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The Prevalence of Populism in South America: Crafting Credible and Competitive Candidates

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The Prevalence of Populism in South America: Crafting Credible and Competitive Candidates

DISSERTATION

submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in Political Science

by

Robert Nyenhuis

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Russell Dalton, Co-Chair
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2016

DEDICATION

To

my amazing parents and loving family around the world

who always supported and encouraged me.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Before I started the dissertation, my father advised me that it would be a long, often lonely, road to completion. I have reached the finish line courtesy of the gracious and unwavering support of those mentioned below. Without them, and others not mentioned, this project would never have been possible.

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2016 "Protecting Elections: Designing Institutions of Electoral Governance in Latin America." (Under review)

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Prevalence of Populism in South America:
Crafting Credible and Competitive Candidates

By

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Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Irvine, 2014

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Populism is a recurring phenomenon in Latin America that periodically shows its face. Candidates utilizing populist tactics have won elections throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The overall consequences of these leaders are open to debate. In this dissertation, I ask: *why do citizens in South America vote for populist candidates?*

In answering this question, I improve the study of populism in a few ways. First, I discuss and trace the development of the concept of populism, and offer my operationalization of populism. I demonstrate that my particular project fills an important gap in the study of populism—namely that I systematically measure and score the populist behavior of presidential candidates, and examine the electoral success of these candidates.

Second, I conduct a continental statistical analysis which represents a comprehensive and theoretically driven attempt to analyze the electoral success of populist candidates. I tested five

independent variables prominent in the literature, and my own original hypothesis. I find that South American citizens are motivated to vote for populist candidates as a result of their evaluations of government performance and sociodemographic factors that are politicized by candidates. Third, I explore the role campaign strategists play in elections, and how candidate traits affect the ability of electoral contenders to craft successful populist messages during the campaign. I find support for my argument that populists are most electorally successful when a confluence of candidate traits, campaign appeals, and electorate characteristics exist. The strength of this overlap rests on the credibility of the populist's message that she will provide both symbolic and programmatic representation to citizens.

CHAPTER I: THE PREVALENCE OF POPULISM IN SOUTH AMERICA

I. Introduction

In March 1990, Alberto Fujimori, a political unknown without any formal party organization and a limited campaign staff polled at one percent in Peruvian public opinion polls (Stein 2012, 128). Roughly five weeks later he received 29.1 percent of votes in the first round of the presidential election. Two months later he trounced notable author Mario Vargas Llosa in the runoff, easily winning with 62.4 percent of the vote. In the matter of months Fujimori politically metamorphosed from complete obscurity to the president-elect (Schmidt 1996, 321). The self-proclaimed "antipolitician" gleefully accepted the nickname of "el Chino" (the Chinaman). In doing so, he skillfully reversed the negative connotations of a derogatory term for Peru's Asian population into an electoral advantage. Traversing the Andes in a tractor, Fujimori dined with rural and "forgotten" citizens of the country. Frequently proclaiming his campaign slogan "A President Like You", Fujimori successfully crafted an image of a social and political outsider with which Peru's traditionally excluded citizens could identify with (Stein 2012, 129). Across Latin America, similar election stories can be found. Charismatic leaders who eschew traditional political institutions have dotted the political landscape in Peru, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua.

While populist presidents have a long history of electoral success, they have often divided society. They routinely antagonize their political and economic enemies, and in some cases their actions in office have had deleterious economic consequences for their countries (Conniff 1999, 2; Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). Some scholars (Castañeda 2006; Rodríguez 2008) have even argued that populist presidents are a direct threat to liberal democracy. The

perseverance of populism in various Latin American countries demonstrates the phenomenon's resilience and its importance to understanding political developments in Latin America. Yet populists have had mixed electoral success in other countries and have been absent from the political arena in still others. This variation raises critical questions about why populists gain ascendance, gain votes, and gain power. In this dissertation I ask: *Why do citizens vote for populist candidates?*

Like other concepts in political science, populism's definition is widely contested. Scholars frequently update their core definitional characteristics over time as they observe evolving political dynamics, generating and perpetuating a lack of consensus on who constitutes a populist leader. Researchers have attempted to define populism or classify actors as populist for more than half a century and the only constant has been disagreement. The lack of commonly accepted definitions and categorization undermines the ability of researchers to consistently compare cases, to share insights and knowledge, and to further our general understanding of populism (Mudde 2007: 12). Not surprisingly, the lack of conceptual agreement contributes to extensive scholarly debate and disagreement about the causes and conditions that facilitate the emergence of populist political actors.

Beyond conceptual disagreement, past scholarship on populism has other shortcomings. In most comparative edited volumes (Conniff et al. 1999, 2012; Drake et al. 1982; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012) and recent cross-national studies (Carreras 2012; Doyle 2011; Madrid 2008) the authors define populism and its component parts, unsystematically select cases, and then examine only positive cases (Weyland 1999:380). As such, we understand relatively little about the absence of populism in countries where it has not emerged. This project contributes a careful operationalization and measurement of populism, in which I examine populists with varying

electoral success: incumbents who obtain re-election, political newcomers who win election, and populists who do not win elections. To my knowledge only two (Hawkins 2010; Hawkins and Castanho 2015) other scholars have operationalized and systematically measured populism. This study provides another effort. I also examine the full range of cases in my outcome of interest, facilitating better theory-testing (Geddes 1991, 133; Goertz and Mahoney 2003, 668) and better answers to the question of why populists are electorally successful in a specific country, continent, or context.

Most studies on populism examine how populists have governed. However, to understand why populists govern the way they have, it is important to understand why they emerged in the first place and why they were elected. The processes of emergence, electoral breakthrough, governance, and endurance in office are distinct, and may not have the same explanations (Mudde 2007; 202). Researchers also tend to focus on "demand-side explanations" and do not consider the motivations or strategic actions of either populist candidates or their opponents. Rather, explanations usually center on macro-structural factors and tend to discount the agency of political actors—individual candidates, their campaign strategists, and party elites—to "craft" a populist candidacy.

This dissertation focuses on the moment of electoral breakthrough – or potential electoral breakthrough, offering a agency-based explanation for why voters choose populist candidates. I argue that populists are electorally successful when there is a confluence among the candidate's characteristics (sociodemographic, political history), the electorate's characteristics and political issues most relevant to it, and the appeals made by the candidate during the campaign. Populists have a greater likelihood of electoral success when there is a larger overlap among these categories. There is greater confluence when the populist can convince voters that she will

represent those who may fall within a certain sociopolitical cleavage. When the cleavage is structured around an immutable characteristic shared by the electorate and the candidate (race, religion, gender, language, etc.), the opposing candidates have less ability to diminish this linkage. On the other hand, when the populist bases her appeals and crafts an image on mutable characteristics and issues (e.g. corruption, leadership, economic proficiency), the opposition can more easily undermine the connection between populist and voter.

This and other studies of populist political actors contribute to several broad debates in political science. These include the evolving role of political parties, the (alleged) perils of presidentialism, and the quality of democracy. Populist leaders tend to be at the helm of vertical (top-down) political organizations that offer an alternative to traditional forms of interest representation (political parties). Successful populists are able to capitalize on low levels of citizen support for and trust in political parties (Doyle 2011; Hawkins 2010). Some scholars (Roberts 1996, 2003; Weyland 1999) argue that the continental shift to neoliberal economic policies—and the resultant structural transformations—in the 1990s severed the institutional linkages that unions and labor-based parties in particular used to provide between citizens and politicians. However, other scholars (Dalton et al. 2011; Hug 2001; Katz and Mair 1994) remind us that parties have not really declined in importance but rather have adapted to major structural changes in politics. Although these scholars focused on Europe their insights may hold for Latin America as well. The study of populist emergence and electoral success will inform an understanding of how political parties have evolved in the region.

In early work, Linz (1990, 1994) argued that presidential systems are inherently flawed. One key reason he highlighted was that such systems increased the likelihood of the ascension of outsider candidates to the highest executive office. In turn, outsider executives were likely to

have an antagonistic and inefficient relationship with the legislative branch, leading to increased political gridlock and political instability. Others (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997) advocated for a more nuanced understanding of presidentialism and cautioned against the homogenous treatment of presidencies across the continent.

Populist presidents may also affect the quality of democracy in the countries of the region. According to some scholars, such leaders tend to centralize power in the executive which may limit government accountability and threaten the traditional notions of liberal democracy (Plattner 2009); their alleged manipulation of the masses may distort citizen participation in politics; and their attacks on political parties and, more generally, the political system may weaken democratic institutions (Weyland 1999, 189). However, others (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012; Roberts 2012) argue that populists may increase the degree of popular *participation* in the political system. An assessment of the ambiguous relationship between populism and democracy has practical importance for the region.

This chapter is divided into four sections. I briefly discuss my conceptual contribution to the study of populism. I then further develop the core argument of the dissertation—that populists are electorally successful when they embody certain characteristics that mirror the electorate and politicize issues most relevant to the electorate—offered above and highlight some additional shortcomings of existing literature. I then present my research design and discuss my findings before providing an overview of the chapters that follow.

II. My Operationalization of Populism

In this dissertation, I view populism as a political strategy employed by actors to mobilize electoral support. I include four components of populism: political discourse, relationship with

followers, political organization, and political history. To begin, populists have traditionally employed a discourse that presents politics as a struggle between the good "people" and the evil elites (de la Torre 2015, 2). They argue that a conspiring minority are taking advantage of the wholesome common people (Hawkins 2010; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). Another hallmark of populism is the direct connection the leader forms with the masses (Weyland 2001). Populists try to convince voters that they are the "more authentic representative of the common people" (Jansen 2015, 105). Similar to Barr (2009) and Weyland (2003), in my conceptualization of populism, populists are the face of their organizations and rely solely on top-down mobilizational strategies. They frequently appear as the sole contenders on their electoral vehicles' tickets. Lastly, per my definition most populist candidates have never held a political position or worked for previous governments. As Roberts (2015: 108, 2014) details, "Populist mobilization, therefore, is quintessentially outsider politics." Table 1.1 below illustrates my operationalization. A more detailed discussion and justification for my definition occurs in Chapter Two.

Table 1.1: My Operationalization of Populism

Political Discourse	Relationship with followers	Political Organization	Political History
Manichean, anti-establishment	Direct and personalistic linkages with followers	Vertical, top-down, limited intermediary institutions	Political outsider

My dissertation focuses on the nine Spanish-speaking countries of South America. I examine presidential elections from 2011 to 2014.[1] In determining which candidates in the

[1] When I started my data collection I focused on each country's most recent election at that moment (September

elections under study were populist, I relied on several sources of information including national newspapers, candidate campaign websites, and political party websites. To score each candidate, I assessed his or her behavior during the month preceding the election in question. A team of undergraduate research assistants from the University of California, Irvine assisted me in collecting and reviewing newspaper articles, sorting through more than 9,000 articles total. I then analyzed all relevant articles, scoring candidates on the four elements of populism mentioned above, averaging the scores, and awarding candidates a final score for the month. My effort at a systematic scoring and identification of populist candidates builds on earlier efforts by Hawkins (2009, 2010), and Hawkins and Castanho (2015).

III. Explaining the Election of Populist Presidential Candidates

In this section I briefly review past arguments for why voters in Latin America would cast ballots for populist presidential candidates. I explain why these efforts do not fully account for variation in populists' electoral success and present my argument.

The prevalence and intensity of populist dynamics vary considerably across Latin America. Table 1.2 offers my scores for populist candidates at the country level, when averaging across all contenders in the countries in my sample of country elections.[2] The table demonstrates that there is considerable variation in the "degree of populism" that marks national political systems – at least judging by the populist tendencies of presidential candidates – across South America. Colombia, Argentina, and Uruguay have the least populist presidential candidates on average. By contrast, Venezuela, Chile, and Ecuador's presidential candidates had stronger

2014). Therefore, I examined the 2011 not 2015 Argentine election. The elections include: Argentina 2011, Bolivia 2014, Chile 2013, Colombia 2014, Ecuador 2013, Paraguay 2013, Peru 2011, Uruguay 2014, and Venezuela 2012.

[2] As discussed in Chapter Two, I was unable to score any newspapers for Brazil due to linguistic shortcomings and newspaper access restrictions. The full scoring for each presidential candidate is discussed in Chapters Two and Three.

populist tendencies. Below I review country-level evidence of conditions that previous scholars have identified that contribute to populist emergence and success.

Table 1.2 Populist Aggregate Score, by Country and Presidential Election

Country	Average Candidate Score Highest score = 8.0	Range	Number of Candidates Scored
Argentina	0.54	0.05	7
Bolivia*	1.44	2.31	5
Chile*	1.88	4.96	9
Colombia	0.37	1.19	5
Ecuador*	1.80	2.34	8
Paraguay*	1.55	2.08	4
Peru	1.19	1.04	5
Uruguay	0.79	1.80	4
Venezuela*	2.93	1.42	2

Notes: The country and year for elections include Argentina 2011, Bolivia 2014, Chile 2013, Colombia 2014, Ecuador 2013, Paraguay 2013, Peru 2011, Uruguay 2014, and Venezuela 2012. Asterisks (*) indicate that at least one populist candidate received 10 percent or more of the vote in that election.

A rich and extensive literature exists on why populists may be able to achieve electoral success. Electoral *success* is yet another arbitrary assessment in political science. Some studies focus on leaders who won the election (Arnston and de la Torre et al. 2013; Conniff et al. 1982, 2012; de la Torre et al 2015; Hawkins 2010; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012) while others examine presidents who received at least 20 percent of the vote (Doyle 2011). Carreras (2012) advances the analysis by examining the vote share of all outsider candidates who ran for president. This study examines all candidates mentioned in newspaper articles the month prior to the election, allowing their discourse, behavior, and other elements present in my definition to define them as populists, and then tracing their electoral trajectory.

Table 1.3 provides country scores on the causal factors posited in the central theories that have been advanced to explain populism in the region. I briefly discuss each explanation in turn and suggest why it does not fully account for the variation in the rough estimate of "presidential populism" offered in Table 1.2 above. Early studies of Latin America's "neo-populists" found that highly corrupt countries provided favorable contexts for populist actors to emerge (Roberts 1996; Schmidt 1996; Weyland 1998).[3] Similarly, Hawkins (2010) found that widespread corruption is a necessary condition for the emergence of populism, and found no populist candidates or executives in countries with low reported rates of corruption. While very corrupt country settings seem to provide very favorable conditions for leaders to attack the establishment and offer an alternative, corruption (as measured by Transparency International [TI]) does not offer much to help explain country levels of populism. In using TI scores for the year prior to the elections I consider, Venezuela is the most corrupt and has the highest levels of presidential populism.[4] However, Argentina and Paraguay also score as more corrupt yet rank towards the lower end of populist density as measured by presidential candidates/winners. At the other end, Chile is one of the least corrupt countries yet three populists competed in the 2013 presidential election. Lastly, Ecuador ranks high in the TI list but has a considerable share of populist candidates.

[3] Neo-populism is a term to refer to the populist leaders who emerged in Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s who blended traditional populist political behavior with neoliberal economic policies.
[4] In 2011, TI scored Venezuela a 19, out of 100. Higher scores reflect less country corruption. These scores can be found in column 2 of Table 1.3 below.

Table 1.3 Country Scores on the Independent Variables[5]											
Country	Country Corruption	Corruption Perceptions	GDP growth	Unemployment	GINI	Country Economy	Personal Economy	Party ID	Trust in the Judiciary	Trust in Political Parties	Trust in Congress
Argentina	29	47.6	4.2	8	44.5	7.6	15.1	19.45	36.7	51.7	34.5
Bolivia	34	30.7	5.7	2.6	46.7	15.2	16.9	15.8	26.0	41.2	15.5
Chile	72	24.9	5.2	7.2	50.8	8.7	11.1	16.7	19.8	30.6	16.3
Colombia	36	60	5.2	10.4	53.5	10.7	31.7	28.3	30.0	53.1	32.2
Ecuador	38	30.7	6	4.4	46.6	26.1	21	22.5	29.1	46.1	29.4
Paraguay	25	43.3	5.4	5	48.2	21.9	31.4	45.7	40.8	50.8	38.2
Peru	35	52.9	6.2	4.3	46.2	14.9	20.2	21.2	32.8	45.4	43.1
Uruguay	73	24.8	4.5	6.5	41.3	25.1	30	60	21.3	32.4	19.9
Venezuela	19	41.4	-0.2	8.2	NA	16.5	18	46.9	25.3	30.0	24.0
Average	40.1	39.6	5.6	6.3	47.2	16.3	21.7	30.7	29.1	42.4	28.1

[5] Country corruption scores are for the year before the election under study here and vary from 19 to 73. The scores all come from TI's annual corruption index and are publicly available at its website: http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview. A higher score indicates less corruption. Corruption perceptions include the total percentages of Americasbarometer survey respondents who believe corruption to be either "very widespread" or "somewhat widespread". These figures come from the AB survey completed most recently before each election of interest. GDP growth, unemployment, and the GINI are three-year averages prior to election. These data all come from the WB's website: http://data.worldbank.org/. Both country economy and personal economy are the percentage of survey respondents who answered that the economic situation had improved in the past 12 months. Trust in the judiciary, political parties, and congress is the percentage of citizens who have either no or very little trust in these institutions. All these survey responses again come from the AB surveys completed most recently before the elections

Beyond TI rankings, citizen perceptions of corruption at the country level offer even less explanatory power. The three countries whose citizens believe corruption to be generally widespread, according to citizen responses in the Americasbarometer surveys, include Colombia, Peru, and Argentina. None of these countries had very strong populist candidates, and all have low country averages of populism (Table 1.2 above). Again, those countries with more positive citizen evaluations of corruption in the Americasbarometer surveys (Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador) had several populists enter the presidential race under study here.[6] In short, corruption seems to be neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for populist emergence or electoral success.

Economic explanations always feature in studies of voting behavior in Latin America. A prominent and recurring explanation in the literature for the electoral success of populist leaders is that they capitalize politically on periods of great socioeconomic inequality and abysmal economic conditions (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Weyland 1999). Weyland (1999, 395), in a cross-regional analysis of Eastern Europe and Latin America, argues that severe inflationary crises are a necessary condition for neoliberal populists to emerge. Latin America is a region that for the past few decades has been the most unequal in the world (Weyland 2003), constantly suffers through economic disasters and continues to be beset by high levels of poverty.

Across the nine Spanish-speaking countries of South America, I find less than satisfactory evidence for an economic account of populism. The argument holds for some degree for Venezuela, as that country had South America's lowest GDP growth and second-highest unemployment rate but still re-elected Hugo Chávez, an obvious populist.[7] However, Chavez

[6] Discussed later in the dissertation, Chile's 2013 election featured three populist contenders, Bolivia's 2014 election featured two, and Ecuador's 2013 election featured four. These countries' presidential candidates' average populist scores were some of the highest in the sample (Table 1.2 above).

[7] Venezuela's annual GDP growth was -3.2% in 2009, -1.5% in 2010, and 4.2% in 2011. Its three-year annual average 8.2% unemployment rate was second only to Colombia (10.2%). All data come from the World Bank's

ran as an incumbent, in the election under consideration here, and his incumbency status and poor economic performance should have decreased his vote share and increased the vote share for his rival, Capriles Radonski. However, Chávez won the 2012 election by roughly 9 percent. Other countries with poor economic performance—Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay—had the three lowest levels of populism.[8] Conversely, two countries with the best economic performances—Ecuador, Bolivia—had high levels of populism, and have even been referred to as cases of "serial populism" (Roberts 2014, 53).

The support is again mixed at best for the posited negative association between citizens' perceptions of economic conditions and the electoral success of populist presidential candidates. Citizens of Ecuador, Uruguay, and Paraguay all had the best evaluations of economic conditions. This provides some support that better economic perceptions deflate support for populist candidates, although Ecuador had a very high level of populism. Conversely, countries' in which citizens had the worst perceptions of economic conditions—Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Bolivia—all had varying levels of populism. Chile fits best for the argument, with three populist outsiders competing in the 2013 contest. However, the populist in Bolivia, Evo Morales, competed in the 2014 election as an incumbent. His incumbency status again detracts from arguments that these conditions facilitate populist outsiders. Moreover, the successful re-election of populist incumbents (Morales, Chávez, and Correa) blur the expected theoretical relationships offered in the populism literature. Throughout this dissertation I consider how populist candidates' incumbency affects citizens' motivations for voting for populist candidates.

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publicly available economic indicators.

[8] In the three years prior to Argentina's 2011 election, the country's GDP averaged 4.2% growth and its unemployment rate averaged 8%. Colombia's numbers for 2011 to 2013 were: 5.2% average GDP growth and 7.2% unemployment. Uruguay averaged 4.5% GDP growth and 6.5% unemployment from 2011 to 2013. The averages for Spanish-speaking South America were: 5.6% GDP growth and 6.3% unemployment.

The debt crisis that swept through Latin America in the 1980s severely damaged the credibility of political parties. For the last three decades, political party identifications have declined significantly in the South America (Wibbels and Roberts 1999; Roberts 2003). The detachment and de-alignment of voters with parties have created a "political vacuum" that provides a perfect political setting for populist candidates to exploit (Roberts 1995; Barr 2003).

Once again, the evidence for this explanation is mixed. Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina had the lowest levels of citizen identification with political parties.[9] In Bolivia populist incumbent Morales used his party, the MAS, to extend his presidential tenure. This argument may fit best in Chile. The 2013 election featured three populist outsiders: Franco Parisi, Marcel Claude, and Roxana Miranda. However, Argentina had one of the lowest levels of country populism average. Conversely, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Paraguay all have high levels of party identification. Uruguay has a low level of populism while Venezuela and Paraguay both saw populist candidates win their elections.

Lastly, several scholars have argued that the key factor contributing to the electoral success of populist presidential candidates is the public's lack of trust in political institutions—political parties, the judiciary, and the legislature (Barr 2003, Roberts 1998). Widespread mistrust in these institutions creates favorable conditions for populists to publicly denounce and distance themselves from these organizations (Doyle 2011). Candidates can mobilize public disenchantment with the political establishment using populist appeals (Ellner 2003). Thus, the

[9] 19.5 percent of Argentinian respondents in the 2010 AB survey claimed to be affiliated with a political party; 15.8 percent of Bolivian respondents in the 2014 AB survey; and 16.7 percent of Chilean respondents in the 2012 AB survey. All data are publicly available from LAPOP's website: http://datasets.americasbarometer.org/database/usersearchform.php.

perpetuation of perceptions that there are unequal patterns of political inclusion, that citizens are not represented by these institutions, provides a fertile electoral environment for populists.

I find mixed support for this explanation. Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela all have the lowest aggregate levels of trust in political institutions. In both Chile and Venezuela, there were multiple populist contenders competing, and the overall level of populism was high. Conversely, Uruguay had a much lower populist average with the only "mild" populist receiving a low vote share. More convincing is the fact that countries with the highest combined levels of trust in political institutions (Paraguay, Argentina, and Peru) witnessed some of the lowest levels of populism – although it bears mentioning that Horacio Cartes won the Paraguayan election with a well-orchestrated populism campaign.

In sum, while this analysis must be considered somewhat speculative given the high level of abstraction at which the phenomenon of interest are being considered and the very short time period discussed, it does seem to suggest that some of the dominant theories for the emergence and electoral success of populist presidential candidates have somewhat limited explanatory power when one examines populism cross-nationally. They identify conditions that in many countries are present yet do not lead presidential candidates to engage in populist discourse or behavior. Thus, more theorizing is needed to account for why populists can successfully exploit favorable political environments.

My argument: A Strategic Theory of Populism

The conditions I have discussed above no doubt provide a very favorable context for a populist candidate to have electoral success. However, many of these conditions have been prevalent in most Latin American countries since the transition to democracy. In some cases no

populists competed in elections when these conditions have been present. In other countries different populist candidates have had varying levels of electoral success in successive elections when these underlying conditions have been stable. Lastly, two or more populists have competed in the same election but not won the contests or received strikingly different vote percentages. Therefore, something else must be at play to explain why some populist candidates are able to better capitalize on these conditions than others, and why the same populist candidate may have varied success across electoral attempts.

Further, some existing explanations do not do enough to consider the interaction between populists and the other presidential candidates, or the interaction among populist candidates and the voters. Work on populism could do more to consider how traditional political parties respond and react to their own failures. What actions do they undertake when they lose members or fail to retain votes across elections from their traditional support bases? When political actors conduct "damage control" they may be able to survive challenges from populist contenders. Or, as discussed throughout this dissertation, the opponents of populists may undermine their credibility and populist appeals. A more pressing challenge to existing explanations is why populists competing in the same election have varying electoral success. Most scholars have identified conditions that may account for cross-national variation but cannot explain within-case variation.

In formulating the argument advanced in this dissertation, I seek to offer a supply-side based argument to better help account for why fertile political conditions do or do not allow for populist electoral success. I argue that populist presidential candidates are successful when they craft a message that 1) either constructs and politicizes a new cleavage or politicizes an existing cleavage in the country, and 2) is credible – that convinces voters that they are the most qualified

to address the specific concerns afflicting a sizeable portion of the country. The second condition is most important and ultimately determines whether the populist has electoral success.

The credibility, and ultimate success, of the populist's message depends on several factors—his or her political history, professional background, and characteristics (class, ethnicity, or geographical affiliation, for instance). An electoral contender's immutable characteristics like ethnicity, gender, religion, and age lend a certain authenticity to their message. Immutable characteristics hamstring a populist opponent's ability to challenge or discredit the populist's connection to the electorate. Conversely, populists who base their appeals on traits that can be much more easily eroded (e.g. economic proficiency) are much more vulnerable to their opponents' attacks. A populist candidate is more likely to be successful when she can politicize some kind of social division, articulate an agenda and make campaign promises that would provide significant substantive representation and tangible benefits to as many groups of citizens as possible. Normally this group of citizens would feel excluded or marginalized from the political system, and the populist would exploit this (Pappas 2012).

IV. Research Design and Findings

This dissertation adopts a mixed-methods approach, drawing on the strengths of both the quantitative and qualitative methodological traditions. I start with a large-N quantitative analysis with the aim of explaining why citizens vote for populist candidates. In the statistical analysis, I use survey data from the Americasbarometer project and consider micro-level explanations. The results from my models and my systematic scoring of all countries inform my selection of country cases, leading me to choose the 2014 Bolivian and 2013 Chilean presidential elections. The Bolivian case is important for populism as the election featured a highly popular populist

president who is the current longest serving executive in the region. Morales' incumbency allows for an examination of how populists change their behavior over time after initial electoral success. This has yet to be systematically studied. The Chilean case allows for fascinating discovery of why populists emerged in a least likely case – a country known for its political stability and institutionalized traditional political parties – and how *three* populist candidates, one of whom was a complete political outsider, emerged to compete in a presidential context.

I have two goals in my case studies: 1) to confirm my hypothesized relationships (i.e., to further evaluate whether the statistically significant hypothesized factors actually led citizens to vote for populist candidates), and 2) to probe the causal mechanisms at work (Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Put differently, these more detailed studies allow me to examine whether citizens actually voted for populists for the reasons my statistical models suggest, and to explore the underlying connections between those factors and citizens' voting behavior. I employ process tracing and conduct within-case analysis. In short, I explore the motivations and decision-making of voters.

In assessing citizens' motivations, I first analyze survey data. Many public opinion surveys that respondents which issues are the most pressing for them. I acknowledge that voters' motivations and decisions are also conditioned by the actions of political actors—namely, the candidates campaigning for their votes. Part of what makes a certain candidate's appeal to voters more successful is how convincingly she can frame her narrative. I argue that candidates and their messages are "crafted" by parties and strategists in an effort to exploit political and socioeconomic disillusion among citizens. In order to test these assessments I collected data on the campaign strategies and effectiveness of candidates. I conducted semi-structured interviews

with party elites, campaign strategists, political insiders, and journalists. Drawing on all of these sources, I tried to accurately re-create how the campaign was waged. I investigated how populists tried to reach their targeted audiences and mobilize them to vote.

My analyses yield several findings. First, I find support for my argument that populists have considerable electoral success when they embody certain characteristics that forge a connection with the electorate and credibly convince voters that they will represent them on vital issues. Evo Morales in Bolivia has masterfully presented himself as the sole representative of indigenous people in the country, while also employing populist tactics to increase his national appeal. Even a decade after his initial electoral success, Morales continues to receive mostly unwavering support from the country's majority indigenous population. However, his governing strategies have caused a rupture within specific sectors of this key voting bloc. Morales' response to this rupture has been twofold. First, he sought to shore up support with the indigenous population through a combination of direct populist appeals to poor indigenous communities (both rural and urban), and by framing the 2014 election as a choice between the continuation of an inclusive, Plurinational state versus a return to the exclusive past. Second, Morales and his campaign team knew that economic performance is the major predictor of voter motivations in Bolivia. Morales extended his base of support across the country by utilizing state resources for electoral gain (he distributed government largesse via inaugurating several infrastructural projects in key electoral regions) and cozying up to previous political enemies, eastern entrepreneurs, who have benefitted from the economic boom in Bolivia.

Franco Parisi, a charismatic economics professor, played up his outsider status to tap into Chileans' discontentment with their traditional political parties. For months Parisi credibly

communicated that he was different from normal politicians. As an outsider, the country's political establishment had not corrupted him. He also convinced large segments of the population that he would more equitably distribute the country's immense wealth. Buoyed by his tagline that Chile "*está forrado*" (is swimming in money), he gained considerable electoral traction as the "economist of the poor". His credible message, however, was undermined by an aggressive attack launched by another candidate, Evelyn Matthei, in the last few weeks of the campaign. Releasing public documents that accused Parisi of gross mismanagement of a private school, Matthei successfully eroded Parisi's image as a clean cut skilled professional.

Second, the incumbency status of populists highly conditions citizens' evaluations of these candidates. The current crop of populists varies considerably in their political histories. Similar to what others have found, incumbency confers significant electoral advantages *but also* conditions what claims populists can make. Moreover, incumbency conditions citizens' voting behavior, making it easier for them to determine who should be rewarded or punished at the ballot box. Third, and related, is the importance of a candidate's history—whether she is seen as part of the establishment or a complete outsider. Outsider status clearly conditions the ability of a candidate to attack the establishment and mobilize voters who feel marginalized. Chile, a country with a strong tradition of well-established political parties, had three outsider populists compete in the 2013 election. All three candidates vehemently attacked the political establishment and parties, attempting to capitalize on citizen disillusionment with traditional political institutions.

Fourth, I found that demographic factors matter greatly. Usually treated as simple control variables, these predictors offered considerable explanatory power across my models. Demographic factors matter for the study of populism, and more importantly to my theory,

because they are potential cleavages that populists can exploit. Past theories of populism have centered on political conditions relating to government performance that populists could exploit. However, I advance past arguments by examining how sociodemographic traits of electorates could condition their voting motivations. Fifth, contemporary Latin American populists are often labeled "radical" or as part of a "revolutionary left" (Castañeda 2006; Weyland 2009). However, I found that populists in the nine Spanish-speaking countries of South America occupy a variety of area on the ideological spectrum, ranging from leftist firebrands to right-wing traditionalists.

This study contributes to the study of populism in several ways. Two of the major advances in my study are that I operationalize and measure populism as a continuous rather than dichotomous variable, and I attempt to systematically score the populist behavior of all presidential candidates in the elections under study. Examining populism as a continuous variable and considering each candidate in the elections that I studied (rather than taking for granted that some candidates are populist and others are not) allow me to systematically chart where and when the phenomenon is most visible. Moreover, when one looks at the entire slate of candidates, not just the electorally successful leaders of the dominant parties, it is clear that some elections feature more than one populist candidate. Most studies treat a specific candidate as populist and fail to consider whether multiple populists may compete in a race. This skews the analysis and leads to studies that merely examine the successful populist, which could lead to the erroneous view that these actors are operating in a political vacuum.

I posit that a comprehensive explanation of populism requires both supply-side and demand-side explanations, and I seek to cast the light on supply-side explanations that have gone largely unnoticed and unexamined in most studies of Latin American populism (Carreras 2012

the lone exception). More specifically, I argue that the strategic decisions made by campaign strategists affect the interactions between populist candidates and voters, and populist candidates and their non-populist electoral competitors. Last, to my knowledge, no study has extensively explored why or how political campaign strategists, party elites, and candidates themselves decide to employ populist tactics. I contend that much of populism is "crafted"—a rational decision by competitors to maximize votes. The lessons (successes and failures) political actors learn from attempting to craft and implement these strategies surely affect future political behavior and may provide insights about why populist behavior may be repeated. These considerations, I submit, provide a unique and potentially exciting new way to understand populism.

V. The Remainder of the Dissertation

In chapter two, I provide an overview of past conceptualizations of populism and justify my own operationalization. I discuss the literature on why citizens vote for populist candidates. I outline the data collection and scoring method I used to rate all presidential contenders. Lastly, I present the "populist" scores for all candidates in the presidential elections under study.

In chapter three, I discuss the results of a continental statistical analysis of voting behavior. The chapter represents a comprehensive and theoretically driven attempt to analyze the electoral success of populist candidates. I conduct several quantitative analyses using logistic regression models. I test the explanatory value of four major independent variables drawn from institutional and structural theories: citizens' perceptions of corruption, socioeconomic performance of government, mistrust in public institutions, and low levels of identification with

political parties. Additionally, I investigate the explanatory power of frequently ignored demographic variables (age, gender, race and ethnicity, income).

In chapter four, I present my findings for the Bolivian case study. A country with a rich history and high density of populism, Evo Morales has been a leading face of populism in the continent. I examine the underlying motivations of Bolivian voters by analyzing individual-level data culled from the Americasbarometer surveys. I also draw on information obtained from semi-structured interviews from fieldwork in La Paz in May and June 2015. Generally speaking, I find that citizens voted for Morales based on their economic considerations, ethnicity, and as a result of the significant electoral advantages incumbency conferred.

In chapter five, I present my findings for the Chilean case study. A country that historically has seen an absence of populism, the 2013 election featured three populists. The chapter assesses the underlying motivations of Chilean voters by analyzing individual-level data culled from publicly available surveys (Americasbarometer, Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), and Diego Portales University), and drawing on information obtained from semi-structured field interviews in Santiago in April and May 2015. Generally speaking, I find the citizens who voted for the main populist candidate (Franco Parisi) were younger, more educated voters who had high levels of dissatisfaction with the political establishment. Parisi assembled a loosely connected coalition of support, but his lack of mobilizational capacity ultimately undermined his ability to get these voters to turn out on election day.

In chapter six, I conclude with a discussion of the implications of my findings. I relate my project to the broader field of comparative politics. Specifically, I examine how my findings pertain to important debates about political parties, presidentialism, and the quality of democracy

in Latin America. I contend that my finding of the ambiguous and non-linear relationship between party strength and populist electoral success challenges the conventional wisdom that weak parties facilitate populist emergence and electoral victory. I add to previous work (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997) on presidentialism that detailed the significant variation in Latin America's presidential systems. Similar to Shugart, Carey, and Mainwaring, I caution against older arguments (specifically Linz 1990) that outsider candidates would prey on the political instability inherent in presidential systems. In examining populists' affect on the quality of democracy, I offer a speculative account that the elections of dominant populists of the last two decades (Chávez, Morales, Correa) boosted citizens' perceptions of their political systems and the quality of democracy in their countries. However, as these rulers continued in office, the effects on citizens' perceptions waned.

CHAPTER II: OPERATIONALIZING POPULISM, EXPLAINING CITIZENS' VOTING BEHAVIOR, AND SCORING POPULIST CANDIDATES

I. Introduction

In this chapter I present an overview of conceptualizations of populism and offer my own conceptualization and operationalization. Populist contenders utilize an anti-elite discourse that stresses an "us" versus "them" framework and tend to view politics as a zero-sum game. This perspective incentivizes them to establish direct, unmediated connections with citizens who feel most marginalized or excluded from the political system (Barr 2003; Ellner 2001; Hawkins 2003, 2009; Hellinger 2005; Weyland 2001, 2003). I then review theories that other scholars have offered to explain why citizens would vote for populist candidates, and develop my own argument.

I argue that populist presidential candidates are most successful when they embody certain characteristics that mirror the electorate, can politicize issues most relevant to the electorate, and there is a large overlap among these two conditions. The credibility of their claims, asserting that they truly represent the marginalized sectors of the population, is the defining factor in whether these leaders will continue to receive the backing of potential supporters (Ellner 2003). I contend that my argument is novel and original in that it examines the characteristics of not only the electorate but also the candidates. Essentially, I offer a supply-side argument that complements the dominant demand-side arguments available in the populism literature. Finally, I provide my scoring of the populist behavior of presidential candidates who competed in the most recent election in 10 South American countries.[10]

[10] The countries include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and

II. Defining Populism: The Dependent Variable

One of the difficulties in studying populism is to agree on which actors should be classified as populists. Table 2.1 provides an illustration of the various definitions scholars of populism in Latin America have offered over time. One important thing to note is that some definitional components pertain to the political behavior of actors before and during their rule, while other features are bound by leaders' time in office. In this dissertation, I argue that leaders can exhibit populist political behavior in or out of office and conceptualizations bound by time have less utility. Definitions should not be temporally contingent—that is a leader who exhibits the same behavior should not be classified as a populist while in office, and as a non-populist prior to election. I view populism as a ***political strategy*** employed by actors to mobilize electoral support. Throughout Latin American history opposition figures have employed a populist political strategy prior to electoral periods, they have utilized it as candidates, and then ruled in a similar fashion. Thus, a conceptualization that accounts for behavior across all time periods is most valid and would allow for a systematic operationalization and measurement.

In table 2.1, competing conceptualizations are organized along dimensions commonly found in the literature. I use the term "definitional category" to reflect the broad grouping of previous conceptual attempts by scholars. Political style involves the tactics or strategies employed by leaders to garner electoral support during the campaign and maintain it in power. Economic policies are the macroeconomic policies initiated once in office. Characteristics of a leader's support base refer to the demographics and social class of the candidate's followers,

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Venezuela.

Table 2.1: Chronology of Definitions of Populism				
Definitional Category	Political Style	Economic Policies	Support Base	Ideology
Classical	Charismatic leader, inspirational rhetoric (Conniff 1982; Drake 1982)	State-led with heavy social spending, protectionism (Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Kaufman and Stallings 1991)	Organized masses, mostly urban, but a broad heterogeneous social coalition (di Tella 1965; Conniff 1982)	Chameleon-like, varies (Conniff 1982; Drake 1982)
Political-organizational (neo-populism)	Personalistic leader with fiery rhetoric (Barr 2009; Ellner 2003)	Varies (Roberts 1995, Weyland 1996, 1999, 2003; Knight 1998)	Unorganized, marginalized masses (Knight 1998; Roberts 1995; Weyland 1999)	Not a feature of the definition
Rhetorical[11]	Manichean discourse (Hawkins 2010; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012)	Not a feature of the definition	Not a feature of the definition	Not a feature of the definition

which are easier to identify post-election. Ideology concerns the political orientation of the policies advanced while governing. Below is an overview of how scholars' definitions of populism have changed over time. In general scholars' definitions have varied in an effort to reflect empirical reality. At times, researchers have struggled to categorize leaders who employed or embodied only some of the prior elements of populists.

[11] I discuss the "moral discourse" definitions that have been proffered in a separate sub-section (limitations of past conceptualizations) below.

From the 1960s to the 1980s, Latin American scholars assessed the characteristics and defining features of the continent's populist leaders that emerged from the 1930s to the 1960s (Conniff 1982, 14; Drake 1982, 218). These early researchers labeled the leaders "classical" populists and advanced definitions that included the following elements as pertaining to populism: a political style that featured a charismatic leader who employed rhetoric aimed at inspiring people; a reformist economic agenda that promoted development through state activism; and a movement with a heterogeneous social coalition and policies that targeted the working classes (Drake 1982, 218). Ideologically speaking, these leaders were inconsistent and changed course in order to maximize support (Conniff 1982, 14). These early definitions mostly concerned the behavior of leaders *while in office*. The result is that the degree of state involvement in the economy, the beneficiaries of socioeconomic policies, and ideological consistency can be analyzed only after a leader has governed, not before.

After an interlude of "antipopulist governments" (authoritarian regimes) in the 1960s and 1970s,[12] populist leaders re-emerged in the 1980s and 1990s (Conniff 1999, 12) and in very different socioeconomic environments than the classical populists. These new leaders *reached office* by using classical populist political strategies—appeals to the masses, inspirational rhetoric, and promises of redistributionist economic policies (Drake 1991, 36). However, a marked difference occurred while these leaders *were in office* as they initiated neoliberal economic reforms. Labeled "neopopulists", these presidents implemented radically different economic policies from their predecessors (Roberts 1995; Weyland 1996, 1999; Knight 1998) and, for most leaders, policies that deviated from their campaign promises (Stokes 2001).

[12] Not all governments in the region were devoid of populism. Some scholars consider Peru's military regime during this time period as blending authoritarianism and populism.

Further, the neoliberal reforms they implemented in office drastically altered (compared to the classical populists) the socioeconomic characteristics of their support base—from the organized working class to the unorganized masses (Knight 1998; Roberts 1996; Weyland 1999, 2003)—while in office.

The deviation in economic policies and support bases from prior populists presented a conceptual challenge to researchers. As one may expect, scholars disagreed about how to classify the new leaders who combined market reforms with populist appeals. Some refused to classify the neopopulists as populists and retained state-led economic policies and redistributionist social spending as definitional requirements (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991; Nun 1994; Vilas 1992, 1995).[13] Others (Weyland 1996; Knight 1998) argued the emphasis on the inclusion of economic attributes failed to consider the variation in the economic policies of classical populists. Some leaders (Perón in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, Haya de la Torre in Peru, Ibarra and Bucaram in Ecuador) switched from expansionary to orthodox policies (Weyland 2003) while others diverged from the implementation of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) policies (Knight1998: 238). Further, other "non-populist" leaders like Salvador Allende in Chile and José Sarney in Brazil initiated state-led economic policies (Weyland 1999: 381). I contend that economic definitional components of populism became murkier and less central for scholars than what they had in previous work. Similar to a leader's support base, the economic policies of populists tend to vary across the campaign and governing periods, and within leaders' tenures. Thus, I posit that economic policies should not be an integral feature of populism's definition.

[13] Although populist leaders like Fujimori and Menem engaged in targeted social spending to offset the negative consequences of neoliberal policies on their countries' poor, these scholars contend that overall these presidents engaged in radically different socioeconomic policies than the classical populists.

Many authors now view populism in political-organizational terms. Among these researchers, Weyland (2001) has defined populism as "a political strategy through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers (14)." Several other scholars have used variations of his "minimal procedural" definition (Arnston and de la Torre et al. 2013; Barr 2003, 2009; Conniff et al. 2012; Ellner 2003; Filc 2010; Hellinger 2005; Pappas 2012; Roberts 2007).

This is not to suggest that there is a scholarly consensus of populism definitions. The recent conceptual framework advanced in cross-regional studies of populism heavily focuses on a certain discourse—the reliance on bellicose and moralizing language that illustrates how the political system has been corrupted or undermined. Kirk Hawkins defines a "populist worldview" as "a Manichean outlook that identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring minority" (2010, 29). Similar to Hawkins, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) define populism as "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2007, 23; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 8; 2014).

Central to ~~these~~ definitions based on actors' discourse is a moral component, that politics pits the "corrupt" elites against the "pure" masses. The authors contend that the key advantage to this definitional strategy is that it leaves populists' political mobilization strategies (top-down or bottom-up), characteristics of their electoral bases, and type of socioeconomic policies open to empirical investigation. Additionally, these scholars construct minimal definitions that include

"*only* the core—necessary and sufficient—attributes of a concept", in an attempt to have a high level of abstraction that allows for the analysis of a greater pool of cases (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011: 4).

I argue that although the minimal definitions may facilitate cross-regional research and increase the potential pool of cases, relying on a strictly rhetorical definition risks hollowing out the concept of populism. Scholars who employ this definitional strategy may even be guilty of "conceptual stretching" (Collier and Mahon 1993; Sartori 1970). Further, the potential benefit of increasing one's cases seems to be irrelevant to conceptual measurement and validity. Relaxing the limitations of the core components of a concept potentially distorts the ability of scholars to develop concepts that map onto political reality. Rhetorical appeals are a staple and central part, but only one part, of populism (Barr 2009; Filc 2010; Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Pappas 2012). Nearly all political challengers employ verbal tactics that play up the deficiencies of incumbents, seek to convince voters that they would improve the political situation, and offer better representation for the majority of the population. Thus, a definition based solely on rhetorical appeals is too minimal and seems to capture a behavior employed by both non-populists and populists.

From the above discussion, it is clear that efforts to find a consensus on the definition of populism in the Latin American context continue to be undermined by scholarly disagreement on which traits should be considered constitutive elements (Collier 2001:11814).[14] So, how should the constitutive elements be chosen? Past strategies verged on "conceptual gerrymandering"—as scholars chose definitional features to seemingly fit reality. Most studies on populism focus on

[14] Although this applies to studies on populism, the same may hold for many concepts in social science.

how populists will and have governed. Will they, in historical populist fashion, concentrate power in the executive and "deinstitutionalize" politics? Will their political strategies (anti-politics rhetoric and lack of party affiliation) contribute to legislative gridlock and heightened tensions between the branches of government?

In this dissertation, I contend that populism is a political strategy that should be examined systematically. In this regard, I offer: a) that to understand how populists will govern one should examine their attributes prior to election and b) an accurate definition of populism should consistently apply to actors during their campaigns, and stints in office including their attempts at re-election, if allowed. In sum, if researchers wish to comprehensively understand populism then it is critical to examine the conditions under which it first emerges. A definition should capture and measure behavior that occurs before a leader takes office.

In accord with Weyland (2001, 10), I view populism as a "classical concept" with its primary or central domain focused on "competing for and exercising political power". As discussed above, scholars have varied in their inclusion or exclusion of actors' economic policies. Ideology is also not a constant component as leaders historically have been "chameleon-like" in their orientation (Drake 1982), and populists may lean both to the left and the right (Roberts 2013, 39). I exclude both economic and ideological components from my operationalization because they are not definitional attributes identified by scholars that remain consistent across leaders and time. As a result, I argue that conceptualizations of populism should encompass a leader's political style (discourse and actions), relationship with followers, political history and structure of political organization.

During my fieldwork in both Bolivia and Chile I asked several journalists and political practitioners (strategists, elected officials, and government representatives) how they would define populism. I also asked which, if any, of the candidates they considered to be populist. A near consensus emerged that populism is a political strategy. I contend that academic definitions should be consistent with the conceptualizations of both practitioners and those who publicly classify candidates during the campaigns (journalists). One final thing to note is that the above selected elements naturally overlap and interact with one another. It is plausible and, to some degree, expected that a leader who presides over a vertical organization without a prior political history would be likely to employ anti-establishment rhetoric and seek to foster unmediated and direct relationships with supporters. This interaction is yet another reason these components constitute a coherent set of attributes to examine.

My operationalization of populist actors

In this dissertation, I ask the following research question: *Why do citizens vote for populist candidates?* To sufficiently answer this question, I need to advance criteria for who is a populist. In this dissertation I define populism to include leaders' discourse, the relationships with their followers, the structural characteristics of their political organizations, and their political histories. I view populism as a continuous variable that has four dimensions.

Populist rhetorical appeals include anti-establishment references (Barr 2009, 30-32), a Manichean discourse that leaders utilize in an effort to construct an "us versus them" narrative—the "pure people" and their representative versus "the corrupt elite"[15] (Hawkins 2009; 2010; Mudde 2004, 543, Mudde 2007, 23, Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012, 8). I include rhetoric in my

[15] The elites are a vague and amorphous term that could include both economic and political elites (Barr 2009).

definition of populism because it has been a definitional staple over time, and has been employed by the classical, neoliberal and current crop of populist leaders.

Populists rely on direct, unmediated relations with their followers (Weyland 2001). They establish a personalistic linkage to voters—in that they rarely use forms of institutional mediation (Barr 2009, 35-36). Contemporary populists routinely establish direct communication with the unorganized, largely poor masses in the informal sector of society (Weyland 1996; Roberts 1996). Examples abound of charismatic leaders visiting rural towns and attending informal events in which they communicate with enthusiastic supporters. These events are organized to showcase the candidate's connection with the "common" people. The lack of horizontal, mediated relationships commonly found in modern political parties are a hallmark sign of a populist political actor.

A similar yet separate component of populism is the structural organization of a contender's electoral vehicle, namely his political party or organization. Populist candidates and leaders are likely to head their electoral vehicle or party and be the uncontested authority at the helm. This allows for top-down political mobilization strategies (Albó 2008; Roberts 2007) in which populists exercise autonomy in making campaign and governing decisions. This structure reinforces the unquestioned loyalty of supporters and staff to the leader, not the broader political organization or movement (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). This particular vertical organization may be the intended design of political actors, or it may be the outcome of a motivated populist who has wrested control of his political institution. In either sense the key feature is the structure of the electoral vehicle is very hierarchical, facilitating direct connections between candidate and electorate.

A final component of populism is that the leader is a political outsider or an individual which has gained political prominence without climbing the ranks of a traditional and dominant political party. As Roberts (2013, 39-40) eloquently puts it, populism "is the quintessential expression of outsider politics." Barr (2009, 33-34) defines political outsiders as political actors who gain political prominence not through or in association with an established, competitive party, but as a political independent or in association with new or newly competitive parties. [16]

Most political actors exhibit some degree of populist behavior at any given time. In my conceptualization, in order to be labeled as a populist during a particular time period, a leader must display *some* level of *at least two* of these component parts during that period. To allow for flexibility and consistency in my operationalization, an actor could be scored as a populist for a given time period (i.e. the campaign before his election) and as a non-populist for another time period. The flexibility in this scoring implies that populism is not an intrinsic characteristic of political actors. That is to say politicians are not "born populist". Rather, it is a political style that presidential contenders may selectively utilize for electoral gain. It is fundamentally strategic. This also suggests that no politician is "a populist" every day of his or her political life. However, I will use the term when a candidate acts like one. Table 2.2 below illustrates the component parts of my operationalization:

[16] An inherent tension in defining populism in this manner is that leaders who are eligible for re-election are automatically less populist in the outsider category. However, I contend that this definitional component contributes to the study on populism as most scholars have not dealt with how populism has changed over time for successful candidates who rule for many years.

Table 2.2: My Operationalization of Populism as a political style			
Discourse	Relationship with followers	Political Organization	Political History
Manichean, anti-establishment	Direct and personalistic linkages with followers	Vertical, top-down, limited intermediary institutions	Political outsider

III. Explaining Why Citizens Vote for Populists

In this section, I critically assess explanations of why populist presidential candidates achieve electoral success. Electoral *success* is yet another arbitrary assessment in political science. Some studies focus on leaders who won the election (Arnston and de la Torre et al. 2013; Conniff et al. 1982, 2012; Hawkins 2010; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012); while others examine presidents who received at least 20 percent of the vote (Doyle 2011); and yet others consider those candidates who received five or more percent (Hawkins and Castanho 2014). Carreras (2012) advances the analysis by examining the vote share of all outsider candidates who ran for president. Below I review theories for why citizens vote for populist candidates and derive testable hypotheses. For each explanation, I review the logic for and develop hypotheses at both the macro (country) and micro (individual) levels. When these levels of analysis may interact, I try to clearly emphasize it in the analysis. I then develop my own argument for citizens' voting behavior. Finally, I discuss the shortcomings of past scholarship, mainly the neglect of a systematic examination of negative cases.

I assess "demand-side" explanations that center on the conditions that may entice the populace to consider a political alternative to the traditional and incumbent political actors –

considering the roles played by corruption, low citizen trust in public institutions, low levels of societal institutionalization, and poor socioeconomic performances by government. I argue that these conditions have been consistently present in Latin American history, and by themselves, cannot account for populist candidate success. Specifically, these country-level factors have been present when no populist candidates have competed in elections, and, more importantly, cannot account for the varying levels of vote share among populist candidates when two or more populists compete in the same election. At best, these explanations identify contexts favorable for populist emergence.

Reaching beyond these dominant explanations for why citizens vote for populists, I develop an alternative, supply-side theory that focuses more on populist contenders themselves, and when and how they are able to exploit favorable contextual conditions and obtain a considerable vote share. Most accounts that explore citizens' motivations focus only on citizens. I offer a unique argument that also examines the behavior of the candidates. Drawing on Roberts' (2013) concepts of "activation" and "conversion", I posit that populists are most successful when they are able to politicize citizen resentment and construct an electoral coalition bound by a commonly shared sense of marginalization. The key to doing so, I argue, is credibility: a candidate's capacity to craft an image that portrays her as the candidate best able to represent the interests of this politically estranged group.

A) Alternative Explanations

I) Corruption

In a global examination of populism, Kirk Hawkins (2010) examines whether corruption (actual or perceived) affects both the emergence of populists and the use of populist discourse

among chief executives. In regard to emergence, the author contends that widespread perceived corruption is a necessary condition for the emergence of populism—most populists in his global examination are in countries with high levels of perceived corruption; while none of the countries at the low end of the corruption perception scale have more than slight traces of populism (2010, 153). The practice of corruption has long been a feature of Latin American societies.[17] Most countries score poorly on International Governmental Organizations' (IGOs) annual rankings (Transparency International's [TI] annual corruption perceptions indices and the World Bank's World Governance Indicators [WGI]).[18] More broadly, Weyland (1998) demonstrated that actual corruption in Latin America has increased since the shift from military to democratic rule and resulted from the clientelistic governing strategies of neo-populist leaders; while Seligson (2002, 2006) persuasively argues that citizens' experience with corruption has decreased the legitimacy of political systems in some Latin American countries, providing an opening for outsiders.[19] Amid corruption scandals and negative IGO reports painting national governments in a bad light, a very favorable context exists for political actors to employ populist political tactics to denounce the current government, encouraging disenchanted voters to support them.

This favorable context directly impacts candidates' adoption of a populist political style during the campaign. First, it likely incentivizes entry into the electoral race for more populist candidates as they may view the incumbent as potentially vulnerable to a challenge from a

[17] I use the words "actual corruption" to refer to TI and World Bank corruption scores. These scores are still country expert judgments. However, I use actual as an adjective to differentiate it from citizens' perceptions of corruption, culled from surveys.
[18] Using the World Bank's "control of corruption" measure, only Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay score in the top 50 percentile of countries in the world from 1996-2011(http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp, accessed 5/30/2013).
[19] Seligson (2002) conducted interviews in Bolivia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Panama. In his 2006 article, he added Ecuador to the analysis.

candidate who lacks affiliation with the traditional political institutions. Second, high levels of corruption may also impact the behavior of candidates during the campaign. There is a cycle that I described as an electoral tango earlier. Populist candidates who sense their attacks on the political establishment to be working are more likely to continue hammering and highlighting corruption. In turn, this will make corruption an even more salient issue to voters.

In essence, in part as a result of corruption, citizens in Latin America have lower levels of trust in democracy that could lead them to seek political alternatives to traditional political representation. One political alternative for citizens may be populist candidates who often practice the politics of "anti-politics" (Roberts 1995:13) in that they relentlessly critique the inefficiency of the political status quo and go to great lengths to portray themselves as political outsiders who will restore democratic order to political institutions. Additionally, the populist narrative emphasizes a conspiring minority, who seek to advance their own personal interests at the disadvantage of the community and have conspired to subvert government (Hawkins 2010; Roberts 2013). At the citizen level, citizens who *perceive* corruption to be rampant and worsening are more likely to cast ballots for political outsiders who critique the status quo and pledge to reform and "clean up" political institutions if elected (Carreras 2012, 1462). In line with this, I posit:

Hypothesis 1a: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates in countries with higher levels of actual corruption;

Hypothesis 1b: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when they perceive corruption to have increased.

I examine both of these hypotheses because there may be a disconnect between actual (country-level) and perceived (by citizens) levels of corruption. Individual-level survey data may depart from IGO databases that heavily rely on expert (mostly from the business world)

opinions. To provide one example; in the 2001 TI report the authors found that a higher percentage of Chileans (71%) than Mexicans (61%) considered corruption to be "very serious" although Chile scored significantly better than Mexico at the country level as judged by… (Transparency International 2001, 227). Thus, it is important to examine how macro-level and micro-level potential causal factors interact.

Hawkins (2010, 160-172) cautions against viewing corruption as a sufficient condition for populist emergence and electoral success for two reasons: first, he acknowledges that many countries with high levels of corruption do not have populist candidates enter electoral races. Second, he speculates that it may take repeated government administrations and scandals for citizens to punish governments, as citizens have finite resources to devote to gathering information about politics. Additionally, although citizens may be dissatisfied with corrupt government officials and also perceive corruption to be widespread, the issue may not be the most pressing to them and thus they may not base their vote on it. Past studies on the influence of corruption (Seligson 2002, 2006; Weyland 1998) have failed to consider that citizens may view corruption as mundane and commonplace. In the annual Latinobarómetro survey, when asked about what the most pressing problem facing their country is, crime, unemployment, the economy, poverty, and education tend to rank above corruption.[20] Therefore, a statistical model should control for other relevant variables related to government performance that citizens deem more pressing than corruption when trying to explain their vote choice. Last, Weyland (1998) argued that numerous neo-populist leaders like Fernando Collor (Brazil), Alberto Fujimori (Peru), and Carlos Menem (Argentina) left or were removed from office in the midst of corruption scandals. The fact that past notable populists succumbed to that which they effectively

[20] This reflects the regional trend, across all 18 countries in which LAPOP administered the survey.

campaigned against—corruption—may have a diluting effect on the effectiveness of future populist appeals; leaders may be reticent to center campaigns on corruption and publics may be more skeptical of a leader who promises to root out corruption.

II) Poor socioeconomic performance by governments

A prominent and recurring explanation in the literature for the electoral success of populist leaders is that they capitalize politically on periods of great socioeconomic inequality and abysmal economic conditions (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Weyland 1999). Weyland (1999, 395), in a cross-regional analysis of Eastern Europe and Latin America, argues that severe inflationary crises are a necessary condition for populists to emerge. Latin America is a region that for the past few decades has been the most unequal in the world (Weyland 2003), constantly suffers through economic disasters and continues to be beset by high levels of poverty. Large swaths of the population perceive that traditional political parties and institutions insufficiently address, let alone fulfill, the socioeconomic needs of their constituents (Carrion 2009). Detecting that the current administration is failing to meet citizens' needs populist-leaning candidates have ample opportunity to pounce on the opportunity to denounce the regime. These attacks, again, politicize important issues to voters and indicate that a candidate is competing who may possibly improve these conditions.

Furthermore, periods of great socioeconomic turmoil tend to generate an enormous need for a national savior. The public, especially the poorest sectors, actively seeks a leader(s) who will provide an immediate resolution and alleviate its suffering (Barr 2003). Poor, marginalized masses hope that their leader will be "the man in power…[who] would exercise his personal benevolence in the favor of the poor and downtrodden," (Stein, 1999,111). The argument is that

leaders are likely to employ populist rhetoric during the campaign in an effort to win elections when countries are facing a socioeconomic crisis. Weyland (1999, 395) also found that high levels of inflation turned many Polish and Russian citizens against the established political class, and disgruntled voters voted for populist outsiders who promised to save their countries: Lech Walesa (Poland) in 1989 and Boris Yeltsin (Russia) in 1991. However, recent work on voting behavior in Latin America has found that GDP growth does not yield statistically significant findings in regard to populist (Doyle 2011) or outsider (Carreras 2012) vote share; whereas higher levels of inflation increase vote share for populists and outsiders (Carreras 2012; Doyle 2011; Hawkins 2010).

The conflicting findings above could indicate one or more of the following: 1) voters make voting decisions based on economic conditions that most directly impact them,[21] 2) voters' perceptions of the economy matter more than actual economic conditions. In line with the above, I posit:

Hypothesis 2a: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when country levels of inflation, unemployment, and poverty are high;

Hypothesis 2b: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when they perceive economic performance to be poor.

Scholars have been unclear about what exactly constitutes a socioeconomic "crisis". Some researchers have talked about "inflationary crises". They argue that the poorest sectors of the population are most likely to experience direct consequences of a very high inflation rate, or hyperinflation (Barr 2003, 1163). Hyperinflation is a problem that necessitates immediate action because it destabilizes the predictability people have in planning their daily lives, and the

[21] Barr (2003) and Weyland (2003) both found that inflation most directly impacts voters, rather than GDP per capita. This is discussed below.

consequences stemming from this uncertainty disproportionately affect the poor (Weyland 2003, 1099). Hyperinflation may be the most immediate concern but high levels of poverty, unemployment and extended periods of negative growth are also pressing problems afflicting most Latin American societies, facilitating popular mobilization (Barr 2003, 1174; Weyland 2003). Stokes (2001) demonstrates that poor economic growth weighs heavily in the minds of voters when they evaluate both challengers' economic policy proposals and the economic performance of incumbent executives. Conversely, incumbents are likely to be rewarded when their countries have experienced periods of positive economic conditions (Lewis Beck and Ratto 2013).

Again, it is important to think about the interaction of economic factors at the country and citizen levels. For instance, one could imagine a citizen who lost her job prior to the election in a richer (higher per capita GDP) country being more inclined to vote for a populist contender than a wage-earner in a less developed nation who has remained steadily employed.[22] Also, citizen perceptions of economic performance of their country and their individual situations could have different effects on voting behavior. A lively and extensive debate exists on whether economic voting is retrospective or prospective, sociotropic or pocketbook (Echegaray 2005; Remmer 1993). When examining this hypothesis, I will consider citizens' perceptions for both their perceptions of the country economic situation and that of their own personal circumstances.

III) Mistrust in political institutions

Since democratization, many publics across Latin America have lost faith in their political institutions—political parties and the different branches of national governments,

[22] There are a multitude of permutations between country and individual economic situations.

creating a favorable context for leaders to employ populist appeals (Barr 2003, Roberts 1998). Similar, and likely correlated to corruption, widespread loss of faith and confidence in these institutions by a citizenry create a fertile environment for politicians, eying an upcoming election, to publicly denounce and distance themselves from these institutions and the politicians involved in them (Doyle 2011).[23] Thus, it is likely that emerging candidates will seek to exploit citizens' mistrust for their own political gain.

Low levels of confidence and trust in political institutions are also likely to influence the proposed solutions candidates offer during their campaigns. Candidates seeking to mobilize public disenchantment with the political establishment may rely on populist appeals and advocate for the implementation of "participatory" or "direct" democracy as a corrective to inefficient political bureaucracies that the public perceives to have failed to represent their interests (Ellner 2003). Thus, the perpetuation of unequal patterns of political inclusion by existing institution continues to pave the way for populist appeals (Hawkins 2010: 149).

To win elections in contexts where political institutions have lost legitimacy, populist candidates need to appeal to disaffected voters and convince them that they offer a different avenue than the political mainstream and are more likely to represent the common peoples' interests (Roberts 1995, Barr 2003). Fiery rhetoric is likely to resonate much more with publics that have lost confidence, if not complete faith, in public institutions. In an examination of 18 Latin American countries between 1996 and 2008, Doyle (2011) finds significant support for this hypothesis—that higher levels of distrust in the traditional political institutions of liberal

[23] The possible correlation among these variables presents potential statistical issues with multicollinearity in my models. This is discussed in Chapter Three when the quantitative findings are presented.

democracy in a given country increases the probability of support for populist candidates during a given election. In line with the above arguments, I posit that:

Hypothesis 3a: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates in countries with lower levels of trust in political institutions;

Hypothesis 3b: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when they have lower levels of trust in political institutions.

One issue with past research is the tendency to lump together national political institutions without a theoretical or empirical justification for doing so. Doyle (2011) constructs an index of citizen trust in the national parliament/congress, political parties, and the judiciary. However, Seligson (2007, 89-90) demonstrates that, across the region, levels of citizen trust in political parties (35%) are much lower than in the judiciary (43%) and important within-country level differences in trust for these institutions exist. Also, there is no reason to assume that trends in citizen disapproval are consistent across these institutions, especially since they are different branches of government whose scope of authority and institutional configuration vary widely across countries.

IV) Weak Political Party Identification

The 1980s debt crisis that afflicted most of Latin America bankrupted and undermined state-led economic models. The long period of economic torpidity also weakened the major forms of institutionalized political representation—labour unions and political parties—and created a political opportunity for populists to emerge (Roberts 2003: 36, 2013; Weyland 1998, 2003). The privatization of state companies, and resulting loss of unemployment and hostility to unionization, severed links between Latin American governments and labour unions. Similar to most global regions, labor union memberships and political party identifications have declined significantly in the last few decades in Latin America (Wibbels and Roberts 1999; Roberts 2003,

2014). The severing of these political representation linkages create a "political vacuum" that allows populist candidates to exploit and capitalize on the situation in their attempt to come to power (Roberts 1995; Barr 2003). Essentially, a significant group of citizens lacking political party identification are available to be politically mobilized around a new cause or leader. This opening presents the opportunity for charismatic leaders to establish vertical, unmediated relationships with the unorganized, largely poor masses in the informal sector of society who may feel excluded or marginalized by their current political system (Weyland 1996).

The deinstitutionalization of traditional political representation bodies may provide an opportunity for new political actors, especially those with no political history or formal association with any of the traditional political parties. Nonetheless, to be electorally successful, populists have to convincingly frame a narrative that attracts considerable support and persuades voters that they are a more beneficial option than other non-incumbent competitors. Their discourse needs to center on the perception that the marginalized masses in the country are victims of privileged groups (specifically the political establishment which includes incumbents and non-incumbents) and that there is a need to transform or replace the underperforming and inefficient institutions (Barr 2003). These appeals are likely to resonate more with potential voters who lack any political party affiliation. Citizens who do not identify with parties do so because they have either lost faith in the traditional political institutions and parties, or they do not see a viable option on the electoral menu in front of them. In line with the above, I posit that:

Hypothesis 4a: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates in countries with weaker political party identification;

Hypothesis 4b: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when they identify more weakly with the established political parties.

Past scholarship has neglected to consider how traditional political parties respond and react to their own failures or why they have not been able to maintain their electoral base. Surely political incumbents do everything in their power to avoid electoral defeat and a comprehensive analysis needs to investigate why parties have or have not been successful at warding off populist challengers. For instance, political scandals may lead leaders to switch parties or undertake political maneuvers that allow for their political survival, as was the case in Brazil when Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva distanced himself from the Worker's Party in his 2006 re-election bid (Roberts 2007, 15 fn. 24). Similarly, the lack of presidential re-election in some countries may aid incumbent parties by allowing them to present a "fresh" or "unblemished" candidate from their ranks. When political actors conduct "damage control" they may be able to survive challenges from populist contenders. A comprehensive examination of low political party identification will thus require an in-depth analysis of how political parties respond to electoral competition from populist challengers. Again, this shifts the focus away from just the electorate and into the supply-side—political parties, elites, and presidential candidates.

V) Widespread populist attitudes among citizens

Scholars (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2014; Hawkins and Castanho 2015) have begun to develop and test an "ideational theory" of populism. These researchers contend that when citizens hold a core set of beliefs in populist ideas, they are more likely to support populist candidates or leaders. Generally defined, populist ideas usually include the following components: a Manichaean view of politics, a notion of a reified popular will, and a belief in a conspiring elite (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2015). Citizens who firmly hold these views envision politics as a struggle between good and evil, think that a few special interests

hinder their countries from progressing, and believe that they should have greater direct control over political decision-making.

Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde (2012) demonstrate that populist ideas are quite prevalent in societies in which citizens elect populist candidates. This holds for some of the West European countries (the Netherlands, Austria), as it does in Latin America (Venezuela). In countries where citizens desire greater political efficacy, their demands are likely to be met by political actors who advocate delegating more direct political control to the masses. Citizens who believe that they are their compatriots should have greater direct say over political decisions will be attracted to candidates who directly appeal to the masses and eschew the representational aspects of modern liberal democracy. Populists have always appealed to the voice of the common man. In an election featuring contrasting approaches to democracy—direct and popular vs representational, voters that hold deeply embedded populist ideas will likely gravitate towards populist candidates. I posit that:

Hypothesis 5a: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates in countries with higher levels of populist ideas;

Hypothesis 5b: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when those citizens hold stronger populist ideas.[24]

In sum, the major demand-side explanations advanced in the Latin American populism literature center on the shortcomings of the political establishment, and illustrated in table 2.3:

[24] I use "stronger" to describe citizens who, on a scale of 1 to 7, would agree to a stronger degree that citizens should have greater participation in political affairs. The exact survey questions I examine are discussed in Chapter Three.

Table 2.3: Demand-side Explanations for Populist Political Success and Their Expected Effects on Citizen Voting			
Explanation	Level	Expected Effect on Vote Share for Populists	Arguments Posited By Whom
Corruption (actual)	Country	Higher levels likely lead to higher vote share	Hawkins (2010); Seligson (2006); Roberts (1995)
Corruption (perception)	Country, Individual	Higher levels likely lead to higher vote share	Carreras (2012); Hawkins (2010);
Economic Situation (actual)	Country	Poorer economic performance increases vote share	Carreras (2012) ; Dornbusch and Edwards (1991); Doyle (2011); Hawkins (2010);
Economic Situation (perceived)	Country, Individual	Poorer economic perceptions increases vote share	Hawkins (2010); Stein (1999); Weyland (2001)
Mistrust of Public Institutions	Country, Individual	Higher levels likely lead to higher vote share	Barr (2003); Doyle (2011); Ellner (2003)
Citizen affiliation with representative institutions	Country (actual), Individual ~~(perception)~~	Lower levels of individual affiliation increase vote share	Barr (2003); Roberts (2003, 2013); Weyland (1998, 2003)
Populist Ideas among Citizenry	Country, Individual	Higher levels likely lead to increased vote share	Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde (2012); Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2014); Hawkins and Castanho (2015)

Populist candidates are likely to have a window of opportunity when societies experience (actual and/or perceived) higher levels of corruption, there is widespread public discontent with political institutions, citizens have less affiliation with political parties, are lower, governments' socioeconomic policies perform poorly, and citizens hold high levels of populist ideas. A key consideration to note is that these explanations naturally interact with one another. For instance, poor economic performances and repeated corruption scandals may have a profound delegitimizing effect on traditional parties and public officials.

B. An Alternative Argument: A Strategic Theory of Populism

The conditions I have discussed above no doubt provide a very favorable context for a populist outsider to have electoral success. However, these conditions have been prevalent in most Latin American countries since the transition to democracy while the electoral engagement and success of populist politicians have varied. In some cases no populists competed in elections when these conditions have been present, in others populist candidates have received significantly different vote totals in successive elections when these underlying conditions have been stable,[25] and in yet others two or more populists have competed but not won the contests or received differing vote percentages.[26] Therefore, something else must be at play to explain why some populist candidates are able to better capitalize on these conditions than others, and why the same populist candidates' success may vary across electoral attempts.

Most studies on populism and voting behavior focus solely on demand-side explanations. This paints part of the picture, but not all of it. Voters and political candidates engage in an electoral tango of sorts—one leads then follows then leads again. I thus turn my attention to the candidates themselves. The most successful populist candidates, I posit, are keenly aware of citizen disillusionment, craft an effective and credible message to exploit this disillusionment, and continue to hammer this point across, reinforcing it periodically to maintain enthusiasm among supporters.

[25] For instance, Johnny Fernandez received 5.51% of the vote in the 2002 Bolivian election, whereas Evo Morales received 20.9% in 2002, and 53.74% in 2005.
[26] Using Doyle's (2011) populist scoring and analysis, two or more populists competed in Bolivia in 1997 (Fuchtner with 15.9% and Loza with 15.8%), Ecuador in 2002 (Gutiérrez with 20.43%, Bucarám with 11.86%), and Paraguay in 2008 (Lugo with 40.9%, Oviedo with 21.93%).

Relatively few other studies of populist electoral success have focused on candidates rather than voters.[27] In examining why populists may make electoral inroads, Roberts (2013) focuses on the mobilizational capacity of these candidates. He noted that populists employ fervent anti-elite and anti-establishment rhetoric, and have the ability to undermine the political class by mobilizing citizens who feel marginalized or excluded from the system. Beyond describing their behavior, Roberts (2013, 40) posited that populists have the most electoral success when they can: 1) mobilize and garner the support from citizens who were previously non-participants in the political system ("activation"); 2) win over voters who previously supported the established or traditional political parties and figures ("conversion"). Roberts (2013, 41) goes on to specify the conditions under which these two processes are more likely to occur. He suggests that activation is more likely when the populist mobilized voters around an agenda of political inclusion or social reform and when voters are potentially mobile, not fixed to partisan loyalties and attachments. Conversion by contrast, is more likely when a leader articulates new issues that are salient to voters but neglected by established parties, or that don't map onto existing cleavages.

Although Roberts has advanced the theoretical discussion by encouraging scholars to focus on the candidates themselves, what is missing from Roberts' argument is how exactly populist actors are able to exploit the conditions and why certain contenders may be more credible to voters than others. In short, and in social sciences parlance, Roberts downplays the vital component of agency in his explanation. Additionally, his argument fails to consider the interplay between candidate(s) and voter(s) that is so vital to understanding electoral success. Why are some populists able to convince voters that they are the answer to citizens' personal and

[27] Exceptions include Roberts (2013) and Pappas (2012).

their countries' problems, while others make short-term electoral splashes before flaming out? Voters may consider abandoning traditional political parties when they are disillusioned with the system. But, why, among many political alternatives, will they select the populist candidate?

I argue that populists are more likely to be successful when they are able to craft a credible message that accomplishes two things: 1) it either constructs and politicizes a new cleavage or politicizes an existing cleavage in the country, and 2) convinces voters that she is most qualified to address the specific concerns afflicting a sizeable portion of the country (generally the downtrodden). A candidate's ability to craft a credible message, and thus her electoral appeal and success, depend on several factors: her political history, professional background, and characteristics (class, geographical affiliation, and language). An electoral contender's immutable characteristics like ethnicity, gender, religion, and age can lend a certain authenticity to their populist message. Stated somewhat differently, a populist candidate is more likely to be successful when she can politicize some kind of social division, and articulate an agenda and make persuasive campaign promises to provide significant substantive representation and tangible benefits to one group (or groups) of citizens – normally a group that feels excluded or marginalized from the political system (Pappas 2012). Important to her persuasiveness is a candidate's ability to provide symbolic representation. To give one example, a candidate of the same ethnicity (or some other immutable characteristics) as those who feel most marginalized in society would be most successful when she can politicize the ethnic cleavage in her message. The shared connection, along the cleavage line, between voter and candidate confers legitimacy and credibility to the populist's message, enhancing her ability to convince these citizens that life will improve were she to be elected. In developing this argument, I posit that:

Hypothesis 5a: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when the candidates have successfully politicized a cleavage;

Hypothesis 5b: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when the candidates embody the characteristics around which the cleavage has been constructed;

My argument is illustrated in Figure 2.1 below. I contend that populists have the greatest electoral success when the degree of overlap between the three circles (electorate characteristics and concern, populist's appeals and behavior, and characteristics of the populist) is mathematically sufficient.[28] Past arguments in the populism literature have exclusively focused on two of three circles; I feel that my argument is novel in that it adds a third circle, that of the characteristics of populist candidates themselves.

Figure 2.1 Visual Illustration of My Theory



[28] I qualify the argument with a mathematical consideration to account for the institutional variance among Latin America's political systems in voting rules (e.g. plurality or majority) and electoral system features (e.g. number of candidates).

In crafting their own political identity, message, and convincing citizens that they truly represent them, populists employ certain rhetorical strategies and behaviors. Populist politicians have historically used national symbols in their messages and self-identification to claim that they are the "sole" or "true" representative of the people, and have even played up specific characteristics about themselves to forge stronger connections with the people (de la Torre 2015, 8). I contend that populists should be most successful when they share a common defining and immutable characteristic with the group(s) that either feels excluded or the populist can convince is excluded from or disadvantaged in the current political system. However, and discussed below, much of the crafting part of populism is how actors who lack the common element artificially create a common connection.

Such characteristics may be identity-based, for instance, relating to ethnicity and religion. Regarding ethnicity in Latin America, indigenous groups have suffered centuries of political exclusion. In the last two decades, many indigenous rights organizations helped establish political parties or purposefully forged formal linkages with existing parties (Yashar 2005, Van Cott 2005, Madrid 2012). Two of these parties, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia and the Pachakutik United Plurinational Party (MUPP) in Ecuador have had electoral success. Labeled "ethnopopulist political parties" (Madrid 2008, 475), these actors have blended ethnic representation and populist electoral strategies to tap into ethnic cleavages in their countries. Presidents Evo Morales (Bolivia, 2005-present) and Rafael Correa (Ecuador, 2006-present) came to office on messages that appealed to people who self-identified as indigenous and others who shared some identification with indigenous cultures (Madrid 2008, 477).

In regards to religion, populist parties have been able to gain electoral success by constructing national identities around religious affiliation or by tapping into widespread feelings of religious persecution. In Poland, Pankowski (2010, 3-7) argues that both the League of Polish Families (LPR) and the Self Defence of the Republic of Poland (SRP) movements have garnered electoral success by claiming "truths" like "all Poles are Catholics" and relying on clear anti-Semitic and homophobic agendas. These parties have attempted to make connections to the Polish citizenry by playing up their common sense values and the belief that any deviation from Roman Catholicism is somehow a threat to the nation. In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has gained prominence by offering a voice to those in the Hindu majority who feel they have been politically and socioeconomically slighted by the secular Congress Party. In doing so, the party promoted the concept of Hindutya—"an all encompassing term that represents everything in the name of Hinduism" (Ayyanger 2007, 96).

In the discussion above I identified one mechanism that enhances the credibility of the populists' messages—political actors sharing the identity of those whom they wish to represent. However, candidates who lack a clear immutable connection to voters may exaggerate or even artificially construct certain features of their personal profile or history to create this common bond. Campaign strategists and public relations teams play a vital role in this process by offering advice on how candidates should market themselves to the electorate. Possible examples of this image crafting include adopting cultural practices of groups, speaking in languages or dialects native to certain geographical areas, or changing physical appearances (accent, vocabulary, dress, etc.) to convey an authenticity and likeness to the group(s).

Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), a Peruvian of Japanese descent, won an election in a country with an ethnic majority whose identity he did not share. He came to office in Peru by exploiting the resentment of the country's majority *cholos*—darker skinned, poorer citizens—against the country's minority white elites (Weyland 1999). He ran as a political unknown with no formal party organization, no campaign staff, and "posed as an antipolitician" to exploit feelings of political exclusion (Stein 1999, 115). More importantly, he crafted his appeals and constructed his behavior to create a connection with those citizens who felt culturally, politically and economically exclude. Fujimori used innovative campaign tactics to portray himself as a representative of society's marginalized. Dressed in traditional indigenous garb (he wore *ponchos* and *chullos*, hats with ear flaps) and dancing to regional music with locales, he delivered countless unrehearsed and unscripted discourses in remote locations across the country (Oliart 1990, Schmidt 1996). In his speeches he used simple language, far from the sophisticated vocabulary and jargon-heavy conversations of his prior academic life.

To tap into the widespread feelings of exclusion by the political system's racial undercurrents, he adopted the nickname *el Chino* ("The Chinaman"). He did so to exaggerate the fact that he, like the majority of citizens, was not a member of the ruling white minority (Stein 1999). Further elucidating his point and connection to the excluded citizens, he travelled to several Andean villages in his specially designed "Fujimobile"—a cart pulled by a tractor to increase his direct appeals to citizens (Oliart 1990). Fujimori's opponent, Mario Vargas Llosa, seemingly aided his campaign. Vargas Llosa attacked Fujimori's Japanese ethnicity and publicly condemned Fujimori's mother's inability to speak Spanish (Yergin and Stanislaw 2008). Fujimori retaliated by portraying Vargas Llosa as the candidate representing the white, privileged elite sectors of society, and even publicly campaigned that his Asian facial features

were closer to those of Andean Indians than Vargas Llosa's European facial features (Yergin and Stanislaw 2008).

In identifying scope conditions for my argument, I consider whether there are any thresholds that may impact a candidate's electoral success. It is likely that the most electorally successful populists deliver either: a) a message that appeals to a cleavage that represents a majority of the population, or b) a series of messages that appeal to more than one cleavage and are credible. For example, in Zambia, president Michael Sata used a populist message that united cross-ethnic, poor, urban voters and ethnically-motivated voters in rural Bemba-speaking areas (Resnick 2015, 229). Depending on how cross-cutting the cleavages are in society, the message would have to resonate across cleavages. In Bolivia and Ecuador, it just so happens that the urban and rural poor are also predominantly indigenous. Many of these cleavages may interact with one another. When a candidate is unable to unite the disillusioned people, or present a message that taps into several cleavages, she wins votes but not enough of them. I argue that candidates that share immutable characteristics that align with the underlying motivation of the dominant cleavage (e.g. race, ethnicity) are likely to be most successful. This occurs for two reasons. One, the populist is able to clearly demonstrate a shared experience with the group that affords her significant political legitimacy. Second, the populist's opponents are severely hindered in their attempts to discredit and sever the linkage between these potential voters and candidate.

IV. Populist Scoring of Presidential Candidates

This section discusses the data collection procedure I used to assemble a repository of newspaper articles covering the campaign for each of the elections I examine. I collected the newspaper

articles to have a systematic database that would include references of presidential candidates' discourses, behaviors, histories and political organizations during the campaigns. I also discuss the populist scoring for each presidential candidate, and describe how I scored contenders on the four components of populism (discussed above). The scores are included at the end of the section.

A) Data Collection Procedure

I used two criteria in deciding which newspaper sources to use for each country. First, I selected newspapers with a national circulation, or that reached a national audience. I examined presidential elections which are national-level contests as I wanted to score candidates' behavior visible to the entire country. In determining whether a newspaper is nationally available, I used the University of Texas's Latin American Network Information Center's (LANIC) directory of country newspapers. In the directory, I looked for newspapers labeled "*Periódico de circulación nacional*". In the event that this was not listed, I examined whether there were any that were located in the capital city. Second, I considered the ideological bias (if any) of the newspapers. To account for this, I emailed contacts and experts from the country and asked them two questions: a) which newspapers are the two largest? b) What are the ideological leanings of these newspapers? Lastly, I performed a Google search to see if I could find anything about each paper's circulation, history, and political bent.

Once I identified the newspapers of interest, I utilized the newspaper's online search box and set the parameter of articles to one month prior to the presidential election of interest. I collected the URLs for all articles appearing in the national, politics, economics, and opinion sections of each newspaper. After establishing the parameters, I manually scoured the list of

articles that the newspaper's search engine returned for articles related to the election of interest.[29] When doing this, I considered whether any of the formally registered candidates were mentioned; if they were, I sorted these articles into a sub-group of all articles. I also did a manual search of each candidate's name for the time period of interest to ensure that I got all mentions of the candidates and maximized my ability to find any quotes that they may have given, and any discussion of their campaign behavior or strategy. Ultimately, I tried to get information that was related to my operationalization of populism (political discourse, political history, relationship to followers, political organization) and that would allow me to score these observations as often as possible. I arranged the articles in chronological order.[30]

B) Populist Candidate Scoring

In measuring actors' ***political discourse***, I considered the degree of populist rhetoric using public statements made by the candidates. I relied on Hawkins' (2010: 251-3) rubric of populist content that advances the following criteria:

- The use of Manichean discourse: right or wrong, good or evil,
- Assigns cosmic proportions of speeches: they affect people everywhere and across time,
- Draws connections of self to revered national and religious leaders,
- Mentions of a conspiring minority who acts in their own self-interests,
- The use of a romanticized notion of the common man who embodies the national ideal,
- Advocacy that systemic political change is necessary,
- Bellicose and incendiary language toward the opposition.

[29] I encountered a lot of cross-national (less intra-country) variation in how many articles I collected. The range is from 600 to 1200 for the 1-month period prior to the election. This is to be expected—some newspapers in more developed countries are much larger and better staffed allowing them to provide more coverage. In total, the full set of articles analyzed exceeds 2,000.

[30] The newspaper results are part of a cross-national data set collected by the author and his team of research assistants at the University of California-Irvine, and available upon request. I am forever indebted to the wonderful work done by the undergraduates, each of whom are mentioned in the acknowledgements of this dissertation. For their efforts each student received academic credit for the full duration of their assistance.

I considered only newspaper articles in which the actor's original speech or words were presented and quoted. Similarly to Hawkins (2010), I scored the actor's original rhetoric in each article as: 2-an extremely populist speech or message; 1-a somewhat populist speech; and 0-a speech that has very little or no populist content. I totaled the scores for all articles relating to a particular candidate and then divided by the number of articles, awarding each candidate an average monthly score ranging from 0 to 2.

For the candidates' ***relationships with followers***, I investigate the nature of the campaign events organized by their political teams. Populists often rely on direct relationships with their followers. They usually lack the traditional mobilization channels commonly found in parties, labor unions, and other organizations. The desire for a direct relationship with followers usually leads the populist to take to the streets, hugging people and frequently touring neighborhoods off the beaten path. Lastly, populists tend to utilize folk and popular images and symbols to convey their connection to the common person. I examine campaign events relying on descriptive analysis available from candidate campaign websites and the major country newspapers. I score each campaign event a 0 if the candidate scheduled a private and very formal event (e.g. a luncheon with members of a chamber of commerce), 1 if there is some attendance by followers and the meeting is in public, and 2 if the candidate takes to the streets and is flanked by supporters. Two qualifying conditions include: a) whether the candidate was joined by other party or political officials (decreases the score), and b) the location of the event. If the location holds some symbolic or strategic importance (e.g. a historically marginalized area, a plaza dedicated to independence heroes) the event will receive an increase in populist score.

In measuring the structure of candidates' ***political organization***, I considered the structural organization of her political apparatus (party, movement, etc). I considered whether the candidate's party or movement fielded any candidates at local or regional levels. I aimed to get at whether or not the individual exercises unquestioned authority over the electoral vehicle. I scored each actor's political organization as: 0-a traditional, competitive political party with candidates at all levels; 1-an institution that fields some candidates but only at the national level, and the candidate is clearly a dominating personality with disproportionate influence; and 2-an institution or electoral vehicle designed solely for the purpose of launching the candidate's campaign.

To measure actors' ***political history***, I considered whether candidates had any prior political institutional affiliation or political experience. Drawing on Carreras (2012), I considered an entrant for the presidential race to be an outsider if he met one or both of two criteria. The first concerned whether she had held political office or a position in politics (or party or movement) prior to the start of the campaign. The second concerned whether the person ran as a political independent. Candidates who never held any political position in their lives or registered as a political independent received a score of 2. If the candidate had established a recent (within the past calendar year) affiliation with a party, she received a score of 1 as did a leader who was affiliated with a traditional party but then broke off and created a new party.[31] If a figure had risen through the ranks of her party or served in public office then she received a score of 0.[32] To assess each actor's political history, I relied on candidate, party and governmental websites and a variety of secondary sources including biographies and newspapers.

[31] Barr (2009) and Carreras (2012) refer to these candidates as "mavericks".
[32] I select one calendar year as a cutoff because this is likely to represent the creation of a political party merely as an electoral vehicle. This is a commonly occurring practice throughout Latin America.

In sum, each actor received several scores on all these indicators. I calculated a monthly aggregate score for each actor, and then divided by the number of scores the candidate received. Each component part of the variable was continuous—in that the score could range from 0 to 2, reflecting how populist their behavior was. The last month is critical as it was the month directly preceding the election when voters are forming and finalizing their impressions. Additionally, almost all countries in the analysis have limited official electoral propaganda and campaign windows—usually one month prior to the election date. These scores produced an average, ranging from 0 to 8. Each electoral contender received a score for her behavior for the month prior to the campaign.

The tables below present the scores for all candidates. A few comments on the table scoring are necessary. I have listed all presidential candidates for all nine elections in descending order by the vote share they received in the election. For each candidate there are four columns aligning with the four component parts of my operationalization of populism. In each of these columns I add, in parentheses, the total number of scores for the component part (e.g. behavior) I scored from the full collection of newspaper articles. The last column represents the aggregate score for the month, tallying the four individual component scores. Lastly, candidates who are bolded (across columns but within their rows) reflect the candidates I have deemed to be populist by my criteria stated above.

TABLE 2.4: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE POPULIST SCORES, BY COUNTRY

Candidate	Political Party	Behavior (total scores)	Rhetoric (total scores)	Organization (total scores)	History (total scores)	Total populist score
			Argentina 2011			
Fernández de Kirchner	Front for Victory (FPV)	0.22 (26)	0.33 (20)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.59
Binner	Broad Progressive Front (FAP)	0.53 (19)	0.10 (27)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.63
Alfonsín	**Radical Civil Union (UCR)**	**0.71 (17)**	**0.02 (31)**	**0 (1)**	**0 (1)**	**0.71**
Rodríguez Saá	Federal Commitment (CF)	0.67 (6)	0.00 (6)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.67
Duhalde	Popular Front/Union (FP)	0.20 (10)	0.13 (22)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.33
Altamira	Workers' Left Front (FIT)	0.33 (3)	0.06 (4)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.39
Carrió	Civic Coalition (CC)	0.22 (9)	0.26 (18)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.48
			Bolivia 2014			
Morales	**MAS-IPSP**	**1.65 (57)**	**0.66 (23)**	**0 (1)**	**0 (1)**	**2.31**
Medina	National Unity	0.71 (14)	0 (12)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.71
Quiroga	Christian Democratic Party	0.36 (11)	0 (13)	0 (1)	0 (1)	0.86
Del Granado	Movement without Fear	0.75 (8)	0.38 (8)	0 (1)	0 (1)	1.13
Vargas	Green Party	0.67 (6)	0 (6)	0 (1)	2 (1)	2.67

Chile 2013

Bachelet	New Majority (NM)	0.39 (20)	0 (21)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.39
Matthei	Alliance (UDI)	0.22 (25)	0.06 (36)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.28
MEO	Progressive Party (PRO)	0.21 (7)	0 (9)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.21
Parisi	**Independent**	**0.38 (4)**	**0.58 (13)**	**2.00 (1)**	**2.00 (1)**	**4.96**
Claude	**Humanist (PH)**	**0.5 (4)**	**1.14 (7)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.00 (1)**	**3.64**
Sfeir	Green Ecologist Party (PEV)	0.6 (5)	0.5 (4)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.1
Miranda	**Equality Party (IP)**	**1 (6)**	**1.25 (12)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.00 (1)**	**4.25**
Israel	Regionalist Party of the Independents (PRI)	0 (5)	0 (5)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00
Jocelyn-Holt	Independent	0 (5)	0.06 (8)	2.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	2.06
Bachelet	New Majority (NM)	0.39 (20)	0 (21)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.39

Colombia 2014

Santos	Social Party of National Unity (PU)	0.53 (34)	0.13 (38)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.66
Zuluaga	Democratic Center (CD)	0.00 (6)	0.00 (11)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00
Ramírez	Colombian Conservative Party (PCC)	0.00 (4)	0.00 (5)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00
López Obregón	**Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA)**	**1.11 (9)**	**0.08 (7)**	**0.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**1.19**
Peñalosa	Colombian Green Party (PVC)	0.00 (2)	0.00 (3)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00
Santos	Social Party of National Unity (PU)	0.53 (34)	0.13 (38)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.66

Ecuador 2013

Correa	**Alianza PAIS**	**1.22 (18)**	**0.95 (8)**	**0.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.27**
Lasso	Creating Opportunities (CREO)	1.16 (15)	0.00 (2)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.16
Gutiérrez	**Patriotic Society Party (PSP)**	**1.59 (20)**	**0.75 (3)**	**0.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.34**
Rodas	More Action United Society (SUMA)	0.83 (16)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.00 (1)	1.83
Noboa	Institutional Renewal Party of National Action (PRIAN)	1.22 (16)	0.25 (4)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.47
Acosta	**Plurinational Unity (UP)**	**1.27 (17)**	**1.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.27**
Wray	Ruptura 24	0.92 (17)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.00 (1)	1.92

Paraguay 2013

Cartes	**Colorado Party (PC)**	**0.62 (26)**	**0.26 (45)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.00 (1)**	**2.88**
Alegre	Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA)	0.62 (15)	0.18 (25)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.80
Ferreiro	Forward Country (AP)	1.07 (7)	0.34 (20)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.41
Carrillo	Guasú Front (FG)	0.50 (2)	0.61 (9)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.11
Carrizosa	Beloved Fatherland Party (PPQ)	N/A	0.18 (10)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.18*
Oviedo Sanchez	National Union of Ethical Citizens (UNACE)	N/A	0.17 (3)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.17*
Ferreira	Paraguayan Humanist Party (PHP)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00*
Soto	Kuña Pyrenda	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00*
Arce	Workers' Party (PT)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00*
Almada	White Party (PB)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	1.00 (1)	1.00*
Galeano	Free Homeland Party (PPL)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	1.00 (1)	1.00*

Peru 2011

Humala	Peru Wins (GP)	0.89 (7)	0.22 (15)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.11
Fujimori	Force 2011 (Fuerza 2011)	0.72 (8)	0.00 (14)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.72
Kuczynski	**Alliance for Great Change (AGC)**	**0.69 (8)**	**0.04 (14)**	**1.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**1.72**
Toledo	Peru Possible (PP)	0.75 (14)	0.13 (20)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.88
Castañeda	National Solidarity (SN)	1.33 (10)	0.20 (14)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.52
Ñique de la Puente	**Peruvian Fonavist Party (PFP)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**2.00 (1)**	**4.00***
Noriega	National Awakening Party (PDN)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00*
Belaúnde	Forward Political Party (PPA)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00*
Reymer	National Force Party (PFN)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	2.00(1)	2.00*
Pinazo	Justice, Technology, Ecology (JTE)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	0.00(1)	0.00*

Uruguay 2014

Vazquez	Broad Front (FA)	0.68 (15)	0.00 (23)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.68
Lacalle Pou	National Party (PN)	1.08 (16)	0.00 (25)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	1.08
Bordaberry	**Colorado Party (PC)**	**1.08 (13)**	**0.04 (23)**	**0.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**1.12**
Mieres	Independent Party (PI)	0.25 (2)	0.03 (9)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.28
Abella	Popular Assembly (AP)	N/A	0.08 (3)	0.00 (1)	2.00 (1)	2.08*
Vega	Radical Intransigent Ecological Party (PERI)	N/A	0.00 (2)	0.00 (1)	2.00 (1)	2.00*
Fernandez	Workers' Party (PT)	N/A	0.00 (2)	0.00 (1)	2.00 (1)	2.00*
Vazquez	Broad Front (FA)	0.68 (15)	0.00 (23)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.68

Venezuela 2012

Chávez	**United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)**	**1.86 (18)**	**1.78 (10)**	**0.00 (1)**	**0.00 (1)**	**3.64**
Capriles	Justice First (PJ)	1.80 (27)	0.42 (22)	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	2.22
Sequera	Democratic Union (UD), Worker's Power (PL)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00*
Reyes	Authentic Renewal Organization (ORA)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	0.00 (1)	0.00*
Bolívar	United Democratic Party for Peace and Liberty (PDUPL)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	2.00 (1)	2.00*
Chirino	Party for Socialism and Liberty (PSL)	N/A	N/A	0.00 (1)	2.00 (1)	2.00*

Sources: Bolivia: *La Razón*, September 12-October 11, 2014; Chile: *La Tercera*, October 16-November 15, 2013; Colombia: *El Tiempo*, April 25-May 24, 2015; Ecuador: *El Universo*, January 17-February 16, 2013; Paraguay: La Ultima Hora, March 21- April 20, 2013; Peru: *El Comercio*, March 11- April 10, 2011; Uruguay: *El País*, September 27- October 26, 2014; Venezuela: *El Nacional*, September 8- October 7, 2012.

The scoring for all candidates varies from 0 to 4.96. I selected as populist those who were either their country's most populist or who met the minimum (2 or greater). Of the 49 candidates I reviewed, four met the first condition, 10 met the last condition, whereas 22 scored below 1.0. Thus, I feel as if my scoring threshold is robust and accurately depicts the political landscape both across the region and within each country.

V. Conclusion

In this chapter I reviewed past conceptualizations of populism and put forth my own conceptualization and operationalization. Existing work on populism suffers from two central shortcomings: scholars fail to sufficiently justify their conceptualizations of populism, and they fail to carry out systematic scoring of populists. I then reviewed past theoretical accounts for why citizens vote for populists. In doing so I developed several hypotheses that will be tested throughout this dissertation. I also advanced my own theory of citizens' motivations to vote for populists. Lastly, I tried to make transparent both how I scored candidates' populist tendencies.

In developing an operationalization, I tried to avoid conceptual stretching and accepting too minimal of a definition. I sought to advance my conceptualization by considering both historical and present examples of populism, finding consistent and common behavioral traits. My operationalization included four component parts: discourse, relationships with followers, the structure of the candidate's political organization, and political history. I tried to detail what kinds of information and events would fall into these categories and what I looked for in scoring each of them. I feel that this is a unique contribution to the study of populism and builds on earlier efforts by other scholars (Hawkins, Kaltwasser, Mudde).

I reviewed past theoretical accounts for why voters cast ballots for populist candidates. All of these explanations are focused on demand-side factors—conditions that may stimulate voters to seek out political alternatives (populists). I argued that these past accounts could not fully account for why some populists were successful and others were not, especially when several populists competed in the same election (country and date). I developed a supply-side argument to better zone in on why some populist candidates are better able to exploit many of these conditions and other political environments for electoral gain. I feel that my argument is novel and unique in that it focuses on the characteristics and electoral strategy utilized by populist candidates, and it attempts to accurately model and depict the electoral tango that voters and candidates engage in during electoral cycles. The hypotheses I advanced are tested quantitatively in Chapter Three; while I trace the causal mechanisms of how these independent variables affect voter choice in my two case studies in Chapters Four (Bolivia) and Five (Chile).

In conducting my scoring, I aimed to discover cross-national and within-country variation. There is considerable variation in the electoral success of the candidates under study. Some received more than a majority of votes, whereas others gained single-digit percentages. The range of candidates also includes both incumbents seeking re-election and complete outsiders competing for the first time. Lastly, my scoring indicates that some elections featured more than one populist, a possibility that some previous scholars have failed to examine (Doyle 2011; Kaltwasser 2014).[33] The more fine-tuned scoring, I argue, has treated all candidates, regardless of vote share and electoral outcome, as possible populists, allowing for a more rigorous examination of citizen motivations to vote for populist candidates.

[33] Both Doyle and Kaltwasser detail elections with several populists. Doyle (2011) pools vote share across populists in his series of statistical models.

CHAPTER III: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CITIZENS VOTING FOR POPULIST CANDIDATES

Introduction

In Chapter Two I argued that populists are likely to have electoral success when there is a significant overlap among the traits shared by the candidate, the electorate, and the appeals made during the campaign. Part of the success equation for populists depends on them being able to politicize socioeconomic or political cleavages. Cleavages often form around immutable characteristics (e.g. race, religion, language). In testing my argument, I wish to explore whether factors that are often included into statistical models as control variables may provide insight into political cleavages identified, politicized and exploited by populist candidates.

In this chapter I analyze citizens' voting behavior in nine elections (Argentina 2011, Bolivia 2014, Chile 2013, Colombia 2014, Ecuador 2013, Paraguay 2013, Peru 2011, Uruguay 2014, and Venezuela 2012),[34] seeking to explain the conditions under which voters support populist candidates. These nine countries comprise all of Spanish-speaking South America and these were the most recent elections in each country when I collected my data.[35] I test the impact of five independent variables—perceptions of corruption, perceptions of economic conditions, mistrust of political institutions, political party identification, and citizens' populist attitudes—to determine which factors offer the greatest explanatory value. I find that government performance

[34] These nine countries are all Spanish-speaking polities in South America. I have not included Brazil in the analysis for two reasons. First, I scored Spanish language newspaper articles. I lack any fluency in Portuguese that would allow for similar analysis in Brazil. Second, the major national English newspaper in Brazil, *Folha International*, has a very limited archival history. The period available does not extend to before the 2014 election.

[35] Argentina and Peru have had elections since my data collection. The decision to focus on the most recent election has two justifications. First, it allows for a systematic test of questions in the Americasbarometer surveys. Questions frequently change over time in the surveys, or even disappear. Second, newspapers across the continent have limited archives available online.

evaluations and sociodemographic features matter more to citizens' voting behavior than do ideas, and that voting for populist presidential candidates is best explained by perceptions of corruption, sociotropic retrospective economic perceptions, and whether an individual has any affiliation with a political party.

When examining populist candidates, their incumbency status and political history should be considered. Non-incumbent populists have greater electoral success when voters believe government is not combatting what they perceive as widespread corruption, citizens have poor evaluations of the economy, and citizens have stronger identifications with political parties. These relationships are conditioned by incumbency and outsider status. When populists are non-incumbent outsiders, voters are more likely to support them when they have low trust in political institutions and lack an identification with political parties. Unsurprisingly, incumbent populists have the greatest success when citizens have better evaluations of government. Demographic variables (race, age, education, and ideology) that are usually included in models as control factors also provide considerable explanatory power. This finding provides potential support for my argument that citizens vote for populists based on commonalities along immutable characteristics. How and whether populists politicize these factors are investigated in Chapters Four and Five.

This chapter is divided into five sections. I first briefly discuss my operationalization of the political style of populism and present my case selection. I then advance my hypotheses. I outline my measurement of the variables, and discuss my methodology. I present the statistical analyses and discuss and interpret my findings. In the conclusion, I recap the chapter and offer some implications of its findings.

I. Operationalizing populism as a political style

In this dissertation I ask: *why do citizens vote for populist candidates?* To sufficiently answer this question I need to advance criteria for who a populist is. As discussed in chapter two, I consider populism to be a political style that can be evaluated by studying four aspects of political leaders: their discourse, their relationships with their followers, the structural characteristics of their political organizations, and their political histories. I view each of these four dimensions as a continuous variable and thus consider populism as a continuous variable.

Most political actors exhibit *some* degree of populist behavior at certain points in time, specifically the electoral cycle. Given the context or political event, candidates may behave in a populist fashion on one day and not the next, or on all days of the campaign. Table 3.1 below illustrates the component parts of my operationalization. My measurement and scoring practices are outlined in the methodology section of Chapter Two.

Table 3.1: My Operationalization of Populism as a Political Style

Discourse	Relationship with followers	Political Organization	Political History
Manichean, anti-establishment	Direct and personalistic linkages with followers	Vertical and top-down, lack of intermediary institutions	Political outsider

Table 3.2 presents the populist scores for all presidential candidates deemed to be to any degree populist (i.e., who received a populist score greater than "0") during the month preceding the election under study. I have highlighted candidates that have either: a) reached a scoring threshold of both a total score of 2.0 and at least a score of 0.5 for a minimum of two of the four

criteria, or b) represent the most populist candidate in their country's election. Requiring that candidates exhibit two of the four criteria represents a reasonable lower bar, protecting, for instance, against the inclusion of a politician who registered her electoral vehicle very late but practices no populist behavior while campaigning. I acknowledge that the 2.0 total score threshold is arbitrary but reflects a concern for identifying the most populist candidates in the region and each country. The scores in my pool of cases range from 0 to 4.96. Of the 49 candidates under review, 14 score above 2.0 or are the most populist in their countries, whereas 22 score below 1.0.[36] Thus, I feel as if the threshold identifies the most populist candidates in each country and the continent.

Table 3.2 also illustrates each candidate's vote share. There is considerable variation in their electoral success. Some received more than a majority of votes, whereas others gained single-digit percentages. The range of candidates also includes both incumbents seeking re-election and complete outsiders competing for the first time. Lastly, my scoring indicates that some elections featured more than one populist, a possibility that few scholars have examined (Doyle 2011; Kaltwasser 2014).[37]

[36] The scoring for all candidates is available in the candidate scoring section of chapter two.
[37] Both Doyle and Kaltwasser detail elections with several populists. Doyle (2011) pools vote share across populists in his series of statistical models.

Table 3.2: Populist Candidates by Score and Vote Share

Country	Year of Election	Candidate	Populist Score	Vote Share (1st round)
Chile	2013	Franco Parisi	4.96	10.11%
Chile	2013	Roxana Miranda	4.25	1.24%
Chile	2013	Marcel Claude	3.64	2.81%
Venezuela	2012	Hugo Chávez*+	3.64	55.10%
Paraguay	2013	Horacio Cartes*	2.88	45.80%
Bolivia	2014	Fernando Vargas	2.67	2.65%
Ecuador	2013	Lucio Gutiérrez	2.34	6.73%
Bolivia	2014	Evo Morales*+	2.31	61.40%
Ecuador	2013	Rafael Correa*+	2.27	57.17%
Ecuador	2013	Alberto Acosta	2.27	3.26%
Peru	2011	Pedro Pablo Kucynski	1.72	18.51%
Colombia	2014	Clara López Obregón	1.19	15.23%
Uruguay	2014	Pedro Bordaberry	1.12	13.33%
Argentina	2011	Ricardo Alfonsín	0.71	11.14%

Notes: The asterisks (*) indicate the candidate won the election. The plus signs (+) indicate the candidate ran as an incumbent.

II. Explaining Populist Candidates' Vote Share

There are several possible explanations for why populist candidates may win an election. For each explanation, I review the logic and develop hypotheses. I examine what may be called

demand-side explanations. The term refers to factors that center on the conditions that may entice the populace to consider a political alternative to the traditional political actors. I assess some of these factors—the role of corruption, poor socioeconomic performances by government, low citizen trust in public institutions, levels of party affiliation, the presence of populist ideas among citizens, and demographic variables. The hypotheses developed in Chapter Two accounted for both country-level and individual-level explanations. I investigate survey responses by citizens in this chapter so the hypotheses are developed only at the individual level below.

A) Perceptions of corruption

Corruption has long been a feature of most Latin American societies. Frequent corruption scandals and negative IGO annual reports could lead citizens to believe that corruption is endemic. Constant government improprieties may also erode citizen trust in the political establishment, encouraging candidates to employ populist rhetoric. The populist narrative emphasizes that a conspiring minority subverts popular government, and seeks to advance its own personal interests at the disadvantage of the community (Hawkins 2010). Populist candidates declare that they will serve as correctives to these social ills. Outsider candidates may be the most persuasive at delivering this message to disillusioned citizens. Their critiques of the status quo and pledges to reform and "clean up" political institutions have considerable credibility. Citizens who *perceive* corruption to be rampant and the government to not be actively combatting it are likely to cast ballots for political outsiders and populist candidates. In line with the above, I posit:

Hypothesis 1: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when they perceive government to not be combatting corruption.

The above hypothesis has been slightly modified from Chapter Two. I have done this to account for different questions asked across surveys. Instead of examining corruption in society in general, my focus will be on citizen evaluations of government action.

II) Mistrust in political institutions

After the countries of the region transitioned to democracy in the early 1990s, citizen confidence in the performance of their political institutions has steadily declined (Booth and Seligson 2009; Morgan 2011). Across the continent citizens hold their national congresses, judiciaries, and political parties in low regard. Similar to corruption, public discontentment with these institutions creates an opportunity for outsider populists to gain electoral traction. By demonizing elected officials and inefficient bureaucrats, populists may further lower public confidence in the political mainstream. Skillful politicians could capitalize on these conditions and convince voters that they will truly represent the common peoples' interests (Roberts 1995, Barr 2003). Doyle (2011), in a cross-national study, finds that higher levels of distrust of the traditional political institutions increase the probability of support for populist candidates. In line with the above arguments, I posit:

Hypothesis 2: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when they have lower levels of trust in political institutions.

III) Weaker Party Identification

The crippling debt crises that swept almost the entire continent in the 1980s not only decreased citizens' support in governments; they also eroded citizen confidence in political

parties (Roberts 2003: 36). Citizens viewed political parties as out of touch with their demands and inefficient at dealing with complex problems afflicting the region. Similar to trends in the more industrialized countries in Western Europe and North America, political party identification has declined significantly in the last few decades in Latin America (Dalton and Weldon 2007; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Roberts 2003; Wibbels and Roberts 1999). Some (Barr 2009; Levitsky and Roberts 2009; Mainwaring 2006; Morgan 2011) have even argued that much of the continent suffers from a crisis of representation.

The detachment of citizens from traditional political parties creates a "political vacuum" for populists to exploit. An increase in politically unorganized masses of citizens provides a base of potential supporters. If potential voters also feel excluded or marginalized by the political system, a perfect setting for populist contenders exists (Weyland 1996). A less institutionalized party system frequently leads to increased electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006). The increased electoral volatility lowers entry barriers to new political actors, paving the way for "personalistic anti-system politicians" (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 157). In line with the above, I posit:

Hypothesis 3: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when citizens have lower levels of identification with established political parties.

IV) Poor socioeconomic performance by governments

Historically populists have had electoral success during times of economic crisis and suffering (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991, Weyland 1999). In the most unequal region of the world (Weyland 2003), significant percentages of citizens continue to experience socioeconomic instability and insecurity. Large swaths of the population perceive that the political establishment

is incapable of, or unwilling to, addressing the socioeconomic needs of their constituents (Carrion 2009). Extended economic torpidity may generate a perceived need for a national savior of sorts. Stokes (2001) demonstrates that poor economic growth weighs heavily in the minds of voters when they evaluate both challengers' economic policy proposals and the economic performance of incumbent executives. A candidate promising to alleviate socioeconomic suffering will have very broad appeal to many disadvantaged voters. Conversely, good and sustained positive economic performance will decrease the political opportunity afforded to populists. In line with the above arguments, I posit:

Hypothesis 4: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when they <u>perceive</u> economic performance to be poor.

V) Widespread populist attitudes

One explanation that has been largely unconsidered in the literature is the presence of a set of populist "ideas" among the populace. Recently, scholars (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2014) have begun to test what they label an "ideational theory" of populism. The theory holds that populist leaders and movements have increased success when citizens core beliefs reflect populist ideas. Populist ideas usually include a Manichaean view of politics, a notion of a reified popular will, and a belief in a conspiring elite (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2015). Citizens who firmly hold these views envision politics as a struggle between good and evil, suspect that very few but very powerful special interests hinder their countries from progressing, and contend that the common person should have greater direct control over political decision-making.

Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde (2012) illustrate that populist ideas are prevalent among the general population, and these findings are consistent across space (in both Latin America and Europe). In contexts where citizens have a firm belief in popular sovereignty, their demands are likely to be met by political actors who advocate delegating more direct political control to the masses. Citizens may also gravitate toward candidates who do not represent the "political class". I posit:

Hypothesis 5: citizens are more likely to vote for populist candidates when those citizens hold stronger populist ideas.

In sum, populist candidates are likely to have a window of electoral opportunity when societies perceive corruption to be widespread, governments perform poorly in improving socioeconomic conditions, there is significant public discontent with political institutions, levels of party institutionalization are lower, and citizens hold higher levels of populist ideas. A key consideration to note is that these explanations likely interact with one another. For instance, poor economic performances and repeated corruption scandals may have a profound delegitimizing effect on political officials. Table 3.3 provides an overview of my hypotheses.

Table 3.3 Hypotheses and expected findings

Hypotheses	**Expected Effect on Populist Vote Share**
$H_{1:}$ Corruption	Higher perceived levels likely to increase vote share
$H_{2:}$ Mistrust of Public Institutions	Higher mistrust levels likely to increase vote share
$H_{3:}$ Political Party Identification	Lower levels likely to increase vote share
$H_{4:}$ Perceptions of the Economy	Worse evaluations likely to increase vote share
$H_{5:}$ Populist ideas	Higher presence likely to increase vote share

III. Data and Methodology

My analysis is based on Americasbarometer survey data for the country elections discussed above. A few comments about the nature of the surveys are necessary. There is variation in when the surveys were conducted in relation to the elections. For each country and election I use either the most recent survey that immediately follows the presidential election, or the one that is conducted closest to the election day. I acknowledge that the temporal disconnect between when the elections occurred and when the surveys were conducted is problematic but for all elections they were conducted less than a year before or after the event. For each election I use either the survey that immediately followed or most closely preceded election day. Specifically, three of the surveys occurred before the elections, and six happened after.[38] Surveys were conducted prior to the following elections: Bolivia 2014, Colombia 2014, Uruguay 2014, and Venezuela 2012.[39] They were conducted after the following: Argentina 2011, Chile 2013, Ecuador 2013, Paraguay 2013, and Peru 2011.

Outcome

My dependent variable is *vote for the populist candidate(s)*. For surveys conducted after the elections, I use the survey question "*For whom did you vote for President in the last presidential elections?*"[40] For those carried out prior to the election, I use the following question,

[38] This method has become standard and accepted practice when using aggregated survey data (Carlin and Love 2014; Carreras 2013, 2014; de Ferrari 2014).

[39] This would usually cause major analytical problems as surveys before elections ask whether respondents would vote for or against the government candidate. Fortunately for Bolivia and Venezuela, Morales and Chávez both ran for re-election and were populists. The negative is that I could not model voting behavior for the other populist in Bolivia, Fernando Vargas. Vargas received 2.65% of the vote in the election. In Colombia, the survey was conducted a few weeks before the election. The LAPOP researchers included all candidates as possible responses. Unfortunately for Uruguay, the survey was conducted roughly six months before the election and the voting question featured who respondents voted for in the party primaries. Thus, it is not included in the analyses.

[40] For the in-text discussion I translate the questions into English. The original survey questions ask, "¿*Por quien*

"If the presidential election were next week, who would you would vote for?" Both questions are scored as dichotomous variables (1=populist/s, 0=non-populists) using the classification in table 3.2 above.

Predictors

To measure citizens' perceptions of whether governments are addressing corruption, I use the question asking respondents whether they believe government has actively combatted corruption.[41] The respondents are asked to plot on a seven-point scale their degree of agreement.

In testing the economic success hypotheses, I consider two survey questions. One asks the survey respondent whether she believes the economic situation of the country has improved in the last 12 months; the second asks about the individual's economic situation during the same period.[42] The responses include "better", "the same", and "worse" and I exclude the responses "don't know" and "no answer" from the analysis.[43] Similar to the trust in political institutions variables, these economic variables were highly correlated. To protect against possible multicollinearity, I aggregated the two scores. Thus, each economic index ranges from two to six, a higher score indicating more positive economic perceptions.

For the trust in political institutions hypothesis, I use a question that asks about trust in the various political institutions (the judiciary, the national congress/parliament, and political

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votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de….? ¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted?" All of the survey questions utilized in this study are reproduced in the chapter's appendix.

[41] I have rescaled and recoded the variables to align to my theoretical expectations discussed earlier in the chapter. A different question in some of the surveys asks whether respondents believe corruption among public officials to be widespread. However, this question was unavailable for some of the surveys, limited its general use.

[42] Originally I hoped to also test both current and prospective economic evaluations. However, question unavailability limited systematic testing across cases.

[43] This was repeated for each variable throughout the analysis.

parties). Again respondents are asked to place their level of trust for each institution on a scale, and to make an assessment from 1 to 7. Similar to Doyle (2011), I construct an index of citizen trust in these institutions, combining all three scores to generate an index varying from 3 to 21.[44]

For party affiliation, I use a question that asks whether the respondent sympathizes with any political party. The question is scored dichotomously ("no" or "yes") and I use the "yes" scores as my reference group.[45]

I use two questions to evaluate the presence of populist ideas in the population. One asks respondents to what degree they believe the people should govern directly, not through elected representatives. The second question asks to what degree citizens concur with the statement "those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the country." Both questions allow respondents to assign themselves a score from 1 to 7 (strongly disagree to strong agree). As with the economic and trust variables, I have aggregated these two scores creating an index ranging from 2 to 14.

Lastly, I include control variables to account for variation in the gender, education, income, age, racial self-identity, and ideology of survey respondents.[46] Drawing on previous studies, I expect that respondents who are females, less educated, less wealthy, younger, self-

[44] I first included each of these institutions separately in my models to see whether any one institution has a stronger effect than the other two. I had no reason, *a priori*, to assume that these institutions should all have the same statistical association with vote choice as levels of trust in these institutions vary across countries and time (Seligson 2006). However, the results did not differ much between treating these institutions separately or running them as an aggregated index. For ease of presentation, I include here only the indexed, single measure.
[45] Ideally I would also measure which party respondents sympathized with. However, across countries, a very low response rate occurred for this question. The variable's missingness is unlikely to be random, disqualifying its use.
[46] For gender, "female" serves as the reference group; for education, years are treated continuously; for income, there are 16 levels which are adapted for country-specific factors, for race I have excluded mulatto and "other" respondents as their quantity are insufficient for statistical models and treat those who responded "white" as my reference group; for ideology, a higher score represents a more leftist ideology, as determined by the respondent on a 10-point scale.

identify as mestizo and indigenous, and have a stronger leftist orientation should be more likely to vote for populists (Doyle, 2011; Ellner, 2003; Kampwirth, 2010; Lewis-Beck and Celeste-Ratto, 2013; Remmer, 2011; Weyland 2011).

IV. Findings

My statistical findings are displayed in several tables in this section and in the appendix. Additional regression models are included in the appendix to illustrate the results when I run the model on each country subset (e.g. Argentina 2011) and for a subset of the surveys that included the populist attitudes question. I did this to determine whether there were any methodological reasons against pooling cases, and to see if any interesting specific country patterns emerged. The tables below include regression outputs for when I aggregate data across countries (pooling data sources), when I run each country separately, and I divide elections by those featuring incumbent populists and those featuring only non-incumbent populists. I include separate analyses for incumbents because the hyper-presidential systems of Latin America provide a very favorable electoral environment for incumbents. Since 1995, when free and fair elections started to become routine in Latin America, only one president has lost a bid for re-election: Hipólito Mejía in the 2004 Dominican contest.

Table 3.4 provides logit regression results examining citizen support for populist candidates in all elections for which surveys were conducted prior to the election. In column 1, when pooling countries, I find no statistical support in the expected direction for any of the hypotheses. [47]I actually find considerable support in the opposite direction. This is due to the fact

[47] I do find some support (not statistically significant) in the expected direction for corruption and economic perceptions for Colombia 2014.

Table 3.4: Logistic Analysis of Support for Populist Presidential Candidates Using Data from Surveys Conducted Prior to Election (Future voting)

	Pooled Results All Candidates B/(SE)	Bolivia 2014 Morales B/(SE)	Colombia 2014 López Obregón B/(SE)	Venezuela 2012 Chávez B/(SE)	Incumbents Morales & Chávez B/(SE)
Individual-level variables					
Government fights corruption	**0.398***(0.04)**	**0.535***(0.06)**	-0.182 (0.10)	**0.527***(0.11)**	**0.515***(0.05)**
Positive Economic Perceptions	**0.289***(0.05)**	**0.342***(0.07)**	-0.208 (0.15)	**0.572***(0.18)**	**0.343***(0.06)**
High Trust in Political Institutions	**-0.079** (0.03)**	-0.037 (0.04)	-0.038 (0.08)	-0.156 (0.08)	-0.044 (0.03)
No political party affiliation	**-0.759***(0.14)**	**-1.197***(0.17)**	-0.331 (0.31)	**-1.330***(0.38)**	**-1.308***(0.15)**
Potential cleavage variables					
Education	-0.019 (0.01)	**-0.094***(0.02)**	**0.153* (0.05)**	-0.039 (0.02)	**-0.088***(0.05)**
Gender (male=1)	-0.215 (0.11)	-0.207 (0.16)	-0.028 (0.31)	-0.097 (0.37)	-0.228 (0.14)
Income	**-0.060***(0.02**)	-0.021 (0.02)	0.006 (0.04)	**-0.156** (0.02)**	**-0.043* (0.02)**
Age	**0.008* (0.00)**	0.005 (0.01)	0.005 (0.01)	-0.005 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)
Race (black)	-0.495 (0.36)		-0.344 (0.81)	0.420 (0.89)	0.811 (0.72)
Race (mestizo)	**0.476** (0.15)**	**0.894* (0.36)**	0.253 (0.36)	0.230 (0.38)	0.121 (0.21)
Race (indigenous)	**1.190***(0.22)**	**1.625*** (0.41)**	0.981 (0.66)	0.808 (0.98)	**0.729** (0.28)**
Leftist Ideology	**0.300***(0.02)**	**0.203*** (0.04)**	**0.272***(0.07)**	**0.451***(0.08)**	**0.250***(0.03)**
Constant	-3.025***(0.47)	-2.797***(0.78)	-3.901** (1.34)	-1.375 (1.42)	-1.766** (0.60)
N (Individuals)	1 916	1 109	485	319	1 430
*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001					
R^2 (ML)	0.739	0.646	0.282	0.962	0.780
McFadden R^2	0.564	0.524	0.350	0.834	0.627

Note: The number of black respondents in Bolivia totaled 6. I have excluded this racial category from the model presented above. There is no effect on the significance or direction of all other variables when "black" respondents

are disaggregating the cases, between incumbent populists and non-incumbent populists, results are much more in line with my expectations. Therefore, I discuss the findings for the two incumbent populists (Chávez and Morales), and those for the non-incumbent populist (López Obregón).

Both Chávez and Morales are widely regarded as prominent examples of populism in the region. However, both leaders continuously won successive re-election. Therefore, during the 2014 and 2012 elections respectively, neither candidate could be seen as an outsider. Rather they had become the central figure of the political establishment. Much of populism's appeal is a discourse that attacks the existing political order, and offers an alternative. Both leaders continue to reinvent political enemies, frequently referring to the opposition as a choice of the past. The analysis in this chapter provides insight into whether the factors that helped Chávez and Morales get elected still matter long after their initial electoral breakthroughs.

Column 5 of the table above provides the results when data were pooled for Bolivia and Venezuela. As expected when incumbents seek re-election, citizens' vote choices are conditioned by their evaluations of government. Respondents were more likely to vote for both candidates when they perceived government to be actively combatting corruption, they had more positive perceptions of economic performance, and they identified with a political party. I find a negative, but not statistically significant, relationship between voting and citizens' trust in political institutions. Data on populist attitudes were only available for the Venezuelan survey. Column three in Table 3.9 of the appendix provides results when this variable is included. I find a positive association with a vote for Chávez, but the relationship is far from statistically significant.

Demographically, both candidates received strong support from less educated and poorer respondents who held more leftist political orientations. None of these findings are surprising. Chávez and Morales have long been champions of the marginalized and excluded citizens (Hawkins 2010; Lupu 2010; Madrid 2008, 2010). They are also globally renowned for challenging capitalist forms of economic development (Castañeda 2006; Cameron and Hershberg 2010; Hawkins 2009). One somewhat surprising finding is that indigenous and mestizo voters were much more supportive of Morales than they were of Chávez.[48] This could be the result of two factors. First, Morales has been able to politicize the ethnic cleavage in Bolivian society, and continuously portrays himself as the first ethnic president of Bolivia (Farthing and Kohl 2014; Madrid 2008). Second, a plurality of respondents in the Venezuelan sample claimed to be "white". Within this racial category in the sample, there was significant variation in the respondents' political ideologies and socioeconomic strata.

The results for the only non-incumbent, Clara López Obregón, appear in column three of Table 3.4. As expected of a non-incumbent populist, citizens who had worse approvals of government performance and political institutions were more likely to support her.[49] The lack of statistical significance is likely due to two factors. First, as illustrated above in Table 3.1, although López Obregón was the most populist of the candidates in Colombia, she was much meeker in her populist behavior and rhetoric than other regional contenders. Second, López Obregón competed in an election initially viewed as dull but later marred by bitter verbal attacks. Spats recurred between incumbent Juan Manuel Santos and the winner of the first round, Oscar Zuluaga (Botero 2014). Zuluaga's strategy largely relied on several negative attacks against

[48] Both indigenous and mestizo voters supported Chávez. However, these relationships were not statistically significant ($P<0.05$).
[49] None of these relationships, however, were statistically significant ($P <0.05$).

government corruption and unresponsiveness in the last month of the first round. Thus, López Obregón was less positioned to capitalize on citizen dissatisfaction than she would have been had she been competing for the electoral lead and directly engaging with the incumbent.

Ideologically, respondents who placed themselves on the left of the political system were much more likely to support López Obregón, who occupied the political space on the left (Botero 2014, 226) in an election that featured several candidates on the right (Marta Ramírez and Oscar Zuluaga).[50] She gained a considerable reputation as a leftist political figure during her time as acting mayor of Bogotá. While in charge, she publicly pledged that no public assets would be privatized (*El Espectador* 2011). Deviating from Chávez and Morales, she drew significant support from more educated voters. As an extremely educated candidate,[51] López Obregón stressed the importance of higher education throughout the campaign (*El Tiempo* 2014).

In addition, Table 3.5 below shows the predicted probabilities of voting for the populist candidate in Bolivia, Colombia, and Venezuela.[52] The figures in each column represent the change in probability of a yes vote for different levels of the independent and control variables, when all the other variables are held at their median values. Table 3.9 in the appendix replicates the predicted probabilities for the pooled model found in column 1 of table 3.4 above.

The overall takeaway point from the analysis is that voting behavior for populists is not just conditioned by citizens' evaluations of government. Non-performance factors, specifically sociodemographic values also matter greatly. This provides evidence that characteristics of the

[50] Enrique Peñalosa may be viewed as a center-left candidate.
[51] She received a Bachelor's degree in economics from Harvard, a law degree from the University of the Andes, and a doctorate from the University of Salamanca.
[52] Table 1 in the appendix illustrates the change in predicted probabilities for the variables when using the full model, or when all three countries' data are pooled.

electorate, namely education, race, and ideology matter greatly. This finding identifies potential cleavages that may be politicized by populist candidates. In Table 3.5, the five variables in bold display the greatest change, in terms of absolute magnitude. Across countries, the results reflect those in the logistic regressions discussed previously. Moving from the most rightist to most leftist ideological placement produces the greatest effect in two of the three countries. Perceptions of government performance (economic management and combatting corruption) dominate voting probabilities for the two races featuring incumbents. Income seems to matter a lot in Venezuela, reflecting a continuation of class-based voting that Lupu (2010) found significant evidence for in earlier elections. Morales did better among poorer voters, but the

Table 3.5: Change in predicted probabilities of voting for populists as predictors change from their minimum to their maximum, based on logistic regression using data from surveys conducted prior to election (future voting)

Variable	Bolivia	Colombia	Venezuela
Government Fights Corruption [1-7]	**0.67**	**0.08**	**0.57**
Positive Economic Perceptions [2-6]	**0.33**	**-0.06**	**0.43**
High Trust in Political Institutions [3-21]	-0.17	0.04	**-0.54**
Political Party Identification [Yes to No]	-0.26	-0.03	-0.18
Education [0-18]	**-0.39**	**0.18**	-0.13
Gender [Female to Male]	-0.05	0.00	-0.02
Income [0-16]	-0.09	0.00	**-0.51**
Age [18-96]	0.10	0.03	-0.08
Race	**0.38**	**0.11**	0.13
Leftist Ideology [1-10]	**0.43**	**0.18**	**0.72**

Notes: Morales received 67.22% of the vote in the LAPOP sample, López Obregón 11.84%, and Chávez 63.13%. In Bolivia the greatest change for race occurred between white (0.29) and indigenous (0.67); in Colombia it was black (0.04) to indigenous (0.15); in Venezuela it was white (0.73) to indigenous (0.86).

change was nowhere as pronounced as in Venezuela. In the next chapter (IV), I elaborate on this finding, as it signals a shift in Morales's electoral coalition.

A consistent and somewhat surprising finding across models is the relatively strong effect of party identification. Respondents who identified with parties were much more likely to vote for the populist candidates. In a region with declining identification with political parties and considering the existing literature, this may seem extremely counterintuitive. However, party identification and respect for parties have actually *increased* in Bolivia and Venezuela since the early 2000s. These reversals are largely the result of populist leaders institutionalizing their sociopolitical movements (Roberts 2013; Van Cott 2005; Rice 2012).[53] Therefore, populist leaders, especially those who are seeking re-election, have strong incentives to institutionalize their electoral vehicles and create a broader political base. Although I did not test respondents' support for particular political parties directly, I ran several other models with an interaction between party identification and leftist ideology. In all three countries, respondents on the left of the ideological scale are still likely to support these leaders. Those with no party identification are less likely, and the interaction terms in all cases are negative. The conclusion here should be that leftist respondents who also identify with a political party are much more likely to support this group of populists.[54]

Past Voting and Other Country Cases

[53] Throughout this dissertation I use the term "institutionalization" to refer to movements and parties that, over time, develop and field candidates in several electoral races. The more institutionalized the party, the more geographic and political levels (e.g. local, regional, etc.) it competes in.

[54] In Bolivia, when party and ideologies were run as an interaction, leftist ideology is still highly significant ($P<0.01$), no party is still negative ($P<0.68$), and the interaction is negative and significant ($P<0.04$). All other variables remain the same. In Venezuela, the same thing occurs but only leftist ideology is significant. Similarly in Colombia, the effect occurs: leftist ideology is still highly significant ($P<0.01$), but the interaction is not significant.

One major shortcoming of Latin American survey data is that the most reliable project, the Americasbarometer, conducts its surveys every two years. This biannual collection method places restrictions on how data can be used. For five of my cases the surveys were conducted *after* the election: Argentina 2011, Chile 2013, Ecuador 2013, Paraguay 2013, and Peru 2011. As discussed above, the survey question used to estimate the dependent variable (vote choice) has changed but some caution is also required for interpretation of the statistical findings. I still use the same questions to test independent variables but I must provide additional consideration for the temporal element.

Table 3.6 illustrates my statistical models for past voting behavior. I again account for elections that feature incumbent populists and non-incumbent populists. Similar to future voting, I find that the following independent variables offer significant explanatory power for populist voting behavior: perceptions of corruption, sociotropic retrospective economic considerations, levels of trust in political institutions, and political party identification. However, the direction of the statistical associations is very different. For corruption perceptions and economic evaluations, I find significant statistical support in the theorized directions. Respondents who doubted corruption is being combatted and who perceived worsened economic conditions were more likely to support these non-incumbent populists. I also find statistically significant relationships between no party identification and trust in political institutions on the one hand and voting for populists on the other. Again, the associations were in the opposite direction as theorized. Table 3.9 in the Appendix offers the results for the same regression models run for each country. The opposite effects for these variables mostly hold in Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru. This is likely due to the nature of candidates who competed. Most of the

Table 3.6: Logistic Analysis of Support for Populist Presidential Candidates Using Data from Surveys Conducted After the Election (Past voting)

	Pooled Results	
	Non-Incumbents	Non-Winners (Cartes removed)
	B/(SE)	B/(SE)
Independent variables		
Government fights corruption	**-0.134***(0.03)**	**-0.237***(0.05)**
Positive Economic Perceptions	**-0.184***(0.04)**	**-0.184* (0.08)**
High Trust in Political Institutions	**0.045* (0.02)**	0.046 (0.04)
No political party affiliation	**-0.527***(0.10)**	0.249 (0.18)
Control variables		
Education	0.012 (0.02)	**0.094***(0.03)**
Gender (Male=1)	**0.292** (0.10)**	0.288 (0.16)
Income	**0.027* (0.01)**	0.023 (0.02)
Age	**-0.018***(0.00)**	**-0.016** (0.01)**
Race (black)	0.582 (0.31)	**1.321** (0.66)**
Race (mestizo)	**-0.306** (0.11)**	0.299 (0.19)
Race (indigenous)	**-1.072** (0.35)**	0.277 (0.39)
Leftist Ideology	**-0.184***(0.02)**	**-0.070* (0.04)**
Constant	0.776***(0.41)	**-2.420***(0.79)**
N (Individuals)	3 217	2 700
*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001		
R^2 (ML)	0.459	0.418
McFadden R^2	0.500	0.282

Note: Non-incumbent populists contested elections in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Peru. In Paraguay, Horacio Cartes won the election

Candidates examined represent major parties and have held national office. Thus, they represent the establishment.[55] When one examines the Chilean case, no relationship between party identification and trust in political institutions on the one hand and populist vote share on the other are in the anticipated directions. Again, this is due to the nature of the populist candidates in Chile. All three (Parisi, Claude, Miranda) were complete outsiders and independent candidates who vociferously challenged the traditional political establishment (Bunker 2013). Parisi even went a step further, eschewing any political party endorsement or affiliation, a move exceedingly rare for Chilean presidential competition. Thus, they were able to utilize anti-systemic and anti-establishment rhetoric throughout their campaigns to drum up support. These strategies are discussed in detail in Chapter Five that explores the outsider populists in Chile.

Demographically, the profile of supporters for this crop of populist candidates is remarkably different than it was for Chávez, López Obregón, and Morales. These non-incumbents drew significant support from more educated, male, wealthier, younger, white, and more conservative voters. These characteristics are almost exactly the opposite from the leftists above. This should not be entirely surprising. Several scholars (Conniff et al. 1999; Hawkins 2009; Roberts 1996; Weyland 2001) have long documented the chameleonic nature of Latin American populists' ideologies. The emergence of both right-wing (Fujimori, Collor, Menem) and more radical leftist (Chávez, Morales, Correa) populists is well documented.

Again, in an effort to distinguish which predictors offer the greatest explanatory power, I

[55] In Argentina, the most populist candidate was Ricardo Alfonsín, a member of the traditional UCR party and national deputy from Buenos Aires. Lucio Gutiérrez served as president of Ecuador from 2003 to 2005. Kuczynski in Peru served as general manager of the Central Reserve Bank and Minister of Economy and Finance in the early 2000s. Cartes joined the right-wing ANR-Colorado Party after the 2008 presidential elections. Although he was a political outsider when elected, his party had ruled for decades prior to its defeat in the 2008 elections.

have estimated the variables' predicted probabilities. Table 3.7 below illustrates the effects when a variable moves from its minimum to maximum value, while holding all other variables at their median values. Of note is the fact that three demographic variables provide the most explanatory weight: ideology, race, and age. In the models for future voting (Table 3.5), ideology, race, and education all mattered significantly. These variables are normally included in regression models as mere control factors. However, a thorough examination of each could offer significant insights into how populists are able to politicize cleavages and mobilize potential support.

Lastly, the results for the Ecuador regression model for the incumbent (Rafael Correa) are presented in Table 3.9 of the appendix. As with Chávez and Morales, citizen evaluations of government performance weighed heavily in their electoral decision-making. This provides additional evidence that economic and corruption perceptions strongly affect voter choice,

Table 3.7: Change in predicted probabilities of voting for populists as variables change from their minimum to their maximum, based on the past voting for non-incumbents model

Variable	Lowest Level	Highest Level	Change
Leftist Ideology [1-10]	0.20	0.05	-0.15
Race [Indigenous to Black]	0.05	0.20	0.15
Age [18-99]	0.13	0.03	-0.09
High Trust in Political Institutions [3-21]	0.07	0.14	0.07
Government Fights Corruption [1-7]	0.13	0.06	-0.07
Political Party Identification [No to Yes]	0.09	0.15	0.06
Positive Economic Perceptions [2-6]	0.13	0.07	-0.04
Income [0-16]	0.08	0.11	0.03
Gender [Male to Female]	0.09	0.12	0.03
Education [0-18]	0.08	0.10	0.02

Note: The total vote share for all these candidates in the pooled samples was 17.16%. Keeping all other variables constant at their medians, going from a 99-year old, left-wing and indigenous respondent to an 18-year old, right-wing and black respondent increases the populist vote probability from 0.007 to 0.477.

incumbents are contesting the election. The demographic profile of Correa's supporters largely matches the other left-wing populists: less educated, female, poorer, older, and with leftist political orientations.

Somewhat surprising are the negative coefficients for black, indigenous, and mestizo voters. However, a closer look at Ecuadorian politics and the 2013 presidential candidates provides some insights. Lucio Gutiérrez had a political alliance with the Pachakutik indigenous movement when he served as president in the early 2000s (Madrid 2012, 162). In both the 2009 and 2013 elections, he continued to employ ethnopopulist strategies aimed at attracting indigenous support (Madrid 2012, 107). Additionally, my analysis revealed that both Gutiérrez and Alberto Acosta practiced more populist behavior than Correa did in the 2013 election. Both candidates made frequent trips to poor, racially diverse neighborhoods on a daily basis during the campaign. Thus, they made significant electoral inroads with these constituencies. This effect is illustrated in column 3 of Table 3.9 of the appendix.[56]

Figure 3.1 provides an overview of my theoretical findings. Several of my findings, when qualified by the incumbency or outsider status of candidates, offer significant support for recent work on voting behavior in Latin America. Historically, work on populism in Latin America has not considered whether citizens' motivations to vote for populists would be affected by the candidate's time in office. The incumbency status of candidates should be a central concern for

[56] Compared to white voters, black and indigenous voters were more likely to support these two candidates than the others.

any study of elections in Latin America for two vital reasons. First, only one president (Hipólito Mejía in the 2004 Dominican election) seeking re-election in the region has lost in the last two decades (de Ferrari, 2014). Second, there is an ever-increasing literature on the effects of incumbency on electoral accountability (Hellwig and Samuels, 2008; Samuels, 2004; de Ferrari, 2014), and the early consensus is that voters can more easily hold incumbents seeking re-election accountable than other candidates. I found this to also be true. When populists ran as incumbents, government performance on a host of issues mattered greatly.

Hypothesis	Result
H_1: Corruption Perceptions	Strong support but conditioned by incumbency
H_2: Trust of Public Institutions	Some support but conditioned by candidates' outsider status
H_3: Political Party Identification	Strong support but conditioned by candidates' outsider status
H_4: Perceptions of the Economy	Strong support but conditioned by incumbency
H_5: Populist ideas present	Weak Support

Figure 3.1 Summary depicting results of hypothesis testing.

Consistent with recent studies (Carreras 2012; Hawkins 2010; Manzetti and Wilson 2009; Seawright 2012) on corruption and voting behavior, I find that citizens who believe that corruption is being combatted are much more likely to vote for leaders seeking re-election than

those who believe corruption to be neglected. My finding that perceptions of the health of the country's economy matter greatly should not be surprising. It reflects a consistent pattern found in the broader voting behavior literature (Barr 2003, Benton 2005, Echegaray 2005, Remmer 1991, Stokes 2001, Weyland 2003). It also provides additional support that sociotropic retrospective economic perceptions severely impact the incumbent vote (Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013).

VI. Conclusion

In this chapter I have reviewed various theoretical explanations for why citizens may vote for populist candidates. I have also provided survey evidence to suggest why citizens across Latin America voted for populist candidates between 2011 and 2014. Below I discuss some of the implications of my findings.

Populist leaders denounce elites; they criticize existing political institutions and detail politicians' perceived ineptitude to solve issues that afflict citizens; and they employ mobilization strategies that seek to establish direct connections with supporters. Populist political candidates have won office occasionally since democratic elections were restored in Latin America. However, more often than not such candidates do not win elections; moreover, most elections do not even feature a populist candidate. Non-incumbent candidates who employ populist political tactics are likely to obtain electoral success when the following conditions are met: voters believe government is not combatting corruption, they have poor evaluations of the economy, and they identify with political parties. The last condition is reversed, and a low trust in political institutions matters, when the non-incumbents are also populist outsiders. In elections involving incumbent populists, citizens tend to behave very similarly to the way they behave in

elections featuring non-populist incumbents seeking re-election. Voters tend to reward or punish incumbent populists based on the performance of their governments.

The survey evidence that I present in this chapter leads me to conclude four things. First, studies on voting for populists need to take into account the incumbency status of candidates. Past large-N studies (Doyle 2011; Remmer 2012) on voting for populist candidates combined both incumbents and non-incumbents. However, the current crop of populists varies considerably in their political histories. Some have ruled for more than a decade while others seem to appear out of nowhere, registering their candidacies just months prior to an election. In Chapter Four, I explore Evo Morales's political longevity. I examine how his populist behavior and citizens' voting motivations have changed over his near decade in office. Second, and related, studies of populism need to control for a candidate's history—whether she is seen as part of the establishment or a complete outsider. Outsider status clearly conditions the ability of a candidate to attack the establishment and mobilize voters who feel marginalized. Chile, a country with a strong tradition of well-established political parties, had three outsider populists compete in the 2013 election. I take a closer look at these figures in Chapter five.

Third, I found that demographic factors matter greatly. Usually treated as simple control variables, these predictors held considerable explanatory power across my models. They should be examined more closely, especially when they capture a significant social cleavage. There is a nascent research agenda on these factors. A new volume, *The Latin American Voter*, has initiated a systematic study on the impact of gender, religion, race and ethnicity, poverty, and regionalism on voting behavior (Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister 2015). Fourth, some scholars have described populism in the region as "radical," adopted by leaders on the impractical or "revolutionary left"

(Castañeda 2006; Weyland 2009). However, my analysis demonstrates that populists in the region continue to come in all ideological flavors. This reflects the continued tendency of these actors to participate as ideological chameleons in the electoral arena.

In closing, populism is a phenomenon that is not confined to a specific region, time period, electoral status, or political qualification. The potential exists for fascinating discovery if scholars broaden the pool of possible cases to examine, if they score those cases systematically, and allow that scoring to direct case selection. In some Latin American countries, populists win and rule for extended periods while in others populists compete but never achieve electoral breakthrough; in yet other Latin American countries there is a complete absence of populist candidates. Researchers should consider that populists include both incumbents seeking re-election and presidential challengers, and may be either right wing or left-wing actors. This will allow for improved theory-testing and the generation of better answers to the question of why populists are able to achieve electoral success in a specific country or context.

APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL MODELS

Table 3.8: Change in predicted probabilities of voting for populists as predictors change from their minimum to their maximum, based on the logistic regression using data from surveys fielded prior to the election (future voting)

Variable	Lowest Level	Highest Level	Change
Leftist Ideology [1-10]	0.17	0.75	0.58
Government Fights Corruption [1-7]	0.22	0.75	0.53
Race [Black to Indigenous]	0.26	0.65	0.39
High Trust in Political Institutions [3-21]	0.63	0.29	-0.34
Positive Economic Perceptions [2-6]	0.34	0.62	0.28
Income [0-16]	0.59	0.36	-0.23
Political Party Identification [No to Yes]	0.48	0.68	0.20
Age [18-96]	0.44	0.59	0.15
Education [0-18]	0.53	0.44	-0.09
Gender [Female to Male]	0.48	0.42	-0.06

Note: Percentages are predicted probabilities derived from model 1 in table 3.4 above.

Table 3.9: Logistic Analysis of Support for Populist Presidential Candidates Using Data from Surveys Fielded After the Election (Past voting)

	Argentina 2011		Chile 2013		Ecuador 2013+		Ecuador 2013		Paraguay 2013		Peru 2011	
	B/(SE)		B/(SE)		B/(SE)		B/(SE)		B/(SE)		B/(SE)	
Independent variables												
Government fights corruption	**-0.469*** **	**(0.03)**	0.103	(0.16)	**-0.345** **	**(0.12)**	**0.383*** **	**(0.07)**	0.092	(0.06)	**-0.199***	**(0.09)**
Positive Economic Perceptions	-0.257	(0.15)	**-0.530***	**(0.25)**	**-0.354***	**(0.15)**	**0.314*** **	**(0.08)**	**0.189***	**(0.09)**	0.000	(0.12)
High Trust in Political Institutions	0.142	(0.09)	**-0.235***	**(0.12)**	0.049	(0.09)	0.003	(0.04)	**0.086***	**(0.04)**	0.069	(0.05)
No political party affiliation	-0.080	(0.39)	0.568	(0.59)	-0.025	(0.37)	-0.270	(0.19)	**-0.637** **	**(0.21)**	0.338	(0.35)
Control variables												
Education	0.049	(0.06)	0.075	(0.08)	0.103	(0.05)	**-0.072***	**(0.03)**	0.020	(0.03)	**0.107***	**(0.04)**
Gender (Male=1)	0.246	(0.38)	0.645	(0.44)	0.538	(0.37)	-0.193	(0.19)	-0.173	(0.20)	0.053	(0.25)
Income	-0.038	(0.06)	0.047	(0.06)	**-0.100***	**(0.05)**	-0.034	(0.03)	-0.022	(0.02)	**0.082***	**(0.04)**
Age	0.001	(0.01)	**-0.036***	**(0.02)**	-0.007	(0.01)	0.013	(0.01)	0.012	(0.01)	**-0.027** **	**(0.01)**
Race (black)	0.828	(1.18)			**1.738***	**(0.82)**	-0.800	(0.59)	0.354	(0.59)	0.066	(0.86)
Race (mestizo)	0.326	(0.39)	**0.956***	**(0.45)**	-0.051	(0.58)	-0.097	(0.32)	0.272	(0.20)	-0.488	(0.36)
Race (indigenous)	0.710	(1.17)	0.728	(1.13)	1.126	(0.79)	-0.490	(0.50)			-1.294	(0.69)
Leftist Ideology	-0.175	(0.09)	-0.057	(0.09)	0.015	(0.07)	0.054	(0.04)	**-0.103** **	**(0.03)**	-0.107	(0.06)
Constant	-1.837	(1.46)	0.811	(2.05)	-1.232	(1.55)	-1.188	(0.85)	-0.937	(0.77)	-2.669*	(1.21)
N (Individuals)	611		439		761		761		515		885	

*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001

Notes: The following candidates represent the countries: Raúl Alfonsín (Argentina 2011); Franco Parisi, Marcel Claude, and Roxana Miranda (Chile 2013); Rafael Correa, Lucio Gutiérrez, Alberto Acosta (Ecuador 2013); Horacio Cartes (Paraguay 2013); Pedro Pablo Kucynski (Peru 2011). The first column for Ecuador includes the non-incumbents; the second displays results for voting for incumbent Rafael Correa. The number of black respondents in Chile and indigenous respondents in Paraguay both totaled 15. When other variables were introduced, there were fewer than 10 cases in each model. The coefficients, thus, became non-interpretable. I have excluded these racial categories from the models.

Survey questions used (Americasbarometer surveys, 2014):

I. Dependent variable (vote share):

VB3. ¿Por quién votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de XXXX?

II. Independent variable (corruption perceptions):

N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el

gobierno?

III. Independent variable (trust in political institutions):

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

IV. Independent variable (sympathy for a political party):

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?
(1) Sí [Siga]
(2) No [Pase a POL1]
(8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]

V. Independent variable (economic perceptions):

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?

(1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR

VI. Independent variable (populist ideas):

POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?
(88) NS (98) NR
POP113. Aquellos que no están de acuerdo con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (88) NS (98) NR

VII. Control variables (education), (gender), (income), (ideology), (age), (race):

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó?

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____

años total [Usar tabla abajo para código]

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo la ayuda económica del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]_

L1. Cambiando de tema, en esta tarjeta tenemos una escala del 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha, en la que el 1 significa izquierda y el 10 significa derecha. Hoy en día cuando se habla de tendencias políticas, mucha gente habla de aquellos que simpatizan más con la izquierda o con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se encontraría usted en esta escala? Dígame el número.

Q2D-Y. ¿En qué día, mes y año nació usted? [Si se niega a decir el día y mes, pedir solo el año o preguntar edad y calcular luego el año.] Día: _____ Mes (01 = Enero): _____ Año: _____ (Para Q2D y Q2M: 88 = NS y 98 = NR) (Para Q2Y: 8888 = NS y 9888 = NR)

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra, mulata, u otra? [Si la persona entrevistada dice Afro-argentina, codificar como (4) Negra] (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (88) NS (98) NA

CHAPTER IV: THE POLITICAL LONGEVITY OF EVO MORALES AND MAS

I. Introduction

In October 2014, Evo Morales achieved a rare feat in modern politics in Latin America. He was re-elected for a third consecutive presidential term. The result was less than surprising. However, it illustrates the leader's continued command and dominance of a political system that allows for free and relatively fair elections. The 61.4% of votes that Morales received, and a striking victory margin of 37%, are the products of a confluence of factors discussed below.

The case of Evo Morales' 2014 re-election is important for comparative and populist scholars to study because it allows for an analysis of whether a populist, who came to power on a vitriolic anti-establishment agenda, has changed his populist strategy as an incumbent. In chapter three I found that there are major differences in citizens' voting behavior for populists depending on the candidate's incumbency status. Most studies of populism do not consider whether a long-serving president may vary in his use of populism. In this chapter I argue that Morales has modified his populist behavior. The evolution of his populism has allowed him to maintain high levels of electoral support. I find strong evidence in support of my contention that populism is not an inherent characteristic of certain politicians but rather strategically deployed by adroit political actors. Specifically, Morales has successfully crafted an electoral message that blends his ethnic characteristics with a politicization of issues most relevant to the electorate, namely economic performance.

I examine the underlying motivations of Bolivian voters by analyzing individual-level data culled from the bi-annual Americasbarometer surveys for years 2006-2014. I also draw on information obtained from semi-structured interviews from fieldwork in La Paz in May and June

2015. Significant academic research has focused on explaining MAS and Morales' emergence (Madrid 2008, 2012; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Zuazo 2008; to name a few) in the early 2000s. In this chapter, I focus on the factors that may help explain Morales' political longevity with a specific focus on his 2014 electoral victory.

The chapter progresses in the following manner. I offer an overview of Morales' electoral success and his changing support base. I then employ quantitative methods to analyze survey responses to assess whether citizens' economic considerations, their trust in political institutions, identity with political parties, and perceptions of corruption affected their support for Morales. I employ process tracing, including a series of hoop tests, to examine evidence to confirm that these factors affected the electoral contest. I conclude with a discussion of the implications for the study of populism of Morales' changing support bases and the evolution of his populism.

II. Morales' Electoral Success and Changing Support Base

Evo Morales and his MAS party first emerged in Bolivian politics in the early 2000s. After narrowly losing the 2002 presidential contest, and benefitting from the resignation of two presidents,[57] Morales swept to victory in 2005 with 53.7% of the national vote. In doing so, he became the first candidate in Bolivia's post-authoritarian era to claim a majority in a presidential election. Morales' ascent to power was the product of strong support among coca growers and indigenous groups in Bolivia and other disillusioned middle class voters who embodied high levels of resentment toward the Bolivian established and traditional political order (Shifter 2004; Madrid 2012; Van Cott 2005). He campaigned in 2005 by framing his political discourse around the issue of indigenous identity and crafted his rhetoric in such a way as to appeal to the

[57] Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada ("Goni") resigned in October 2003. Carlos Mesa resigned in June 2005. Originally scheduled for 2007, interim president Eduardo Rodríguez moved the presidential elections forward two years.

historically excluded sectors of Bolivia (Haarstad & Andersson 2009). However, Morales was careful to not exclude or polarize potential white or mestizo voters while employing ethnic and populist appeals (Madrid, 2012). During his time in office, Morales has continued to make direct contact with the masses (Carrion 2009, Kohl 2010) and generate ethnic appeals (Madrid 2008).

Table 4.1 below illustrates Morales' vote share in presidential elections for 2005, 2009, and 2014. There is a clear picture of increasing electoral dominance for Morales, as he progressed from winning 6 out of 9 national departments in 2005 to winning 8 in 2014. Additionally, his national vote share increased from 53.9% in 2005 to a high of 63.9% in 2009, before dropping to a still remarkable 61% in 2014. The table below illustrates Morales' vote share disaggregated by national department, indicating that he lost significant electoral ground in

Table 4.1: Vote Share for Evo Morales in Presidential Elections, 2005-2014, by Department

Department	2005	2009	2014
Chuquisaca	54.2	56.1	63.4
La Paz	66.6	80.3	68.9
Cochabamba	64.8	68.8	66.7
Oruro	62.6	79.5	66.4
Potosí	57.8	60.6	69.5
Tarija	31.6	51.1	51.7
Santa Cruz	33.2	40.9	49.0
Beni	16.5	37.7	41.5
Pando	20.9	44.5	52.1
National	53.7	63.9	61.0

Sources: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE)
Note: Morales received a plurality not majority of votes in Santa Cruz in 2014.

2014 in the traditional MAS strongholds La Paz and Oruro, while continuing his dramatic electoral advancements in the opposition's stronghold—the eastern Media Luna—of Beni, Pando, Santa Cruz, and Tarija. Figure 4.1 below provides a visual illustration of the geographical realignment of Morales' support base.

Figure 4.1 Departments Won by Morales in the Presidential Elections, national vote share in parentheses



Source: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE). Maps made by author using zeemaps.com.

The central argument in this dissertation is that populists have electoral success when they are representationally convincing. Generally speaking, I find that Morales largely depended on the support of poor, rural, ideologically leftist and indigenous Bolivians in the Western highlands in his 2005 election and early years in office. Employing populist appeals centered on his indigenous ethnicity, cocalero background, and nationalist economic proposals, he formulated a credible message that he would truly represent this constituency. Morales' electoral victory and initial support base offer evidence that he successfully politicized ethnic and socioeconomic cleavages, bringing to light that indigenous citizens have been historically marginalized, and that he was qualified to redress this wrong. A majority of Bolivian citizens embodied the above qualities and, more importantly, found Morales' claims to enhance their

political representation to be credible. Figure 4.2 below presents a visual illustration of the symbiosis between Morales' electoral coalition, his populist appeals and the candidate image he credibly crafted.

Figure 4.2 The Overlap of Morales' Populist Appeals, His Personal Characteristics and Characteristics of the Electorate, 2003-2006



As Morales' time in office continued, he relied on support from many of the above sectors but some changes in his base have occurred. In an effort to maintain dominance at the ballot box, Morales has converted former political opponents into his camp, while also suffering some "ruptures" in political support. His national economic policy that heavily focuses on maximizing gains from resource extraction sectors has increased his political ties to business

elites. Located primarily in the Eastern lowlands, some upper class citizens who have benefitted from state contracts have begun to support Morales. The same dependence on the extractive sectors of the economy has led to Morales compromising on his promises to safeguard the environment, especially in protected territories. His about face has eroded support from rural indigenous settlers in the Beni department. Figure 4.3 below visually illustrates Morales'

Figure 4.3 The Overlap of Morales' Populist Appeals, His Personal Characteristics and Characteristics of the Electorate, 2010-2014



nearly a decade in office, Morales remains highly popular as a result of his government performance,[58] of which the benefits have been distributed in traditional populist fashion. Ethnicity continues to play a major role in Bolivian politics. However, Morales' electoral strategy to remain in office has involved shifting his base of support. In an effort to maintain dominance at the ballot box, Morales has converted former political opponents into his camp. I discuss this transformation in greater depth below.

III. Explaining Morales' Electoral Success

In attempting to explain why voters may have continued to vote for Evo Morales, I develop hypotheses to account for his popularity. Many of the explanations developed in the populism literature focus on the emergence of populist politicians and electoral candidates. In line with what other scholars have argued, I contend that the processes of emergence, electoral breakthrough, governance, and political longevity are distinct. They may not have the same explanations (Mudde 2007, 202; Kaltwasser 2014, 187), especially for a leader who has won three successive elections. In this chapter my main focus is on Morales' political longevity. I also draw on the broader voting behavior literature and consider certain national conditions to account for why citizens may (not) continue to support Morales. I evaluate a set of hypotheses to account for citizen's motivations similar to those that were assessed in Chapter two, centering on the following causes: the benefits of incumbency, the role of race and ethnicity, how citizens respond to socioeconomic performance by government, their trust in public institutions, perceptions of corruption, the presence of populist ideas, and demographic variables. I developed

[58]Although Morales narrowly lost a referendum on changing the constitution in February 2016, his presidential approval rating has remained well above 50% for almost the entirety of his time in office, including throughout 2016.

hypotheses in Chapter two to account for populists in general. In this chapter I modify these explanations to account for Morales' decade in office.

A) Incumbency Factor

I start with the consideration that an incumbent is seeking re-election. The hyper-presidential systems of Latin America provide a very favorable electoral environment for incumbents. These leaders are the most visible political figures to the public as media campaign coverage centers on them. Beyond media coverage, incumbency allows some candidates to utilize state resources that can be distributed in a patrimonial fashion for electoral gain. The benefits of incumbency may be insurmountable. Since 1995, when free and fair elections started to become routine in Latin America, only Hipólito Mejía in the 2004 Dominican contest ran for re-election and lost. In office in Bolivia since 2005, Morales is without doubt the face of his political party, and arguably the country's political system. Although tough to measure the impact on voting behavior directly, one should witness certain observable implications of the advantage. The media coverage of Morales should dwarf that of the other candidates, and Morales' use of public resources and public office for electoral gain will be widely publicized.[59]

B) Race and Ethnicity

Both race and ethnicity are prominent features in Bolivian society that affect and shape social, political, and economic relations. Many indigenous rights organizations helped establish political parties or purposefully forged formal linkages with existing parties (Yashar 2005, Van Cott 2005, Madrid 2012). Within Bolivia, authors have documented the racial component—

[59] Since this is not a cross-national study, I do not include a specific variable in my models to account for the incumbency factor. For an excellent review on the effects of incumbency that enhances the clarity of the concept, see de Ferrari (2014). However, later in the chapter I examine specific aspects of Morales' incumbency advantage: the disproportionate media coverage in his favor, the practice of launching government projects during the campaign, and specific electoral rules that handicap the opposition.

along indigenous lines—of the *Movimiento al Socialismo* (MAS) party and citizen attachment with Evo Morales. However, it is important to note that racial and ethnic self-identification in Bolivia are "fluid and dynamic" and vary over time and in different political contexts (Moreno Morales 2012, 253).[60] Since 2000, the share of the population identifying as white has decreased, and those who regard themselves indigenous has increased. The mestizo category has also been increasing and represents an overwhelming (~75%) majority of citizens. This trend may actually capture the rural to urban migration in the country or possibly reflect the process of *mestizaje* (Madrid 2012). Given the origins of MAS and that Morales was the country's first indigenous president, I expect that Morales will command significant support from those citizens self-identifying as indigenous.

C) Economic performance by governments

I expect citizens to tolerate (relatively) poor economic performance during the embryonic stages of Morales' regime. His promises and fulfillment of major structural economic changes are likely to have been viewed as necessary to usher in improved socioeconomic conditions for all Bolivians. Thus, early on in his rule, I would expect citizens to grant some leeway to Morales in the economic sphere, as the culpability of economic torpidity would still be unclear. Following de Ferrari (2014), I posit that as Morales' tenure in office continued, a greater clarity of responsibility developed, forging a closer connection between Morales and the economic performance of the country. This condition would likely increase the degree of performance-based voting among the electorate. Improving macro- and microeconomic conditions are likely

[60] These self-identifications are fluid and dynamic in the sense that they can and do change over time. For example, some indigenous citizens in Bolivia (and the rest of Latin America) have undergone a process of *mestizaje* ("mixing"). After migrating to major cities, they may downplay their indigenous traits and take on cultural traits of their country's urban Spanish-descendants.

to increase citizen support for Morales. Increases to citizens' wages, while inflation and poverty decrease will likely yield favorable election results.

Positive macro-economic performance may also affect the level to which the state controls the economy (the causal arrow likely goes both ways). Remmer (2011) finds that, across Latin America, an expanding economy allows leaders to make certain campaign promises, and after being elected, carry out government economic policies. These usually include poverty reduction projects, increased government spending, and more government control of the economic sector. Sustained economic performance and the change in government economic philosophy may also affect citizens' attitudes. Voters may be more willing to pay for additional government programs for two reasons. First, they are likely to be more confident in the public sector's ability to address structural issues in the socioeconomic domain. Second, they are more likely to support a government that plays a more active role in guiding the economy. In short, I expect an interactive and positive effect among strong country-level economic performance, additional government projects, and citizens' favoring a more nationalistic economy. Citizens who previously favored a greater role for the state in the economy will be even more convinced, whereas citizens who strongly supported a more privatized economy will re-evaluate their economic philosophies.

D) Mistrust in political institutions

As mentioned above, Morales utilized an anti-establishment discourse to convince a majority of Bolivians to support his political ascendancy. After years in office citizens may start to view Morales and his political colleagues as part of the establishment. Over time MAS has wrested control of all major national political institutions. In considering which institutions to

examine, Doyle (2011) constructs an index of citizen trust in the national parliament/congress, in political parties, and the judiciary. In my analysis, I examine each of these institutions separately to see whether citizens' evaluations about any one institution have a stronger effect on Morales's popularity than the other two. Seligson (2006) demonstrates that there is considerable variation in citizens' levels of trust for these institutions, and these levels vary over time. Morales' ability to exert control over these institutions also varies considerably. I again expect that voters would initially tolerate poor performance from these institutions. Their perceptions of them would not influence voting behavior considerably. However as Morales' party gained control of the national congress, I expect that higher levels of trust in the congress should be associated with a higher probability of voting for Morales as the incumbent president.

E) Perceptions of corruption

The populist narrative emphasizes that the political system has been subverted by a conspiring minority who seek to advance their own personal interests at the disadvantage of society (Hawkins 2010). From 2002 to 2005, Morales denounced traditional political parties and elites, accused them of rampant corruption, and pledged to reform the political system once elected (Madrid 2012, 39). Since Morales successfully campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, one would expect that voters were hopeful that corruption would decrease during his time in office. Failure to comply with this electoral promise during his tenure might erode citizen confidence in him, possibly enticing voters to seek out alternatives. In line with other recent studies on Latin American voting behavior (Carreras 2012; Seawright, 2012), I expect that citizens who view corruption to be widespread would gradually punish Morales as his time in office continued.

F) Widespread Populist Ideas

The literature has largely overlooked the presence of populist "ideas" among the populace as a source of voting decisions. Recently, scholars (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2014) have begun to test what they label an "ideational theory" of populism. The approach contends that populist leaders and movements have increased success when citizens core set of beliefs is based on populist ideas. I expect that Bolivian citizens who hold stronger populist ideas would be more likely to support Evo Morales throughout his tenure.[61] Morales has consistently campaigned and governed with the pledge that he rules "by obeying" the will of the people (Anria 2013, 35).

G) Environmental Concerns

Although not a general theory of populism, environmental concerns are a major national issue in Bolivia. They also affect other independent variables. One caveat to the expected general support among Indigenous voters for Morales concerns the region in which the government proposed to build a controversial highway—the Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). The plan first gained traction with Morales' public inauguration of the project in June 2011. Construction sparked protests in August 2011, with talks and resistance resurfacing periodically. The Moxeño-Trinitario, Yuracaré, and Chimáne peoples are concerned about deleterious environmental effects, ranging from deforestation to colonization from migrant settlers to possible resource exploitation by transnational oil companies (Achtenberg 2013b). More important, this issue may have an affect on two other independent variables: populist attitudes and economic perceptions. The government's decision to not offer a *previa consulta*

[61] I contend that citizens who, on a 1 to 7 scale, more strongly agree with statements advocating for greater popular control to hold firmer populist views. The measurement and text of survey questions are discussed below.

(prior consultation) with indigenous groups before construction began led to major political fallout. The decision violated the Bolivian Constitution, sparked massive protests, and led to a cross-country march to La Paz by affected groups (Achtenberg 2013c). Additionally, citizens who are very positive about economic progress may be less enthusiastic if they see that this growth comes at the cost of environmental protections. In short, citizens' environmental concerns are likely to condition their support for Morales, while also affecting their perceptions of economic performance and their populist inclinations.

IV. Data and Methodology

My quantitative analysis testing the above hypotheses is based on the Americasbarometer survey. My dependent variable is *voting intention for Evo Morales*. I use five surveys to track change over time. The 2014 survey was done a few months before the upcoming election. The other surveys (2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012) were conducted after elections. To investigate voter intention, I use the following question, "If the presidential election were next week, who would you would vote for?" The question is scored dichotomously (1=Morales, 0=all other challengers). I use a logit regression model to estimate the odds that survey respondents support the incumbent.

Operationalization and Measurement

To examine the effect of ethnic self-identification, I use two questions asking respondents with which ethnicity they self-identify, and whether they grew up speaking either Aymara or Quechua. In testing the economic success hypotheses, I consider two survey questions: one that asks the survey respondent whether she believes the economic situation of the country has

improved in the last 12 months, and whether she believes her individual economic situation has improved during the same period.[62]

For the trust in political institutions hypothesis, I use a question that asks to what extent people trust the various institutions (the judiciary, the national congress/parliament, and political parties). I disaggregate the question, allowing one variable in the model for each institution. The scale allows for respondents to make an assessment from 1 to 7 for each institution. To test the corruption hypothesis, I use a question that asks respondents whether they believe corruption among public officials to be widespread.[63] For all variables, I have rescaled and recoded the variables to align to my theoretical expectations discussed earlier in the chapter. For instance, I expect when citizens perceive corruption to be less widespread they are more likely to support Morales. Thus, higher levels on this variable do not reflect more corruption, rather a more positive evaluation of corruption.

In testing whether populist ideas are present in the population I use three questions concerning to what degree respondents agree the president should follow the popular will, whether the people should govern directly, and to what degree respondents believe the world is a struggle between good and evil. Unfortunately, these questions featured only in the 2008 survey. I include a model in the appendix creating an index with these variables. The results can be seen in column 1 of Table 1.

[62] These and all full survey questions are available in the Appendix. Later surveys (post-2010) included only the retrospective questions. The responses include "better", "the same", and "worse" and I exclude the responses "don't know" and "no answer" from the analysis. This was repeated for each variable throughout the analysis.
[63] There are four possible answers: very widespread, somewhat widespread, not really widespread, and not at all widespread. When I index these variables, there is very slight variation, discussed below.

Lastly, I include control variables to account for variation in the gender, education, income, age, geographic location, and ideology of survey respondents.[64] Drawing on previous studies, I expect that respondents who are less educated, less wealthy, self-identify as mestizo and indigenous, live in a rural area, do not live in the Media Luna,[65] and have a stronger leftist orientation should be more likely to vote for Morales (Anría 2013, Doyle 2011, Ellner, 2003; Lewis-Beck and Celeste-Ratto, 2013; Remmer, 2011; Van Cott 2005, Weyland 2011).

V. Statistical Findings

Table 4.2 gives the pooled logit regression results for surveys for the years 2008-2014. I discuss my findings in terms of whether each causal factor captured in my variables led to an increase or decrease in the estimated odds that a respondent voted for Evo Morales, compared to all other electoral challengers. Table 4.3 below provides the change in predicted probabilities of the explanatory variables, when one moves from their minimum to maximum values, while holding the other variables at their median values. I examine whether motivations for citizens to vote for or against the long-serving executive have changed over time. Lastly, I focus specifically on the factors that mattered most prior to the 2014 election. Across models, and over

[64] For gender, "male" serves as the reference group; for education, years are treated continuously; for income, there are 10 levels which are adapted for country-specific factors, for race I have excluded mulatto, black, and other respondents as their quantity are insufficient for statistical models and treat those who responded "white" as my reference group; for ideology, a higher score represents a more leftist ideology, as determined by the respondent on a 10-point scale.

[65] As discussed above in section II, the eastern lowlands are home to a majority of the country's wealthiest citizens and business elites. The geographic regions is colloquially referred to as the "*media luna*" ("half moon").

Table 4.2: Logistic Analysis of Voting Intention for Evo Morales, 2006-2014

	2006 B/(SE)	2008 B/(SE)	2010 B/(SE)	2012 B/(SE)	2014 B/(SE)
Control Variables					
Education	-0.024 (0.02)	-0.022 (0.03)	**-0.076***(0.02)**	-0.015 (0.02)	**-0.073***(0.02)**
Gender (female=1)	-0.052 (0.16)	-0.198 (0.19)	-0.023 (0.16)	-0.255 (0.15)	0.212 (0.16)
Income	-0.031 (0.07)	**-0.233***(0.07)**	-0.016 (0.05)	-0.012 (0.02)	-0.027 (0.02)
Age	-0.005 (0.01)	-0.008 (0.01)	0.008 (0.01)	**0.018** (0.01)**	0.010 (0.01)
Leftist Ideology	**0.295***(0.04)**	**0.368***(0.05)**	**0.381***(0.04)**	**0.113***(0.03)**	**0.186***(0.04)**
Geography					
Rural residence	0.280 (0.22)	**0.488* (0.22**)	**0.814***(0.19)**	0.237 (0.17)	**0.373* (0.18)**
Media Luna (yes = 1)	**-0.353* (0.16)**	**-1.273***(0.21)**	**-1.089***(0.18)**	-0.076 (0.16)	**-0.926***(0.18)**
Ethnicity and Linguistic Factors					
Race (indigenous)	**1.849***(0.49)**	**1.591***(0.45)**	0.535 (0.41)	**0.910* (0.44)**	**1.465***(0.41)**
Race (mestizo)	**0.727** (0.23)**	0.473 (0.34)	0.462 (0.31)	0.571 (0.39)	**1.050** (0.35)**
Quechua as maternal language	**1.261***(0.28)**	0.440 (0.30)	**1.335***(0.28)**	**0.736***(0.21)**	**0.592* (0.23)**
Aymara as maternal language	**2.276***(0.63)**	**1.334* (0.64)**	0.572 (0.46)	0.203 (0.33)	0.826 (0.43)
Economic Perceptions					
Individual economy compared to a year ago	-0.217 (0.13)	0.148 (0.14)	0.005 (0.01)	0.145 (0.13)	0.132 (0.14)
Country economy compared to a year ago	**0.365** (0.12)**	**1.162***(0.13)**	**0.392***(0.11)**	**0.642***(0.12)**	**0.611***(0.12)**

Trust in Public Institutions					
High trust in Judiciary	-0.048 (0.06)	0.023 (0.07)	**0.133* (0.06)**	0.079 (0.06)	0.112 (0.06)
High trust in Congress	0.069 (0.06)	0.000 (0.07)	**0.400***** (0.06)**	**0.224***** (0.06)**	**0.365***** (0.06)**
High trust in Political Parties	-0.037 (0.06)	0.001 (0.07)	**-0.130* (0.06)**	0.026 (0.05)	0.072 (0.06)
Social Ills Perceptions					
Corruption is not widespread	0.074 (0.10)	-0.044 (0.11)	**0.392***** (0.11)**	**0.272** (0.09)**	**0.203* (0.10)**
Constant	-2.229** (0.74)	-3.022***(0.91)	-6.199***(0.87)	-5.425*** (0.80)	-5.256***(0.83)
N (Individuals)	903	985	1 206	998	1079
R^2 (ML)	0.764	0.729	0.694	0.682	0.658
McFadden's R^2	0.560	0.618	0.579	0.508	0.525

Note: When institutions are run as an index variable, the combined variable is significant in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 models. The other variables (significance and sign of coefficients) are unchanged for all models. For the 2010 model, corruption loses a bit of its statistical significance (P<0.01). The 2014 model, there is a very minor effect on the other explanatory variables. Quechua as dominant language becomes slightly more significant, and Aymara as dominant language becomes statistically significant (P <0.05)

time, there are several factors that consistently help explain citizens' intention to vote for Morales, but there are also some changes.

Morales has consistently drawn broad support from less educated, politically leftist, indigenous and mestizo voters. These citizens have been and continue to be the core of his support base. Throughout the 2014 campaign (as with prior elections), Morales made several informal visits to both urban and rural settings to directly appeal to voters. In these speeches he

Table 4.3: Change in predicted probabilities of voting for Evo Morales as variables change from their minimum to their maximum, based on the logistic regressions above

Variable	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014
Education	-0.10	-0.10	**-0.33**	-0.05	**-0.31**
Female	-0.01	-0.05	-0.01	-0.05	0.05
Income	-0.06	**-0.46**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.11
Age	-0.09	-0.14	0.14	**0.28**	0.20
Leftist Ideology	**0.58**	**0.67**	**0.69**	**0.20**	**0.39**
Rural	0.07	0.12	0.20	0.05	0.10
Media Luna	-0.08	-0.29	-0.25	-0.02	-0.22
Race	**0.43**	**0.38**	0.13	0.17	**0.33**
Language	**0.45**	0.30	0.30	0.17	0.20
Personal Econ. Perceptions	-0.11	0.11	0.00	0.06	0.07
Country Econ. Perceptions	**0.18**	**0.69**	**0.54**	**0.25**	0.29
Trust in Judiciary	-0.07	0.03	0.20	0.10	0.16
Trust in Congress	0.10	0.00	0.27	**0.27**	**0.49**
Trust in Political Parties	-0.05	0.00	-0.19	0.03	0.11
Corruption Perceptions	0.06	-0.04	**0.31**	0.17	0.15

Notes: I have bolded the four variables with the greatest absolute change per survey. Education ranges from zero to eighteen years. Income and ideology have ten levels. Race illustrates the difference between white and indigenous respondents. Language displays the change from a Spanish to Quechua speaker. The economic perceptions variables have three levels. All the trust variables range from one to seven. Corruption ranges from one to four.

emphasized how a vote for an opposition candidate would undo the significant advances his near decade in office has achieved. Many of his public statements stressed how the country's indigenous had finally attained social, economic, and political representation. A vote for his opponents would threaten their hard-earned inclusion. He also promised continued improvements and greater spending in education. However, some clear changes in his support base are visible. Morales has made electoral inroads with newly middle-class and wealthier citizens, specifically in the *Media Luna*, a "rupture" with some indigenous groups occurred, and he has made considerable advances with urban residents.

As table 4.3 above displays, less educated citizens were much more likely to support Morales. The predicted probability of a vote for Morales in 2010 and 2014 decreased roughly 30 percent between those with no education, and those with 18 years. Citizens with stronger leftist political orientations were much more likely to support Morales than their conservative counterparts. Moving from a 1 to a 10 on the self-placement scale drastically increased the likelihood of a vote for Morales. In the earlier years of Morales' tenure, ideology was the strongest predictor.[66] Over time, the number decreased in absolute terms but also in comparison to other explanatory variables. These decreases likely reflect Morales' courting of more conservative voters in the industrialized eastern lowlands. Both tables also illustrate that income is no longer statistically significant from 2010 onward, and the change in the predicted probability is rather minimal. This is somewhat surprising, as the income variable is a scale of 0 to 10. Again, this provides evidence that Morales has broadened his appeal to wealthier citizens

[66] Ideology may serve as a proxy for party identification in these models. I did not include party identification because in several surveys the response rate for the question was less than 25%. The missing data are likely not missing due to randomness, therefore violating best statistical practices (Gelman and Hill, 2006).

across the country. It also likely demonstrates that previously impoverished citizens who have benefited from his redistributionist policies have rewarded him with support.

In line with other studies (Anría 2013, 2014), I also find that MAS and Morales have broadened their base beyond their original rural constituencies. Although citizens in rural locations consistently support Morales to a greater degree than their urban compatriots, the difference is rather small. In the 2014 Americasbarometer sample 49% of urban residents, compared to 59% of rural residents, supported Morales when holding all other variables at their median values. Respondents who claim to reside in the *Media Luna* are less likely than their eastern compatriots to support Morales. However, the 22 percent difference obscures the fact that 49% of the 2014 survey respondents who reside in the region said they would vote for Morales. In short, there is ample evidence to suggest that Morales relies less on his western highlands and rural support bases, the cornerstones of his and MAS' political emergence and electoral dominance in the 2000s.

Morales continues to command significant support from mestizo and indigenous citizens. This was especially true in the early years of his time in office and increased again in 2014. The latest resurgence could be attributed to his personal appeals to indigenous voters discussed above. Of note, as with other demographic factors, a sizeable amount of non-indigenous voters said they would support Morales. 46% of white respondents in the 2014 Americasbarometer stated they would vote for Morales, compared to 79% of people self-identifying as indigenous.

There have also been some shifts in his base and citizen's voting motivations over time that resulted from his governing strategy and incumbency status. Again, this builds on the finding in chapter three that citizens have different relationships with populists when they are

incumbents. Citizens' evaluations of the country economic situation serve as a major predictor across all surveys. In the poorest country in South America, economic performance will always be a major question for voters. Averaged across surveys, respondents with negative country economic perceptions had a 27% probability of voting for Morales, when all other variables were held at their median value. At the variable's maximum, this rose to, on average, 67%. This suggests that as a populist's tenure in office continues, she will be judged electorally in a similar vein as other non-populist incumbents.

Trust in political institutions does not seem to play a major role in determining the motivations of citizens. Although previous studies (Madrid 2006, Doyle 2011) found that populists receive a greater share of the vote when citizens have lower trust in the institutions of liberal democracy (the legislature, the judiciary, and political parties), I find very little evidence to suggest that this matters in Bolivia. This may be due to the time period observed. Trust in 2002 and 2004 for these same institutions is likely to have been lower, reflecting the political crises that engulfed the country, leading to the joint resignations of Goni and Carlos Mesa. The only institution that seems to weigh heavily in the public's electoral conscience is the Congress. There is, however, reason to believe that this captures the effect of respondents' political party affiliation. As discussed above, I did not include political party affiliation in any of the models due to missing values. Since 2005, MAS has enjoyed a sizeable majority in the lower chamber, and dominated the Senate since 2009.[67] Thus, the remarkable differences in support for Morales witnessed in the surveys starting in 2010 likely reflect survey respondents' affinity for MAS, rather than the political institution itself.

[67] In 2005, MAS won 55.4% of the seats in the lower chamber, 44.4% in the Senate. In 2009, the party increased its share to 67.7% in the lower chamber, 72.2% in the Senate. In 2014, the number remained unchanged in the lower chamber, and dipped to 69.4% in the upper house.

Lastly, perceptions of corruption, apart from the 2010 survey, seem to be a non-issue for Bolivian voters across the duration of Morales' presidency. Table 4.4 in the appendix provides a modified 2008 model that includes an index for citizens' populist values. Data limitations prevent a complete test of the populist attitude theory. However, in 2008 citizens who hold stronger populist attitudes were much more likely to support Morales. Future studies on populism should evaluate this hypothesis much more extensively.

The 2014 election

Table 4.4 in the Appendix also provides regression results for the 2014 model with the inclusion of a few questions asking respondents to evaluate government performance (whether it protects citizens' security and whether it fights corruption), whether they believe government protects the environment, and whether they support increased economic nationalization. Similar to the model in table 4.3 above, I find that less educated, more politically leftist, indigenous and mestizo citizens who live in the west of the country strongly support Morales.

More importantly, I find strong evidence to suggest that survey respondents in 2014 held stronger intentions to vote for Morales if they had more favorable perceptions of the economic climate, were convinced that the government protected citizens' security and actively fought corruption, protected the environment, and they desired a more nationalistic economy. Of note, neither trust in political institutions nor perceptions of general corruption influenced their voting decisions.[68] These results are examined in greater detail in the qualitative assessment below.

[68] I ran several models without indexing trust in political institutions. The results remained unchanged. I also ran several models including corruption and excluding government fights corruption, citizens' security, and the other government variables. I tried numerous permutations of including and excluding these variables. Perceptions of general societal corruption were statistically significant in none of the models.

VI. Qualitative Assessment of Explanations

In the preceding two paragraphs, I found strong statistical associations between demographic factors and support for Morales, and that citizen evaluations of government performance shaped their voting motivations. The below analysis focuses mainly on the latter. Regarding the performance evaluation variables, citizens prioritized the government's handling of the economy, whether or not they believe government actively fought corruption, protected their security, and protected the environment. Lastly, they were inclined to back Morales if they desired a more nationalized economy.

To adjudicate among these explanations for Bolivians' vote for Morales in 2014 I administer a series of hoop tests. Hoop tests, by themselves, serve the function of eliminating alternative hypotheses, but fall short of providing convincing evidence for the hypotheses that are not discredited (Bennett 2010, 208). They identify necessary but not sufficient criteria for each explanation. I lay out the causal sequence (with timing) that I posit underlies Morales's re-election in 2014 in Figure 4.4 below.[69]

[69] Voting in Bolivia is mandatory, and failure to do so carries a fine that is enforced. The country's high electoral court publicly warned citizens of the consequences of not voting months prior to election day.

Figure 4.4: Causal Story of Citizens' Voting for Morales



As the figure suggests, I posit that both immutable characteristics of voters and their evaluations of politics explain their voting behavior. While the survey data used in my 2014 regression analyses were generated in March, April, and May 2014, at least six months prior to the election, this qualitative analysis seeks to illustrate the continuing political and electoral relevance of the explanatory variables over time. Temporal disconnects frequently go unaddressed in survey research studies (Carreras, 2014).

For each independent variable I found to be statistically significant in the quantitative analysis, I investigate whether these factors actually impacted citizens' voting behavior. In doing so, I examine whether any evidence can be found that corroborates each causal step outlined in the sequence in Figure 4.4. I examine whether any major political events centered on the issue (e.g. corruption scandals) occurred prior to the surveys (far left box in the figure above), whether citizens believe this issue matters (box 2) or whether citizens believe the issue has become better/worse (box 2), whether there is a statistical connection between citizens' attitudes of the issues and their likely vote choice of the president in 2014 (box 3), and whether the campaign

teams of Morales or the opposition politicized the issue during the campaign (boxes below the campaign period heading). In short, I am examining evidence that would suggest that each explanatory factor was a concern for citizens, whether the issue became politicized, and whether there is any information that would suggest the issue had an impact on the electoral contest.

Economic Perceptions and Preferences for Economic Nationalization

In this sub-section I examine the economic climate over time in Bolivia. My statistical analysis relies on the Americasbarometer surveys that asked very abstract questions to get at citizens' economic perceptions. Below I look at an array of economic measures to try and see whether on the ground economic performance may help account for citizen perceptions.

Since 2006 (Morales' first year in office), there have been remarkable economic gains for the country. The GDP has grown annually at an average of 5.1%; the national level of poverty has declined from 59.9% in 2006, to 39.1% in 2013; and wages (including increases to the minimum wage and the systematization of the annual bonuses, the *doble Aguinaldo*) have steadily increased.[70] In short, Bolivia has experienced a decade of considerable economic improvement, free of the disastrous crises that have afflicted the country throughout its history.

Despite these laudatory achievements, many citizens still view economic affairs as the most serious problems facing the country. The LAPOP survey data illustrate that from 2006 to 2010, a plurality of respondents judged an "economic crisis" to be the most serious problem facing Bolivia.[71] Additionally, significant amounts of participants identified unemployment,

[70] Data all come from the World Bank's publicly available data. The website is: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx (accessed in March 2016, and verified in July 2016).
[71] In 2006, 25% of respondents chose it; in 2008, 18%; in 2010, 16.3%; in 2012, 23.8%.

poverty, and inflation as the most serious.[72] Respondents' opinions of both the country's (macro-level) situation and their individual economic situations improved in a non-linear fashion between 2010 and 2014.[73] Taken together, economic affairs are still seen by citizens as vital issues that need to be addressed. Table 4.4 in the Appendix provides the results of a logistic regression modelling voter intention for Morales in the March/May 2014 LAPOP survey. The 2014 model illustrates that both economic perceptions and support for a more nationalized economy were statistically significant ($P < 0.001$) predictors of vote intention for Morales. In summary, economic affairs are vital for citizens, they perceived the overall situation to have improved prior to the 2014 election, and the variable had a statistically significant association with vote intention for Morales.

Morales' incumbency also offered several significant advantages for his effort at re-election. Specifically, Morales used his advantage to centralize the message of economics during the campaign. In interviews with opposition deputies, all complained about an unfair electoral playing field. They decried two conditions that favored the incumbent: first, the official electoral propaganda window was only 28 days, and second, Morales was allowed (after a favorable electoral court ruling) to inaugurate public works during this period.[74] The first condition limited the ability of electoral challengers to put forth critiques of the government in the media, and to put forth and publicize alternative economic proposals.[75] The time window also provided a major

[72] The aggregate sums of the four economic answer choices were: 59% in 2006, 46% in 2008, 44% in 2010, 58% in 2012, and 28% in 2014.
[73] In 2010, 18.6% of respondents believed the country economy to be better than 12 months ago; 15.2% in 2012; and 28.2% in 2014. The percentages for individual assessments for the same period were: 19.4, 16.9, and 23.3.
[74] The official electoral propaganda window is the time authorized by the high electoral court (TSE) in which candidates can campaign on TV, radio, etc. Author interviews with congressional deputies from the Democratic Unity (UD), La Paz, 6/9/2015.
[75] Chapter 116 of the 2010 electoral code.

advantage for Morales as there was no limit on the use of government communication in the media of proposed projects and future plans.

Morales made ample use of the powers and capacities afforded to him as the incumbent during the campaign to convince voters that the economy was strong and the government served their interests. As chief executive he used his political office to launch government projects on 27 occasions in the last month before election day.[76] As head of government he inaugurated several government megaprojects throughout the country including: oil refineries, hospitals and sophisticated medical centers, scientific facilities for research and discovery, the yellow line for the cable car in La Paz (telefórico), thermonuclear energy plants, a nuclear reactor in La Paz, and plans for highway megaprojects. At events Morales routinely stirred up crowds, made promises of future investments in regions that he visited, while broadcasting these speeches and rallies on state television channels. The government project under which his near daily inauguration of megaprojects was accomplished was fittingly titled "*Bolivia cambia, Evo cumple*".[77]

More broadly, these public inaugurations served two important functions. First, Morales made sure to remind the country that these projects were possible because his government nationalized vital sectors of the economy. These events were covered in great detail on state television and reinforced the notion that economic growth and success were a result of nationalization. In an interview with a member of Morales' strategic communications team, the official acknowledged the high volume of public works during the campaign and discussed that the government wanted to show the people that it had a lot of public investment. With these

[76] Author's calculation taken from all *La Razón* newspaper articles that were analyzed in Chapter two for Morales' populism score.
[77] This translates to: "Bolivia changes, Evo delivers".

funds it developed major governmental projects, and these projects were a means to illustrate the government's commitment and obligation to the masses.[78]

Second, there was a strategic purpose in terms of regional focus with these projects. Santa Cruz, long a bastion of the opposition, received several visits from the president. On state-owned TV Bolivia Morales launched government natural gas refineries, several hospitals and medical clinics (specifically with the *Mi Salud en la Villa Primero de Mayo de Santa Cruz* program), and petrochemical plants. A speech on September 25, 2014, illustrates his behavior: he publicly pledged to spend $405 million dollars to open power generating plants in the Chiquitania valley; iron industrialization centers in Mutún; a long distance train with an interurban train connecting the areas of Montero, Warnes, and Santa Cruz; and promised to construct three new airports in the department. The same Morales communication strategist referred to above acknowledged that these projects were employed to make electoral inroads in opposition territories, specifically the departments of Santa Cruz and Tarija.[79] In my interview with the chief strategist of opposition candidate Doria Medina, the advisor admitted that Morales' successful economic record presented a severe challenge for his candidate. The campaign team's message and strategy was to admit that the economy was solid but that Doria Medina "could do better", a less than convincing position.[80]

I find significant evidence for all steps in the causal story I laid out in figure 4.4. above. Bolivia experienced significant economic improvements prior to the 2014 election. Citizens deemed economic affairs to be extremely pressing for the country. They generally had favorable

[78] Author interview, La Paz, 6/1/2015.
[79] Author interview, La Paz, 6/1/2015.
[80] Author interview with Ricardo Paz, La Paz, 6/3/2015.

(and improving) attitudes toward their economic situations that also positively affected their evaluations of the president, and conditioned their voting behavior for Morales. Showcasing Morales' economic record was a central strategy employed by his campaign team, the opposition more or less conceded on the issue, and Morales sensed and exploited the importance of economic affairs in his capacity as head of state. He opened the state coffers and inaugurated several government megaprojects as the election neared. In sum, economic performance and citizens of the economic climate mattered greatly for the 2014 Bolivian election. Consistent with the argument that I have developed in this dissertation, not only did the economy matter greatly to citizens prior to campaign, but Morales was able to craft a very credible image that his government had and would continue to have substantial economic success. These appeals gained legitimacy via conditions on the ground but also an aggressive public relations strategy employed by his campaign team and Morales himself, as he launched near daily projects.

Corruption

Morales first gained national electoral prominence in the 2002 presidential elections. Relying on an anti-establishment and anti-corruption discourse he would eventually achieve electoral success in 2005. In 2014, however, most Bolivians still had very negative views regarding corruption. In the 2014 LAPOP survey, roughly a third of respondents thought that corruption was very widespread. More importantly, of 40 topics to choose from, corruption was seen as the most serious threat to the country by the greatest plurality of participants.[81]

Over time, corruption has become less of an issue affecting support for Morales. In table 4.2 above, citizen perceptions of corruption were statistically significant in 2010 ($p < 0.001$),

[81] 15.8% of respondents chose corruption as the most serious threat.

2012 ($p < 0.01$), and 2014 ($p < 0.05$). The probability of a respondent voting for Morales when changing from a very negative to a very positive perception also subsequently declined (table 4.3), and had a much lower impact than other explanatory variables. Table 4.4 in the appendix also illustrates that corruption perceptions are not a statistically significant predictor in the revised model with government evaluations. However, the government performance index variable, which includes government actively combatting corruption, was highly significant.[82]

Although societal corruption remains a pressing issue, the overall picture is that corruption matters not as much as the other variables for citizens' voting behavior. This may be due, in part, to the government and opposition's responses to the issue seem to influence how the electorate and broader society evaluate the government's handling of it. Experts' perceptions of corruption in the public sector, as measured by Transparency International's annual corruption perceptions index, have improved consistently and rather remarkably over time.[83] One cause was the MAS-dominated legislative assembly passing law 004 in March 2010, which bolstered efforts to vigorously root out public cases of corruption and the illicit enriching of public officials.

These findings are perhaps partially a result of the differing prioritization given to the issue by the opposing campaign teams. The Morales team saw corruption as an issue that it had to confront:

[82] In additional models that I ran disaggregating the government performance index, allowing the government actively combatting corruption variable to be tested by as a single variable yielded similar findings.

[83] TI's scale runs from 0 to 100, with a higher score indicating less corruption. In 2002, Bolivia's country score was 22 and has steadily improved in a monotonic fashion through to 2014, in which the country received a score of 35. Although the index relies on fewer than 10 expert surveys, it does provide a barometer of the overall country climate when considering corruption.

"Of course, we have corruption. Of course, yes. However, we have made major public efforts to investigate it. It is not something that you can deny. If you deny it, you have less capacity to control the message and your response is really limited. We have many ministers who are investigated permanently; we have many who are in jail. The public sees that."[84]

Beyond acknowledging their own government and party's shortcomings, the MAS government program featured a section (MAS 2014, 72-4) highlighting its accomplishments in the battle against corruption.[85] The campaign team also made an active effort well before and during the campaign to highlight the corruption of the opposition. By doing so, it denied its political opponents the opportunity to fully exploit general societal dissatisfaction with corruption. An interview with a strategist from the campaign of opposition candidate Doria Medina revealed that the issue was not central to its message nor did they seek to highly politicize it:

"We did our research, using focus groups and surveys, corruption is a very important issue but the people are very accustomed to it. Here in Bolivia they have the idea that corruption comes in a package, it is part of politics. But, it's not a factor that triggers their votes. Thus, it was not a central focus or axis of our campaign."[86]

In sum, corruption was not an issue that greatly affected Bolivians' voting behavior for Morales. Although 2014 LAPOP survey respondents deemed it to be a pressing issue for the country, it provided less explanatory power than other independent variables in my statistical models. Most importantly, the Morales' government adroitly publicized its record on fighting corruption. To his advantage, his political opponents saw corruption as an issue that does not trigger voting behavior, and failed to politicize the issue.

Citizens' security

[84] Author interview with member of Morales' campaign communications and strategic planning team, La Paz, 6/1/2015.
[85] The government program is electoral propaganda. It is an electoral brochure advertising the party's governance achievements and its long-term political ambitions and policy proposals.
[86] Author interview with Ricardo Paz, La Paz, 6/3/2015.

Although Bolivia ranks quite favorably in cross-national indices of crime levels in Latin America, many of its citizens believe that crime has increased in recent years, and a significant portion view it as a serious threat to the country. The last few LAPOP surveys indicate that the importance of crime has increased for Bolivians. In 2010, 8.14% regarded it as the most pressing issue, placing it as the fifth most vital concern; in 2012, 17.4% did, making it the third most serious concern; while in 2014, 15.8% chose it as the most serious issue in Bolivia, receiving the same percentage as corruption (joint first place).

Beyond salience and significance in public opinion surveys the issue has recently become heavily politicized. In August 2014, mass protesters including members of the Catholic Church and the politically powerful pro-Santa Cruz Council flooded the streets of Santa Cruz. Demonstrators were motivated by growing dissatisfaction with violent crime in the city and region. The catalyst for the protests appeared to be the femicide of Sophia Calvo Aponte, a young biochemist from a well-known family (*El Deber* 2014c). The high profile case sparked recurrent civil protests and even led to the national government's minister of government, Jorge Pérez, to urge the prosecuting authorities to immediately process the case (*El Deber* 2014a). A few weeks later, the violent murder of a minor resulted in citizens blocking the highway route from Santa Cruz to Cochabamba (*El Deber* 2014b). In short, citizens perceived crime to be a major issue and several publicized protests occurred prior to the 2014 campaign.

In addition to motivating protesters, the issue of citizen security was one of the major themes the campaign team of opposition candidate Doria Medina exploited. Relying on focus group research and surveys of likely voters, the decision was made to craft a message targeting the government's lack of action and concern for citizen safety and rising crime:

"Citizen security was one of the pillars of our campaign. We had a very strong message of advocating for reform of the police and the judiciary…the problem in Bolivia is that both of these institutions are rotten."[87]

Although Morales' communications and strategic team did not emphasize citizen security in campaign speeches or messages, in its official electoral documents, it did. The electoral program of MAS included details on its efforts and plans to modernize all political institutions in the country and to install video surveillance of major metropolitan centers (MAS 2014, 72). In sum, crime and concerns over citizens' security were significant issues well before and during the campaign. The Doria Medina campaign team ensured to politicize them. Those citizens who believed the government to be protecting citizens' security were more likely to vote for Morales (table 4.4 in the appendix).

Environmental Concerns

A major and controversial environmental issue that occurred after the 2009 election was the government's inauguration of the construction of a highway leading to and through the TIPNIS region, in the department of Beni. The government's official position was that the road was necessary and vital to the country's continued economic development. It would provide a much-needed link between the Andean highlands and the Amazonian Beni region (Achtenberg 2011a). Those who stood to benefit most from the project included Quechua and Aymara "colonists", former miners from the country's highlands, who had settled within the region after the large-scale privatizations of mines in the 1980s. These farmers, including *cocaleros* in Cochabamba and local civic and business groups, had improved the area's agricultural production but lacked national market access to sell their products. The plan's fiercest critics

[87] Author interview, La Paz, 6/3/2014.

included indigenous community leaders who viewed the development as inevitably leading to devastating ecological, social and cultural damage (Achtenberg 2011b).

The government initiated construction of the highway to the north of the TIPNIS region in June 2011. As the development approached the protected area, indigenous groups mobilized blockades to halt encroachment toward the park and organized a 375-mile march from Trinidad to La Paz. The proposed march served as a catalyst for both anti-highway and pro-government forces. Scores of pro-MAS colonists with support from the federal police blocked a road and brutally suppressed protests (wounding dozens of marchers). The repression of indigenous protesters led to two government ministers resigning. It also motivated the country's chief trade union federation, the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB), to call for a national strike for several days, temporarily crippling the economy (Achtenberg 2011c). After months of publicly berating and belittling the indigenous community leaders, Morales suffered a major political setback.

The political consequences of the affair manifested in a dip in Morales' popularity. Polls conducted nationwide at the time the crisis reached its fever pitch showed that the president's approval ratings dropped to 37%, among the lowest of his time in office (Achtenberg 2011b). Amidst the planned march to La Paz by the TIPNIS protesters, Bolivia went ahead with its scheduled elections for several national high courts. These judicial elections may be best remembered for the high degree of "spoiled" and blank votes, and for noticeable abstention (~ 20%) in a country with mandatory voting. Of the votes cast, 43% were invalid, 15% blank, and only 42% valid (Driscoll and Nelson 2013, 2-4). Although the outcome was mostly the result of citizen concerns over the independence of the judicial branch (Driscoll and Nelson 2013), some viewed it as a referendum on the MAS government. Reports surfaced that several citizens

invalidated ballots by marking them "TIPNIS" (Achtenberg 2011c). Responding to the furor, Morales backtracked on his plans. In October 2011, he publicly asked for forgiveness, suspended construction on the entire project until 2015 (i.e., after the 2014 presidential contest), cancelled the portion that would extend through the protected zone, and called for a referendum on future plans in Beni and Cochabamba (Achtenberg 2011d).

As the conflict progressed, attention to the TIPNIS region reached most of the major cities, and marchers gained backing from workers, students, indigenous groups, and middle-class sectors across the country (Achtenberg 2011d). A poll administered in September 2011 illustrated that more than 80% of the respondents thought Morales was handling the issue poorly (Achtenberg 2011c). When examining 2014 survey data from LAPOP, a logistic regression yielded a strong correlation between those who claimed to have protested within the last year, and those who indicated that they believed protecting the environment was more important than economic development.[88] In other words, those who favored environmental protections in a "tradeoff" over economic growth were still politically active and upset enough to protest in the streets in the twelve months prior to the 2014 presidential election – several years after Morales had halted forward motion on the project. Thus, I find strong evidence to suggest environmental concerns were a major consideration for Bolivians prior to the 2014 campaign.

The government and Morales' campaign team took note of the lingering public disaffection resulting from the conflict. Beyond Morales' decision to suspend the project until after the election, his campaign strategists concluded that the "rupture" caused by the TIPNIS

[88] The regression is included in table 4.5 of the appendix. The survey question asked respondents for a yes or no answer on whether they had participated in a protest or demonstration within the last year. The "tradeoff" question asked respondents whether they would rather: protect the environment; promote economic development, or both. I excluded those who responded both to allow for a direct comparison on this question.

affair severed many of its ties with historical bases of support. The most important and disaffected political actors included indigenous groups that formed part of the Unity Pact (*pacto unido*).[89] A member of Morales' campaign communications and strategic planning team noted in an interview that the conflict weighed heavily in their decision to aggressively try and shore up what they deemed to be lost support. They aggressively campaigned to convince supporters that the government had always protected the environment and consulted these groups prior to any development:

"One of the fundamental pillars of this campaign was centered on the environmental sectors, who had historically been our allies. The TIPNIS affair caused a major and serious rupture with these sectors. Additionally, we had a second rupture with the same environmental groups with our development of genetically modified foods in government geoplasma labs."[90]

The government's aggressive public relations campaign, aimed at improving its image on environmental affairs, seemed to pay dividends. In 2012, 20.3% of LAPOP survey respondents stated that they strongly believed that the government was protecting the environment; in 2014, that number had increased to 26%.[91] However, in Beni, roughly only 20% held as strong a belief, while the median respondent scored a four on the scale with the national median as a five.

Perhaps the most direct impact the TIPNIS conflict had on the 2014 electoral contest was it provided motivation for an opposition candidate, Fernando Vargas, to enter the race. Vargas served as president of the TIPNIS governing body, engaged in direct negotiations with the Morales government, led many of the protests in defense of the area, and even became a victim

[89] The protests and march towards La Paz were organized and sponsored by former staunch supporters and vital members of Morales' and MAS' broad coalition. These groups included the lowlands indigenous federations CIDOB, CONAMAQ, and other indigenous and environmental organizations (Achtenberg 2014).
[90] Author interview with official, La Paz, 6/1/2015.
[91] I label responses of 6 and 7 on a scale of 1-7 (with 7 reflecting a lot) as "strongly believed."

of police repression. In June 2014, the Green Party announced Vargas as its candidate for the presidential election. In an interview with the national newspaper *La Razón*, Vargas declared that he accepted the nomination because he saw it as necessary to continue the fight for the conservation of the environment, forests and wildlife, as well as respect for "Mother Earth" (La Razón 2014b). Although Vargas would receive only 2.65% of the national vote, his mere candidacy ensured that environmental matters would continue to receive attention.

As mentioned above, political dissatisfaction with the Morales regime would also manifest itself in the region most affected by the conflict, Beni. MAS had made considerable electoral inroads in the department since 2005, when it won only 7% of the presidential vote. The party improved its lot with its candidate Jessica Jordan capturing 44% of the vote share (although losing by 8%) in the special 2013 gubernatorial election. However, Morales' vote share in the region dropped to 41.5% in 2014, and he lost convincingly to Doria Medina by 8.9%.

Although the TIPNIS affair centers on the environment, the broader issue at play was the government's failure to honor the constitutional requirement of engaging in a *previa consulta* with indigenous groups prior to signing the construction contact and securing funding (Achtenberg 2011b). The lack of government consultation served as a trigger for the cross-country march, and provided additional motivation for Vargas to enter the political contest. He claimed he represented those who had been "politically betrayed" by the Morales government (La Rázon 2014b). The issue alienated past MAS supporters who had been drawn to Morales for his promises of greater popular consultation and political autonomy for indigenous groups. The handling of the TIPNIS conflict left these supporters outraged at Morales' political about face.

Environmental protections, therefore, mattered to citizens prior to the campaign. During the campaign, the government's message seemed to limit the damage of its policies. However, it could not sufficiently exercise damage control in Beni. The department most affected by the TIPNIS crisis was the only department that Morales did not win in the 2014 election. Morales' handling of the affair led to a rupture with a vital constituency, making the "unity pact" less united. Similar to the issue of corruption, Morales and his government tried to take responsibility on the issue. However, corruption (prior to January 2016) scandals had not directly implicated Morales, nor did citizens' perceptions of corruption motivate them to protest (table 4.5 in the appendix). The fact that the highway would have threatened the existence of the indigenous peoples ensured that the issue was of much more significance to the populace.

Indigenous Self-Identification

From its inception, the MAS and Evo Morales have been global symbols of the political inclusion of indigenous people. Madrid (2012, 62) finds that those who identified as indigenous carried Morales to a sweeping victory in 2005. Morales politicized the ethnic cleavage around a discourse that indigenous citizens had been excluded for five centuries (Farthing and Kohl 2014). Publicly embracing his Aymara heritage and origins as a *cocalero* union leader,[92] Morales established credibility as a true representative of the indigenous majority (Sivak 2010).

More than a decade since his initial electoral triumph, ethnic identity continues to shape politics in Bolivia and structure political party identification and support. Table 4.6 in the appendix provides results for a logistic regression modeling support for MAS. Those respondents

[92] As a cocalero trade union leader, Morales gained increased credibility to represent Bolivia's indigenous peoples, as the coca leaf is a strong symbol of indigenous way of life. Considered sacred, its mere cultivation is seen as a staunch form of resistance to US imperialism and interference, following the US' support of eradication efforts in the 1990s (Farthing and Kohl, 2014).

who identify as indigenous are 2.22 more times likely to be affiliated or attached to MAS than those who do not. I have run two models, one controlling for ideology (column 1) and one without that variable (column 2). When I modeled respondents' ideology, those identifying as indigenous were highly associated with a leftist ideology. When removing ideology, accounting for the variables' correlation, the effect of indigenous self-identification has a tremendous effect on party affiliation (column 2). In sum, indigeneity continues to play a major role in Bolivian politics, and condition citizens' support for MAS and Morales. In the chain of events in figure 4.4 above, indigenous self-identification provides an electoral advantage for Morales. No other major candidate in the 2014 election could claim any kind of connection to the indigenous population.[93] Throughout the campaign Morales would continue to play up his indigenous qualities. He would frequently dress in traditional Aymara attire and remind his followers that not supporting him would erase the progress the country had made to respect indigenous rights.

However, not all indigenous citizens continue to support Morales. Since his re-election in 2009, Morales has made certain political decisions that have destabilized his original coalition of indigenous and rural peasants. Although it is true that those who self-identify as indigenous are still more likely to vote for Morales than are other ethnic groups, the geographical location of support among indigenous voters has shifted. As mentioned above in the discussion of the TIPNIS conflict, indigenous community leaders in the department of Beni fiercely protested against the government's decision to go ahead with construction of a highway that would have intersected sacred land. The plan pitted the government's extractive development policy against

[93] I use major to describe Samuel Doria Medina and Jorge Quiroga. Neither Juan del Granado nor Fernando Vargas won more than three percent of the vote. Vargas was the only candidate who could credibly claim to represent the indigenous population.

those seeking to protect indigenous cultural ways of life (Hindery 2013, 158), but also illustrated a continuously growing rift within MAS' coalitions (Webber 2011).

The government's continued favoring of cocaleros in Chaparé has caused tensions with other lowland indigenous people. These strained relationships led to a rupture with past-dedicated supporters of Morales. Indigenous voters in Beni were less likely than indigenous voters elsewhere (in the other 8 departments) to support Morales. Table 4.7 in the appendix provides regression results demonstrating this effect. Consistent with my argument that populists are electorally successful when they can credibly claim to represent specific sectors of the electorate, the evidence supports a shift in the electoral coalition of Morales. Voters in Beni, especially the indigenous affected by the TIPNIS affair, no longer feel Morales represents them, leading them to electorally defect from him.

Morales' Evolving Populism Strategy and Base of Support

As a whole, the regression models throughout the chapter and my within-case analysis yield a few insights that suggest that Morales' base of support has evolved. His early support centered on rural coalitions and its ties to indigenous organizations (Madrid 2012, 36). However, seeking to increase its vote share and solidify its electoral dominance, the MAS began to appeal to a wider constituency. Madrid (2008, 475) described the MAS as an "ethnopopulist party" that used inclusively ethnic discourses with populist electoral strategies. As the MAS expanded geographically and became a national movement, it developed both a rural and urban social base. It increasingly relied on indigenous support in the country's largest cities, La Paz and El Alto (Anría 2013).

Several of the government decisions discussed above accelerated the continuing heterogenization of its supporters. In short, it seems as if Morales' core group of supporters have been realigned and now includes an alliance of rural peasants and small to medium-sized agricultural producers, an urban-rural "popular business" bloc, and elements of the national entrepreneurial sector, including some conservative elites in the *Media Luna* (Achtenberg 2015). In my interview with Morales' campaign chief strategist, the official confirmed that the party, prior to the campaign, and the team, during the campaign, targeted certain demographics to mobilize: middle-class citizens in urban areas who they tried to remind had been helped out of poverty by government policies, and conservative elites in Tarija and Santa Cruz who had benefitted from years of economic expansion. Morales' courting of eastern business elites was well publicized. He shared public dinners with the Confederation of Bolivian Private Entrepreneurs (CEPB) and inaugurated the business fair Fexpocruz in Santa Cruz in mid-September 2014 (La Razón 2014a, La Razón 2014c).

The evolution of his populist electoral strategy has allowed him to maintain high levels of electoral support. At times Morales dons traditional indigenous clothing, speaks in Aymara, and rallies his traditional supporters. At other times, he cozies up to business elites promising an increased symbiosis between the public and private sectors. This provides evidence for my contention that populism is an electoral strategy that political actors can carefully calculate when to use to maximize its benefits. Morales successfully crafted his 2014 campaign image that emphasized his ethnic features yet also highlighted his competency as the national leader who guides economic policy and was no longer a threat to the country's entrepreneurial elites.

VII. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed various theoretical explanations for why citizens may vote and continue to vote for Evo Morales, I have provided survey evidence to suggest why citizens did so in the 2014 election, and I examined evidence of how these factors became politicized and may have affected the electoral contest. I tested the argument developed throughout this dissertation that populists are electorally successful when there is a confluence among the candidate's characteristics, the electorate's traits and issues relevant to them, and appeals made by the candidate during the campaign. I found considerable evidence that Morales continued to credibly convince voters that he alone represented the indigenous peoples' interests and that his near decade in office had delivered considerable improvements to the country's economic situation. I also found that Morales' near decade of incumbency allowed him to make electoral inroads in former bastions of support for his political opponents.

In examining LAPOP surveys over time, I found considerable evidence that citizens' economic concerns (performance and degree of economic nationalization) and evaluations of government (combatting corruption, improved citizen's security, protected the environment) conditioned their propensity to vote for Morales. The regression models also indicated that the president's support base no longer comes exclusively from rural or indigenous supporters, but rather includes a strong urban and mestizo element. With that being said, ethnicity continues to structure politics in the country. Morales continues to politicize the ethnic cleavage in campaign events, desperately trying to convince the populace that he is the sole representative of a historically excluded and marginalized people. The TIPNIS affair restricted his ability to do so, but he still benefited from the fact that he was the only major candidate in 2014 who had any direct connection to the country's indigenous majority.

The over time analyses of Morales' support demonstrate a likely evolution in MAS and Morales' core electoral constituency. Morales' nationalistic economic agenda of heavy state investment and public infrastructural megaprojects, which relies on continuously extracting natural resources, allowed the president and party to incorporate new factions into its political coalition. These new members include previously unsupportive citizens in urban centers and more conservative members of the national entrepreneurial sector. However, the government decisions to go ahead with national economic development projects at all costs, disregarding the importance of indigenous protected lands, led to a political "rupture" of some its traditional allies—namely, indigenous organizations in the Beni province and those opposed to the current extractive economic model. These lessons from Bolivia seem to apply across Latin America. In other countries experiencing commodities booms, especially of an extractive nature, leaders have been more successful if they could incorporate generous social programs. Frequently these programs are targeted at citizens in the lower socioeconomic strata.

In short, it seems as if MAS's core groups of supporters have been realigned. When one considers all these bits of evidence, Morales masterfully crafted a hybrid candidate image of sorts—one that represents both the interests of less educated, poor indigenous Bolivians and the newly middle-class and wealthier entrepreneurial elites in the east of the country.

APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL MODELS FOR BOLIVIA

Table 4.4: Logistic Analysis of Voting Intention for Evo Morales, 2008-2014

	2008 B/(SE)	2014 B/(SE)
Education	-0.023 (0.03)	**-0.060** (0.02)**
Gender (female=1)	-0.156 (0.19)	0.180 (0.17)
Income	**-0.227*** (0.07)**	-0.039 (0.03)
Age	-0.005 (0.01)	0.009 (0.01)
Leftist Ideology	**0.382*** (0.05)**	**0.204*** (0.04)**
Rural residence	**0.453* (0.23**)	0.160 (0.19)
Media Luna (yes = 1)	**-1.184*** (0.21)**	**-0.921*** (0.19)**
Race (indigenous)	**1.270** (0.47)**	**1.450** (0.46)**
Race (mestizo)	0.353 (0.36)	**0.938* (0.40)**
Quechua as maternal language	0.337 (0.31)	**0.579* (0.26)**
Aymara as maternal language	**1.585* (0.66)**	0.657 (0.48)
Individual economy compared to a year ago	0.028 (0.15)	
Country economy compared to a year ago	**1.239*** (0.14)**	
Economic Perceptions Index		**0.279*** (0.08)**
Corruption is not widespread	-0.045 (0.12)	0.120 (0.11)
Populism Index	**0.110*** (0.03)**	
High trust in Judiciary	0.024 (0.07)	
High trust in Congress	-0.050 (0.07)	
High trust in Political Parties	0.036 (0.07)	
Trust in Institutions Index		0.059 (0.03)
Government Performance Index		**0.268*** (0.04)**
Protects the environment		**0.227*** (0.07)**
Supports increased nationalization		**0.264*** (0.05)**
Constant	-4.589***(1.05)	-9.104***(1.06)
N (Individuals)	948	1 071
R^2 (ML)	0.754	0.665
McFadden's R^2	0.640	0.532

Sources: 2008 & 2014 LAPOP Americasbarometer Surveys

Table 4.5: Logistic Analysis of Citizen Inclination to Protest

	Model 1 Beta (SE)
Education	-0.013 (0.02)
Gender (female= 1)	-0.254 (0.15)
Income	-0.006 (0.02)
Age	0.000 (0.00)
Leftist Ideology	-0.022 (0.04)
Mestizo (yes = 1)	0.607 (0.41)
Indigenous (yes = 1)	**0.991* (0.43)**
Independent variables	
Favorable country economic perceptions	-0.033 (0.11)
Government protects citizen rights	0.053 (0.07)
Government is combatting corruption	0.014 (0.06)
Strong preference for nationalization	0.002 (0.04)
Environment > Economic development	**0.469** (0.17)**
Constant	-2.175***(0.64)
N (Individuals)	1 374

*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001

Source: 2014 LAPOP Americasbarometer Surveys

Table 4.6: Correlates of 2014 Support for the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) Party

	B/(SE)	B/(SE)
Education	-0.006 (0.00)	**-0.072** (0.03)**
Gender (female=1)	-0.004 (0.04)	-0.146 (0.23)
Income	-0.008 (0.00)	-0.005 (0.01)
Age	-0.001 (0.00)	-0.005 (0.01)
Leftist Ideology	**0.047***(0.00)**	
Identifies as Indigenous	**0.104** (0.04)**	**0.800***(0.23)**
Constant	0.604***(0.12)	2.611***(0.68)
N=	496	556

Source: 2014 Americasbarometer Survey

Table 4.7: Logistic Analysis of Support for Evo Morales in 2014

	Model 1 Beta (SE)
Education	**-0.092***(0.03)**
Gender (female= 1)	-0.054 (0.13)
Income	-0.025 (0.02)
Age	0.000 (0.00)
Beni (yes = 1)	-0.472 (0.23)
Indigenous (yes = 1)	**0.847** (0.28)**
Large City	**-0.195***(0.05)**
Interactions	
Beni*Indigenous (yes = 1)	**-0.160* (0.48)**
Large City*Indigenous (yes =1)	0.144 (0.08)
Constant	2.114***(0.32)
N (Individuals)	1 383
*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001	

Source: 2014 LAPOP Americasbarometer Surveys

Survey questions used (Americasbarometer project):

I. Dependent variable (vote intention):

VB20: ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted?

II. Independent variable (corruption perceptions):

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está:

N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno del Presidente Morales combate la corrupción en el gobierno?

III. Independent variable (trust in political institutions):

B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?

B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?

B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?

IV. Independent variable (economic perceptions):

SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses?

IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses?

ROS1. El Estado boliviano, en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?

V. Independent variable (race and ethnicity)

ETID. ¿Usted se considera una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena u originaria, negra, mulata, u otra?

BOLETIDNEW. Como boliviana o boliviano, ¿se considera usted perteneciente a alguno de los pueblos indígenas u originarios de Bolivia?

VI. Independent variable (populist ideas)

POP106. Los presidentes tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?

POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con que existe una lucha entre el bien y el mal?

VII. Independent variable (environmental concerns)

BOLN16. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que el Gobierno promueve y protege los derechos del medio ambiente o de la "madre tierra"?

ENV1. En su opinión, ¿a qué debe darse más prioridad: proteger el medio ambiente o promover el crecimiento económico?

VI. Control variables (education), (gender), (income):

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó?

IDIOMAQ. Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español (2) Quechua (3) Aymara

A4. En su opinión ¿cuál es el problema más grave que está enfrentando el país?

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte):

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo la ayuda económica del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]_

TAMANO. Tamaño del lugar:

(1) Ciudades eje (área metropolitana) (2) Ciudad grande (3) Ciudad mediana (4) Ciudad pequeña (5) Área rural

ESTRATOPRI: (1001) La Paz (1002) Santa Cruz (1003) Cochabamba (1004) Oruro (1005) Chuquisaca (1006) Potosí (1007) Pando (1008) Tarija (1009) Beni

CHAPTER V: THE POLITICAL INROADS OF OUTSIDER POPULISTS IN CHILE

I. Introduction

The 2013 presidential election in Chile marked the country's sixth contest since its (re)democratization in 1989. With former president Michelle Bachelet defeating Evelyn Matthei in a second round run-off, the result ensured that one of the two major political party coalitions – *La Nueva Mayoría* (previously *La Concertación*) and *La Alianza* – had won all elections since transition. This gives the impression that Chile's presidential contests continue to be dominated by candidates from its major political parties. However, after outsider Marco-Enriquez Ominami's (hereafter MEO) successful showing in 2009 (he finished in third place with 20.14 percent of the vote), the 2013 contest featured several populist candidates attacking the establishment: Franco Parisi, Marcel Claude, and Roxana Miranda. The recent emergence of populist political actors makes Chile an ideal case to test theories of populism, given the country's "historic weakness" of populism (Drake 2012, 71).

The historic weakness of populism in Chile cannot be understated. The classical, neoliberal, and contemporary eras of populism have left hardly any Latin American countries bereft of populist actors. Yet, a charismatic leader who captivates the masses with direct appeals has never won, and seldom contested presidential elections in Chile (Larraín and Meller 1991, Drake 1999, 2012). When reviewing populism in the country during the entire twentieth century, Drake (2012) contends that the Europeanized and durable political parties have "filled the ideological spectrum" leaving little room for "personalistic mass mobilization or independent adventures (73)." Since the country's transition to democracy, "Chile became the paragon of

antipopulism" in the 1990s, while Presidents Lagos and Bachelet successfully implement free-market policies "devoid of populism" (Drake 2012, 82).

This chapter assesses the underlying motivations of Chilean voters by analyzing individual-level data culled from publicly available surveys (Americasbarometer, and those fielded by the Centro de Estudios Públicos [CEP], and Diego Portales University), and drawing on information obtained from semi-structured interviews in Santiago in April and May 2015. Generally speaking, I find the citizens who voted for Franco Parisi were younger, more educated voters who had high levels of dissatisfaction with the political establishment.[94] Parisi assembled a loosely connected coalition of support, but his lack of mobilizational capacity ultimately undermined his ability to get these voters to turn out on election day. Up until the last month of the campaign, he successfully politicized the issues of government inefficiency, economic inequality, and the lack of political representation Consistent with the argument developed throughout this dissertation, I find that Parisi was unable to credibly convince his potential supporters that he would usher in a new political alternative. Parisi based his appeals on and crafted an image of an adept economist who was outside the corrupt and self-serving political establishment. The mutable character traits he and his team emphasized were thoroughly undermined by an aggressive yet successful attack campaign from his nearest competitor, Evelyn Matthei.

The 2013 election also allows for a test of Roberts' "activation" and "conversion" argument of populist electoral success.[95] The major electoral registration reform (in 2012) prior

[94] Below, I discuss in detail and provide a justification for why the analysis centers on Franco Parisi and not Marcel Claude or Roxana Miranda.

[95] Roberts (2013) contends that populists have electoral success when they can activate new voters into the electoral arena, and/or when they can convert voters away from the traditional political parties.

to the election ushered in automatic electoral registration (although voting itself was optional). It led to an electoral windfall of sorts—a sudden surge of registered voters who could be activated and convinced to participate in the electoral arena. Parisi's message appealed to two groups. First, he appealed to citizens disillusioned with the traditional political parties and "political class" in Chile. Yet citizen disillusionment with the political system and political actors presented an electoral double-edged sword. Politically disillusioned citizens were the voters with whom Parisi's outsider status and message most resonated; yet they were also the least likely to vote. Second, he had early and frequent success at converting traditionally conservative citizens away from Matthei's camp and into his potential support base. A devastating attack strategy by Matthei against Parisi in the last month of the campaign, alleging fraud and financial malfeasance, discredited Parisi's central campaign image and message. In the end, Parisi's image was discredited and he lack the mobilizational capacity to turn out potential voters on election day. Similar to my analysis in Bolivia, figure 5.1 below presents a visual illustration of the overlap among Parisi's characteristics, his populist appeals, and the electorate's traits and issues of concern.

Figure 5.1 The Overlap of Parisi's Populist Appeals, His Personal Characteristics and Characteristics of the Electorate, 2013



The chapter progresses in the following manner. I offer an overview of the three populist candidates' electoral success. I examine the effect that Chile's change in voter registration likely had on the 2013 election contest.[96] Similar to Chapter four and the analysis of the Bolivian election, I then employ quantitative methods to analyze survey responses to assess whether citizens' economic considerations, their trust in political institutions, identity with political parties, and perceptions of corruption affected their support for Parisi. I repeat the analysis from

[96] In an attempt to account for the major difference in Chile and Bolivia's voter registration, I include this section. Voting in Bolivia is mandatory. In Chile, voter registration is automatic but the act of voting is voluntary.

the Bolivian case study in examining data collected from field interviews with campaign strategists to test and evaluate my argument. In doing so, I assess the candidates' electoral strategies and evolving bases of support. I conclude with how the Chilean election of 2013 helps us understand the behavior of populist presidential candidates.

II. Description of the Chilean Populists' Electoral Performances

In chapter three I classified the candidates Franco Parisi, Marcel Claude, and Roxana Miranda as populists. Table 5.1 below illustrates the electoral outcome in the first round of voting in the 2013 presidential contest. Together, these candidates garnered 14.16% of the vote. This aggregate vote share is by no means overwhelming, but a closer look at the campaign reveals that Parisi was a major factor in the election, threatening to finish second. Additionally, Parisi had the highest populist score of any candidate that I examined in Chapter two. In a country with hardly any history of populism, it is quite surprising to see three of the most populist candidates across South America all compete in the same election. Kenneth Bunker's overview of pre-election polls illustrates that Parisi challenged Matthei's grip on second place in public opinion polls in September and October, before succumbing to a fourth-place finish on November 17 (Figure 5.2 below).

Table 5.1: 2013 Chilean Presidential Election, First Round Vote Share, by Candidate

Candidate	Political Party	Vote share	Populist Score
Michelle Bachelet	New Majority (Nueva Mayoría)	46.70%	0.39
Evelyn Matthei	The Alliance (La Alianza)	25.03%	0.28
Marco Enríquez-Ominami (MEO)	If You Want, Chile Changes (PRO)	10.98%	0.21
Franco Parisi	Independent	10.11%	4.96
Marcel Claude	Humanist (PH)	2.81%	3.64
Alfredo Sfeir	Green Ecologist Party (PEV)	2.34%	1.10
Roxana Miranda	Equality Party (PE)	1.24%	4.25
Ricardo Israel	Regionalist Independent Party (PRI)	0.57%	0.00
Tomás Jocelyn-Holt	Independent	0.19%	2.06

Sources: Servicio Electoral de Chile (SERVEL). The populist score is a replication of those scores presented at the end of Chapter two.



Figure 5.2. Chilean Electoral Polling Data. The above figure has been modified from Bunker (2013, 347). Bunker examined pre-election polls and included only those candidates who averaged more than 5% of the vote. His sources include: CEP, Conecta, El Mercurio-Opina, ICHEM-UA, Ipsos, La Segunda-UDD, ICSO-UDP.

III. Electoral Context and Theoretical Expectations

The 2013 Chilean election featured a former president (Bachelet) and a candidate from the incumbent party coalition (Matthei). In the broader political landscape, Matthei's candidacy reflected the first time after the country's democratic transition that the right fielded an incumbent candidate.[97] The 2013 election provides a perfect test for the theoretical arguments I reviewed in Chapter Two. Many of the explanations developed in the populism literature attempt to explain populist emergence, and the Chilean election provides that context— three non-incumbent populist candidates ran for president for the first time.

Michelle Bachelet, president from 2006 to 2010, resigned from her position as head of the United Nations gender equality agency, UN Women, in mid-March 2013 and returned to Chile to announce her candidacy. Once Bachelet declared and won her party's nomination in June 2013, the outcome (a Bachelet plurality in the first-round) of the election was never in doubt. Upon leaving presidential office in 2010, she had enjoyed approval ratings above 80 percent (Carlin et. al 2015) and her likely vote share never dropped below 40 percent in public opinion polls during the campaign (Bunker 2013). She also released an electoral program that featured highly popular proposals and promises including free higher education (von Bülow and Ponte 2015), and long-awaited constitutional and tax code reforms (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2015). In short, she was a highly popular and formidable candidate who threatened to win the first round by a majority. The focus of the media and voters turned to second place.

[97] Prior to Sebastian Piñera's victory in 2009 (2010 run-off), the left-wing Concertación had won all elections.

Evelyn Matthei, Bachelet's main challenger, became the conservative coalition's candidate through an unexpected and remarkably intricate process. Laurence Golborne, the popular former minister of energy and mining who favorably handled the 2010 Copiapó mining accident,[98] was announced as the candidate of the right-wing Independent Democratic Union (UDI) in November 2012. His party envisioned him as its candidate who would compete in the right-wing coalition's primary at the end of June 2013. However, in late April 2013, Golborne withdrew his candidacy after two embarrassing events. First, the Supreme Court fined major national retailer Cencosud, a company for which he served as chief executive officer in 2006, $70 million for abusive practices against its clients during his tenure with the firm. Second, the discovery of tens of millions of dollars in an offshore account in his name, and accumulated as a result of the firm's predatory practices (*Sierralta* 2013).

Golborne's withdrawal left the UDI scrambling to find a replacement. A month later it nominated Pablo Longuiera, a minister in incumbent president Sebastián Piñera's cabinet. Longuiera won the right-wing coalition's primary in June 2013 with 51.7 percent of the vote. The temporary respite would be shattered by yet another unexpected turn. Less than three weeks later, Longuiera would withdraw his candidacy citing health reasons after being medically diagnosed with depression (*La Tercera* 2013b). This unanticipated event and those it triggered further unsettled *La Alianza*, an alliance that had been uncertain and tentative since the country's most recent democratic transition (Siavelis 2014), exposing cracks in its precarious unity. Amid tensions that persisted from a contentious primary, the UDI rejected the RN's original proposal

[98] The mining accident gained worldwide attention as 33 miners were trapped in the mine for 69 days. All were successfully rescued.

of Andrés Allamand.[99] It supported Evelyn Matthei, who the RN reluctantly backed a few weeks later (Bunker 2013). It was against this disoriented political backdrop that populist presidential candidates could make electoral inroads in the 2013 contest. A Matthei campaign strategist told me, "There was never a clear candidate. They had to go through a few picks before they got it right. It reflected the political divisions and tensions on the right."[100]

Franco Parisi, a former economics professor, entered the Chilean public conscious by appearing on a TV show titled "*Los Parisi: el poder de la gente* [The Parisis: the power of the people]". He and his brother discussed complex economic affairs in a very simplistic and colloquial fashion, earning him the nickname "*el economista del pueblo* [the economist of the people]" (Correa 2012). Capitalizing on his increasing fame, Parisi announced his presidential candidacy in January 2012, and officially registered with the electoral tribunal on August 7, 2013. He registered as an independent, devoid of any political party connection. Because of his status as an independent, he was required to collect 37,000 signatures. After extensive campaigning, Parisi collected 52,000 citizen signatures (*La Tercera* 2013c). While hand delivering the signatures in transparent boxes to the electoral service headquarters, Parisi proclaimed that he represented real transformation to the Chilean system and that "the time of the people, not the political elite, has arrived" (*La Tercera* 2013c).[101]

Another former economist and academic, Marcel Claude, was proclaimed by the Humanist Party as its candidate in March 2013 and he officially registered in August 2013.

[99] Allamand served as Minister of Defense in the Piñera administration. He resigned in November 2012 to compete in la Alianza's primary as the RN candidate. He finished second in the primary, losing to Longuiera by 2.75%.
[100] Author interview, Santiago, Chile, 5/20/2015.
[101] Author's translation. The original quote in La Tercera reads ""llegó el tiempo de la gente y no de la elite política."

Claude gained national recognition for his years as an environmental activist in the 2000s, and, more recently, his role in the massive student protests in 2011 (*La Tercera* 2013e). As such, he positioned himself as the representative of citizens' demands and the country's variegated social movements. The third populist candidate and another social activist, Roxana Miranda, entered the national picture through her work with the Association of Home Debtors/Borrowers (ANDHA Chile). Constantly referring to herself as a "pobladora [slum dweller]", Miranda presented herself as a representative of low-income citizens and lodged visceral attacks on the country's continued embrace of the neoliberal economic model (*La Tercera* 2013d).

In examining why voters would gravitate toward the populist candidates, I expect the hypotheses developed in chapters two and three to hold. I anticipate that citizens who perceive corruption to be widespread, have low trust in public institutions, have unfavorable perceptions of the government's socioeconomic performance, have strong populist beliefs, and lack political party identification to be more supportive of Parisi, Claude, and Miranda.

IV. Activation of Potential Voters

a) Electoral Law Reform

Up until 2012, Chile had what some scholars called a "semi-voluntary" voting system: citizens could select whether they wanted to register with the electoral service, but once they registered they had to vote (Contreras et al. 2015). As time passed in the post-authoritarian period sanctions were never enforced for those who did not vote, and electoral participation began to wane. More worrisome was the trend of fewer Chileans submitting to be on the electoral registry. Starting in the mid-1990s, a gap began to form between the voting age population (VAP) and registered

voters. In 1989, the percentage of the VAP that registered was 89%; by 2009 that percentage had dropped to only 68% (Contreras et al. 2015). Roughly four million eligible voters did not register. This phenomenon caused major concern among academics, pundits, and practitioners. After several years of debates in the national legislature, the Chilean government approved electoral law reform in 2012 implementing a system of automatic voter registration but making the act of voting voluntary (Barnes and Rangel 2014). Overall, there was a general consensus among Chilean legislators that the reform would lower registration costs, boost turnout and, in theory, make future elections more democratic.[102]

In December 2011, the Chilean Senate approved the new law with 28 in favor, 8 against, and three abstaining, while 119 out of the 120 members of the Chamber of Deputies voted in favor (Barnes and Rangel 2014, 576). The automatic registration mechanism almost immediately corrected the low and decreasing registration rates. Once processed, 5.4 million new voters were enlisted, bringing the total up to 13.4 million Chileans (Contreras 2015). The automatic registration changed the demographic composition of the electoral registry by including hundreds of thousands of previously unregistered youth. Prior to the reform, a scant 8% of Chileans aged 18-29 were on the roll; after the law went into effect, this same age group accounted for 26.9% of those on the list (Contreras et al. 2015). Scholars (Contreras and Navia 2013; Navia and del Pozo 2010) had documented the low rates of electoral participation among Chile's youth, and this reform instantly made younger citizens potentially influential political actors.

[102] For a wonderful overview of the debates in the Chilean Senate, House, and the role that President Piñera played in passing the electoral reform, please see Barnes and Rangel (2014, 573-7). Briefly, the debates centered on whether the act of voting is a right or civic duty.

For all the praise the Piñera administration publicly provided for the reform, the changes failed to bring about the improvements its advocates had championed. In the two elections (2012 Municipal, 2013 Presidential and Legislative) since the electoral law modifications, Chile witnessed decreased electoral participation among its citizens. Comparing across the last two elections for each level, turnout dropped alarmingly. In the 2008 municipal elections 58% of the VAP participated, while only 41% did so in 2012 (Contreras et al. 2015, 525). More disappointing is the comparison of the last two presidential elections. In 2009, 59% of eligible citizens cast ballots, with this figure slumping to only 49% in the 2013 contest (Barnes and Rangel 2014, 577). The comparative voting literature (Singh 2011; Sheppard 2015) tells us that compulsory voting increases voter turnout. Chile is one of only four countries in history to abandon compulsory voting,[103] and these two elections offer preliminary evidence that switching from compulsory to voluntary voting also decreases voter turnout.

The 2013 election was the first presidential contest held under the country's new electoral and voter registration system. The new electoral rules increased uncertainty as to who would turnout to vote, how many people would vote, and the possible bias in the characteristics of voters. Any attempt at explaining the vote share of candidates in the Chilean presidential election should first focus on who voted and the reasons why they did or did not vote. In Bolivia, I did not replicate this in the analysis as voting is mandatory and carries an enforced sanction. Additionally, the electoral change swelled the electoral ranks with new voters, serving as an institutional mechanism that could potentially and greatly favor populist candidates. Thus, examining who voted allows one to test Roberts' argument that populist candidates are able to

[103] The other countries include the Netherlands, Venezuela and Italy (Lijphart 1997; Gratschew 2004).

have electoral success when they can "activate" citizens who did not previously participate in the political arena.

B) Electoral Turnout

Two surveys (CEP and UDP) conducted prior to the election and one (2014 Americasbarometer survey fielded by LAPOP) fielded afterwards allow for the painting of a complete picture of citizen motivations of voting. Drawing on the extensive voter turnout literature, I expect that certain demographic variables should matter. In line with what other scholars have found, I expect that older, female, more educated, wealthier, conservative, and white citizens are the most likely to participate in the Chilean election (Aldrich 1993; Blais 2006; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Carreras and Irepoglu 2013; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Radcliff 1992). I also consider attitudinal factors. I hypothesize that citizens who lack a political party identification (Carreras and Irepoglu 2013) should be less likely to vote. Chile's institutionalized party system should exacerbate this factor (Siavelis 2014). I also expect citizens who have greater trust in the fairness and quality of elections to be more likely to participate (Blais 2006; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004). Lastly, citizens who have lower levels of trust in the major political institutions should be less inclined to show up on election day (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014).[104]

Drawing on the three surveys just mentioned, I ran several logistic regressions modeling why citizens decided to vote in the 2013 presidential election.[105] Since question availability

[104] Country-level factors like the electoral system (e.g. concurrent elections), the closeness of the race, levels of GDP, economic growth, Polity measures, and number of parties all affect voter turnout (Aldrich 1993; Blais 2006; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2014; Carreras and Irepoglu 2013; Downs 1957; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Radcliff 1992). I do not assess these variables because I examine only one country.

[105] Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita (2013) found that political interest, demographic, and employment-related

varies significantly across these surveys, I have run models including variables available in all surveys. Table 5.2 below illustrates the results. Table 1 in the appendix provides results for a more complete model using the richer 2014 Americasbarometer data.

Table 5.2: Logistic Analysis of Voter Turnout in 2013 Chilean Presidential Election

	CEP 2013 Beta (SE)	UDP 2013 Beta (SE)	AB 2014 Beta (SE)
Age	**0.030*** (0.80)**	**0.043*** (0.01)**	**0.047*** (0.01)**
Gender (female=1)	-0.216 (0.22)	0.274 (0.24)	0.260 (0.19)
Education	0.027 (0.06)	0.122 (0.07)	**0.065* (0.03)**
Income	-0.004 (0.04)	0.153 (0.10)	0.033 (0.02)
Leftist Ideology	0.026 (0.05)	0.021 (0.06)	0.060 (0.04)
Constant	0.810 (0.80)	**-1.963* (0.87)**	0.555 (1.13)
N (Individuals)	718	577	809
*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001			
Adjusted R^2	0.705	0.756	0.718
McFadden's R^2	0.591	0.640	0.564

Sources: 2013 UDP Survey, 2013 CEP Survey, and 2014 Americasbarometer Survey
Note: Table entries are coefficients from logistic regressions

The models yield several findings that help us understand the electoral outcome of the 2013 presidential election. Age is a major predictor of electoral participation as has always been the case in Chile (Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2013; Contreras and Navia 2013; Corvalan and Cox 2013). When exponentiating the coefficients, a one-year increase in age increases the log

variables mattered most across Latin America. Within Chile, political interest and social networks mattered most. In a series of models I ran, the variable political interest mattered greatly. When included, it was statistically significant at the $p < 0.001$ level, and had a coefficient of 0.823. However, subsequent analyses revealed that older, more educated, wealthier, and respondents who are prouder of the political system had higher levels of political interest, or that all these variables were strongly correlated with political interest. Thus, I excluded it from my model.

odds of an individual's propensity to vote by roughly 4%. Similar to other scholars (Corvalan and Cox 2013; Navia and del Pozo 2012), I find a class-bias (education and income as proxies), in favor of the wealthy, in turnout.

The fact that older Chileans were more likely to vote is partly a relic of their historical political behavior. As in many other countries, the youth in Chile have always participated at lower rates. The Parisi campaign team was well aware of this and tried to actively combat the political apathy among younger citizens. In an interview with Parisi's campaign manager, he asserted that one of their central campaign foci included the attempted mobilization of the youth vote. They organized campaign events with a specific focus on younger Chileans:

"We used Facebook to organize events throughout the country. As a professor, he had a good relationship with the universities, for the first year or 18 months we went to at least 1 or 2 universities each day, in every region of the country. It was like a class. At first people were a bit scared to have him as a presidential candidate. They invited him as a professor. Sometimes we had 50..Sometimes we had up to 100. Every day he was talking to students. These were 80 percent lecture. It was like a Chilean economics lecture then 20 percent question and answer."[106]

Although Parisi gained a substantial following among the young, survey data suggest that they did not show up to cast ballots. Part of this is likely due to the group's historical political inertia; part of this may be due to Matthei's aggressive attack strategy on Parisi in the final weeks of the campaign. In mid-October 2013, roughly a month before the election, Matthei launched a series of attacks (public speeches, TV ads, etc.). In them she insinuated that Parisi had grossly mismanaged funds of private schools while he served as their director, and owed millions of Chilean pesos to workers of his firms and business interests (*La Tercera* 2013f). Matthei continued on the offensive for weeks, raising serious doubts about Parisi's ability to lead the

[106] Author interview, Santiago, Chile, 5/2/2015.

country. The Parisi team admitted that these attacks carried significant weight and they observed a decline in support in several private surveys they conducted after the public allegations. Perhaps just as important they noticed lessened enthusiasm for the candidate:

"MEO made the same attack about two months before the election, we didn't really respond..and we went up [in the polls] after the MEO attack. We never responded directly, we had a debate but we never retaliated hard, and the people appreciated it. But with Matthei, we retaliated very hard, we went down in the next poll. People who were undecided but leaning towards us, did not vote."[107]

Another finding that stands out from the second model in table 5.6 in the appendix is that political parties continue to play a major role in mobilizing the vote in Chile. Although only 13.1% of the respondents in the 2014 LAPOP survey claimed to identify with a political party, those who did were significantly more likely to vote than those who lacked any identification. This suggests that political parties continue to effectively mobilize their members in Chile, putting independent candidates (Parisi and Tomás Jocelyn-Holt) at a disadvantage. The drawbacks of lacking a well-funded political organization with a history of mobilizing voters were quite evident for the Parisi camp. It relied on volunteers to whom they delegated significant power:

"All the people who worked for Franco made their own decisions, the campaign was very decentralized, and we had a sizeable amount of volunteers. At times it was very disorganized, quite chaotic; for us it was impossible to compete with the large candidates and parties."[108]

Lastly, citizens who had low trust in political parties were less likely to vote than those who held more positive views. Others (Contreras et al. 2015) have noted that the youth's

[107] Ibid. The change in response from the Parisi team was partly due to the competitiveness between Matthei and Parisi (challenging for second place. Both MEO and Parisi polled less than 5% when MEO launched his attacks), the timing of the attacks by Matthei (closer to election day), and the evidence presented (MEO made verbal attacks, Matthei made verbal attacks and followed up with uploading legal documents involving Parisi on her website.
[108] Ibid.

disillusionment with the political system and political parties has led to a widespread lack of political interest and participation among that demographic.

Citizen disillusionment with the political system and political actors carried both positives and negatives. While it was with young, disillusioned citizens that Parisi's outsider status and message most resonated, they were the least likely citizens to vote. Moreover, his ability to provide a credible message that would "activate" them to participate in the election was undermined by a few factors. First, these groups' historical political inertia and disassociation decreased their critical electoral mass. Second, fervent attacks by his major competitor (Matthei) discredited his message of a candidate devoid of the character flaws that one develops as being part of the established political class. These factors behind why potential voters would desert Parisi and the electoral arena in general also offer significant clues as to why citizens did and did not vote for Parisi. To this question I now turn.

V. Explaining Parisi's Vote share in the 2013 Election

In this section, I examine why Chilean voters may have voted for Parisi in the 2013 presidential election. One part of my argument, developed in Chapter Two, is that populists do not compete in an electoral vacuum. Much of their electoral success stems from how successful they are at portraying themselves a certain way that meshes with the interests and traits of the electorate. I contend that the quality, characteristics, and strategies of their opponents should also be considered. Below I look at how Parisi compares to the other major candidates, and why voters would select him, the populist, instead of Bachelet, Matthei, or MEO. Much of the analysis focuses on the competition between Parisi and Matthei, as they competed for the same ideological bloc (the political right) and for almost all of the campaign they were locked in a

neck-to-neck contest for second. I include both statistical analysis of publicly available data before and after the election, and draw on field interviews with candidates' campaign teams.

As discussed above, Michelle Bachelet emerged as the clear favorite in the 2013 presidential contest, never dropping below 40% in opinion polls of likely voters. However, as the campaign progressed, the chance of a second round run-off increased. Thus, an electoral tussle largely between Parisi and Matthei for a second place finish in the election became the focus of the campaign and conditioned the behavior of both candidates. The analysis that follows focuses on how voters decided among the four top vote getters—Bachelet, Matthei, MEO, and Parisi. This analytical strategy also allows me to evaluate my hypotheses, comparing negative cases of populism (the other three top candidates) vs the positive case (Parisi). This is mostly a function of data restrictions—that in pre-election and post-election surveys the number of respondents who claimed that they would vote or voted for the populist candidates (Claude and Miranda) was consistently small.[109] Another justification concerns electoral influence: among the populists, Parisi had by far the greatest effect on the first round outcome. To supplement the available public opinion surveys, I include analysis of original data collected from interviews conducted in Santiago in April and May 2015. Lastly, my aim here is to understand why Parisi could (not), using Roberts' concept, "convert" voters to his camp. [110]

To simulate the decision-making of Chilean voters, namely the complex task of selecting among the major candidates, I model individuals' voting behavior using multinomial logistic

[109] In surveys with samples well above 1200, Miranda usually had fewer than 15 total supporters. Claude's number of supporters in the various polls ranged from 10 to 40. However, when running multivariate models with several independent variables, and accounting for missing values, these numbers became even smaller. Thus, the small number of cases violated statistical best practices (Gelman and Hill 2006) and led to non-interpretable coefficients.
[110] Section four focused on voter turnout testing the activation part of Roberts' argument. It attempted to answer whether Parisi could bring in new voters. This part focuses on his ability to convert voters away from the traditional political parties.

regression. A vote for Parisi serves as the baseline category. I aim to identify the reasons why Parisi had success (or did not have success) in converting voters who historically supported the traditional political parties. Given that Parisi's central competitor (for second place) was Matthei, one would expect the clearest (in terms of statistical significance) differences to occur in the Matthei vs. Parisi comparisons. Table 5.3 presents the results of the regression models using data from the 2014 Americasbarometer survey, completed *after* the election. To seek to correct for this temporal disconnect, I ran similar models with data from surveys conducted *before* the election; these results can be found in Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 in the Appendix.[111]

Compared to Bachelet, Parisi's supporters tended to be more educated, male, wealthier, younger, more ideologically rightist, and less confident in public institutions, especially the judiciary. Similarly, Parisi performed better than MEO among males, more educated, younger, more ideologically rightist voters who had lower confidence in political actors. The fact that more ideologically leftist citizens supported Bachelet and MEO to a greater degree should not be surprising. Figure 5.3 illustrates where on the ideological spectrum survey respondents placed the candidates; respondents viewed Bachelet as the furthest left, MEO and Parisi as centrists, and Matthei on the far right.

[111] The surveys conducted prior to the election include fewer questions and have smaller sample sizes. In general, the findings from these additional models closely align with the statistical relationships results presented in table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Multinomial Logistic Analysis of Voting Intention [Franco Parisi as baseline], 2013 Chilean presidential election

	Bachelet B/(SE)		Matthei B/(SE)		MEO B/(SE)	
Control Variables						
Education	-0.112	(0.11)	**-0.015****	**(0.12)**	-0.049	(0.13)
Gender (female=1)	0.180	(0.58)	0.469	(0.66)	0.458	(0.69)
Income	-0.045	(0.08)	-0.038	(0.09)	0.128	(0.10)
Age	**0.044***	**(0.02)**	**0.056***	**(0.02)**	0.033	(0.03)
Leftist Ideology	**0.391***	**(0.14)**	**-0.619***	**(0.18)**	0.281	(0.18)
Race (mestizo)	-1.031	(0.57)	-1.155	(0.64)	**-1.354***	**(0.68)**
Independent Variables						
Individual economy compared to a year ago	-0.263	(0.48)	-0.024	(0.56)	-0.880	(0.59)
Country economy worse than a year ago	-0.991	(0.57)	-0.348	(0.63)	-0.940	(0.66)
Government does not fight corruption	-0.055	(0.24)	-0.274	(0.27)	-0.438	(0.28)
Government does not care about citizens	-0.152	(0.20)	-0.025	(0.22)	0.204	(0.24)
Government does not protect citizen rights	-0.113	(0.22)	-0.073	(0.26)	-0.022	(0.27)
High interest in politics	-0.277	(0.33)	-0.130	(0.37)	-0.092	(0.38)
No political party affiliation	-1.729	(1.13)	-2.169	(1.17)	-2.056	(1.20)
Lower trust in the judiciary	**-0.481***	**(0.21)**	**-0.687*****	**(0.25)**	**-0.635***	**(0.27)**
Lower trust in the legislature	0.183	(0.27)	**0.735***	**(0.31)**	0.529	(0.33)
Lower trust in political parties	-0.188	(0.23)	**-0.612***	**(0.26)**	-0.131	(0.29)
Constant	**10.423***	**(4.77)**	**11.661***	**(5.05)**	6.252	(5.44)

Source: 2014 Americasbarometer Survey

Figure 5.3 Median responses for each candidate's ideological placement, placed by survey respondents



Source: 2013 CEP survey (September/October)

Although the above regression model illustrates that Matthei had greater support than Parisi from conservative circles, Parisi vigorously attempted to "convert" many of Matthei's followers during the campaign. The campaign team acknowledged that they would not finish in first place so their focus turned to finishing second and competing in the 2nd round against Bachelet. As a center-right candidate (both his own program and citizens' placement), Parisi was well placed to pick off substantial voters from Matthei's base:

"We realized we were closer to Matthei. What we tried to do was to make the people believe that we were a good choice. We could not go to the heart of the far right. But, they did not hate us. They hated Bachelet. Our program director was from the right wing [National Renewal, RN]. We had a much better chance to beat Bachelet in the second round. Matthei was not very liked in the right wing circles."[112]

In an interview with a strategist from the Matthei camp, the operative confirmed that Matthei's political identity and the selection process of her candidacy played into the hands of Parisi:

"The UDI financed the campaign, organized the ideas, the strategy was always coming from them, we [members of the RN] did not have autonomy. Our vote share was also cut short due to the Parisi factor. He was an independent, but he took a lot of votes away from the center-right, the more liberal elements of the Alianza coalition. The [RN] parliamentary candidates did not publicize or campaign with Matthei; they did not help with organizing events. There were major tensions between the UDI and RN. Many of the RN did not want to associate with Matthei."[113]

Some RN political party members even went beyond political disassociation. RN Senator Antonio Horvath assisted in the development of Parisi's government program in the policy areas pertaining to the environment and energy (*La Tercera* 2013a). More devastating for the Matthei candidacy was the development of a group of roughly 50 RN members of congress who publicly supported Parisi. They asked their party to allow them freedom of political endorsement, which was subsequently denied by party leaders. The party's general secretary, Mario Desbordes,

[112] Ibid.
[113] Author interview, Santiago, Chile, 5/23/2013.

publicly threatened revocation of party membership to those who did not support Matthei (*El Publimetro* 2013; *The Clinic Online* 2013).

As discussed above, the verbal attacks Matthei launched against Parisi benefitted her in several ways. First, it shored up support among her more liberal right-wing supporters, those to whom Parisi had most success with his appeals. Second, it shattered the squeaky-clean outsider image Parisi had successfully crafted. This decreased his ability to draw on his outsider credentials to capitalize on citizen disillusionment and frustration with the political system. According to his campaign manager:

"All the Matthei issues hit us, our numbers went down, it was really clear, not so much among young people, but we lost people on the right with whom we had made inroads. These people had seen us as a better and more viable option in the 2nd round; we got some people from the right. Matthei put a wall between her voters and us, all the people from her base that were coming to us, stopped coming. Our voters were the people who weren't happy with politics, who had doubt in the political system, we like this guy, but when Matthei's camp put a lot of doubts about us, it removed the credibility and outsider persona that Franco had."[114]

Compared to Parisi, Matthei commanded greater support from less educated, older, more conservative voters who had greater trust in public institutions, except for the legislature. Taken together, the overall picture is that younger, more educated voters who had low trust in political institutions supported Parisi to a greater extent than the other four candidates. This fits what one would expect in the Chilean election, when one considers that he was an independent candidate, voting was voluntary, and the other three candidates were all part of the establishment. Additionally, this is the product of a concerted campaign strategy by Parisi's team to reach out to younger and more educated voters. Social media and advanced technology aided this effort and also allowed an outsider with comparatively limited resources the chance to increase his

[114] Author interview, Santiago, Chile, 5/2/2015.

following. In an interview, his campaign manager stated:

"We didn't have the money to use the mass media. 80% of our campaign was in the social media. We used twitter in a different way. Half of the votes that we had are in our Facebook page. We also used a crowd-sourcing platform… people could really feel as if they were contributing to the campaign…. to the program. People could feel a part of it."[115]

Citizens' perceptions of the economy are not statistically significant in any of my models above. However, across all candidates, respondents who had more negative views of both the country's and their own personal economic situations were much more supportive of Parisi. Parisi's team strongly emphasized his economic credentials—a university professor and dean in the department of economics. He gained a popular following on radio and TV years before the campaign. In that medium, he explained economic problems in very simple and concrete terms and gave advice on saving money to his middle class audience. The campaign team went to great lengths to reinforce this message, make it salient to citizens, and do so in a pure populist fashion:

"Franco had an economical discourse or message, explaining or educating people how the things were working in the banks, pension systems. We stressed that Franco was qualified, as a university economics professor. We went to the streets with a whiteboard so that he can make classes in the street, [tell people] how the Chilean economy was doing."

Beyond economic performance, several other issues greatly mattered to Chileans. Using data from the well-respected and prestigious Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP), I constructed an over time dataset of citizen's most pressing concerns. I identified which issues gained salience during the campaign and which were the most vital right before election day. Table 5.4 presents the most popular responses for three CEP surveys completed prior to the election. Surveyors asked respondents to list the three issues government should prioritize in solving. As illustrated, health, crime, and education were consistently the most important issues to Chileans.

[115] Ibid.

Table 5.4: Most Pressing Concerns among Chilean Citizens

Issue	Nov/Dec 2012	July/Aug 2013	Sept/Oct 13
Health	43%	47%*	53%*
Crime	46%	47%	48%
Education	45%	44%	44%
Citizen Salaries	29%	29%	26%*
Poverty	29%	24%*	24%
Employment	19%	22%	21%
Judicial System	12%	13%	10%
Corruption	12%	8%*	12%*

Source: Centro de Estudios Públicos (CEP)
Notes: asterisks indicate that the changes in percentages across surveys are statistically significant, as determined by CEP analysts. For each respondent, three choices are allowed. Thus, the aggregate percentage totals 300%.
The question appears in the survey: "¿Cuáles son los tres problemas a los que debería dedicar el mayor esfuerzo en solucionar el Gobierno?"

However, economic issues – citizen salaries, poverty, and employment – also mattered greatly. The judicial system and corruption mattered, but to much smaller percentages of citizens.

In addition to the abovementioned issues, the televised debates featured issues that mattered greatly to citizens. These included potential reforms to the Constitution, educational system, and tax system. In the September/October 2013 CEP poll, 85% of respondents agreed that government should reduce the differences in salaries among the richest and poorest, 74% of respondents believed higher education should be universal and free, 67% desired tax reform, while 45% favored constitutional reform (CEP 2013, 75).

On the questions of institutional reforms, Bachelet, MEO, and Parisi publicized government programs that would enact these reforms, while Matthei fervently rejected any substantial changes (Bunker 2013, 347; *El Mercurio* 2013). Other major proposals of Parisi's government program included a "devolution of power, wealth and opportunities to empower the

people,"[116] increased mechanisms for direct citizen participation (citizen initiatives), tax breaks and financial protections and safety nets for young entrepreneurs, and increased government spending in the educational and health systems (Parisi 2013).

Yet overall, the similarity among Bachelet's, MEO's, and Parisi's programs decreased his ability to distinguish himself from the other leading candidates on the issues of major concern for Chileans. For instance, Parisi and his campaign team tried to structure his candidacy around his expertise on economic affairs. They stressed the fact that he was a university professor in Economics and tried to maximize his appeal as the "economist of the poor". Yet Bachelet was still seen as the most qualified to manage the economy. In the September/October 2013 CEP poll, 15% of survey respondents said Parisi was most qualified to handle inflation (41% for Bachelet, 14% for Matthei), 14% listed economic growth (43% for Bachelet, 16% for Matthei), and 10% thought he was prepared to resolve educational challenges (47% for Bachelet, 12% for Matthei). Bachelet's strength on economic issues likely reveals two things. First, it partly reflects Chileans' fond memories of her time in office in which the economy experienced consistent growth. Second, it also demonstrates the shortcomings of Parisi's candidacy. The fact that Bachelet trumped Parisi in questions of economic management indicates that his message and credibility as an economic expert were not entirely convincing.

Two other major factors also negated Parisi's capacity to craft an image as a wholesome outsider, replete with economic expertise who would make the Chilean economy work for and serve everyone's interest. On the one hand, the current state of the economy was very good. On the other hand, Matthei's attacks on Parisi, especially his alleged debt to his workers and

[116] The original Spanish reads: "Desconcetración del poder, la riqueza y las oportunidades empoderando a la gente."

mismanaging of small private schools rocked citizen confidence in his ability to lead. Matthei repeatedly asked whether Chileans could entrust the country's economy in his hands when he could not even direct two small educational programs (*La Tercera* 2013f). The fact that Parisi's image relied on two mutable characteristics (pure outsider, economic expert) made him much more vulnerable to attacks from the opposition than other populists who foster a linkage around immutable traits (e.g. race, ethnicity, gender, language, religion).

Most damning to Parisi's push to be president were his poor evaluations on the issues that mattered most to Chileans and their lack of confidence that he was prepared to be president. Asked about which candidate was most prepared to resolve health challenges, Parisi received 6% approval (54% Bachelet, 13% Matthei); and only 9% of respondents believed him to be most equipped to tackle crime (36% Bachelet, 23% Matthei, 10% MEO).[117] Similarly, when asked whether they believed each candidate to be prepared to be president, only 18% of respondents agreed that Parisi was fit for office (81% Bachelet, 33% Matthei, 30% MEO). Parisi consistently ranked fourth among respondents when researchers controlled for ideology, although those that self-identified as rightist were more supportive (27%) than those on the left (13%). That Parisi could not craft a credible candidacy offers support to my argument that for populists to have electoral success there needs to be significant overlap between what matters to the electorate, the content of the candidate's populist appeals, and the traits of the candidate himself.

Parisi's relatively poor performance on these citizen evaluations should not be entirely surprising when one considers his competition. Bachelet served as Minister of Health in the Lagos administration (2000-2002). Matthei served as Minister of Labor and Social Security in

[117] The figures in this paragraph all come from the September/October 2013 CEP poll.

the then incumbent Piñera administration until she resigned to launch her campaign in July 2013. Parisi's inability to either "own" a specific issue or articulate new substantive issues that resonated in the political mainstream also hindered his chances. These conditions both undermined his ability to "activate" new political participants and decreased his ability to "convert" followers from other major political parties.

The last cleavage that Parisi attempted to politicize and exploit included a growing regional divide in the country. He specifically tried to tap into resentment of the wealthy capital (Santiago) among some of the northern regions and southern Aysén region. Parisi established himself as a favorable political figure in the Aysén region in 2012. He served as a quasi-mediator in a conflict that pitted social movements in the area against the national government (*La Tercera* 2012). The conflict centered on two issues: 1) the high prices for combustibles in the area due to its geographic isolation, and 2) the regional authorities' request for relief in the amount of taxes it owed the national government. Parisi served as a technical advisor to the movement leaders, becoming famous nationally for his support of the region's cause. In several televised comments he gained significant popularity for his statement that the Chilean national government "*está forrado en plata*".[118] Parisi would use the phrase repeatedly during the campaign in an attempt to convince citizens that the national government had misused and abused funds. It would resonate most loudly among citizens in the "exterior", away from Santiago and reflected a broader tactical decision made by Parisi's campaign:

"We lacked space in major national newspapers so we put our money in regional newspapers, put money in *radios communales*. 60% of our message was to specific regions. We studied what

[118] The colloquial expression is roughly a Spanish equivalent to "swimming in money".

mattered most to the regions…People in the regions were very tired about the power that is in Santiago."[119]

The data publicly available from the Chilean electoral service, SERVEL, illustrated in Table 5.5 below, clearly demonstrate that turnout and voting behavior greatly differed across regions in Chile. In the regions in which Parisi was most competitive, the voting eligible populations are comparatively small and turnout was lower than in the larger regions (with Biobio being an exception to both).[120] The regions of Antofagasta, Arica y Parinacota, and Magallanes all experienced waves of protests between 2011 and 2012 by citizens demanding greater respect, recognition, and autonomy from the national government (*Biobío Chile* 2012, *El Diario de Antofagasta* 2012, *La Nación* 2012).

Parisi's relative success in regions with very low turnout rates and small populations and his lack of success in the major metropolitan areas depressed his vote share. These dynamics also point to his failure to organize and construct an electoral institution with the ability to mobilize potential supporters. In a system with traditional political parties that have not collapsed populist outsiders need to have incredible mobilizational capacity. In 2009, MEO, nicknamed "*el díscolo [rebel, or unruly one]*", ran as an outsider and anti-establishment candidate. After finishing third (with 20.2% of the first-round vote) he institutionalized his party, moderated his stance, and his party fielded candidates at all different levels of government in subsequent national-level contests. Although his Progressive Party failed to win any representation in either the Chamber of Deputies or Senate, many of its candidates obtained

[119] Author interview, Santiago, Chile, 5/2/2015.
[120] Turnout rates for the regions include: Antofagasta (42.16%), Arica y Parinacota (40.95%), Tarapacá (38.79%), Magallanes (40.76%), Biobio (52.10%). Information for these rates comes from Barnes and Rangel (2014, 579).

Table 5.5: Vote Share per Candidate, per Region

Region	Parisi	Bachelet	Matthei	MEO	Claude	Miranda
Top 5 for Parisi						
Antofagasta (2.30%)	21.67	39.73	19.09	13.54	2.74	1.13
Arica y Parinacota (0.97%)	20.46	41.89	21.88	10.33	2.15	1.23
Tarapacá (1.15%)	19.65	36.59	23.33	13.15	3.66	1.57
Magallanes (0.88%)	13.37	50.94	18.02	12.09	2.37	1.16
Biobio (12.89%)	13.28	50.80	22.02	8.06	2.16	1.18
Bottom 5 for Parisi						
De la Araucanía (5.99%)	9.55	49.58	29.30	6.56	1.81	1.06
De Coquimbo (3.95%)	9.53	55.76	20.54	9.12	2.07	0.98
Del Maule (6.82%)	9.25	56.68	22.50	7.35	1.35	0.86
De los Lagos (4.79%)	8.89	53.29	25.15	7.12	2.47	0.99
Metro de Santiago (39.40%)	7.66	41.57	27.48	14.33	3.36	1.47

Note: percentages in parentheses indicate the region's contribution of the total national vote share. For instance, the *Metro de Santiago* region accounted for roughly 40% of all votes cast.

Sources: Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), Corte Nacional Electoral (CNE)

relatively high (upwards of 20%) vote percentages in major districts of Santiago (*El Mercurio* 2013). Thus, part of MEO's vote share could be attributed to turnout among followers of his party, partly a product of competitive candidates contesting valuable congressional districts. Sans

this advantage, Parisi struggled to make electoral inroads in the major metropolises of Chile. A strategy that, in hindsight, would always be politically futile.

VI. Conclusion

Chile has long been regarded as having one of the most institutionalized political party systems in Latin America (Mainwaring and Scully 1995, 2010; Coppedge 1998). In its last two elections political outsiders, completely devoid of political party affiliation at the time of the contest, have had unprecedented good fortune and threatened to compete in a second-round runoff. In the 2013 contest three populist candidates competed. In a country with a historical absence of populist emergence and electoral success, these developments are striking. They also highlight the potential political vulnerability of future presidential candidates fielded by the established and traditional electoral alliances: *La Nueva Mayoría* (previously *La Concertación*) and *La Alianza*.

Franco Parisi, a university professor, entered the Chilean political fray by exploiting citizen disillusionment with political institutions and a growing sense of frustration with continued socioeconomic inequality. As a political outsider, supposedly isolated from the corrupting influences of the political establishment, Parisi crafted a message offering a real political alternative. He achieved a significant presence among younger, more educated voters who had low levels of trust in political institutions. His support among these voters reflected a sophisticated campaign. Enthusiastic and resonating appeals allowed him to overcome his disadvantageous lack of coverage in traditional media outlets. The "economist of the poor" provided public lectures in the streets and on university campuses. In these lectures he explained why the Chilean economic system had failed citizens, bolstering his credibility to address grievances that disproportionately affected younger and middle-class voters.

Although relatively successful, the negative campaigning from Evelyn Matthei cut into his final vote count. Unlike Morales in Bolivia, whose popularity is largely conditioned on an immutable characteristic, his indigenous ethnicity, Parisi's credibility was based on his economic expertise and untarnished outsider status. Matthei's attacks discredited Parisi's central message: that as an economic expert he could usher in a new economy that would benefit greater segments of the population. Her attacks also tarnished Parisi's reputation as a wholesome outsider, devoid of the corrupting influences of membership in Chile's political class. Taken together, Parisi's ability to "activate" and "convert" voters in the system had initial success but slowly faded. In a political system that favors established parties and an electoral system with a voluntary vote, an independent candidate will always be at a disadvantage. Lacking a political institution adept at mobilizing potential voters proved to be a major hindrance to Parisi's chances, and ultimately ensured an electoral cushion for Matthei.

APPENDIX C: ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL MODELS FOR CHILE

Table 5.6: Logistic Analysis of Voter Turnout in 2013 Chilean Presidential Election

	Beta (SE)		Beta (SE)	
Control variables				
Age	**0.045*** **	**(0.01)**	**0.045*** **	**(0.01)**
Gender (female=1)	0.121	(0.21)	0.115	(0.21)
Education	**0.075***	**(0.03)**	**0.075***	**(0.03)**
Income	0.021	(0.03)	0.020	(0.03)
Leftist Ideology	0.054	(0.04)	0.059	(0.04)
Race (Mestizo = 1)	-0.182	(0.20)	-0.177	(0.20)
Independent Variables				
No identification with political parties	**-0.866****	**(0.32)**	**-0.887****	**(0.32)**
Low trust in Congress	0.028	(0.09)		
Low trust in Political Parties	**-0.169***	**(0.08)**		
Low trust in the Judiciary	-0.051	(0.08)		
Political Institutions Index			**-0.063***	**(0.03)**
Trust in Elections High	**0.163***	**(0.07)**	**0.154***	**(0.07)**
Constant	-0.427	(1.12)	-0.429	(1.12)
N (Individuals)	684		684	
*P <.05, **P < .01, ***P<0.001				
Adjusted R^2	0.819		0.819	
McFadden's R^2	0.644		0.643	

Source: 2014 Americasbarometer Survey

Note: When using the September 2013 UDP survey data, I found similar results to column. The most significant variables included age and perceptions of the country economic situation.

CHAPTER VI: THE PREVALENCE OF POPULISM IN SOUTH AMERICA, LESSONS FOR LATIN AMERICAN AND GLOBAL POLITICS

I. Introduction

In this dissertation, I attempt to answer *why South American citizens vote for populist candidates*. My argument is that populists are more likely to achieve electoral success when they craft a credible message, convincing the electorate that they are best suited to address the issues of most concern to voters. The populist's credibility hinges on whether this linkage is based around an immutable social characteristic or whether he can successfully portray himself to be a qualified or sole representative of citizens' interests.

In this chapter, I summarize my study's findings. I discuss the contributions (methodological and theoretical) of the dissertation. I consider how my findings relate to broader questions in the subfield of comparative politics and field of political science. I discuss whether the argument can "travel" to other geographical areas. Lastly, I examine possible avenues for future research.

II. Summary of Findings

In Chapter Two, I presented an operationalization of populism. The concept has led to abundant scholarly disagreement so I aimed to be as transparent in my efforts. I contend that populism is a *political strategy* utilized strategically by electoral contenders to maximize popular support. As a strategy, it contains four components: rhetoric or discourse, behavior (relationship with followers), political history, and the organizational structure of the candidate's electoral vehicle. I advanced a theory that populists are electorally successful when there is convergence among the characteristics of the candidate, appeals used by the candidate, and the electorate. The greater

the overlap among these categories the better the electoral prospects for the contender. I contend that there is greater confluence when the populist can convince voters that she will represent those who may fall within a certain sociopolitical cleavage. When the cleavage is structured around an immutable characteristic shared by the electorate and the candidate (race, religion, gender, language, etc.), the opposing candidates have less ability to diminish this linkage. On the other hand, when the populist bases her appeals and crafts an image on mutable characteristics or issues (e.g. corruption, leadership, economic proficiency), the opposition can more easily undermine the connection between populist and voter. In Chapter Two I also provided my efforts at scoring candidates competing in nine presidential elections across South America. I found considerable variation among electoral contenders and identified countries with the highest and lowest populism densities in their most recent election.

In Chapter Three, I developed a series of statistical models to examine why citizens voted for the populist candidates I identified in Chapter Two. I found strong support that South American citizens, voting for populists, were motivated by their perceptions of corruption, their identification with political parties, and perceptions of their economic situations. I find milder support for citizens' trust in public institutions and no support for the presence of populist ideas. However, some nuance is needed when evaluating these explanations. Both corruption and economic perceptions are strongly conditioned by the incumbency status of the populist Citizens with negative thoughts on these matters are more likely to support non-incumbents. Likely voters with more positive outlooks are more supportive of populist incumbents seeking re-election. Similarly, both trust of public institutions and political party identification are conditioned by candidates' outsider status. Citizens with more positive assessments again support populists running under the banner of institutionalized political parties. Likely voters with more

pessimistic evaluations and identification are more likely to cast their ballots for the populist outsiders.

In Chapter Four, I examined the political longevity and evolution in populism of Evo Morales. After sweeping to electoral victory in 2005 on an anti-elite and anti-establishment discourse, Morales continues to be Latin America's longest serving executive. I found that Morales modified his populism over time to broaden his electoral coalition. Early in his time in office, he relied mostly on rural, poor indigenous supporters in the country's western highlands. As his time in office has progressed, he has increased his popularity in the eastern lowlands. Morales has made significant electoral inroads among the growing "entrepreneurial elite", citizens who have greatly benefitted from government contracts in the extractive sector. The shift in support was accompanied by a parallel shift in appeals during the campaign. Morales has masterfully combined the use of enthusiastic speeches in traditional Aymara garb with public meetings with upper-class businessmen.

In Chapter Five, I investigated the 2013 Chilean election that featured three populist outsiders. Chile has historically been considered a "bastion of antipopulism" (Drake 2012, 84). Given the absence of populism in the country for decades, the sudden materialization of populist candidates allows for an ideal case to test theories of populism. My analysis centered on the most successful populist outsider, Franco Parisi. I found that younger, more educated citizens who lacked trust in the political establishment supported Parisi. The "economist of the poor" successfully politicized government inefficiency, economic inequality, and the lack of political representation. Reeling after a spate of public attacks by Evelyn Matthei, Parisi's ability to credibly convince potential voters sharply faded. He crafted an image of a skilled economist, devoid of the corrupting influences of the establishment. The mutability of these traits and

appeals left him vulnerable, and ultimately defeated, by the undermining of his image as an unblemished and politically refreshing contender.

III. Contributions

This dissertation makes four original contributions to the study of populism. They include constructing an original data set with a careful operationalization and measurement of populism, scoring populism systematically across presidential candidates including negative cases, drawing on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods, and testing an original theory with unique data collected by the author. I briefly discuss each contribution below.

The first contribution is descriptive: I operationalize populism as a continuous variable, allowing a presidential candidate's degree of populism to vary within a campaign. In doing so, I found that candidates do vary in the degree of their populism during campaigns. This empirical finding provides support for my contention that populism is not an inherent trait or attribute of political actors. Rather, it is a political strategy that adroit candidates and their campaign teams can utilize to mobilize electoral support.

Second, I scored each candidate on four different aspects that represent an amalgamation of populist traits that previous scholars have identified. To the best of my knowledge, less than a handful of studies (Hawkins 2009, 2010; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2014; Hawkins and Castanho 2015) have attempted a systematic scoring of populism. In total, I examined over 6,000 newspaper articles. I scored 49 presidential candidates in 9 countries for the last month of the

campaign.[121] This the first study to score populist candidates in Latin America using publicly available newspaper articles.

The collection of original data also allowed for a systematic scoring across presidential candidates. This allowed me to identify the most and least populist candidates across the continent and within each country election. In past studies, scholars have tended to select, for study, candidates deemed populist by their previous researchers or relied on a non-systematic selection of speeches or quotes. This study has standardized the time period of scoring and built on scoring rubrics put forth by other populism scholars (Hawkins 2009, 2010).[122] In doing so, I have determined in which countries populism is most prevalent and which individual candidates were the most populist electoral contenders.

Most populism studies treat a specific candidate as either populist or not, leading to two weaknesses. On the one hand, most scholars fail to consider the possibility that a given election may feature numerous populists. On the other hand, scholars fail to examine country elections in which populists compete but do not win against non-populists. This practice has often truncated the dependent variable and led scholars to examine only candidates who have won elections. Kaltwasser (2014) leads a growing call among scholars of populism for the study of negative cases. This study seeks to provide another example.

My approach and scoring possibly allow for a more accurate classification of populists as I identified the most populist candidate in each country and the continent as a whole. I have examined the full array of possible populist outcomes—a populist wins re-election (Bolivia

[121] In total there were 64 candidates competing in these elections. 15 of them did not garner sufficient mentions in newspapers to merit a systematic scoring. They were excluded from the analysis (discussed in the last section of Chapter Two).

[122] Kirk Hawkins kindly provided a series of Skype training sessions in the summer of 2014 using his rubrics to score populist speeches. I applied these skills to score speeches and rhetoric found in the newspapers.

2014, Ecuador 2013, Venezuela 2012), a populist wins election for the first time (Paraguay 2013), populists do not win the election (Argentina 2011, Chile 2013, Colombia 2014, Peru 2011, Uruguay 2014), and new populists emerge who challenge but do not defeat the populist in his bid for re-election (Ecuador 2013). I contend that the systematic scoring across cases advanced my ability to more accurately test theories that account for why citizens vote for populist candidates.

Third, the study draws on the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods. To my knowledge it is the first study on populism in Latin America that blends a rigorous statistical examination of publicly available survey datasets with semi-structured field interviews. I tested voting behavior theories at the micro-level (citizens), developing on the few past large-N studies (Doyle 2011, Remmer 2012) that examined populist electoral outcomes at the country level. The two case studies of this dissertation—Bolivia and Chile—present two unique cases for which past study has been limited. In Bolivia, scholars have extensively studied the emergence and initial electoral victory of Evo Morales and his MAS party (Madrid 2008, 2012; Van Cott 2005; Yashar 2005; Zuazo 2008; among others). However, little research has been done to longitudinally examine the political longevity and changing populist nature of Evo Morales. In Chile, a country that some view as the "the paragon of antipopulism "(Drake 2012, 81), the 2013 election featured three populist contenders. Two of who were among the most populist candidates across the continent. The 2013 election offered a perfect opportunity to test theories of populism emergence and electoral success.

The qualitative analyses also allowed for an investigation into the role campaign strategists, party elites, and candidates themselves play in elections. To my knowledge no study has extensively explored why or how political campaign strategists, party elites, and candidates

themselves decide to employ populist tactics. The key takeaway of my argument, and the evidence I find for it, is that populism does not occur "naturally" but often occurs as a very strategic calculation made by campaign teams. That is to say that candidates are not inherently populist, they rationally decide to act like populists. The argument considers both demand-side explanations (what conditions favor populist appeals) and a supply-side explanation (the behavior of political actors).

One empirical finding from my study is that the reasons why citizens vote for populists are highly conditioned by the candidate's outsider and incumbency status. This seems to be a significant oversight as a populist's outsider status conditions (facilitates or hinders) a candidate's ability to attack the establishment and mobilize voters who feel marginalized. My analysis illustrates that voters do have different motivations when they vote for a populist challenger as opposed to a populist incumbent seeking re-election.

Similarly, almost all of the literature on populism in Latin America has grouped incumbent and non-incumbent populists together. Explanations and research designs treat these types of populists similarly. My dissertation questions the conceptual and theoretical validity of this approach. The statistical analyses in Chapter Three demonstrated that traditional theories of populism helped account for the electoral success of non-incumbent populists. These candidates tend to be electorally competitive when voters believe corruption is widespread and perceive their economic situations to be worsening. However, when populists were also incumbents these conditions no longer held. Actually, the reverse applied—citizens were more likely to support populist incumbents when they had positive evaluations of the economic situation, perceptions that corruption was not widespread, higher levels of identification with political parties, and higher levels of trust in political institutions (the legislature, judiciary, and political parties).

Chapter Four additionally details the evolving nature of Evo Morales' populism as his time in office progressed. As his dominance of the political system became more entrenched, he used his dual position as head of state and government to campaign successfully.

This dissertation also builds on recent work (Carlin, Singer, and Zechmeister 2015) in the voting behavior literature that examines the influence of demographic variables. These factors are usually given theoretical short shrift. However, many socio-political and economic factors lurk as possible cleavages in Latin America. The continent's complex history of colonialism, independence struggles, economic disasters, military rule, and democratization have created a plethora of potential political fault lines. Hopefully this dissertation pushes scholars to re-assess sociodemographic variables instead of merely inserting them in statistical models as control variables.

Lastly, the scoring I have provided in this dissertation identified populist candidates across the ideological spectrum. Other scholars (Castañeda 2006; Weyland 2009) have bifurcated Latin America's leftwing leaders between the impractical "revolutionary left" and the good, practical left. My analysis illustrated that populists in South America come in all ideological flavors, reflecting this phenomenon's leaders' ability to thrive as ideological chameleons in the political arena.

IV. Broader Questions in Political Science

Scholars for decades have argued that populists achieve electoral success when traditionally dominant political parties are weakened (Drake 1982, 1999, 2012; Roberts 1995, 1996, 2013, 2014; Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Weyland 1999) or when the party system fully collapses (Carrión 2006; Schmidt 1995; Seawright 2012). In this dissertation, I find non-linear

and inconsistent relationships between party strength and populist electoral success.[123] In elections featuring populist outsiders the relationship help. However, other populist candidates who utilized the mobilizational capacity of traditional parties had favorable electoral outcomes. This applies to both non-incumbent and incumbent candidates. Several multi-term serving incumbents (Chávez, Correa, Morales) all had significant support from citizens who identified with political parties, illustrating that these leaders have institutionalized their electoral vehicles to afford them better mobilization of their supporters.[124] The claim that populists are both a symptom and cause of weak political parties needs to be refined. Populist electoral success, much of which has occurred with the help of political parties and their mobilizational capacity, indicates a shifting nature of the roles played by parties, similar to what other scholars have documented in Western Europe (Dalton et al. 2011; Hug 2001; Katz and Mair 1994).

Latin America provides an abundance of cases to study presidentialism. Regarding outsider populists, Linz (1990, 1994) feared that the inherent flaws of these political systems would usher in candidates to the executive who lacked any connection to the legislative branch. The results would likely be political instability caused by government gridlock. However, in this dissertation I find that Linz's (among others) early concerns were a bit overblown. Instead I advocate, like others (Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997), for a more nuanced understanding of presidentialism that considers cross-national variation.

Among the five populist outsiders in my study, only one achieved an electoral victory, whereas three of them won less than three percent of the vote share.[125] Apart from the case of

[123] I characterize the relationship between populists and party strength and institutionalization as linear in the scholarship cited above. In essence, it is a negative linear relationship.

[124] By institutionalization I consider that these leaders are at the helm of political parties who field candidates at the local, regional, and national levels.

[125] These five candidates are: Franco Parisi, Roxana Miranda, and Marcel Claude in Chile 2013; Horacio Cartes in

Alberto Fujimori in 1990s Peru, other successful populists (Chávez, Morales, Correa) in the region have come to power riding the crest of a wave of popular support.[126] The only outsider populist in my study who won an election, Horacio Cartes in Paraguay, did so as the candidate of a traditional party. His coalition, the National Republican Association-Colored Party,[127] won 58% of the seats in the lower chamber and 42% of the seats in the Senate. Over time, many populists in my study have actually increased their party's dominance of the national legislature, leading to criticism from democracy scholars.

The other major question and debate about populism is whether its emergence and success have an overall positive or negative effect on the quality of democracy in South America. Scholars have roughly divided themselves into two camps: the positive one that centers on the representational aspects of democracy, and the more negative one with a focus on the procedural elements of democracy. Regarding the first concern, my argument is that populists have electoral success when they can convince electorates that they represent them symbolically or descriptively and will offer programmatic representation to issues they truly care about. Whether or not populists in office do provide presentation for their citizens is an ongoing empirical question.

Survey data from the Americasbarometer project lend some insight to the question. Table 6.1 below presents country-aggregate scores for three populists I identified in my scoring. These leaders feature prominently in studies of populism and all ruled for considerable amounts of time. This allows for a brief inspection of the effects of

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Paraguay 2013; and Fernando Vargas in Bolivia 2014. Of these contenders, only Parisi and Cartes won more than 10% of the vote share. Cartes was the only one who won an election.

[126] Chávez, Morales, and Correa all won with majority votes. This also translated into legislative majorities for all three candidates' electoral vehicles.

[127] In Spanish: *Asociación Nacional Republicana -Partido Colorado*.

Table 6.1 Citizens' Pride in their National Political System

Country	2004	2006	2008	2010
Bolivia	17%	22%	21%	21%
Ecuador	14%	9%	16%	21%
Venezuela	NA	35%	31%	28%
Latin America average	26%	26%	26%	25%

Note: The question asked in the LAPOP surveys reads: ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso(a) de vivir bajo el sistema politico? The figures above illustrate the combined percentages for the 6 and 7 (a lot) responses. The scale ranges from 1 to 7. The Latin American average represents all 18 countries in the LAPOP sample. Morales took office in 2006, Correa in 2007, and Chávez in 1999.

populism on citizen attitudes toward their political systems. The table presents respondents' answers to a question asking citizens, on a scale from 1 to 7 (highest), how much pride they have to live under their country's political system.

The data in table 6.1 provide a snapshot into citizens' changing political evaluations. In general, Bolivians and Ecuadorians have become prouder of their country's system since both Evo Morales' and Rafael Correa's initial electoral victories. The above cross-tabs also indicate that Venezuelans reached relatively high levels of pride in their political system in the earlier stages of Chávez's rule. However, over time, as the country's politics have become more polarized (Corrales and Penfold 2011; Hawkins 2009, 2010) noticeable drops have occurred.

When investigating citizens' perceptions of the democratic quality in their countries, similar patterns occur in the three countries with populist incumbents. Table 6.2 below illustrates the changes in citizens' evaluations of democracy. In general,

Table 6.2 Citizens' Perceptions of Their Country's Level of Democracy

Country	2004	2006	2008	2010
Bolivia	59%	67%	61%	73%
Ecuador	56%	49%	61%	63%
Venezuela	NA	76%	81%	57%
Latin America average	64%	64%	64%	67%

Notes: The question asked in the LAPOP surveys reads: En su opinion, ¿el país es un país muy democrática, algo democrática, poco democrática, o nada democrática?The figures above illustrate the combined percentages for the "very democratic" and "somewhat democratic" responses.

Bolivians and Ecuadorians (after Correa's inauguration) have developed more favorable perceptions of democratic performance in their countries. In Venezuela, the early years of Chavez's rule witnessed increased satisfaction among citizens. However, since 2008, there has been a decline in favorable perceptions about the level of democracy. Overall, the election of visible and dominant populists in Latin America has increased citizens' perceptions of their political system and quality of democracy. This is quite significant as these countries had suffered from a "crisis of democratic representation" prior to the election of these leaders (Mainwaring 2006). Over time, the effects tend to level off and even decrease in Venezuela.

Beyond questions of representation and democratic perceptions, there is a debate over political participation. Mudde and Kaltwasser (2012) first explored this question and argued that populists had facilitated the entry into the electoral and political arena of previously marginalized citizens. A more recent study (Allred, Hawkins, and Ruth 2015) found that leftwing candidates competing in elections motivated new voters to enter the race, regardless of whether they were

populists. One difficulty with studies examining voter turnout is that many countries in Latin America have mandatory voting, albeit with varying levels of enforcement and sanction. However, countries with non-mandatory voting offer some insight. In this dissertation, I found that the entry of Franco Parisi, a center-right populist, had no noticeable effect in turnout in Chile's 2013 presidential election. More research could be conducted to explore this connection, controlling for ideology and percentage of vote share.

Regarding the second camp of the debate on populists' effect on democracy, during the tenure of the abovementioned populists there have been significant changes to their countries' constitutions and political institutions. In all three (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) countries, these leaders have rewritten their constitutions in the hopes of bringing about profound social, political, and economic changes. In all three countries, citizens played key roles in the rewriting process via constituent assemblies and referenda. Noguera (2011, 167) has labeled these similar occurrences as the start of an "Andean neoconstitutionalism."

In Bolivia, Morales' 2009 changes to the constitution included new rights for increased political participation and a recognition of indigenous peoples and their political systems (Schilling-Vacaflor 2011, 3). However, it also increased the strength of the executive branch, specifically its control over state resources and socioeconomic policy (Postero 2010). Critics of Morales have complained about the disproportionate influence of the national government in electoral cycles. Several of the National Unity Front (FUN) congressional deputies I interviewed bemoaned the limited window they and their presidential candidate Samuel Doria Medina had to advertise publicly. Some of the interviewees even claimed that they had evidence of large-scale electoral fraud, intimidation, and that the OAS electoral observers had "taken a nice vacation to

Bolivia and smiled for the cameras".[128] Serious concerns on limits on political participation continue.

In Ecuador, Correa's changes ushered in a hyperpresidential system, provided recognition to the country's Plurinational nature, and embedded the collective rights of minorities (Montúfar 2013, 312). Specifically, the new constitution tilted the balance of political power very much in the executive's favor. The president can now subjugate the legislative branch and restrict its oversight powers; exerts additional control over local governments due to the centralization of fiscal resources; can significantly intervene in the economy via the executive's control over strategic sectors; and, lastly, established control over the functioning of various civil society organizations (Montúfar 2013, 313).

Overall, both Morales and Correa have centralized power in the executive at the expense of other branches of government. Critics of both presidents lament the threats these actions pose to appropriate checks and balances necessary for Madisonian liberal democracy. Both leaders have exercised significant control over strategic economic sectors. In doing so, they have utilized state resources for electoral gain, to successfully compete in their "permanent campaigns" (Roberts 2013, 55). However, these efforts have not gone unnoticed. In Bolivia, recurring highway blockades and Morales' defeat in the 2016 constitutional referendum illustrate some measure of accountability exists. Even though he remains highly popular, ordinary Bolivians can hold him accountable when they perceive him to potentially abuse the rules the country majority agreed upon.

V. Geographical Extensions and Scope Conditions of the Argument

[128] Author interview, La Paz, 6/7/2015.

In this section I discuss whether the argument presented in this dissertation can "travel" to other geographical areas, and whether any scope conditions exist. Scholars usually treat countries in Latin America as homogenous cases yet we know that significant intra-regional variation exists. Some researchers have also warned that Latin America is unique and comparisons to other global regions are futile. I address the possibility of geographically extending my argument below.

I have argued that populists have a greater likelihood of success at the ballot box when certain aspects align. These include the candidate's characteristics, the electorate's characteristics, and the appeals made by the populist. Two things matter greatly. First, the populist's ability to credibly craft an image of a contender who embodies certain aspects and can provide representation to the specific concern or niche of the population. Second, is a mathematical consideration—whether enough of the population fit within the overlap. If a fringe party limits its appeals to a small segment of society than it is likely to remain on the electoral outside, looking in. Such a narrow strategy may even lead to the party or actor's obsolescence. This seems to have been the case with the electorally unsuccessful indigenous parties in Latin America. The Pachakutik (Ecuador, starting in 2006), YATAMA (Nicaragua), and PUAMA (Venezuela) parties have focused mostly on narrow ethnic demands, issues that appealed to specific grievances of a small percentage of the country's population (Madrid 2012). After being a major political actor between 1996 and 2002, the Pachakutik currently have only 5 out of 137 seats in the National Assembly. The other parties mentioned above have even less importance at the national level in their respective political systems.

My argument's strategic element of populism should be applicable to political systems around the world. In fact, it is similar to the "winning strategy" argument developed by Kitschelt and McGann (1995, 2005) to account for the emergence of radical right populism in Western

Europe. The authors contended that a new radical-right party could be successful if it offered an electoral manifesto and program that appealed to all of their potential constituents simultaneously. Their base of support usually includes a multiclass constituency who all feel "left behind" by economic modernization. A potential addendum to the authors' argument could be a focus on the characteristics of the party leaders themselves. Some scholars (Adam and Maier 2010, Dalton et. al. 2000, Garzia 2011) have found that media coverage of campaigns in Europe and North America has focused less on political parties and more on individual candidates.[129]

The phenomenon of populism has deep roots in Latin America and the United States. Since the 1980s scholars have discussed its emergence and broader political effects in Western Europe, Canada, and Australasia. More recently, scholars have pushed the research agenda forward by examining populism through a cross-regional (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012) and global (de la Torre et. al. 2015, Moffitt 2016) lens. The argument developed in this dissertation should be able to be tested with new and interesting cases. The focus on the leader-follower relationship should help account for major institutional differences (e.g. presidential versus parliamentary systems) frequently cited by comparative scholars as hindering cross-national, cross-regional, and global comparisons.

VI. Future Research and Concluding Remarks

In this dissertation, I attempted to answer why South American citizens vote for populist candidates. I proposed an operationalization of populism derived from attributes I identified that

[129] There is considerable debate on whether politics in general and the entire electoral campaign have become more personalized. For a nice overview of the debate, see Kriesi (2011) , Adam and Maier (2010), and Garzia (2011). As such, I choose to temper my claim to just media coverage above.

were consistent across historical and contemporary cases. I collected an original data set on populist behavior and then systematically scored presidential electoral contenders across 9 contests, In doing so, I identified the most populist actors in the continent. I developed an original argument to account for populist electoral success and found evidence in support of it. I conducted several cross-national statistical tests and found that candidates' incumbency and outsider statuses conditioned citizens' voting behavior. I examined within-case variation in support for Evo Morales, Latin America's longest continuous serving executive. I repeated the analysis in the 2013 Chilean election, a contest novel for the appearance of three populist outsiders, in a country historically lacking populism.

To my knowledge no study has extensively explored the considerable impact that political campaign strategists, party elites, and candidates themselves may play in influencing electoral outcomes. I contend that much of populism is "crafted"—a rational decision by competitors to maximize votes. The lessons (successes and failures) political actors can gain from attempting these strategies surely affect future political behavior and may provide an insight as to why populist behavior may be repeated. It seems like these considerations provide a unique and potentially exciting new way to understand populism.

Further research on populism should explore the richness of cases in Central America. There is significant debate whether Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua is a populist. After serving as executive for nine years, scholars interested in Evo Morales could conduct similar analyses on populism and incumbency. Costa Rica would be another fascinating potential case. Luis Guillermo Solís in 2014 became the first president of the country in over six decades to not represent the PLN party. Buoyed by anti-corruption, anti-establishment appeals with a focus on

economic equality, Solís ran an effective campaign that caused the incumbent candidate to resign prior to the second round vote.

Future studies could also make methodological and theoretical improvements. Adding the Central American cases would allow for hypotheses to be tested at the country-level with hierarchical statistical modelling techniques. In investigating more cases, continued interest and focus should be paid to countries with a history of failed populism or an absence thereof. Exploration into whether populists heed lessons from past populist experiments could lead to insights into how behavior has changed over time and whether populism is indeed "serial" (Roberts 2013, 51) in some countries.

Lastly, this dissertation has put forth a supply-side argument to account for a demand-side (citizen) outcome (voting behavior). Several other institutional and party-centered explanations could also shed significant light on the phenomenon. Some scholars (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2006) posited that populist outsider candidates would likely spring up in majority runoff electoral systems, especially if the country conducts executive and legislative elections concurrently (Carreras 2012; Jones 1995; Shugart 1995; Siavelis and Morgenstern 2006). Others (Freidenberg and Sánchez-López 2001; Carey and Polga-Hecimovich 2006) contend that primaries and candidate self-designation increase populist actors, especially when parties exercise less control over the distribution of funds. Future work can do well to blend both supply-side and demand-side explanations to offer a rich, comprehensive account for populists' electoral success.

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