic hierarchy in China," *Women's History Review* 17, no. 4 (2008).

might someday form the core of new orphanages and schools in places that were too remote or dangerous for a female European missionary.

The virgins helped the Sister's to expand the capacity of their mission, but the business of running an orphanage was fickle. "As you will notice, the number of our child adoptions always leaves something to be desired, although each year it is increased by a few this is always due to the causes which you already know and which will level out with time," Sister Dutrouilh reported in 1866.⁴⁴ More of the orphans were also coming from outside the city, even from other provinces.

"Yesterday at ten o'clock in the evening," reported Chevrier, "The orphanage was enriched by forty girls of three, four and five years old. Five or six of them seem to be between nine and ten years old. You know it was M. D'Addosio who made this shipment."⁴⁵

One wonders what the orphanages' neighbors thought of these late-night deliveries of children, some as young as three years old. Nor was this the only time that Father D'Addosio made such a trip. Chevrier notes that in September of 1867, D'Addosio returned to Tianjin with another 25 orphans to be placed in the Sisters' care.⁴⁶ There is no evidence to doubt the claim that the children were orphans, abandoned, or willingly surrendered to Father D'Addosio during his travels through the villages, but it is hard to be sure that all went quietly. Many likely arrived at the Sisters' lodgings in various states of emotional distress, a scene that would have attracted

44. Sister Dutrouilh to J.B. Etienne, October 1, 1866. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Annales CM 1867., p. 473.

45. Chevrier to Thierry, April 3, 1867. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 221.

Pascal-Raphaël-Nicolas-Carmel D'Addosio (1835-1900) was an Italian Lazarist working under the Beijing Vicariate. He was killed either by Boxer militia or imperial troops in Beijing on August 15, 1900.

46. Chevrier to Mouly, September 29, 1867. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 282.

the attention and sympathy of those nearby. Such sympathy could easily give way to suspicion that the children had been obtained through force or purchase.

Chevrier and the Sisters also conspired to bring a group of female villagers to the city for instruction. Although male catechumens often made the trip between the rural communities and the mission in Tianjin, it was not as easy for women, and it was considered unseemly—and unsafe—for women to travel in groups away from their homes. There were exceptions. One of those was when women would journey from smaller villages to larger towns for temple fairs. These events offered chances to buy goods, opportunities for religious expression, an occasion to meet friends and kin, a space to arrange marriages, and a way to enjoy entertainment, especially operas and other performances—what the missionaries referred to as ‘The Comedies.’

“Sister Agathe told me,” Chevrier wrote in a message to Sister Marquet in Tianjin, “that some pagan women, wishing to pay you a visit, had offered to accompany them. This walk would be done at their expense, and only in a few months, at the time of the comedies, which they would agree to deprive themselves of to carry out their project. I’m afraid the devil will find a way to create obstacles.”⁴⁷

In May, a group of 11 children and three adult women left their village and began the journey to Tianjin. The secret expedition got off to an inauspicious start when one of the children—a nine-year-old girl—fell from a cart and under the wheel of the heavily laden vehicle. Miraculously, reported Chevrier, choosing his words with literal intent, the girl was unharmed except for a large welt.

47. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance*

More orphans meant more work, and more work required additional hands. Two new sisters arrived in China that April, and two nuns transferred north from Ningbo in May. Unfortunately, one of the nuns who arrived that spring, Sister Bange, succumbed in June to a typhoid epidemic that gripped Tianjin during the summer of 1867. Another funeral procession marched through the streets of Tianjin and a mass was held in the chapel at Rencitang.

In 1868–1869, the final years for which the mission reported its numbers before the riots, the Sisters distributed 56,700 bowls of porridge, treated over 48,000 patients at their pharmacy and dispensary, and admitted 174 patients to their small but growing clinic. They converted 50 adults and instructed 21 women in the catechism leading to 14 more baptisms. The nuns proudly reported they had also baptized 2007 children while continuing to care for 196 orphans.⁴⁸

The Sister Superior wrote to the Holy Childhood Association: “Adoptions this year have tripled due to the food shortage. But unfortunately, we have not been able to receive all the children exposed and doomed to death! Poor little creatures! The heart is heartbroken at the thought of their sad exit too, according to the intention of our dear Associates, we try not to neglect anything to reduce the number.”⁴⁹

Three years after moving into the new Rencitang, the orphanage was once again running out of room. “Children arrive more abundantly than others sometimes there is more often ministry for M. le Curé and his vicars: baptisms, confirmations and burials almost every day. The

48. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 244. 2007 was a high enough number that I had to double-check the original source. “L'oeuvre de la Ste Enfants enregistrait 2.007 baptêmes d'enfants moribonds; 196 enfants en nourrice; 179 à l'orphelinat; 19 filles dont 12 païennes à l'école externe. Sa part de dépenses avait été de 26.852 francs.” If the number is accurate, that would mean the nuns were giving last rites to an average of 20 children each week in the two years before the 1870 riots. Little wonder many Tianjin residents associated the Sisters and their establishment with death.

49. Sister Marquet to the Holy Childhood, February 5, 1868. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM 1869., p. 531.

big house is starting to get too small,” Sister Dutrouilh wrote to Father Thierry in Beijing. “I do not really know where we are going to put our people for the Christmas party: ordinary days are full; that day, I think we will have to leave some in the yard.”⁵⁰

Chevrier followed up with a letter of his requesting additional funds: “We brought to Jen-tse-tang, already so full, to learn the doctrine, twenty-six people, including six women, eight boys, six girls from nine to fifteen and six more young children. I believe that there is no empty space left in [the] establishment. However, what annoys me the most is not the lack of premises, but rather the decline in *sapèques*.”⁵¹

Missionaries worked for God, but relied on earthly sponsors and patrons for funding. Local mission leaders like Father Chevrier and Sister Marquet, the new Sister Superior at the Rencintang, were required to submit regular reports with granular statistical data on the progress of their mission. Tables and charts reflected key performance indicators for a missions’ success, and maintaining good quarterly numbers was essential for continued funding.⁵² As with any start-up, early successes raised expectations. The number of orphans and baptisms fluctuated with local conditions, but those variations were not always easy to communicate to Paris and the leaders who approved the mission budget. Unsurprisingly, a few statistically inclined mission workers around China did the math and began offering cash bounties for baptisms and even for

50. Sister Dutrouilh to Thierry, December 21, 1867., Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 233.

51. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 233.

52. Harrison, “‘A Penny for the Little Chinese’: The French Holy Childhood Association in China, 1843–1951.”, p. 81.

adoptions.⁵³ Given the relative poverty of many villagers in China, particularly those who might be most inclined to give up their children to the orphanage, a bounty could be a powerful inducement.⁵⁴ It seems that sometime around 1867, the nuns at the Rencitang began a similar strategy. This might account for the sudden surge in adoptions in 1868-1869, but the boost in the numbers came at a high cost. Later, it became impossible to separate the Sisters' awkward solution to dwindling numbers from public perception that the missionaries were buying children for evil purposes.⁵⁵

Tianjin residents' distrust and resentment toward the mission was not likely to be improved by Father Chevrier's new passion project: the construction of an enormous stone church at Wanghailou.

When Chevrier took up his position in Tianjin in 1866, church-building had been very much on his mind, and he soon revived dormant plans for a church to replace the small chapel at Wanghailou. Chevrier wanted the church to be an "impregnable mansion," a citadel in the fight against satanic forces. It was Chevrier who suggested that the façade of the new church be built in line with that of the consulate so that the two structures gave the impression of a powerful bulwark on the banks of the Hai River. After his travails in the Mongolian badlands and the urban wilderness of Tianjin, the soldier-turned-priest would finally have his spiritual fortress.⁵⁶

Chevrier set about raising funds to cover the anticipated 8,000 taels of silver (about \$11,840) needed for construction. Donations came from the French government, fellow

53. Chevrier, June 25, 1867, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, pp. 272–273

54. Harrison, "'A Penny for the Little Chinese': The French Holy Childhood Association in China, 1843–1951.", p. 82.

55. See Tian Xiaoli, "Rumor and Secret Space: Organ-Snatching Tales and Medical Missions in Nineteenth-century China."

56. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province.*, p. 190.

missionaries (including Chevrier's old costumer Father Aymeri, the Lazarist procurator based in Shanghai). Chevrier's sister even sent him 100 ounces of silver from Lyon. For the next three years, the church became an all-consuming obsession for Chevrier, and he involved himself in almost every decision related to its construction, from the layout to the name and the planning of the consecration ceremony. The construction of *his* church became a singular fixation for Chevrier even as other duties demanded his time and attention.

The proposed site of the new church had a complicated history. In 1862, Chonghou arranged for Father Talmier to lease a plot of land at Wanghailou measuring about 2.5 acres. Talmier was delighted, but what Chonghou (not to mention the neighbors) understood to be a fixed-term lease with regular payments, Talmier saw as an opportunity to secure permanent rights to prime waterfront real estate right next to the consulate. Talmier didn't view the arrangement as a lease but a concession.⁵⁷ Where once an impressive imperial villa, two temples, and several surrounding shops and residences had stood before 1862, there was now a permanent French diplomatic station along with a chapel and mission house.

Even though France had established a concession area downstream at Zizhulin, French administrative and ecclesiastical interests in Tianjin were concentrated at the Wanghailou compound. The location's symbolic resonance and visibility trumped concerns that the compound was isolated and too far from the other consulates and concessions. In 1862, Bishop Mouly passed through Tianjin on his return trip from Paris, and was even then considering the potential of the site for church construction. "This place in Tianjin's suburbs is an excellent

57. A copy of the actual agreement between Chonghou and the French granting them title to Wanghailou can be found at the Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Nantes, France. An abridged version can also be found in 近代天津图志 *jindai Tianjin tuzhi* (*Atlas of Tianjin Modern History*), ed. Tianjin shi liwu bowuguan (Tianjin, 1992), p. 25

location. On the way to Beijing, Tianjin is the first gateway, and all Europeans will pass this way.”⁵⁸




Figure 5.2 Wanghailou and the Sanchahekou waterfront, ca. eighteenth century

The building of churches was one of the most contentious issues between foreign missionaries and members of Chinese communities, and protests over church construction would be a factor in many anti-missionary cases, including in Tianjin. As early as the Kangxi Era, Chinese literati had raised concerns about the architectural ambitions of the Christians. An official named Dong Han wrote in 1702, “If we let the petty barbarians from across the seas pour into China with their heterodox teachings and, in addition, build palatial residences to house them and provide them with rich emoluments to sustain them, when they beguile men’s hearts into rejecting the orthodox way whose fault will that be?”⁵⁹

58. Yu Xueyun 于学蕴 and Liu Lin 刘琳, *Tianjin lao jiaotang 天津老教堂 [Old Churches of Tianjin]*, p. 3; Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*. p. 183.

59. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 29.

Demands for land to build churches and missions became a standard part of negotiations between French authorities and Qing officials following anti-missionary or anti-Christian incidents in a particular area. In 1862, French missionaries were awarded a plot of land to build a public orphanage in Nanchang following an incident in that city.⁶⁰ In 1861, Jesuit representatives reclaimed a former church in Shanghai that had been converted into a temple to Guan Yu despite widespread public support for the shrine.⁶¹ In the city of Chengtang, not far from Tianjin, an imperial palace—albeit in need of renovation—was purchased by Jean-Baptiste Anouilh who then converted the space into a church, orphanage, and school. “I have already told you that the French legation has just obtained for me the imperial domain of the town of Tching-ting-fou. As this palace is in ruins, I must repair it: it is there that I am going to concentrate the main works of the vicariate. There is not yet a Church of God; but the devil has right next to me one of the most beautiful temples in the Chinese empire. The bronze statue of the very false god *Fo* is 72 feet high, his sanctuary is over 100, and this pagoda is half a league in length. This is a motive, it seems to me, for you to come to my aid to help me build a suitable Church which is not the laughingstock of the infidels.”⁶²

Bishop Mouly had dodged shells and bullets in 1860 to lay claim to the four churches in Beijing and the Catholic cemeteries located outside the city walls.⁶³ The properties were a legacy of the long history of missionaries working with the imperial court in Beijing. The South Church, where Mouly held the funeral mass for the men killed during the 1860 Anglo-French Expedition,

60. Suzanne Wilson Barnett, "Christianity in Rural China: Conflict and Accommodation in Jiangxi Province, 1860-1900," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 63, no. 3 (2004).

61. See Stefano Piastra, "Shanghai's Lao Tang ('Old Church') in Historical Cartography. Mapping and Perception of a Sensitive Place," (2014). Benot Vermander, Liz Hingley, and Liang Zhang, *Shanghai Sacred: The Religious Landscape of a Global City* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2018), p. 18.

62. Jean Baptiste-Anouilh to Paris, April 19, 1862. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM 31 1866., p. 27.

63. See Chapter 2.

had been established in 1605 by the Matteo Ricci. Johann Adam Schall von Bell petitioned the Shunzhi Emperor to allow the Jesuits to build a cathedral at the site in 1650 and a second renovation and expansion of the original church was completed in 1703 during the reign of the Kangxi Emperor.⁶⁴ In 1655, a second church was built on land granted to the Italian Jesuit, Lodovico Buglio (1606-1682) who used the church, known popularly as East Church, as a primary residence while serving at the imperial court.⁶⁵

The most prestigious church, due to its proximity to the imperial palace, was the North Church.⁶⁶ It had been built on a site decreed to the Jesuits in 1694 by the Kangxi Emperor, and the original church was completed in 1703. Unlike the South Church or the East Church, the North Cathedral abutted the wall of the Imperial City, the enclosure that encompassed the Forbidden City, the imperial gardens, and the temples, warehouses, and administrative offices serving the needs of the palace and its denizens.⁶⁷

All of Beijing's churches were seriously damaged by an earthquake that struck the capital region in 1730. The Kangxi Emperor's subsequent proscription of Christianity led to the churches and their attached buildings further deteriorating from not-so-benign neglect and conversion to more mundane purposes.⁶⁸ This had been the situation in Beijing in 1860 when

64. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province.*, pp. 75–77.

65. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province.*, p. 102.

66. The most thorough English language treatment of Joseph Mouly and his project to rebuild North Cathedral is Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral*. See also *China's old churches: the history, architecture, and legacy of Catholic sacred structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*, Chapter 3 (pp. 71–149).

67. A fourth “West Church” was later built inside of Xizhimen in 1723 by the Italian Lazarist Teodorico Pedrini (1671-1746). *China's old churches: The history, architecture, and legacy of Catholic sacred structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*, pp. 47–48.

68. Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral.*, p. 83.

Baron Gros and Prince Gong granted what remained of the properties to Joseph Mouly and the Lazarists.

In 1863, Bishop Mouly broke ground on a new cathedral to replace the old North Church. Mouly envisioned a great gothic structure whose towers would dwarf the original church and loom over the surrounding cityscape. Such a cathedral would proclaim the glory of the Christian religion to the people of Beijing.⁶⁹ Most structures in Beijing, except for a few shrines, palaces, and towers were low profile one-story buildings. Early European visitors walking the walls of Beijing looked down on a bowl of green—the tops of the city’s trees—with only a few obvious structures, including the central halls of the Forbidden City, the White Dagoba, and the Drum and Bell Tower, rising above the tree line. The new North Church, completed in 1864, rose high above the adjacent buildings, and the top of its twin spires possessed a commanding view into the forbidden gardens and palaces of the emperor. “The towers of the Pe-tang cathedral in Peking particularly irritated the Chinese,” wrote W. A. P. Martin, “and created a thousand problems for the legation.”⁷⁰

Bishop Mouly’s new church violated fundamental tenets governing the use of space in the city, putting Chinese notions of political geomancy on a collision course with the missionaries’ use of space to proclaim the superiority of French and Catholic civilization. Almost immediately, the propriety the endeavor was called into question by the court. Prince Gong had remonstrated against the plans to reopen, let alone rebuild, the North Church.⁷¹ In defiance,

69. Anthony E. Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and his Cathedral* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2019), p. 41.

70. Martin, *A Cycle of Cathay; or, China, South and North with personal reminiscences.*, p. 110.

71. Prince Gong to Baron Gros, November 5, 1860, and supplementary document, *Qingmo jiaozhan* 清末教案 [*Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing*], Volume 1., Document 147, Enclosure 1. There were also reports from missionaries in North China that the issue had moved to the streets, with one missionary warning of possible demonstrations by the Chinese community against the plans to rebuild the cathedral. *The Christian World Magazine*, Volume XVIII, January to December 1867. Published by the American and Foreign Christian Union, New York, 1867, p. 61

French minister Jules-Francois-Gustave Berthemy (1826–1902) reportedly shouted at the ceremony to lay the first stone, “It is France that lays this stone; woe betide him who dares move it.”⁷²

Unfortunately for Berthemy and his successors, the Qing court was willing to risk woe to move the church. In 1887, Empress Dowager Cixi wanted to reclaim the land in order to expand an adjacent garden known as Zhongnanhai.⁷³ The court offered to provide 400,000 taels of silver to the Catholic Church to relocate the cathedral to a new site a short distance away at a place called Xishiku. The negotiations stalled when Catholic officials were unwilling to make any agreements with the Qing government without first consulting the Legation. Eventually, the French government agreed to the move, despite Berthemy’s defiant stone placement, and an agreement was signed for the construction of a new cathedral at Xishiku.

The American minister to China, Charles Harvey Denby (1830–1904) wrote, “The settlement of the vexed question of the occupation of the Pei T’ang is eminently favorable to all religious associations. It establishes friendly relations between the Imperial Government and the leading Christian society in China.”⁷⁴

This spirit of “friendly relations” would be short-lived. In the turbulent summer of 1900, the cathedral became a focal point of Boxer violence and was besieged for several weeks. It was only through the stout defense organized by the Lazarist bishop Pierre-Marie-Alphonse Favier (1837–1905) that the church and many of the people inside were saved.⁷⁵

72. Quoted in Anthony E. Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and his Cathedral* (Seattle: University of Washington, 2019), p. 128.

73. Since 1949, Zhongnanhai has served as a residential and office space for the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.

74. Denby to Bayard, December 12, 1888, in *Executive Documents of the House of Representatives for the United States of America, 1889–’90* Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890.

75. See “A Western Account of the Boxer Rebellion at Peking,” Excerpted from W. A. P. Martin, *The Siege in Peking, China against the World.*, By an New York, F. H. Revell Company, 1900. Favier arrived in China on the same ship that carried the nuns to Tianjin in 1862. See Chapter 3.

If Mouly was willing to court controversy by building a cathedral right in the heart of the Imperial City, one can imagine the attitude of those missionaries working in places far away from the capital. Within a year of the signing of the Beijing Convention in 1860, the Catholic Church broke ground on a massive stone cathedral in Guangzhou built on the ruins of the former yamen of Ye Mingchen. Also known as the “Stone Church,” this “granite monument to God” is still the largest gothic cathedral in East Asia. On January 1, 1861, French government officials and the first vicar apostolic of Guangdong, Bishop Philippe Francois Zephirin Guillemin (1814-1886) concluded an agreement with the new governor-general, Lao Chongguang (1802-1867). France would take possession of about 65 mu of land surrounding the former headquarters of Ye Mingchen on the grounds that the site was ‘compensation’ for former missionary properties destroyed following the earlier proscription of Catholicism.⁷⁶

The selection of Ye Mingchen’s yamen was intentional. At the outbreak of the Arrow War in 1856, British ships heavily shelled the city of Guangzhou causing massive property damage. In the fighting, Ye Mingchen’s yamen was almost totally destroyed before foreign troops captured Ye Mingchen and sent the unfortunate governor-general on his one-way trip to Calcutta. Construction of the church was a symbolic punishment against an official whose inability to compromise was cited by both Britain and France as a reason for the war. Guangzhou officials offered several sites that were recently vacated and cleared by foreign bombs, but French negotiators insisted on the former yamen. On the Feast of the Sacred Heart in 1861, workers began foundation work for the cathedral with donations from French Catholics and support from Emperor Napoleon III.⁷⁷

76. Xiang, Hongyan. “Building an Ecclesiastical Real Estate Empire in Late Imperial China.” *The Catholic Historical Review* 104, no. 4 (2019): 636–658.

77. Xiang Hongyan, "Land, Church, and Power: French Catholic Mission in Guangzhou, 1840-1930" (PhD Pennsylvania State University, 2014)., pp. 119–120.

The project in Guangzhou was almost immediately beset by problems. Cantonese workers had little experience with constructing such an enormous structure entirely of stone. Architect Leon Vautrin (1820-1884) based his design on the Basilica de St. Clotilde in Paris, but the builders working on the project simply did not have the engineering skills needed to realize Vautrin's vision. In addition, tensions in Guangzhou had scarcely abated with the end of the war. Residents felt as though they were living under occupation, and there was growing discontent not only against the invaders but also toward the officials who appeared more interested in keeping peace with the foreign powers than protecting the common people. Several homes and shops in the surrounding area also were leveled to make room for the huge foundation of the cathedral, the attached mission school, orphanage, and vicarage. All of this was done with the explicit approval of Lao Chongguang. The outrages included an official order that nearby homes were not allowed to build windows looking out onto the construction site and that existing views needed to be obstructed by bricks.⁷⁸

In the first year of construction, villagers attacked laborers quarrying granite for the cathedral foundation, severely beating six men. Lao Chongguang had to appeal to central authorities for an imperial edict authorizing access to the quarry and the stone.⁷⁹ The new church was finally consecrated 1863 with a huge celebration coinciding with the Feast of the Immaculate Conception. The diplomatic and clerical representatives of the foreign powers residing in Guangzhou at the time, Qing officials, and a contingent of banner troops, all attended the ceremony. French consul Baron Gilbert de Trenquallye and Bishop Guillemin gave speeches

78. Xiang Hongyan, "Land, Church, and Power: French Catholic Mission in Guangzhou, 1840-1930." p. 145.

79. Xiang Hongyan, "Land, Church, and Power: French Catholic Mission in Guangzhou, 1840-1930." p. 130.

as two special stones were laid, one with the engraving 'Jerusalem 1863' and the other 'Roma 1863.' Each was placed carefully on soil brought to China from those sites.⁸⁰

The office of the governor-general was the symbol of Qing authority in Guangzhou. It was looted and destroyed, and the governor-general exiled from his home country. French religious and diplomatic officials then re-sacralized the space. Even the ground was re-sodded with new earth imported and imbued with Christian symbolism. The civilizing mission required Chinese spaces to be reformed into understandable terrain for the imposition of a specific set of values. Not all examples of missionary activities or construction were as literal an act of deterritorialization and reterritorialization as the construction of the Sacred Heart Cathedral in Guangzhou or the enlargement of the North Church in Beijing, but the underlying motivation behind the building of churches was to establish a beachhead for the spiritual, cultural, and physical remapping of unfamiliar terrain for the benefit of the foreign powers.⁸¹

The controversy around the building of churches was compounded by the ambiguity of the Beijing Convention of 1860.⁸² Although the Chinese text of the Beijing Convention gave foreign missionaries the right to buy and lease land for mission purposes, local officials sought to stonewall these transactions by insisting that missionaries first apply to the consuls of their respective nations stating their intent to acquire land. Once approved by the consuls, applications

80. Xiang Hongyan, "Land, Church, and Power: French Catholic Mission in Guangzhou, 1840-1930." p. 128. These projects were not confined to China. 1863 also marked the breaking ground of the Notre-Dame Basilica in Saigon, a Gothic cathedral finally completed in 1877. Like the Stone Church in Guangzhou, the Cathedral in Saigon also stands to this day. Anthony E. Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and his Cathedral*, p. XIV.

81. Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang, "Spatial Struggles: Postcolonial Complex, State Disenchantment, and Popular Reappropriation of Space in Rural Southeast China," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 63, no. 3 (2004). For a discussion of these processes in a global context, see Stuart Elden, "Missing the point: Globalization, Deterritorialization and the Space of the World," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30, no. 1 (2005). Unlike similar structures in Beijing and Tianjin, the original structure of Sacred Heart Cathedral has survived more or less intact into the 21st century and remains a prominent religious landmark in Guangzhou, offering weekly services in Cantonese, Mandarin, Korean, and English.

82. See Chapter 2.

would then be forwarded to officials in the relevant jurisdictions for approval before transactions could be finalized. Moreover, local officials continued to insist that properties could only be rented or sold to the mission collectively and not be held in the name of individuals. The result was that even as churches were being built in Beijing and Guangzhou, missionaries in other cities and towns chafed at what they saw as unreasonable—and possibly illegal—bureaucratic obstructionism on the part of local authorities.⁸³

In 1865, French Minister Jules Berthemy sent a memorandum to the Zongli Yamen requesting a clarification and simplification of the process of missionaries buying and renting land. The Berthemy Convention of 1865 reiterated the terms of the Beijing Convention insofar as mission property was held collectively and not by individual missionaries or local Christians, but the transaction only required a simple declaration stating “I <name> intend to sell my property to the Catholic Church and to make this property part of the communal property of the church.” The convention removed the need for government approval and deprived local officials of an important mechanism they had previously used to regulate missions’ activities in their jurisdictions.⁸⁴

In 1869, Jesuit missionaries in Zhangzhou attempted to purchase land for a church in that city only to cancel their plans after placards circulated reading “Drive Away the Western Devils! Let the flesh of the person who dares to sell an inch of land for the building of a church be

83. Xiang, Hongyan. “Regulating Church Property in Late Imperial China.” *Frontiers of History in China* 12.1 (2017): 93–111, p. 100; Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, p. 32.

84. Xiang, Hongyan. “Regulating Church Property in Late Imperial China.” *Frontiers of History in China* 12.1 (2017): 93–111, p. 100; See also *Qingmo jiaoyan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 305. Ultimately, it was left to one of Berthemy’s successors, Auguste Gérard to finally settle the matter in 1895. By that time, military defeats by France and Japan had weakened the resolve of the Zongli Yamen in supporting local officials against the missionaries. The Gérard Addendum restored most of the original intent of Berthemy’s 1865 Convention and ordered local officials to charge the same fees for missionary property transactions as they did for all other transactions, thus removing another point of friction between the missions and the local authorities.

skinned alive and eaten raw.” Residents in these places stood ready to make good on the threats. In 1869, an English church in Sichuan was destroyed.⁸⁵ A year later, when the Catholic mission announced plans to build a new church in Nanning, which had already been the site of several serious anti-missionary incidents, people protested to authorities. The governor of Jiangxi, Liu Kunyi (1830-1902), wrote to the Zongli Yamen to tell them that should the mission go ahead with their plans for a church, he could not guarantee the safety of the missionaries or the church.⁸⁶ Chevrier’s plans for a new church in Tianjin would provoke similar outrage in that city.⁸⁷

On June 3, 1867, Father Chevrier notified Bishop Mouly that he had raised the necessary funds and was ready to begin construction, but Chevrier faced the question of who would oversee the technical aspects of the project. Father Paul-Joseph Marty (1829–1873) was the principal architect for the Lazarists, but with so many construction projects undertaken by the French missionaries in the 1860s, Marty was very much in demand. Until 1872, when Marty returned to Paris for reasons of exhaustion and poor health, he was almost constantly on the move between cities and villages supervising the construction of churches, chapels, and missions.⁸⁸ “I would be very happy to be able to count on dear Brother Marty for the next year,”

85. Cohen, *China and Christianity*, p. 222; Wyman, Judith. “The Ambiguities of Chinese Antiforeignism: Chongqing, 1870–1900.” *Late Imperial China* 18, no. 2 (1997): 86–122.

86. Cohen, *China and Christianity*, p. 219.

87. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province.*, pp. 182–183.

88. J. Van den Brandt, *Les Lazaristes en Chine, 1697–1935*, Notes Biographiques (Peking, 1936), p. 69. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province.*, p. 184; Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral.*, pp. 184.

Chevrier wrote to Bishop Mouly. “If you could lend him to me, God willing, we would try and begin construction and have our church built by 1868.”⁸⁹

Unfortunately, Brother Marty could not be promised to Tianjin in the timeline Chevrier wished for his church, but in a follow-up letter to Bishop Mouly, Chevrier revealed for the first time the provocative name he chose for his yet-to-be-built church. “Despite my fear of not having Brother Marty next year, I still want to hope. I believe that the existence of a pretty little church in Tientsin, which would be dedicated to Notre Dame des Victoires [Our Lady of Victories] if Your Greatness approves it, would make many more conversions than our insipid and lukewarm words.” Chevrier also asked Mouly to approve the purchase of a small statue of Our Lady of Victories for placement in the chapel at Rencitang.⁹⁰

Notre Dame des Victoires was a name suited for a church championed by a former soldier. It represented France’s reemergence as a European power and the role the French government played in establishing a religious protectorate in China. However, as Alan Sweeten has argued, divorced of its spiritual and political context, the name, especially when translated into Chinese, (*sheng mu desheng tang* 圣母德胜堂) conveyed a different meaning to people who had lived through repeated occupations and the imposition of international settlements in their city. Most Tianjin residents referred to the church as the Wanghailou Church, preferring a geographic description to the impolitic official name.⁹¹ Bishop Mouly had approved of

89. Chevrier to Bishop Mouly, June 3, 1867. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 271.

90. Chevrier to Bishop Mouly, June 25, 1867. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 272.

91. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province.*, p. 185. See also Yu Xueyun 于学蕴 and Liu Lin 刘琳, *Tianjin lao jiaotang 天津老教堂 [Old Churches of Tianjin]*.

Chevrier's decision for the church's patron, although other Lazarists, including Mouly's eventual successor Bishop Guierry, were less enthusiastic.⁹²

In January 1868, Father Marty finally presented his vision for the Notre Dame des Victoires church in Tianjin, but Marty's many commitments delayed breaking ground in Tianjin until the following year. Chevrier asked Mouly to, if possible, impart a sense of urgency on the overcommitted Brother Marty. "I very much wish that Brother Marty could be sent to Tien-tsin as soon as possible. I only see him buy bricks, lumber, etc., etc., please, etc."⁹³

Bishop Mouly reported to Paris about the status of Chevrier's project: "M. Chevrier had proposed to have the foundations laid this year for his church, which we will dedicate to Notre Dame-des-Victoire, and which, for years, everyone has desired with the greatest impatience. Having granted His Exc. Mr. the Minister of France, our dear Brother Marty to build the quay, in front of the Consulate and the House of the Mission, we hoped that the two works, located on the same ground, could easily be directed at the same time. Consequently, M Chevrier had already asked me to come and bless the first stone of his church, but the two works not having been able to go together, our dear Brother contented himself with disposing of the premises for next year, towards the end of June."⁹⁴

When the foundations for the church were finally completed in August 1868, Chevrier installed a small monument to Notre Dame de Victoires on the site, and in December of that

92. Chevrier to Guierry, March 27 and March 29, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 244.

93. Chevrier to Mouly, December 31, 1868. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 319.

94. Joseph Mouly to Secretary General in Paris, October 27, 1867. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, Annales CM 1869, p. 78

same year, purchased a bell for 3,000 francs. “It’s a lot of money, you might say, and maybe others might say so too, but she is beautiful; I was burning with the desire to acquire it. If you wish to blame me, I beg you to soften the blow; it seems to me that Bishop Mouly once insinuated to me that I could buy it; and is it not in accordance with the nature of things that the peals of Our Lady of Victories shall resound into the distance?”⁹⁵ Chevrier’s excitement for his new bell is palpable, but history does not record what the church’s neighbors thought of this new addition to their daily soundscape.

Joseph Mouly passed away in December 1868 after a 34-year career as a missionary in China. Upon hearing of Mouly’s death, Chevrier traveled to Beijing where he assisted at in the mass and burial. The late bishop’s funeral procession through the streets of the capital included representatives from France, England, Russia, and Prussia, and the Russian Archimandrite. Thousands of curious spectators watched as over 60 bearers carried a 12-foot-high catafalque and an enormous wooden cross along a two-mile route while children and congregants sang hymns. Outside the city, dignitaries switched to carts and horses as the coffin continued another five miles to the Catholic cemetery that also contained the tombs of Matteo Ricci and Johann Adam Schall von Bell.⁹⁶

When Chevrier returned to Tianjin, he continued his persistent lobbying, now addressing Mouly’s successor, Bishop Guierry. “I beg you to make known your thoughts on the following project: For the feast of Pentecost, I would like to invite Your Greatness, M. de Rochechouart

95. Chevrier to Mouly, December 3, 1868. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 315.

96. Favier to Paris, December 18, 1868. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. *Annales CM*, 1869. Today the cemetery is somewhat awkwardly surrounded by the grounds of the “Beijing Administrative College,” the Communist Party training center serving the Beijing Municipality.

[the new charge d'affaires at the French Legation], (and by means of M. le Comte, the Tch'oung ta-jen), Mother Azaïs, the English consul, the Russian consul... At the end we will have a solemnity like the mission of Tien-tsin has never seen, on the occasion of the laying of the first stone of the church of Our Lady of Victories. Perhaps we could also baptize our beautiful bell and propose to M. de Rochechouart to be godfather along with Mother Azaïs?"⁹⁷

If Chevrier expected Guierry to continue Mouly's support for the Tianjin church, then his new commanding officer soon disabused the former soldier of that notion. Bishop Guierry expressed dissatisfaction with some of Chevrier's church plans, including the name. Guierry suggested the church honor the founder of their order, Vincent de Paul, an idea that provoked a strong reaction from Chevrier.

"I confess to you, Monsignor, that I am a little dejected when I heard that it was a question of giving our church another Patron than Our Lady of Victories. Having several letters from Bishop Mouly which approve this patronage, I thought that it was done and that certainly Your Greatness had also given its approval. It is on both knees that I beg you to leave me Notre Dame des Victoires."⁹⁸

Chevrier followed that up two days later with a note to Guierry that read, "I hope that Pentecost will be a particularly beautiful feast for Tien-tsin. It is always on my knees that I beg

97. Chevrier to Guierry, March 5, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, pp. 329–331

98. Chevrier to Guierry, March 29, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 343.

Your Greatness to leave us Our Lady of Victories as our first patron. I am sure that St. Vincent will not blame you; besides, he will have, like St. Joseph, a beautiful altar in a small chapel.”⁹⁹

Chevrier had been addressing his letters from “N-D des Victoires” since the summer of 1868 and tried his best to push ahead despite Guierry’s reluctance. The bishop eventually softened his stance on the issue of the name and, true to his word, on May 16, 1869, Chevrier conducted a Pentecostal mass celebrating the laying of the first stone for his new church. “All of the Consuls of Tien-tsin and five great Chinese mandarins with red buttons had responded to the invitation made by the Consul of France,” Chevrier wrote. “The sisters were also there in respectable numbers. The large and collected crowd was formed of Christians, catechumens, and many pagans attracted by the spectacle of this solemnity, who did not know how to show themselves that day respectful and sympathetic.”¹⁰⁰

The behavior of the onlookers was one of many indications that the construction of the church was a provocative act, and the church drew the nearly universal ire of Tianjin’s residents. From the name to the height of the building to the large new bell and the prominent location on the city’s waterfront, everything about Notre Dame des Victoires seemed calculated to elicit a strong reaction from Tianjin’s non-Christian masses.

The architecture of Notre Dame des Victoires reflected a fad for gothic-style church construction in vogue among French missionaries at this time.¹⁰¹ The center of the façade rose

99. Chevrier to Guierry, March 29, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 344.

100. May 16, 1869, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 352.

101. See Clark, *China Gothic: The Bishop of Beijing and His Cathedral.*, p. 73.

dramatically in a flat-topped bell tower that dominated the surrounding area's skyline.¹⁰² Two supporting octagonal towers with narrow windows—like gun slots according to historian Alan Sweeten—gave the church a fortress-like appearance to match its bellicose name.¹⁰³



Figure 5.3 The church at Wanghailou, Notre Dame des Victoires.¹⁰⁴

On January 27, 1870, Chevrier wrote to his sister. She had been one of the first donors who had contributed to the realization of the priest's dream of building a church in Tianjin: "Our beautiful church, although unfinished, was handed over to divine worship on December 8. Already the district of Tien-tsin has felt the wonderful effects of the protection of our loving and powerful Mother. The work of the catechumens is in the process of prosperity; since the feast of

102. This description of the church is based on Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*. p. 187. Sweeten disputes sources claiming the original tower was 33 feet (10 meters) in height, noting that the central tower in subsequent iterations of the Notre-Dame des Victoires church, the tower was recorded as being nearly 72 feet (22 meters) tall.

103. Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*. p. 187. See also Yu Xueyun 于学蕴 and Liu Lin 刘琳, *Tianjin laojiaotang 天津老教堂 [Old Churches of Tianjin]*.

104. Image from Sweeten, *China's Old Churches: The History, Architecture, and Legacy of Catholic Sacred Structures in Beijing, Tianjin, and Hebei Province*. p. 187.

the Immaculate Conception, I have baptized 32 adults, and by Easter I hope to regenerate another 70 to 80.”¹⁰⁵ By the spring of 1870, the mission could count the new church among several successes, including an increasing number of new converts. The orphanage and dispensary were busy, as was the attached school for the young fosters and older aspiring congregants, but what Chevrier considered to be triumphs only increased the danger to the missionaries.

The church was an all too visible symbol that the foreigners, especially the missionaries, intended to stay and expand their activities. While other foreign consuls worked and lived a mile downstream, removed from the bustle of the Chinese city, the French consulate and church stood proudly overlooking the city’s busiest wharf and waterway. The nuns were proud of the numbers of baptisms, converts, and orphans they had, but the community was alarmed at the number of children who entered the orphanage only to leave in coffins. Non-Christians were not allowed inside mission properties, making it hard to disprove the wild stories circulated by polemics like the *Bixie Jishi*, anti-Christian placards, and backstreet gossip.

On the surface, however, Tianjin seemed calm, especially compared to the ongoing anti-missionary and anti-Christian violence incidents in remoter regions like Guangxi and Sichuan. For nearly a decade, the Zongli Yamen, and officials like Chonghou and his brother Chongshi, had worked with foreign representatives and officials to defuse tensions and avoid having local incidents escalate into large-scale violence or war. For the most part, they enjoyed the cooperation of the foreign ministers and consuls. Even the staff of the French Legation, as committed as they were to the extension of a civilizing mission and religious protectorate in China, found it occasionally necessary to tamp down the enthusiasm of French missionaries and

105. January 27, 1870, Chevrier to his sister. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, pp. 359.

gently remind them not to abuse their treaty privileges. Many of the French diplomats in China were not religious personally, and their political support for the church and its missions blew hot or cold depending upon the needs of Paris.

That situation would change in 1865, when a new Charge d'affaires, Henry de Bellonet (1832-1881), arrived at the French Legation in Beijing. Bellonet challenged the Zongli Yamen and intervened directly in missionary cases in both China and Korea. Count Julien Rochechouart, who took over the post in 1868, continued the activist policies of Bellonet. Rochechouart's bellicosity would reflect a perilous impatience with officials who failed to enforce treaty rights and his actions would usher in a new era of confrontation.

Chapter 6: The Count and the Prince

In 1866, a young French nobleman sailed up the Hai River and took in the city of Tianjin and its surroundings. He was unimpressed. “The French consulate is situated in a charming position in any other country, built on the water’s edge, at the mouth of the Pei-ho and the Imperial Canal. All the movement of Tien-sin takes place in front of his door. But the water in the Pei-ho is dirty, yellow, muddy, and covered with miserable and disgusting boats. The eddy formed by the two currents has another disadvantage, that of stopping the corpses which descend towards the sea. Right in front of the consulate, there are times when these mass graves become intolerable, and I have seen myself, on a second trip that I made to Tien-tsin a few months later, the corpses encumbered the river to such an extent that we were obliged to take police measures to make them disappear.”¹

Julien de Rochechouart (1831–1879) was the scion of an illustrious French family. His father, Louis-Victor-Leon (1788–1858), had been a general who opposed Napoleon and fought in the Royalist, Imperial Russian, and then Bourbon armies during the Napoleonic Wars before serving in the government of Louis XVIII. The younger Rochechouart joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1860 and then spent six years in the French legation in Tehran.

Rochechouart arrived in China as Legation First Secretary with the newly-named Charge d’affaires, Comte Charles de Lallemand (1826-1904). Less than two years later, Lallemand requested home leave of six months and never returned. Rochechouart was appointed de Lallemand’s replacement in 1868, making him the third French charge d’affaires for China in the three years since Jules Berthemy resigned.

1. Julien de Rochechouart, *Pékin et l’intérieur de la Chine [Peking and the Interior of China]* (Paris: Plon, 1878), p. 200.

Henry de Bellonet, Berthemy's immediate successor, had filled the post temporarily with the assumption that Berthemy—who traveled back to France at the end of 1865 for health reasons—would return to China following a period of recuperation and rest. Bellonet served as interim charge d'affaires for less than a year, but it was a busy 12 months.

In the summer of 1866, The French Legation in Beijing received a message from the consulate in Tianjin. Gabriel Devéria reported hearing news from sailors about anti-Christian persecutions in Korea and the execution of nine French Jesuit missionaries.² French Rear Admiral Gustav Roze (1812-1883) was in Tianjin at the time, and he decided to take action against the Koreans, even before word of the situation made its way to Beijing or Paris.

Roze and Bellonet's responses to the executions on the Korean peninsula present an excellent example of the dangers of overreach by French diplomatic and military representatives in Asia seeking to protect and extend France's religious protectorate.³ Bellonet's active defense of the rights of Catholic missionaries to proselytize would be repeated by his successors, particularly Julien Rochechouart, with decidedly mixed results. His harangues against Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen because of the Korean incident contributed to a growing awareness among Qing officials about the difficulties of dealing with the French compared to the other foreign powers.⁴

Bellonet had tangled with the Zongli Yamen before. Ongoing tensions over missionary activities in southwest China, particularly in Sichuan, resulted in a diplomatic debacle that

2. For a full account of these events and Bellonet's role, see Kane, Daniel C. "Bellonet and Roze: Overzealous Servants of Empire and the 1866 French Attack on Korea." *Korean Studies* 23 (1999): 1–23.

3. Kane, Daniel C. "Bellonet and Roze: Overzealous Servants of Empire and the 1866 French Attack on Korea." *Korean Studies* 23 (1999).

4. An observation made by both Ding Richang and Zeng Guofan in the aftermath of the Tianjin Massacre. See Memorial draft in *Xiang Xiang Zeng Shi Wenjian*, Volume 7, pp. 4502; Final version received by throne on September 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaoyan 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing]*, Volume 1. Document No. 632; Li Chuanbin, "Shixi Zeng Guofan de jidujiao guan 试析曾国藩的基督教观 [An Analysis of Zeng Guofan's View of Christianity]."

strained ties between the French Legation and their Qing counterparts in the months prior to the Korea fiasco. In January, 1866, the Zongli Yamen sent a note to Bellonet asking him to consider a proposal with ten articles for the regulation of Christian activities.⁵ The original document had been forwarded to the Zongli Yamen by Chongshi, who claimed it had been jointly drafted with Annet-Théophile Pinchon (1814–1891), then serving as Vicar Apostolic for northern Sichuan.⁶ The proposed recommendations reflected the challenges local officials had in dealing with the flood of foreign missionaries since the Treaty of Tianjin and 1858 and the Beijing Convention of 1860, including several injunctions against missionaries interfering in criminal or civil cases involving Christians.

The trouble started when Bellonet sent copies of the proposal to all the bishops based in China. Louis Faurie (1824–1871) in Guizhou not only expressed dismay at the content of the circular—nearly every bishop responded with similar expressions of opposition—but also suspected the document of being a forgery. These suspicions were confirmed in the summer of 1866 when it was discovered that the Latin wording on the document’s seal, supposedly the seal of Bishop Pinchon, had been reversed. Bellonet was furious and accused the Zongli Yamen, Chongshi, and officials in Sichuan of bad faith.⁷

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5. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*, pp. 149–150. Daigle, Jean-Guy. “Challenging the Imperial Order: The Precarious Status of Local Christians in Late-Qing Sichuan.” *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 4.1 (2005): 1–29; Daniel Kane places the “Case of the Spurious Ten Articles” in the context of the Korean crisis in Kane, Daniel C. “Bellonet and Roze: Overzealous Servants of Empire and the 1866 French Attack on Korea.” *Korean Studies* 23 (1999), p. 8.
 6. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*, p. 149. *Qingmo jiaao ’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Volume 1, Document No. 338
 7. Bellonet to the Zongli Yamen, July 9, 1866. *Qingmo jiaao ’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Volume 1, No. 362. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*, p. 153.

As a result of the incident, Bellonet was primed for a fight with the Zongli Yamen even before he had heard of the tragedy in Korea. The same month Bellonet presented evidence of forgery of the Pinchon document, he informed Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen of his intention to use military force against the Korean court to obtain reparations for the deaths of the nine French missionaries there. “The day on which the King of Korea laid his hands upon my unhappy countrymen,” Bellonet wrote to Prince Gong, “was the last of his reign, he himself proclaimed its end which I in my turn solemnly declare today. In a few days, our military forces are to march to the conquest of Korea and my august Emperor [Napoleon III] reserves the right and the power to dispose of the country and vacant throne as he sees fit.”⁸ Neither Prince Gong nor the Korean court was moved by Bellonet’s blustering. In August, Prince Gong shared copies of the French diplomat’s threatening letters with the other representatives in Beijing, As Prince Gong anticipated, Bellonet’s absence of tact inspired little sympathy from his fellow foreign representatives.

A lack of adequate information about the treacherous currents and terrain of the Korean coastline obliged Admiral Roze to scale back his plans for a military assault. After occupying the city of Ganghwa for two months, winter weather and a robust Korean military build-up caused Roze to retreat. Plans to return the following year for a strong show of force were scrapped following the heavy losses by the French army in the Second Franco-Mexican War (1861–1867).

Bellonet’s handling of the Sichuan forgery case and the Korean debacle left French relations with the Qing court on shaky ground when Count de Lallemand and Julien Rochechouart arrived to take up their new posts. Lallemand did what he could to repair the damage caused by Bellonet’s disastrous tenure, but Lallemand left China after only two years

8. Quoted in Kane, Daniel C. “Bellonet and Roze: Overzealous Servants of Empire and the 1866 French Attack on Korea.” *Korean Studies* 23 (1999), p. 8.

(his formal excuse was a general failing of the eyes). He turned management of the Legation over to Rochechouart, urging his deputy to cooperate whenever possible with the Zongli Yamen.

Count Julien de Rochechouart formally assumed his duties as the French charge d'affaires in China in November 1868 and held the post until 1871. In addition to being a champion of French imperial interests and a staunch supporter of Emperor Napoleon III, Rochechouart was also the brother-in-law of the French historian and prominent Liberal Catholic Count Charles-Forbes René de Montalembert (1810–1870).⁹ Rochechouart ignored his predecessor's warning, and embarked on a series of military adventures that alarmed the other foreign powers while inflaming anti-French sentiments among Qing officials.

The interventionist policies of Bellonet and Rochechouart set them apart from the other foreign representatives in China. As Paul Cohen argued, for the British, "war was too expensive and, in view of China's political weakness, might well lead to colonial responsibilities that Britain was simply unwilling to shoulder."¹⁰ Although Sir Rutherford Alcock (1809–1897) deployed gunboats to settle disputes in Yangzhou and Taiwan in 1868, British missionaries were warned that their actions might have consequences and that the British authorities could not always be counted upon for military support.¹¹ For example, Alcock tersely denied a request made by the British consul at Hankou for a gunboat to be permanently stationed in that city following the appearance of anti-Christian placards there in late 1868. "I do not consider it either necessary or possible for Her Majesty's Government to provide a gun-boat to be stationed at

9. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2. Volume II, p. 343.

10. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 192., Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, pp. 42–43.

11. Yinghui Duan, "1868 年扬州教案解析 1868 nian Yangzhou jiao'an jixi [An Analysis of the 1868 Yangzhou Anti-Missionary Case]," *周口师范学院学报 zhoukou shifan xueyuan xuebao [Journal of Zhuokou Normal University]* 31, no. 3 (2014).

every port... if the missionaries cannot carry on their labors at Wuchang peaceably, and without an appeal to force for their protection, it seems very doubtful how far Her Majesty's Government will hold themselves justified in resorting to measures of a warlike character for their protection away from the ports."¹²

Alcock warned of the danger for consular officials involving themselves in criminal cases or obstructing local authorities from enforcing the law, no matter how unfair those laws or investigations might appear to be. "Who is determine when [catechists and converts]... are accused of offending against the laws, that they have done nothing in contravention of Chinese law? How is false or conflicting evidence to be sifted in a case occurring in the heart of one of the provinces far removed from any consular authority? And supposing a Consul could proceed to the spot, he is such an officer to go behind the judgment of a Chinese magistrate and establish by unquestionable evidence that the witnesses have borne false testimony and that the Judge has been guilty of an unrighteous judgment? And to what attempts to secure justice between Chinese Christians and their own authorities lead, or where could they end, save in perpetual and forceful intervention between authorities and subjects fatal to any native executive powers if successful and fraught with infinite wrong and mischief to those whom it desired to protect if the reverse."¹³

Alcock's analysis focused on the problem of missionary—and by extension diplomatic—interference in local law enforcement. It also touched on a broader issue: Western notions of religious liberty versus Chinese concepts of social stability and rule by law. "Who is trace the limits of persecution for religion's sake and the rightful assumption of the territorial authorities

12. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 193.

13. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 198.

to pursue crime and maintain order...? Or discover with certainty when the action of the Magistrate is dictated by the or other motive?"¹⁴

British restraint contrasted with French activism, especially during Julien Rochechouart's tenure. One important result of the treaties of 1844, 1858, and 1860 was to place Roman Catholic missionaries—and by extension all Chinese Catholics—under the protection of the French government.¹⁵ Even later, during the Third Republic (1870–1940), when anti-clerical Republics sought to severely undermine and curtail the influence of the Church in France, in Asia there remained a partnership between the Catholic Church and French colonial and diplomatic representatives.¹⁶ Unlike the Portuguese, who had previously claimed jurisdiction, the French did not involve themselves in internal Church affairs like the naming of bishops or other clerical appointments, but they were far more aggressive in defending and aiding the missions.¹⁷

In September 1868, Rochechouart sent a circular letter to the heads of all the Catholic missions in China, regardless of nationality, reinforcing the French Protectorate in East Asia. Although the other foreign powers acknowledged the protectorate, the Spanish Minister, Garcia de Quevedo objected, claiming that the Spanish Dominicans, most of whom were in Taiwan, would be protected by Spain. Unfortunately for Spain's minister, the Dominicans felt differently about the situation. "We have received a communication from M. de Quevedo in which he intends to place us under his protection," wrote Fernando Saïnez, a Dominican based in Taiwan, "but European protection that is not backed by warships is of no value in China?"¹⁸

14. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 198.

15. See Chapter 2.

16. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, p. 42.

17. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, p. 42.

18. Quoted in Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*, p. 639.

Rochechouart wasted little time showing his teeth when a French priest, Jean François Rigaud, and dozens of Christians were reported killed in Youyang, Sichuan in January 1869.¹⁹

Youyang was in a mountainous region between the river port city of Chongqing and the borders of Yunnan and Guizhou provinces. It was a wild area with a majority non-Han population not unlike the district where Father Chapdelaine, Agnes Cai, and Lawrence Bai had been killed over a decade earlier.²⁰ French missionaries had arrived in the area beginning in 1862 but failed to understand the tangled overlay of clan, ethnic, and political power structures that governed the district. In 1865, hundreds of rioters stormed the mission and a French priest named Mabileau was beaten to death in the attack. After Henry Bellonet protested to the Zongli Yamen, one of the suspected culprits was executed, and France received 80,000 taels of silver in compensation.²¹

The church in Youyang was rebuilt, but tensions continued between Christians non-Christians. During the winter of 1868–1869, a local militia group recruited men from the surrounding area, including over the border in Guangxi, to expel the foreign missionaries. On January 31, 1869, the militia attacked and again burned down the church, killing Father Mabileau's successor, Jean-François Rigaud. Rigaud's body and those of 39 other people identified as Christians were found in the ruins of the church. In retaliation, some of the Christian leaders in the community organized their own militia and launched a series of reprisals against non-Christians. Over 100 men and women were killed in sporadic clashes that spring.²²

19. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 427. See also Cohen, po. 209; Chongshi's report of nine structures and over 100 casualties, QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 431.

20. See Chapter 1.

21. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 306.

22. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Documents No. 427 and 431 (Reports from Chongshi), and 437 (Notes and Memoranda).

Rochechouart demanded the Zongli Yamen respond to the outrages in Sichuan. Prince Gong attempted to mollify Rochechouart, promising to dismiss the prefect of Youyang County for negligence in his duties and to direct the other officials to arrest the murderers.²³ This had been how the Zongli Yamen had dealt with earlier cases involving foreign missionaries, but Rochechouart was, by nature, impatient and disinclined to trust the ability of the Qing government to manage its treaty obligations effectively.

Rochechouart's mistrust put the Zongli Yamen in a bind. The purpose of the office was to act as an honest broker, helping to arbitrate disputes by reconciling the complaints from foreign missionaries with the grievances of local stakeholders.²⁴ Foreign representatives received most of their intelligence via missionary channels while the Qing court relied on the upward flow of information through the official bureaucracy. Inevitably, the same event would generate wildly divergent narratives. This required the Zongli Yamen to walk a narrow path between minimizing the more hysterical theories of the foreigners—who tended to imagine broad conspiracies going to the very top of Qing administration—and officials and residents who assumed the stories of Christian witchcraft, devilry, and magic to be true. The growing number, and increasing violence, of anti-missionary cases in the late 1860s compromised the ability of the Zongli Yamen to find middle ground and threatened a decade of hard work maintaining the fragile peace.²⁵

In response to the death of Father Rigaud, Rochechouart sent a series of ultimatums to the Zongli Yamen. The first, received on March 3, demanded reparations for all property lost in the riots, as well as for the death of the French priest. Rochechouart requested that the governor of

23. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 436, Enclosure 1.

24. Rudolph, *Negotiated Power in Late Imperial China: The Zongli Yamen and the Politics of Reform.*, p. 115.

25. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, 1963, p. 215.

Sichuan Province, Wu Tang, be remanded to the Board of Punishments for interrogation and execution if it could be proven that Wu Tang had been involved in the incident.²⁶ The second, received by the Zongli Yamen ten days later, reiterated Rochechouart's earlier demands while informing Prince Gong that failure to act would force Rochechouart to deputize his French military colleagues to proceed to Youyang County to force a settlement.²⁷

Rather than see Prince Gong as an ally, Rochechouart's actions undermined Prince Gong's authority and that of his office. Throughout 1869 and into 1870, the French minister's threats of violence and war took away the ability of Prince Gong to manage potential conflicts and shifted the burden of that responsibility onto France and its admirals. Rochechouart had little faith in the Chinese to administer their own country and too much faith in the power of the French flag. "The Chinese race," Rochechouart later wrote, "is not susceptible to great progress until it has undergone a major ethnographic revolution. M. Renan, speaking of these people, used the expression: an inferior humanity, and he is absolutely right."²⁸

For the next year, Rochechouart would be busy intervening—sometimes at great personal risk—in several anti-missionary cases. From Guizhou to Nanjing to Sichuan, Rochechouart bullied officials, ordered gunboat sorties while continuing to harangue the Zongli Yamen. Rochechouart's first sortie, to Taiyuan the capital of Shanxi Province, almost ended in disaster. Rochechouart's party stopped at a village inn on the way to Shanxi to rest for an evening, when a dispute between the legation's Chinese servants and a group of villagers who had been drinking all day at a festival escalated into a brawl. Rochechouart ordered his guards to fire into the air.

26. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 436, Enclosure 3, March 13, 1869

27. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 436, Enclosure 3, March 13, 1869

28. de Rochechouart, *Pékin et l'intérieur de la Chine* [Peking and the Interior of China]., p. 353.

When the crowd failed to disperse, he ordered them to shoot at the crowd's feet, wounding one of the festival goers. The villagers retaliated and forced Rochechouart and his party to retreat into an inn that they then threatened to set on fire. Rochechouart escaped when one of his servants impersonated an official and ordered the crowd to make way allowing the legation party to make a hasty exit.²⁹

Rochechouart's reception in Taiyuan was almost as frosty. The purpose of the visit was to convince the governor-general to respond to a series of threats made against a group of Franciscan missionaries stationed in Shanxi. Rochechouart may have been overly aggressive in defending the rights of missionaries, but he was not blind to the problems which the missionaries sometimes brought on themselves. "Our relations with the high authorities of Chan-si were not easy. The missionaries, badly advised by their Christian congregants, issued at the beginning of their stay in this province a demand of etiquette that prevented good relations from being established, and the mandarins, having convinced themselves that we wanted to impose concessions they could not make, resolved to dissuade us, by their attitude, from any interference in their quarrel with the Franciscans."³⁰ Perhaps Taiyuan authorities sensed Rochechouart's ambivalence in the case because the governor-general ignored the missionaries' "demand of etiquette," and Rochechouart returned to Beijing empty-handed.

Other serious incidents that summer prompted Rochechouart to take his expeditions into the southern provinces. A Catholic bishop Eustache Vite Modeste Zanolli (1831-1883) in Hubei reported that the governor-general had issued an edict against heterodox religions and evil sects, particularly those involved in the kidnapping of children. Zanolli complained the decree gave an official imprimatur to persistent rumors that the Europeans used magical powders to stupefy

29. de Rochechouart, *Pékin et l'intérieur de la Chine [Peking and the Interior of China]*., p. 321.

30. de Rochechouart, *Pékin et l'intérieur de la Chine [Peking and the Interior of China]*., p. 325.

children who were then killed, eaten, and had their bones and eyes used in experiments.³¹ In July, a priest stationed in Guangdong, Jean-Marie Delavay (1834-1895), was wounded when rioters overran his chapel. Over 100 Chinese Catholics were injured and seven were killed in the melee. The riots in Guangdong might have been related to accusations that were circulating in the province about Christian sorcerers at the time. A Chinese Christian woman had been arrested that same month by Guangdong officials on suspicion that she was removing the eyes and bone marrow of kidnapped children to make medicine and potions.³²

In the summer of 1869, a fight broke out in the city of Zunyi in Guizhou Province between members of the Catholic Church and a group of non-Christians leading a procession to burn incense at the Fire God Temple as part of a local festival. The non-Christians surrounded the church seeking retribution. When the French priest Pierre-Étienne-Amédée Gilles (1839–1869) tried to escape, he was seized by the crowd, beaten, and turned over to local officials. Father Gilles died in custody a few months later in August.³³

The situation in Guizhou was complicated by the actions of Louis Faurie. Not only did Bishop Faurie badger local officials for redress, but when those officials refused to agree to Faurie's demands, he decided to go over their heads and appeal directly to the Zongli Yamen. Faurie was not the first missionary to circumvent local officials and the French legation in this way, forcing Prince Gong to write an exasperated note to Rochechouart asking the French minister to remind his fellow countrymen of the importance of diplomatic protocol.³⁴

31. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*. F. Alcan, 1901, p. 334., *Missions Catholiques*, III, 1870, pp. 203–4.

32. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*. F. Alcan, 1901, p. 330.

33. Rochechouart to the Zongli Yamen, (August 20, 1869). *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 440; Prince Gong to Count Rochechouart, (October 17, 1869). *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 450

34. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*, p. 335.

In his reply, Rochechouart pressed Prince Gong for a speedy and forceful resolution to the cases in Guizhou and Sichuan. Rochechouart wanted the governors of both Guizhou and Sichuan demoted and remanded to the Board of Punishments to determine if either was guilty of more than just dereliction of duty. Rochechouart saw conspiracies all around him and was convinced that the proliferation of anti-foreign incidents had to be part of a coordinated effort on the part of Qing officials. He wanted to know how high up the conspiracy went. The burning and looting of two Catholic missions in Anhui in October 1869 only fueled Rochechouart's anger and resolve.³⁵

On October 14, 1869, Rochechouart demanded Prince Gong forward a memorial drafted by the French Legation to the throne. Rochechouart's letter complained of bureaucratic obstructionism, reminded the Qing court of their responsibilities outlined by the Treaty of Tianjin, and reiterated French demands for reparations in the Guizhou and Sichuan cases.³⁶ As a not-so-subtle threat, Rochechouart also included a note for Prince Gong saying that he was proceeding to Tianjin to discuss military options with the French admiral stationed there. Prince Gong was unsure what to do. Forwarding the memorial to the Empresses was a serious breach of court protocol. Barbarians did not directly address the throne in this way.

In November, Prince Gong sent a long reply to the French legation outlining the status of several open cases and complaining about Rochechouart's lack of decorum. The memo was a response to insinuations Rochechouart had made that the Zongli Yamen was deliberately stalling. When Prince Gong pointed out that the court had dispatched one of the most respected

35. See report and Prince Gong's follow up in *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 459 and 461.

36. Rochechouart letter to the Zongli Yamen, October 14, 1869. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 450, Enclosure 3.

and senior officials in the empire, Governor-General Li Hongzhang to personally manage the cases, Rochechouart retorted that Li was “a notorious hater of Christians.”³⁷

In a November 8 letter to Rochechouart, Prince Gong expressed confidence in Li and reminded Rochechouart that Li Hongzhang had previously worked closely with the foreign powers during the Taiping War when Li was stationed near Shanghai. Then Prince Gong turned the tables on Rochechouart, inquiring about outstanding cases where Chinese had been the victims of French violence. “The cases of people wounded or killed by French subjects in Zhili, Tianjin, Jiading, Jiangsu, Xiamen, Fujian, etc., have been open for several years and have not been completed. It is hoped that the settlement will be completed quickly and impartially. So far, the murder cases are still pending, and this yamen has only waited for your country to handle it.”³⁸

Prince Gong’s letter did not have its intended effect. In November 1869, Rochechouart announced his plans to sail for Nanjing and other points along the Yangzi River to settle the outstanding cases personally.³⁹ News of Rochechouart’s departure upset both the Zongli Yamen and Rochechouart’s superiors in Paris. In December, the French Foreign Minister, Henri, Prince de La Tour d’Auvergne (1823-1871), wrote to Rochechouart wondering if the Count might not reconsider such a confrontational move.

“It is rare,” Rochechouart later wrote, “that if the psychological moment is well-chosen, that is to say, if the city where this demonstration is to take place, in peace but forcefully, is easily accessible, that the matter is not settled in a few hours; but, in general, the Chinese

37. Li Hongzhang dispatched to Zunyi and Sichuan, See *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Volume 1, No. 447 and 448 Memorial and Edict, October 9, 1869.

38. Prince Gong to Rochechouart, November 8, 1869. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Volume 1., No. 459.

39. Rochechouart, J. *Pékin Et L'intérieur De La Chine*. Plon, 1878, p. 331.

government does not make this decision until the last moment, and only at the scene of the incident. This mixture of military engagements and conferences, this violent state, which is neither peace nor war, which makes it possible to bombard a city without severing diplomatic relations, appears, seen from afar, very dangerous, and the Western nations no longer want them. - But we will come back to it by force of circumstances; for Chinese inertia would tire the patience of the saints themselves, and we will be forced, avoid long and costly expeditions, to return to these helping hands whose success is certain when they are undertaken with prudence and rarely.”⁴⁰

Rochechouart traveled to Nanjing via Shanghai in December on the frigate *Vénus* escorted by two French gunboats and the corvettes *Dupleix* and the *Scorpion*. Although the fleet was too small to cause significant damage, Rochechouart made his point. As the convoy neared their first port-of-call, Nanjing, Qing officials including Li Hongzhang and Ma Xinyi (1821–1870), governor-general of Jiangxi and Jiangsu, hastily tried to settle the outstanding cases and tie up loose ends.

In Nanjing, Ma was concerned with a case involving the November looting of the mission and the residence of two French priests, Joseph Seckinger (1829–1890) and Pierre Heude (born 1836). Ma was a veteran of the Taiping War, and he had served as the governor-general in Nanjing for just over a year when Rochechouart demanded a meeting. Rochechouart and Ma agreed to compensate the missionaries for their lost property and for Ma to issue an edict condemning anti-missionary and anti-Christian rumors and activities in his jurisdiction.⁴¹

40. Rochechouart, J. *Pékin Et L'intérieur De La Chine*. Plon, 1878, p. 333.

41. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 471 Ma Xinyi Memorial dated January 14, 1870, and *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 472 Enclosures 1–3 related to the settlement of cases in Nanjing and Anqing.

“For some time now, scholars, common people, have sometimes made opposition or stirred up troubles, to prevent the missionaries from having the land necessary for the construction of temples,” read the edict posted as a condition of Rochechouart’s departure from Nanjing. “These are facts. Although, on several occasions, the viceroys and other officials have severely imposed on the mandarins of the towns to have the guilty searched, seized and punished, it has not always been possible to do it in the same way and with due diligence. This is what the illustrious minister of France, [Rochechouart], complains about and what he asks to be resolved. In the future, therefore, Christians and pagans must always live in harmony, animated with good feelings towards each other. This is what we are notifying to all by this edict. This is why we order all those, whoever they are, who are subject to our authority, military or civilians, not to forget it. Know all that the treaties make it possible to propagate and to embrace the religion of the Heaven; and those who don’t want to, we don’t force them. It is therefore absolutely forbidden to obstruct it without reason and to stir up trouble. The missionaries come from Europe with the intimate desire to exhort men to virtue: this is a reason for receiving them with all the greater kindness.”⁴²

From Nanjing, Rochechouart and his fleet traveled to the Yangzi River ports of Anqing, Jiujiang, Nanchang, and Hankou. At each city, Rochechouart requested an audience with the highest official in the jurisdiction where he would present them with a list of demands. Thanks largely to the energetic preliminary actions of Li Hongzhang, Ma Xinyi, and Liu Kunyi, officials were able to meet most of Rochechouart’s requests. Liu Kunyi averted a potentially embarrassing incident when he deployed soldiers before Rochechouart arrived in Nanchang after

42. Cordier, H. *Histoire Des Relations De La Chine Avec Les Puissances Occidentales: 1860–1902*. F. Alcan, 1901, p. 342.

learning that a mob was planning to assault the French charge d'affaires.⁴³ Li Hongzhang was responsible for negotiating a settlement to the serious incidents in Sichuan and Guizhou, and managed to convince the mission in Sichuan to agree to reparations. Li speedily sent word of the agreement downriver to Hankou for Rochechouart's benefit.⁴⁴

Rochechouart's strong-arming of Qing officials won him praise among representatives of the foreign powers in China and, eventually, back home in France. Thomas Wade, now head of the British Legation in China, sent word to the Zongli Yamen, informing Prince Gong and his staff that should they fail to make good on all outstanding cases involving British missionaries, Wade might be inclined to follow the lead of his French counterpart.⁴⁵ The French Foreign Ministry, perhaps feeling that Rochechouart's successful application of gunboat diplomacy had cleansed the palate from the Korea debacle of 1866, retracted its earlier concerns and gave its full endorsement to Rochechouart's mission.⁴⁶

Rochechouart's escapades did little though to quell anti-Christian sentiment, rumors, and threats of anti-missionary violence. The expedition had damaged the prestige of the Zongli Yamen—prestige that was necessary if the Zongli Yamen was to continue to act as an intermediary between the foreign powers and local officials. Cases in Nanjing and Sichuan had been settled, but emotions in those areas continued to run hot and another missionary was

43. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*, p. 212 and p. 215.

44. Li Hongzhang, Memorial dated January 3, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 467. See also follow-up communications in *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Documents Nos. 468–470 also dated January 3, 1870.

45. Thomas Wade to the Zongli Yamen, February 23, 1870. QMJA Volume 1, No. 481; Cohen, *China and Christianity; the missionary movement and the growth of Chinese antiforeignism, 1860–1870*, p. 215.,

46. Cohen, *China and Christianity; the missionary movement and the growth of Chinese antiforeignism, 1860–1870*, p. 212.

attacked in Guizhou in February.⁴⁷ In March 1870, Rochechouart requested naval support for the foreign missionaries in Anqing following new reports of anti-missionary agitation in that city.⁴⁸

Rochechouart had intended his expeditions as a demonstration of how easily problems of anti-missionary and anti-Christian violence could be solved by a small European force. Instead, he kneecapped the only institution in the Qing government that was concerned with preserving peace between China and the foreign powers while also raising the stakes for local officials who were unfortunate enough to have an incident occur in their districts.

The number of anti-Christian incidents in and around Tianjin also steadily increased between 1868 and 1870. Although many of these cases were due to local conditions and unrelated to the actions of Rochechouart, the number and nature of the incidents suggest that hostility toward foreigners in Northern China grew commensurate with the increased bellicosity of the foreign powers. Rochechouart's actions may also have inspired Chevrier and his fellow missionaries to become bolder when intervening in local disputes on behalf of their congregants—precisely the kind of activities that the Zongli Yamen and other Qing officials had identified as being the primary point of conflict between the missionaries, Christians, and their neighbors.

Zeng Guofan, who headed the investigation into the 1870 riots, recorded in his notes on that case, “The Catholic Church is a legal entity but there are many people who are accepted into the faith no matter whether those people are good or not... Whenever one of their followers is accused of committing a crime, the priest does not ask whether that person was right or wrong. The foreign consul does not ask whether that person was right or wrong. The non-believers are

47. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document Nos. 495 and 496.

48. Morse, Hosea Ballou. *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*. 3 vols. London, New York etc.: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910, p. 235.

pushed down, and the Christian followers always win and so become more powerful. The result is that the common people become angry and resentful. The anti-missionary cases in Youyang and Guizhou were all caused by the inability to settle the hearts and minds of the people.

Although it is stated in the treaties that if Chinese people commit crimes, they are under the jurisdiction of Chinese officials and Chinese law, but it seems that if somebody is Christian then this is not the case.”⁴⁹

Another official who would later become involved in the Tianjin investigation was Ding Richang (1823-1882). Ding shared Zeng’s view of the problems caused by missionaries intervening on behalf of their flock. “There is a popular saying,” Ding wrote. “If you are not part of the religion, you are like a mouse, but if you are a follower, you are a tiger. Oh! The people’s hatred grows day-by-day just as the reputation of the priests grows worse. Officials...dare not quarrel with consular officers [even] when the people are wronged.”⁵⁰

On June 27, 1868, Chevrier wrote to Father Thierry in Beijing about an incident in one of the villages along Chevrier’s circuit. “At seven or eight leagues from Tien-tsin, and in the districts of Nan-tang and Pao-ty-shien, I count about one hundred and ten neophytes scattered around a dozen villages. During my tour, I had to deal with a certain affair, complicated by a little malice against our Holy Religion. At first, I wanted to reconcile the parties, but the pagans were deaf to my voice. So, I went to visit the mandarin of Toung-ngan-shien, who received me very well, and promised to bring the matter to a successful conclusion.”⁵¹

49. Du, *YWSM*; Du Shoutian, *yiwu shimo*: 6., TZ 7057.

50. Du Shoutian, *yiwu shimo*: 6.6., TZ 7041.

51. Chevrier to Thierry, June 27, 1868. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance*. p. 305.

Father Chevrier also became embroiled in a case against a magistrate in two counties near the border of Shandong. Roving gangs had attacked several Christians. According to Chevrier, the congregants were beaten, taken prisoner, and in some cases hauled before local magistrates on charges of sorcery, kidnapping, or disturbing public order.

Chevrier took the matter seriously and asked Gabriel Devéria at the consulate for advice. Devéria concluded that Chevrier's Chinese congregants would be better served by Chevrier pursuing recourse with higher authorities in Tianjin, rather than riding out to confront the officials. Chevrier asked Devéria to draft a petition seeking redress in the case. It must have taken a great deal of self-control on the part of the former soldier not to take a more direct approach to the problem. "Your miserable servant will have the great honor of raising the standard of the Cross against Satan," Chevrier wrote to Monsignor Guierry in Beijing, "You understand, Monsignor, how much in this serious fight I need the help of your kind prayers."⁵²

Although Chevrier initially resisted his inclination to ride to the rescue, the French priest did continue his regular patrols through the villages around Tianjin. Traveling in the company of a Chinese congregant or a catechist, Chevrier rode from town to town, staying overnight in simple accommodations provided by local Christians. In a report to Monsignor Guierry from January 1869, Chevrier describes a typical visit:

"In the dark twilight, I arrived incognito in the village, made up of about seventy families, only three of whom were catechumens. The order is given as soon as possible to warn all the inhabitants of the place that I was inviting them to come and hear very interesting things the next day.

52. Chevrier to Guierry, December 26, 1868. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, pp. 318–319

They were faithful to my invitation. The next day, after Holy Mass, I saw myself surrounded by a crowd of people, and I had the pleasure of keeping my promise by talking to them not only about interesting things but again who watch them very closely. My speech finished, I asked them which side they wanted to take. Everyone remains silent.

So, if no one dares to speak, I told them, if no one dares to worship the true Master of Heaven and earth, I will pack up and go.

Before coming to this extremity, I begin to distribute medals to my former catechumens; in these matters, I like to engage the responsibility of the Blessed Virgin, our good and divine Mother.

Then suddenly I call out to them again:

‘Let’s see, who wants to worship the Lord of Heaven?’

‘Me,’ said a voice from the crowd.

‘What is your name? your age? How many members are in your family?’

After having written everything, new questioning

‘Who else?’

‘Me’

That’s good, your name, your age, etc.

‘The same questioning repeated nine times increases my catalog of nine families. Then the division is made. Some seem happy, and others show rather sinister faces. I knew, a little later, that the devil had persuaded them that if they were to become Catholics, I would come back after their death to take away their eyes, teeth, and hearts.’”⁵³

53. Chevrier to Guierry, January 13, 1869. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Annales CM 1869., p. 529

Back in Tianjin, Devéria was lobbying Chonghou in support of Chevrier and the Christians who had been attacked by the gangs near the Shandong border. In March 1869, Chonghou agreed to issue an edict on behalf of the Christians.⁵⁴ Chevrier had copies of the proclamation made and carried several with him on his visits to the outlying villages, brandishing them like a talisman whenever he needed to challenge the authority of a local magistrate.⁵⁵

Chevrier's partnership with Devéria ended soon after, when the young linguist received promotion in rank and a future billet in the consulate in Fujian. To replace Devéria, the French Legation sent one of its senior interpreters to Tianjin. "I had the honor to see our new Consul, M. Fontanier," wrote Chevrier on March 26, 1869. Adding optimistically, "like his predecessor, he is animated by the best dispositions for the Mission."⁵⁶

Chevrier felt that no matter how much he struggled, his efforts did little to stop a rising tide of hostility against his mission. There seemed to be a correlation in the number of incidents where Chevrier pushed officials to protect the rights and property of his congregants and the number of new cases that demanded Chevrier's attention. More reports filtered back to Chevrier in Tianjin of continued violence against Catholics. In one village, a copy of Chonghou's edict posted by Chevrier was torn down. In another, a catechist was seized by local authorities, tortured, and imprisoned. Chevrier even asked his superiors if he could transfer from his urban mission in Tianjin to take up a full-time posting in the rural areas to keep an eye on what was

54. Chevrier to Guierry, March 7, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 332.

55. Chevrier to Guierry, March 26, 1869. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Annales 1869., pp. 538–544

56. Chevrier to Guierry, March 26, 1869. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Annales 1869., pp. 538–544.

happening there. “It seems to me,” wrote Chevrier, “that if the Pastor cannot often visit, defend, encourage, direct his sheep, which are very weak in the faith, the wolves will produce terrible havoc.”⁵⁷

In the summer of 1869, Chevrier heard from a group of 15 catechists that local officials had threatened them should they persist in converting to Christianity: “Already the Tifang has orders to accuse us if we persist in becoming Christians: we are cursed terribly; they cry out that this doctrine is false, bad; that we are only Pey-lien-kiao (White Lotus), mi-mi kiao (secret societies); that we want to follow the Europeans who are only rebels; that we hold assemblies where abominations are committed, etc., etc.”⁵⁸

Chevrier reported on the latest rumors of violent reprisals against the foreigners in Northern China. “Here, Monsignor, a tiny sample of the malice of Satan and his henchmen. It is also said that the churches of Pé t’ang and Nan-tang (two churches in Peking) were razed, and the missionaries exterminated; that in Tien-tsin, as soon as the governor arrived, the Europeans hastened to flee on board ships and weigh anchor; that the [Wanghailou] and the [Rencitang] were destroyed. Others assure that the killing of the 6th of the 3rd moon did not take place, as it was announced, because the Kouï-tze (devils) gave plenty of money to temporarily arrange the affairs. There are still many other tales. And what effect do these absurdities, these calumnies produce on the very badly tempered minds of catechumens or of those who are thinking of

57. Chevrier to Guierry, April 30, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 350

58 Chevrier to Guierry, April 15, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, pp. 346–348.

becoming one? Indecision, fear, desertion, sometimes also exasperation: we retaliate, we get angry, we curse, we fight, and this is new business.”⁵⁹

While Chevrier was rallying his congregants in Tianjin, a serious incident occurred just outside of the city. In August 1869, unidentified assailants killed James Williamson of the London Missionary Society while he was traveling from Tianjin to outstations in Shandong. His companion, the Reverend W.B. Hodge managed to escape, but Williamson’s body was found a few miles downstream from where the pair had been attacked.⁶⁰ As 1869 gave way to 1870, the situation between missionaries and the people of Tianjin was approaching a breaking point.

59. Chevrier to Guierry, April 13–15, 1869. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 346–348

60. Lovett, R. *The History of the London Missionary Society, 1795–1895*. H. Frowde, 1899. Print, p. 549.

Chapter 7: Grave Danger

Marie-Clorinde Andréoni was the only Italian sister working at the Rencitang orphanage in 1870. Born in Tuscany in 1836, she had been in the first group of nuns who came to Tianjin back in 1862. “When we arrived,” Sister Andréoni wrote in a letter to a former seminary classmate in 1869, “There was only one Christian family, without a priest and a church. The French troops who had just left had set bad examples to the population and we had to bear the penalty. In the beginning, no child could be received because the people were afraid of us; but little by little, they got used to it, and now the day begins to shine for these poor blind people, with the patience of patience and prayers.”¹

Despite Sister Andréoni’s optimism, signs of hostility directed against the sisters in Tianjin were still very much present. By 1870, suspicions regarding the nun’s activities began to focus on two separate gravesites. One cemetery belonged to the mission while the other was a “potter’s field” used by the local community to dispose of unclaimed corpses.

For nearly a decade, the mission had maintained a small burial plot a short distance away from Wanghailou. It was a rectangular space, about 60 meters by 60 meters, surrounded by a brick wall and metal gate. Locally known as the “French cemetery,” the first interments had been an officer and four soldiers killed during the 1860 Anglo-French Expedition. The Sisters buried Christian converts (or those baptized at the time of death), as well as children of the orphanage who had died after being baptized. The rate at which the cemetery filled with coffins shocked residents who were already alarmed by a graveyard in the middle of their neighborhood.

Although the cemetery was outside the city walls and across the river from the market district, it

1. Marie-Clorinde Andréoni, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.* p. 18.

was still in a residential area. In China, the deceased were to be honored from a distance. Many felt it unnerving to have the dead interred so close to the living.

The cemetery was also a tempting target for residents to express their defiance of the foreign occupation of their city or for amateur sleuths looking to validate tales of Catholic witchcraft and sorcery. Father Chevrier and the Sisters despaired of the numerous acts of vandalism and grave desecration, and protecting the sanctity of burials was one of the thorniest issues between the mission and officials.² In 1868, Father Chevrier lodged official protests with the French consul, local officials, and Chonghou when it was discovered vandals had stolen the iron gates to the cemetery. Chevrier was outraged at the desecration, although it is also possible the culprits were motivated by greed, and found the gates valuable as much for their metal as for their symbolism.³

As the Rencitang expanded and added a hospital, the staff needed additional places to bury patients who died in their care. Across the river was a plot of land about half an acre in size set among the high mounds of salt lining the riverbank. It was there that the poor, the indigent, and the unidentified of Tianjin were buried, and a minor official, usually a member of the Salt Commission, received a small fee for maintaining this communal burial ground. For several years, the Rencitang had buried some of their deceased patients, particularly non-Christians, at this site. Administration was generally lax, and there were few records kept as to who was buried where or why, but the inattentive management of the burial ground also meant graves were more easily disturbed than the mission cemetery, which was protected by walls and, usually, a gate. In

2. Zhang Guangzao, Deposition, *xiangxiang Zengshi wenxian* 湘乡曾氏文献 [*Documents of the Zeng Family of Xiang County*]. Volume 7, p. 4519.

3. Chevrier to Mouly, X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l'Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 289.

the spring of 1870, the disposal of bodies, which had been a minor irritant in the mission's relations with the city, became a major controversy. The problems began when a typhoid epidemic, followed soon after by an outbreak of cholera, ravaged Tianjin. The 1870 outbreaks were particularly serious and the Rencitang hospital filled with victims. Many patients did not recover despite the efforts of the Sisters and their staff.

“When we are in pain, we find consolation in coming and communicating it to our friends. So, I come to ask you to pray for us and for our dear sick people, my sister Marie [Sister Clavelin] and my sister Vincent [Sister Legras] have typhoid fever. We follow for her the same treatment that we followed for us: God grant that it is also effective! We still have the Chinese hospital full of sick people, and a few baptisms too: today preparing to receive this sacrament is an opium smoker who is reaching his last moments.”⁴

Typhoid and cholera were perennial concerns for people living in the crowded cities of the Chinese coast, including Tianjin. Sanitation was poor and most residents dumped refuse into the rivers. During warmer months, the canals turned brown with a steady stream of human and animal waste and resulting blooms of algae and bacteria. In dry years, the currents were insufficient to move the debris downstream and it was not uncommon to see the bloated corpses of animals and even people floating past the city. The smell of the water in summer was infamous.⁵ When the rivers and canals around Tianjin froze in the winter, waste would build up in the streets, ditches, drains, and banks. The spring thaw then unleashed several months of sewage and effluent into waterways with predictable results. Waterborne bacteria were not the

4. Sister Marquet to Sister Laracine (February 20, 1870). Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tchely) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 245. Sister Clavelin and Sister Legras both recovered. The opium smoker did not, and was one more body that need burial.

5. Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China*. pp. 86–87.

only vectors for disease. Every summer, the brackish marshes surrounding the city bred immense clouds of mosquitos and other biting flies that spread yellow fever, dengue fever, and even more exotic viruses and diseases.⁶

As spring turned to summer in 1870, a severe drought added to the misery and anxiety of Tianjin's residents. Although foreign and Chinese accounts differ over the causes of the riots, all sources seem to agree on one important point: The summer of 1870 in Tianjin was hot and very dry. Droughts were among the most difficult of natural disasters for officials to manage. Floods, plagues, even earthquakes, came and went—sudden violent shocks to the natural and social order—but droughts truly stretched the state's ability to respond to crises and maintain social stability.⁷ Local officials reported that the terrible drought in Tianjin had made the local population uneasy and restless.⁸ Chonghou would later begin his report on the riots: “Since spring, we have seen little rain, and this has made the people's hearts unsettled and ill at ease.”⁹

One result was an agricultural crisis among subsistence farmers in the areas surrounding Tianjin. The drought forced farmers to abandon their fields, and rural residents streamed into the city looking for work, food, or an escape from the dire conditions of the rural hinterland. These refugees swelled the ranks of an urban underclass already forced to eke out an existence on the economic and physical margins of the city, and increased competition for lodging and jobs led to conflict between the urban poor and the rural migrants. Tianjin officials were predisposed to suspect recent arrivals when investigating thefts, anti-social behavior, or more other crimes.

6. Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China.*, p. 178.

7. Lillian M. Li, *Fighting Famine in North China: State, Market, and Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s* (Stanford University Press, 2007), pp. 267–268.

8. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, June 21, 1870. Du, *YWSM.72:22* For the connection between drought and social unrest in North China, see Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising*; Cohen, *History in Three Keys: The Boxers as Event, Experience, and Myth*.

9. Chonghou to the Zongli Yamen, June 21, 1870. Du, *YWSM.72:22*. Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, July 16, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870* (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., p. 69.

Certainly, it was easier to arrest a transient for a crime than someone who might be connected to individuals or local groups who could cause trouble for the authorities.¹⁰

The influx of refugees also likely contributed to the virulence and scale of Tianjin's 1870 cholera and typhoid outbreaks, and at least some of the migrants found their way to the nun's hospital and orphanage. The nuns did what they could, but mortality rates remained high. However noble the missionaries' motives may have been in bringing the sick and dying to their facilities in Tianjin for care and baptism, Tianjin residents agitated by the epidemic and the drought viewed the mission's increased activity with suspicion and dread. Many Chinese people, especially children, entered Rencitang and the number of bodies the mission buried in local cemeteries increased. What was happening behind the high walls of the foreign mission?

A rash of kidnappings in the spring and summer of 1870 transformed these suspicions into an international incident. Soon after the Chinese New Year, children started to disappear from the lanes and streets of Tianjin. This was not necessarily unusual. Children were often seen as commodities that could be bought, sold, stolen, and trafficked.¹¹ Girls had value as wives in poor rural areas where a preference for boys, high infant mortality, and the common practice of female hypergamy meant large numbers of unmarried males desperate for wives.¹² Young women could be sold into brothels or elite households as maids or concubines. Boys were also valuable,

10. Li, *Fighting Famine in North China: State, Market, and Environmental Decline, 1690s-1990s*; Jia Hongwei, "Famine and Foreign Trade: Centered on the Port of Tianjin, 1867—1931," *Modern Chinese History Studies* (2008).

11. See Li Bin. "The Origin and Spread of Kidnapping in South China in the Qing Period." *Journal of Wuyi University (Social Sciences Edition)* (2013).

12. For a discussion of female hypergamy and 'rootless' males, see Matthew Harvey Sommer, *Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China, Law, Society, and Culture in China*, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000). On hypergamy and the commoditization of young women as maids, concubines, and wives, see Mann, *Precious Records: Women in China's Long Eighteenth Century.*, p. 220; On the practice of kidnapping children for the purposes of selling them into marriage or bondage, see Susan Mann, *Precious records: Women in China's long eighteenth century* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 42. Article 275 of the Great Qing Code specifically forbade the practice of people selling children, whether kidnapped or their own. William C. Jones, *The Great Qing code* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).p. 257.

especially to those families who lacked sons and were willing to pay to ensure the continuation of an ancestral line or simply for their labor.¹³ Even by the standards of a large Chinese city in the late nineteenth century, the number of alleged victims and missing persons in Tianjin that spring and summer made the kidnappings hard to ignore.

With all the misinformation, the misunderstandings of the Sisters' activities, and the resentment generally toward foreigners in Tianjin, it was inevitable that Tianjin residents suspected the Catholic mission of being connected to the kidnappings. Lurid rumors of missionaries stealing good people for nefarious purposes had long been part of the lore about foreign missionaries. The volume of published pamphlets, placards, and other anti-Christian polemics gave a certain kind of credibility to the worst of the stories.¹⁴

In a city already on edge, the idea that foreigners were taking advantage of the crisis to advance their evil schemes was too much for the people of Tianjin to endure.¹⁵ Quite a few residents, especially the bolder elements of society, acted on their suspicions. After a Sunday mass in late May, a yamen runner working for the county magistrate began insulting parishioners as they exited the church. "So! This is the day when you Christians come here to eat the medicine that unsettles your minds!"¹⁶

13. This practice continues, leading to periodic crusades by Chinese journalists and academics to help parents to recover lost or exploited children. In the spring of 2011, the sociologist Yu Jianrong launched a campaign on the microblogging site Sina Weibo asking users to post pictures of child beggars, often suspected of being abducted children, in the hopes that their parents might see the photographs. The campaign had limited success and child kidnapping remains a grave problem in Chinese society. The documentary *Living with Dead Hearts* looks at this problem in some detail through the eyes of four families living in Shaanxi. Charlie Custer and Li Leia, "Living with Dead Hearts," (Songhua Films, 2013), Documentary Film.

14. See Chapter 2.

15. *Qingmo jia'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 531.

16. Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 377.

Another incident occurred when Sister Andréoni was making a round of house calls. The Sisters traveled to the homes of sick converts or other patients to minister those for whom infirmity or propriety made traveling the streets difficult. The same expectations for female behavior that kept some women bound to their home also made the Sisters' forays into local neighborhoods unusual enough to call once again into question their gender. This was especially true in the rough areas controlled by the lodges of the *hunhunr*.

At a home in a neighborhood known as a bastion of *hunhunr* activity, Sister Andréoni heard shouting outside the residence. Still not conversant in the language after eight years in China, she asked her translator Agnés Soun what was being said. Soun was 68 years old and served as a catechist in the mission. She told the Italian nun that the men were shouting, in coarse tones, "Who is it that is in there? Is it a man? Is it a woman? Why don't we find out!" Soun suggested to Andréoni that they leave before the situation escalated. It was the last home visit Sister Andréoni would make.¹⁷

Something in the city's mood had shifted.¹⁸ Unable to see what was happening inside the carefully guarded gates of the Rencitang, residents intensified their sleuthing at the cemeteries, searching for clues that could confirm whispers of sorcery and devilry that swirled around the mission.¹⁹

According to several Chinese Christians interviewed by missionaries after the riots, the trouble at the gravesites escalated in early May, when the Rencitang staff interred a large number

17. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance*, p. 376.

18. 刘海岩 Liu Haiyan, "Tianjin jiao'an shulun 天津教案述论 [Commentary on the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case]," *Shoucang 收藏*, no. 2 (1986).

19. Zhu Dong'an 朱东安, "Zailun Tianjin jiao'an de qi yin yu xingzhi -- jian ping changpian lishi xiaoshuo "Zeng Guofan" jinmen pian 再论天津教案的起因与性质——兼评长篇历史小说《曾国藩》津门篇 [Re-Examination of the Causes of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident]."

of bodies (one interviewee estimated about 50) in a single day. Some of the deceased were victims of disease – it had been a bad month at the hospital – other interments were likely bodies being reburied in deeper graves following the spring thaw, but the number of burials excited the talk that the Sisters were committing atrocities. Indeed, the interment of that many bodies in a short time made the site seem less like a sacred resting place and something more akin to a mass grave.²⁰

On May 29, Agnès Soun told the Sisters she had seen freshly-opened coffins in the public cemetery with scores of people covering their noses and inspecting the corpses, presumably to see if the deceased still possessed their eyes and hearts.²¹ The mission ordered two of their porters to return to the cemetery that evening to repair and rebury the coffins. The porters did more than that. Arriving at the public burial plots, they surprised a man in the act of digging up a grave. The porters seized the man as a prisoner with the intention of delivering him to the county magistrate but were stopped by the Sisters. The nuns took mercy on the culprit, but news of the incident put Chevrier in a distinctly less merciful mood.

Chevrier headed out to the public cemetery only to find more signs of graves being opened and despoiled. “This afternoon,” Chevrier reported to Father Thierry in Beijing, “I went to the Chinese cemetery; a crowd of Christians, the great catechist at the head, accompanied me. There, I noticed the opening of about twenty Jen-tse-t’ang coffins, bones, debris of clothing here and there. I noticed, importantly, that these coffins had been dug up and opened, not by dogs or

20. Report from Protestant Chinese residents of Tianjin collected, translated, and published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, June 30, 1870. The same testimony was enclosed in a report from British Consul Lay to Thomas Wade in a report dated June 28, 1870.

21. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*

other animals, as some maintain, but by human hands.”²² The former soldier confronted a night soil worker using a pitchfork to rummage through a recently unburied coffin. A catechumen who was accompanying Chevrier tackled the worker, and the culprit was brought back to Wanghailou and tied to a tree in the yard of the mission.

Frustrated at local official indifference to violations of the cemetery, Chevrier attempted to enlist Fontanier to his cause, requesting the French consul summon the country magistrate to deal with the trespasser. Fontanier was sympathetic to the goals of the mission, but starting to lose patience with Chevrier’s constant petitioning of his office and was reluctant to intervene. “I gave an account of my mission to the Consul,” wrote Chevrier, “but for him it is obvious that our faults are not slight. According to him, we must not now demand justice, nor ask the Mandarin for a writing declaring the falsity of all these odious accusations.”²³ Fontanier demanded that Chevrier free his prisoner. The debate between the two Frenchmen went on for some time until a group of the accused man’s friends arrived and begged forgiveness, allowing Chevrier and his catechumens to release the man while still saving some face.²⁴

What particularly angered Chevrier was that Fontanier seem to blame the mission for causing the situation. Following Chevrier’s visit and the wrangling over the priest’s hostage,

22. Chevrier to Thierry, June 5, 1870. In X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 382.

23. Chevrier to Thierry, June 5, 1870. X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 382.

24. While collecting human waste was a far from desirable occupation, the nightsoil collector guilds could be powerful actors in local society, in part due to the critical importance of waste management in the city. Leaders of these guilds were also connected to criminal organizations. The friends who arrived to rescue Chevrier’s prisoner may have also helped the mission staff understand the potential problems that the continued detention of their fellow nightsoil worker might cause. Dean T. Ferguson, "Nightsoil and the ‘Great Divergence’: Human Waste, The Urban Economy, and Economic Productivity, 1500–1900," *Journal of Global History* 9, no. 3 (2014)., Rogaski, *Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China.*, p. 208.

Fontanier wrote a terse letter to the Sister Superior at Rencitang, Sister Marquet, criticizing the Sisters for their continued use of the public cemetery. The grounds fell under the nominal supervision of the Salt Commission and Fontanier felt the Sisters were violating local rules by burying bodies there, especially digging so many graves in a short time span. “I do not doubt that Madam Superior will understand how important it is above all for the success of her works not to unnecessarily offend the minds of the population in what is most dear to them, that is to say, respect for their dead.” Fontanier recommended that the mission consider expanding the Catholic cemetery north of Wanghailou or buying a new tract of land for future burials.²⁵

Even after Fontanier’s curt dismissal, Chevrier continued to implore his neighbor to intercede with Chinese authorities. He reminded Fontanier of their relative isolation several kilometers away from the main concession area. It had been many months since a gunboat had anchored in the city. Perhaps Fontanier could send word to French authorities to have a ship make a call to Tianjin?²⁶

As Fontanier continued to rebuff Chevrier’s requests, the ex-military man lost his patience and finally his temper. Fontanier, also not known for possessing equanimity and self-control, responded in kind.²⁷ On June 9, Fontanier sent Chevrier a formal letter: “This morning, I noticed with difficulty again the lack of restraint in your language in your dealings with me. You

25. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 386.

26. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 386. The relative dearth of gunboat calls at Tianjin, possibly to avoid exposing sailors to the ongoing cholera epidemic, was later seized upon by newspapers and members of the foreign diplomatic missions as a contributing factor to the massacre.

27. Fontanier’s personality and irascibility was well-known even back in Paris. See *Massacres de Tientsin. 1870. Dossier Mission au Tcheli, 1871–1883, Article 414, Series A, Peking Fonds. Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes* (CADN), Nantes, France.

have to admit, I did not answer as coolly as I could have. To avoid the renewal of such regrettable scenes in the future, I believe it is much preferable, Sir, that your relations with the French consul henceforth take place in writing.”²⁸ With that, the priest was officially banned from the consulate next door.

Church authorities would later accuse Fontanier of negligence. Writing a month after the riots, Bishop Thierry summed up the feelings of many Lazarists in China: “If M. le Consul de France had acted, it is probable that such great misfortunes would not have happened. I have M. Chevrier’s letters which tell how his hands were tied and could not claim from the mandarins, too because of M. Fontanier’s susceptibility.”²⁹

Chevrier contemplated going over Fontanier’s head and addressing his concerns directly to Count Rochechouart at the legation in Beijing, but felt such a step might anger the consul to the point of breaking off all contact with the Tianjin mission. Father Thierry later justified Chevrier’s decision writing: “Our dear colleague, always to spare the Consul, had asked me not to say anything to the Chargé d’affaires; he preferred to have these miseries communicated to him by M. Fontanier himself; but he had enabled me to answer if these gentlemen had wanted to cause us difficulties.”³⁰

28. Henri Fontanier to Chevrier, June 9, 1870. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 386.

29. Thierry to Delaplace, July 21, 1870. X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 389.

30. Thierry to Delaplace July 1870. X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l’Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 393

On June 14, Chevrier addressed a letter to the Vicariate in Beijing urgently describing the situation in Tianjin. “For ten days, the most serious accusations have been circulating on behalf of the Sisters. They buy children, kill them, tear their hearts out, and remove their eyes. Others say the Christians are to be exterminated. Meanwhile, coffins containing the dead from the Sisters’ hospitals were opened on the pretext of searching for proof of these odious calumnies. In the face of all of this, what do the authorities do? Nothing. No, I am wrong. It is less than nothing. They accuse the Sisters of being at fault.” Despite the darkening storm, Chevrier still had faith in his stone fortress to his God: “At this moment in Tien-tsin, almost all devils seem unleashed. Fortunately, we have the protection of Notre-Dame-des-Victoires.”³¹

Chevrier sent an update to his superiors 48 hours later, reporting that family members of several catechists had been threatened or possibly even attacked and killed. Chevrier was unsure whether to believe the rumors, but fewer congregants attended mass and all of those who did were men. The catechumens and catechists told Chevrier that even the non-Christians who had been friendly before no longer acknowledged that they knew the Christians or spoke with them. The situation was dire, but Chevrier again expressed his faith that all would be well despite the lack of earthly allies. “I was asked earlier if I was not afraid for our establishment because there are now gangs organized to create disorder.”³²

Still unwilling to alienate Fontanier, Chevrier traveled to the Tianjin settlement to seek out another consul who might assist the mission. Chevrier found a sympathetic ear in the Russian consul, C.A. Skatschkoff. Chevrier shared the whole story and vented his frustrations about

31. Chevrier to Jean-Baptiste-François-Joseph Delemasure, June 14, 1870. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. Annales CM 1872

32. Chevrier to Thierry, June 16, 1870. X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l'Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 399.

Fontanier. While the Russian consul felt it was inappropriate to intercede with local authorities on behalf of a French priest, Skatschkoff said he would try to reason with Fontanier. The next day, Skatschkoff paid a professional courtesy call on the French consul only to be told that Fontanier was unavailable. When Skatschkoff returned to the Russian consulate, he sent Fontanier a formal note requesting an interview. Fontanier journeyed to the concessions to meet his Russian counterpart. When he learned of the reason for the meeting, Fontanier ended the discussion. “What business is it of yours to meddle?” the French consul said before turning around and heading back to Wanghailou in a huff.³³

Meanwhile, the kidnapping scare continued to trouble the city. On June 6, 1870, two men identified in official reports as Zhang Xuan and Guo Guai were seized by residents in the village of Yongfeng and turned over to the county magistrate. Very little is known about Zhang and Guo other than that they were recent arrivals to Tianjin.³⁴ They were accused of drugging and kidnapping Li Dayang, a youth from the Jinghai district about 35 km south of Tianjin. Magistrate Liu Jie and his staff interrogated the two men extensively before the suspects confessed to “kidnapping young people by means of drugs and spells.”³⁵ Neither was known to have any connection with the Catholic Church in Tianjin and proof of their guilt was based solely on the testimony of their captors and the forced confession recorded by Tianjin officials.

The two criminals were turned over to the Tianjin Prefect, Zhang Guangzao, for sentencing. The prefect’s report of the arrest and interrogation did not implicate any of the foreign community, but his report confirmed popular suspicions that kidnappers had been

33. Incident recorded in Hübner, Alexander, and Mary Elizabeth Herbert. *A Ramble Round the World, 1871*. New York: Macmillan and co., 1874, p. 317.

34. Chonghou report to the throne. *Qingmo jiaozhan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499. Even their recorded identities seem more like descriptive terms rather than actual names.

35. Deposition of former magistrate Liu Jie, quoted in Tang Ruiyu 唐瑞裕, *Qingji Tianjin jiaozhan yanjiu* 清季天津教案研究 [Research into the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case of the Qing Period], 276., p. 22.

dismembering their victims and using their hearts and eyes for the production of medicine and magical potions.³⁶ The penalty for kidnapping was severe, but Zhang felt the intent carry out sorcery was the more serious crime.³⁷ Following their interrogation, the two men were publicly executed.³⁸

“I have been told that these villains are employed to drug and kidnap young people in all directions,” District Magistrate Liu Jie wrote in a proclamation distributed the day after the execution. “The brains, hearts, and eyes (of the victims) being extracted and made into medicine. What practices can surpass these in barbarity?”³⁹

The Qing penal code made it a crime to use drugs or “nefarious arts” to obtain the possession of persons by unlawful means or the sale of persons so acquired.” Kidnapping directly threatened the integrity of the family, which officials and commoners considered a pillar of the social order. The section of the penal code that dealt with kidnapping was amended during the reign of the Jiaqing Emperor (r. 1796–1820) to specifically forbid the enticing of a woman, boy, or a girl, for marriage, concubinage and adoption.⁴⁰ Violators were subject to different forms of execution according to the gravity of the case and even accessories to the crime faced punishments including 100 blows of heavier bamboo, banishment, or if it could be proven that drugs or other stupefying powers had been used, death by strangulation.⁴¹

36. Zhang Guangzao, deposition taken July 1870, in *xiangxiang Zengshi wenxian* 湘乡曾氏文献 [Documents of the Zeng Family of Xiang County], Volume 7, p. 4519

37. Zhang Guangzao, Deposition, in *xiangxiang Zengshi wenxian* 湘乡曾氏文献 [Documents of the Zeng Family of Xiang County], Volume 7, p. 4519

38. Chonghou report to the throne. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499.

39. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 4, p. 19.

40. For more on the legal implications of kidnapping for the purposes of adoption see Ann Waltner, "The Loyalty of Adopted Sons in Ming and early Qing China," *Modern China* 10, no. 4 (1984), p. 441–459. Matthew Sommer, *Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China*. (Stanford University Press, 2000).

41. An Account of Kidnappings in Tianjin dispatched June 21, 1870, and published in the *North China Herald*, July 7, 1870, p. 6.

Tianjin was not the only Chinese city dealing with mysterious abductions that summer. On June 15, 1870, local officials in Jinjiang posted a proclamation warning of kidnappers who used stupefying powders to steal children. Attempts to arrest the culprits had been unsuccessful as the kidnappers likely fled downriver to Shanghai. The proclamation claimed that the kidnappers gouged out the victims' eyes and removed their genitals to manufacture drugs. Another declaration in Jinjiang suggested that kidnappers blew tobacco or other smoke in the faces of the unaware to subdue potential victims. Children and wives were particularly vulnerable, warned the posting.⁴²

The official notices issued in different cities and regions that summer employed many of the same tropes, including anxiety over the body, particularly bodily mutilation. Traditional Chinese burial protected the corpse. Dismemberment—even postmortem—was considered gravely unfortunate for the deceased, which is why decapitation and slicing were sentences reserved for the most serious offenses. These punishments involved not just the fear of physical pain or injury but the spiritual and religious implications of dismemberment. Sentences such as strangulation, while also terminal, were comparatively merciful. Kidnapping threatened another form of symbolic dismemberment. Losing a family member, especially an heir or, at the very least, a unit of labor within the household, was a serious situation, and although several factors could trigger a kidnapping scare—an epidemic, an inrush of rural refugees, the sudden appearance of strange foreign faces in a city or village—the frequency of these outbreaks suggest that kidnappings were a common and much-lamented crime afflicting Qing society.

Magistrate Liu's proclamation reflected that, concluding: "The suburbs of Tien-tsin are populous and extensive; and these kidnappers will too probably continue their practices, and will

42. *A reprint of letters regarding the Tientsin massacre. from the "North-China daily news."*, (Shanghai,: Printed at the "N'rth-China herald" office, 1870)., pp. 40–43.

skulk about the neighborhood, hiding in secret places, from whence, watching their opportunity, they will issue to drug and kidnap unsuspecting young people. Active measures must be taken to arrest them if their cruelties are to be put a stop to and the locality tranquilized.”⁴³

The arrest of Zhang and Guo set off a witch hunt through the lanes and streets of Tianjin.⁴⁴ City residents, including members of the hunhunn lodges, began rousting suspicious outsiders and interrogating them—often brutally—on the spot about their possible involvement in kidnapping and sorcery. Tianjin officials, concerned by the level of excitement in the city but accustomed to allowing local organizations to police urban neighborhoods, did little to dispel the rumors or restrain undisciplined groups from their self-appointed task of uncovering hostile elements in their midst.

A few days after Zhang Shuan and Guo Guai had been taken in custody and executed, a gang seized a trader named Shen Jibao and accused him of kidnapping children on behalf of the foreigners. Shen lived in the Yuzhou district and traveled to the city to buy goods to sell in the periodic rural markets around his hometown. On a previous visit to the city, Shen had become ill and was admitted to the hospital run by the Sisters. As he recovered, Shen learned the Sisters were hiring teachers for the mission schools Chevrier and the other priests had established in the outlying areas. Shen Jibao, being partially literate, applied and was given a posting in a village not far from the outskirts of the city.⁴⁵

43. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 24, Enclosure 4.

44. Zhang Guangzao Deposition. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu, 1870, tongzhi 102630 number 103300, National Palace Museum, Taipei. See also *Xiang Xiang Zeng Shi Wenjian*, Volume 7, pp. 4519

45. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531

One Sunday in early June, Shen, accompanied by one of his students, traveled the ten miles into Tianjin to attend services at the Notre Dame des Victoires church. Father Chevrier met with Shen and was surprised to see the teacher with his young charge. Chevrier suggested to Shen that it might be unwise to travel with an unrelated child given the rumors circulating around the city. Perhaps, said the priest, it would be better if the child remains in Tianjin for a few days until things calmed down. Shen replied that he had promised the boy's mother that they would not linger in the city and that she would worry if the two did not return by mid-week.⁴⁶

They remained in the city the following day, possibly to allow Shen time to visit the markets and fulfill orders for his trading business. Shen left the student drinking tea at a local restaurant while the teacher made his rounds in the marketplace. When he returned to meet his student, the pair attracted the attention of the other patrons. Shen was not a native of the region but had been born near the border of Mongolia, not far from Chevrier's former mission at Xiwanzi. It was sufficiently distant from Tianjin that Shen's accent was noticeably different from that of the boy with whom he was traveling. Upon being questioned by the other patrons, Shen vigorously protested his innocence, claiming that he was merely accompanying the child home and was worried for his ward's safety. The mob had heard enough. They threw Shen to the ground and savagely beat him with iron rods before dragging the teacher's limp body through the streets to the magistrate's office.

The capture of Shen Jibao had the potential to cause problems for the magistrate. Shen was not a rootless drifter like the unfortunate Guo and Zhang. He was identified as a "teacher" affiliated with the Catholic Church at Wanghailou. Soon after Shen's arrest, one of the other

46. Account from Sub-Deacon Michel Tchang in Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*

Catholic congregants rushed to tell Chevrier of the teacher's predicament. Chevrier's first response was to take the matter to the consul, but Fontanier was still not seeing the priest and Chevrier's requests for consular intercession on behalf of Shen went unanswered.

Fearing he would not have the support of the consulate, Chevrier enlisted the assistance of Father Vincent Ou and another church leader, Michael Tchang, and headed to the magistrate's yamen. Father Chevrier's interference annoyed the magistrate and Liu raised several objections to freeing the prisoner. Chevrier, informed of Shen's rough treatment, warned Liu that there would be consequences should the teacher die in custody. Father Ou also suggested that Chevrier and the church pay for a doctor to come to the yamen and attend to Shen's injuries.⁴⁷

Liu Jie absented himself from the negotiations for more than an hour to consult with other officials in the city. Finally, the prefect Zhang Guangao arrived. After a careful examination by Zhang, Shen was cleared of the charges and released into the care of Chevrier, Ou, and Michael Tchang.⁴⁸ The pitiful teacher, who had suffered several broken ribs, could not walk out of the yamen due to his injuries. A stretcher was summoned, and bearers carried Shen out of the city to the mission residence at Wanghailou to recover.

Although the church's intercession spared Shen further punishment, it confirmed the teacher's guilt in the eyes of the community. Chevrier's meddling fit a pattern in which Christians could commit serious crimes only to have the foreigners browbeat feckless officials out of doing their duty. Shen had been caught red-handed, and his light punishment made a

47. Letter from C.M. Chevrier to J.L. Chevrier, June 13, 1870, X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l'Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 398.

48. X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l'Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), p. 398.

mockery of the public proclamations posted by the magistrate and prefect to reassure Tianjin residents they would be protected from the kidnapping menace.

The unofficial groups continued to patrol the city looking for enemies real or imagined. Crowds dragged suspects—branded ‘sorcerers’—to the magistrate’s yamen, demanding that the criminals be punished. Innocence offered little protection. As had happened with Shen Jibao, even when there was little evidence of wrongdoing, the physical torments of the Qing judicial process could leave suspects crippled and scarred.

On June 17, another kidnapping suspect, Wu Lanzhen, aged 19, was seized in the local marketplace. What made Wu’s case special was his willingness to implicate the church. According to his statement, Wu, a non-native to Tianjin, was working as a boatman in the city when a man named Wang San drugged him and took Wu to the church at Wanghailou. Wang San then threatened Wu with death if he did not immediately become a Catholic. When Wu surrendered, Wang San gave him a packet of “stupefying powder” and ordered Wu to go out to the outlying areas and bring back new converts.⁴⁹

Wu Lanzhen said he used the drugs to kidnap another man about his age from a village just north of Tianjin. “I put some of the drug in the palm of my hand and rubbed it on his face. He became quite silly and followed me, and I hurried back to the Roman Catholic church and handed him over into Wang San’s keeping.” For his trouble, Wang San paid Wu five Mexican dollars. Wu’s brief career as a kidnapper ended when residents in another town caught Wu in the act of leading away one of their fellow villagers.⁵⁰

49. Zhang Guangzao Deposition. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu.

50. Wu Lanzhen statement, enclosed in Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499.

Wu claimed that he was one of seven men working for Wang San in the kidnapping ring. The men slept at the church, and every morning, Wang San would give them special powders to use on their victims as well as another reddish-brown powder for the men. “After a pinch of it, I felt very brave and thought of nothing but kidnapping people. When I returned in the evening, Wang San gave a draught of medicine as an antidote, which brought me to my senses, but by that time the gates were shut, and I could not get out.”⁵¹ In his statement to officials, Wu described Wang San as about 20 years old with a fair complexion slightly marred by smallpox scars. Wu’s arrest and sensational testimony implicating members of the Catholic community added to the pressure on local officials to investigate the activities of the church and the orphanage.

On June 18, the prefect, Zhang Guangzao, and the magistrate, Liu Jie met, with Chonghou at the latter’s yamen and presented their case for taking the investigation onto the church’s grounds and search for the suspect Wu Lanzhen described as “Wang San.” Local officials also sought Chonghou’s approval for their plan to exhume corpses from the church cemetery north of Wanghailou and the public burial ground near the salt mounds.⁵²

Chonghou was not part of the local administration and had no jurisdiction in criminal matters in Tianjin, but he was the senior official in the city and had close personal and political ties to members of the court. Chonghou was also responsible for managing the foreigners. If the magistrate and prefect hoped to expand the scope of their investigation and accuse the foreign mission of complicity in the kidnappings, then it seemed prudent to meet with Chonghou. Chonghou either agreed to their plan or felt he lacked the authority to stop the officials from going forward. Zhang Guangzao and Liu Jie pressed ahead with their investigation. The two

51. Wu Lanzhen statement, enclosed in Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499.

52. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 502.

local officials may have also been emboldened by the recent arrival in Tianjin of another imperial dignitary, General Chen Guorui (1836-1882).

General Chen was one of the most notorious officers in the Qing military.⁵³ He had demonstrated great brilliance on the battlefield against the Taiping and later against the Nian Rebels. However, success bred an arrogance that, along with a fierce temper and a tendency toward insubordination, gave Chen Guorui a reputation as a loose cannon. He was cashiered several times but invariably reinstated because of his military skills and the loyalty he commanded from his troops. He also had powerful mentors and allies in the military command, especially Sengge Rinchen.⁵⁴

While serving under Zeng Guofan, Chen became jealous of a new shipment of rifles and supplies given to his fellow officer Liu Minquan. Ignoring the rebels, he was supposed to be fighting, Chen led 500 of his men on a nighttime raid of Liu's camp to seize the guns. The attack failed, and in the confusion, most of Chen's raiding party was killed.⁵⁵ Zeng wrote a memorial to the throne asking for Chen Guorui's dismissal and for Chen to be stripped of all ranks and titles, but the Qing Empire in 1865 faced threats on several fronts, and a man with Chen's particular set of skills could not remain sidelined for long. Within a few years, he was back on the frontlines in the ongoing war against the Nian rebels and winning back his decorations and ranks. Wounded in battle in the summer of 1870, Chen was given time off to recuperate. In June, Chen was in

53. For a complete account, see Chen Guorui's entry in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)*, pp. 89-90.

54. Chen had been in the area when Sengge Rinchen was killed fighting the Nian rebels in 1868. Chen, despite being wounded, galloped back into the fray to recover the body of his fallen patron. Hummel, pp. 89-90.

55. 贾熟村 Jia Shucun, "Taiping tianguo shiqi de wulai 太平天国时期的无赖——陈国瑞 [Chen Guorui: A Taiping Era Rogue]," *安徽史学 Anhui shixue* 4 (1992).

Tianjin on the way back to his hometown of Yangzhou, where, coincidentally or not, just two years earlier there had been a serious outbreak of anti-foreign and anti-missionary violence.⁵⁶

General Chen's presence in Tianjin corresponded with a surge of activity in the streets of the city. Placards denouncing the foreigners and Christians appeared throughout the city. Chinese clerks at foreign firms warned their employers of dark threats being made against the foreign community that urged Tianjin residents to strike soon "since there are no gunboats in the river."⁵⁷ A letter writer from Tianjin wrote the following to his counterpart in Yantai: "The barbarians have employed men of our country to kidnap infants, men, and women for sale to the Catholic church. Their people's eyes are dug out and hearts are carved to be used as magic. Residents discovered these activities and one of the kidnappers was brought before the authorities to be tried and sentenced. Still, the criminals were undeterred. No small number of children have perished by their hands and the populace is full of anger."⁵⁸

A Christian interviewed after the riot reported that the nature of the rumors about the foreigners had shifted in June, accompanied by a rising pitch of anger and a willingness to use violence and even murder to rid the city of the foreign menace. According to this witness, earlier chatter had not threatened the lives of the foreigners but instead focused on destroying the recently built church, which was upsetting the *fengshui* of the surrounding area. However, by the middle of June, the whispers grew louder, bolder, and more violent. Concerns about geomancy gave way to horrific tales of child abduction, murder, and dark magic. More people spoke of

56. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)*, 89–90; Fairbank, "Patterns Behind The Tientsin Massacre."

57. North China Herald, July 6, 1870, p. 6; X. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance* (A l'Imprimerie de Lazaristes, 1895), pp. 440–441

58. "Chinese testimony of the Tien-tsin Massacre," Enclosure. Wade to Clarendon, July 16, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., pp. 74.

their willingness to use violence against the foreigners, shouting: “Kill all the foreigners, destroy all foreign property.”⁵⁹

Around the time of Wu Lanzhen’s arrest, a few of the sisters from the Rencitang called on the wife of William Lay, the acting British consul in Tianjin.⁶⁰ Lay took advantage of the nuns’ visit to inquire after their wellbeing and ask if they had heard the stories. Lay was skeptical of the more sensational gossip about the Sisters buying children, but he was concerned that the Sisters’ practice of offering gifts and cash rewards for people who informed them of children in need of last rites or as inducements to parents and others to leave children at the orphanage was doing more harm than good. According to Lay, the Sisters scoffed at the rumors, saying there were a “few bad men in the city, but they were not afraid.”⁶¹ However dubious these transactions may have appeared to outsiders; the Sisters could justify the policy by arguing that it was better to part with a few pieces of cash than to have children left to die or their souls abandoned to eternal damnation.

The mission was understandably prickly about allegations of child buying, particularly when those accusations came from fellow Westerners, even more so when their accusers represented Protestant nations. That the Holy Childhood and other Catholic orders were sensitive about the issue suggests that whatever their spiritual and moral justifications, some in the association knew the policy was problematic. At the very least, the practice perpetuated the belief held by many Chinese that the nuns were buying children for wicked purposes. At worst, cash rewards for orphans could—and likely did—provide a perverse incentive for the

59. “The Rev. W.N. Hall’s Report of the Narrative of a Chinese (A) who witnessed the Massacre of three Russians at Tien -tsin,” Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 58, Enclosure 4. p. 105–106

60. Brother of Horatio Nelson Lay, see Chapter 2.

61. Acting Consul Lay to Wade, June 28, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 20, Enclosure 24.

opportunistic to profit by bringing kidnapped infants and children to the orphanage and exchanging them for money.⁶²

According to Tianjin gossip, the nuns and the church staff were not only paying Chinese to act on their behalf, but the Sisters themselves were not above snatching unwary passers-by.⁶³ The street in front of the Rencitang slowly became devoid of pedestrians, except for those in groups moving together for safety or for individual hunhunn showing their bravado by strutting past the nuns' establishment.⁶⁴

On June 19, County Magistrate Liu Jie arrived at the French consulate, bringing with him the written testimony of witnesses who claimed to have been the victim of a sorcerer in the employ of the missionaries and the sworn statement of Wu Lanzhen.⁶⁵ Fontanier tried to excuse himself, but the magistrate was persistent, and the French consul had little choice but to admit him into his parlor. The meeting was not a success. Liu Jie kept insisting on a search of both the orphanage and the church and an interrogation of staff. Fontanier was unwilling to expose the missionaries to the Qing judicial system with its dungeons and extreme methods of interrogation. He lost his temper when Magistrate Liu, unable to persuade Fontanier to agree to his investigation, resorted to threats. The magistrate warned Fontanier that in their present state of excitement, Tianjin's people would not be easily calmed, nor their passions soothed without robust official action. Fontanier responded hotly that his government would hold Magistrate Liu

62. "Missionary Mistakes in China," Op Ed, *Pall Mall Gazette*, published September 14, 1868. Also see Chapter 6.

63. Zhu Dong'an 朱东安, "Zailun Tianjin jiao'an de qiyan yu xingzhi -- jian ping changpian lishi xiaoshuo "Zeng Guofan" jinmen pian 再论天津教案的起因与性质——兼评长篇历史小说《曾国藩》津门篇 [Re-Examination of the Causes of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident]."

64. Chinese Witness Testimony. Enclosure in Lay to Wade, June 28, 1870, Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., p. 36.

65. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jia'an 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing]*, Volume 1., Document No. 502.

personally responsible for any incident that harmed French lives or property. Fontanier advised Liu that France could bring significant forces to bear against the city and this would have grave consequences for Tianjin, its people, and, especially, its officials. With that, Fontanier declared his unwillingness to discuss the matter further and announced he would take the issue directly to the Imperial Commissioner, Chonghou. The magistrate and his assistants were unceremoniously expelled from the consulate grounds.

Magistrate Liu's warning to Fontanier about restive elements in Tianjin's streets was as much an admission of Liu's precarious position as it was an attempt to intimidate the French consul. Fontanier's implication that local officials were complicit, if not actively involved, in the unrest reflected a general suspicion among Westerners in China regarding the unshakeable xenophobia of Qing officials. Fontanier was also blinded by his visceral dislike of the magistrate, and clung to the naive belief that the Chinese people were harmless unless incited to action. Liu Jie knew better, and must have wondered if Fontanier even realized who his real enemies were.

Magistrate Liu and Henri Fontanier were known in their respective circles as stubborn and ill-tempered.⁶⁶ Their battle of wills ended in a stalemate when neither was willing to concede jurisdiction, but the animosity between the two men left little doubt that subsequent meetings had the potential to end less than amicably. Personalities aside, the feud between Fontanier and Liu Jie represented the clash of interests between the foreign powers and the Qing authorities on a molecular level. The conflict played out performatively, with both parties heavily invested in the discursive power of dignity and national honor.

66. "We all knew that the unfortunate Fontanier was of a violent and irascible character..." Massacres de Tientsin. 1870. Dossier Mission au Tcheli, 1871–1883, Article 414, Series A, Peking Fonds. Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Nantes, France.

Official inquiries involving foreign nationals, their dependents, and property were to be handled by the appointed representatives of those nations without the interference or involvement of Qing authorities. The mission and the orphanage were French property outside the jurisdiction of nosy officials. Fontanier thus felt justified in rebuffing any requests by Magistrate Liu to carry his investigation onto the grounds of the church.

The history of the concessions and settlements—indeed, the whole justification for the violence that led to the building of the treaty system one war at a time—was based upon avenging real or perceived wrongs against the national dignity of the foreign powers. Whether it was Lin Zexu seizing opium stocks from the Canton Factories in 1839, Ye Mingchen arresting the crew of the (supposedly British) *Arrow* for piracy in 1856, the murder of French priest Chapdelaine, or the surprise attack on the British fleet sailing through the Dagu Forts in 1858, the foreign powers were quick to claim they were the victims, and to weaponize their victim status as a pretext for war. Every incidence of aggression was justified as the actions of an aggrieved nation seeking redress for a supposed Chinese injustice. Foreign attitudes of dominance were based in part on ethnocentric, even racist, assumptions of civilizational superiority. Armed conflict needed to be given moral legitimacy, and that was more easily done if it was the result of provocations from by the Chinese.⁶⁷

Consuls like Fontanier believed the moral and legal consequences of maintaining French privileges and honor outweighed the exigencies of a local criminal case. Conceding those privileges to a blustering magistrate was out of the question. Fontanier would be responsible for setting a dangerous precedent, undermining the understood letter and spirit of the treaties regarding the inviolate status accorded to ‘foreign property’ in the treaty ports, without which the

67. This is one of the central themes in Bickers, *The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832-1914*. See especially pp. 81–82.

foreign concessions would not be able to exist at all.⁶⁸ What made these cases explosive was when foreign privileges were extended to include “dependents” such as converts, Christians, and Chinese employees working for the foreigners.

Qing authorities from local magistrates to the Zongli Yamen argued, not unreasonably, that the foreign, especially French, understanding of ‘dependent’ was too broad, and was often used by missionaries and their followers to shelter those who should otherwise be prosecuted according to local law. Tianjin officials were committed to upholding the law and maintaining proper social relations and public order. The criminal being investigated for kidnapping, Wu Lanzhen, was not French, but a Qing subject, as was the fugitive named in Wu’s deposition Wang San. Neither enjoyed extraterritorial status under the treaties. Magistrate Liu felt a sense of urgency to conclude the investigation in a way that satisfied both his constituency and kept the case off the docket of his superiors. For the magistrate, the French consul was obstructing a criminal inquest by hiding behind a smokescreen of legal and spiritual sanctity for the Church. The only way for an official inquiry to proceed was to interrogate Wu Lanzhen at the church and gauge the veracity of Wu’s original deposition, and that would require gaining access to the interior of Notre Dame des Victoires.

On Monday, June 20, Chonghou found himself busier than usual. Not only had he received urgent word from Fontanier demanding the commissioner receive the irascible French consul, but Fontanier’s British counterpart Lay sent a lengthy formal letter to Chonghou’s office interceding on behalf of Jonathan Lees (1835-1802), who worked for the London Missionary

68. Fontanier to Count de Rochechouart (June 21, 1870) Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 1860–1900* (The History of China’s Relations with the Western Powers, 1860–1900). p. 351.

Society in Tianjin.⁶⁹ Lees complained of his converts being harassed and threats against LMS chapels and the British hospital in Tianjin. Lay wanted Chonghou to order the magistrate and prefect to issue a new proclamation denouncing the rumors against the foreigners and demanding that Chinese subjects be polite and to cease harassing foreigners passing through Tianjin or doing business there.⁷⁰

In fact, many streets and neighborhoods had become dangerous for foreigners. Dr. Frazer, an English physician who regularly attended to patients at the sister's orphanage, was attacked by a mob after leaving the establishment. Only the doctor's swift mounting of his horse allowed him to escape serious injury. A Chinese eyewitness interviewed two weeks after the riots by the Methodist missionary William N. Hall (1829-1878) recounted groups of *hunhunr*, many wearing the city's militia and fire brigade uniforms, roaming the streets in June. The flamboyant *hunhunr* strode purposefully down thoroughfares and through the markets announcing their intention to do what needed to be done to protect the city and its people.⁷¹ A few residents were skeptical of the *hunhunr*'s swashbuckling machismo, empty threats had been made against the foreigners before, but cautious merchants and shopkeepers were boarding up their stores and a steady flow of urbanites headed out of the city to stay with relatives and family in the countryside.

It was a short walk from the French consulate to Chonghou's yamen, but Fontanier could not have missed the large knots of men standing along the riverside or crowding onto the quay in front of the church. A few were wearing uniforms that identified them as runners for the county

69. In 1914, Jonathan Lees' grandson, Harry Lees Kingman (1892-1982), suited up for four games with the New York Yankees becoming the first Major League Baseball player born in China. Bob Timmerman, "Harry Kingman," *Society for American Baseball Research*. <https://sabr.org/bioproj/person/harry-kingman/>

70. Acting Consul Lay to Wade, June 28, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Enclosure 24 in No. 20, p. 32.

71. "The Rev. W.N. Hall's Report of the Narrative of a Chinese (A) who witnessed the Massacre of three Russians at Tien-tsin," Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 58, Enclosure 4. p. 105-106.

and prefectural yamens. Afterward, several witnesses stated that in the days and hours leading up to the riots, the yamen runners and other sub-officials did little to try to disperse the crowds and were sometimes the rowdiest voices in the street.⁷²

Fontanier had a great deal of faith in Chonghou's position, but despite Chonghou's lofty titles, the commissioner was limited in the amount of influence he had over the actions of local officials, many of whom openly loathed Chonghou for his cozy relationship with the foreigners. Chonghou felt a sense of informal and extrajudicial responsibility to resolve mediate involving the foreign representatives stationed in Tianjin. He listened to complaints involving the international settlements or foreign trade and tried to handle problems in as expedient a manner as possible, but, like many Qing officials, Chonghou was less interested in the right or wrong of the situation than he was in keeping the peace and preventing local squabbles from escalating into international incidents. Some residents of the city felt that in doing so, Chonghou coddled the foreigners and conceded to foreign demands, no matter how unreasonable. They accused him of acting more in the interests of the occupying powers than the people of Tianjin.

Chonghou knew the situation involving the French missionaries was a potential powder keg and felt compelled to try to head off a confrontation. Upon hearing of the disastrous encounter between Fontanier and Magistrate Liu, Chonghou agreed to the meeting with Fontanier. Now he entertained the consul's complaints about Liu and Zhang not unsympathetically, saying little to counter Fontanier's low impression of the magistrate's professionalism. Indeed, Chonghou took advantage of this private meeting with Fontanier to do a

72. "The Rev. W.N. Hall's Report of the Narrative of a Chinese (A) who witnessed the Massacre of three Russians at Tien-tsin," Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 58, Enclosure 4. p. 105–106

little venting of his own, complaining about how little consideration he was given by the local authorities.⁷³

Chonghou reminded the French consul that the people of Tianjin were in a pitched state of fear and loathing and utterly convinced that the rumors of child-snatching, murder, mutilation, and sorcery were true. Obstructing the authorities' investigation only increased suspicions while putting local officials in an exceedingly difficult position. Some residents might even interpret the French consul's blocking of the inquiry as evidence the charges were true. This in turn increased the pressure on local officials to vigorously pursue the case against the mission.

Chonghou implored Fontanier that the only way to calm the situation and end the vicious circle of recriminations was to allow the local officials to conduct their investigation and interrogate their suspect, Wu Lanzhen, on church grounds.⁷⁴ If, as Fontanier adamantly insisted, the charges were baseless, then it was unlikely Wu could corroborate his earlier testimony by accurately identifying the people and places he talked about in his deposition. That would go a long way in removing the cloud of suspicion and superstition that hung over the church and the orphanage.⁷⁵ Chonghou also suggested Fontanier might be able to impose some limitations on the extent of the inspection and that Father Chevrier, as the leading ecclesiastical official in Tianjin, could accompany Magistrate Liu and the prefect during their visit to the church.

Chonghou succeeded where Magistrate Liu failed, convincing Fontanier that an investigation on

73. Fontanier to Count de Rochechouart (June 23, 1870) Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 1860–1900* (The History of China's Relations with the Western Powers, 1860–1900), p. 351

74. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen (June 21, 1870). *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499

75. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen (June 21, 1870) *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499

church grounds was the only way forward, and it was to Chonghou's not inconsiderable relief the French consul finally relented.

Chonghou sent word to the magistrate and the other officials about the breakthrough and warned them to either conclusively prove the charges against the missionaries or drop the matter entirely. His intercession was essential to getting the French to agree to the search and interrogation at the church, but Chonghou notified the officials that he would be recusing himself from the spectacle at the church, now set for 10:00 am the next day, June 21.⁷⁶

Although he was a man of no great moral courage, Chonghou was a political survivor. He likely had little desire to be placed—figuratively and physically—between a hawkish group of officials playing to an aggressive mob and an equally hostile contingent of French consular officials defending sacred ground that Chonghou had personally deeded to them.⁷⁷ Chonghou had done what he could to appease the officials and hopefully protect the French consulate and the missionaries, but he knew his position was less secure than that of the local officials. In his later deposition, Prefect Zhang stated that most of the anger toward the Christians was grounded in a belief that supposed converts were using their connections with the French missionaries to bully their neighbors. It was a situation, Zhang noted dryly, “generally tolerated by Chonghou.”⁷⁸

76. Zhang Guangzao Desposition. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu., See also *xiang xiang Zeng shi wenjian*, Volume 7, pp. 4519

77. Qi and Wang, 晚清教案紀事 *wan qing jiao an ji shi* (*A Chronicle of Anti-Foreign Incidents in the Late Qing*), p. 104. Agreement between Chonghou and the French granting them title to Wanghailou, 近代天津圖志 *jindai Tianjin tuzhi* (*Atlas of Tianjin Modern History*), ed. Tianjin shi liwu bowuguan (Tianjin, 1992), p. 25. and at Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Nantes, France.

78. Zhang Guangzao Desposition. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu., See also *xiang xiang Zeng shi wenjian*, Volume 7, pp. 4519

“Ch’ung Hou, the head Mandarin here, a special commissioner,” William Lay wrote later, “had a difficult part to play. He has no jurisdiction in Tien-tsin, and he is most unpopular for being friendly with the foreigners. Had he tried to stay this trouble when it arose, he would probably have been killed, for it seems the mob was determined to have revenge on the French and would have let nothing stand in their way.”⁷⁹

Chonghou’s dilemma reflected that of the Qing state, caught between an inexorable series of attacks on its sovereignty by the foreign powers and a seemingly inexhaustible supply of antipathy directed at the foreign colonials. In his predicament, Chonghou must have felt as if he were being asked to choose between being boiled in a vat of oil or having the same vat simply poured over his head.

In the final hours before sunset on June 20, a large crowd assembled on the quay in front of the church and consulate. A few of the braver men in the mob threw stones and bricks at the mission and consulate. As night fell, the crowd gradually dispersed, but that would only be a temporary respite for the people inside Wanghailou. Father Chevrier met a fellow Frenchman named Coutris, who lived in the Chinese city. “Come tomorrow to mass,” the priest said. “It is time to prepare ourselves for death.”⁸⁰

At the British consulate, Lay wrote to his superior Wade in Beijing. “There is no doubt that a very hostile spirit on the part of the natives towards foreigners exists here at present. It has smouldered for some time and is now breaking out. The Sisters of Charity have been very stupid in buying children and so on; and the old cry has been raised that they do this for an unholy

79. W.H. Lay to Thomas Wade, June 28, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.

80. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*

purpose. Their house has been mobbed lately, and the excitement increases rather than diminishes.”⁸¹ The British consul closed his report on a direful note: “I put no faith in idle rumours; but I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that we are far from being liked here, and that the authorities are as anti to foreigners as ever.”⁸²

At the orphanage that evening, the nuns received word that their establishment might be visited the following day by the magistrate and his staff. Meanwhile, the Sisters could not miss sinister developments just outside their door. Merchants had abandoned their shops and reinforced windows and doors as if preparing for a typhoon or flood. Several adults, claiming to be family members of the orphans and the parents of some of the children enrolled at the mission school, arrived to reclaim children. The Sisters arranged to transfer a patient, an English merchant captain, to the British hospital in the international settlement.

A few witnesses later said the fire brigades did a sweep of the neighborhood on the night of June 20, asking those shopkeepers who remained to stay closed the next day. They also suggested merchants and homeowners have large buckets of water at the ready or, better still, keep the exteriors of their structures wet lest any fire in the area spread.

In the evening, Sister Andréoni gathered the children and the Chinese employees and asked them to be sure the house and grounds were in good order. Some of the staff and a few of the children began to cry. “Come on then,” said the sister, “if you have faith, you will not be afraid.”⁸³

81. Lay to Wade, June 20, 1870 Enclosure 3, No. 20, Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., p. 19.

82. Lay to Wade, June 20, 1870 Enclosure 3, No. 20, Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. p. 19.

83. Recounted by Marie Tchaè, an employee of the orphanage who survived the riots. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 419.

Chapter 8: Massacre

In the early morning of June 21, 1870, William Lay, the acting British consul in Tianjin, wrote an urgent dispatch to his legation in Beijing: “It is my painful duty to report a very unsatisfactory state of things at this port. For some time past there have been threats from the Chinese that they will kill the foreigner or drive him away from Tien-tsin. The last few days, the excitement has increased; the Chinese have declared their intention to burn the Roman Catholic Cathedral and the French Consulate and to kill all the foreigners.”¹

The city had been in a state of fear and anxiety for weeks. There were widespread rumors of kidnappings, black magic, and murder involving the foreign community. The month of June had witnessed a growing number of verbal and even physical attacks against foreign residents, and Lay felt the clamor was too great to ignore; failure to heed these warnings would be an abandonment of his duty to protect British property and persons residing in Tianjin. It was time for the gunboats to return.

“No French or American or Russian gunboat has visited Tien-tsin this year,” Lay wrote.² Lay sent an urgent letter to the senior officer at the British naval base in Yantai requesting the re-routing of a vessel to Tianjin. “I am quite certain that the mere presence of a vessel of war in this port would allay the excitement at once.”³ The British consul then picked up his pen and wrote a third message to be delivered to Imperial Commissioner Chonghou inquiring about whether the

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1. Acting Consul W.H. Lay to Thomas Wade, June 21, 1870, (N.B. Dispatch not received until June 27) from Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure No. 6.
 2. Acting Consul W.H. Lay to Thomas Wade, June 21, 1870, (N.B. Dispatch not received until June 27) from Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure No. 6.
 3. Acting Consul W.H. Lay to Commander Walker, June 21, 1870, (N.B. Dispatch not received until June 27) from Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 4, Enclosure 14.

Imperial Commissioner planned to act on Lay's earlier request for a proclamation exhorting the people not to molest or insult the foreign community.

As Lay was scribbling furiously at the British consulate, the church and orphanage were beginning their day. Around 4:00 am, the Sisters awoke as usual and went about their morning prayers and meditation. At the Wanghailou church across the canal, Father Ou said the early mass and Father Chevrier began hearing confessions. The enormous bell atop the church sent its stentorian knell ringing across the waterfront.

Chevrier was perhaps pleased to see M. Coutris, the businessman, heeding the priests' advice from the day before to attend mass. The church could be a refuge and a bulwark in times of unchecked wickedness and peril. Coutris was not alone in his attendance. The pews were filled that morning with native Christians, many fervently praying with more than a few crowding to make their confessions.

Chevrier's riposte to Coutris the previous afternoon suggesting they ought "prepare ourselves for death" had probably been made half in jest. This was hardly the first-time stories of an imminent attack on the foreign settlement had consumed a treaty port. However, the packed rows of frightened Chinese congregants were an ominous sign that a tipping point had been reached and one witness later recalled that many Christians felt their last hour was upon them.⁴ Following mass, Father Chevrier and Father Ou returned to the mission and told the staff to start preparing to receive the magistrate and his delegation later that morning.

The gongs and bells used to summon the militia and fire brigades rang out through the neighborhood at about nine o'clock. Crowds began gathering on both sides of the river, especially in front of the gates of Wanghailou. Witnesses report large numbers of hunhunr, many

4. Witness statement included in Alexander Hübner and Mary Elizabeth Herbert, *A Ramble Round the World, 1871*, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan and Company, 1874)., p. 327.

in their capacity as militia members and volunteer firefighters, among the crowd.⁵ “The chief actors in the affair are stated to have been the fire brigades, and the banded villains known as the Hun-sing-tzu,” British Minister Thomas Wade later reported to London. “These were ready for the attack, and as soon as the gongs sounded fell on, provided with deadly weapons.”⁶ The crowd on the quay was primarily male and nearly all adults. Families had been keeping their children and women close to home for fear of the kidnappers. A few members of the crowd threw stones at the compound gates and the front of the church. The large cross over the door was a particularly tempting target.⁷

Back across the river, the Sisters tried to project a sense of normalcy both to reassure themselves and calm their frightened charges. Just before nine o’clock, a woman unknown to the Sisters crept through the orphanage gates and began examining the rooms and courtyards. The orphanage’s male porters quickly hustled the intruder back into the street, but the incident unsettled the Sisters. Was it just a curious neighbor, or a reconnaissance mission? The sudden sound of the gongs only added to the sense of foreboding. Many at the orphanage thought an attack was about to start, and it was with relief, if only for a moment, that they saw the streets outside the orphanage remained quiet.

Sister Andréoni tried to reassure the orphans, “We must not be afraid,” Sister Andréoni reportedly told her charges. “If they really come to kill someone, it will be the Sisters; For you

5. “Report by the Rev. C. Stanley of the testimony of Christian C taken in Tien-tsin, July 4, 1870 in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Enclosure 6.

6. Thomas Wade to Prince Gong, Beijing, September 5, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 95, Enclosure 2.

7. News from Tianjin Concessions published North China Herald July 7, 1870 (Page 6–7); Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, pp. 322–323.

Chinese, there is no danger.” Marie Tchaè, one of the Chinese workers at the orphanage who survived the massacre, later recalled the entire Rencitang in a state of high anxiety. “We made cornmeal bread, which the children usually like very much, but no one, neither the employees nor the children, wanted to eat.”⁸

A little after 9:00, a clamor from inside the walled city signaled the gathering of the officials and their staff. A large procession with thundering drums and more gongs and cymbals began rolling through the streets of Tianjin and out the northern gate toward the riverbank and Wanghailou. Armed guards pushed back crowds and cleared the roadways for the sedan chairs of Magistrate Liu Jie, Prefect Zhang Guangzao, and the *daotai*, Zhou Jiaxun. Behind the officials marched more guards and clerks followed by the prisoner Wu Lanzhen.⁹

Wu’s face and body were covered with the marks of his imprisonment and repeated interrogations. The heavy chains on his hands and feet and wretched condition made walking difficult. The magistrate’s jailers kept him moving with harsh words, the prodding of rods, and sharp pulls on the chain. As the gruesome parade passed them, onlookers jeered at Wu Lanzhen, occasionally spitting, or throwing things at the accused kidnapper, careful not to accidentally hit or provoke the armed yamen runners guarding the prisoner.¹⁰

Just before 10:00, the procession reached the gates of Wanghailou. Guards proclaimed the arrival of the ranking officials and the magistrate’s clerk ordered the gates opened. The officials dismounted their sedan chairs. They were eager to commence their investigation, but

8. Account of Marie Tchaè, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 452.

9. Liu Jie Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu.

10. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 424.

also concerned about safety. The noise and spectacle of the prisoner's march had attracted a large crowd who followed the procession onto the quay in front of Wanghailou and joined the throng that had been steadily growing all morning.¹¹ A wave of revulsion swept through the crowded street as the prisoner appeared into view and inspired several of the braver spectators to step forward menacingly, pelting the hapless Wu Lanzhen with stones and cursing and threatening to kill him on the spot.¹²

The Chinese staff inside the compound waited for a signal. Henri Fontanier and Father Chevrier both gave their assent, the gates swung open, and the motley assemblage trudged up the steps of the great stone church.¹³ Two guards roughly guided the prisoner Wu Lanzhen inside the narthex as the interrogation began. The magistrate asked Wu Lanzhen to point out the secret hiding places where Wu claimed the church concealed their stash of stupefying powders and other magic elixirs. His face white with terror, Wu looked around the enormous interior of the church. High arches towered above him, eyeless statues of Mary and a suffering Jesus stared back. Wu shook his head. The prefect demanded Wu identify which church servants gave him the intoxicating drugs and ordered Wu to kidnap people in the markets. Wu simply stared forward. He could not recognize a single person.¹⁴ In his deposition, Wu claimed to be a frequent visitor to the church and that he was even held captive there for a time, but now it was becoming

11. Zhang Yu, Yamen servant, deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document Number 102630.

12. Liu Jie Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu.

13. Zhou Jiaxun, Deposition in *xiangxiang Zengshi wenxian* 湘乡曾氏文献 [*Documents of the Zeng Family of Xiang County*], p. 4519

14. Deposition of Zhang Guangzao, Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu., No. 102630

clear to the dismayed officials that Wu could not recall coherently and of the places or people he had described in the deposition. Wu had never been to the church, his earlier testimony—obtained after days of being beaten and tortured by the magistrate’s guards—had been false.¹⁵

In desperation, the magistrate commanded Wu Lanzhen to show him where they could find the mysterious Wang San, the alleged mastermind of the Catholic kidnapping ring. Wu Lanzhen sat there, miserable, with no way to comply with the magistrate’s order. The officials’ case against the church crumbled. The attempt to implicate the foreigners in the kidnappings had become a very public fiasco.

In the streets, an expectant crowd pushed against the gates to try to see or hear what was happening inside. Instead, they saw the magistrate and his fellow officials storm out of the church with their retinue and prisoner, followed by two foreigners and the foreigners’ Chinese lackeys. Jeers and admonishments against both the foreigners and the officials filled the street. The officials got in their sedan chairs, ordered their guards to clear the roads, and marched back inside the walled city to considerably less fanfare and seemingly no longer interested in investigating the grounds of the orphanage.¹⁶

Fontanier felt satisfied that a crisis had been averted and the missionaries exonerated of the baseless charges against them. Even better, the outcome had humiliated the local officials,

15. Chonghou Report on the Incident at Tianjin in *Qingmo jia'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Doc 499. Deposition by Liu Jie in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhi fu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu.

16. Chonghou report on the Incident at Tianjin received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jia'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Doc 499; Chinese evidence of the Tien-tsin Massacre taken June 27, 1870, Thomas Wade to Lord Clarendon, July 16, 1870 (Enclosure) in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.; Zhang Guangzao Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhi fu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu.

particularly Magistrate Liu. Fontanier took a moment to write a quick report of the past few days for Count Rochechouart. “This little incident,” Fontanier concluded, “which might have taken a bad turn but for the intervention of Chonghou, appears today to be almost at an end: Chonghou having also promised me to publish a small proclamation in the next few days to allay the fears of the public.”¹⁷

In his report, Fontanier placed all the blame for the recent troubles on the local authorities. He was convinced it was the magistrate, the prefect, and their brother officials who were inciting the unsophisticated and semi-civilized rabble against the missionaries. Although he was quick to credit Chonghou for helping to refute the baseless charges against the church, the consul failed to tell his superiors about the investigation on the church grounds that morning.¹⁸ This seems not to have been an oversight. Fontanier included detailed accounts of his meetings with Magistrate Liu, but likely worried Count Rochechouart would question Fontanier’s willingness to concede some of the foreign prerogatives granted in the treaties. It might be better for Fontanier’s career to emphasize his standing up to local officials in stalwart defense of French rights in Tianjin.

After drafting the report, Fontanier headed out to the large veranda that wrapped around the front and sides of the consulate. Lunch had been prepared at an outdoor table with views of the river and close enough to the compound’s walls to hear the protests continuing outside. Fontanier’s guests that day were his former colleague from the French Legation in Beijing, M. Thomassin, and Thomassin’s new bride, recently returned to China following their honeymoon in Europe. Rather than spend the night in the settlement area, Thomassin had accepted the

17. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 351. The original text and an alternate translation of this line occurs also in Correspondence, dispatches, circulars, and other papers respecting missionaries in China, 1868–72, p. 264.

18. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 351.

hospitality of his fellow diplomat. He had an appointment with a Swiss merchant named Borel who operated out of the Chinese city and the consulate was more convenient than the settlement. The couple was eager to get underway to Beijing, and their boat was tied up on the nearby quay and loaded with luggage, but first, they would take lunch with Fontanier. They may have also wanted to give the crowds a chance to disperse.

While Fontanier and the Thomassins dined on the veranda, Father Chevrier and Father Ou were braving the city's streets to meet with Chonghou. From Chevrier's perspective, the morning's interrogation at the church must have seemed like just the latest and most egregious in a series of outrages that dated back to the very beginnings of the mission in Tianjin. Chevrier pleaded with Chonghou to take a firmer hand with local officials, to do more to suppress the slanderous rumors about the church and its activities, and to send armed guards to disperse the daily crowds of ruffians who gathered outside the church and harassed those who tried to go inside.¹⁹

Chonghou heard Chevrier's demands and then turned the church's problems back on the missionaries. Chonghou thought that the church's policies, especially the secrecy surrounding the orphanage, increased the suspicions of the local populace. It made the church seem sinister. As a result, even the most elaborate and baroque of the claims against the foreigners seemed plausible in the absence of other information. At the very least, by not allowing anyone other than members of the church to enter the grounds of the orphanage, the nuns certainly looked as though they had something to hide.²⁰

19. Chonghou report on the Incident at Tianjin (Received June 23, 1870) *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Doc 499.

20. Chonghou report to the throne (Received June 23, 1870) *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Doc 499.

According to Chonghou's record of the meeting, Father Chevrier agreed that in the future all deaths within the orphanage would be reported to authorities in accordance with local law and that corpses would be buried in the presence of local officials or their representatives. Chonghou claimed Father Chevrier also consented to register all acolytes and converts with the magistrate's office, a surprising concession given the near-universal opposition to convert registration among Catholic and Protestant missionaries.²¹ Whether Father Chevrier acquiesced to these rather extraordinary requests is uncertain. Chonghou's later memorial to the throne states the French priest approved each of his proposals, but neither Father Chevrier nor Father Ou left an account of the conversation.²²

After the meeting, the two priests returned to the mission and sat down for their lunch. Joining them was M. Coutris and several Chinese members of the mission staff. As the group was eating, they heard loud shattering sounds. Stones broke through the church's stained-glass windows and Chevrier headed into the church to find the windows ruined and bricks and rocks scattered around the floor. The former soldier noted the damage before heading back to the mission to calmly finish his lunch.²³

The noise of the crowd attracted more people and the streets and waterfront surrounding the gates of the French compound filled with demonstrators shouting curses and throwing rocks and bricks over the walls.²⁴ Local constables stood by and watched, emboldening the mob. There

21. Chonghou report to the throne (Received June 23, 1870) *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Doc 499.

22. Chonghou report to the throne (Received June 23, 1870) *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Doc 499. Many of the same suggestions would be included in a circular sent by the Zongli Yamen to the foreign legations in February 1871. See Chapter 12.

23. Hübner and Herbert, *A Ramble Round the World, 1871.*, p. 429.

24. Liu Jie Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu.

was no sign that the magistrate or the other officials wished to intervene or attempt to stabilize a rapidly deteriorating situation. Prefect Zhang Guangzao testified later, “The Tianjin people, once there is some news, like to gather. Even if we dismiss them, they just come back and gather again.”²⁵

A little after noon, the bells and gongs to muster the local militia and the fire brigades again sounded through the streets of Tianjin.²⁶ Rushing to the scene were hundreds of *hunhunr* ready to do battle and protect their city.²⁷ “The soldiery of Tien-tsin are, of course, of the people,” wrote Thomas Wade, “and the more important of the rioters are said to have been men of the Fire Brigade, which is, I think, a sort of guild, and especially dangerous section of the population known as the Hun SingTzû, or *omnium gatherum*.”²⁸

British Counsel Lay commented on this phenomenon in a letter to Thomas Wade, “Mr. Lees informs me that he is ready to swear he heard the gongs beat to call the mob together. These gongs are in charge of the ‘huo -hui’ (fire brigade) and are beaten in case of fire or any other trouble. On the gongs being sounded, the whole of the Tien-tsin people turn out and flock to a certain point indicated. In this case they seem to have been told where to go; and if not, the

25. Zhang Guangzao Interrogation. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu., Document No. 102630.

26. Statement by Zhang Yu, Yamen servant. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu., Document No. 102630.

27. Zhou Jiaxun 周家勛, "Zhou Jiaxun zhi Wu Rulun mihan 周家勛致吳汝綸密函 [Zhou Jiaxun secret correspondence to Wu Rulun]," in *近代史資料 jindai shiliao [Modern History Materials]* (Social Science Press, 1996), p. 18.

28. Correspondence between Thomas Wade and Earl Clarendon, Beijing, July 16, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short

presence and shouting of a large mob of people close to the French Consulate and Cathedral would very soon indicate the destination of those who were called out.”²⁹

The *hunhunr* presence during the riots was misunderstood (or deliberately misinterpreted) as evidence that local elite and local officials were the real organizers of the massacre. Crucially, the foreigners assumed that because groups like the local militia and fire brigades were organized, they must be under the control of the local elite and local officials. Although low-level elites were in leadership positions, these men were just as likely to yield to pressure from their members as they were to take marching orders from any cabal of local elites and officials. Both Zhang Guangzao and Magistrate Liu Jie later denied they had anything to do with spreading rumors or inciting the crowd.³⁰

When the local administration failed to take effective action to neutralize the danger, the men of the streets, both *hunhunr* and like-minded members of more orthodox local protection societies, considered themselves deputized to act. The *hunhunr* and fire brigades mingled with the crowd, cursing the foreigners, and threatening to try to force their way through the gates and into the compound. Several *hunhunr*, referred to by witnesses as “Tianjin Braves” or just “Ruffians,” kept agitating the mob and threatened to try to force their way through the gates and

29. Correspondence between W.H. Lay and Thomas Wade, June 28, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short

30. “Deposition of Cashiered Magistrate Liu Jie” and “Zhang Guangzao responds to questions from the Zongli Yamen.” Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

into the compound.³¹ When a passerby asked one of the firemen where the fire was, the brigade member replied, “There is no fire; we’re going to a fight at the church.”³²

Fontanier and his second-in-command, M. Simon, assessed the situation. They had dispatched servants out into the street with messages imploring Chonghou to send help, but those servants had not returned. Given the crowd’s mood, it was entirely possible they never made it to Chonghou’s yamen. The foreigners along with the rest of their Chinese servants and a few Chinese congregants were trapped. The crowds kept up their chants and threats as the gates heaved inward from the crush of bodies in the street.

With no help forthcoming, Fontanier and Simon organized a makeshift defense. A servants crept forward to reinforce the gates but were forced back by a hail of stones. They pleaded with those at the gateway to disperse, but their entreaties only caused the crowd to stop cursing the foreigners and turn their ire toward the Chinese servants. The rioters accused the converts and servants of being “Slaves of the Ghosts.” Angrily, the consulate and church staff attacked the gate from the inside, using sticks and poles to force people away from the entrance. Others picked up the rocks and other debris thrown by the crowd and returned fire over the wall into the mob outside.³³

Finally, three of Chonghou’s secretaries, identified by the white buttons on their hats, appeared outside the gates. They tried to reason with the crowd only to be shouted down and threatened. Fontanier was enraged. He went down to the gate and yelled at one of the besieged

31. “Chinese Evidence as to the Massacre of June 21, 1870” in Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72.*, p. 278.

32. “Report by the Rev. C. Stanley of the testimony of Christian Teacher E taken in Tien-tsin, July 4, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Enclosure 6. pp. 110–111.

33. Zhang Guangzao Deposition and notes. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

secretaries until he got their attention. “Do something,” Fontanier implored the secretaries. “There is nothing to be done,” replied the secretary.³⁴ According to one witness, Fontanier was so enraged that he began swinging at one of the officials with a riding crop.³⁵ The three sub-officials quickly retreated, with one of the men managing to escape the mob only by leaping from the quay onto a departing ferry barge. A consular servant who had returned to Wanghailou with the secretaries from Chonghou’s yamen had to be rescued by the consulate’s cook, who dragged his bloody colleague through a gap in the gate and back into the temporary safety of the compound.³⁶

At around 1:00 pm, Fontanier decided to make a last desperate attempt to force Chonghou to save the French compound. Having failed to raise the Chonghou’s assistance by sending messengers, Fontanier and Simon prepared to make a more direct appeal. They dressed in full uniform and carried a French flag. Should the flag prove insufficient to force passage through the streets, Fontanier carried two pistols, and Simon, known in the community as a swordsman of considerable ability, brandished his military saber.³⁷ With weapons at the ready, the two men slipped out the back gate of the consulate and hurried down alleys to Chonghou’s office.

34. Dialogue as later described by the Lazarist priest Jean-Baptiste-François-Joseph Delemasure. CM. Notices Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 433; A consular servant who survived the attack also described the brief conversation. Delemasure’s source was probably Coutris, who was the only French survivor of the group at Chonghou’s yamen.

35. Statement from Zhang Yu, Yamen servant, “Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

36. Recounted in Hübner and Herbert, *A Ramble Round the World, 1871.*, p. 331.

37. Correspondence from Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon (July 16, 1870). Correspondence Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72.*, p. 313.

Meanwhile, the anger outside the gates of Wanghailou was intensifying. For most of the day, the crowd had been content to hurl stones and epithets, but with the withdrawal of Chonghou's secretaries the last vestiges of public order seemed to evaporate.³⁸ The slogans grew louder, and people in the front of the crowd began pushing on the gates and testing the strength of the locks. Finally, the weight of the rioters bent the gates inward, crushing those in the front against the iron bars as the barrier threatened to collapse entirely.

Some witnesses suggested Father Chevrier, either motivated by sympathy for those being squeezed against the gate or simply because he felt there was nothing to hide, ordered his staff to open the gates. There is reason to be skeptical of this account, which appears in a Lazarist compilation of testimony and letters published, in part, to burnish the martyrdom credentials of those killed. Witnesses later place Chevrier inside with Father Ou when the rioters poured into the compound and surrounded the church. It would be difficult to imagine Chevrier leaving the church, opening the gate, and then outracing the crowd to get back inside. It is far more likely that the gate simply gave way. A few congregants in the church managed to escape from side portals as the doors burst open and the rioters entered the sanctuary. The two priests barricaded themselves in the sacristy before squirming through a window that opened into the adjacent consulate garden and hiding among the mass of scholar rocks.³⁹

At the consulate, the Thomassins watched in horror as the crowd surged into the compound. Mr. Thomassin grabbed his wife and fled out the north gate. Running through side alleys, they reached the courtyard of the Swiss merchant Borel and scrambled inside. However,

38. Liu Jie Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu.

39. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 329.

Thomassin seemed concerned that the merchant's yard offered only a temporary redoubt. Grabbing his pistol, he led his wife in a mad dash back to the riverfront and the relative security of their boat tied to the quay.⁴⁰ They never made it. The mob began pelting the pair with stones, forcing Thomassin to turn and fire on the crowd. In an instant, armed rioters surrounded the terrified honeymooners. M Thomassin held off the attackers long enough for his wife to try and escape before he succumbed to dozens of stab wounds. Mdme Thomassin was killed soon after by a single hatchet blow to the back of her head.⁴¹

After a frantic charge through hostile streets, Fontanier and Simon arrived outside of Chonghou's yamen. Fontanier kicked open the partially shut gate and the two Frenchmen barreled past the guards at the entrance and into the outer courtyard. Chonghou was in his inner office drafting a proclamation. Hearing the commotion in the courtyard outside his chamber, Chonghou got up from his desk, walked out, and came face-to-face with a highly agitated Fontanier. The French consul immediately turned his anger on Chonghou, shouting abuse at the Manchu official, gesticulating wildly, and waving a loaded pistol in the air. "Our very lives are threatened," yelled Fontanier, "and you do nothing about it?"⁴²

Just then, another scuffle broke out in the outer courtyard. Fontanier's servant had also forced his way inside along with M. Coutris. Coutris had been at the Mission with Chevrier as the gates broke open. Chevrier pleaded with him not to risk his life by leaving the compound, but

40. Chonghou report to the throne, Received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499; "List of Deaths and Injuries by Country" [各國死傷人數之清單 *geguo sishang renshu qingdan*] July 23, 1870. Archives of the Junjichu. Document No. 102740

41. Chonghou report to the throne, Received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499; Local witness reported in Hübner and Herbert, *A Ramble Round the World, 1871.*, p. 33.

42. Chonghou report to the throne, Received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499; Local witness reported in Hübner and Herbert, *A Ramble Round the World, 1871.*, p. 33.

Coutris, who lived in a courtyard not far from the consulate, wanted to protect his home. He saw Fontanier and Simon leave the consulate and decided to follow their route as a means of escape. With Fontanier's servant next to him, Coutris navigated the back alleys only to run into a pack of armed rioters. The two men retreated, taking refuge in Chonghou's yamen.

After Fontanier's violent entry, the yamen guards were in no mood for further intrusions. Fontanier's servant received several pike wounds on his leg before one of Chonghou's secretaries—who also happened to be an acquaintance of Coutris—intervened and hustled the Frenchman and the wounded servant into a small, unused room. From there, Coutris could hear the drama unfolding between Fontanier and Chonghou, but he could not see what was happening.

In Chonghou's chambers, Fontanier asked the commissioner for help before resorting to decidedly less diplomatic language. Chonghou did what he could to calm Fontanier, but the consul was in no mood to be patronized. All Fontanier heard were prevarications and excuses. The French consul finally flew into an absolute rage at Chonghou, forcing the commissioner to make a hasty retreat into the relative safety of his inner office. As Chonghou's assistants and guards struggled to regain control of the courtyard, Fontanier proceeded to vandalize the space, throwing crockery against the wall, and smashing other objects into the floor.⁴³

Chonghou's account of the interview claims that Fontanier also tried to shoot the commissioner. "The consul was in a violent state and carried two pistols in his waistband," reported Chonghou. "Another foreigner, who accompanied him, was armed with a sword. Both rushed forward to meet me, and hardly had he come near me than M. Fontanier began to speak

43. Chonghou report to the throne, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [*Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing*], Volume 1., Document No. 499; Correspondence Henri Fontanier to Count de Rochechouart (June 21, 1870) in Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales, 1860–1900* (The History of China's Relations with the Western Powers, 1860–1900), p. 351.

most improperly, drew his pistol from his sash, and fired it in my presence. Fortunately, no one was hurt, and M. Fontanier was restrained. But, as it would not have been dignified on my part to have come to blows with him, I retired.”⁴⁴

There is reason to doubt Chonghou’s story, and it is possible that details of the altercation between Fontanier and Chonghou were muddled with the violent encounter that occurred soon after between Fontanier and Magistrate Liu Jie. Coutris and Fontanier’s servant both claimed that despite the ruckus in Chonghou’s office, they never heard anything that sounded like a gunshot or firearm.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the effect of Fontanier’s tantrum was an immediate end to the meeting as well as any hope of Chonghou’s direct intervention on behalf of the foreigners. Chonghou was not generally known for his courage, but the Manchu had been an army officer and it wasn’t his first time dealing with an angry and armed antagonist. He told the French consul that his violent fit had attracted a large crowd outside of the *yamen*. It might be advisable, Chonghou counseled the consul, for Fontanier and Simon to remain inside the *yamen* gates until the mob dispersed. Another version of the story, based on accounts from Coutris and Fontanier’s servant, claims that Chonghou’s guards hustled the two Frenchmen toward the gate and then barred the door, preventing him from reentering.

Both versions agree that while exiting the premises, Fontanier was heard to exclaim that he would return to the French compound and do what Chonghou could not: protect the consulate and church. As a parting shot, Fontanier yelled back, “I have nothing to fear from the common people!”⁴⁶ Out in the street and enraged, Fontanier and Simon ran a formidable gauntlet of

44. Chonghou report to the throne, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499

45. Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, July 16, 1870. Correspondence Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72.*, p. 313.

46. Chonghou report to the throne, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499

hostile rioters as they fought their way to the consulate. Somewhere between the gates of Chonghou's yamen and the walls of Wanghailou—accounts differ as to the exact location—Fontanier and Simon came face-to-face with Magistrate Liu Jie who was accompanied by guards and some of his staff.⁴⁷

Wu Lanzhen's poor showing earlier that day had embarrassed and flummoxed the magistrate and the rioting at the church and the consulate was creating a situation that seriously threatened public order and the magistrate's authority. Having heard reports of an attack at Chonghou's office, Magistrate Liu rushed to the scene fearing the worst, only to run into the apoplectic foreigner carrying his guns.⁴⁸ For Fontanier, Magistrate Liu was the *bête noire* of this drama, and it is likely Fontanier went to his death convinced the magistrate had orchestrated the whole affair. Witnesses claim Fontanier was so enraged that he seemed like a drunken man. Facing his nemesis and surrounded by a hostile crowd pushing forward, Fontanier raised his pistol and took a shot in the direction of the magistrate. Liu ducked behind one of his own clerks as Fontanier's bullet struck and wounded the unfortunate assistant.⁴⁹ The result was total bedlam.

47. Chonghou report to the throne, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499

48. "Deposition of Cashiered Magistrate Liu Jie." Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

49. "Deposition of Cashiered Magistrate Liu Jie." Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630. The account of Fontanier shooting the bystander was generally accepted as true by most of the foreign community, journalists, and other diplomats. A set of handwritten notes on the case held at the Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes also makes mention of Fontanier's reputation for impulsiveness and his temper and concedes Fontanier's guilt in the killing of the sub-official. See *Massacres de Tientsin*. 1870. Dossier: Mission au Tcheli, 1871–1883, Article 414, Series A, Peking Fonds. Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Nantes, France, p. 4.

In the confusion, most in the crowd thought Fontanier had shot and killed the magistrate. Cries and shouts arose throughout the street: The foreigner has murdered an official!⁵⁰

The assembled mob, many with the spears, clubs, axes, knives, and short swords closed around Fontanier and Simon. The two Frenchmen fought ferociously but were overwhelmed before they reached the relative safety of Wanghailou. The mob stripped the mutilated carcasses and dumped the remains in the nearby canal. British Consul Lay organized the retrieval of Fontanier's body the next day and his unfortunate French counterpart could be identified only by a single remaining article of clothing—a sock monogrammed “H.F.”⁵¹ Simon's corpse was discovered a few days later, floating bloated in the canal. As had been the case with Fontanier, Simon's body was disfigured in the fatal attack and postmortem as the crowd continued to rain blows down upon the dead man. The remains were recognizable only by the fashionable *L'Imperial* facial hair favored by Simon.⁵²

The rioters boiled eastward down the dusty street where they merged with the crowds already in possession of the French compound. Wood and straw were packed against the wall of the church, and the rioters set the church ablaze, forcing the terrified people inside to choose death by incineration or face the violent and armed mob waiting outside.⁵³ Both Father Chevrier

50. Testimony of Li Gao, servant of Liu Jie. Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

51. Acting Consul Lay to Mr. Wade, Tianjin, June 24, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. No. 20, Enclosure 15.

52. “Chinese Version of Tianjin Massacre” in Correspondence Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72.*, p. 319. See correspondence from Acting Consul W.H. Lay to Thomas Wade (June 24, 1870) in *Ibid.*, pp. 270–271.

53. Zhang Guangzao Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

and Ou were killed, their bodies found later amid the stones of the consulate rock garden.⁵⁴ Chevrier's skull had been split in several places, and his chest and stomach were cut open. With the priest and consul dead, the rioters demolished the consulate and the church. Towering flames engulfed the newly built Notre Dame des Victoires. A crash and a resounding clang announced the collapse of the bell tower.

According to his statement, Prefect Zhang heard the gongs summoning the fire brigades and rushed from his office to the scene, ordering the servants carrying his sedan chair to follow the sounds of the crowd. Along the way, he saw “the people, rolling like a tide in the same direction, and almost all of them armed.”⁵⁵ Zhang and his attendants hurried the mile from his office inside the city out the north gate and over to the north bank of the city moat where both Chonghou's *yamen* and the French compound were located. “The streets around the North Gate [of the city, where Chonghou's *yamen* was located] were crammed with people, and so many were armed with swords and spears. As I went, I shouted for people to cease and desist at once,” he later reported, “but it was to no avail. Even guards could not help. There were so many people and so few foreigners, what help could be given? By the time I reached the spot, Fontanier was dead.”⁵⁶

Following the fatal confrontation with Fontanier, Magistrate Liu and the other officials realized they had lost whatever small amount of control they had over the situation.⁵⁷ According

54. “List of Deaths and Injuries by Country” [各國死傷人數之清單 *geguo sishang renshu qingdan*] July 23, 1870. Archives of the Junjichu. Document No. 102740

55. Zhang Guangzao Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

56. Zhang Guangzao Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

57. Zhang Guangzao Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

to witness statements collected later, Magistrate Liu's actions suggest less a man in charge than one rapidly losing his mind in a crisis. After the mob killed Fontanier and Simon, Magistrate Liu rushed into Chonghou's yamen. It was now the magistrate's turn to implore Chonghou to fix the situation.⁵⁸ Chonghou, shaken from his earlier encounter with Fontanier and the chaos around him, replied tersely, "I shall have a great deal of trouble even to save myself."⁵⁹

Liu rushed back into the street to try and stop the crowd from doing more damage. With throngs of residents, as well as local militia units and armed gangs of *hunhunr* all heading toward the church, Liu Jie had little hope of stopping the destruction of Wanghailou, but he did order the pontoon bridge that spanned the canal closed in an attempt to keep the rioters on the north bank of the river and away from the gates of the city and the orphanage.⁶⁰ Liu Jie's efforts to contain the riot were foiled by the intervention of General Chen Guorui.⁶¹

General Chen would testify that he rushed to Chonghou's *yamen* after he heard the news—which turned out to be untrue—that the foreigners had murdered the commissioner.⁶² General Chen's sudden appearance at the bridge collapsed an already shaky chain of command. When Magistrate Liu ordered the pontoon bridge closed, witnesses claim General Chen insisted it remain open so that the general could reach the opposite shore. As Chen crossed the bridge, the crowd followed.⁶³ This testimony seemed to corroborate a widespread view among the foreign

58. Liu Jie Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

59. Witness statement recounted in Ramble Hübner and Herbert, *A Ramble Round the World, 1871.*, p. 338.

60. Zhang Guangzao Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

61. "Chinese Evidence as to the Massacre of June 21, 1870" compiled by Thomas Wade in Correspondence, dispatches, circulars and other papers respecting missionaries in China, 1868–72, p. 281.

62. Chen Guorui Written Statement. Undated (likely 1870). Archives of the Junjichu. Document No. 102826.

63. See Fairbank, "Patterns Behind The Tientsin Massacre." Foreign suspicions regarding General Chen began in the weeks after the riot. See Lay to Wade (June 28, 1870) Ibid, p. 276. Wade to Earl Clarendon (August 1, 1870) in Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, p. 345.

community that General Chen's presence was not coincidental, and his checkered past as a renegade military leader led many to suspect that he instigated the riots.⁶⁴ William Lay even cited a possible motive: Chen had been demoted while stationed in Sichuan Province after the French minister in Peking Rochechouart had complained to the court about Chen's anti-foreignism. Lay suggested that Chen assisted the mob or, at the very least, worked to undermine attempts on the part of other officials to act responsibly.⁶⁵

Several foreign language accounts published after the massacre name Chen as the main villain and mastermind behind the massacre, although the official investigation, led by Chen's erstwhile patron Zeng Guofan, exonerated the general of any involvement. Later historians have had their reasons to cast doubt on Chen's innocence. In an influential essay, historian John King Fairbank argued that the circumstantial evidence against Chen seemed to overwhelmingly point to his having played a part in inciting the riot.⁶⁶

Whatever Chen's motivations, the failure to close the pontoon bridge allowed the crowd to surge across the river to the opposite bank where the orphanage was located. Just after 2:00 pm, the Sisters received word that the church and consulate were on fire. From the rooftop of the Rencitang, they saw the flames consume the bell tower of the Cathedral de Notre Dame des Victoires. Sister Superior Marquet ordered her fellow nuns and the other employees of the orphanage to move the children—including the infants at the nursery—into the chapel. Once inside, Chinese employees placed the youngest into a small recess under the floor and then locked the chapel doors.

64. See Chapter 7.

65. Correspondence W.H. Lay to Thomas Wade, June 28, 1870 in *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870* (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. "I hear that a military mandarin, Ch'en Ta-shuai, whom M. de Rochechouart caused to be degraded some time ago in Szechuen. This man seems to have assisted the mob, and to have prevented any intervention on the part of Ch'ung-hou."

66. Fairbank, "Patterns Behind The Tientsin Massacre."




Figure 8.1 Map of Rencitang showing approximate locations where the nuns were killed.⁶⁷

The attack on the orphanage and the killing of the nuns turned the riots into an international cause célèbre. Yet despite the outrage and a cottage industry that soon sprang up reproducing lurid reports of martyrdom and slaughter, reconstructing what occurred at the

67. Map of Rencitang, Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 456. Not all the bodies were recovered, and the map was likely recreated by descriptions and testimony from survivors of the attack.

orphanage is difficult. There were fewer witnesses (or fewer witnesses willing to testify) regarding what happened at the orphanage than of the events at Chonghou's office and at the church. Separating contemporary sources from sensationalist hagiographies of the victims is possible, and there are accounts from Chinese witnesses who shared their stories, the deposition given by Prefect Zhang, and from forensic evidence collected and described by British Consul Lay. Chonghou's initial dispatch on the case stated simply: "The orphanage, the Hall of Benevolence and Mercy, located outside the East Gate was burned down."⁶⁸

Once the rioters crossed the pontoon bridge, they squeezed down the narrow market streets to Rencitang. Eyewitnesses reported that many were armed with the long pikes used by official forces, and one of the men even used his pike as an improvised ladder to gain access to the roof of the enclosure followed by several more rioters. There were reports that once on top of the building, someone fired off a shot from a large gun or small cannon. The sound temporarily scattered the crowd outside who believed the nuns might have opened fire on them. When it was realized the explosion had been directed at the orphanage, the crowd again surged forth and began to break down the doors. A witness described the main thoroughfares clogged with armed men shouting, "Death to all Foreign Devils."⁶⁹

The first rioters through the gate mortally wounded the porter, surnamed Toung [Dong]. They entered the pharmacy and began smashing through jars, bottles, and cabinets in a

68. Chonghou report to the throne, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jia'ao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499 "List of Deaths and Injuries by Country" [各國死傷人數之清單 *geguo sishang renshu qingdan*] July 23, 1870. Archives of the Junjichu. Document No. 102740. In a letter to French officials, Prince Gong wrote, "The fate of the Sisters of Mercy (Nuns) killed was indeed pitiable." The language is interesting especially when compared to an earlier part of the letter in which he referred to the death of French officers as "deplorable." (Prince of Kung to Count de Rochechouart) in Correspondence, dispatches, circulars and other papers respecting missionaries in China, 1868–72, p. 326.

69. "Report by the Rev. C. Stanley of the testimony of Christian Teacher E taken in Tien-tsin, July 4, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Enclosure 6. pp. 110–111.

haphazard search for evidence in the form of stolen body parts. As the superior, Sister Marquet likely felt a sense of duty to confront the attackers. One witness says that she tried to calm the crowd: “‘What do you want from us,’ [Sister Marquet] said gently. ‘We only do good; if this is our lives you want, take it, we will die, but spare the children.’” She was killed just inside the gate, pierced by spears, and her skull split by a sword. Her body was later found to be missing the hands and feet, although these were possibly removed after she was dead, perhaps as trophies or for their perceived magical value.⁷⁰

Sister Andréoni was killed with an ax. She had apparently stepped forward to confront the attackers following the murder of Sister Marquet and possibly to give the others inside more time to escape or hide. The corpses of Sisters Andréoni and Marquet were brought outside, stripped naked, and impaled on pikes. Sister Clavelin was last seen hiding in the chapel, but her body was found in the pharmacy, she had either fled there after being discovered or was taken there to be interrogated. Some reports claim that her eyes and heart had been removed during the attack. Sisters Viollet, Legras, and Adams, and the Irish Sister Alice O’Sullivan were all found in the yard around the chapel. One witness claimed that Sister O’Sullivan had been tortured by a group of attackers who doused her with a boiling pot of water found in the nearby kitchen. Sisters Pavilion and Tillet were both located in the crawl space under the chapel. Their bodies were among the ones burned after the rioters set the orphanage on fire. The last nun, Sister Lenu, was killed while guarding the door to the older children’s dormitory.⁷¹

70. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 456.

71 Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l’Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 456.

Many of the bodies were naked. Several, including those of Sister Marquet and Sister Clavelin, had also been disemboweled. It is possible some of the nuns were disrobed during the attack. The number of people involved, the ferocity of the assault, and the persistent belief that the nuns were secretly men lends credibility to reports of rioters stripping the nuns of their clothing. The condition of the bodies—many corpses were partially or entirely set ablaze along with the orphanage—and the chaotic aftermath of the violence prevented a systematic examination of the victims' remains. Whether the worst of the humiliations and mutilations occurred before or after the nuns were killed may never be known.

Alphonse Favier from the Beijing Mission searched the ruins of Rencitang a week after the massacre. He helped collect what remained of the sisters for burial. "I sifted through all the rubble," he recalled later, "and couldn't find any other bones."⁷² The paucity of remains also helps shed light on the fate of the children and the Chinese employees of Rencitang. Some reports suggested that as many as 100 children had died in the crawl spaces under the chapel when the building was destroyed by fire.⁷³ Favier indicated that although it was certainly possible some of the children and employees were killed either in the attack or by not being able or willing to leave their hiding places as the buildings burned, he put the number of casualties as "not over twenty."⁷⁴ Another source says that most of the children scattered when the attack began. Those children found inside were taken to the magistrate's office to be questioned and to see if they could be reunited with their families.

72. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 465.

73. Chinese version of the Tientsin Massacre, Enclosure, Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, July 16, 1870. Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72.*, p. 74.

74. Sackebant, *Notices et documents sur les Prêtres de la Mission et les Filles de la Charité de S. Vincent de Paul: massacrés, le 21 Juin 1870, a Tien-tsin (Pé-tche-ly) Chine en haine de la religion catholique et de ses saintes oeuvres ; ou, les premiers martyrs de l'Oeuvre de la Sainte-Enfance.*, p. 465.

A number of Chinese employees died trying to defend the orphanage, although the exact total is also difficult to establish. One witness claimed the crowd seized a woman who was not identified and threw her into the nearby river to drown, only to pull her out when she promised to claim the Sisters had bewitched her.⁷⁵

As the attack on Rencitang was unfolding, the climate of anger and violence made the streets unsafe for any foreigner. A French merchant named Chalmaison lived not far from the French consulate and close to the home of the Swiss merchant M. Borel where the Thomassins had earlier taken temporary refuge. Chalmaison heard the commotion in the street and was struck and killed almost immediately upon opening his gate. His wife would be one of the last foreign victims of the massacre. After her husband was cut down, she fled down the back alleys and was saved by a neighbor who hid Madame Chalmaison in her house. That night, she wished to return to her home, possibly to help retrieve her husband's body. Disguised as a Chinese woman, Madame Chalmaison made her way through the darkened lane only to find her house destroyed. She began retreating back down the alleys toward her neighbor's house but became confused, perhaps by the darkness or in her distress, and knocked upon a gate only to realize she had arrived at the wrong address. The people who answered, astonished to be confronted by a foreign woman, cried out in alarm, alerting patrolling groups of *hunhunr* and other men who had participated in the riots. Madame Chalmaison's mutilated corpse was discovered the following day.⁷⁶

75. Acting Consul Lay to Mr. Wade, Tianjin, June 25, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. No. 20, Enclosure 17.

76. "List of Deaths and Injuries by Country" [各國死傷人數之清單 *geguo sishang renshu qingdan*] July 23, 1870. Archives of the Junjichu. Document No. 102740.

Mr. Borel, the Swiss merchant, barricaded himself in his courtyard and hoped for the best. Somewhat miraculously, he survived aided by a stout door and a Chinese employee who kept insisting, at considerable personal peril, that the foreigner had already left. The following day, Borel and M. Coutris, who had waited out the riots hiding in Chonghou's yamen, were escorted by Chonghou to the relative safety of the British concession.⁷⁷

The final three non-Chinese victims were a Russian merchant named Basoff and a young couple, Mr. Protopopoff, and his wife, née Startzoff.⁷⁸ Like the Thomassins, the Protopopoffs had recently married, and Protopopoff and Basoff worked for the same Russian trading house in the Tianjin concessions.⁷⁹

On the morning of June 21, they had left the concession area earlier that morning along with two Russian merchants Nefediev and Antonfiev and Nefediev's clerk, Cotelncow, to go to the markets outside the city walls. At a little past noon, a Chinese servant ran to warn the group that the Catholic Church was being attacked and the three should return to the concession area downriver for their own safety. The group got into their sedan chairs and were making their way back when a group of armed rioters stopped their convoy. Nefediev, Antonfiev, and Cotelncow were following behind on foot and hid in a sentry box as they witnessed armed men force Basoff, Protopopoff, and his wife out of their chairs. A quarrel ensued. According to some reports, the two men tried to argue for safe passage on the grounds they were not French, but when the armed rioters grabbed Mrs. Protopopoff, her two companions drew their swords.⁸⁰ The crowd

77. Dispatch from Tianjin, published in the *North China Herald*, July 7, 1870 (pp. 6–7)

78. Zhou Jiaxun 周家勋, "Zhou Jiaxun zhi Wu Rulun mihan 周家勋致吴汝纶密函 [Zhou Jiaxun secret correspondence to Wu Rulun]." p. 20.

79. W.H. Lay to Thomas Wade, June 24, 1870, Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72*. p. 27.

80. "Deposition of M. Nefediew, August 20, 1870." Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Enclosure No. 68.

fell on them and all three were killed, their bodies stripped and dismembered. One witness claimed that Mrs. Protopopoff had her finger severed so that an attacker could claim her ring.⁸¹ The same witness also recalled seeing sub-officials attached to the magistrate's yamen watching the riots and witnessing the three Russians' slaying. "These men never attempted to interfere with the proceedings of the mob," said the witness, "except in one instance, when they advised that the foreign settlement should not be attacked on that day. Their whole department was that of men who approved of the acts of the crowd."⁸²

After seeing their fellow Russians killed, Nefediev, Antonfiev, and Cotelncow fled on foot. They were later seized by rioters but succeeded where the others had failed, convincing their captors that the Chinese had no quarrel with Russians. The three were then bound and taken to Chonghou's yamen where they joined the foreign survivors escorted back to the concessions the following day.⁸³

Rioters also destroyed four empty chapels, including one previously used by the Jesuits when they had stayed in Tianjin during unrest in Shandong a few years earlier. The other structures belonged to British and American missionary societies. The consulate, cathedral, and orphanage were all burned. Only the vicarage was spared destruction, likely because it shared a wall with several homes.

81. "Report by the Rev. W.N. Hall of the testimony of a Chinese (A) who witnessed the massacre of the three Russians at Tientsin taken in Tien-tsin July 4, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document 58, Enclosure 2. pp. 105–106

82. "Report by the Rev. W.N. Hall of the testimony of a Chinese (A) who witnessed the massacre of the three Russians at Tientsin taken in Tien-tsin July 4, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document 58, Enclosure 2. pp. 105–106

83. Correspondence from Russian Minister Butzow to Thomas Wade, July 8, 1870 and Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, July 16, 1870 in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.

By 5:00 that afternoon, the attacks subsided. According to one account, the riots ended because a severe thunderstorm blew into Tianjin that evening. After two months of drought led to a day of rage and rioting, it was a hard rain that quelled the violence.⁸⁴

84. Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Volume 2., p. 246. Morse credits the thunderstorm with saving the international settlement by discouraging the rioters from traveling further upriver to the concession areas. Another witness reported that the drums and gongs that had initially summoned the fire brigades and militias sounded the signal to retreat and disband. Chinese Version of the Tient-tsin Massacre, recorded June 27, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 35, Enclosure 4.

PART III

Chapter 9: A Conspiracy of Bones

Two days after the massacre, on June 23, 1870, Sister Jaurias, a Daughter of Charity stationed at the orphanage in Beijing, addressed God in a letter. “Your wishes are fulfilled. You have ten of your Daughters who suffered martyrdom in China. Yes, my very honored Father, it is indeed a true martyrdom, since the populace massacred our worthy Missionaries and, our beloved Sisters, in hatred of Religion.”¹

In Tianjin, the unfortunate task of collecting the bodies and officially notifying the legations in Beijing regarding the number of foreign casualties and the identities of the victims fell to Acting British Consul William Lay. The remains of Fontanier, Simon, Mr. and Mrs. Thomassin, Protopopoff and his wife, their friend Butoff, Father Chevrier, and Vincent Ou had been recovered and positively identified, although the discovery of Fontanier’s body floating in the canal the day before had been something of a shock. Chonghou had informed the Lay that he had Fontanier’s remains under guard at his yamen and even agreed to provide a coffin to convey the body to the British consulate. Lay was therefore a bit vexed when word reached him that a bloated corpse wearing Fontanier’s monogrammed socks had been fished out of the canal not far from the still-smoldering remains of the consulate.²

Every hour seemed to bring new corpses. The same day that he examined Fontanier’s remains, Lay was summoned to identify yet another body found floating in the canal. Based on a cursory inspection of the remains, Lay concluded it was not one of the foreign victims, but a

1. Sister Jaurias to Pierre Etienne dated June 23, 1870. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. 1871, p. 94.

2. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 25, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 17.

Chinese woman associated with the mission. “It was past recognition, but we made it out to be the body of a woman. It was fearfully cut, and the skull broken in two, the head nearly off the body. In order, if possible, to identify it, I had the clothes cut off. They were Chinese, and no undergarment which a foreign lady would wear was on the body. The hair was coarse, and I am of opinion that it was the body of one of the Chinese Sisters who were known to be in the cathedral.”³

Over the next week, more remains were delivered to the British consulate. Like the other corpses, the new bodies were also severely burned, mutilated, or affected by long immersion in the canal, making identification difficult.⁴ The bodies of the Chalmasons arrived on June 26, as well as four other coffins containing remains too burned to be identified. “Two coffins contained bodies half burnt,” reported the Tianjin correspondent for the Shanghai Evening Courier, “one of which had evidently been in the water and had apparently been partially eaten; the second was in much the same horrible state; the remaining two were burnt to a cinder; in one, only the skull and a few bones remained. I forced myself to look upon these six and hope I may never see such another sight.”⁵ Local officials said the bodies were those of the Sisters, but Lay was unable to confirm their identities.⁶

3. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 25, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 17.

4. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 25, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 17.

5. “The Tientsin Massacre” (From our Correspondent.) Tientsin, 22nd to 27th June 1870. Shanghai Evening Courier Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No 2, p. 7.

6. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jia'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499; Also Du, YWSM. TZ 72:23a. “List of Deaths and Injuries by Country” [各國死傷人數之清單 *geguo sishang renshu qingdan*] July 23, 1870. Archives of the Junjichu. Document No. 102740

All of the victims bore evidence of the crowd's fury. Fontanier's torso and head had been cut nearly in two and there was a gaping spear wound in the chest. Simon's body was also covered with sword cuts and had been disemboweled. Mr. Thomassin's body was riddled with injuries from spears and swords, and his wife's body had a large gash through the back of the neck where she had been hit with an axe. Mr. Chalmaison had the left side of his face cut away, his eyes were missing, and most of his torso was hacked to pieces. Father Chevrier's skull was broken in multiple places and attackers had used their swords to cut open his chest and abdomen. The Russian victims, Mr. and Mrs. Protopopoff and Mr. Basoff had similar injuries, each body showed numerous sword and spear wounds.⁷

Lay kept the bodies in one of the buildings at the British consulate to examine their wounds but was soon forced to make other arrangements. "The stench is so frightful; I cannot keep them any longer; and I have just had them placed in the foreign cemetery. The coffins have been covered with earth, and they will remain until the French authorities demand them for burial. I have painted numbers upon the coffins so that by-and-by there may be no difficulty in knowing each particular body."⁸

Lay was also coordinating the evacuation of British subjects from Tianjin and acting as a temporary French consul.⁹ With the city in disarray and local officials in disgrace, there was no one else to take witness statements, identify bodies, or search the ruins of the orphanage and church to look for evidence as to what had transpired. Lay did what he could. "I find it difficult

7. "THE TIENSIN MASSACRE" (From our Correspondent.) Tientsin, 22nd to 27th June 1870. Shanghai Evening Courier Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No 2, p. 7.

8. Correspondence from Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 24, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 15.

9. Correspondence from Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 26, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 19.

to write,” he lamented, “Every minute I am interrupted by subjects of all countries who rush to Her Majesty’s Consulate, as if once they were in the Consul’s office, they were safe, and as if the Consul had nothing to do but talk to them.”¹⁰

The day after the riot, Chonghou met with Lay and the other surviving counsels on neutral ground: the residence and office of Charles Hannen, the Tianjin representative of the Imperial Maritime Customs Service. Chonghou began by offering his most profound apologies for what happened but explained that it had not been in his power to restrain the mob. He related his version of how Fontanier and Simon had forced their way into his yamen, and accused Fontanier of trying to shoot him. Fontanier’s impetuosity and violence, Chonghou concluded, was what started the riot.¹¹

The imperial commissioner promised to help make things right. Chonghou proposed sending troops into the foreign settlements to safeguard the residents there, a request that was flatly denied by the counsels, who felt the presence of armed Chinese soldiers would do little to allay the fears of the foreign community, especially after hearing stories of the militias’ gleeful participation in the June 21 massacre. Lay also rejected Chonghou’s request to immediately requisition funds to rebuild the Protestant chapels destroyed along with the Catholic church during the riots. “The truth is, his Excellency... wants to do something—to do anything—that he may be able to report some action to the Governor of Chih-li when he comes to make inquiries.”¹² Finally, Chonghou used his visit to escort to the relative safety of the international

10. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 24, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 15.

11. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaozhan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499

12. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 28, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 60, Enclosure 1.

settlement several foreigners, including M. Coutris, who had taken refuge in Chonghou's yamen the day before and was one of the few surviving French citizens in Tianjin.¹³

Although there were no significant outbreaks of violence in the days and weeks after the riot, a state of nervous tension settled over Tianjin. Most of the foreign community kept close to their concessions, avoiding their offices, go-downs, and warehouses near the walled city and the area where the massacre had taken place. Thomas Wade reminded Lay to restrain hotblooded individuals from doing anything rash. "British subjects," wrote Wade, "especially the junior members of the community, should be cautioned against demonstrativeness, but I understand that some four or five persons of different nationalities have strolled through the city unmolested, and it seems to me that foreign residents would do well to resume their business relations with the people as soon as possible. Preaching, except in the settlement, should be postponed for some time yet, and when resumed, the preachers should be very careful not to allude to late events."¹⁴

Wade was perhaps a bit too optimistic about the restoration of order in Tianjin. Pockets of hostility and violence remained in the city. Chinese Christians, whether they were associated with the French church or not, reported being attacked and mobbed in the days after the riots. Several were harassed and asked if they were "from Tianjin or were they Cantonese?" and many Christian homes had been looted after their owners fled. A man was found in the British church the day after the massacre, reportedly in possession of "combustible materials." Another was accused of carrying a revolver into the concessions, but when local guards seized the suspect, the gun was "tossed into the river" and lost. Both men were handed over to the authorities for

13. Dispatch from Tianjin published in the *North China Herald*, July 7, 1870 (pp. 6–7)

14. Thomas Wade to Acting Consul W.H. Lay, Beijing, July 5, 1870. Correspondence from Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 24, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 32, Enclosure 3.

punishment.¹⁵ Every day, there seemed to be new rumors of an impending attack on the Zizhulin settlements. Defending the concessions against thousands of angry Tianjin residents was out of the question and the foreign consuls prepared for a possible full evacuation in the event of another riot. The captain of the steamer *Manchu*, already in the Hai River, offered his vessel as a refuge for the settlement's women and children. Two additional British merchant ships in Northern China, the *Shantung* and the *Appin*, made haste for Tianjin.

Charles Hannen was deputized commandant of the guard for the protection of the settlement, assisted by Dr. Frazer, the physician who had narrowly escaped the mob outside the orphanage on the day before the riots.¹⁶ A local witness interviewed on July 3, nearly two weeks after the massacre, reported gangs still roaming the streets of Tianjin waving swords and threatening to overrun the foreign concessions.¹⁷

After word of the massacre reached Shanghai, the British consul in that city, Walter Henry Medhurst (1822–1885), sent ships northward to assist Lay and the Tianjin consuls. Medhurst had his own worries. Two years prior, Medhurst managed—his critics said bungled—negotiations over a serious incident involving British in Yangzhou.¹⁸ Now he commandeered vessels from the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company and the trading firm Jardine-Matheson for the operation. The Shanghai Municipal Council also ordered 15 constables from the French and British settlements to be ready for dispatch to Tianjin if needed as extra security.¹⁹

15. "The Tientsin Massacre" (From our Correspondent.) Tientsin, 22nd to 27th June 1870. Shanghai Evening Courier Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No 2, p. 5.

16. Dispatch from Tianjin published in the *North China Herald*, July 7, 1870 (pp. 6–7)

17. Additional Notes to Chinese Version of the Tientsin Massacre, written in Tientsin on June 27 and published in the *North China Herald*, July 7, 1870, p. 7.

18. See Millions Alwyn Austin, *China's Millions: The China Inland Mission and Late Qing society, 1832-1905*, Studies in the History of Christian Missions, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 2007).

19. Consul Medhurst to the Earl of Clarendon, June 30, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tientsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.

British representatives Lay and Medhurst, along with Medhurst's French counterpart in Shanghai, Count Eugène Méjan (1814–1874), sent urgent requests to their nations' naval commanders on the Chinese coast.²⁰ The British ships *Opposum*, *Avon*, and the *Dwarf* arrived in Tianjin within a week of the massacre.²¹ The gunboat *Leven* joined the troopship *Adventure*, usually based in Hong Kong, along the bund in Shanghai as a precaution against riots in that city while the HMS *Zebra* steamed across the Yellow Sea from Japan.²² Meanwhile, the French ordered their gunboat *Flammé* to proceed at once to Tianjin.²³

With the appearance of armed ships, Tianjin's residents, including rich merchants, shopkeepers, and sojourners, fled the city fearing another occupation by foreign troops.²⁴ "The Chinese are now suffering from fright," Lay wrote from Tianjin, "The people fear vengeance. They know it will come, and they are moving away until peace is restored. I would ask that no French vessel be sent for until arrangements are made for a large force to come. I am quite certain that the arrival of a French gunboat with a few men on board would be the signal for the rising of the whole of the troops in the city. Their animosity to Frenchmen is great, and they will fight now to the last. There would be a great danger to the English and the English Settlement if

20. Lt. Governor Whitfield to Earl Granville, Hong Kong, July 6, 1870; Consul Medhurst to the Earl of Clarendon, June 30, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of the Europeans at Tientsin* London, 1871.

21. Wade to Clarendon, Telegraph, July 25, 1870; Mr. Wade to Vice-Admiral Sir. H. Kellet, Beijing, June 27, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin*, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 1.

22. Lieutenant-Governor Whitfield to Earl Granville, Telegram, Hong Kong, July 6, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin*, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 2; Commodore Price to the Secretary to the Admiralty, *Princess Charlotte*, Hong Kong, July 7, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin*, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 8, Enclosure 1.

23. Consul Medhurst to the Earl of Clarendon, June 30, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin*, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.

24. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 25, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin*, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 17.

any attack were made by the French... The Chinese are very determined now, and I am quite certain will take up the gauntlet and fight.”²⁵

It would have been little comfort to the foreign consuls and residents of the international settlements in Tianjin to know that their sense of panic was matched in equal measure by the anxiety of Qing government officials. Chonghou’s report of the riots arrived in Beijing on June 23, 1870. Written to put the best possible light on his own involvement in the chaos, the initial memorial was a painful narrative of a city spiraling into madness.²⁶ Chonghou blamed a breakdown in communication between Fontanier and the Chinese officials that prevented the officials from formulating an effective response to the brewing crisis.²⁷ He also insinuated, as he had in his June 22 meeting with the consuls in Tianjin, that an already volatile situation had exploded into mass violence because of Fontanier’s recklessness in discharging his weapon.²⁸

The court found Chonghou’s memorial gravely disturbing, especially the reports of vigilantism. Confucian models of good governance had little room for citizen posse.²⁹ Chonghou was keenly aware that he would shoulder much of the blame for allowing the massacre to occur and was unsure of his standing at court. He suggested that “a high-ranking official” be

25. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 25, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 17.

26. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499.

27. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499.

28. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499. See also Zhang Guangzao Deposition in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjin fu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

29. Imperial Edict, June 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 504.

dispatched to Tianjin to assist in cleaning up the mess.³⁰ The court made the management and investigation of the incident a top priority while also ordering that Chonghou, along with Magistrate Liu Jie and the Prefect Zhang Guangzao, be remanded to the Board of Punishments pending an investigation into their failure to prevent the riots.³¹

Despite Chonghou's ineffectual efforts on the day of the riots, the Imperial Commissioner was doing everything he could to prevent renewed violence and to preserve public order in Tianjin. On June 22, Chonghou issued a proclamation ordering civil and military officials to arrest any person who harassed or made threats against the foreign residents.

A second proclamation appeared a day later: "I have already issued a notice on the subject of the massacre of missionaries and the burning of their churches, perpetrated by the mob on the 21st, in which the people were warned that immediate arrest and execution would overtake all who again attempted in their ignorance and stupidity to molest or loot any of the foreign *hongs*. We must now redouble our efforts to protect the consuls and all other foreigners in the various *hongs* to preserve amicable relations. I have therefore to direct the county magistrate to exercise his personal surveillance in protecting the foreign *hongs*, the customs, and the consulate in and about the Zizhulin [International] Settlement. If any malignant ruffians dare continue these disturbances, the magistrate will immediately arrest and execute them without the

30. Chonghou to Zongli Yamen, received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 499.

31. Imperial Edict requesting Zeng Guofan to proceed to Tianjin and begin an investigation. June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., No. 500. Chonghou Memorial June 25, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 501. See also Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, Beijing, July 16, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 35.

least mercy, and he shall be answerable for any disturbances that may further take place through the laxity of his discipline.”³²

Given that the magistrate Liu Jie was facing serious legal problems, one wonders how effective Chonghou’s threats were in convincing residents to abandon their resistance against the foreigners in Tianjin.³³ The gunboats sailing down the Hai River were probably a more effective deterrent.³⁴ The appearance of the *HMS Opossum* and the warship *HMS Avon* was a relief to many in the foreign community of Tianjin, but few still dared venture beyond the confines of the Zizhulin settlement. Many wondered about the fates of their businesses and employees in and around the walled city. When Lay asked Chonghou on June 27, whether it was safe for foreigners to walk the streets of the walled city, the commissioner advised that foreigners continue to avoid any travel beyond the settlement.³⁵

John Meadows, a British merchant and one of Tianjin’s most experienced China hands, volunteered to go into the city and assess the situation. Meadows also did double duty as the Tianjin correspondent for the Shanghai-based *North China Herald*.³⁶ On June 29, eight days after the violence, Meadows took a long stroll reconnoitering the city for his editors. He started out along the docks, before heading past the brothels, stores, and warehouses of the riverfront,

32. Proclamations by Chonghou and by Magistrate Liu Jie transcribed and published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, pp. 11–12.

33. Drafts of Liu Jie’s proclamation and a similar communication issued by Prefect Zhang Guangzao are also found in Documents Submitted on behalf of Zhang Guangzao, former Prefect of Tianjin, and Liu Jie, Former Magistrate 已革天津府知府張光藻天津縣知縣劉傑親供等件呈軍機處 Yige Tianjinfu zhifu Zhang Guangzao Tianjin xian zhixian Liu Jie gong deng jian cheng junjichu. Document No. 102630.

34. News from Tianjin Concessions dispatch June 26, 1870, published *North China Herald* July 7, 1870 (pp. 6–7).

35. “THE TIENSIN MASSACRE” (From our Correspondent.) Tientsin, 22nd to 27th June 1870. *Shanghai Evening Courier* Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No 2, p. 11.

36. John Meadows was the younger brother of the writer and translator Thomas Taylor Meadows, and worked as an officer and interpreter in the British consular service from the age of 18 until he retired from government service and moved to Tianjin. Chonghou hired Meadows in 1867 to be the manager of the Tianjin Machine Bureau, later known as the Beiyang Machine Factory under Chonghou’s successor, Li Hongzhang.

stopping when he saw rough types or *hunhunr* to test their reactions. He then visited the burned-out establishment of Rencitang and entered the walled city through the East Gate. “No one interfered with me, although numbers of people stared at me but said not a word.”³⁷

Word of the massacre reached Beijing within 48 hours, prompting the foreign representatives there to issue a strongly worded joint communication addressed to Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen demanding to know what the Qing government was planning to do to ensure the safety of foreign nationals in China.³⁸ “If such a catastrophe may break out eighty miles from the capital of the Empire, the Undersigned cannot help fear that in cases where the culprits are not promptly punished, new attacks will occur on points further from the capital where the action of the central authority is even less effective.”³⁹

In short, what good are treaties if the privileges enshrined in those treaties are not consistently and aggressively enforced?

Prince Gong assured the foreign diplomats that the court was taking the matter very seriously and was launching an investigation into what happened, replying on June 25 that “he had written to the Minister Superintendent of the three northern ports [Chonghou] instructing him, without a show of mercy, to arrest the parties concerned in the disturbance, and to punish

37. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, June 24, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 15.

38. The Foreign Representatives to the Prince of Kung, Peking, June 24, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., No. 498. See also Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 11.

39. The Foreign Representatives to the Prince of Kung, Peking, June 24, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., No. 498. See also Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 20, Enclosure 11.

them with the utmost rigor of the law; that, by making an impressive example of them, others may be deterred.”⁴⁰

Over the next three days, Prince Gong submitted a flurry of memorials to the throne, summarizing his initial discussions with the legations and outlining the beginnings of a diplomatic strategy to weather the inevitable storm. Prince Gong summarized the four key areas of concern based on his talks with the foreign representatives in Beijing and his own understanding of international law: the desecration of the French and British national flags, the murder of a diplomat, the killing of an undetermined number of foreign nationals, and the burning of the consulate, orphanage, and several churches and chapels.⁴¹

Qing officials were aware of the petty rivalries that often divided the foreign powers. Simple expediency dictated handling the rather straightforward demands of the British, Russian, and American missions first before tackling the prickly Count Rochechouart.⁴² The Russian Legation wanted reparations and justice for the three Russians killed, Britain was seeking redress for the death of the Irish sister, Alice O’Sullivan, and the destruction of the Anglican chapels. The American case involved only loss of property. Prince Gong felt these cases would be easier to negotiate plus he wanted to do what he could to isolate the French.⁴³

The other major concern for the Qing government was social stability. One of the court’s first responses was an edict reaffirming that only the authorities are entrusted with the responsibility to arrest and punish criminals: “All rely on local officials, day in and day out, to

40. Prince Gong to Thomas Wade, et. al. June 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 508.

41. Prince Gong, letter to the throne, June 28, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 509.

42. Zeng Guofan, letter to the throne, July 6, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 507.

43. Prince Gong, letter to the throne, June 28, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 513.

maintain strict control and at all times keep sole possession of the right to use power and force. When the people take the authority, on their own, to seize suspected criminals, this is a truly untenable state of affairs.”⁴⁴ The edict argued the principal failure of the local officials had been allowing the residents of Tianjin to take the law into their own hands.⁴⁵ In the opinion of the throne, this subversion of official authority had exacerbated an already tense situation. Although it was not specifically mentioned in the edict, the court may have been aware—or at least suspected—that the posse were made up not of ordinary law-abiding residents, but militia troops and members of the *hunhunr* lodges. Local officials knew that it was *hunhunr* who were organizing and leading the vigilante groups, and by allowing these hoodlums to deputize themselves, the officials had forfeited their roles as the primary guardians of law and order in society and forsaken their duty to preserve the social order and pacify the hearts and minds of the people.⁴⁶

The throne sent an edict to all governors and governors-general making it clear that vigilantism was as much of a problem as the rumors of sorcery, child-snatching, or whatever else the common people suspected the missionaries of doing. “We believe that since the establishment of trade with the various countries, negotiations have proceeded according to the treaties, and Chinese and foreigners, merchants and people, have lived together peacefully while our court has treated all with equanimity. If those bad elements who cast aspersions and accuse religious practitioners of violating the law and committing crime are brought in, questioned, and

44. Imperial Edict, June 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 504.

45. Imperial Edict, June 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 504.

46. Chonghou letter to the throne. June 24, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 502. Imperial Edict, June 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 504.

their allegations carefully examined and clarified, and then, if found true justice is done and, if found false, the accusers punished, how would it be possible for the people to spread rumors and take rash actions?”⁴⁷

If the Qing government lacked the will to restore order and bring the culprits to justice, then the foreign powers, especially the French, stood ready to do so by military means.⁴⁸ French minister Count Rochechouart was demanding the execution of two Tianjin officials and the renegade Qing general, Chen Guorui, who Count Rochechouart blamed for instigating the crowds against the French.⁴⁹ On June 29, Prince Gong sent a letter to Count Rochechouart expressing sympathy and asking that the French minister show restraint in the weeks ahead. Rochechouart was in little mood for moderation, and was unimpressed by Prince Gong’s sanguine closing, “The Tien-tsin affair was but a movement of the people excited for one day. It will not take long to dispose of it, and relations will be more friendly than ever.”⁵⁰

The foreign ministers in Beijing were particularly irritated about the continuing spread of the kind of misinformation and inflammatory gossip that led to the massacre in Tianjin. Thomas Wade wrote the Zongli Yamen on behalf of his diplomatic colleagues urging Prince Gong to take necessary steps to convince the public that the rumors of sorcery, kidnapping, and mutilations were untrue and ridiculous. The question was: How?

47. Imperial Edict June 29, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 512.

48. Rochechouart to the Zongli Yamen, diplomatic note, June 25, 1870. Summarized by Prince Gong in a Letter to the Throne, June 28, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 509.

49. Rochechouart to the Zongli Yamen, diplomatic note, June 25, 1870. Chinese translation of Rochechouart’s memo *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., No. 505. Original French text and English translation in Commons, *Correspondence, Dispatches, Circulars and Other Papers Respecting Missionaries in China, 1868-72.*, p. 313.

50. Prince Gong to Count Rochechouart, June 29, 1870. Translation in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 36, Enclosure 2.

Officials had posted announcements in several jurisdictions, including Tianjin, but Wade wondered if these proclamations were not making things worse. “Even supposing the framer of a proclamation to be so much before his time as to agree with us, he would not dare to inform the Chinese community at large that he differed with them, lest he should be exposed to a suspicion of barbaro-manie, hurtful alike to the barbarian and himself... Secondly, I feared that even if perfectly unobjectionable in language, a public notice might attract an attention to religious establishments which, at a crisis like the present, they are better without.”⁵¹

Wade insisted Prince Gong do more. In a letter to the Zongli Yamen, Wade described the history and works of the Daughters of Charity and asked how anyone could think the nuns were capable of the terrible atrocities associated with the Catholic missions. “If even lettered Chinese can believe such evil of the women whose lives are devoted to the alleviation of suffering, what better opinion can they entertain of any foreigner? And how is it possible that, holding such things true, they should regard the foreigner otherwise than as their enemy; and that, when opportunity offers, they should fail to deal with him as such? What guarantee, in a word, so long as the educated and uneducated alike give ear to charges at once so horrible and so ridiculous, what guarantee does any Government possess for the security of its subjects residing in this country?”⁵²

As news of the massacre spread, so did conspiracy theories that the riots were not an isolated act, but the beginning of a wider assault on foreign targets throughout China.

Missionaries especially were wary. Father Thierry, the former head of mission in Tianjin, wrote

51. Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, July 21, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.

52. Thomas Wade to Prince of Kung, Beijing July 9, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., No. 36, Enclosure 1.

from Beijing, “These are the days when news of Tien-Tsing’s crimes spread among the people of Beijing. June 25 was, according to the public voice, the day fixed when we were to be massacred, the Sisters and us, and our establishments burnt down. That day, we had gatherings of curious people in front of our church in *Pétang* and in front of the *Maison des Soeurs*. But as, that same morning, the two sub-prefects of the Beijing police had come to see us and offer us their services in case of need, we warned them of these gatherings which disappeared in front of two or three of their runners. Since that moment, we have seen nothing more, and the people of Peking seem to be quiet.”⁵³

Home to the most prominent international concession in China, Shanghai buzzed with rumors, which turned out to be untrue, that an assault on the foreign legations in Beijing had resulted in the death of Count Rochechouart.⁵⁴ On July 12, there was a false alarm in Shanghai about an imminent attack on the French concession. Although no riot materialized, William Medhurst felt the Shanghai concessions were still vulnerable.⁵⁵ The size of the city’s international settlement raised questions about lines of defense over a large area, and any mass evacuation of the large foreign population would mean significant logistical challenges.⁵⁶

A decade earlier, facing threats from the Taiping armies, the Shanghai Municipal Council had funded their own local militia, including the famous “Ever Victorious Army,” to defend the

53. Father Thierry to Pierre Etienne, July 2, 1870. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. 1871, p. 62. Also see Thomas Wade to Early Clarendon, Peking, Telegram, July 6, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.

54. Consul Medhurst to the Earl of Clarendon, June 30, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. According to Medhurst, the news finally reached Shanghai on June 27, six days after the riot.

55. Consul Medhurst to Thomas Wade, Shanghai, July 13, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.

56. Consul Medhurst to Thomas Wade, Shanghai, July 16, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 23, Enclosure 4.

settlements.⁵⁷ By 1870, these militias had been reorganized as a standing volunteer corps of about 500 men, but Medhurst was concerned that such a small number of volunteers would be insufficient to counter a mob like the one in Tianjin.⁵⁸ Members of the Shanghai business community, including George Dixwell (1814-1885), the Chairman of the Municipal Council, concurred, adding that with so much invested in Shanghai, members of the foreign community might feel compelled to defend their property, an effort that would be far more effective if British ships and soldiers could be relied upon to do more than just evacuate residents.⁵⁹

Local officials in Shanghai posted a proclamation condemning superstition and violence against the foreigners, but rather than refute rumors of foreigners kidnapping children, the proclamation merely asked Shanghai residents to turn suspected kidnapers or sorcerers over to the authorities and they would be dealt with according to the relevant laws and regulations.

“Surely you know that the crime of kidnapping people with the use of drugs is punishable with death; and if any of you can bring clear proof of your having suffered an injury at the hands of anyone guilty of these practices, the local authorities, of course, will not fail to pay the fullest attention to the case, and inflict the severest punishment to the terror of evil-doers.”⁶⁰

Proclamations like these tried to walk both sides of a line. Local officials did not want to be seen as protecting evil, but they tried to fulfill the letter, if not the spirit, of foreign demands

57. See Richard Joseph Smith, *Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China* (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1978).

58. Consul Medhurst to Thomas Wade, Shanghai, July 26, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document 28, Enclosure 1.

59. Dixwell to Medhurst, Council Room, Shanghai, July 22, 1870. Medhurst to Dixwell. Shanghai, July 23, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document 28, Enclosure 2. Medhurst to Dixwell. Shanghai, July 23, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document 28, Enclosure 3.

60. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 15, Enclosure 1.

that they do more to prevent further outbreaks of violence. Upon reading the proclamation, British consul Medhurst sent a message to local authorities in Shanghai asking them, in effect, to try again. This time, Medhurst suggested, could the officials add a bit more courage and strength to their wording? “I have to request you to issue a proclamation forthwith prohibiting the practice of posting placards and denouncing the circulation of malicious rumours on pain of being punished with the utmost severity of the law.”⁶¹

The editors of *The North China Herald* warned, “Whether further outbreaks will occur or not, the Chinese seem to think will depend entirely on the upshot of affairs at Tientsin.” The Chinese, the *Herald* contended, have no “feeling of shame at the massacre...but think it rather a creditable triumph. It is simply a question of confidence or apprehension, whether it will be repeated elsewhere.”⁶² Of particular concern to the Shanghailanders were the “junk men, discharged soldiers, and rowdies, of whom there are a large number here.” Like Tianjin and the *hunjun*, Shanghai had its boisterous gangs of waterfront toughs. The *hunjun*, especially in their roles as the fire brigade and militia members, were already identified as the principal culprits behind the worst violence in Tianjin. Other foreign settlements in China felt they had good reason to be wary of similar groups in their own cities.⁶³

In the three months following the massacres in Tianjin, foreign consuls received numerous requests from frightened missionaries asking to be evacuated by gunboat. The American consul at Yantai requested the assistance of British Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Kellett (1806-1875) to rescue 18 missionaries and their dependents from an outpost in Shandong after

61. Consul Medhurst to the Taouetae of Shanghai, Shanghai, July 12, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 15, Enclosure 3.

62. *North China Herald*, July 14, 1870 (pp. 20–21)

63. *North China Herald* July 14, 1870 (pp. 20–21)

one of the Chinese employees at the American mission was arrested by local officials.⁶⁴ They did not believe the local *daotai* who said that it was all a misunderstanding and that officials had no problem with the missionaries living in the city.⁶⁵

“I cannot understand,” Thomas Wade wrote to Prince Gong, “how in China an officer in the Taoutae’s position should have been ignorant of rumours of which the whole community, native and foreign, have cognisance. If he indeed be so, to whom are we to look for the measures necessary to the preservation of peace? Your Imperial Highness will, I am sure, agree with me, that at a time like the present, the chief authorities at the Consular ports should take pains to keep themselves somewhat better informed. The Tien-tsin atrocity is surely sufficiently grave without farther complications.”⁶⁶

In August, another group of American missionaries, stationed in Penglai not far from the British naval base at Yantai, contacted Frederick Low, the U.S. minister in Beijing and British Vice-Admiral Kellett requesting assistance. “We have credible grounds for believing that official communications were received here some time back from Tsing-quo-fan, and from the governor of the province, calling upon the authorities and the people to make arrangements for massacring foreigners generally sometime this fall. It is believed here that Chi-hien, and the principal military officers who were summoned to the provincial capital some weeks ago, went for the

64. *North China Herald*, July 7, 1870, p. 3.

65. J.L. Nevin to S.A. Holmes, August 29, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President, December 5, 1870, Document 229, Enclosures A & B; Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870* (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document 94, Enclosures 2–3.

66. Thomas Wade to Prince of Kung, Beijing, July 14, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870* (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 33, Enclosure 1.

express purpose of being instructed as to what they should do with us, and as to the preparation they should make for defending the city in case of war.”⁶⁷

The acting British consul in Yantai, William Mayers, was not convinced by reports of danger in Penglai, but forwarded the appeal. “Having been requested by Admiral Kellett to call on the United States vice-consul after the receipt of his first letter, I found Mr. Holmes apparently sharing my own opinion, that the apprehensions of the missionaries of official designs against them were exaggerated and based on insufficient information, although excusable, doubtless, in view of their exposed position, the prevailing popular excitement, and the anti-foreign spirit evoked by the massacre at Tien-tsin.”⁶⁸

Mayers promised the Americans that he would meet with local officials, but they were even more skeptical than the consul had been about the need for an evacuation, especially as the port had been quiet despite the violence just across the Bohai Gulf. Mayers reported the officials “professed surprise on hearing that the missionaries were again disturbed by rumors of hostile designs, which he treated with ridicule, and begged me to take notice that he held himself personally responsible for complete security of the missionaries.” Nevertheless, such was the state of alarm all along the Chinese coast that Mayers dispatched Vice-Admiral Kellett who evacuated nearly two dozen missionaries, their families, and some of their Chinese colleagues two days later.⁶⁹

67. J. L. Nevin to S. A. Holmes, August 29, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President*, December 5, 1870, Document 229, Enclosures A & B; *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870* (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document 94, Enclosures 2–3.

68. W.F. Mayers to Thomas Wade, September 2, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Transmitted to Congress with the Annual Message of the President*, December 5, 1870. Document 229, Enclosure C; *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870* (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document 94, Enclosure 1.

69. List of American Missionaries and their Families removed from Tung-chow-foo by Her Majesty's ships *Barrosa* and *Grasshopper* on the 1st September, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin*,

Tensions also remained high in Nanjing despite—or perhaps due to—Rochechouart’s ill-advised mission to the city earlier in the year. Governor-general Ma Xinyi had done his best to prevent anti-Christian hostility from turning violent, but anti-missionary demonstrations continued in the city throughout the spring and summer of 1870. Ma ordered guard boxes to be built in the markets and busy streets to spot possible troublemakers. He also prevailed upon the foreign community to limit their activities and, if possible, to leave the city during the 1870 provincial examinations scheduled for that summer.⁷⁰ Ma’s actions seemed to have had an effect, and there were no significant outbreaks of violence in Nanjing, but although the city remained quiet, there was still a deep reservoir of anti-foreign feeling and lingering resentment toward Ma for taking the hated foreigners under his personal protection.⁷¹

A foreign resident in Yingkou reported that news of the massacre reached that northern port a week after the riot. “Our community is a scattered one, the means of defence against a Chinese rising do not exist, there were only two sailing vessels in port, and not one gun-boat was near. It is not wonderful then that when the last foreign vessel left our port, we all more or less felt our position to be a perilous one and that we were in a somewhat anxious state.”⁷²

They concluded with a sentiment widely held by foreign residents throughout China in the summer of 1870: A proportional response was necessary to prevent the spread of the violence. “It is to be hoped that the French government will in a signal and impressive manner, visit upon the Chinese government a righteous retribution. Unless this is done, we cannot hope to

21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document 82, Enclosure 5.

70. Ma Xinyi, Proclamation, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 536.

71. Ma Xinyi, Memorial to the Throne, July 30, 1870. Archives of the *Junjichu*. National Palace Museum. Document No. 102077

72. “Notes from Newchang (Yingkou) in Liaoning” published July 11, 1870. in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative*.

have in peace in China; and we shall be startled ere long by hearing of another catastrophe, greater in its magnitude at one or other of the ports, and without the slightest excuse which friends of the mandarins advance in extenuation of the Tientsin tragedy.”⁷³

At issue was whether the riot at Tianjin was a local event caused by the ill-advised policies at the orphanage and the foolish actions of the French consul, or were instead part of a wider conspiracy organized by Chinese elites and officials (“the mandarins”). Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen strongly supported the former view. Many missionaries were given to the latter, but one point upon which both sides seemed to agree was the involvement of the fire brigades and militia in the attack.

“The various fire guilds, (huohui), and volunteer companies (i-men), all have as their heads literary men, whose names are enrolled in the Ya-mens; and it is impossible to believe that these men would venture to take an active part in a movement which they knew was opposed to the wishes of the officials,” wrote the Tianjin-based Protestant missionaries Jonathan Lees and William Hall.⁷⁴ “The mob was summoned to its bloody work by the gongs of the fire guilds, and when the principal acts of violence were accomplished, the guilds were in like manner ordered to disperse, by the usual recall... On the sounding of the fire-gongs, in place of the members of these guilds seizing their fire-buckets, &c, as would ordinarily be the case on the giving of such a

73. “Notes from Newchang (Yingkou) in Liaoning” published July 11, 1870. in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*.
Carvalho, The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.

74. Letter by Jonathan Lees and William N. Hall with their views on Tianjin Massacre published in the *North China Herald* July 14, 1870 (Pages 27–28). The two men interviewed many of their protestant congregants before writing the letter. Their report was submitted to the *North China Herald*, in part, to rebut insinuations made by Tianjin correspondent John Meadows that the protestants had not done enough to help save their Catholic missionary brethren on the day of the riots.

signal, there was a universal rush to arms, and spears, swords, and sticks were everywhere seen.”⁷⁵

For Hall and Lees, the involvement of the fire brigades was overwhelming proof of guilt against the local elites and officials. “From the intimate connexion existing between the literati and the fire guilds and the volunteer companies, consequent upon these bodies having graduates at their head; it being inconceivable that these organizations could act with such evident unity of purpose, unless their leaders had so willed; and equally inconceivable that their leaders would have ventured upon such action unless they had known that their literary brethren sympathized with them.”⁷⁶

Although missionaries argued that the presence of the fire brigades was a smoking gun implicating the elites, Qing authorities were not so certain. Nobody denied that there was a great deal of anti-foreign sentiment in the empire, or that these sentiments were being spread and perpetuated through rumors, meetings, placards, and pamphlets. However, few, if any, high-ranking officials took seriously the notion that there was a broader anti-foreign conspiracy at work and the official investigation focused exclusively on local causes and local actors. The foreigners assumed the men of the militia and fire brigades were brutes unable to act without an elite leader, but many of those who took part in the riots were members of *hunhunr* lodges fully capable of organized violence and collective action. Indeed, it was their true *métier*. From the perspective of the Qing government, the officials were guilty of failing to control the rabble and of dereliction of duty, not for leading or taking part in the attacks.

75. Letter by Jonathan Lees and William N. Hall with their views on Tianjin Massacre published in the *North China Herald* July 14, 1870 (Pages 27–28).

76. Letter by Jonathan Lees and William N. Hall with their views on Tianjin Massacre published in the *North China Herald* July 14, 1870 (Pages 27–28).

Lees doubled down on his conspiracy theories a month later. Like most missionaries, he was unwilling to believe common people would hold violent views against those sent by God to help them. “*The people, left to themselves, are friendly to foreigners* [original italics]. Many amongst us, who have travelled extensively among them, and had numberless opportunities of meeting them, both in city and country, have enjoyed too many proofs of their kind and even hospitable spirit to doubt it. There is no such thing as an innate and national feeling of hatred to us. It is true that the appearance of such a feeling can be got up to order. Any man even moderately familiar with the structure of Chinese society, and above all, with the terrorism exercised by the yamens, can easily understand this.”⁷⁷

Father Thierry echoed the assessment by his Protestant counterpart: “The general opinion is that the events of Tien-tsin are only the first act in a vast drama which the Mandarins are preparing to play throughout the Empire with the aim of getting rid of the barbarians,” wrote Thierry. “The local agitations, the partial movements which have been taking place over the past month in the various towns... inhabited by Europeans, leave little doubt as to the real aim of the attack begun in the North. Also, I am not without concern for our colleagues from within. What precautions can they take in these distant lands, abandoned as they are, without any human means of defense, at the mercy of hostile Mandarins and a blind mob, always ready for plunder? If the sight of the French flag floating at Tien-tsin, if the proximity of the Minister of France to Péking, could not prevent the horrors which have just been committed, what do we not have to fear in the remote provinces of the Empire?”⁷⁸

77. Jonathan Lees, Letter to the editors of the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, published July 20, 1870.

78. Thierry to Etienne, June 26, 1870. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. 1871. p. 62

Not all foreigners bought into conspiracy theories. In a report to London, British minister Thomas Wade argued that despite their better education, in matters of medical science, local elites and officials were “as ignorant and superstitious as the common people” and that Tianjin authorities probably did believe the rumors of magic and alchemy. “The magistrates could scarcely have done less than they are represented to have done if they believed what the people believed, and their education considered, I know no reason why they should not believe it...I have stated that I do not think the government ‘at the bottom’ of all this; on the contrary, if I am not mistaken, it is seriously embarrassed by these movements and for very sufficient reason.”⁷⁹

An investigation was necessary to understand better what occurred before and during the deadly riots of June 21, 1870. Given the politically sensitive nature of the case—and the possibility of war—such an investigation would need to be carried out by an official with military experience and unimpeachable credibility. Few statesmen of the era were as well known or respected as Zeng Guofan (1811-1872). There seemed to be no doubt that he would be the perfect person to settle the affair if he were willing, and if he were able to get out of his bed.⁸⁰

79. Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, Beijing, July 16, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document 35.

80. Imperial Edict issued June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 500.

Chapter 10: Vertigo

Zeng Guofan was sick, depressed, and dizzy.¹ Zeng was one of most powerful officials in the empire and had served the dynasty for nearly four decades, but his efforts had taken a physical and an emotional toll.² The imperial court ordered Zeng to investigate the riot in Tianjin and to do what he could to prevent a military conflict with France. Zeng knew the task would be difficult, if not impossible. He was all too aware of how the arrogance and actions of missionaries could inspire people to act out violently and feared that nations like Britain and France retained a military advantage over China should it come to another war.

Zeng had risen to fame as an unlikely military hero in the campaigns against the Taiping rebels and the experience made him suspicious of the foreigner's religion. Taiping theology might have little in common with the Christianity preached by the missionaries, but for a conservative Confucian scholar like Zeng Guofan those distinctions made little difference. Both the Taiping and the missionaries claimed to worship the god of the Westerners and follow the sage Jesus. What had Jesus ever brought China, Zeng wondered, but chaos and war?

Zeng would later write, "Since the start of commercial relations between China and the outside countries, all have been at peace. But France has for a time been engaged in spreading religion and this has caused serious troubles. Other religions—for example, Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam—none have disturbed the peace among the people. Only the Westerners with their teachings of Jesus are troublesome, claiming there is only one God and true faith, this has stirred up many problems."³

1. Zeng Guofan, Memorial to the throne, June 27, 1870. *Qingmo jia'ao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 507.

2. See Yi Mengchun 易孟醇, "Zeng Guofan zai banli Tianjin jiao'an zhong de xinli maodun 曾国藩在办理天津教案中的心理矛盾 [Zeng Guofan's Psychological Contradictions in Handling Tianjin Missionary Case]."

3. Du, *YWSM*. TZ: 7055–7057

When Zeng received the imperial edict to proceed to Tianjin, he tactfully declined, claiming illness.⁴ Fifty-seven years old and unwell, investigating a massacre of foreigners was a job he neither wanted nor needed, and his reply was not entirely an excuse. Zeng's wartime service had weakened his health. Not long after his appointment to the post of Zhili governor-general in 1868, Zeng started having serious trouble keeping his balance. He sometimes required the assistance of aides, one on each side, to help him walk and found climbing even the slightest step or stair to be an almost insurmountable challenge.⁵ Zeng's vertigo made sedan chairs and carts unbearable and riding a horse unthinkable. In the twilight of his career, it was a suddenly a great effort for the old soldier to venture far from his own gate.

Zeng was, nevertheless, a man with a finely honed sense of duty and obligation, and so with reluctance, and more than a little trepidation, he prepared to travel the 200 km from the Zhili provincial capital in Baoding to Tianjin. He was an obvious choice to manage the situation. Tianjin was the largest city in the province he served, and as governor-general Zeng was responsible for any disturbances in his jurisdiction. Zeng had led the final victory against the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom in 1863 and later assisted in defeating the Nian rebels who had waged a stubborn and violent guerilla insurgency across the North China Plain taking the lives of several talented loyalist generals, including the Mongolian Prince Sengge Rinchen.⁶ The imperial court thought of him as a man who could accomplish the impossible.

4. Imperial Edict, June 23, 1870. First Historical Archives: 军机处上谕档 *junjichu shangyu dang* TZ 9.5.25; Zeng Guofan, Memorial to the throne, June 27, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 507.

5. Zeng Guofan, Memorial to the throne, June 27, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 507.

6. See Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, The West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War*. Also see Chapter 2.

In a letter received by the court on July 5, Zeng apologized for the delay and informed the throne that he had begun his journey. Zeng described his regiment of physical therapy and wrote that after his latest bout, with a few days of practice, he could walk for the most part unassisted and could climb stairs, albeit with some difficulty.⁷ Still, Zeng was so unsure of his health that he also sent letters to his sons with notes for planning his funeral.⁸

Zeng Guofan, along with his protégés Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang, play a major role in most studies of this period, but there has not been a comprehensive English biography of Zeng. The lengthy, and detailed, entry for Zeng in Hummel's *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, as well the voluminous writings left behind by this prolific diarist and correspondent, suggests such a project would be a worthy—if laborious—undertaking.⁹

Zeng Guofan was born in Hunan Province in 1811. Although the family was not wealthy, they had ambitions. Zeng Guofan passed the 1832 examinations in his county, the same year as his father, and Zeng's father and grandfather thought Zeng Guofan represented the best hope for family success, investing a lot of time and what meager resources the family had into his education.¹⁰ After passing the county-level exam, Zeng studied at the prestigious Yuelü Academy in Changsha, founded in 976. The Yuelü Academy was famous for its conservative

7. Zeng Guofan, Memorial to the Throne, July 5, 1870. Archives of the *Junjichu*. National Palace Museum.

Document No. 101465; See also 曾国藩年谱 *Zeng Guofan nianpu* [*Chronicles of Zeng Guofan*]. Edited by Li Hanzhang and Li Hongzhang. 曾文正公(国藩)全集.年谱 *Zeng Guofan wenzheng (Guofan) quanji*. [*The Complete Works of Zeng Guofan*. Volume 12 (Taipei: Wenhai Publishing House, 1974), p. 19019.

8. 曾国藩家书全编 *Zeng Guofan jiashu quanbian* [*Complete Collection of Zeng Guofan's Family Letters*]. (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2000), pp. 2324–2326

9. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)*. Volume 2, pp. 751–756.

10. This biographical sketch follows Hummel Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)*. The many articles and books about Zeng Guofan written by Zhu Dong'an also inform this biographical sketch. Zhu Dong'an 朱东安, "Zailun Tianjin jiao'an de qiyan yu xingzhi -- jian ping changpian lishi xiaoshuo "Zeng Guofan" jinmen pian 再论天津教案的起因与性质——兼评长篇历史小说《曾国藩》津门篇 [Re-Examination of the Causes of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident]."; Zhu Dong'an 朱东安, *Zeng Guofan zhuan 曾国藩传 (A Biography of Zeng Guofan)*, Third ed. (Liaoning renmin chubanshe 辽宁人民出版社, 2014).

attitudes and its adherence to Song Neo-Confucian values, which included rigorous textual study, ascetic self-denial, and a commitment to self-cultivation.¹¹ By the time Zeng Guofan was a student, the academy had begun incorporating practical subjects, part of a general trend in the late Qing Dynasty that encouraged the study of statecraft.¹² This blend of old-school Confucian values and a practical approach to problem solving would characterize Zeng Guofan's later career.¹³

Zeng Guofan first visited Beijing in 1835 to sit for the triennial imperial examinations. He failed to make the cut that year, but succeeded on his second attempt, earning the coveted *jinshi* degree in 1838. In June of that same year, he was assigned to the Hanlin Academy, which served as a think tank and clearinghouse for scholarship and was also something of a holding pen where talented young prospects could bide their time waiting for an official position to become available.¹⁴

By the mid-nineteenth century, the administrative structure of the Qing government was having a difficult time keeping up with demographic changes in the empire. The population had doubled since the start of the Qing dynasty, but the number of official positions remained the same despite calls to increase the number of jurisdictions and postings. Bureaucratic inertia and an imperial court generally suspicious of reform kept the system locked in an untenable status quo.¹⁵ There were many more degree holders and scholarly aspirants than positions for them to

11. Stephen R. Platt, *Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China* (Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 24.

12. See William T. Rowe, *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-century China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001).

13. Yiping Liu Yongli and Liu Yiping, "Self-Cultivation as the Basis of Person Making: A Confucian Perspective Illustrated by a Case Study of Zeng Guofan," *Psychology and Developing Societies* 33, no. 1 (2021).

14. See Di Yongjun, "A Comparison between Chinese Hanlin Scholars and Manchu-Mongol Hanlin Scholars in Social Status in the Reign of Daoguang of the Qing Dynasty," *Journal of Guangdong Polytechnic Normal University* (2005).

15. R. Kent Guy, *Qing Governors and their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644-1796* (University of Washington Press, 2017). p. 108.

fill and a large pool of young scholars with thwarted expectations and a lot of time on their hands. Often, these zealous novitiates would use that time to gossip, write, and criticize the older officials they saw standing between them and their ambitions.¹⁶

Zeng's career progressed slowly but steadily, with routine appointments including postings in the Board of Ceremonies and other ministries. He was naturally curious, and his diverse assignments gave him a broad understanding of the levers of power in the imperial bureaucracy, but before he could rise higher he was forced to return to Hunan after his mother passed away in 1852. This was a common obstacle for officials looking to advance up the ranks of the civil service. The death of a parent required an official to take a sabbatical to mourn appropriately, and not doing so would have marked an official as unfilial and unfit to serve in office.¹⁷ During the required period of mourning, the armies of the Taiping burst from the hills of southern China and into the middle Yangtze region. Zeng's home province of Hunan became a warzone.

In the early months of the Taiping War, the troops of the standard army proved ineffective in stopping the advance of Taiping leader Hong Xiuquan and his followers. The Qing bannermen, the caste of warriors which claimed descent from the armies that invaded and conquered China two centuries earlier, had been made soft by garrison living and were more interested in their collections of crickets and games of poetic virtuosity than maintaining martial skills. A desperate imperial court turned to members of the Chinese elite, like Zeng Guofan in

16. See Wakeman Jr, "Boundaries of the Public Sphere in Ming and Qing China."; Rankin Mary Backus Rankin, "'Public opinion' and political power: Qingyi in late nineteenth century China," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 41, no. 3 (1982).

17. Qi Lin, "Zeng Guofan Native Complex of Beijing Official Career," *Journal of Hunan University of Humanities, Science and Technology* (2015).

Hunan and, less effectively, Liang Baochang in Tianjin, to come to the dynasty's aid and organize ad hoc armies to fight the Taiping.¹⁸

In 1853, at about the same time salt merchant Zhang Jinwen was organizing and arming *hunhunr* members as his Pu Braves to defend Tianjin, Zeng formed his Xiang Army, named after the river in Hunan. Zeng recruited men from his home region and paid for their training, weapons, and supplies by diverting internal taxes ordinarily sent to the central government.¹⁹ He proved himself to be a competent—if occasionally reluctant—commander in a tough war fought against an unrelenting enemy with little support from the central government.²⁰

Zeng won several brilliant victories, but also suffered setbacks. On three separate occasions following defeats, he was prevented from taking his own life only by the swift intercession of his aides.²¹ On July 19, 1864, the same week General William Tecumseh Sherman captured Atlanta at the end of a different civil war, the forces of Zeng Guofan took the Taiping capital after a long and bloody siege. The fall of Nanjing to Zeng's army was notorious for the brutality of the soldiers and the extent of carnage in the city. Perhaps as many as 150,000–200,000 people died in the fight to retake Nanjing for the Qing Dynasty.²²

For his exploits, the imperial court awarded Zeng Guofan the title of Marquis First Class with the designation Yiyong, an unprecedented honor for a career civil servant. Having earned the trust of an appreciative court, Zeng Guofan took up a series of high-level postings, including governor-general of Jiangnan-Jiangxi based in the recaptured city of Nanjing. There he built

18. For Liang Baocheng's brief career organizing the defense of Tianjin, see Chapter 1.

19. Sun Chunzhi 孙春芝, "Brief Analysis of the High Quality of Xiang Army's Military Leading Group," *Journal of Southwest China Normal University (Philosophy & Social Sciences Edition)* (2004).

20. Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, The West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War.*, p. 113.

21. Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, The West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War.*

22. Platt, *Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom: China, The West, and the Epic Story of the Taiping Civil War.*; Jonathan Spence, *God's Chinese Son: The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom of Hong Xiuquan* (W.W. Norton, 1996). For comparison, PRC historians calculate the total number of casualties for the Nanjing Massacre of 1937 at around 300,000.

arsenals, founded printing presses and publishing houses, transportation companies, and training centers for engineers and military officers.²³ Finally, in 1868, he was transferred north to become the governor-general of Zhili, closer to the imperial capital at Beijing.²⁴ He was famous throughout the empire, and had earned the grudging respect of the foreign diplomats stationed in China even if Zeng remained ambivalent about their presence in his country.²⁵

One of the first things Zeng did upon arriving in Tianjin in early July 1870, was to issue a public proclamation forbidding loitering or gathering in large numbers in the streets and marketplaces. "Neither is anyone to alarm and excite one another by bandying about idle stories; nor must you collect in the neighborhood of the foreign *hongs* or shipping, as this will occasion misunderstanding."²⁶ Zeng also announced the commencement of his investigation. "With regard to the inquiries that will be needed in the matter of this late disturbance, it will be the duty of the Governor-General to conduct these unsparingly and with strict justice. Assuredly will he not show any, even the slightest, partiality to either side."²⁷

In his journal, Zeng expressed concerns about the investigation and about what he might learn regarding the city's murky connections between the gangs along the waterfront and the Tianjin elite. "The militias of Tianjin and the water and fire brigades involve large numbers of people... Anyone who speaks publicly about this matter may do so to use the indignation of the

23. Huang Songping and Zhu Yazong, "Zeng Guo-fan and the Chinese Modernization of Military Technology," *Journal of Changsha University of Science & Technology (Social Science)* 6 (2011).

24. Ma Xiao, "Zeng Guofan's Contribution to the Administration of Justice in Zhili in the Qing Dynasty," *Journal of Shijiazhuang Teachers College* (2001).

25. Guo Yingjie and He Baogang, "Reimagining the Chinese Nation: The 'Zeng Guofan Phenomenon'," *Modern China* 25, no. 2 (1999). Yang Guohong, "On Zeng Guofan's Diplomatic Thoughts," *Shenzhen University Journal (Humanities & Social Sciences)* (1992).

26. Proclamation Issued by Zeng Guofan at Tianjin. Recorded and Transcribed. July 10, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 32, Enclosure 6.

27. Proclamation Issued by Zeng Guofan at Tianjin. Recorded and Transcribed. July 10, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 32, Enclosure 6.

people of Tianjin to expel the foreigners or make accusations against Chonghou. They might also use the anger among the gentry and the people to gather the militias and cause problems for the enemy... I intend to secure the peace and not provoke the foreigners into starting a war.”²⁸

Zeng Guofan also shared the Zongli Yamen’s worries about being dragged into a military conflict. In his initial memorial on the case, Zeng alluded to the ongoing problems in Guizhou and Sichuan, and noted that the case in Tianjin was an even greater threat to peace because of the large number of foreign casualties.²⁹ Zeng was aware of more gunboats steaming toward Tianjin and also that Count Rochechouart had announced his intention to take troops to Tianjin, and even to Beijing if necessary, to settle the matter. Under these circumstances, Zeng felt his first responsibility was to prevent the empire from being pushed into an unwinnable conflict with the foreign powers: “If the Zongli Yamen is able in any and every way to dissuade [Rochechouart] from this course of action and troops are not sent, this would be the best way out. If we are not able to prevent this from happening in advance, then your official waiting at Tianjin will also not be able to stop their force. Nevertheless, I am determined not to provoke a fight, and am prepared in accordance with the situation to cooperate with the foreign powers in principle and to resolve this case in a fair and unbiased manner.”³⁰

Zeng believed the primary cause of the disturbance was the people’s alarm at the presence of kidnappers and foreign alchemists in their midst. This had been the case in Yangzhou, where Zeng had been sent two years earlier to quell the disturbance against

28. Zeng Guofan nianpu 曾国藩年谱 [Chronicles of Zeng Guofan]. Edited by Li Hanzhang and Li Hongzhang. 曾文正公(国藩)全集.年谱 Zeng Guofan wenzheng (Guofan) quanji. [The Complete Works of Zeng Guofan. Volume 12 (Taipei: Wenhai Publishing House, 1974), p. 19019

29. Zeng Guofan, Memorial to the throne, June 27, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 507.

30. Zeng Guofan, Memorial to the Throne, June 27, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 507.

missionaries in that city.³¹ The 1868 Yangzhou incident had started after rumors of Catholic priests kidnapping children had been given credence in the eyes of the people by placards posted throughout the city, and Zeng's involvement in the Yangzhou anti-missionary case would influence his approach to the investigation into the much more serious riot in Tianjin.³²

From the very beginning, Zeng was forced to defend his management of the case from ceaseless attacks on his character, ability, and loyalty.³³ In a memorial, Hanlin academician Yuan Baoheng (1827-1878) criticized Zeng, insinuating that Zeng's desire to placate the foreign powers had affected his priorities. Yuan wrote, "It is indeed to be feared that those who have managed cases involving the barbarians have been overly cautious. They have indulged the barbarians to excess but have been too busy to trouble themselves concerning public opinion."³⁴

Song Jin (d. 1874), a member of the grand secretariat, inveighed against Zeng's approach to the investigation, writing that it was the provocative actions of the French that brought on the unrest and subsequent violence, in particular how the Church and the consulate shielded suspects in a criminal investigation.³⁵ Song Jin disagreed with the initial assessment found in Chonghou's report that the Tianjin people's actions had precipitated the attack. Instead, he pushed the theory that Fontanier's actions, especially the reported gunplay at Chonghou's office and the later shooting of the magistrate's clerk, started the riot. "The barbarian priests were killed because they kidnapped too many small children, a situation which deeply grieved the people. When the

31. Imperial Edict, November 8, 1868. Li Chuanbin, "Shixi Zeng Guofan de jidujiao guan 试析曾国藩的基督教观 [An Analysis of Zeng Guofan's View of Christianity]", p. 74.

32. Zhou Qi and Chen Sujuan, "On the Review and Rethinking of the Diplomacy Dilemmas in Late Qing Dynasty—Based on Tianjin Massacre," *Journal of Xiangtan University (Philosophy and Social Sciences)* (2013).

33. Zhu Dong'an. "Zai lun Tianjin jiao'an de qiyan yu xingzhi" (A reexamination of the characteristics and origins of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident) in *Modern Chinese Studies*, no. 6. (1997), p. 143.

34. Yuan Baoheng, Memorial to the throne, August 26, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 603.

35. Song Jin, Memorial to the throne, July 12, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 522 and 523. See also Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, pp. 235–236.

French official fired his gun at the Commissioner for Trade (Chonghou) and the magistrate, the result was bloodshed, but this violence was not without reason or justification.”³⁶

Song did agree with Zeng Guofan on one point. Like Zeng, and many other members of the Qing government, Song differentiated the behavior of France, whose insistence on acting as guarantor of missionary safety invariably brought into conflict with residents, and the other foreign powers that Song argued engage primarily in trade. “Are all these cases fabricated? How is it that all the people of our empire can live together as one peaceful family with those from other countries, and it is only France who is vilified by the masses? Supposing that France did not encourage the spread of their religion, from whence come these rumors?”³⁷

Song Jin’s attitude and rhetoric foreshadow those of the Qingyi faction, which later drew the Qing Empire into the Sino–French War of 1884. The Qingyi faction was one of several formal or informal associations made up of the young scholars who bided their time waiting for a position or promotion by commenting on politics at court or second-guessing other officials.³⁸ Members of the Qingyi faction tended to favor bold responses to the challenges facing the empire and were, perhaps because of their age and relative lack of administrative or diplomatic experience, willing to take risks that might jeopardize the fragile peace with the foreign powers.

Song Jin recommended that the throne redouble its defenses in the major coastal cities, and for Zeng Guofan to put the foreign powers on notice that the Tianjin riots were not a pretext

36. Song Jin, Memorial to the throne, July 12, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 522.

37. Song Jin, Memorial to the throne, July 12, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 522.

38. See Mary Backus Rankin, “‘Public Opinion’ and Political Power: Qingyi in Late Nineteenth Century China,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* (1982).

for war. It was the foreigner's responsibility to maintain positive relations with the Qing Empire, not the other way around.³⁹

Nobody in the Qing government, including Zeng Guofan, welcomed the brutal reality of the alien presence in China, but seasoned officials like Zeng knew better the military capabilities that the foreign powers could bring to bear and were under no illusions of China's readiness to respond. While sympathetic to the idea of taking a stronger stand against foreign aggression, he was also ruthlessly realistic regarding the Qing state of military preparedness.⁴⁰ Zeng's Jiangnan Arsenal in Nanjing had been in operation for less than 20 months and his plans to create a modern army based in Zhili had stalled.⁴¹

A censor stationed in Henan, Chang Run, submitted a memorial that, for officials tired of trying to enforce treaty provisions while managing a restless public, cut right to the heart of the issue: "Ten years ago, an evil influence entered our world. Although we might want to ban it, we could not. This evil has caused harm beyond description. Because the peace treaty contains a provision on the spread of religion, it is impossible to prohibit people from joining the church. This is responsible for the unrest with the people of Tianjin... Your humble servant advises that Zeng Guofan and the Zongli Yamen negotiate with the various ambassadors, including the French, and explain the obstacles and difficulties inherent in implementing this provision, and strongly recommend that the article be rescinded, the churches be destroyed, and the

39. Song Jin, Memorial to the throne, July 12, 1870. *Qingmo jia'ao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 522. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*. p. 236.

40. Zeng Guofan's transfer to Zhili in 1868 set off a spate of rumors in the treaty ports; many foreigners thought that the arrival of Zeng and his armies to the north of China would be the start of a general rebellion against foreign interests. For example, see "Letter from Peking," published in the *Shanghai Courier*, July 25, 1870. Courier Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document 53, pp. 95-99.

41. Huang Songping and Zhu Yazong, "Zeng Guo-fan and the Chinese Modernization of Military Technology."

missionaries be expelled, and so we can emphasize the spirit of international friendship and benefits of trade.”⁴²

Zeng Guofan’s detractors were not confined to the ranks of ambitious junior officials or mid-career bureaucrats. Senior members of the imperial clan also voiced strong opinions at the outset of the investigation. Prince Chun Yihuan (1840–1891) was the uncle of the minor Tongzhi Emperor (r. 1861-1875) and the younger brother of the Imperial Regent, Prince Gong.⁴³ A powerful figure at court, Prince Chun’s influence had grown as a tutor to his young nephew and a close confidant and political ally to the Empress Dowager Cixi who was, along with Empress Dowager Ci’an (1837-1881), the main decision-maker at court.⁴⁴

Prince Chun submitted his own memorial to the Empresses Dowager, offering views similar to those of Song Jin.⁴⁵ Prince Chun argued the people of Tianjin and the officials should not be punished harshly because they were only acting to protect themselves and their families. Moreover, by siding with the foreign powers, the Qing government risked losing the support of the people.⁴⁶ If this meant war, then so be it, and Prince Chun recommended that coastal defenses be strengthened and foreigners in Beijing watched closely.⁴⁷ Prince Chun also spoke out

42. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 236.

43. Prince Chun (Yihuan) letter to the throne, July 15, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 528. The son of Prince Chun (Yihuan), Zaitian, would be named the emperor a few years later in 1875 following the untimely death of the Tongzhi Emperor. The Empress Dowager Cixi would also later arrange for Prince Chun’s grandson, Puyi, to ascend the throne following the death of Zaitian in 1908.

44. See 任恒俊 Ren Hengjun, "Lun xinyou zhengbian 论辛酉政变 [On the Xinyou Coup]," *jindai shi yanjiu* 近代史研究 1 (1986); 陈绛 Chen Jiang and Yang Surong 杨苏荣, "lun xinyou zhengbian 论辛酉政变 [On the Xinyou Coup]," *复旦学报社会科学版* [Journal of Fudan University, Social Science Edition] 5 (1987).

45. Prince Chun (Yihuan) letter to the throne, July 15, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 528.

46. See also Cohen, 1963, p. 235. Prince Chun uses language meant to recall passage 12:7 in the Analects, “There have been deaths since time immemorial, but no state can exist without the confidence of the people.”

47. Prince Chun, letter to the throne, July 14, 1870 *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 528. See also Cohen, 1963, p. 235. Cohen also cites a memorial received July

in defense of Chen Guorui, whom the Manchu noble had known when Chen served under Yihuan's command as part of the Beijing field force.⁴⁸ “This official [Chen Guorui] has nothing but the deepest affection for the people when he came to resist the barbarians; how can it be that he now finds it necessary to extricate himself from these false charges?”⁴⁹

The memorials by Song Jin, Prince Chun and other hawkish members of the Qing government seemed to gain traction with the imperial court, and the throne repeatedly urged Zeng to try and make a case against the missionaries. There were persistent rumors that hearts and eyes had been found on the French property but not reported. Should the allegations against the Church prove true, it would mean that the people of Tianjin acted in response to a credible threat, thus weakening French demands for compensation and “justice.” The Qing court ordered Zeng Guofan to make this the focus of his investigation.⁵⁰ During his first week in Tianjin, Zeng Guofan dutifully visited the cemeteries where the nuns had buried their patients and ordered several coffins exhumed. Although the bodies were in an advanced state of decay, the condition of the corpses—many appeared to have eyeless sockets—excited the crowd of onlookers who then began shouting anti-foreign slogans.⁵¹

On July 10, Zeng Guofan met with Thomas Adkins (1836-1912), the British consul at Yingkou who was in Tianjin assisting William Lay, and Hugh Fraser (1837-1894), Secretary for

19, 1870, from Grand Secretary Guanwen on behalf of a member of the staff, Li Rusong which echoes Prince Chun's concern for maintaining popular support: “If [the throne] opposes the barbarians but wins the confidence of the people, it still has a means of controlling the barbarians. But if it forfeits popular trust to win over the barbarians, it has no way of controlling the people and also no way of governing the barbarians.” See Li Rusong, Memorial to the throne, July 13, 1870. Archives of the *Junjichu*. National Palace Museum. Document No. 101574 (Original cover memorial by Guan Wen, July 13, 1870., Document No. 101573.)

48. Hummel, 1942, p. 90.

49. Prince Chun (Yihuan) letter to the throne, July 15, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 527.

50. Zeng Guofan, report to the throne, received July 21, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531.

51. *Shanghai Evening Courier*, Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document 23.

the British Legation in Beijing. Adkins reported later that he and Fraser had taken a boat from Tongzhou to Tianjin without incident, even though the boatman were all from Tianjin. Arriving in the city, they passed by the “shell of the cathedral,” its walls “blackened by the smoke and flame.”⁵²

Zeng told the two British diplomats that in his view, “the outrages recently committed at Tien-tsin were entirely the work of an ignorant populace and that the official body had in no way connived at or caused them. As for the settlement of the question, he had been honoured with the Emperor’s commands on which he intended to act with promptitude, and without respect of persons.”⁵³ Fraser warned Zeng that in so serious a case, his actions would be severely scrutinized by the French. The only way to avoid complications was for Zeng, acting on behalf of China, to take measures so prompt and stringent as to afford no opportunity for interference.⁵⁴

Thomas Adkins wrote back to Thomas Wade later that week to update his superior on the situation in Tianjin. “On the afternoon of the day of our arrival,” wrote Adkins, “we walked through the suburbs towards the French cathedral, passing by the establishment of the Sisters of Mercy, now a heap of ruins. A Proclamation, posted on a piece of wall which was left standing, forbade the removal of the window and door-frames—a precaution which seemed entirely superfluous. The shops in the immediate neighbourhood were all open, and the hucksters’ stalls as abundant as usual. The three miles of streets traversed by us that afternoon were thronged with people of all classes. I was not altogether reassured by their demeanour. We met with no

52. Memorandum of Mr. Adkin’s Visit to Tien-tsin in the company with Mr. Fraser, July 15, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 32, Enclosure 4.

53. Memorandum of Mr. Adkin’s Visit to Tien-tsin in the company with Mr. Fraser, July 15, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 32, Enclosure 4.

54. Memorandum of Mr. Adkin’s Visit to Tien-tsin in the company with Mr. Fraser, July 15, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 32, Enclosure 4.

incivility; but there was as sullen, repugnant air about them, which I have never before seen in this part of China. I came to the conclusion that a trifling act of indiscretion committed by a foreigner in that locality, would most likely get him into serious trouble. I noticed that sword blades were being forged at several of the blacksmiths' shops."⁵⁵

Hugh Fraser also noted placards posted throughout the city. "One by Ch'ung Hou, threatening summary punishment for any insult or obstruction to foreigner's resorting to the city, and another, as I think, by the Chih-foo, which Mr. Adkins pronounced objectionable, to the effect that 'the dispute between the populace and the religious establishments should not interfere with the transaction of commercial affairs.'"⁵⁶

On July 19, Lay reported to Wade that Zeng's presence and stern proclamations had started to settle things in the city, but that some extramural villages, particularly those with a strong *hunhunr* presence, continued to be a cause for concern. "We have nothing to fear now but the black guards who infest a village opposite the Settlement, and they are strong in numbers. These men were in the massacre of the 21st June, and until a vessel of war arrived I had a guard of 500 soldiers placed round the village day and night. The present menace from this village will, I trust, be removed in due time."⁵⁷

The Tianjin correspondent for the *Shanghai Evening Courier* was similarly anxious about the uneasy peace that had descended over the city. "You know I am not an alarmist, but I do now most deliberately say that things are about as gloomy as they can be. Our natives are much

55. Memorandum of Mr. Adkin's Visit to Tien-tsin in the company with Mr. Fraser, July 15, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 32, Enclosure 4.

56. Mr. Fraser to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, July 14, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 32, Enclosure 5.

57. William H. Lay, Memorandum on the State of Affairs at Tien-tsin, July 19, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 54, Enclosure 3.

alarmed, and speak of the demonstrations in the city, and especially in the suburbs east of the river as most menacing.”⁵⁸ On July 20, based in part on the conversations between Hugh Fraser and Chonghou, Lay issued a bulletin stating that the city was now safe for British subjects to go about their business but reiterated the warning against preaching or needlessly provoking residents.⁵⁹

The week after the riots, a harried Prince Gong had sent a circular to the foreign representatives in Beijing announcing the appointment of Zeng as a special investigator in charge of handling the incident in Tianjin. Prince Gong hoped his circular would reassure the foreign powers that their citizens and subjects would be protected, but according to Thomas Wade, the foreign diplomatic community suspected the court of trying to pass off responsibility. “The Central Government, once the Grand Secretary Tseng was desired to take up the Tien-tsin affair, appeared to think that it had done its duty.”⁶⁰

Chonghou was officially Zeng Guofan’s co-investigator, but his actual role was unclear. He had been involved in the events of June and was the subject of several rumors circulating in Tianjin, few of which reflected positively on Chonghou. Local wags gossiped that Chonghou was in league with the foreigners, that he had attempted to bribe Zeng Guofan to avoid punishment, and even that residents had attacked Chonghou and thrown him off his boat after they encountered the Manchu making a secret trip to Beijing. None of the stories were true, but

58. “Report on Conditions in Tianjin,” published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 4, 1870.

59. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No. 44, p. 69.

60. Thomas Wade to Earl of Clarendon, Beijing, July 16, 1870. *Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty)*, Short. Document No. 36.

his position with the court, and with the people of Tianjin, was far from high, and Chonghou's future career looked to be in jeopardy.⁶¹

Qing officials like Chonghou and Zeng Guofan were not the only ones feeling the pressure of politics. Many in the foreign community pointed to the massacre as proof that the legations and their consular representatives had been too lenient and lax in their dealings with the Chinese. It had been nearly seven years since the occupation of Northern China by the Anglo-French expedition, and more than a few foreign residents in China felt that a strategy of peaceful coexistence had only allowed problems to fester while emboldening anti-foreign elements in Chinese society, especially the local authorities.

The editors of the *North China Herald* blamed the massacre, in part, on a policy of appeasement carried out by the British Legation and Thomas Wade. "Atrocities have been committed which must be avenged, and it is possibly fortunate that the growing insolence and anti-foreign policy of the Chinese, fostered by the feeble and mistaken policy of the Home Government, and nurtured by the errors of a Wade and a Burlingame... The true character of Chinese officials daily becomes more transparent, and the folly of our present mode of dealing with a nation of liars is also yielding its fruit. How many corpses will be required to awaken the present home Government, we don't pretend to estimate; it is, however, simply a question of numbers."⁶²

Even though Anson Burlingame passed away in February 1870, the mission of Qing officials Burlingame organized to travel the world had continued after his death. For the Zongli Yamen, the Burlingame Mission was an important opportunity to meet with world leaders and

61. Acting Consul Lay to Thomas Wade, August 11, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 85, Enclosure 1.

62. Editorial published in *The North China Herald*, June 30, 1870.

present China's case without the information passing through the hostile filter of foreigners who had a stake—whether commercial or ecclesiastical—in preserving and expanding the treaty system.⁶³ “It is perhaps best for Mr. Burlingame's reputation,” wrote the *North China Herald* on July 22, “that he died before this last sad and convincing proof of the entirely unfounded nature of his statements could have tempted him, as apologist for the Peking Government... The desire for progress, the wish to live in amity with the nations, the welcome offered to the shining cross, have been finally rejected by the Government on whose behalf he published them to the world. The old position, that we exist on Chinese soil only by the exhibition of physical force, has been impressed on us, not by consequence of any action of ours, but by the deliberate conduct of the Chinese Government itself.”⁶⁴

As Zeng's investigation continued, new concerns arose that the foreign powers, including France, would be encouraged to settle the case in exchange for monetary compensation and a promise to punish the guilty.⁶⁵ To do so, argued militant interests in Shanghai and the other treaty ports, was to miss an opportunity to pressure the Qing government for additional concessions and humble officials who had become too bold in pushing back against foreign interests. There was resentment that Thomas Wade and other diplomats were reluctant to endorse the theory that the massacre had been part of a broader conspiracy.⁶⁶

63. Frederick Wells Williams, *Anson Burlingame and the First Chinese mission to the Foreign Powers* (Scribner's, 1912); David L Anderson, "Anson Burlingame: American Architect of the Cooperative Policy in China, 1861–1871," *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 3 (1977); John Schrecker, "'For the Equality of Men—For the Equality of Nations': Anson Burlingame and China's First Embassy to the United States, 1868," *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* 17, no. 1 (2010).

64. "The Burlingame Mission and the Current Crisis," *North China Herald*, July 22, 1870.

65. Prince Gong Memorial, July 3, 1870. *Qingmo jia'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 516.

66. Report from Tianjin, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 18, 1870. "Mr. Lay has been very energetic in collecting and sifting facts for the information of the British Charge d'affaires, the tenor of which was to criminate the Chinese authorities. The consular zeal has lately cooled down, owing, it is supposed, to the fact that Mr. Wade has become intolerant of information. From the first he is said to have decided that the massacre was an accidental street riot, and a street riot it shall remain."

“The butchery of 19 men and women, a month’s loss of peace, the almost total suspension of trade, the demolition of nearly a score of buildings, the sacrifice of nobody knows how many natives, the perpetual clamourings of the lawless villains for the completion of their work of blood by the utter extermination of foreigners, and the damning evidence we have of the culpability of some of the officials in this enormous tragedy; all this fails to convince these gentlemen that there is much reason for complaint, or any cause for fear. Here is a grand opportunity for placing foreign relations with China on a more substantial and satisfactory basis than has ever been practicable; but let this chance pass without due improvement, and what may we next look for in the shape of indignity and humiliation,” *Shanghai Evening Courier* complained in July.⁶⁷

Many foreign conspiracy theorists made simplistic—and often wildly inaccurate—assumptions about the politics of the Qing government. In a tradition that continues today, international observers assigned the labels of “pro-foreign” and “anti-foreign” to officials based largely on anecdotal evidence or the handling of certain public cases. One of the Beijing correspondents for the *Shanghai Evening Courier* described the internal political maneuverings of the two groups. “The war party are said by the natives to be Tseng-Kwo-Fan (Zeng Guofan), Cheng-Kwo-Shwai (Chen Guorui), and Mao-Chang-his (Mao Changxi), President of the Board of War, who was entrusted with Foreign Affairs just before Prince Kung was taken with the sudden ‘indisposition’ that kept him six weeks in retirement. Some foreigners here believe that orders have been sent to Tseng-Kwo-Fan to have the Tientsin city magistrates beheaded. Perhaps this course is thought safer than to bring them up here for punishment the present state of public feeling; and such a stern act of justice may do something to repress the anti-foreign feeling here

67. Report from Tianjin, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 18, 1870.

which is every day becoming more bitter.”⁶⁸ Whatever the shortcomings of Zeng’s investigation, there is very little to suggest the elder statesman was eager for war. If anything, Zeng’s mental and physical health was breaking under the strain of coming up with a solution that would prevent just such an outcome.⁶⁹

Zeng Guofan submitted the report of his investigation on July 21, 1870, concluding that the violence had been the result of misinformation and the inadequate management of public order. “Regarding the affair of the 21st June, the honest settlement of which the Governor-General has been directed by His Majesty to come to Tien-tsin to effect, in conjunction with your Excellency, it appears that the hostilities were engendered by the fact that certain scoundrels, kidnapers, incriminated the Roman Catholic Establishment in their proceedings, as well as by the talk of eyes scooped out and hearts cut out to form medical ingredients. Nor were these rumors current among the simple and ignorant alone, for the upper and learned classes all joined in the same cry. Resentment thus was the product of the accumulated suspicions and developed itself into a serious calamity.”⁷⁰

Zeng then noted that these rumors were hardly confined to Tianjin and had been at the root of several other serious incidents in the preceding years, including at Yangzhou, Hunan, and Jiangxi. Although those cases had been sufficiently handled to prevent an outbreak of violence, the misinformation leading to the unrest had never been adequately refuted.

68. Letter from Peking, July 25, 1870. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document 53.

69. See Zeng Guofan’s initial memorial to the throne on the matter dated June 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 507

70. Zeng Guofan report to the throne, July 21, 1870. See full report in QMJA *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 531 and National Palace Museum (Taipei) Archive of the *junjichu*, Document No. 101720. Du, *YWSM*. 73:23a. Translation based on version prepared and submitted to the British Foreign Office. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 70.

Zeng cited the testimony of 150 men, women, and children associated with the Rencitang who had all been “rescued” during the June 21 attack. “Each one, and all of them, when questioned, state that they have been Roman Catholics for a long period of time; that they were placed in the institution by their relatives to be brought up; that they had certainly been neither kidnapped nor inveigled.”⁷¹ His report referenced the improper behavior by the orphanage which, although suspicious and foolish under the circumstances, Zeng did not feel reached the level of criminal liability. He specifically mentioned the poor burial procedures, the placing of multiple bodies into a single coffin, and the closure of the orphanage to outsiders. “What was going on inside could not be divined, and the populace consequently became still more alarmed and surprised, and false, unfounded rumors began to be heard on every side.”⁷²

Despite less than three weeks passing from being ordered to Tianjin on June 24 and the release of his findings on July 21, Zeng believed he provided sufficient opportunity for Tianjin residents to make claims for restitution against anyone from the mission who had harmed them or their families. Zeng said that upon arriving in Tianjin, people swarmed his sedan chair presenting him with petitions that Zeng later minutely examined. Most were based on hearsay and things people had heard or knew to be true. “But none of the cases,” Zeng wrote, “could be substantiated or verified as accurate.”⁷³

Finally, Zeng judged that the actions of a few bad actors should not tarnish all Chinese Christians. “Roman Catholic natives may, perhaps, kidnap by fraud or force, and such like, use the name of the religious establishment to ensure their own protection; such cases cannot be

71. Zeng Guofan report to the throne, July 21, 1870., QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531

72. Zeng Guofan report to the throne, July 21, 1870., QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531

73. Zeng Guofan report to the throne, July 21, 1870., QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531

prevented, but their punishment, as a matter of course, should be inflicted on the criminal native Roman Catholic, the whole religious society must not be held responsible.” Although Zeng’s conclusion made sense from a legal perspective, it was a difficult needle to thread in a society that generally assumed characteristics for an individual based on that person’s group affiliation and where officials still ordered forms of collective punishment for the families of those convicted of serious crimes.⁷⁴

The report did not find any truth to the stories of missionaries kidnapping innocent people, engaging in sorcery and lewd acts, dismembering bodies for use in medicine, or any of the other sensational and salacious accusations that had been spread by gossip, placards, and pamphlets. “As for the killing of children, the destruction of dead bodies, and the mutilation of the living, to get the materials for the concoction of medicines, such acts would not be perpetrated by the cruelest of savages. How, then, can the natives of England, France, or of any of the great outer States, be capable of such barbarities. Let the matter be looked at in a rational point of view, and it will be at once seen that such a practice cannot exist.”⁷⁵

In an unsubmitted draft, Zeng also noted that the man identified by Wu Lanzhen as “Wang San” had been apprehended and interrogated in June, but that the arrested man’s name was actually Wang Er, “Wang number two,” rather than Wang San, “Wang number three.” The confusion of two commonplace names may have contributed to the problems locating and identifying the mysterious mastermind named in Wu Lanzhen’s original deposition. According to Zeng’s unsent letter, Wang Er confessed to receiving drugs from the priests and running a

74. Zeng Guofan report to the throne, July 21, 1870., QMJA *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531

75. Zeng Guofan report to the throne, July 21, 1870., QMJA *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531

kidnapping ring out of the church, but Zeng felt there was insufficient proof to tie the kidnappings with the foreigners.

Zeng strongly suspected that Chinese Christians were operating illegal enterprises, but were doing so without the awareness or active complicity of Chevrier and church authorities. “There are many kidnapers in the church,” wrote Zeng. “And the consular officer never hears about it and the priests never know about it.”⁷⁶ The prefect Zhang Guangzao agreed, telling investigators that “In this case, those who use drugs for kidnapping are all Chinese and have nothing to do with France.”⁷⁷

Zeng recommended that Prefect Zhang Guangzao and Magistrate Liu Jie be cashiered for dereliction of duty and turned over to the Board of Punishments for trial and further punishment, and that those Tianjin residents who had taken part in the killings be executed for their crimes.⁷⁸ “In China, in a case of murder or slaughter, a life is required for each one taken. Still less, when a number of foreigners have been killed, and war hardly avoided, can malignity be allowed to extend itself.”⁷⁹

The proposals to punish the officials and execute rioters were immensely unpopular and Zeng’s exoneration of the Church angered hardliners at court.⁸⁰ Cangzhi, one of the grand

76. *Zeng Guofan mi pian zhiyi* 曾国藩密片之一 [Zeng Guofan’s secret letters]. 近代史资料总 88 号 jindaishiliao zong 88 hao, pp. 27–28

77. *Zhang Guangzao mi bing* 张光藻密禀 [Zhang Guangzao confidential enclosure], 近代史资料, 总 88 号 jindai shiliao zong 88 hao [Historical Materials No. 88], p. 26.

78. Zeng Guofan, supplementary report, submitted July 21, 1870. Du, *YWSM.*, 73:23a. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 531. National Palace Museum (Taipei) Archive of the *junjichu*, Document No. 101724. See also a detailed indictment of the three officials in Zeng Guofan, letter to the throne, August 26, 1870 Du, *YWSM.* 75:16b.; See also Zeng Guofan, letter to the throne, September 10, 1870 (*Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 612) and subsequent edict (军机处上谕档 *junjichu shangyu dang* TZ 9.8.15)

79. Zeng Guofan report to the throne, July 21, 1870.

80. Zeng Guofan. *Xiangxiang Zengshi wenjian* 湘相曾氏文件, Taiwan: Student Press, 7910–7911. Zhu Dong’an Zhu Dong’an 朱东安, *Zeng Guofan zhuan* 曾国藩传 (A Biography of Zeng Guofan), pp. 144. Cohen

secretariat staff called out Zeng for his decision, writing that “by requesting punishment for the prefect and magistrate of Tientsin, he had betrayed both his country and his reputation.”⁸¹

Zeng may well have wished to take a firmer stance against the French, but with Count Rochechouart personally threatening military action if he found the punishment meted out by the Qing government less than satisfactory, Zeng had little room to maneuver diplomatically.⁸² The lessons of Lin Zexu exiled for his role in the start of the Opium War in 1839, lessons studied assiduously by Zeng as a young official-in-waiting, were not forgotten decades later.⁸³ Earlier drafts reveal Zeng’s struggle with self-doubt and the stress of the investigation, and the criticism he received for doing his duty left him a bitter and broken man.⁸⁴

With his report, Zeng Guofan attempted to placate everybody and satisfied no one. Clearing the missionaries of any severe wrongdoing did little to persuade people the missionaries were innocent while the exoneration convinced large swaths of the population that Zeng was a corrupt tool of the foreign powers. It was an ignominious final chapter to a storied career.

After putting a high-profile figure in charge of a high-profile case, the court may have felt a great deal of pressure to validate Zeng’s findings, whatever they were. The tone of the court’s edicts suggests, however, that the court was ultimately displeased with Zeng and his report, and this displeasure grew sharper as the summer progressed. It was displeasure born of frustration;

remarks that as early as July, Zeng had misgivings about his initial recommendation to cashier the Tianjin officials. See Zeng Guofan, letter to Li Hongzhang, quoted in Li, letter to the throne, August 7, 1870. Du, *YWSM*.74:2b.

81. Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 242.

82. Count Julien Rochechouart to the Zongli Yamen, diplomatic note, received July 2, 1870. Chinese copy in FHA: 军机处照会挡 *junjichu zhaohui dang* noted received on TZ 9.6.4

83. Zeng Guofan met Lin Zexu after the latter returned from his exile to Ili following the Opium War debacle. See Eric Schluessel, "The Law and the “Law”: Two Kinds of Legal Space in Late-Qing China," *Extreme-Orient Extreme-Occident*, no. 40 (2016).

84. Zeng Guofan. *Xiangxiang Zengshi wenjian* 湘相曾氏文件, Taiwan: Student Press, 7910–7911. Zhu Dong’an Zhu Dong’an 朱东安, *Zeng Guofan zhuan* 曾國藩傳 (*A Biography of Zeng Guofan*).

frustration at the impotence of the Qing diplomatic strategy, frustration at foreign obstinacy, and frustration over a lack of viable options for calming an unsettled populace without provoking war with the foreign powers, especially France.

The court issued its verdict on July 23, 1870. Based on Zeng Guofan's report, the imperial edict affirmed the elusive Wang San was involved in the drugging and kidnapping of Wu Lanzhen but that there was no evidence linking Wang San to the Catholic Church. "From the report of the Governor-General [Zeng Guofan] and his colleague [Chonghou], it is now made plain to everyone that it had its origin in the suspicions of the people of Tianjin awakened by idle rumors."⁸⁵ The decree urged provincial and local officials to increase their vigilance and to strictly enforce laws banning kidnapping and sorcery in their jurisdictions. The court also asked the Board of Punishments to consider increasing the degree of severity for all sentences carried out against those convicted of kidnapping.⁸⁶

A separate proclamation released the same day revealed the fates of the local officials involved in the riots. As Zeng recommended, Magistrate Liu Jie and Prefect Zhang Guangzao were officially dismissed from their posts and remanded to the Board of Punishments for investigation and sentencing.⁸⁷ On August 7, another edict announced the trials of Liu Jie and Zhang Guangzao would be done in Tianjin, under the supervision of Zeng Guofan and the head of the Zhili judiciary.⁸⁸ There was a slight delay before those trials could begin. Zhang Guangzao

85. Imperial Decree, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jia'ao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 535. Translation follows version prepared and submitted to the British Foreign Office. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 53, Enclosure 1–2.

86. Imperial Decree, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jia'ao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 538.

87. Imperial Decree, July 23, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jia'ao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 538.

88. Imperial Decree, July 23, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jia'ao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 538.

and Liu Jie had absconded upon hearing the court's decision.⁸⁹ They were recaptured a short time later after being found hiding in hill towns just north of the capital.⁹⁰

Prince Gong, the member of the court with the primary responsibility for managing foreign relations, accepted Zeng Guofan and Chonghou's conclusion that the violence was a result of a needlessly roused rabble.⁹¹ What troubled the Prince was news he was receiving from officials like Ding and Ma Xinyi about reports of similar rumors and agitation in Nanjing and Yangzhou. Prince Gong believed that one more violent incident would render the empire's diplomatic position untenable, and suggested quietly fortifying key strategic locations in the event of war.⁹² A month earlier, he had been optimistic that diplomacy could win the day, especially when compared to the pugnacious stance taken by his brother, Prince Chun, but faced with Rochechouart's incessant hectoring, Prince Gong feared the worst. "The ships have arrived, and more are coming," he wrote, "whether we will be forced to resort to arms, I cannot yet foresee."⁹³

Prince Gong worried that his efforts to prevent France from joining forces with Britain and Russia were failing. As he drolly noted in a letter to the throne on July 23, 1870, "I fear the various countries maintain closer and more frequent contact with each other than they do with

89. Acting Consul Lay to Mr. Wade, Tianjin, August 11, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 85, Enclosure 1.

90. Thomas Wade to Prince Gong, Beijing, September 5, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., No. 95, Enclosure 2. Liu Jie had fled to Miyun, now a tourist hub and a suburb of Beijing.

91. Prince Gong Letter to the throne, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 533.

92. Prince Gong Letter to the throne, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 534. See also Ma Xinyi, letter to the Zongli Yamen, enclosed in the memorial, received by Prince Gong, July 18, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 534.

93. Prince Gong Letter to the throne, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 533.

our yamen.”⁹⁴ The veteran Qing diplomat knew the dangers of provoking the foreign powers against his government, and Prince Gong did not want to face another Anglo-French alliance.

Count Rochechouart had a good idea of what would be included in Zeng Guofan’s report even before the court received the final document. The French Charge d’affaires traveled to Tianjin on July 18 to meet with Zeng and to try and persuade him to recommend the maximum possible punishment for Magistrate Liu Jie, Prefect Zhang Guangzao, and Chen Guorui.⁹⁵ Prince Gong had instructed Zeng be careful dealing with Rochechouart, knowing the French diplomat’s penchant for escalating local disputes.⁹⁶ Zeng agreed with Zongli Yamen’s general strategy: Separate the claims of the different foreign powers, negotiate bilateral agreements and settlements, and prevent the foreign forces from linking their grievances as a pretext for joint military action.⁹⁷

The problem was Rochechouart and his lack of patience. He wanted a result that would be a quick and dramatic assertion of French treaty rights and privilege in China. Rochechouart had nothing against Zeng Guofan. By all accounts, he considered Zeng a fair man despite conspiratorial—and ridiculous—whispers that Zeng was one of the architects of the grand anti-foreign conspiracy, nor did Rochechouart believe another common rumor that Chonghou was also involved in the plot against the missionaries.⁹⁸

94. Prince Gong Letter to the throne, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 533.

95. See Rochechouart note to Zongli Yamen dated July 2, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 515; Prince Gong Letter to the throne, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 539.

96. Prince Gong Letter to the throne, June 28, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., No. 509; Prince Gong letter to Zeng Guofan, July 3, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 516. See Chapter 6.

97. Zeng Guofan to the Zongli Yamen, July 6, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 518.

98. Report from Tianjin, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 20, 1870.

Baron Eugene de Méritens, who had assisted in the negotiations and translation for the Beijing Convention of 1860 and who was at the time employed by the Imperial Maritime Customs Service, was informally advising Rochechouart and may have influenced Rochechouart's position regarding Chonghou's innocence. According to Méritens, "Zchongheou was not an accomplice of the prefect for a moment, but I also rest assured that if he had done his duty, if he had no lack of heart at the critical moment, if he went finally officially to the Consulate as he should, that the massacre would be prevented."⁹⁹ In other words, Chonghou was incompetent and useless as an official, but he was not a criminal. Rochechouart, instead, fixated on Chen Guorui, who many foreigners believed to be the mastermind behind the riots, and the two local officials, who Rochechouart was convinced had taken an active role in the planning and organizing of the attacks.¹⁰⁰

One of the first demands Rochechouart made when he arrived in Tianjin on July 20 was the immediate release of any Christian prisoners being held in local jails. All of those prisoners were to be brought to the quay where Rochechouart could visually inspect the prisoners' conditions from his vantage point atop the deck of the gunboat *Flammé*. Zeng Guofan ordered local officials to comply with Rochechouart's request and by the end of the day a parade of wounded, sick, and in some cases mutilated prisoners paraded past the ship along the city's wharf.¹⁰¹ Satisfied that his first request had been successfully met, Rochechouart issued another: Zeng Guofan was to come on board the *Flammé* to give an account of his investigation to Rochechouart plus a timetable for the execution of Magistrate Liu, Prefect Zhang, and General

99. *Massacres de Tientsin*. 1870. Dossier: Mission au Tcheli, 1871–1883, Article 414, Series A, Peking Fonds. Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Nantes, France, p. 5.

100. Report from Tianjin, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 20, 1870.

101. Report from Tianjin, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 20, 1870.

Chen Guorui. Rochechouart set a deadline for the meeting, after which, he threatened, the *Flammé* would begin bombarding Tianjin.¹⁰²

Zeng Guofan agreed to meet with Rochechouart, but it was a stinging and pointed humiliation for a governor-general to be summoned by a diplomat for a dressing down aboard a foreign gunboat. An earlier compromise, to greet Rochechouart on the more neutral ground of the British consulate, failed when the French minister refused to consider the encounter an official visit paid to Rochechouart.¹⁰³ The meeting aboard the French ship was a disaster and Rochechouart spent most of the time scolding Zeng. The French diplomat launched into a series of long-winded and wild accusations that Zeng was personally responsible—possibly even a main organizer—of the riots, but it is not clear whether this represented an actual change in views by Rochechouart or was simply a crude negotiating tactic to unsettle the Qing official.¹⁰⁴ That Zeng was willing to compromise with Rochechouart was remarkable evidence of the Qing official's reserves of patience and political tact, as well as a bitter acknowledgment of the tough task assigned to Zeng by the court.

Zeng was reluctant to forfeit the lives of the two local officials and refused to consider demands to execute Chen Guorui. He was not convinced of Chen's guilt in the matter, and Zeng was certainly aware the oft-disgraced general had survived for so long because of powerful

102. Report from Tianjin, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 20, 1870.

103. "Report from Peking," July 20, 1870. *Shanghai Evening Courier Carvalho, The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document 44.

104. "Report from Tianjin," July 20, 1870. *Shanghai Evening Courier Carvalho, The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document 51. Equally likely is that the part-time correspondents based in Beijing and Tianjin for the *Shanghai Evening Courier* included mixed messages in their reporting from two different cities.

connections at court. Offering Chen Guorui up for execution just to placate the quarrelsome diplomat was a non-starter.¹⁰⁵

Many foreign residents shared Rochechouart's obsession with proving Chen Guorui's complicity in the riots. The idea of a villain representing the highest echelons of power in China using his influence to incite hatred and violence to further his schemes was a narrative that made sense to the international community. An elite conspiracy was also more palatable than facing the hard truth that the foreigners were widely—and, in Tianjin, violently—resented. Zeng Guofan believed Chen Guorui's presence in Tianjin had been coincidental, but in the interest of thoroughness, or possibly to mollify Rochechouart, Zeng requested that Chen travel back to Tianjin to be questioned in the matter.¹⁰⁶

The British took a less extreme view than the French regarding Zeng's refusal to recommend the execution of the two Tianjin officials and General Chen. Thomas Wade's reasoning reflected the practical realities of securing a conviction, as well as the possible repercussions for the foreign community if the men were sentenced to death.

“I should be sorry myself to see them executed otherwise, not only for justice's sake but because their sacrifice, as it would be regarded, could bring us nothing but evil,” Wade wrote to British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Earl Clarendon on August 10. “The case presents many difficulties. The conviction of both the Chinese Government and people that the Tientsinese had a bonafide ground of exasperation against the religious establishments will incline the Government to favour the mildest possible construction of the offence to be punished; and, so far as the Mandarins we accuse are concerned, although our presumptions are strong, our

105. See Chonghou letter to the throne, July 26, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 545.

106. Imperial Edict, July 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 542.

evidence would be worth little in a court against any but the magistrate. He can be shown, I believe, to have brutally tortured some of the Romish Chinese who were made prisoners on the day of the massacre. Against the Prefect and the ex-rebel Chen Kwo-jui there is the testimony of common fame, but not, I repeat, such evidence as would, with us, secure a conviction.”¹⁰⁷

Wade did take exception to the report’s suggestion that the immediate cause of the violence on June 21 was the crowd’s reaction to Fontanier’s attempt to shoot the magistrate, Liu Jie. “The latter part of the Memorial, as quoted in the Decree, is intended to screen both authorities and people,” wrote Thomas Wade. “The explanation of that popular suspicion to which the Roman Catholics became obnoxious may be accepted as bona fide, but the assumption that the outbreak of the 21st of June was the affair of that single day, that the people were roused to action by seeing M. Fontanier fire upon one of their officials, is simply audacious.”¹⁰⁸

It was also not true based on the timeline of the riots. The attack on the church and the murder of the Thomassins occurred in the time just after Fontanier made his dash to Chonghou’s yamen, and the confrontation with the magistrate was after that meeting. Fontanier’s impetuous act added a significant amount of fuel, but the fire was already burning.

Rochechouart’s demands became an ultimatum: Execute the officials or face war. Zeng Guofan and Prince Gong believed Rochechouart’s threat should be taken seriously.¹⁰⁹ An imperial edict ordered officials in Guangdong and Guangxi to stay vigilant for any attempts by

107. Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, Beijing, August 10, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 69.

108. Thomas Wade to Earl Clarendon, Tianjin, August 1, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 56.

109. Chonghou Memorial to the Throne, July 26, 1870. *Qingmo jia’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 545.

the French to recruit Cantonese for a potential war against the Qing government.¹¹⁰ On July 23, 1870, Prince Gong wrote that even though a number of gunboats were patrolling the Chinese coast, he was still opposed to punishing Chen Guorui and also inclined toward leniency—perhaps exile?—in the case of the two officials.¹¹¹ The court urged Zeng Guofan to stand firm and not to coddle the foreign powers or be too quick to give in to Rochechouart’s demands.¹¹²

“I am under a great deal of pressure to make arrests,” Zeng Guofan wrote to his son. “The criminals we have are not willing to confess. This makes things difficult. I can see I am being ridiculed and I don’t know what to do.”¹¹³ On July 24, Chonghou and Zeng Guofan were meeting about the case when Zeng suddenly vomited and became too weak to stand.¹¹⁴ Two days later, Chonghou reported that Zeng Guofan had again fallen ill, and he asked the court to dispatch additional officials to assist in concluding the case.¹¹⁵

Li Hongzhang and his army were scheduled to arrive in August. The court also dispatched Mao Changxi (1817-1882), a stalwart official working with the Zongli Yamen, to Tianjin, and ordered Ding Richang to temporarily leave his post as Fujian governor and also head north.¹¹⁶ Although most of these moves represented an administrative shuffling of officials

110. Imperial Edict. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 541.

111. Prince Gong Memorial, July 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 539.; Prince Gong Memorial, July 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 533.

112. Imperial Edict, July 25, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 541.

113. Zeng Guofan jiaoshu quanbian 曾国藩家书全编 [Complete Collection of Zeng Guofan’s Family Letters]. (Zhongguo huaqiao chubanshe, 2000), pp. 2346.

114. Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan* 经世悲欢: 崇厚传 [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893] (Shanghai: 上海社会科学院出版社 Shanghai shehui kexue yuan chubanshe [Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press], 2009), p. 151.

115. Chonghou Memorial to the Throne, July 26, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 545.

116. Imperial Edicts, July 26, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 545, 546 and 551.

and posts, all of the men had military experience and were veterans of the Taiping War. In addition, the court moved a division of troops from the Mongolian frontier to the Great Wall pass at Gubeikou to add to the defenses around the capital.¹¹⁷

Meanwhile, preparations were underway for a funeral to honor the victims of the riot although Zeng Guofan and Chonghou worried that the public ceremony might cause another incident. A public procession and memorial service was sure to be seen by many in Tianjin as a provocation, and feelings still ran high in the city. The correspondent for the *Shanghai Evening Courier* reported that “An English missionary told me yesterday that he had heard from some of his people that the Chinese on the French Consulate side of the river had raised a great talk about two Europeans having come there in chairs, remarking: ‘Only look, these foreigners think they can come here again, but we will do for them yet.’ When we visited Tientsin city last- Sunday, the looks of the people certainly did not betray fear. Every now and then a single Chinaman would step boldly up to my chair and stare at me with a look which said, ‘you are not afraid to come amongst us again. Don’t think we are afraid of you.’”¹¹⁸

On August 3, the funeral for the victims of the riots went ahead amid the ruins of Notre Dame des Victoires. Foreign guests were met by Chonghou, with Zeng Guofan absent as he recovered from his recent bout of vertigo. The service began at 5:00 am, in part to avoid the heat of the Northern China summer sun, but the early start was also intended to limit the number of uninvited onlookers. Local troops were present to maintain order, but the situation remained tense throughout the service. Admiral Marie-Jules Dupré (1813-1881), recently arrived in China

117. Boyanmabogo letter to the throne and Imperial Edict, July 25, 1870., *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 543 and 544.

118. Report from Tianjin published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier* July 26, 1870. The missionary was not identified but was likely either Jonathan Lees or Lees' colleague William Hall.

from a post in Réunion, had let it be known he had given orders for the French gunboat *Aspic* to bombard the city in retaliation for any hostile acts against the funeral or its participants.

Despite the threats, the soldiers, a gunboat, and the early hour, an immense crowd gathered along the riverbanks to try and catch a glimpse of the procession. All through the night, gravediggers had been working to disinter the bodies from the English cemetery near the international settlement and place the corpses into larger coffins for reburial. The gunboats *Scorpion* and *Aspic* conveyed the coffins and the funeral attendees from the settlement to the ruins of the consulate and church at Wanghailou for the ceremony.

“As we passed up the well-known banks of the river, the scene was sufficiently exciting,” recalled one foreign attendee. “As usual, at this season, there was a considerable number of junks at anchor, and the deck of each was covered as soon as the steamers appeared, with groups of eager gazers. All were quiet enough, for of course, strict orders had been issued by the mandarins to prevent disturbance, and it would have been madness to act otherwise. I did not hear a single offensive word. But there was no mistaking the expression of many a face, and it would be hard to describe the sickening feeling with which one looked upon some of whose share in the late atrocities there could be no rational doubt. Nor was it remarkable that the number of these repulsive, hate-speaking countenances was greatest in those very districts upon the east of the river, where the bitterest feeling has prevailed throughout the whole of these troubles. The Hwen-Hsing-tze (Hunhunn) are there in great strength, and are the dread, not merely of foreigners, but of their more peaceable neighbours.”¹¹⁹

The crowds outside the funeral were mostly quiet, but enterprising vendors found another, more lucrative, way to commemorate the events of June 21. Entrepreneurs hawked

119. Report on Funeral of Tianjin Victims, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, August 6, 1870.

souvenir fans with a picture of the burning cathedral and scenes from the attack on Wanghailou. “Having been informed that fans on the face of which the massacre of foreigners at, and the burning of the French Cathedral, are represented, are being sold in the streets, I sent and procured a few. I send you one of these, and you will probably find it interesting as showing the popular idea of the affair,” William Lay wrote to Thomas Wade.¹²⁰




Figure 10.1 A souvenir fan depicting the attack on Wanghailou. Note the shirtless armed men attacking what appears to be a foreigner, the pontoon bridge that separated the two banks of the channel, and the burning church in the background.

The appearance of the fans did little to calm tempers or dispel the notion that the violence in Tianjin had been sanctioned by officials. “As it is, the most mischievous and alarming reports are rife; placards and illustrated fans are published, bringing foreigners into contempt, all of which Must be perfectly well known to the Mandarins: but there is no action taken whatever to

120. William Lay to Thomas Wade, August 11, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 85. A copy of the fans was also sent back to London.

suppress these mischievous publications or to contradict the objectionable and false stories in circulation, nor, as far as I know, any steps taken to keep the peace.”¹²¹

This was also not the first time that souvenirs like this had been sold in China. Similar fans had appeared on the streets in Guangzhou and other parts of China in previous decades following clashes with foreigners.¹²²

The fan gives some clues as to who may have participated in the riots. On the left side of the fan, there is an official in front of his sedan chair surrounded by his bearers and guards. It is not clear from the image if the official is, as Lay surmised, directing the attackers, merely an observer, or even somebody actively trying to stop the riot. The rioters are mostly shirtless, armed with swords and poleaxes commonly issued to militia members and also frequently found in the weapon caches of *hunhunr* lodges. Reinforcements, some wearing a form of uniform, appear to be arriving either by boat or pontoon bridge.

Local officials banned the fans, but the souvenirs proved popular with Tianjin residents suggesting that while the violence was over, resentment against the foreign presence in Tianjin had not abated.¹²³

121. Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett to Mr. Wade, “Salamis” at Yantai, August 16, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 88, Enclosure 1.

122. Thomas Wade to Vice-Admiral Kellett, Beijing, August 22, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 88, Enclosure 2.

123. William Lay to Thomas Wade, Tianjin, August 15–16, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.No. 85, Enclosure 1.




Figure 10.2 Color photograph of a souvenir fan depicting the attack on Wanghailou.

When the two foreign gunboats along the quay, French sailors carried the coffins of the deceased into the destroyed Wanghailou compound. The ruins of the consulate and church were to be the backdrop for a public expression of foreign grief and anger, and Rochechouart and the French delegation may have felt that such a venue was necessary to make an impression on those attendees representing the Qing government.¹²⁴ The decision to bury the fallen on the spot where they died rather than at the Catholic cemetery had also been made by Rochechouart. “In Tientsin we have a beautiful area surrounded by walls, where the soldiers of the army of 1860 and two Missionaries and two Sisters were buried,” wrote Thierry to Bishop Jean-Gabriel Delaplace (1820-1884). “Your Greatness may ask me: Why didn’t you buried our dear martyrs in this been a cemetery? But, Monsignor, it did not depend on us. Monsieur le Chargé d’affaires [Rochechouart] had a fixed idea on this subject: he wanted to bury the victims of the massacre in

124. The use of ruins as reminders of past crimes here parallels the unwillingness by Chinese authorities a century later to rebuild or renovate the destroyed gardens at Yuanmingyuan. The general sentiment is that as ruins they are a powerful symbol of China’s National Humiliation and a reminder of the violent perfidy of Western nations.

the very place where they had fallen under the knife of the brigands. He did not do me the honor of asking my opinion on this subject.”¹²⁵

Bishop Thierry led the mass while Count Rochechouart, Admiral Dupré, and Thomas Wade gave speeches. Rochechouart’s eulogy emphasized the suffering of the nuns. “One in vain searches history to find occurrences so execrable as those of which this city was the scene on the 21st of June last. Seventeen French subjects, twelve of them ill-fated women, were massacred — what do I say? —were cut to pieces by a fanatical mob, who not content to kill and to destroy, wished, if possible, to add to the enormity of their crime by venting their fury on the dead bodies.”¹²⁶

Admiral Dupré echoed Rochechouart’s high dudgeon in his remarks. He had just been appointed the head of the French fleet in China and Japan and had not taken part in Rochechouart’s expeditions along the Yangtze in 1869, but Dupré’s address at the funeral indicated he shared with his diplomatic counterpart a willingness—even an eagerness—to satisfy grief by resorting to guns. “I am distressed at the sight of these coffins, in which are the noble victims of cowardly murderers. Let justice be done. Chinese authorities have demonstrated that they will come to reason and the side of justice and punish the butchers. But France also has a duty to punish those who killed the consul, the priests, the sisters, and our other countrymen. We will act humanely, but also without weakness.”¹²⁷

Thomas Wade, speaking on behalf of Irish-born nun Alice O’Sullivan, kept his public remarks brief, noting merely that he had met Sister O’Sullivan in Beijing earlier that year and

125. Thierry to Delaplace, August 3, 1870. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. 1872 Volume, p. 130.

126. Transcription and Translation published in *Shanghai Evening Courier Documents*, No. 56. It is unclear why Rochechouart miscounted the number and nationalities of the victims.

127. Transcription and Translation published in *Shanghai Evening Courier Documents*, No. 56.

that it was a great tragedy that she and her fellow Sisters, whose lives were devoted to good works, should have fallen victim to brutal ignorance.¹²⁸

Although Wade was non-committal about British support for Rochechouart's bellicosity, in communications with the Zongli Yamen, Wade was explicit about the potential costs to the Qing government should there be a repeat of the massacre at Tianjin. "Foreign residents in China, all told, can hardly be counted by thousands, and when they are away from the protection of men-of-war, could be as easily overwhelmed as the unfortunate French were at Tien-tsin. But the barbarian would not for all that be expelled. Six months, or at the most twelve, would see the coasts of China beset by foreign navies combined, and her provinces invaded by troops differing widely in discipline and fitness for war from the levies which have achieved a certain success against the Taepings or the Nien-fei. Your Imperial Highness, well knows that I speak no more than the truth."¹²⁹

Soon after the funeral, Li Hongzhang finally arrived in Tianjin. Li's appearance in the city set off another round of conspiracy theories. Missionaries and other members of the foreign community remained implacably convinced that the June 21 massacre was premeditated and meant to be the beginning of a race war against all foreigners. Li's march to Tianjin, with an army in tow, panicked foreign residents across Northern China including Charles Stanley (1835-1910), an American missionary living in Tianjin. On August 12, Stanley wrote, "The van of this

128. Transcription published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier Documents*, No. 59.

129. Mr. Wade to Prince Gong, Beijing, September 5, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 95, Enclosure 2. See also Prince Gong letter to the throne, September 24, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 634.

army has already arrived. Li is simply a military man, and his presence is only wanted where there is to be fighting.”¹³⁰

Others were less alarmed about the presence of Li’s troops. Thomas Wade felt outside forces might be just what was needed to quell anti-foreign elements in the city, especially the *hunnunr*. “Anything is possible in China, but I have understood from the first that the Governor-General [Li Hongzhang] would not be able to seize the persons belonging to the dangerous classes, who were more particularly the agents of crime upon the day of the massacre without a force of his own. If the troops now arriving are intended to act against the fire brigade and the Hun-Sing-Tzu, then I read the Proclamation you have forwarded as a hint to the notables or literati (who have been equally suspected by foreigners of sympathy, if not of co-operation, with the mob) that they are not going to be interfered with.”¹³¹

Those inclined to speculate on Qing politics tended to include Mao Changxi and even Li Hongzhang in the ‘War Party.’ “Mow-Chang-Hsi seems to be a fire-brand; calls Prince Kung ‘foreigner,’ and Tseng-Kwo-Fan and Chung-How ‘Catholics,’” speculated one curator of Beijing whispers. “Mao declares that the kidnapping charges against the Catholics are true and goes to Tientsin to re-investigate. He is loud-mouthed in bragging that as the Coreans repulsed the French, it will be much easier for the Chinese to do so. It was Mow-Chang-Hsi who collared the French interpreter at the Tsungli yamen and challenged him to fight, or something very like it. On the whole it will be seen he is a tolerably dangerous man to entrust with the “investigation”

130. The Reverend C. Stanley to Captain Taylor, United States Navy. The American Boards Mission, Tientsin, August 12, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 61, Enclosure 2; For Li’s arrival see *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 548.

131. Mr. Wade to Acting Consul Lay, Beijing, August 19, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 85, Enclosure 2.

and control of affairs at Tientsin. A respectable gentleman on hearing of his appointment observed: ‘I guess the French will find now they have got one that will pay them back in their own coin for their brow-beating of the Chinese!’”¹³²

Reporting back to his superiors in Paris, Bishop Delaplace offered his take on the latest rumors in Beijing. “We know, on the other hand, that the most famous generals of the empire are called to the theater where they want, it seems, to play the destinies of China a second time. The famous Ly-Houn Tchang (Li Hongzhang) himself, currently greatly embarrassed, despite all his fame and skill, by the Mahometans of Chen-Si, arrives at Tien-tsin: From all sides, the soldiers come running: the Mongols they themselves came out of their plains; the army is growing every day, and the total force will be, according to what is said, one hundred thousand men.”¹³³

Not even the Qing capital was said to be safe from an uprising. General Chen Guorui, who had not been reported seen in public since June 21, was thought to be hiding out among the guild halls and market streets of the Outer City of Beijing, protected by a crowd of his “Braves.” Many in the foreign community felt Chen’s presence in Beijing, in the company of hooligans of the same ilk as those who carried out the Tianjin attacks according to the Shanghai English-language press, was a sure sign that the Beijing Legations would be the next target in the campaign to exterminate the foreigners.

“There are present here some of the ‘T’ou-Muh’= ‘heads and eyes’ of the Tientsin massacre who are reported to be in the outer city close to where Cheng-kwo-Shwai is residing, where they are displaying as a trophy a tablecloth clotted with blood and boasting of their

132. Report from Peking, *Shanghai Evening Courier*, August 5, 1870. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No. 60

133. Delaplace to Superior-General Paris, August 18, 1870, *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. 1872, p. 142

exploits in connection with it. This they do openly, yet while the Mandarins, and the foreign ministers who support them declare their desire to punish those who are proved to have taken part in the bloody outrage, no one seizes these men, or even cries shame on them! They also assert that the Tientsin magistrates guaranteed their safety and promised them promotion if they managed the massacre successfully. All this might be treated as mere braggadocio were it not that their presence here is itself a proof of their confidence that no punishment will overtake their work at Tientsin.”¹³⁴

As outlandish as these rumors were, and most were demonstrably false, the staff at the foreign legations in Beijing stayed on high alert. On August 16, Wade returned to the British Legation following a meeting at the Zongli Yamen to find the compound in an uproar after a man tried to force his way inside with a spear. The assailant, later identified as Zhang Zhixi, was overpowered by legation guards, and turned over to the Beijing authorities. Zhang was a farmer from Luanzhou, a village located between Tianjin and Beijing, and his younger brother had disappeared.¹³⁵ After hearing about foreigners who purchased kidnapped children, Zhang traveled to the capital and asked local residents to show him where the foreigners lived. They pointed Zhang to the legation quarter, where he attacked the first gate he saw. A local court sentenced him to receive 80 blows and reprimanded the unit responsible for guarding Beijing’s Chaoyang Gate for not stopping and questioning a troubled young man walking into the city carrying a spear as his only luggage.¹³⁶

134. Letter from Peking published July 25, 1870. *Shanghai Evening Courier*. Document No. 53

135. See deposition of Zhang Zhixi included in correspondence from the ministers of the Zongli Yamen to Foreign Ministers, Beijing, August 23, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 96, Enclosure 3.

136. Correspondence from the ministers of the Zongli Yamen to Foreign Ministers, Beijing, August 23, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 96, Enclosure 3.

The incident involving Zhang Zhixi was relatively minor, but with autumn drawing near, foreigners residing in North China began to wonder whether it would be prudent to evacuate before winter froze the canals and rivers making a rescue or escape difficult in the event of another outbreak of violence. “We must have Taku, Tientsin and Peking well protected this winter. People here with families have grave doubts about spending the winter here unless something be done to give us some security. I believe that many will move off. Rumours are rife here, and kidnapers are being apprehended. This is now a common epithet hurled at one in the street, and at the converts: ‘There go the kidnapers.’”¹³⁷

Against a backdrop of uncertainty, all eyes looked to Rochechouart: Was France planning war? “The French officers still blame Rochechouart for his inaction and seem to think he is in a great measure guided by the other ministers,” reported the *Shanghai Evening Courier*. “If he has not the power to make the Chinese give up the heads of the three mandarins he named; viz: the che-fu, che-hsien and Chen-Kwo-Shwai, he has made a great mistake. The Chinese will not give them up; and to them it is nothing-less than a declaration of war. The Chinese all this time are having the best of it. Their troops are concentrating around Taku, and at the signal will take possession of both places and declare war themselves when they are ready.”¹³⁸

Just after the funeral, Rochechouart met again with Zeng Guofan and repeated his demands for the execution of Liu Jie, Zhang Guangzao, and Chen Guorui. Zeng stood firm. The Zongli Yamen denied that the transfers of Mao Changxi, Li Hongzhang, and Ding Richang were military preparations, but many foreigners believed the men to be military reinforcements sent by the Qing government in expectation of Rochechouart making good on his ultimatum.

137. Report from Peking published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 25, 1870.

138. Report from Peking published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 25, 1870.

The problem for Rochechouart was that events in Europe were threatening to limit his options. On July 19, 1870, French Emperor Napoleon III declared war on Otto von Bismarck and Prussia. French diplomatic representatives in China eagerly awaited word from the battlefields in Europe. News of Prussian routs and French retreats began filtering back to Beijing and Shanghai, and with each Prussian victory Rochechouart felt a little more ground give way. By the end of August, Rochechouart must have known he could no longer bring to bear the kind of overwhelming military force necessary to avoid a repeat of the Korea fiasco of 1866. At the same time, France's prestige was at stake in both China and Europe. After French diplomats and civilians had been massacred in the streets of Tianjin, Rochechouart and France might be denied their righteous retribution.

Chapter 11: Lines

As news of the Franco–Prussian War reached Beijing in late July 1870, Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen considered how they might turn the war to their advantage. France’s predicament gave Prince Gong greater confidence in his efforts to delay negotiations while blunting the urgency of Count Rochechouart’s ultimatums, and there was hope Rochechouart would drop his demands for the heads of Liu Jie, Zhang Guangzao, and Chen Guorui. For his part, Rochechouart was seething at the Zongli Yamen for stalling, but there was little he could do. Reports of French defeats hummed across the telegraph wires connecting Europe and Asia, and Rochechouart feared he might no longer be able to make good on threats of military force. He was not alone in that assessment.

On August 18, 1870, Marquis Charles de Lavalette (1806-1881), the French ambassador in London, reached out to George Leveson-Gower, 2nd Earl Granville (1815-1891), who had replaced Lord Clarendon as British Foreign Secretary. Marquis de Lavalette expressed his desire, and that of Napoleon III, that the British keep a stiff spine and support French claims against the Qing court. “Although the victims of these attempts are almost exclusively French,” wrote de Lavalette, “it cannot be denied that such deeds reveal the existence of dangers which menace without distinction all foreigners residing in China. It is by considering their interests as common in these countries of the extreme East that the European Powers can arrive at securing to their countrymen the guarantees and the security stipulated for in the Treaties.”¹

Earl Granville replied on September 15 that while the British government deplored the violence and loss of life in Tianjin, France would be left to her own devices in the event of

1. M. de Lavalette to Earl Granville, London, August 18, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.; For the original French, see Cordier Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 374.

military action. “It cannot be denied that the grievance to be redressed is not in its origin a British grievance and that the demand for redress, however justly it may be insisted on, should proceed in the first instance from the nation to whom the wrong has been done... The calamity has been the result of a system which they have always deprecated as dangerous and impolitic, and which they have long foreseen might lead to events such as they now deplore. It is for the reasons such as these, it is from knowing that missionary zeal might lead to consequences not only fatal to those devoted persons who apply themselves to spread Christianity in China, but calculated to put in jeopardy the lives and interests of the whole foreign community, that Her Majesty’s Government have felt it their duty to discountenance missionary operations which seemed likely to give rise to difficulties with the Chinese Government and people; and Her Majesty’s Government trust most sincerely that British missionaries will take warning from what has befallen the Roman Catholic missionaries at Tien-tsin, and conduct their operations with the utmost prudence, and with a steady purpose to abstain from exciting suspicion or animosity among the Chinese, and to insist upon their proselytes not looking upon their conversion to Christianity as releasing them from their general duties as subjects of China.”²

There were rumors that a member of the Zongli Yamen, presumably Prince Gong, had been making overtures to the Prussian minister in Beijing hoping to gain some leverage over Rochechouart. There is no evidence that any such communications took place, but in the heady summer of 1870, whispers of intrigue were rampant.³ Even Robert Hart, the head of the Imperial Maritimes Customs Service, was not immune from political speculation. “The horrible doings of

2. Earl Granville to Thomas Wade, September 15, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 24.

3. Report published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, August 31, 1870. Shanghai Evening Courier Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No. 72.

the 21st June at Tientsin you will long ago have heard of. No account of what was done could be bad enough or give all its horrors; and no punishment could be severe enough for the *whole* place. The T'nsin folk of all classes glory in what was done, and the authorities are either so afraid or so sympathetic, that, till now, almost three months after the event, they have literally done nothing—yes, they have done one thing: they have massed troops in this province, and, preparing for defence, they are cocky enough to think they can whip the French! The *seventh Prince* and all the officials are for war, Prince Kung and two or three others are for peace. Much depends on the attitude of the French, but it's a toss-up as to which party will carry the day. If the war party, we are all in a nice trap here! If we don't get scragged right off, they'll probably hold us as hostages; if the peace party, we are safe enough, but quiet will not bring things back to where they were a year ago for a full year to come. We are simply taking our chance here. Still, thank God. Peking is as near Heaven as any other bit of earth. The Chinese are anxious to know what terms will satisfy the French, and are awfully puzzled to find that *money* is not allowed to be talked of. They thought money would do it! I tell them France would be grieved to hear of the putting to death of one innocent person, but that, so long as one guilty person remains unpunished, France will not be satisfied. We all wonder what effect on our interests here, the European War will have. Telegrams vaguely say Prussia has been twice victorious.”⁴

The Tianjin riot occurred at the dawn of an information age. For all the incredible changes brought by the internet in the late twentieth century, it is difficult to overstate the impact of the first intercontinental telegraph cables. Harry Parke's consular report describing his actions against Governor Ye Mingchen in Guangzhou following the 1856 Arrow Incident had taken

4. Robert Hart to James Duncan Campbell, September 1, 1870. Robert Hart, *The I. G. in Peking: Letters of Robert Hart, Chinese Maritime Customs, 1868-1907*, ed. John King Fairbank et al. (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 58. Hart's premonition that he would be “scragged off” nearly came to pass thirty years later when the Boxer militias besieged the Legation Quarter in the summer of 1900.

nearly three months to reach London, at which point there was little the British government could do to avert war with China. The Anglo-French Expedition of 1860, at the conclusion of that war, was to be one of the last military expeditions launched before intercontinental cables shrank lines of command and control for many nations including Britain and France.⁵ By 1870, English and Chinese newspapers were routinely publishing market information updated via telegraph. It still could take weeks for a message to travel from Europe to China, but the telegraph made the world a smaller place in 1870 than it had been just a decade earlier.⁶

The first telegraph lines did not reach Hong Kong until 1871, and mainland China remained unconnected until 1874. Nevertheless, the development of global telegraph networks played an essential role in disseminating information about the Tianjin Massacre worldwide. News of the violence reached Hong Kong on July 4 and was then forwarded via steamship to Point de Galle in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), then the terminus of the undersea cable in Asia. On July 23, that message was relayed to London, arriving on July 25. As it happened, the first communication from the British Legation in Beijing regarding the incident, sent on June 25, also arrived at the foreign office by telegraph on July 25. Rather than travel by sea, the message from the legation had to be physically carried across the Sino–Russian border and then relayed to the British foreign office via the terminus of the overland telegraph line at Kyakhta.⁷

5. Ariane Knüsel, "British Diplomacy and the Telegraph in Nineteenth-Century China," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 18 (09/01 2007), p. 523.; Zhang Xiaochuan 张晓川, "Cong zhongxi dianbao tongxun kan tianjin jiao'an yu pufa zhangzheng — jiantan Zeng Guofan yi feng jiashu de riqi wenti 从中西电报通讯看天津教案与普法战争——兼谈曾国藩一封家书的日期问题 [Viewing the Tianjin Missionary Case and the Franco-Prussian War from the Perspective of Chinese and Western Telegraph Communications — And a look at the date of correspondence from Zeng Guofan]," *近代史研究 jindaishi yanjiu* 1 (2011).

6. Zhou Yongming, *Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 43; Erik Baark, *Lightning Wires: The Telegraph and China's Technological Modernization, 1860-1890* (London: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 96.

7. Zhou Yongming, *Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China*, pp. 41-42.

The telegraph also brought news of the world to readers in China. The *Shanghai Xinbao* reported extensively on France's problems in Europe in the spring of 1871, printing articles describing the Franco–Prussian War and the dramatic events in Paris in almost every issue.⁸ Members of the Qing government and the literate elite in China's major cities were aware of France's quandary, and they discussed how the Franco–Prussian War might affect the ongoing negotiations over reparations and the fate of officials involved in the Tianjin riots.⁹

Even in the nineteenth century, control over telecommunications infrastructure could be politically sensitive in times of crisis. The *Shanghai Evening Courier* on August 29, 1870, complained about the delay of several telegrams after storms near the Kyakhta station in Russia destroyed sections of the telegraph line. That was the official reason for the delays, but there were whispers in Shanghai that certain governments were interfering with transmissions and attempting to intercept sensitive information flowing through lines built within their borders. The editors of the *Courier* expressed the hope that future communications sent via undersea cables would be more secure. "Altogether the matter excites reflections anything but pleasant, and seems fitted to commend submarine lines, as, on the whole, less exposed both to physical and to political influences."¹⁰

If Rochechouart was worried about developments from Europe coming over the wires, then Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen were equally nervous about a situation developing much closer to home. On August 22, Ma Xinyi, the governor-general of the provinces Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui, was assassinated outside of his yamen in broad daylight by a single

8. Zhou Yongming, *Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China.*, p. 42.

9. Zhou Yongming, *Historicizing Online Politics: Telegraphy, the Internet, and Political Participation in China.*, pp. 42–43

10. *Shanghai Evening Courier*, August 29, 1870. Courier Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No. 70.

assailant. Ma had been returning from the parade grounds when a man by the name of Zhang Wenxiang ran toward the governor-general and stabbed him in the ribs. Zhang was seized immediately, and Ma was hurried back to his residence for medical treatment, but the governor-general died the following day from his wounds.¹¹

The audacity of Ma's assassination, carried out on the grounds of the governor-general's yamen, shocked the court, and the central government ordered an investigation of the prisoner Zhang Wenxiang, his motives, and possible accomplices.¹² Given the fear and tension already gripping China that summer, the assassination of such a high-ranking official fueled speculation in the international concessions, particularly in nearby Shanghai. Notably, there was widespread suspicion that Ma was killed because he had prevented Nanjing residents from organizing and carrying out planned attacks against the foreign missions in that city.

“Assassination of prominent members of the Supreme or Provincial Governments are, as you are aware, so foreign to the temper and spirit of the Chinese people, and so entirely unprecedented in the modern history of China, that it is difficult to believe but that the attack upon Ma must have been the work of a madman or a fanatic,” William Medhurst wrote from Shanghai, “At the same time it is quite within the compass of possibility that the act has been

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11. Wu Muhuo 吴木火, "Wan qing liangjiang zongdu maxinyi be ci an kao shu 晚清两江总督马新贻被刺案考述 [Textual research into the Assassination of Ma Xinyi, Governor of Liangjiang in the Late Qing Dynasty]" *收藏 shoucang*, no. 2 (1985); Yang Liu 杨柳, "Qingmo liangjiang zongdu maxinyi bei ci zhi mi 清末两江总督马新贻被刺之谜 [The Mystery behind the Assassination of Ma Xinyi, Governor of Liangjiang in the Late Qing]," *文史博览 wenshi bolan*, no. 3 (2007); Zhou Xuezhong 周学忠 and Du Jun 杜军, "Lun fengjiang da li maxinyi de guanchang shengya yu bei ci zhi mi 论封疆大吏马新贻的官场生涯与被刺之谜 [On Ma Xinyi's Official Career and the Mystery of his Assassination]," *兰台世界: 上旬 lan tai shijie: shangxun*, no. 11 (2013); Yasushi Ogata, "Bashin'i sōtoku no ansatsu to sono kyōhan-sha o ou endo 馬新贻総督の暗殺とそ [Tracking the Assassination of Ma Xinyi]," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Letters, Kobe University*, no. 48 (2021).
12. Wang Jiabi, "A Comprehensive Report on the stabbing to death of Liangjiang Governor-General Ma Xinyi. TZ 09.11.12 (January 3, 1871). *Archives of the Junjichu*. National Palace Museum. Document No. 104822; Decree Published in the Peking Gazette, August 29, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Enclosure 97.

committed in revenge for the active and determined measures which Ma adopted last year against the military students of Ganking-fu with a view to compelling them to produce the two ringleaders in the attack upon the missionary establishments of that city.”¹³

Ma had a reputation as a capable leader and official and earned the post of governor-general in Nanjing when Zeng Guofan was transferred to Zhili following the Yangzhou riots of 1868. As in Tianjin, Nanjing had been swept by rumors of kidnappings and sorcery during the spring and summer of 1870. Children had gone missing in Nanjing beginning in April, and when local officials arrested several men in connection with the kidnappings, they, in turn, implicated the Catholic mission. Ma Xinyi felt the evidence linking the Church to the kidnappings was insufficient, but was still concerned about general sentiment.¹⁴

Ma issued a stern proclamation admonishing the anti-Christian agitation in his jurisdiction. “Now these converts, for all they embrace a new doctrine and yet Chinese subjects, and their teachers inculcate respect and obedience to the Sovereign and a careful observance of the laws and statutes of China. Of course, then, they must be treated with the same kindness (as you show to Chinese), and so exemplify the wish to regard all with equal benevolence... You are to know that the Treaty sanctions both the preaching and the embracing of these doctrines, while those who don’t care to be converted cannot be compelled to do so. You are not, therefore, to offer perverse opposition... These Missionaries have come from abroad, with the set purpose of inculcating virtue; and it is all the more necessary therefore to treat them with courtesy...

13. Consul Medhurst to Mr. Wade, Shanghai, August 25, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 63.

14. Ma Xinyi Memorial to the throne. January 14, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaoyan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 473.

everyone must observe the Treaty; it will not do to make an appearance of complying while you secretly break it.”¹⁵

The North China Herald contrasted the “swift and decisive” leadership of Ma Xinyi in Nanjing with the supposed inaction of Chonghou in Tientsin: “The circumstances will however be made to appear more clearly in a subsequent paper and we will only add that [Chonghou’s] conduct contrasts unfavourably with that of Ma Hsin i who was placed in an almost identical position and who restored order in Nanking by his personal interference when the people had actually gone the length of bringing fuel to set fire to the Catholic Mission premises. The Missionaries appealed to each, Ma responded, Chonghou neglected the call.”¹⁶

The parallels with the situation that summer in Tianjin were eerie but not exact, and foreign observers linking Tianjin and Nanjing failed to account for the very different capacities of Ma Xinyi and Chonghou in their respective positions. Nanjing was not a treaty port but a provincial capital. As governor-general, Ma occupied one of the few regional administrative positions with relatively unambiguous lines of authority and sweeping executive powers to command troops and official forces of order as well as to issue proclamations that had the full force of law for the city and surrounding areas. Chonghou’s mandate was less clear. He could draw upon his stature as a Manchu official attached to the Board of War and had important contacts at the Zongli Yamen, but at the local level, he was forced to rely on cajoling and moral suasion to influence city officials. Under the best of circumstances his authority was ill-defined. In times of crisis, it could be ignored.

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15. Proclamation by Ma Xinyi, Viceroy of Liangjiang and Ding Richang, Governor of Jiangsu, May 24, 1870. Translation in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 23, Enclosure 3.
16. *A Retrospect of Political and Commercial Affairs in China: During the Five Years 1868 to 1872*. (Shanghai: North-China Herald Office, 1873). p. 44.

Paul Cohen has argued that Ma's assassination fits a pattern whereby officials—even those with as lofty a position as governor-general—paid the price for taking an active role in suppressing anti-missionary hostility and violence. Although Cohen did not speculate about the motives behind Ma's murder, he suggested that Ma's actions “undoubtedly alienated those members of the gentry and official classes who had taken the lead in exciting hatred against the missionaries.”¹⁷ Despite repeated questioning, the officials investigating the case were unable to elicit a clear response from the man arrested for Ma's murder. At different points in his interrogation, Zhang Wenxiang admitted to being a former Taiping rebel while at other times he was a disgruntled business owner who had suffered from a crackdown Ma ordered against usury in Nanjing.¹⁸

One theory was that Zhang Wenxiang had been a close friend of Ma Xinyi and that the murder had to do with a personal grudge involving Ma forcing Zhang's wife to become a concubine. The fact that Zhang was able to access the interior of the yamen so easily suggests that he knew Ma or was even related to the former governor-general in some way.¹⁹ Zhang's real motivation may never be known.²⁰ The less-than-satisfactory conclusion to such a high-profile and audacious murder case has made Ma Xinyi's death a rich source of plot material for later

17. Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*, p. 249.

18. See 高尚举 Gao Shangju, *Ci ma an tanyin 刺马案探隐 [An Exploration of the Case of the Assassination of Ma (Xinyi)]* (Beijing: 北京图书馆出版社 Beijing tushu guan chuban she [Beijing Library Press], 2001).

19. Consul Medhurst to Thomas Wade, Shanghai, August 30, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 73 Medhurst writes: “The commonly accepted version of the story amongst the natives at present is, that he is a native of Shantung, and a relative of Ma's; that there had been some quarrel about money matters between himself and Ma, and that he revenged himself by taking M a 's life. The facts of the assassin's having had easy access to the interior of the Yamên renders it probable that he was a relative, and, so far, makes it likely that this story may turn out to be the true one.”

20. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing period (1644-1912)*, p. 555. Another rumor also implicated Ma, a member of the Hui nationality, with the ongoing Muslim uprisings in Gansu and Xinjiang. James Carter, “The Murder of Ma Xinyi,” *SUP China* (August 19, 2020). <https://supchina.com/2020/08/19/the-murder-of-ma-xinyi/>.

popular novels, plays, and films.²¹ While it was unlikely Ma Xinyi was killed because he suppressed anti-missionary sentiment that summer, rumors that Ma's death was at the hands of an anti-foreign conspiracy persisted.

With the sudden vacancy in the important post of governor-general in Nanjing, the imperial court fell into an elegant solution regarding the problem of what to do about Zeng Guofan. The harsh criticism of the investigation had been personally painful, and Zeng was looking for a graceful—or at least an expedient—exit from the job of Zhili governor-general. Zeng's earlier requests to resign due to ill health had been denied by the court, but Ma's death meant there was now a prestigious post, in a city closer to Zeng's hometown, that needed filling. It was decided that Zeng Guofan would return to Nanjing once the Tianjin case was settled. Conveniently, Zeng's transfer also opened the way for the court to appoint the younger Li Hongzhang to take over for Zeng as governor-general in Zhili.

Count Rochechouart remained outwardly firm in his demands for justice even as news of the Franco-Prussian War grew bleaker for France every day. Following his attendance at the funeral service on August 3, Rochechouart had a series of unproductive meetings with Zeng Guofan and Chonghou. With Li Hongzhang having only just arrived in Tianjin, Chonghou was still doing what he could to assist Zeng, especially after Zeng's health scare on July 24. Zeng and Chonghou reported to Prince Gong that the French minister continued to be upset with their refusal to execute the three officials. They also warned the imperial court that Rochechouart was planning to take up the matter directly with Prince Gong when Rochechouart returned to

21. *The Warlords* (投名狀 *tou mingzhuang*) is a 2007 big-budget action film starring Jet Li and Andy Lau. The movie reimagined the Ma Xinyi murder as a tale of romance and betrayal.

Beijing.²² The court wrote back requesting Zeng and Chonghou stall the ambassador in Tianjin. Nobody in the Qing government relished the job of dealing with the truculent French aristocrat.²³

On August 12, Rochechouart, true to his word, met with Prince Gong in Beijing. Prince Gong described Rochechouart as behaving arrogantly and still being unreasonable.²⁴ Rochechouart reiterated his earlier ultimatum, informing Prince Gong that the Qing government had until August 31 to execute Liu, Zhang, and Chen Guorui, or face military consequences.²⁵ Rochechouart was not completely bluffing, but the Prussian War had removed some of the imperative for Prince Gong and his staff to act quickly.²⁶ The lack of resolve on the part of the other foreign powers—in particular Britain—to back French threats further weakened Rochechouart's red line, much to the disappointment of bellicose members of the international community.²⁷

“If the French are in earnest, as they are believed to be, war must follow,” wrote the Tianjin correspondent for the *Shanghai Evening Courier*. “And the more promptly and vigorously it is prosecuted the less will the Chinese suffer, and the greater benefits they will derive from it. For our broken treaties we have only ourselves to blame. We made stipulations on paper, and relaxed them in practice, abandoning one concession after another to please the

22. Zeng Guofan and Chonghou Memorial, August 5, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 559.

23. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 563

24. Prince Gong Memorial to the Throne, August 12, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 585.

25. Zeng Guofan and Chonghou memorial to the throne, (Received August 5, 1870). *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 559.

26. Mao Changxi Report, August 6, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 562; Li Hongzhang, Memorial to the throne, August 7, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 564 and 565. Ding Richang, Memorial to Throne, August 11, 1870. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Documents No. 576 and 577.

27. Some legations continued to support the French. On August 4, 1870, the Belgian Minister wrote to the Zongli Yamen in support of Rochechouart's demands. *Qingmo jiaiao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 558.

Chinese, and now they and we are suffering for it, and war alone can remedy the effects of our short-sightedness and folly. A joint occupation and just rule of the northern provinces for a few years would do more good to China than anything that has happened since the days of Confucius, and even of Yao and Shun.”²⁸

Meanwhile, British representatives were having problems of their own. One of the victims, Alice O’Sullivan, had been a British citizen, and several Protestant properties were destroyed. Following the advice of Prince Gong, representatives from the Zongli Yamen tried to settle accounts with the British and the Russian legations first before dealing with Rochechouart and his demands. The hope was that the amount of compensation owed to Britain and Russia (who had lost three people) would be comparatively smaller and easier to negotiate, and that swift resolution of British and Russian demands would deprive France of allies at the bargaining table.

As early as June 24, Chonghou offered William Lay funds to rebuild the damaged chapels immediately, an offer Lay refused.²⁹ At the time, the British consul was overwhelmed by the aftermath of the riots and did not want to make any agreements that might preclude later concessions. Thomas Wade agreed with Lay’s caution but asked Lay to inquire with the London and Methodist Missionary Societies, to whom the chapels belonged, about the estimated loss on the properties and the proposed cost to rebuild. Lay wrote to representatives from the two societies to ask for an estimate but received instead a stinging rebuke.

In a reply to Lay’s request, which was also leaked to the *North China Herald*, Jonathan Lees and his fellow missionary, William Hall, who had been active collecting witness statements

28. Report from Tianjin, August 10, 1870. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document 64, p. 112.

29. See Chapter 9.

for Lay's investigation, wrote "Will you forgive our expressing an anxious desire not to be separated from our suffering French brethren in any settlement of these unhappy troubles? This is not a mere question of sentiment. We cannot but feel that the interests of our country are involved in what has occurred. We are British subjects, resident here under the protection of Treaties, and engaged in the prudent prosecution of our lawful calling. Our lives have been sought, our property has been destroyed, our converts grievously injured, and our characters assailed."³⁰

The editors of the *North China Herald* piled on. "Yet in the midst of all this evidence of official complicity and wide-spread machination, we find the British Chargé d'affaires calmly treating the matter as finished, and calling on the English missionaries to send in their bill for houses and property destroyed, as though the payment of a few dollars would set all straight, and the erection of new buildings would efface even the memory of a mob's unfortunate effervescence."³¹

The foreign community in the treaty ports of Tianjin and Shanghai were disturbed by the change in their interactions with Chinese neighbors. There was a growing—and, to many, a disquieting—feeling that the massacre had upset the lines of power and privilege that undergirded the treaty system. Lees wrote in his own letter to the *Shanghai Evening Courier*: "That these acts of violence and bloodshed, with which, thanks to the criminal apathy of civilised governments, we have become too sadly familiar in China, and which will still not have reached their climax unless the innocent blood now shed should rouse the spirit which once made 'Civis Romanus sum' a word of power even upon an Englishman's lips:—I say, that these outrages are

30. Reply of Messrs. Lees and Hall, Tianjin, July 21, 1870. Britain Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 60, Enclosure 3.

31. *North China Herald*, Shanghai, July 30, 1870.

not simply the work of the people, and proofs, as we are so often told, of their bitter and invincible hostility to us, is also beginning to be understood both here and in Europe... whatever be the origin of these atrocities, common sense demands that such decisive measures shall be at once taken to vindicate the sanctity of foreign life as shall convince both the rulers and people of China that it can no longer be taken with impunity.³² A Chinaman said to me only this morning ‘A few years ago no one dares touch a dog which was the property of a foreigner, now even the Christian ministers are killed, and no notice is taken of it, see what is the result.’³³

In the same edition, the *Courier's* correspondent from Beijing reported more rumors of Chen Guorui hiding out in the alleyways protected by armed associates. General Chen's presence, the correspondent claimed, inspired people who were now openly catcalling foreigners in the streets, and accusing them of being kidnappers. “The fruit of this I have myself slightly experienced, having been to-date called a kidnapper no less than four times in the street; and a friend was nearly involved in more serious consequences. He was passing along the street when a child accidentally followed in his track, which being observed by the natives, they made a tumultuous rush to the child's rescue, believing he was being “led away” by the foreigners. For to the disturbed imaginations of an ignorant people, plied with mischievous rumours and proclamations, the sight near a foreign quarter, at a foreigner closely followed by a Chinese young person, is proof positive of a case of kidnapping. Yesterday a boy belonging to Mr. Edkin's mission was taken to the yamen as a kidnapper. Mr. Welmann went to watch the case. After a night's detention he was released, it being found that his crime had consisted in playing

32. *The West Wing*, “A Proportional Response,” Season 1, Episode 3. <https://youtu.be/oqxmJc9Ezk0>

33. Jonathan Lees, Letter to the Editors of the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 20, 1870. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, p. 76.

at kidnapping with another child in a mud puddle, with a basket of tea in his hand to represent the dreaded philtre.”³⁴

Another correspondent noted similar misinformation in Ningbo, a city with a long history of missionary activities.³⁵ “A rumour was abroad yesterday at this port that a rising was intended upon all foreigners here; in consequence of this, the gun-boat lay at single anchor and under steam all night. As yet everything is quiet, but the absurd rumours of foreigners kidnapping Chinese are gaining ground every day, as you will see from the following, which was posted up in the city some little while back and is gaining credence amongst all classes of Chinese...A Chinaman presented himself before the local authorities and stated that a foreigner coming along the streets had touched him upon the shoulder; as soon as he had done so, he found himself involuntarily following this foreigner, who led him away into a boat and took him alongside of a foreign ship. But as he found himself following the foreigner into his foreign ship, the spirit of his mother appeared to him and ordered him to throw himself overboard, which he did, and so escaped from evil influence and got home. When he appeared before the magistrate he was dripping wet. This absurd story is believed by a large number of Chinese.”³⁶

The Tianjin Massacre renewed foreign interest in anti-Christian polemics like the *Bixie Jishi*. The American Board of Missionaries condemned the tract as “An abominable book recently issued by the literary class against Christianity and circulated widely in several provinces. It is filled with the most loathsome obscenity and the grossest misrepresentations and

34. Letter from Peking, July 20, 1870. July 20, 1870. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, p. 76.

35. The first orphanage run by the Sisters of the Holy Childhood Association in China had been established there in 1848. See Chapter 3.

36. Report from Ningbo published in the *Shanghai Evening Courier*, August 30, 1870. Carvalho, *The Tientsin Massacre: Being Documents Published in the Shanghai Evening Courier from June 16th to Sept. 10th, 1870, with an Introductory Narrative.*, Document No. 73, pp. 121–122.

falsehoods. Nothing could be more calculated to foment disturbances in the minds of the ignorant people.”³⁷

In a letter from October 1870, Robert Hart described the polemic as “very clever, a queer mixture of truth and error... It is evidently the work of a well-read man, and I have no doubt but that the literati have it, and many more like it on their shelves. The opposition to Christianity seems to be mainly owing to stories of what priests do to female converts, etc.”³⁸

The *North China Herald* obtained a copy, reporting to their readers that the pamphlet provided evidence that the anti-foreign agitation and violence was the work of an official conspiracy. “The book was written by a man of high ability, encouraged by a man of high ability, encouraged by the authorities, widely circulated among the educated, and by them communicated to the ignorant. It is a true firebrand of War.”³⁹

François-Ferdinand Tagliabue (1822-1890), the vicar apostolic for Southwestern Zhili, despaired at the prevalence of anti-Christian misinformation. “From all sides appeared hideous pamphlets, full of disgusting things, which they could only make for themselves in the halls of demons. You have to be a pagan to dare to say and even think of such horrors. This is one of the reasons why our Sisters of Tien-Tsin were subjected to incredible and nameless tortures. O paganism, paganism, how horrible you are!”⁴⁰

37. Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 45.

38. Quoted in Hosea Ballou Morse, Eric Teichman, and Great Britain. Foreign Office. Library, *The international relations of the Chinese empire* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, 1910)., p. 235; See also Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 46.

39. Quoted in Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 47.

40. Monsignor Tagliabue to Brother N____ (Paris), March 12, 1871. *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité*. *Annales CM* 1872, p. 162. In the same letter, Tagliabue also expresses his concern about the situation in Paris, and mentions that the last letter he received had been dispatched by Paris via balloon.

With each urgent communication from the foreign representatives in Beijing demanding Prince Gong and his staff to do more to protect the foreign community, the Zongli Yamen in turn pressured Zeng Guofan and the other officials in Tianjin to hurry up and make some arrests. The foreigners were baying for blood. If the Qing government wished to protect the necks of Magistrate Liu, Prefect Zhang, and General Chen, they would need to find suitable suspects in Tianjin to behead in their places.⁴¹

On August 25, Ding Richang reported he had arrived in Tianjin. His initial assessment departed from the more careful and measured approach of his co-investigators, and Ding recommended arresting “at least 40 or 50 people” while simultaneously preparing for war with France.⁴² The court approved Ding’s aggressive proposals and encouraged him to carry out his plans for mass arrests.⁴³ The following day, Zeng Guofan reported that 37 people had been arrested and questioned for their suspected involvement in the June riots.⁴⁴ On September 10, Zeng wrote that local officials and their troops had seized an additional 80 suspects. Zeng then submitted eight names for execution and recommended another 20 for lesser sentences, including terms of exile.⁴⁵

For over a month, the court and the investigators in Tianjin had wrangled over the exact number and severity of sentences it would take to appease the French. Prince Gong felt that

41. Imperial Edict received August 22, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 595.

42. Ding Richang Memorial dated August 26, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 600.

43. Imperial Edict dated August 22, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 601.

44. Zeng Guofan and Mao Changxi memorial received on August 26, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 602.

45. Zeng Guofan memorial to throne received on September 10, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 612.

“only seven or eight” executions would not be enough to end the matter.⁴⁶ Li Hongzhang argued executing more would cause problems in Tianjin.⁴⁷ Ding Richang felt that members of the Christian community and the Church should also bear some responsibility for the riots.⁴⁸ According to Ding, the problem was that while Protestant missionaries and their followers caused few problems, Catholic missionaries were less selective about who they admitted into their churches. This led to all kinds of miscreants and criminals using the Church as a shield for their schemes. Ding also cited the much-lamented problem of missionary meddling in official judicial matters as a primary cause of resentment against the Catholics.⁴⁹

Zeng concurred with the findings of his younger colleague, reiterating his longstanding view that among all the countries, France seemed the most troublesome. “After two months, I will now finish my task. We have investigated the first group of criminals. Since the government began trading with the foreign powers, things have generally been well, but the French missionaries and the Catholic church have repeatedly made trouble. They care only about the number of converts not the quality of the people. As a result, there are many evil people among

46. Prince Gong memorial to the throne received on September 12, 1870. *Qingmo jiaosha'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 614.

47. Li Hongzhang memorial to the throne received on September 15, 1870. *Qingmo jiaosha'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 621.

48. Ding Richang memorial to the throne received on September 18, 1870. *Qingmo jiaosha'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 624.

49. Ding Richang memorial to the throne received on September 18, 1870. *Qingmo jiaosha'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 624; See also Cohen Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 247; Tan Yanping 谭艳萍, "Lun Ding Richang banli Tianjin jia'an 论丁日昌办理天津教案 [On Ding Richang's Management of the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident]," *辽宁大学学报: 哲学社会科学版* *Liaoning daxue xuebao: zhexue shehuixue ban* [Journal of Liaoning University: Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition] 30, no. 6 (2002).

their followers. It is entirely possible that there are [impossible to say that there are not] criminals associated with the church who do use drugs to kidnap people and take their organs.”⁵⁰

Zeng proposed that churches and their followers be placed under the authority of local officials, that churches register their congregants with the relevant authorities, and that missionaries and church leaders allow officials access to ecclesiastical properties for the purposes of supervising religious activities and investigating suspected crimes. His suggestions echoed those Chonghou made to Father Chevrier just prior to the latter’s murder.⁵¹ Similar proposals would later be included as part of a circular prepared by the Zongli Yamen in February 1871 asking representatives of the foreign powers for input on ways to prevent further outbreaks of violence against missionaries and Christians.⁵²

On October 15, the Zongli Yamen finally replied to Rochechouart’s many demands with a long letter that Prince Gong hoped would be the final word on the case. “The massacre of foreigners at Tianjin on [June 21] resulted from the kidnapping of people and the suspicion focused on the Christians. Suspicion became hate and the situation which arose led to a catastrophe... Zeng Guofan, the Governor-General of Zhili, and others, reported that they had

50. Memorial draft in *xiang xiang shi wenjian*, Volume 7, pp. 4502; Final version received by throne on September 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 632; Li Chuanbin, "Shixi Zeng Guofan de jidujiao guan 试析曾国藩的基督教观 [An Analysis of Zeng Guofan’s View of Christianity]."

51. Chonghou memorial to the throne received June 23, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1. Document No. 499. (See Chapter 8)

52. 董丛林 Dong Conglin, "Tianjin jiao'an hou 《chuanjiao zhangcheng batiao》de chouyi yu yaozhe 天津教案后《传教章程八条》的筹议与夭折 [The preparation and demise of the “Eight Articles for Missionary Regulations” following the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Incident],” *社会科学辑刊/shehui kexue jikan* [Social Science Journal], no. 5 (2018).

completed an inquiry into the circumstances of the incident. They have declared unequivocally that the alleged removal of eyes and hearts was untrue and never took place.”⁵³

Prince Gong informed Rochechouart that the two officials, Zhang Guangzao and Liu Jie were not to be executed but “as the Prefect and Magistrate in Tianjin were unable to prevent the disturbance between the people and the Christians and did not immediately arrest the perpetrators...Zeng Guofan and others began proceedings against the officials and they were remanded to the Board of Punishments which submitted to the throne the recommendation that for not being able to suppress disorders, the two officials would be cashiered and, due to the severity of the incident, have also been sentenced to exile and compulsory labor in Heilongjiang.”⁵⁴

Prince Gong then turned his attention to the alleged perpetrators. “The people of Tianjin were stirred by fear and anger, ignored local officials’ attempts to maintain order, and then boldly murdered more than twenty people, including the nuns at the Rencitang. Zeng Guofan and others have condemned the individuals who were arrested and implicated in this incident and the punishment is in accordance with the severity of the case. ‘Feng the Lame’ and fifteen other

53. Prince Gong to Count Rochechouart, October 15, 1870. *Qingmo jiaozhan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 660, Enclosure 1. A French translation and an alternate English rendering can be found in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document 169, Enclosure 2. A complete list of all the sentenced individuals (in French translation) appears in Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., pp. 383–384; See also Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document 169, Enclosure 3; A partial list is included as an enclosure in Zeng Guofan’s memorial to the throne received on October 8, 1870. See *Archives of the Junjichu*. National Palace Museum. Document No. 103068.

54. In August, the government had ordered the two unfortunate officials to remain in Tianjin for continued interrogation by Ding Richang and Zeng Guofan. Following Liu and Zhang’s brief time as fugitives in August, the court wanted to be sure the two men were firmly in custody. On September 27, the case files for Zhang Guangzao and Liu Jie were transferred to Beijing and the two officials were ordered to present themselves at the Ministry of Punishments for further action. Imperial Edict dated August 28, 1870. *Qingmo jiaozhan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 606.

criminals are sentenced to death. ‘Wang the Awl’ and twenty-one other individuals are sentenced to exile on the frontier.”⁵⁵

Finally, Prince Gong rejected Rochechouart’s demand that General Chen Guorui, widely believed by the foreign community to have been the mastermind of the riots, be executed.

“General Chen Guorui was present in Tianjin purely by chance, on a voyage of convalescence. He was not involved in the incident in any way. There is nothing more to say on that matter.”⁵⁶

For all Rochechouart’s bluster and threats, the position of the Qing officials involved in the case remained consistent. Liu Jie and Zhang Guangzao were incompetent, not culpable. The two would be punished, but their lives spared. Chen Guorui escaped judgement entirely. Justice in the case would mean a set number of capital sentences that would match, body-for-body, the number of foreign nationals killed in the massacre, no more and no less. From the perspective of the Zongli Yamen, all that was left was haggling over the exact amount of compensation for each of the dead foreigners and the value of the destroyed property.

In the final accounting, Consul Fontanier was worth 30,000 ounces of silver and Simon was valued at 20,000. M. and Madame Thomassin were valued at 15,000 ounces of silver a piece. These amounts were correspondingly higher than for the other victims due to their official status as members of the legation or consular staff. The merchant Chalmaison and his wife were valued together at 20,000.⁵⁷

55. Prince Gong to Count Rochechouart, October 15, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 660, Enclosure 1. A French translation and an alternate English rendering can be found in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document 169, Enclosure 2.

56. Prince Gong to Count Rochechouart, October 15, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao 'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document 660, Enclosure 1. A French translation and an alternate English rendering can be found in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document 169, Enclosure 2.

57. Prince Gong to Count Rochechouart, October 18, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short.,

The Church received 130,000 ounces as reparations for the deaths of Father Chevrier and the 10 nuns and compensation for the destruction of property. At first, the Lazarist mission was inclined to refuse. Bishop Delaplace, replying on behalf of the Lazarists, notified Count Rochechouart that it was hard to imagine any amount of money washing away the blood spilled in Tianjin, but that Delaplace would take the matter up with his superiors when he traveled to Rome in the autumn.

On January 3, 1871, after consultations at the Vatican, Delaplace sent a letter to Rochechouart declining the offered compensation and closing with a bloody prophecy: “We fear, thank God, neither poverty nor suffering for ourselves. As for our works, our conviction is this: Either France will take the Tien-Tsin affair to heart, or it will leave it there. If France speaks and acts as we have the right to expect from her, then we will not lack the works and the resources. If France is silent, then our blood will not be long in mingling with the blood of the victims of June. In either case, we do not need to go and collect a terrible amount of money from the corpses of our Missionaries and our Daughters of Charity.”⁵⁸

Unfortunately for Delaplace and his principles, Ange-Michel Aymeri, the venerable procurer for the Lazarist mission in China, had already accepted the 130,000 ounces of silver on behalf of the Church. Aymeri refused to return the compensation without a specific order from the head of their order, Jean-Baptiste Étienne. Étienne apparently agreed with Aymeri, and the Church kept the money.⁵⁹

Document 169, Enclosure 4. A summary of Prince Gong’s plan for compensation can be found in a memorial submitted by Prince Gong and Li Hongzhang on behalf of the Zongli Yamen and received on October 22, 1870. *Qingmo jiaao’an* 清末教案 [*Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing*], Volume 1., Document 658.

58. Louis-Gabriel Delaplace to Julien Rochechouart, (January 3, 1871). *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1872., pp. 214.

59. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 389.

In Tianjin, plans proceeded for the October executions of the men accused of taking part in the killings of the foreigners. In his capacity as acting French consul in Tianjin, William Lay was tasked with negotiating with Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan, both of whom were concerned about public beheadings inspiring more violence.

The new prefect for Tianjin approached Alexander Frater (1840-1893), an assistant interpreter attached to the British Legation in Beijing, to inquire whether the foreign powers would have an objection to the executions taking place “at a distance” from Tianjin. “The heads might be brought back here,” the prefect assured Frater, but at the same time “all excitement among the people thus prevented.” Frater replied that he was in no position to make such a judgment, but that, as a private individual, he believed that “if the executions were not to take place in Tientsin, they might as well not take place at all.”⁶⁰ Frater’s superior in Beijing, Thomas Wade, concurred. Wade wrote to Lay approvingly of Frater’s reply to the prefect. “It is very important,” Wade added, “that the executions take place in Tien-tsin.”⁶¹

Thomas Adkins, still in Tianjin to assist Lay, met with Li Hongzhang in early October as the prisoners were being interrogated. Li asked him what the foreign representatives might consider a fair and appropriate settlement of the case. Adkins replied that “no arrangement could be satisfactory which did not carry with it a guarantee against such occurrences for the future.”⁶²

There was a point to be made, and it had to be made publicly, but Wade, Lay, and Adkins failed to consider that the condemned men might have a point of their own and also possessed

60. Conversation reported by William Lay to Thomas Wade, October 13, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 146, Enclosure 1.

61. Thomas Wade to William Lay, October 15, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 146, Enclosure 2.

62. Memorandum of Interview between Consul Adkins and Li Hung-chang, Governor-General of Chih-Li, October 2, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 101, Enclosure.

the means to make it. Local officials were well aware of who their prisoners were. Based on descriptions of the men as they were being led to the execution grounds, almost all of those sentenced appear to have come from the *hunhunr* lodges. Condemned to death or not, the *hunhunr* had a flair for theatrics and the support of most of the city's residents. No official wished to be seen attending a highly visible martyrdom under the watchful eye—if not tacit supervision—of the hated foreigners.

Tianjin officials eventually conceded the location of the executions, but insisted that they take place before daybreak to avoid too many spectators and possible troublemakers from attending. They also requested that French and British representatives be carried to the execution ground under cover of darkness in small unobtrusive chairs and accompanied by a large guard of 50 men from the local yamen. William Lay rejected these arrangements.

“I objected,” Lay reported to his superior Thomas Wade, “to these two officers proceeding in the undignified mode desired by [the Prefect] and told him that I should not send anyone to an execution that was to take place in the dark. He still maintained the necessity of putting the criminals to death at the time named; and, after some discussion, during which the Prefect gave me unmistakable proof of excitement having shown itself to a large extent among the people for the last three or four days on account of the intended fate of these men.”⁶³

An exasperated Zeng Guofan notified the Zongli Yamen that negotiations with Lay, and by proxy Rochechouart, were not going well. Moreover, Zeng warned, “The morale of the people has been severely damaged; for all these reasons we must be extremely cautious.”⁶⁴ From

63. William Lay to Thomas Wade, October 19, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 170, Enclosure.

64. Zeng Guofan memorial to the Throne, received October 17, 1870. QMJA *Qingmo jia'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 645.

the perspective of Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, it must have seemed that the foreign representatives were incapable of learning from past mistakes. Extravagant displays flaunting foreign power and privilege had been one of the proximate causes of the riot in Tianjin. Now, these same foreigners were forcing them to organize this grotesque and macabre pageant. The potential for violence was very real.

Lay held firm on his demands, and when they were not met, he refused to send any foreign representatives to attend the beheadings. Although Lay does not specifically mention this, it is possible that he also had concerns about the safety of foreign witnesses at the execution. Instead, at Lay's request, the British Legation in Beijing sent one of its Chinese staff to Tianjin as a witness and to bring back the signed death certificates so that British representatives could confirm the identities of the executed. On October 19, using a copy of Alexander Frater's official card, the employee entered the magistrate's yamen in Tianjin and followed the procession from the jail to the execution grounds. He reported back to Lay that over 200 police and soldiers were assigned to escort the 16 men from their cells to the magistrate's courtroom. The messenger also gave a detailed description of the men's demeanor and attire.

"None of the [the accused] would kneel to be bound when ordered to do so. They were all dressed in what is everywhere stated to be a Government present, viz., new silk clothes and wore on their feet shoes of elegant manufacture. Their hair was dressed after the female fashion in various modes, ornaments such as those seen on the heads of Chinese ladies were stuck in their head-dresses. While in the courtroom, one of them vociferated abuse of the Hsie-tai, who had probably caused his arrest to be made. On the way to the execution-ground, the criminals bawled out to the crowd, which even at the early time of the morning had collected, 'Have we changed countenance?' and were immediately answered that they had not. They also accused the Chinese

authorities of selling their heads to the foreigners, and called out to the people to honour them by the name of ‘brave boys,’ which was done by the united voices of the crowd. A large number of personal friends and relatives of the condemned followed them along, giving vent to tears and lamentations. On the arrival of the procession at the execution-ground, outside the west gate, the criminals commenced singing, on hearing which, the Tien-tsin Hsien [Magistrate], gave the order for their decapitation. The criminals stretched out their necks to receive the blow, and the executioners, all of whom were southern soldiers, soon finished the proceedings. This occurred at about 5:30 A.M.”⁶⁵

Only one of the criminals arrested or sentenced in the investigation was specifically identified in official records as having been a member of a hunhunr lodge. 57-year-old Wang “Little Bodkin” Wu was convicted of stealing clothing and other items from the orphanage and sentenced to 100 strokes of the cane and exile of 3,000 li from Tianjin, and the notation for his case reads that Wang “was a leader of a famous *hunxingzi* gang.”⁶⁶ However, the description of the executions given by the legation employee strongly suggests that Wang was not the only self-identified *hunhunr* who was convicted. The swaggering boasts and singing in the face of danger, the cries of “brave boys,” and the decorative flowers in the hair were all well-known trademarks of Tianjin *hunhunr*.⁶⁷

65. William Lay to Thomas Wade, October 19, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 170, Enclosure. Note: First light in Tianjin in October is generally around 6:00 am with the official time for sunrise about 30 minutes after.

66. Li Hongzhang Memorial to the throne, received January 3, 1871. *Qingmo jia'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 667, Enclosure.; Hongzhang Liang Zonglin 廖宗麟, "Tianjin jiao'an zhong de Li Hongzhang 天津教案中的李鸿章 [Li Hongzhang and the Tianjin Anti-Missionary Case]," *天津社会科学 Tianjin shehui kexue* 5 (1985).

67. Li Ranxi 李然犀, "Jiu Tianjin de hunhunr 舊天津的混混兒 [The Hunhunr of old Tianjin]."; Also see Chapter 1 for a description of “typical” *hunhunr* at this time.

In Tianjin, there were rumors of a possible mass public funeral and an arch and shrine to commemorate the men who had been executed, news which greatly alarmed the foreign community. Li Hongzhang and other officials in Tianjin quickly suppressed the efforts to memorialize the men, but it was a reminder to both the foreign representatives in China and the Qing government about how the resolution of the case was being perceived by the people.⁶⁸ If the goal was to cow Tianjin residents with public decapitations, then it seems to have backfired, just as Li Hongzhang and Zeng Guofan had warned it would.

The second round of executions, for the four men accused of murdering Mr. and Mrs. Protopopoff and their friend Basoff, was scheduled a few days later, but the Russian minister asked the investigators for additional interrogations of the condemned men in the hope that they might eventually implicate additional suspects or ringleaders.⁶⁹ Li Hongzhang used the delay to convince the Russian Legation to spare the lives of the four men in exchange for an additional cash settlement.

Frederick Low, the United States Minister to China, expressed the feelings of the foreign representatives regarding the executions and Prince Gong's closure of the case.⁷⁰ "A careful review of all that has transpired in connection with this affair—the timidity and vacillation of the officials; the delay and uncertainty attending the arrest and trial of the offenders; the fear of trouble and riotous proceedings at their execution; the extreme caution exercised in the preparation for and the secrecy of the execution—illustrates most painfully the weakness of the government when called upon to perform a duty in opposition to public opinion, and enables

68. See the report by Frederick Low to Hamilton Fish, December 27, 1870.

69. Frederick Low to Hamilton Fish, October 25, 1870. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1871., Document No. 33, Enclosure 20.

70. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1871., Document No. 23, Enclosure 45.

somewhat of a just estimate to be made of the embarrassments which surround the prince and his associates in their dealings with foreign nations.”⁷¹

On October 22, 1870, Count Rochechouart sent a rather unusual memorandum to all of the French consuls stationed in China. The final summation of the case from Prince Gong had done little to satisfy the demands of Rochechouart’s August ultimatum. The ongoing war with Prussia had defanged the truculent minister, and the other foreign powers had offered only moral support while snubbing France’s requests for a more robust collective response to the Qing government’s unwillingness to impose harsher punishments. Smarting from his forced retreat, Rochechouart felt compelled to “clarify some inaccuracies that had crept into public opinion.”⁷²

In the memorandum, Rochechouart denied that his fixation on General Chen Guorui was personal or related to any history between the two men. “I had never heard the name of Tch’en Kuo-jouei pronounced before the events at Tientsin...and this character had never been involved in any of the matters I had to deal with.”⁷³ Rochechouart also walked back his August ultimatum, suggesting that while he had “demanded such and such conditions to be satisfied” and had been insistent on several points, these demands were never formulated “*sine qui non*.”⁷⁴ Finally, Rochechouart wanted to be clear that, despite appearances, the “most perfect agreement has never ceased to reign between the different chiefs of missions residing in Beijing,” especially owing to the “somewhat cosmopolitan nationality of the Sisters of Charity.”⁷⁵

71. Frederick Low to Hamilton Fish, October 25, 1870. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1871., Document No. 33, Enclosure 20.

72. Circulaire de M. de Rochechouart aux consuls de France en Chine, October 22, 1870. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 386.

73. Circulaire de M. de Rochechouart aux consuls de France en Chine, October 22, 1870. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 386.

74. Circulaire de M. de Rochechouart aux consuls de France en Chine, October 22, 1870. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 386.

75. Circulaire de M. de Rochechouart aux consuls de France en Chine, October 22, 1870. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 386.

In the aftermath of the massacre, the Qing government knew it would have to make a grand gesture, something unprecedented, to make amends for the deaths in Tianjin. Prince Gong had been clear from the beginning that nothing less than a personal apology delivered to the Emperor of France would suffice. The Zongli Yamen just had to find the right person. The envoy needed to be an official of high rank, experienced dealing with the foreigners, and yet be totally expendable to the Qing court. Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen had the perfect candidate: The hapless soon-to-be former Imperial Commissioner of Trade for the Three Northern Ports: Chonghou.⁷⁶

76. Prince Gong memorial to the throne recommending Chonghou be sent to France on a mission of apology, dated June 28, 1870. *Qingmo jiaozhan* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., No. 511.

Chapter 12: The Envoy and the Epilogue

On February 19, 1871, Chonghou celebrated a most unusual Chinese New Year. In the early morning hours, he led a small group of Qing officials in a solemn ceremony that involved kneeling three times and bowing nine times in the general direction of an adolescent emperor over 5,000 miles away. Afterward, there was food and a strange wine made of grapes but little cheer. Chonghou was in the French city of Bordeaux, restlessly anticipating word about whether he would finally be allowed to travel to Paris, complete his mission of apology to the French government—or whoever was now claiming to rule France—and so be able to return to the comforts of China.¹ Chonghou was not much of a traveler. Long journeys unsettled him, and his interest in decoding France's unfamiliar sights and sounds was wearing as thin as his patience.²

Chonghou was one of the first Qing Dynasty envoys to travel in an official capacity to a Western country and his mission would last over a year.³ During this time, Chonghou saw New York, attended the South Kensington Exposition in England, and witnessed the events of the 1871 Paris Commune.⁴ He was accompanied by a delegation that included John Meadows, Chonghou's appointee to run the Tianjin Machine Bureau, and two Frenchmen, Novion and Imbert, who were on loan from the Imperial Maritimes Custom Service. In addition to his

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1. Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传* [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893], p. 176.
 2. In 1879, Chonghou's discomfort with travel would undermine efforts to negotiate a treaty with Russian negotiators at the Crimean city of Livadia. Eager to return to China, Chonghou agreed to broad concessions despite a strong negotiating position. The resulting treaty was considered so one-sided that the court ordered Chonghou's execution on grounds of treason and gross incompetence. His life was spared only after an intercession by representatives from the foreign powers based in Beijing. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*, p. 134.
 3. A brief summary of Chonghou's mission to France can be found in his biographical entry in Arthur W. Hummel and Pamela K. Crossley, *Eminent Chinese of the Qing Period: 1644-1911*, vol. Volume 2 (Berkshire Publishing Group, 2018), pp. 72–73. A more detailed account is given by Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传* [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893], pp. 167–190. See also Knight Biggerstaff, "The Ch'ung Hou Mission to France, 1870-1871," *Nankai Social and Economic Quarterly* 8, no. 3 (October, 1935).
 4. Hummel and Crossley, *Eminent Chinese of the Qing Period: 1644-1911*, Volume 2., p. 72.

foreign aides, the court also sent a dozen lower-ranking officials to travel with Chonghou to Europe. The size of the delegation was necessary to demonstrate its importance and impress their French hosts, but the added staff also meant additional costs. When Chonghou returned to Beijing in 1872, one of the first things he did was inquire at the Zongli Yamen about being reimbursed for his expenses, especially because the mission lasted much longer than Chonghou could have possibly anticipated when he departed from Shanghai on October 28, 1870.

One of Chonghou's companions in France was the young diplomat and translator Zhang Deyi (1847–1918). Zhang was only 23 years old but was already a veteran of two earlier international trips, including participating in the Burlingame Mission of 1868. Zhang had been born in Beijing to an official family on the decline. He was one of the first young men selected to attend the Tongwenguan, and he had spent several years studying foreign languages before embarking on his first overseas tour in 1866. Zhang would later become one of the most famous and widely-read diarists and travel writers of the late Qing Dynasty, and much of what we know about the Chonghou Mission of 1870–1872 comes from Zhang Deyi's memoir of the trip.⁵

The decision to send a mission to France, and have Chonghou lead the delegation, was made less than a week after the riots.⁶ On June 29, 1870, Prince Gong sent a letter to Count Rochechouart informing Rochechouart of Chonghou's mission: "The Chinese Government has

5. Tang Renze's biography of Chonghou makes heavy use of Zhang Deyi's memoir in his chapter on the French mission. Much of the following is based on the account found in Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传* [*The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893*]; Zhang Deyi 张德彝, *Suishi faguo ji 随使法国记* [*Envoy to France*], ed. Zuo Buqing (Changsha: 湖南人民出版社 Hunan renmin chubanshe [Hunan People's Publishing House], 1982).

6. *Qingmo jiaao'an 清末教案* [*Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing*], Volume 1., Document No. 503. Chonghou was also officially under investigation for his role in the riots. This was in response to Chonghou's earlier memorial (dated June 25) in which he admitted that he and the other officials in Tianjin had not properly handled the situation and requested that he and the other officials be sent to the Board of Punishments for trial. Although he never was in the same legal jeopardy as Liu Jie or Zhang Guangzao. *Qingmo jiaao'an 清末教案* [*Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing*], Volume 1., Document No. 501.

felt much apprehension lest its friendly relations with France should be disturbed. It is for this reason that His Majesty has issued the Decree specially appointing the Minister-Superintendent of the Three Ports, Ch'ung Hou, a Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent, wearing the insignia of the first grade, and a two-eyed peacock's feather, a Lieutenant-General of the Han-chün Division of the Bordered Red Banner, and one of the Vice-Presidents of the Board of War, will proceed with instructions to France.”⁷ Prince Gong no doubt felt a recitation of Chonghou's various titles would reassure the French government that the Qing representative was of sufficient rank.⁸

A few weeks later, Chonghou received Thomas Adkins, the British consul at Yingkou but temporarily posted to Tianjin. Perhaps trying to put a brave face on a difficult situation, Chonghou told Adkins that he had long been eager to visit Europe and that he received the emperor's decree ordering him to France with pleasure. Chonghou also said he was hoping to meet with Thomas Wade and the other foreign ministers to learn more about etiquette at the court of France. Chonghou thought this a very important point, telling Adkins that protocol mattered a great deal in China.⁹

Plans for Chonghou's unprecedented apology tour were met with skepticism from some members of the international community. “By the [ship] *Manchu* we have the unexpected news that Chung-How has been ordered to Paris,” wrote the editors of the *Shanghai Evening Courier* on July 4, 1870. “The object of this shifting the venue is of course plain enough. Encouraged by the success of the Burlingame Mission in hoodwinking the European governments, the Peking

7. Prince Gong to Count Rochechouart, June 29, 1870. Recorded and translated in Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short. Document No. 36, Enclosure 2.

8. *Qingmo jiaao'an* 清末教案 [Anti-Missionary Cases of the Late Qing], Volume 1., Document No. 509.

9. Memorandum of Thomas Adkin's Visit to Tientsin with Mr. Fraser, July 15, 1870. Papers Relating to the Massacre of Europeans at Tien-Tsin, 21st June, 1870 (Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty), Short., Document No. 32, Enclosure 4.

authorities probably believe that everything disagreeable may be avoided by simply ‘explaining matters’ to the French Emperor and begging him to consider the ‘difficulties’ of China. But on this occasion the impudence of the Peking government has probably over-reached itself. The idea of sending the man who is charged with the blackest outrage on the French nation and on humanity that has ever been committed in China, as Ambassador to the power that has been so insulted, shows how little the mandarins have yet learned of international decency. The Emperor of China will not condescend to receive the minister of France, but the Emperor of the French is expected to receive one whom we must regard as at least responsible for the murder of French subjects!”¹⁰

Chonghou’s reputation among his fellow officials was not much better than it was with the Shanghai foreign language press. As Chonghou was preparing to depart for France, Mao Changxi submitted a memorial to the throne gently suggesting the riot had demonstrated that the responsibilities of the Imperial Commissioner of Trade for the Three Northern Ports might have been too much for any one person to handle.¹¹ Mao may have had a point. Chonghou had been responsible for supervising trade and commerce, managing new manufacturing enterprises, foreign affairs, and coastal defense for ports in three different provinces.¹² It was a broad mandate for any position. Chonghou brought to the job his personal prestige and his relationships

10. *Shanghai Evening Courier*, July 4, 1870. In a handwritten file on the Tianjin Massacre at the foreign ministry archives in Nantes, there is a notation which suggests that Baron Méritens of the Imperial Maritimes Customs Service was one of those who felt the issue of reciprocity and Chonghou’s involvement in the events leading up to the riots were sufficient reason to reject Chonghou’s embassy. “It is finally in his letter of January 4th accompanying his report that monsieur de Méritens concludes that it would be unworthy to accept as ambassador a man such as Zchongheou and... to send him back to the government which has the audacity to accredit him in France.” Dossier Mission au Tcheli, 1871–1883, Article 414, Series A, Peking Fonds Centre des Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (CADN), Nantes, France.

11. Mao Changxi, Memorial to the Throne. TZ 09.09.16 (October 10, 1870). Archives of the *Junjichu*. National Palace Museum. Document No. 103088.

12. Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传 [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893]*, p. 165.

with members of the inner court to Tianjin, but invitations to watch opera with the Dowager Empresses mattered little in the middle of a violent riot.¹³ Mao Changxi proposed merging the position of Imperial Commissioner for the Three Northern Ports with the governor-general's office and establishing Tianjin as an alternate capital during the summer months when the main channel to the sea was free of ice. On November 12, Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen gave their endorsement, and the court issued an edict formally merging the two positions and asking Li Hongzhang, the expectant governor-general of Zhili, to take the necessary steps to ensure an orderly transition of roles and responsibilities.¹⁴

Chonghou arrived at the port of Marseilles on January 25, 1871, only to find France turned upside down. On September 2, 1870, Napoleon III and over 85,000 of his troops were captured at the Battle of Sedan. Less than three weeks later, Prussian forces surrounded Paris in a siege that would last until the end of January 1871. Unable to immediately travel to the besieged French capital, Chonghou and his delegation diverted to Bordeaux, which was serving as the seat of the Provisional Government of National Defense. The French National Assembly and General Louis-Jules Trochu (1851–1896) had relocated to the Aquitaine following the surrender of Napoleon III, making Bordeaux the nominal capital even as the war effort was being managed

13. Morse Morse, *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, Volume 2., p. 252.

14. Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传* [*The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893*], p. 165. See Chapter 11. Li Hongzhang would remain in the post for nearly a quarter-century and while Baoding remained the official provincial capital, Li would make Tianjin the main administrative center for Zhili and Northern China. Li replaced his mentor Zeng Guofan as the most important official in the empire and become an important leader sponsoring projects to modernize and expand China's military and industrial capacity. Li would use his personal leadership abilities and the authority given to him in the 1870 merger of administrative positions to build a power base in Tianjin unlike anything Chonghou could have imagined. Li supervised the establishment of officer academies, factories, coal mines, and commercial enterprises. He also became the unofficial Foreign Minister for the Qing court, negotiating treaties with Britain, France, and Japan. Even after he retired, Li was recalled to service to help manage the fallout from the Boxer War of 1900. Li developed his "Huai Army," the men who had fought with him against the Taiping and Nian, into a modern fighting force that later became the core of the Beiyang Army under Yuan Shikai, Li's protégé and successor. Having command of the largest and best-trained force in Northern China added to Li's power and influence at court.

from Tours, where Interior Minister Leon Gambetta (1838–1882) had established his headquarters following his dramatic hot air balloon escape over enemy siege lines.¹⁵ Nobody in the French government had much time for a Chinese diplomatic mission. Chonghou and his delegation were made as comfortable as possible, and told to wait.

After several weeks of waiting, however, Chonghou began to grow restless. The Siege of Paris ended in January, and as the Chinese calendar began a new year, Chonghou decided he must act. After all, stalling a foreign delegation and making its representatives wait interminably in a city other than the capital was a diplomatic maneuver with which Qing officials like Chonghou were well acquainted, albeit from the other side.

On March 15, 1871, Chonghou asked Zhang Deyi and Gabriel Devéria, whom Chonghou knew well from the French diplomat's time serving in Tianjin, to travel to Paris to look for suitable temporary lodgings in the capital. They took the train from Bordeaux to Paris (a ride that Zhang Deyi described as "awe-inspiring and blood-chilling") only to arrive amidst more upheaval in the French capital with the start of the Paris Commune. Zhang Deyi wrote in his journal that "most hotels remained closed and those that are open were wary of renting rooms for fear of boarding 'red heads' [Communitarians].¹⁶ Reporting back to Chonghou, Zhang Deyi and Devéria advised moving to Versailles instead.

15. Two classic accounts of the conflict are Franco Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German invasion of France, 1870-1871* (London: Routledge, 1988); Geoffrey Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

16. Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传 [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893]*, p. 177; Deyi Zhang Deyi 張德彝, *Suishi faguo ji 随使法国记 [Envoy to France]*, pp. 384–385. Zhong Shuhe 钟叔河, "Bali gongshe muji ji gao ben de faxian——jieshao Zhang Deyi de 《sui shi faguo ji (san shu qi)》 巴黎公社目击记稿本的发现——介绍张德彝的《随使法国记(三述奇)》 [A Witness to the Paris Commune — the Introduction of Zhang Deyi's The Envoy of France]," *历史教学 lishi jiaoxue* 6 (1982).

For the next seven months, Chonghou continued his frustrating efforts to identify a French government official of sufficiently high rank who was willing to meet the delegation. At the French Foreign Ministry, the task of dealing with Chonghou was passed around the staff until responsibility finally fell to Louis de Geofroy, a 49-year-old career diplomat who would later serve as France's minister to China and Japan.

France's political situation was not the only reason for delaying Chonghou's mission. Even as Chonghou was sailing to Europe, Rochechouart had informed the French Foreign Ministry that negotiations for settlement of the Tianjin case remained deadlocked—primarily over the issue of capital punishment for Magistrate Liu, Prefect Zhang, and General Chen. Geofroy and others in the ministry assumed that part of Chonghou's brief was to bypass the tangle back in China and settle the matter directly with the French government. Chonghou had not been given any authority to do so and was reluctant to get drawn into negotiations without further instructions from Beijing.

The status of Chonghou's diplomatic credentials remained another issue. This was a touchy subject. Despite the 1858 Treaty of Tianjin and the 1860 Beijing Convention, the position of the foreign representatives in Beijing was unclear, and there were issues of reciprocity and fairness to consider. None of the French ministers in China had been granted an audience with the emperor, and French Foreign Ministry officials felt that Chonghou being granted plenipotentiary status and having a direct meeting with the French head of state—once a head of state could be found—should set a diplomatic precedent. Chonghou was aware of the Tongzhi Emperor's rapid maturation from protected minor to full sovereign and the looming question of an imperial audience for the foreign diplomats. Risk-averse in the extreme, Chonghou was careful not to agree to anything that might get him in trouble with the Zongli Yamen or the court.

Anxious and exhausted, Chonghou wrote to Prince Gong and the Zongli Yamen begging to be allowed to return to China. His appeal was denied, and the hapless Manchu courtier waited to meet with somebody—at this point, anybody—who would be willing to accept his apology and end his exile.¹⁷

While Chonghou remained in France, Prince Gong and Wenxiang (1818-1896) of the Zongli Yamen were considering proactive measures to end the escalating cycle of missionary conflict that had culminated in the violence at Tianjin. On February 9, 1871, the Zongli Yamen sent to all of the foreign legations in Beijing a circular letter containing eight proposals for regulating missionary activities and managing conflicts between Christians and non-Christians.¹⁸ The timing of the circular may have reflected a belief among the staff of the Zongli Yamen that setbacks in the war with Prussia would make France and its missionaries more willing to listen to reason.¹⁹

“For the past ten years, while the Prince and his associates have been charged with managing foreign affairs, this subject has been the cause of great anxiety. Those fears were realized with the shocking outburst in Tianjin last summer. The guilty officials have been punished, the murderers have been executed, and an indemnity paid to the victims’ families. These actions have justly brought the case to a close but have by no means dispelled the anxieties which still fill our minds lest the people and the Catholics again come into conflict. If the situation at Tianjin becomes a precedent for the future, then greater difficulties will be

17. Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传* [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893]. p. 178.

18. Original text of the circular, YWSM Du, YWSM., TZ: 82:14–25b. For a translation see Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 416.

19. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 416. For a detailed analysis of the 1871 circular, see Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870*. pp. 250–252. An earlier proposal had been rejected by French Charge d’affaires Henry Bellonet in January 1866 after infuriated French missionaries accused the Zongli Yamen of forging the seal of a Lazarist bishop to lend credibility to their communication. See Chapter 6.

experienced in repressing such uprisings, and every successive quarrel will be more vexing and savage than the last. Given the present situation, we must ask: How can the two parties be brought together to live in peace?”²⁰

The eight recommendations targeted the most significant sources of antagonism between missionaries and the Chinese people. In Article 1, Prince Gong and Wenxiang proposed abolishing missionary orphanages or, at the very least, restricting orphanages to foster only Christian children and requiring staff to report the identities, intake dates, and release dates for all orphans. Article 2 mandated that Chinese women would be barred entry to all Christian churches, and at the same time prohibited female missionaries from working in China. Articles 3 and 4 urged missionaries to respect local laws and officials and to not intervene in legal cases. These articles reaffirmed that Chinese Christians were Chinese subjects first and foremost, and they should not use missionaries as a shield to evade taxes or avoid punishment for crimes. Missionaries who continued to interfere in legal matters would be deported. Article 4 also warned against missionaries using their privileges to extort money from local officials by falsely claiming reparations on behalf of Christians. Article 5 proposed limiting the validity of missionary passports by specifying the province or district where a missionary was allowed to travel. Missionaries found in an area not listed on their travel documents would be deported. Article 6 reminded missionaries to accept only law-abiding “good” people into their flocks. Members of their congregations should be registered with local *baojia* (mutual surveillance) organizations, following a precedent in China that applied to individuals entering Buddhist monasteries, nunneries, or other local religious institutions. Missionaries would be required to

20. Du, *YWSM.*, TZ: 82:14–25b. Sections of this translation are based on the English-language version sent by Frederick Low to U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, March 20, 1871. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1871.* pp. 97–98.

submit monthly reports on church membership to the authorities, and local officials would be allowed to inspect and supervise churches to verify compliance. Article 7 prohibited missionaries from submitting official communications (zhaohui 照会), although they would still be allowed to petition (bing 禀) local authorities. Finally, Article 8 dealt with the inflammatory issue of church-building. The Zongli Yamen had long had problems with the terms of the Beijing Convention, particularly the altered text in the Chinese draft which missionaries believed gave them the right to demand any building or property for mission purposes so long as they could claim it had been “confiscated.”²¹ Article 8 of the Zongli Yamen circular required parties to submit property return requests to local authorities who would then investigate the veracity of the claim while also taking into consideration local opposition to the application as well as geomantic implications of any new construction.²²

Prince Gong and Wenxiang also included recent incidents to provide examples of cases in which following a particular proposal could have prevented or minimized conflict. For example, the first proposal, on banning or regulating orphanages, cited the policies of the Rencitang in Tianjin, policies which the Zongli Yamen believed had been among the primary causes of the June riot. The circular clearly addressed most of the main issues that had previously led to conflict and anti-missionary violence. However, the proposals put the burden for avoiding conflict squarely on the missionaries, and would have required missionaries to concede much of their autonomy while giving local officials a broad mandate to oversee and even intervene in the

21. For more information about this clause and the dual language inserted into the Beijing Convention of 1860, see Chapter 3.

22. Tiedemann, *Handbook of Christianity in China, Volume 2: 1800-Present.*, pp. 314–315; Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.* pp. 254–255; Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., pp. 416–420; *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1871*, pp. 99–104. Original text: YWSM Du, YWSM., TZ: 82:14–25b

affairs of churches and other mission activities. Some of the proposals – for example the banning of women from churches or prohibiting women from serving as missionaries in China – were unthinkable, even objectionable, to most missionaries, and the circular met with significant and strident opposition from missionary organizations and representatives of the foreign powers.

One of the first legations to respond was the United States. In a letter to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, Frederick Low commented, “I do not believe, and therefore I cannot affirm, that all the complaints made against the Catholic missionaries are founded in truth, reason, or justice; at the same time, I believe there is foundation for some of their charges... But while I see clearly the difficulties and dangers, candor compels me to say that the remedy seems to lie outside and beyond the scope of affirmative diplomatic action. Neither will sound policy, nor the moral and religious sentiments of Christian nations, sanction by any retrogression, although trade and commerce might be promoted thereby; nor will the dictates of humanity permit the renunciation of the right for all foreigners that they shall be governed and punished by their own laws.”²³

The British were equally dismissive. Prince Gong and Wenxiang had consulted with Thomas Wade during their preparation of the circular and asked for his comments on an earlier draft. Before Wade was able to respond with his notes, the Zongli Yamen released the circular to the other legations. In a letter to Earl Granville, Wade expressed dismay at the proposals and his pique, writing that his opposition to the circular was due “in no small part to the discouragement I have felt at discovering, in this instance, as so frequently before, that my advice, even when asked for, has little chance of being attended to.”²⁴

23. Frederick Low to U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, March 20, 1871. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, December 4, 1871*, pp. 97–98. For additional details on the United States response to the events in Tianjin, see Frederick Paul Hibbert Clyde, “Frederick F. Low and the Tientsin Massacre,” *Pacific Historical Review* 2, no. 1 (1933).

24. Parliamentary Papers, China. No. 1. Correspondence Respecting the Circular of the Chinese Government of February 9, 1871. (London, 1872), pp. 14–18 and Cohen Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, p. 343, Note 50.

The response of missionaries to the Zongli Yamen proposals was, predictably, outrage. Both Protestant and Catholic missionaries felt that the tone of the proposals perpetuated what they believed to be slander and misinformation regarding mission work in China. “The Chinese government has just sent each of the Legations a memorandum in which it proposes articles which tend to do nothing less than to ignite an outrageous persecution against Christianity and to destroy it,” wrote a Lazarist based in Northern China. “They are especially angry with the Holy Childhood, because she sends to Heaven a crowd of little angels to sow roses near the Throne of the Lamb.”²⁵

The most scathing criticism of the proposals came in a pamphlet published by André-Félix-Chysostome-Joseph Gennevoise, a former missionary with the Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris. Gennevoise claimed the proposals were nothing short of an effort by the government to impose tyrannical control over Christians in China. He rejected the Zongli Yamen’s insinuations of secrecy and legal meddling, arguing passionately for the “religious liberty” of missionaries and their congregations. The Zongli Yamen’s proposals, Gennevoise concluded, were simply the latest in a long line of calumnies targeting Christians with the long-term goal of reimposing a legal prohibition on Christianity and the expulsion of the missionaries.²⁶

The French government waited nearly six months to send its reply to the Zongli Yamen’s circular. On November 14, 1871, Rochechouart finally sent a detailed letter to the Prince Gong rejecting the proposals. “The accusations of the Chinese government,” wrote Rochechouart, “are

25. François-Ferdinand Tagliabue to Brother N..., (March 12, 1871) *Annales de la Congrégation de la Mission (Lazaristes) et de la Compagnie des Filles de la Charité.*, 1872, p. 162.

26. Félix Gennevoise, *Le Mémoire chinois, ou, Violation du traité de Peking, exposé et réfutation par un missionnaire de Chine.* (Rome, 1872). Cohen, *China and Christianity: The Missionary Movement and the Growth of Chinese Antiforeignism, 1860-1870.*, pp. 256–257

very old and they have been many times examined and then refuted.”²⁷ Rochechouart went on to praise Frederick Low’s earlier point-by-point refutation of the circular before launching into his own rebuttal. “The French government,” Rochechouart concluded, “believes that Christians are causing concern for the Chinese government. It believes even more strongly that they are being used as a pretext. The adversaries of foreigners like to make a great noise about the danger the Western religion poses for China, and the clever ones try to profit from the agitation.”²⁸

Rochechouart may have delayed his response so that he could time his rejection for maximum effect. Just one week after Rochechouart sent his reply to the Zongli Yamen, Chonghou was in Versailles meeting with France’s new president, Adolph Thiers (1797-1877).

When Chonghou left China, he could not have possibly known just how much time it would require – or how many additional miles he would need to travel – to complete his assignment. Chonghou had finally arrived in Paris on June 3, 1871, only to find the city full of rubble, garbage, damaged buildings, and not many people.²⁹ Chonghou’s mission stalled once more, as the French government continued to make things difficult for the Qing delegation. Foreign ministry officials again raised the issue of reciprocity, explaining to Chonghou about the challenges France had faced in establishing an embassy in the Chinese capital. Chonghou did not need to be lectured. He had vivid memories of how Baron Gros and Count Montauban had used brute military force to compel the Qing court into agreeing to the permanent diplomatic residences in Beijing, among other humiliating concessions.

27. Count Rochechouart to the Zongli Yamen, (November 14, 1871). Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., pp. 431–435.

28. Count Rochechouart to the Zongli Yamen, (November 14, 1871). Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., pp. 431–435.

29. Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传 [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893]*, p. 177. 阿强 A Qiang, "Mudu bali gongshe qiye de zhongguoren 目睹巴黎公社起义的中国人 [Chinese Witnesses to the Uprising of the Paris Commune]," *侨园 qiaoyuan*, no. 2 (2015).

Equally vexing were persistent requests by his French hosts to reopen negotiations over reparations and the final verdict of the Tianjin case. Chonghou was ultimately just a well-credentialed messenger, and he demurred when Geofroy and others tried to expand his mission. Frustrated at Chonghou's lack of interest in negotiating, Geofroy asked Chonghou to give the French more time to prepare a suitable ceremony. Meanwhile, Geofroy suggested, Chonghou and his delegation could enjoy the beauty of France.

Overcome with homesickness, tired of being toyed with by French government officials, and wanting to save face for his emperor, Chonghou tried to abandon the mission. On August 21, a humiliated Chonghou, along with Zhang Deyi and the rest of the delegation, left Paris bound for New York. They disembarked in the United States on September 11, 1871, but their time in America was short. A week after the delegation's arrival, a message from the French Foreign Ministry was delivered to Chonghou in New York apologizing for the delays and requesting the Qing envoy reconsider his travel plans and instead return to France to meet with France's new president. The French government also recalled Victor Gabriel Lemaire, Rochechouart's interpreter at the French Legation in Beijing, to assist in getting Chonghou ready for his public meeting with the French head of state.

Two months later, on the morning of November 23, 1871, Chonghou, Zhang Deyi, and the delegation arrived at L'Hôtel des Réservoirs in Versailles. They were in full court dress and accompanied by a procession of soldiers and horses. Once inside, Chonghou presented his credentials to the French president and gave a short address. "On June 21 of last year, criminals who stole children in Tianjin gave rise to a riot there. The emperor sent Zeng Guofan, governor-general of Zhili, and other officials, to examine everything fairly and impartially. At the same time, he promulgated a decree to the vice-believers, governors of provinces, and local authorities

to ensure the security of those concerned everywhere. Zeng Guofan and others, after having dismissed [the two officials] Zhang Guangzao and Liu Jie, for having failed in their duties, handed them over to the Board of Punishment whereby they were exiled to remote Heilongjiang. As for the rioters, twenty culprits were beheaded, twenty-five others were exiled.³⁰ A new decree ordered local authorities of provinces to make proclamations to the people so that there would be no more riots. The Emperor declared his firm desire that the French in China enjoy peace and tranquility. While regretting this affair, the Emperor hopes that after its satisfactory and final settlement, it will bring absolutely no prejudice to the relations of the two countries.”³¹

President Thiers accepted the apology of the Tongzhi Emperor on behalf of France while also taking the opportunity to scold the Qing government for failing to do more to protect the interests and the treaty privileges of foreigners in China: “You tell me about the many tortures inflicted on the guilty. The French nation is too human to take pleasure in bloodshed. She only demands the severity necessary to contain the wicked, and she believes that more rigorous measures must be added. The duty of governments, at the same time as they suppress the excesses of the crowd, is to calm their passions, to dispel their prejudices, to make them hear the voice of reason and of humanity... Your government is too enlightened not to appreciate the merit of these missionaries, perfect good men, expatriating themselves to bring to the world the principles of civilization, against whom malicious people have not been afraid of arousing popular hatred recently. Let him proclaim it in his decrees, let him seize every opportunity to

30. The total number of executions was 16, Chonghou may have been referring to the number of people sentenced to death. Four of the capital sentences were suspended after negotiations with the Russian Legation. See Chapter 11.

31. Du, *YWSM*. TZ 85:7844–7846; Tang Renze 汤仁泽, *Jingshi beihuan: Chonghou chuan 经世悲欢: 崇厚传* [The Laughter and Tears in Benefiting the Society: The Life of Chonghou, 1826-1893]., pp. 181–182; French translation in Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 411.

make a solemn witness: the people will respect foreigners when they see them honored by their own magistrates.”³²

His mission now complete, Chonghou was allowed to return home. He reached Hong Kong on January 18, 1872, and Shanghai 12 days later. On March 5, Chonghou arrived in Beijing where he had an audience at court and delivered a letter addressed to the emperor from French President Thiers. For his service, and perhaps out of pity, Chonghou was spared further punishment for his involvement in the Tianjin incident and was allowed to continue as an official at the Board of War.³³

Despite Chonghou’s historic voyage and meeting with Thiers, the rejection of the Zongli Yamen’s February circular and the tone of the French government when receiving Chonghou could not have inspired confidence that missionaries were going to change their approach in China or that the foreign powers would be willing to compromise with the Qing government to prevent future incidents. If anything, the affair had weakened the Zongli Yamen, making it less effective at attempting to mediate and prevent the escalation of local conflicts. Many foreign representatives also believed the Zongli Yamen would soon become obsolete once diplomats had personal access to the emperor.

On June 29, 1873, the representatives of the foreign legations in Beijing gathered at North Cathedral for their first audience with the Tongzhi Emperor. The delegation was paraded into Zhongnanhai, an imperial garden just west of the palace, where at a lakeside pavilion they were greeted by the 17-year-old Qing emperor and other members of the imperial court.³⁴ The audience had long been anticipated, and the foreign dignitaries no doubt hoped future disputes

32. Cordier, *Histoire des Relations de la Chine avec les Puissances Occidentales*, Volume 2., p. 411.

33. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing period (1644-1912)*., p. 73.

34. A few of the diplomats took umbrage to the location, noting that the pavilion where the ceremony took place had previously been used to receive supplicants from tributary states of the Qing Empire.

could be settled through direct dialogue with the sovereign, bypassing the bureaucracy. It was not to be. A little less than two years later, on January 12, 1875, the Tongzhi Emperor died, officially of smallpox.³⁵ He was replaced by his five-year-old cousin, Zaitian, who became the Guangxu Emperor (r. 1875-1908). China was once again ruled by a regency, and the foreign powers resumed their awkward dance with the Zongli Yamen and the Qing bureaucracy.

The patterns behind the Tianjin riots continued unabated through the end of the nineteenth century. Serious incidents took place along the Middle Yangtze in 1891 and Sichuan in 1895.³⁶ As in Tianjin, an orphanage played a central role in escalating tensions that resulted in violence in Hubei in 1891.³⁷ Rumors and misinformation contributed to anti-missionary riots in Chengdu in 1895.³⁸ In the Fujian city of Gutian (then known as Kucheng) in August 1895, a local religious group attacked a group of British missionaries on summer holidays. Eleven people

35. The emperor's young age, the timing of his death, and the reputation of his mother and regent, the Empress Dowager Cixi, have long fueled doubts about the official cause of death. However, smallpox was still common in nineteenth century China, despite the practice of variolation, and had caused the death of at least one of the Tongzhi Emperor's ancestors. (The Shunzhi Emperor, r. 1643-1661).

36. 陈显 Chen Xian and 黄永昌 Huang Yongchang, "1891 nian changjiang liuyu jiao'an yu hubei yuying 1891 年长江流域教案与湖北育婴 [The 1891 Yangtze Anti-Missionary Case and the Hubei Orphans]," *法制与社会 fazhi yu shehui* 3 (2007).; 谢必震 Xie Bizhen, "Gutian jiao'an qi yin xintan 古田教案起因新探 [A New Examination of the Causes behind the Gutian Anti-Missionary Case]," *近代史研究 jindaishi yanjiu*, no. 1 (1998); 刘国平 Liu Guoping, "1895 nian gutian jiao'an yanjiu 1895 年古田教案研究 [Research on the 1895 Gutian Anti-Missionary Case]" (福建师范大学, 2006).; Jan Welch, "Missionaries, Murder and Diplomacy in Late 19th Century China: A Case Study" (paper presented at the 2nd ANU Missionary History Conference Asia-Pacific Missionaries: At Home and Abroad, Australian National University Friday, 2006).; Zhong Gang 钟钢 and Hu Daniu 胡大牛, "1895 nian 'chengdu jiao'an' jianshu 1895 年 '成都教案' 简述 [A Brief Introduction to the 'Chengdu Anti-Missionary Case']," *四川文物 Sichuan Wenwu*, no. 4 (1992); 郭亚宝 Guo Yabao, "1895 nian chengdu jiao'an de yaoyan wenti 1895 年成都教案的谣言问题 [The Question of Rumours and the Chengdu Missionary Case of 1895]" (辽宁大学 Liaoning Daxue, 2017).

37. 陈显 Chen Xian and 黄永昌 Huang Yongchang, "1891 年长江流域教案与湖北育婴 1891 年 changjiang liuyu jiao'an yu hubei yuying Yangtze Anti-Missionary Case and the Hubei Orphans," *法制与社会 fazhi yu shehui* 3 (2007)

38. Zhong Gang 钟钢 and Hu Daniu 胡大牛, "1895 nian 'chengdu jiao'an' jianshu 1895 年 '成都教案' 简述 [A Brief Introduction to the 'Chengdu Anti-Missionary Case']"; Guo Yabao, "1895 nian chengdu jiao'an de yaoyan wenti 1895 年成都教案的谣言问题 [The Question of Rumours and the Chengdu Missionary Case of 1895]."

were killed, and two houses destroyed, in one of the bloodiest anti-foreign incidents to occur in China between the Tianjin riot in 1870 and the start of the Boxer Crisis in 1899.³⁹

In each of these cases, British, American, and French representatives in China threatened military action to gain leverage in negotiating reparations while insisting on harsh punishments for accused perpetrators and local officials.⁴⁰ Violent anti-missionary resistance continued to be dealt with through ultimatums and threats of force as had too often happened in the years before the Tianjin riot.

By the end of the nineteenth century, Qing officials and missionaries faced a complicated landscape of competing national interests in China. Although the Sino-French War of 1884–1885 was a victory for France, it demonstrated the limitations of relying on a single nation for military support.⁴¹ The arrival of Italy and Germany as powers with interests in China gave Catholic missionaries, especially German and Italian nationals, new options for patronage, weakening French claims to a religious protectorate.⁴² Local officials and the central government had to contend with a growing array of foreign powers, each operating independently but also willing to overlook national rivalries to jointly pressure the Qing government to take more robust steps to protect foreign interests.⁴³ Some of the newer powers, like Germany, were more aggressive in carving out spheres of influence, unafraid to let missionaries act as a vanguard.

39. Welch, "Missionaries, Murder and Diplomacy in Late 19th Century China: A Case Study."

40. For another case study of an incident from this period see George E Paulsen, "The Szechwan Riots of 1895 and American "Missionary Diplomacy"," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 2 (1969).

41. For a review of Sino-French relations in the years after the Tianjin riots and leading up to the Sino-French war, see Lloyd E Eastman, *Throne and Mandarins: China's Search for a Policy during the Sino-French Controversy, 1880-1885* (Harvard University Press, 1967)..

42. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, pp. 64–65.

43. John E Schrecker, *Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism* (Harvard University Press, 2013). Sarah Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). The most notorious example is the Eight-Country Allied Expedition Force deployed in the summer of 1900 to relieve the Boxer siege of the Beijing legations. Japan, Germany, Austro-Hungary, Russia, Britain, France, Italy, and the United States all contributed troops to be part of the invasion and occupation force.

On June 21, 1897, a group of diplomats, military officers, the magistrate and prefect, and church representatives gathered in Tianjin. Before the assembled dignitaries and a crowd of curious onlookers, Bishop Alphonse Favier consecrated the newly rebuilt church at Wanghailou. The pomp, the guestlist, as well as the extra security and concern for the possibility of violence, all recalled a similar moment nearly 30 years earlier when the first incarnation of Notre Dame des Victoires had been consecrated on exactly the same spot. Tianjin residents were outraged, and while there was no violence that day in 1897, Bishop Favier and consular authorities thought it best if the Daughters of Charity, successors to the nuns killed in 1870, stayed in their orphanage for their safety. French diplomatic and ecclesiastical representatives congratulated themselves on the newly rebuilt church as a symbol of the power and resilience of God and France.⁴⁴ Less than three years later, the church would be in ruins again, burned to the ground by the Boxer militias that infiltrated Tianjin in the summer of 1900. Although the events that led up to the Boxer Crisis of 1899–1901 are outside the scope of this project, scholars of the period will easily recognize through lines connecting the events of 1870 with those of 1900.⁴⁵

The Wanghailou Church that stands today was rebuilt in 1904. Even in its third iteration, the church has the power to evoke unpleasant memories. A Tianjin resident who went to school in a building adjacent to the church in the 1960s recalled schoolmates and even teachers warning her to avoid straying too close to the church's walls or "the ghosts of the nuns will come out and grab you!"⁴⁶

44. Young, *Ecclesiastical Colony: China's Catholic Church and the French Religious Protectorate.*, p. 4.

45. There are many books, both published and forthcoming on the origins of the Boxer movement and the Boxer War. Of particular note is the chapter, "Imperialism, For Christ's Sake" in Esherick, *The Origins of the Boxer Uprising.*, p. 68.

46. Personal Interview, Wanghailou, Tianjin. 2012.

The era in which the Tianjin riot occurred, known in China as “the Century of Humiliation,” continues to loom large in the institutional and collective memory of people in China.⁴⁷ The events of this century, including war, occupation, unequal treaties, and lost sovereignty, are remembered through textbooks, popular culture, at historic sites, and in the Party-controlled media. Understanding this era, which officially spans the years from 1842-1949, and how it affected China and its people, is critical to understanding the Chinese worldview today. While there has been a recent effort in the West to better remember the terrible legacies of imperialism and colonialism and to recognize the long-term effects of colonialist and imperialist aggression on the people of Asia, Africa, Latin America, indigenous Australia and North America, and other parts of the world, more needs to be done, especially as it pertains to China.⁴⁸

Beginning in the fifteenth century, Soldiers, diplomats, colonial administrators, merchants, literally redrew the map of the world. The colonial empires they built, almost all of which were formed by conquest and held by force, receded in the twentieth century, giving birth to new nations and states, but the process of decolonization also unleashed tremendous forces including ethnonationalism, class and caste struggle, religious conflict, as well as a deep lingering resentment toward past oppressors.⁴⁹ The profound inequalities that define the world today, particularly the disparities between the Global South and the Global North, are legacies of

47. David Scott, *China and the International system, 1840-1949: Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation* (Sunny Press, 2008); Zheng Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014).

48. Pankaj Mishra, *Age of Anger: A History of the Present*, 1st American edition. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2017); Gurminder K. Bhambra et al., "Why Is Mainstream International Relations Blind to Racism?," *Foreign Policy* (July 3, 2020).; Maya Jasanoff, "Misremembering the British Empire: How did the British become so blinkered about their nation's imperial history?," *The New Yorker* (October 26, 2020). Brown, *Informal Empire in Latin America: Culture, Commerce and Capital*.

49. Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals who Remade Asia*, First American edition. ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012).

imperialism and colonialism. While people living in the West might protest, claiming that imperialism and colonialism belong to a different time, those living in the developing world know that imperialist attitudes persist and continue to cause harm, and that even if people living in rich nations today did not directly participate in the historical brutalities of the past, they nevertheless still benefit from economic and other advantages handed down to them by those who did.

For millennia, the global economy centered on the trade routes of South and East Asia. Around 1800, there was a seismic shift, as relatively less populous states in Western Europe, and then the United States, began to account for a disproportionate percentage of global GDP. There are many reasons for this, not the least of which was the industrial revolution, but the “Great Divergence” of 1800 also reflected how Western powers used their new economic, industrial, and technological advantages to subjugate other parts of the world in a colonial system which siphoned off wealth in the form of natural and human resources to benefit the aggressors.⁵⁰ New forms of knowledge production and media created texts, both written and visual, that reterritorialized landscapes, cultures, and bodies to fit a narrative justifying supremacist attitudes and the extension and continuation of colonial rule.

This project has been selective in employing the label “massacre,” which has previously been used in most Western writing to describe the events of June 21, 1870. The term “massacre” means “an indiscriminate slaughter of people,” or “to deliberately and violently kill (a large number) of people.” The events at Tianjin on June 21, 1870, clearly meet these definitions, but

50. Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy*, The Princeton Economic History of the Western world, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robert Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Environmental Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-first century*, Fourth edition. ed., World Social Change, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2020).

this project also appreciates how application of the label “massacre” has been imprecise and politically charged. From Tulsa to Tiananmen Square, usage of the term massacre has provoked controversy and raised questions of historical memory, representation, and the responsibilities of historians to promote social justice.⁵¹ This project acknowledges that describing an event as a “massacre” is not a politically neutral act, especially in the context of imperialism and resistance. To borrow a phrase, one side’s incident is another side’s massacre.⁵²

There is an aspect of the word massacre, embedded in the idea of “indiscriminate slaughter” that a massacre is an act of senseless or random violence, or is mass violence done with intent that is transgressive or that does not meet accepted criteria for a “justified” killing. Most historians label the 300,000 civilians killed at Nanjing in 1937 as the victims of a massacre, but the deaths of an equal number of Japanese civilians in August 1945 are usually referred to as casualties of atomic bombs. Rarely, if ever, do we read about the “Hiroshima Massacre.”⁵³ One reason, perhaps, is that common usage of the term massacre seems to imply a human element and intentionality. The perpetrator of a massacre chooses his or her victim because of what they represent or who they are, whereas bombs fall where they may.

In the colonial context, the term massacre has historically been applied to acts in which colonial subjects are the aggressors and the colonialists the victims. This is a part of the pedagogy of imperialism.⁵⁴ Violent resistance by the colonial subject is portrayed in texts, popular culture, and even scholarship as a denial of modernity, a preference for savagery over order, and, ultimately, a rejection of “civilization.” The term massacre to apply to the mass

51. Kendrick Marshall, "Tulsa Race Massacre: For years it was called a riot. Not anymore. Here's how it changed.," *Tulsa World* (Tulsa, OK), May 29, 2021.

52. Joseph Betz, "The Definition of Massacre," *Social Philosophy Today* Volume 17: Communication, Conflict, and Reconciliation (2001)., p. 9.

53. For a similar analogy using the My Lai Massacre and the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995, see Betz Betz, "The Definition of Massacre."

54. After Hevia, *English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in Nineteenth-Century China*.

killing of colonized subjects or to refer to other acts of collective violence motivated by racial and religious hatred, has become more common as scholars attempt to correct biases latent in early historical writing of colonial-colonized contact.⁵⁵

This project's selective use of the term massacre, along with its critique of imperialism and colonialism, should not be interpreted as mitigating in any way the brutal killing of at least two dozen people on June 21, 1870. At the same time, connotations of "senseless" or "indiscriminate" encoded in the term massacre should not cause us to minimize or ignore the motivations behind the violence, or engage in a type of reductionism that assumes agency or sympathy only for the victims, representing order and rationality, but not the perpetrators who are, by use of the term, defined only through their cruelty and barbarism. Trying to understand the reasons behind a violent act or considering the motivations of the attackers is not the same as sympathizing with their actions or otherwise condoning violence. Furthermore, any discussion of massacres, mass killings or race riots involving Chinese people in the nineteenth century needs to consider how even as international media and foreign governments were condemning the riot in Tianjin as a capital-M "Massacre," people of Chinese and Asian descent in North America were themselves frequently the victims of horrific racist and anti-foreign collective violence.⁵⁶

On October 24, 1871, as Chonghou was preparing to apologize to French President Thiers for failing to prevent the deaths of non-Chinese in Tianjin, several hundred Los Angelenos destroyed the area known as Calle des Negros, lynching 19 Chinese immigrants.⁵⁷ The Chinatown Massacre of 1871 was just one of several incidents in the United States in which lynch mobs targeted Asian communities in the nineteenth century. On September 2, 1885, the

55. Marshall, "Tulsa Race Massacre: For years it was called a riot. Not anymore. Here's how it changed.."

56. Tien-tsin Massacre "The Tien-tsin Massacre," *New York Times* (New York), March 4 1870.

57. See Scott Zesch, *The Chinatown War: Chinese Los Angeles and the Massacre of 1871* (London: Oxford University Press, 2012).

same year China and France were fighting a war over French ambitions in Tonkin, white miners attacked Chinese residents of Rock Springs, Wyoming, killing 28 people and burning over 75 homes.⁵⁸ While there are some parallels to anti-foreign violence in China, particularly how rumors and misinformation can inspire people to violent acts, the differences between the contexts of anti-missionary incidents in China and American lynch mobs are considerable. Not the least of these differences is that, in the late nineteenth century, the Qing government lacked the ability to militarily intervene to protect their citizens abroad even if they had wanted to.⁵⁹

The People's Republic of China, where it is politically problematic, if not dangerous, to discuss colonialism in the context of the nation's current borders and geopolitical footprint, also wrestles with a legacy of decolonization. The Qing Empire was both a victim of imperialist expansion, and a player in the "Great Game" for Central Asia, among other campaigns of expansion and conquest.⁶⁰ Today, Chinese leaders are fond of citing China's exceptionalism, both as a successor state to the "world's oldest continuous civilization" and as a modern nation that never practiced imperialism or invaded another country. Historians working outside of the PRC may quibble with both of these assertions, but this belief is firmly held in China and is routinely trotted out by government spokespeople to harangue the West, especially when deflecting criticism from Western countries about China's human rights record or foreign

58. Joanna Waley-Cohen, *The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), p. 176.

59. The United States government had been reluctant to make amends for the Rock Springs Massacre of 1885 until Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909), then serving as governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi, suggested that Americans living in Guangzhou might face reprisals from angry residents unless the survivors received compensation, at least for their lost property. Waley-Cohen, *The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History*, p. 176.

60. Millward, *Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang*.

policy.⁶¹ That the loudest voices criticizing China tend to hail from the same countries that bullied China during the Century of Humiliation is an irony not lost on the people of China.⁶²

The Patriotic Education Curriculum implemented beginning in the 1990s was designed in part to convince young people that Western society and political systems were not something to idealize or emulate, and that Western soft power was an illusion; the wealth and influence of the West had been established through boots and blood and sustained by unequal treaties and unfair trade policies. The countries who relied on gunboats, Christianity, and opium to subjugate China a century ago, are the same nations currently employing sanctions, tariffs, and Nobel Prizes as part of a conspiracy led by the United States to stifle China's resurgence. This entrenched narrative makes the history of foreign imperialism and anti-imperialist resistance in China a challenging subject to research and study. On one hand, the Chinese experience of Western imperialism is part of a global story of which all people, especially those in rich nations, need to recognize and understand. On the other hand, memories of this period are also a key aspect of the Communist Party's propaganda legitimizing its grip on power.⁶³

Christian missionaries play an important role in this narrative of humiliation and foreign subjugation. Although missionary organizations promoted their activities as being for the benefit of China and the Chinese people, missionaries, and to a somewhat lesser extent Chinese Christians, came to be viewed in the post-1949 era as ideologically suspect and a potentially corrosive influence on Chinese society.

61. Peter Martin, *China's Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021).

62. Manya Koetse, "Digital Art or Visual Propaganda? China's New Wave of Online Political Satire," *What's on Weibo* (June 19, 2021). <https://www.whatsonweibo.com/digital-art-or-visual-propaganda-chinas-new-wave-of-online-political-satire/>.

63. Pamela K. Crossley et al., "How China's History Shapes, and Warps, its Policies Today," *Foreign Policy* (March 22, 2017).

The years between the abdication of the Qing government in 1912, and the establishment of the PRC in 1949 were difficult for most people living in China. Political instability, foreign dominance, and, in the case of Japan, invasion and direct military occupation meant hardship and suffering. Central and local governments struggled to provide important services and build institutions to meet the needs of Chinese communities. Missionary organizations often filled that gap by establishing and managing schools (especially schools for girls and young women), hospitals, and orphanages.⁶⁴ Many people in China appreciated these institutions, but almost everyone was aware that the missionaries were able to provide these services and operate as freely as they did only because of a system of treaties supported by the implicit threat of foreign military intervention.

Missionaries also pushed into areas that saw few other foreigners. They set up soup kitchens in Shanghai slums and Beijing hutongs, built churches in remote villages far from the coast, and operated schools in nearly inaccessible valleys in Yunnan and Guangxi. Most missionaries came to China with the best of intentions, truly believing that they were doing God's work, but to most Chinese people, missionaries were the most visible representatives of a system that was widely and deeply resented. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, outside of the coastal cities and treaty ports, if a Chinese person interacted with a foreigner, the chances were better than average that the foreigner was attached to a Christian mission. This is one reason why conflicts between Chinese and foreigners so often involved missionaries.

By 1953, the government of the newly established People's Republic of China had expelled almost all foreign missionaries from the country and had tightened state and Party

64. Republican Tina Phillips Johnson, *Childbirth in Republican China: Delivering Modernity* (Lexington Books, 2011); Anne-Marie Brady and Douglas Brown, *Foreigners and Foreign Institutions in Republican China*, vol. 30 (Routledge, 2013); Jackson, *Shaping Modern Shanghai: Colonialism in China's Global City*.

control and supervision of Chinese Christians. Today, a foreign national can be deported from China, or even imprisoned, if Chinese authorities believe they are engaging in missionary activities.

Cases of religious controversy in China today share a connection with the missionary conflicts of the nineteenth century. Many missionaries, especially the French Lazarists, employed the language of “religious freedom” to justify their pressure on recalcitrant or resistant officials. Similar rhetoric is used today to criticize the Chinese government’s current restrictions on proselytizing and to condemn persecutions of Chinese Christians, especially those who worship in churches not affiliated with state organs set up to control religious practice or belong to congregations suspected of having financial ties to overseas churches and international Christian organizations.⁶⁵

The criticism directed at the Chinese government regarding religion and human rights in the present day is not without justification. The Chinese state has a documented history of persecuting Christians and other religious groups.⁶⁶ However, organizations or governments who advocate for these groups might benefit from considering how the rhetoric and tone of their criticisms can trigger unpleasant memories from an era when defense of religious liberty was used as a pretext for sending military expeditions against China.

It is also a mistake to assume, as did many missionaries in the nineteenth century, that anti-foreign sentiment in China is confined to the ‘mandarin classes’ – or, in modern times, the

65. For just one example, see Ian Johnson, "For Pastor Critical of Xi, Detention Is Test of Faith," *New York Times*, March 25 2019, New York Edition, Section A. Ian Johnson also discusses the career of Wang Yi, Pastor of the Early Rain Covenant Church in Chengdu, and the subject of the 2019 article, in Ian Johnson, *The Souls of China: The Return of Religion after Mao* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2017).

66. "China wants to make its Christians more Chinese," *The Economist* (London), March 31, 2021, <https://www.economist.com/china/2021/03/31/china-wants-to-make-its-christians-more-chinese>.; This also includes the current campaign of systematic repression targeting Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim ethnicities in Western China. See Adrian Zenz, "'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude': China's political re-education campaign in Xinjiang," *Central Asian Survey* 38, no. 1 (2019).

Chinese Communist Party – and that popular expressions of anti-foreignism must be directed from above or otherwise incited by propaganda generated by the political elite. When forced to explain why China could not be converted, nineteenth-century missionaries pointed to the obstructive and sclerotic Qing Dynasty and the bureaucrats who relied on the state for their privileged positions in society. Today, there is a belief, especially popular among Western politicians, that Chinese people are predisposed to freedom, democracy, internationalism, and cooperation, but are restrained in those ambitions by insecure and conservative leaders. Foreign observers of China seem to be forever painting rosy, but unlikely, scenarios for a future transformation of China, if not through Christ, then by Kentucky Fried Chicken, Capitalism, coffee chains, and K-Pop.

Western observers also tend to blame the Party and its propaganda for the rise of an aggrieved and, in some cases, aggressive nationalism in China. This is not entirely inaccurate. The Party maintains a tight grip on the educational, information, and media environments in China. Historical nihilism, the ‘misrepresentation of China’s past,’ has become a special target during the period of ideological retrenchment that began with the ascension of Xi Jinping as China’s top leader in 2012.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, to assume that all expressions of nationalism, and even xenophobia, are inspired or controlled by the state and the Party is a grave misreading of recent Chinese social and political trends.⁶⁸ The Chinese Communist Party currently enjoys widespread support in China, and the feelings of the Chinese people for their government and their country cannot be simply dismissed as a product of propaganda or “brainwashing.”

67. Jun Mai, "China deltes 2 million online posts for ‘historical nihilism’ as Communist Party centenary nears," *South China Morning Post* (Hong Kong), May 11, 2021.

68. Alec Ash, "China’s New Nationalism," *The Wire China* (August 8, 2021).
<https://www.thewirechina.com/2021/08/08/chinas-new-nationalism/>.

In the Western *longue durée*—and speaking in broad strokes—the worst manmade catastrophes have come about through the imposition of tyranny. Genocide, famine, war, and repression usually result from too much power in the hands of too few people. The villains of history—Nero, George III, Hitler, Stalin, Mao—are portrayed as despots. The nightmares of our popular culture, from Darth Vader to Lord Voldemort, are the archetypes of tyranny. The political systems of the West were, by and large, designed with this in mind. Chaos and inefficiency are features of the system, not bugs. Democracy is messy and often ineffective, but it does make it difficult, although certainly not impossible, for an aspiring tyrant to seize power. Many in the West are willing to live in societies that seem chaotic and mismanaged by contemporary Chinese standards as the price for freedom from tyranny.

In contrast, the worst things to happen in China over the past 200 years have generally occurred when the state was too weak to protect the people. The Chinese phrase *luohou jiuyao aida* (落后就要挨打), which roughly translates as those who fall behind will be beaten, is often used when discussing the Century of Humiliation, the scramble for concessions, and the Japanese occupation.⁶⁹ Even the disasters of the twentieth century, when they are remembered at all, are subtly recast as cautionary tales of chaos. The “Three Years of Natural Disasters,” the standard textbook term for the famine of the Great Leap Forward that killed millions of people between 1959 and 1961, is the result of bureaucratic mismanagement and irrational economic planning compounding the effects of poor harvests. Critics of Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement referred to the demonstrators as “Red Guards,” linking calls for popular sovereignty with the anarchy and political violence unleashed by Mao during the Cultural Revolution. The Party and its surrogates used the same epithet to discredit student leaders during and after the Tiananmen

69. Wang, *Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations*.

Square protests in 1989.⁷⁰ In this narrative, which many in China accept, chaos and instability pose the greatest danger to people's lives and livelihoods, not authoritarianism or state repression. What people are willing to accept is often conditioned by what they fear the most. Assuming that China's political system is entirely a product of propaganda and coercion is a mistake.⁷¹

This dissertation is long. One reviewer commented that it took longer to read than the duration of the actual event. That may be true, but significant acts of mass violence almost never occur spontaneously. The triggering event can make the violence seem sudden, but that violence is almost always fueled by underlying tensions accumulated over many years and even decades. Exploring the root causes of an act of violence means exploring the wider context in which that violence occurred. That said, this dissertation could have been longer than it is now. There are questions, recriminations, accusations, and investigations in the aftermath of an extreme event, particularly a violent one with mass casualties. The search for answers, the quest for revenge, the negotiations over reparations, and the demands for justice and closure all generate a documentary record. Grievances, aggressions, acts of defiance, misunderstandings, rumors, pieces of misinformation, micro-conflicts, threats, and counter-threats that might otherwise go unnoticed individually become part of the historical record in aggregate. The glare of historical inquiry shines on individuals and groups who might otherwise pass unnoticed by contemporary elites or historians.

The lessons of the Tianjin went largely unheeded in the years following the violent riot. The result was continued conflict culminating in the Boxer Crisis and war between China and

70. Jeffrey Wasserstrom, "How will China Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Cultural Revolution," *The Nation* (May 11, 2016).

71. Jeremiah Jenne, "Not Quite A Revolution," *The Atlantic* (February 22, 2011).

<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/china-not-quite-a-revolution/71510/>.

other foreign powers. Nevertheless, there are larger lessons from this era that resonate to the present day. Understanding the nature of imperialism and imperialist resistance and how memories of the violent clashes between foreigners and Chinese in an earlier century may help us to avoid greater tragedies in the present and future.

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