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Europe and United States, 1944-2006: Two Destinies in an Uncertain World

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## **Europe and United States, 1944-2006**

### **Two destinies in an uncertain world**

“... Europe bears major international responsibilities. The Europe of the Six, inferior to the United States in military, industrial and financial power, is already its equal in the field of trade. It is the world’s leading importer of manufactures and agricultural produce. It is the leading importer of products from the countries of the third world. Today, in its present form, it already has major responsibilities to the developing countries — and these will be even more important tomorrow when Europe is a larger entity.

In addition, at a time when the organization of the world on the scale of the old sovereign nations is yielding place to organization at the level of continents, it is important that the errors of the past should not be repeated at this higher level, that the clash of nations should not give way to the clash of entire continents. Consequently, it is Europe’s duty to organize co-operation and association with the other main groups in the world”<sup>1</sup>.

The above declaration published in July 1968 by the European Commission sets the tone of this paper. Perhaps do you are familiar with it ? I intend to show how Atlantic relations have developed from an initial climate of “agreed dependency” by the Europeans, to the emergence of an powerful economic and strategic dimension within the Union, which can now, under certain conditions, challenge American unilateralism.

### ***Consensual dependency***

The first period is that of the “dépendance consentie” (consensual dependency).

#### **A new international order, the ITO Project**

Between 1946 and 1948, West European states tried to keep protectionism against US and Latin America competition in a transitional phase, in order to recover under the auspices of an International Trade Organization. They imagined that a new economic order could be created in which there would eventually be free trade and payments after this provisional period of protectionism<sup>2</sup>. The US had rarely understood provisional protectionism, but in 1947, conscious of the obligations of leadership, they learned to negotiate some compromises. Yet, to-day they decide (things) alone.

#### **Revelation of the differences**

The Marshall plan was the expression of the Europe’s “consensual dependency” on the Americans. It was a step towards the general freeing up of trade and payments that they wanted.

It partly restored inter-European trade, thanks to the European Payment Union (EPU). But it was a failure as a dimension of the common European Recovery Programme. The EPU could have been the embryo of a European monetary authority but was “sunk” by United States and United Kingdom before the introduction of the general currencies convertibility with the Bretton Woods agreements. The Marshall plan did not impose economic liberalism, but it prepared the participant countries to move progressively away from protectionism. It gave the US companies and the US government to stockpile many badly-needed material resources from European overseas territories, an aim that is still relevant as illustrated by recent American interest in natural resources in francophone countries in Africa.

As is still the case to-day, the American intervention was accompanied with advice about good governance. In the past this advice was given to European nations with overseas colonies or territories, while today it goes out to the independent countries themselves through the IMF, Humanitarian or Christian Missionary associations. At the same time, the Marshall plan destroyed the trade links between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, for Cold War reasons rather than for a trade rationale/doctrine. The US (administration) urged the Europeans to cut off (trade) with East in spite of resistances from Europe and even American companies. Some products lists were set up in October 1948 giving rise to opposition from Paris, London, Bern and Stockholm: In France, the French foreign ministry wrote that “It’s no secret that since 6 months the American government has urged the countries participating in the Marshall to limit their trade with Eastern European countries”<sup>3</sup>. The COCOM was then created. The US, however, didn’t succeed in completely isolating the USSR and the Eastern (European) countries. Even American companies didn’t abandon trade with East through Switzerland or Hong-Kong. In more recent times one should recall the question of the gas pipeline from USSR to Western Europe, put under embargo by the American Administration, which poisoned relations between Europe and American during the Reagan administration.

Difficulties related to trading with the “axis of evil” of the Cold War remained a permanent feature of the differences between US and Europe. Then, the communist danger was more deeply felt by the US than by Europe. Today the danger of Islamic terrorism is not understood in the same way by the US and by European public opinion. The intensity of fear is linked to the perception of the threat that weighs on each society. Today threats to the environment are a priority for the Europeans; but they are a lesser worry for the US. In reality, there are two different perceptions and sensitivities to danger.

The cold war period of European “consensual dependency” shows that Europe, despite this dependency, was, in spite of its own weakness, able to make choices about political priorities and the extent of the ‘really existing’ danger of the Cold War.

### ***Atlantic designs and destinies***

The end of the “consensual dependency” opened new paths for Atlantic relations. In spite of apparent unity through the Atlantic Alliance, dependency on the American military and the spreading of the “American way of life” in the emergence of a society of consumption in Europe, friction between American and Europe has occurred. This phenomenon is linked to the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, and not only due to de Gaulle.

#### **European designs of international economic relations**

Under GATT, the European Economic Community had to contribute to reciprocal trade liberation and international solidarity. According to the Treaty of Rome, common trade policy has to contribute to fair world trade and loosen world trade restrictions”<sup>4</sup>. For instance, the European Commission decided that “the well-being of the Eastern countries was a factor that was conducive to peace” and it limited its embargo on the East, although this was against the wishes of the US<sup>5</sup>. The Community tried to organize the world trade by world agreements for the less advanced countries, after discussions with Latin Americans and by preferential agreements with some African countries.

At the same time, the Commission declared Atlantic cooperation as intangible and based upon equality<sup>6</sup>. So, superficially, it seemed that the Kennedy years witnessed excellent euro-atlantic relations and L.B Johnson even evoked an Economic ECE/USA condominium. On the behalf of President Johnson, Ambassador Schaetzel invited the Europeans “to explore new common interests fields” such as scientific research, health and fields dear to Europe such as development aid to underdeveloped countries<sup>7</sup>. The European Commission even hoped to organize its foreign policy in a multilateral and liberal framework which would be set up by the two powers of the free world, Europe and America.

In reality, there were euro-atlantic tensions. Jean-François Deniau, European commissioner, noted “the increasing number of difficulties over agricultural affairs with the American government”<sup>8</sup>. The US wanted to dismantle the Common Agricultural policy (CAP) which « seemed to lead towards the implementation of a closed EEC regional bloc »<sup>9</sup>. In a telex, Pierre Malvé, from the ECE staff in residence to Washington, wrote: “a high officer from the Department of Commerce, M. Kenneth Davis, has complained of incomprehension shown by the Community regarding the US”<sup>10</sup>. But Under-secretary Samuels declared in 1970: « There is no reason that the US could accept Economic disadvantages on the short –term, if they come,

precisely, from the Community Agricultural policy". Senator Jakob K. Javits, Republican, said that the Community was bad for the US due to the CAP, and Dahrendorf had to denounce such a confusion<sup>11</sup>. The US maintained the American selling price and didn't respect industrial self-limitation agreements. They strongly increased tariffs on several European imported products<sup>12</sup>. Next, the Congress was preparing a law, the *Mills bill*. According to this legislation, 20 % of the Community exportations to the US would have been endangered. « This fateful commercial law » according to Dahrendorf, was abandoned in December 1970<sup>13</sup>.

But the Commission was not going to alter its policy, as it formed a core part of the emergence of a European post-war identity and common purpose. The so-called "European agricultural protectionism" continues to obsess Washington to-day. Now, it is quite possible that the US will secure a dismantling of the CAP by using various forms of pressure, and because of a change of heart in certain parts of Europe itself.

Nevertheless, in the past, Euro-Atlantic trade tensions do show that the European Community was able to preserve its own aims despite US pressure

#### **Ordeal and decision: the monetary and energy crises**

Difficulties with the International monetary System encouraged the Europeans to develop a more autonomous approach to monetary issues. The European Commission wanted the Bretton Woods agreements to be implemented because they settled obligation for the participants to regulate their payments deficit, including for the dollar balance. They wanted to return to the initial Bretton Woods agreements and avoid some Central banks acquiring too many dollars. But Robert Marjolin, the Commission vice-president, encouraged the Six to think about creating a European economic and monetary Union as well<sup>14</sup>. At The Hague summit in December 1969, the Six agreed to this, in principle<sup>15</sup>. Ironically it was the French president, Georges Pompidou who hesitated, saying that: "When Americans get angry, it will wipe us all out"<sup>16</sup>. Later, the Community decided "to form their own monetary group in the IMS", but without a common currency<sup>17</sup>. These decisions were coherent with the IMS, and they reinforced the European monetary identity. Suspension of dollar convertibility in gold by President Nixon, on the 15th August 1971 and the protectionist measures taken by him drove the Commission to propose to set up fixed but flexible exchange rates of the great currencies which would reinforce the future European Economic and Monetary Union with a European Monetary cooperation Fund<sup>18</sup>. Not much interested in this idea, the American administration and business milieus asked the Community to import more American products in order to share the burden of American payment deficit. But the President of the Commission, Franco-Maria Malfatti, declared: "It is

unreasonable to demand more ; it is not acceptable to want that”. In February 1973, after the enlargement to the UK, Denmark and Ireland, the Nine, as they now were, were led to reinforce European monetary cooperation. A European Monetary system (EMS), with a European Monetary cooperation Fund, was created in 1979.

In the middle of the 70's, the European Community had also strengthened its objectives towards GATT; it had obtained respect for common policies, which however seemed discriminating to the US. It is useful to give an explanation for these objectives. Americans have always been afraid of the “fortress Europe”; and they didn't easily accept the arising of a new centre of Economic power like the Community. Discriminating (in trade) seems incorrect in principle, but it is the condition to build a European Union and it is permitted by GATT or UN.

The designs of the European Community were to open its borders in a liberal but negotiated way, to build solidarity between industrialized and less developed countries, (and) to create a strong European monetary centre. But the world was far from this ideal. If tariff cuts were a success, permanent conflicts of interest remained between Europe and US. The European Commission was required to build unity by treaty; it had to oppose Community specificity to US and Latin America demands as it had been said in a weekly meeting of the Commission<sup>19</sup>. The Community had strengthened its position towards US, but always had a constant dialogue with them. It had negotiated reciprocal liberalization of exchange, (and) gotten the US and others to respect European common policies. It has proposed special system to the less developed countries regarding the raw products trade. As Darhendorf remarked, the Commission wanted “not a fight without dialogue, but a common attempt to find a solution”. It was, however, out of the question to build an Atlantic Free-trade area under American conditions.

The Community had become an active original partner in international economic relations because it already had a project of political unity, while at the same time it did not want to become a closed economic fortress.

### ***The uncertain future of the Atlantic partnership***

The growth of European Community explains the bitterness of Euro-atlantic tensions. As described by François Géré : “One has to remember that disputes between the US and European countries are not new at all. The Nixon round and the building of GATT were highly controversial at the beginning of the 70s. The oil shock of 1973 has demonstrated how different the positions towards the Middle East and Israel were. In 1982, the Reagan administration harshly opposed the decision of several European countries to buy gas from the Soviet Union”<sup>20</sup> .

In this case, should we talk about Atlantic partnership? Today, I think, it is clear that globalization has finally weakened euro-atlantic relations.

### **The Atlantic financial economy**

First all let me say that Atlantic Financial integration is, indeed, “extraordinary”: more than 600 billions \$ investments in each of the two Atlantic sides, Atlantic exchanges amounting to more than 650 billions €<sup>21</sup>. Networks of Atlantic interdependence are of unrivalled density and quality”<sup>22</sup>. Ironically responding to those who would be afraid of the Atlantic economic tensions, Bernard Cassen, one of the founders of ATTAC, an anti-globalization movement, reassured them: “Straight-away, the importance of the trade conflicts between the two sides have been diminished. If they have been dramatized in the speeches, they affect only 1% of the total exchange volume...The transatlantic economy is closely linked to investments abroad which are a deep force of integration in contrast with trade, a shallow force of integration”<sup>23</sup>. Both Atlantic sides depend on this.

So, it is not surprising to hear the US proposing the creation of a great Atlantic market which could be an element of the New Transatlantic Agenda and Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) The New Agenda has to permit the two parties to unite their forces in order to achieve four common aims : promoting peace, democracy and world development ; answering world challenges; contributing to world trade strengthening ; reinforcing transatlantic economic relations and initiatives <sup>24</sup>

But European governments remain very cautious. Economic, cultural and social differences exist on both sides of the Atlantic. For instance, the Europeans don't want to introduce GMO (genetically modified organisms) on their territory, which led president Bush to say – and not as a joke - that the European Union didn't want to feed the African nations ! It has been hard to reach consensus in a number of areas: from « open sky » to « wine » agreements. For example, the wine agreement signed in 2005 is not satisfying from the European point of view. American producers obtained the right officially to use European brands (Appellations d'origine contrôlée (AOC)) like Champagne, Chablis, Porto or Chianti, which had been used by them without any authorization for American wines. However, producers are forbidden now to use another AOC to describe American wines. Without this agreement asked by EU because Europe was the litigant, European wines would not have got free access to the US market, as a French report of the national Assembly states. The European Union has too introduced an action at the WTO against over taxation of European steel products by US<sup>25</sup>. Tension persists about public aid to aeronautic companies (Boeing & Airbus). The banana conflict has been settled, but against European Union interests. As in the wine case, the big American companies obtained from WTO

the withdrawal of favourable dispositions to ACP countries. Since January 2006, the European market has been opened to all origins bananas, except a quota of 775.000 tons free of taxes for the ACP. All bananas will be taxed at the level of 176 \$ per ton, which endangers the European bananas production because the Latin America bananas are so cheap as they even compete the European Caribbean bananas. For reasons of security, American custom officers are searching ships leaving European ports for America<sup>26</sup>. In another important case, tensions between the two powers have arisen regarding the cultural diversity or “l’exception culturelle européenne” (“the European cultural exception”), in French, which has been solved by an old directive “télévision sans frontières”/”television without borders”, and the recognition by UNESCO against American opposition, in October 2005 for the need of protection of the cultural differences in the world. The EU has always said that cultural productions, processes and service would not belong to the commercial sphere and couldn’t be treated like industrial goods. The convention, approved by 148 votes against 2 (US and Israel) and 4 abstentions, was desired by EU and Canada in order to preserve cultural diversity in the world and to escape culture from the merchandising of the globalization]<sup>27</sup>. The complex files of agriculture and development aid to the ACP countries are still hot. On this last spot Europe takes the risk to abandon the special relationship with Africa and with the ACP countries, even if these are written in to the Treaty of Rome and in spite of the human and historical links with former African colonies of some states of Europe. And what, Europeans ask, does the new American economic and military policies in Africa actually mean?<sup>28</sup>

It therefore seems the case that a free-trade area under American leadership would be nonsense if it were to weaken or cancel the distinctive path of European integration.

### **The Lisbon strategy**

Another reason exists which acts as a brake upon any closer Atlantic partnership : that is the technological gap in new information and communications technologies (NICT) which is to the detriment of Europe.

The US has achieved an information revolution, thanks to massive investment, and by winning supremacy in high tech areas which the EU was unable to do it.. Like President Clinton said: « *Shaping the world, shaping the mind* ». We might now wonder if President Bush doesn’t wish to sustain a « controlled maintenance of that technology gap »<sup>29</sup>.

The European assessment in this field is not at all satisfying . Many European researchers are leaving to US, China now or Japan. Will yet the great technological successes of Europe such as Airbus, very high speed train (TGV), knowledge of human genome, medical research, CERN, Ariane-espace, continue in the future? While the WWW (Word wide web) was created at the



CERN by European researchers, it was developed by American companies. The Nobel prizes, between 2003 – 2005, have been won in great numbers by Americans: 51,4 % of all the Nobel, but 65,2% of the scientific prizes (chemistry, medicine, physics) compared to 15,2% to Europeans.

<b>Chemistry</b>	<b>6 USA</b>	<b>1 France</b>	<b>1 Israël</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Economy</b>	<b>3 USA</b>	<b>1 Norway 1 UK</b>	<b>1 Israël</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Literature</b>		<b>1 UK 1 Austria</b>	<b>1 Sud Africa</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Medicine</b>	<b>3 USA</b>	<b>1 UK</b>	<b>2 Australia</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Peace</b>			<b>1 Egypt, 1 Kenya 1 Iran</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Physics</b>	<b>6 USA</b>	<b>1 Danemark, ½ UK</b>	<b>½ Russe 1 russe</b>	<b>9</b>
	<b>18 USA</b>	<b>7 ½ Europe</b>	<b>9 ½ others</b>	<b>35</b>

The future of globalized world will depend on the « convergence between nanotechnologies, biotechnologies, inflation techs and cognitive sciences, (NBIC) », explains a researcher of Collège interarmées de défense<sup>30</sup>.

At the same time, the Europeans want to take up the challenge of innovation in their own way, and not by following American strategic choices. They relaunched both the Lisbon strategy to make the EU "the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world" , and the European research Area (ERA). For instance, the budget of the seventh Framework programme for Research and technological Development ( FP 7) will increase from 72,7 billions € from 2007 to 2013 from 3,7 billions ecus in 1982<sup>31</sup>. But EU is not focusing primarily on great plans such as the conquest of space. It has instead chosen seven sectors to develop : genomic and biotechnology for health, Information society technology; nanotechnology; aeronautics and space; food safety; sustainable development and global changes,; citizenship and governance.

So, European technological choices are designed to serve a specifically European societal and social project. The Union is stressing the importance of renewable energy and environmental protection, biological agriculture and food safety.

### **Europe and the emergent countries challenge**

Facing the quick growth of China, India or even Latin America, USA and Europe have not adopted the same diplomatic process.

In Latin America, Europe gave priority to region-to-region agreements such as an agreement with the Mercosur<sup>32</sup>, while the United States negotiated the Free-Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) with each country of the Andin pact separately. This project arouses debate on

the real intentions of US. It plans to eliminate all tariffs “from Alaska to the Fire Land » and it affects all Economic sectors, arousing sceptical or ironical comments according to Argentine political scientist Atilio Boron who called it “a project for continental annexation”<sup>33</sup>.

Europeans already know a great deal about Chinese or Indian powers because of delocalisation and Asiatic investments in Europe. The President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barosso, said in October 2005: « Now, China ranks third in the world in terms of its volume of foreign merchandise trade, after the EU and the US. How many of you think it will remain in third position?»<sup>34</sup> Europeans know that EU uses growth of China or India. EU is the first partner of China and its first provider of advanced technologies. The Commission thinks Europe doesn't have to be afraid by the growth desire of Indian and Chinese peoples (“desire for growth on the parts of the Indians and Chinese”).] In this context, the European Commission has called for common European and American leadership “to strengthen and support the international community's multilateral, rules-based architecture”<sup>35</sup> The Atlanticists of the European Commission want Euro-American cooperation to face the Asiatic challenges<sup>36</sup>. Richard N. Haass says the same: “Our goal should be to integrate China into the international system, to make it a pillar of the global establishment”<sup>37</sup>..

There are, indeed, no problems on the common final aim: making China a pillar of the world trade system, but in finding a common European and American leadership vis-à-vis the growth of China and India. Nonetheless we must ask ourselves why rush ?<sup>38</sup> China and Japan have agreed to buy American Treasury bonds, in the framework of the « greatest alliance », wrote *Le Monde*<sup>39</sup>, while European Union is appearing more as a traditional trade area for the Asian capitalist game. Is it in European interest(s) that China continues this special relationship with US ? Will it last ? Doesn't a risk for war even exist between China and the USA? If it is possible, what should be the European Foreign economic policy towards China?]<sup>40</sup>.

Currently, the key to Atlantic world relations with Asia is more in Beijing and Washington than in Europe. We don't see any common action, or leadership, in approaching Asia. That means that America and China are economically more integrated themselves than EU and China are. That means that the relation between America and China is more important than the Europe-China one's. That means that the US is leading its own policy in this area as elsewhere and doesn't need Europe.

### **Happiness and power**

From Europe, the competition in innovation led by the USA seems to serve American unilateralism. The European Union does not have the same raw power objectives, due to the history of European integration<sup>41</sup>. Indeed we can go further. Apparently, happiness seems to be

the design of the integrated Europe according to the Constitution project<sup>42</sup>. As concisely he explained, François Géré writes that the European Union states “have a common motive: Europe must become for the next generations a peaceful, stable and thriving area. Security has to be the rule and with it the respect of personal rights of each European citizen. War mustn’t be a lawful means. Disputes can’t be solved by a ferocious and barbarian ethnic cleaning. Peace can’t be restored by launching half-ton bomb”<sup>43</sup>.

If the United States and Europe are linked by Economic and Financial interests and Political too, they still can’t merge their international policies, first because of the resistance of sovereignty of European nation states; second, because American and European societies have their own identities and their own aspirations. The European Union is seeking a coordinated management of international relations<sup>44</sup>.

### **What future for EU in the transatlantic relation?**

Although we know that the European Union is not an equal partner with the United States, it is deeply involved in international relations, and often on its own terms. Is Europe able to be anything else than on a spoke of the world wheel operated by Washington, as Josef Joffe suggests?<sup>45</sup> No, it doesn’t, answers this author: “Even though Europe spins an economic and monetary integration web which is spreading, the axis of the global strategy converges on Washington”. Is Europe drifting away like Richard Haass wrote? He has written in the *New York Time*: “What should U.S. policy be toward a rising China ? Or toward an emerging India, a newly assertive Japan, a drifting Europe, or a less democratic and possibly declining Russia?”<sup>46</sup> We can’t have any doubts, of course, when we read: “Europeans must shed their illusions about what they can accomplish in the world on their own .... It is neither feasible nor desirable for Europe to establish itself as a geopolitical equal or competitor of the US.” Europeans are invited by the US government to fall behind the US. He says however that “the US should support European integration, because a strong Europe is at least a potential strategic partner, whereas a weak Europe is not”<sup>47</sup>.

And yet, the EU is a reality and shows each day that it is decided to take its part of responsibility in the International relations as show its involvements in Sub-Saharan Africa, Palestine, in the Iranian dispute on the nuclear power, in Macedonia and Bosnia, with the TPI (Tribunal pénal international) (“International Criminal Tribunal”), and in policies for environmental safety and against the unequal development. Sustainable development demands multilateral governance in management of environment and energy access. Is the US ready to get in such relation with the EU in order to have a common leadership? There are no political scientists who predict an equal partnership with EU<sup>48</sup>.

But European public opinion believes in European power, according to a poll driven by *Transatlantic Trends 2005*. 70 % of the Europeans are even in favour of a Europe as a super-power. By contrast, only 47% of Americans themselves agree with this idea, even in case of disagreement with the Europeans with the American policy. Upholding these positions, the polls say that 54% of the Americans wish to reinforce the Atlantic partnership and 55% of the Western Europeans think that EU should have a more independent international security and diplomatic policy.<sup>49</sup>

So, if we try to flesh out this position with realistic policies, I think suited to the situation, according to philosopher T. Todorov, that Europe can be a “quiet power”, founded on the Enlightenment philosophy and a military autonomy<sup>50</sup>. Indeed, in contrast with the American unilateralism in all fields, more obvious since the 9/11 drama, an element of the « quiet power » could be Economic multilateralism, which means an international negotiated management of trade, resources like environmental resources, energy sources, water reserves, which is a necessity according to many political observers : “Multilateralism can be win-win. We must in the same time understand the difference with America and act with America because it is necessary for us as Europe is for them, explained P. Verluise, director of the seminar "Europe's geopolitics" at the Collège interarmées de Défense<sup>51</sup>. Finally, it is good that UNESCO has decided to declare cultural diversity as “common heritage of Humanity”, against American pressures, because it has destroyed then the so-called shocks of civilisation and has open the way to respect the multilateralism<sup>52</sup>.

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An Atlantic partnership is acceptable if European Cultural, Linguistic, Social and Economic diversities are preserved. And however Europe feels a threat through Globalisation which is so often seen as an instrument of Americanisation. The European Union is weak but not drifting. [ « Whenever the Europeans go all over the place and are divided, how do you want the Americans to work with the EU ? Of course they are then going to work with the individual countries. It is a bit easy to say that they divide us. We divide ourselves” Jim Cloos, director in the Council of Union says.<sup>53</sup> If the Union definitively wants to behave as “a global power in the Economic, Social, Environmental governance of the world”, it must talk as a united power<sup>54</sup>. This short overview of the period 1945-2006 demonstrates that it is European integration that has recreated the conditions of European influence. Of course, Atlantic economic integration represents a mighty trend ever since 1944. But the Atlantic Economic and Financial interactions do not necessarily create the political unity of action between the two sides of the Atlantic. According to an article from the review *Europe's World*, pertaining to our problem, it seems that trouble between the two banks of Atlantic is rising because the political, even mental, position of now US

leaders and not because economic or commercial tensions<sup>55</sup>. Does, however, this trouble only depends on the short term situation? We will conclude on the specificity of the two sides of Atlantic. Beyond an economic integration which seems inevitable in an open world and which will spread to another part of industrial countries, beyond the necessary bilateral cooperation due to the old friendship, to hope overcoming the political and cultural differences between the two is both an unrealizable dream and a mistake. So, in reality, there are still two views about our uncertain world, and they vary, depending upon which side of the Atlantic you are.

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<sup>1</sup> Source, EC declaration , 1rst July 1968, <http://www.ena.lu/mce.cfm>

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Foreign relations, série YI 667, 2 juin 1948, "Note relative à la charte de la Havane, pour une organisation internationale du commerce", auteur inconnu.

<sup>3</sup> Ministry of Foreign relations, série DE-CE 333, JPB 25 février 1949, CE, Commerce avec l'Est européen, secret.

<sup>4</sup> Articles 18, 29, 110 and the following, preamble of the ECE treaty .

<sup>5</sup> Archives of the European Union, Brussels, BAC 1/1971, 53, Commission, DG des Relations extérieures, 1<sup>er</sup> octobre 1958, « Problèmes des relations avec les pays à économie planifiée » (note présentée par M. Rey).

<sup>6</sup> « Les relations extérieures de la Communauté par Jean Rey président du groupe des relations extérieures » *Bulletin de la CEE*, 1959, n° 4, p. 19.

« Les États-Unis et le marché commun, discours du président Kennedy du 11 janvier 1962 devant le 87<sup>e</sup> Congrès, message sur l'état de l'Union », *Bulletin de la CEE* n° 2 février 1962, p. 36

<sup>7</sup> Archives of the European Union, Brussels, réunion de la Commission du marché commun, 1966 PV 274, 2, III 2, 4-5

<sup>8</sup> Archives of the European Union, Brussels, 1968 PV49,2,XXVIII,13

<sup>9</sup> Lucia Coppolaro, "Setting the tone of international trade: the United States and the EEC in the GATT negotiations of the Kennedy Round (1962-1967)", *L'originalité des Communautés européennes dans le processus de mondialisation*, Cahiers du CICC, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 2006.

*FRUS* 1961-1963, IX, Section 11/227, Paper prepared by the President's Special Assistant Petersen, Proposal for 1962 United States Foreign Trade and Tariff Legislation, 4 October 1961 and ibidem 11/230 Memorandum from Ball to President Kennedy, 23 October 1961.

<sup>10</sup> Archives of the European Union, Brussels, BAC 3/1978 574 , SEC(69) 4656, 3 décembre 1969, télex de P. Malvé « réflexions sur l'état des relations entre la Communauté et les États-Unis » ; BAC 3/1978 574 , pas de

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date précise, 1970, télex de P. Malvé, « un haut fonctionnaire du département du commerce, M. Kenneth Davis se plaint de l'incompréhension manifestée par la Communauté à l'égard des États-Unis 10 mars 1970 ».

<sup>11</sup> In 1970, exportations of American farm productions had doubled compared with 1958, going from billion dollars to 1.992 billion dollars. They had more increased to the ECE area than the rest of the world, representing 22.2% of all the American agricultural exportations in 1970. The UE aid to farmers was 0.862 billion \$ in 1970, the American aid to its farmers was 1.332 billion £ according to *Bulletin des CE* n° 11, 1971.

<sup>12</sup> Woolen textiles, Italian tomatoes and dairy products ; Archives of the European Union, Brussels, meetings of the ECE Commission, minutes, 1968 PV35,2,XIII,8-9 ; 1968PV56,2,XXI,16-17

<sup>13</sup> Archives of the European Union, Brussels, BAC 25/1980, 1983, « Discours prononcé par M. Dahrendorf, membre de la Commission des Communautés européennes devant le Parlement européen, à Luxembourg, le 19 janvier 1971 ».

<sup>14</sup> « La CEE et les questions monétaires internationales, R. Marjolin vice président de la Commission, discours devant le Parlement européen, 23 mars 1965 », *Bulletin de la CEE*, mai 1965, n° 5

<sup>15</sup> French National Archives, Fonds G. Pompidou, 5AG2, (provisoire), Woimant, 665, SGCI, communiqué final de la conférence de La Haye des 1-2 décembre 1969.

<sup>16</sup> French National Archives, Fonds G. Pompidou, 5AG2, 1042, 13 mars 1970, projet de conseil interministériel sur les questions européennes, jeudi 12 mars 1970, 16h 30.

<sup>17</sup> French National Archives, Fonds G. Pompidou, 5 AG 2, 1012, 18 septembre 1971, Note pour M. Jobert. [without origin, perhaps JR. Bernard, technical counsellor to the Presidency of the Republic]; Jacques Van Helmont, *Options européennes, 1945-1985*, publications des Communautés européennes, Luxembourg, 1986, p. 146. In August 1971, after suspension of the dollar-convertibility in gold, a tax surcharge of 10% has been imposed on the importations to the US and fiscal advantages have been set up to facilitate purchases in the US.

<sup>18</sup> « Déclaration faite par M. Mario Ferrari-Aggradi, président du Conseil, 22 septembre 1971 devant le Parlement européen », *Bulletin des CE*, n° 9/10, 1971, p. 15.

<sup>19</sup> Archives of the European Union, Brussels, 4 juin 1962, PV 190,2, XI.1, 5-6

<sup>20</sup> Director of Institut Defense & Diplomatie 21, (Paris-based think-tank), "The Transatlantic Partnership: from a troubled love story to a pragmatic grown-up relation", in <http://www.diploweb.com/english/transatlantic.htm>.

<sup>21</sup> Joseph P. Quinlan, *Dérive ou rapprochement ? La prééminence de l'économie transatlantique*, préface de Daniel S. Hamilton, notes de la Fondation Robert-Schuman, n° 23, Paris, juin 2004, original title in English : "Drifting Apart or Growing Together ? The primacy of the Transatlantic Economy".

612 billions dollars are invested in Europe by US and 640 by Europe in US. The amounts have been multiplied by 360 (nominal value) since 1946 ! Source for trade exchanges: European Parliament.

<sup>22</sup> Daniel S. Hamilton est Directeur du Center for Transatlantic Relations, Directeur exécutif de l' American Consortium on EU Studies – EU Center Washington,DC. Voir son discours à l'ouverture du bureau à Washington, D.C., de la société de recherche allemande Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, le 17 septembre 2002 ; voir également Daniel Hamilton, *Die Zukunft ist nicht mehr, was sie war: Europa, Amerika, und die neue strategische Landschaft*, Stuttgart: Robert Bosch Stiftung, 2001.

<sup>23</sup> Bernard Cassen, « Intégration au-delà des contradictions, l'apparent affrontement transatlantique », *Le monde diplomatique*, septembre 2004, pages 30 et 31.

<sup>24</sup> The action programme lists 150 specific actions. Source: European Parliament, technical fiches 6.3.6 : « Les États-Unis et le Canada », [http://www.europarl.eu.int/facts/6\\_3\\_6\\_fr.htm](http://www.europarl.eu.int/facts/6_3_6_fr.htm).

<sup>25</sup> November 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2005, Information report of the National Assembly for the European Union on the proposal of decision of the Council regarding the conclusion of the agreement on the wine trade between the European Community and the US, (COM [2005] 547 final/ E 3002), supported by M. Philippe-Armand MARTIN, député.

<sup>26</sup> Ali Laïdi, « Espionnage économique, arme cachée des grandes puissances », *Le Monde diplomatique*, mars 2005, p. 4 et 5.

<sup>27</sup> Jean –Michel Baer, "L'exception culturelle. Une règle en quête de contenus", *Cahiers en temps réel*, n°11, octobre 2003. See details of the convention on the web site of UNESCO.

<sup>28</sup> Tanguy Struye de Swielande, « Le retour de Washington sur le continent africain », *Diplomatie Magazine*, n° 12, janvier-février 2005., p. 32-34

<sup>29</sup> « Indépendance de l'Union européenne et technologies de souveraineté. Plaidoyer pour une Europe de la recherche. », par le Chef d'escadron Eric Bio-Farina, 30 mars 2005, Collège inter-armées de défense-<http://www.diploweb.com/forum/biofarina05121.htm>.

<sup>30</sup> Idem, Chef d'escadron Eric Bio-Farina , 30 mars 2005

<sup>31</sup> ECUS were equivalent to dollars ; source : <http://cordis.europa.eu.int/fp7/breakdown.htm>, to distinguish four parts in it : cooperation, ideas, people, capacities (to add : Euratom budget : 3 billions)

<sup>32</sup> Common market of the South cone, signed in 1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, 240 millions inhabitants.

« Le marché latino-américain convoité par les Etats-Unis et l'Union européenne », *Agencia Latino americana de Información y Análisis-Dos (alia2)* 1er mai 2004 .

<sup>33</sup> Atilio Borón is professor at the Buenos Aires university. Specialist in history of Political ideas, executive secretary of the Latino-american Council of Social Sciences.

<sup>34</sup> José Manuel Barroso, "The EU and the US: a declaration of interdependence", Washington, 18 October 2005 SP/05/622, devant la School of Advanced International Studies, [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/news/barroso/sp05\\_622.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/barroso/sp05_622.htm)

<sup>35</sup> Barroso, idem

<sup>36</sup> Cf that is said by Richard N. Haass : " Our goal should be to integrate China into the international system, to make it a pillar of the global establishment" "What to do About China", June 20, 2005, *U.S. News & World Report*

<sup>37</sup> "What to do About China", Richard N. Haass, June 20, 2005, *U.S. News & World Report*

<sup>38</sup> Voir art. cit *Le Monde diplomatique*, juillet 2005.

<sup>39</sup> Eric Le Boucher, « La très grande alliance entre les Etats-Unis et la Chine contre le reste du monde », *Le Monde*,| 24.01.04 | Le Monde. Fr : « Vous m'achetez mes produits", dit la Chine. "Oui, mais vous me financez", répliquent les Etats-Unis. C'est la TGA, la très grande alliance des deux empires du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle. L'accord explicite entre 1 milliard 300 millions d'individus qui se ruent vers les usines de la côte chinoise pour sortir de la misère agricole et les 280 millions les plus riches de la planète qui veulent continuer à consommer comme des fous... »

<sup>40</sup> Jean-François Susbielle, *Chine-USA : la guerre programmée* , First Editions, 2006

<sup>41</sup> Gérard Bossuat, *les fondateurs de l'Europe unie*, Paris, Belin, 2001.

<sup>42</sup> François Géré, « La protection stratégique, instrument de l'autonomie de l'Union européenne », Copyright 10 mai 2004- Géré/[www.diploweb.com](http://www.diploweb.com). He said : « Europe must become for next generations a peaceful, stability and prosperity area. Security must rule, and with it the respect for human rights of each European citizen".

<sup>43</sup> François Géré, « La protection stratégique, instrument de l'autonomie de l'Union européenne », Copyright 10 mai 2004- Géré/[www.diploweb.com](http://www.diploweb.com).

<sup>44</sup> « Les relations Europe / Etats-Unis en 2005 », par Jean Ordessa, Entretien avec Pierre Verluise, 2005, in [www.diploweb.com/forum/ueusaeu.htm](http://www.diploweb.com/forum/ueusaeu.htm).

<sup>45</sup> Olivier Frayssé, *Les Etats-Unis hyperpuissance* , éd. documentation Française, *PPS*, n°846, 2000, 80 p. et Josef Joffe, Olin Institute for Strategic Studies de Harvard

<sup>46</sup> Richard Haass, "Is There a Doctrine in the House?", November 8, 2005, *The New York Times*.

<sup>47</sup> Richard N. Haass "Marriage Counseling for America and Europe", July 1, 2004, *Project Syndicate*, Council on Foreign relation.

<sup>48</sup> See opinions of Simon Serfaty (Specialist of Europe and international relations at the CSIS-Center of Strategic and International Studies), Brzezinski, David Calleo (*Rethinking Europe's Future*, Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>49</sup> Press communiqué, September, 7th, septembre 2005. *Transatlantic Trends 2005* is a project of the German Marshall Fund of the United States and of the Compagnia di San Paolo from Torino (Italy), supported by the Luso-American Foundation (Portugal) and the Fundación BBVA (Espagne). The study concerns the US and ten European countries public opinion about their perceptions of the transatlantic relations.

<sup>50</sup> Concept of « quiet power » is introduced by Tzvetan Todorov, *Le nouveau Désordre mondial : Réflexions d'un Européen*, 2003, Robert Laffont et *L'Esprit des Lumières*, Paris, Robert Laffont, 2006 ; See as well the Bibliothèque nationale de France exhibition : « Les lumières, un héritage pour demain », du 1<sup>er</sup> au 28 mars 2006. Todorov is Directeur de recherches au CNRS ; Historian, philosopher and moralist, he has published 25 books, of which *Mémoire du mal. Tentation du bien, Enquête sur le siècle*, Robert Laffont, Paris 2000.

<sup>51</sup> « Les relations Europe / Etats-Unis en 2005 », par Jean Ordesa, Entretien avec Pierre Verluise, 2005, in [www.diploweb.com/forum/ueusaueu.htm](http://www.diploweb.com/forum/ueusaueu.htm).

<sup>52</sup> « Des biens et des services porteurs d'identité, de valeurs et de sens, bataille à l'Unesco sur la diversité culturelle », *Le Monde diplomatique*, octobre 2005.

<sup>53</sup> Jim Cloos, "On ne peut mettre un terme à une relation de 2,5 billions de dollars", 27 janvier 2006,

<http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:28-151993-16&type=Interview>

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<sup>54</sup> See *Les relations transatlantiques et l'environnement international*, sous la direction de Josiane Tercinet, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, 280 pages.

<sup>55</sup> See *Europe's world*, spring 2006, n° 2, Peter Van Ham, "America's raising anti-Europeanism" p. 30-37, especially p.