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Narration and Linguistic Fieldwork


By

Meredith Grace Kolar


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requirements for the degree of

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in

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University of California, Berkeley


Committee in charge:

Professor Irmengard Rauch, Chair
Professor Thomas F. Shannon
Professor Jennifer Miller


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Abstract

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Meredith Grace Kolar

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Professor Irmengard Rauch, Chair


This study intends to expand the historical language and gender debate (Chapter 1) by examining the cognitive structures that underlie human beliefs about gender.  Although the work does not profess to be a feminist work, it does seek to offer an opinion about how and why linguistic and social change can occur within a population. It examines the current state of gendered language usage and the potential for change in gendered language usage within a Western population.  The foundational methods for this study include cognitive linguistic and metaphor theories (Chapter 2) combined with narrative theory (Chapter 3), and the study incorporates Christian theological (Chapter 4) and feminist history (Chapters 1 & 4) as a basis for understanding the cultural conventions about gender in the West.

Narratives are considered to be "Instruments of Mind" (3.6).  They consist of systematic structures necessary for all human cognition, principally consisting of metaphorical mappings between source and target domains (2.6).  Narrative structures therefore enable us to reason throughout daily life.  As a crucial part of our reasoning strategies, narratives point to the details in our moral systems (Chapter 4).  A moral system is the coherent foundation of a person's beliefs and choices.  Moral systems are culturally shared, but there may be several versions of moral systems in any given culture (4.1).  Due to the prolific capacity of metaphorical reasoning, spreading activation in neural structures that enables such reasoning (2.4), and the radial characteristics of real human categorization strategies (2.2, 2.3), no human being reasons with complete consistency.  Exceptions abound and point to the blending of moral systems in individuals' reasoning strategies (Chapter 10).  Crucially, exceptions indicate both the potential for change and an innate human creativity (2.11, Chapter 10).

We can draw inferences (3.1) about human reasoning structures and individuals' moral systems from the language individuals choose to discuss culturally shared stories.  Constellations of words, collocations, phrases, and metaphors point to the values, or moral systems, of each individual.  Constellations and collocations (3.4) often demonstrate beliefs in cultural folk models (2.3, 4.1.5).  Folk models primarily consist of prototypes and basic-level effects (2.2), and speakers employ these to make speedy and efficient judgments about people, things, and actions in everyday life.  Prototype categories, however, are radial categories (2.2, 2.3), which

means that membership in a category is based on relationship to the central member, but that categories have indistinct boundaries and allow for unique or novel inclusion radiating from the central members. The capacity for novel usage (2.11) is one of the most salient qualities of human cognition, and it is the quality that allows for both linguistic and social change through cognitive transformation.

The primary folk models in the West point to two moral systems used by speakers to reason about daily, mundane and complex functions and actions. Both prototypical moral systems stem from the Christian heritage: the Strict Father system of morality (SFM) and the Nurturant Parent system of morality (NPM) (Chapter 4). SFM involves hierarchies, strict boundaries, moral strength, and purity, while NPM is based on empathy and dissolves notions of hierarchies. This study demonstrates through interviews with 26 native speakers of modern German regarding stories of Christian saints (Chapters 5-9) that the leading moral system both historically and currently in this Western population segment is SFM (Chapter 10). While many speakers demonstrate occasional features of NPM reasoning, female consultants tend to demonstrate more of these features than male consultants (Chapters 7-10). It appears that women's historical status as a subordinate group under a SFM system may predispose them to the use of empathy (10.1) and therefore to the use of NPM reasoning. Women tend to be the primary instigators of change in gendered language usage.

Finally, the analysis of the study suggests that language and social change occur over time as a result of the creative potential inherent in empathetic cognition, found more often in subordinate groups, due to their perception of a need for alternatives from the norm (Chapter 10). Change rarely occurs "from above", through those who make up the status quo, but originates out of a need by subordinate groups to break down strict boundaries and rigid divisions. Change is always possible, as human cognition is based on fuzzy boundaries and radial categories. Nonetheless, change is a slow process because it requires long-term and often radical alterations in the tenacious narrative and cognitive structures of a shared culture.

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# CHAPTER 1

# THE LANGUAGE AND GENDER DEBATE

## 1.1 Introduction

The language and gender debate is one that has surfaced and resurfaced in many forms over the last century. Although the existence of the label "gender" is a modern development, Western cultures have long since placed people into one of two binary categories based on biological sex: male or female. Distinct cultural roles for these two categories have developed around this traditional dichotomy, and those roles include words and ways we use to talk about men and women, as well as beliefs about whether and how men and women use language differently. These notions are deeply ingrained in our cultural consciousness as shared, conventionalized concepts. Concepts about gender have been contended for generations, because women have desired equality with men in every sphere of life. The feminist and women's right movements in the United States emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century because women wished for equal voting rights with men. It was not until 1920 that the 19th Amendment to the United States Constitution gave women that right. The second wave of feminism in the United States, based on notions of Civil Rights, emerged in the 1960s, and other Western countries, like Germany, followed suit. The current, more eclectic wave of feminism, often called the Third Wave, has brought scores of other concerns about gender into the debate, such as race, socioeconomic class, non-traditional sexual preferences, and even challenges to the notion that "women" is adequate as a label that encompasses a highly diverse number of people. Regardless of how we label these groups, each generation has fought against what it sees as the major oppressions of its time. Each generation has known that language is key in the pursuit of equality, and each has debated with and about language to try to effect change.

While this study does not consider itself to be a "feminist" work, it seeks to continue the inquiry about the relationship between language and gender by presenting a new framework for the discussion. Language is the primary means of human communication and cultural transmission. Countless works throughout recorded Western history attest to the power of language and the power wielded by those who are authorized to speak. We can find these examples by perusing works ranging from commentary of the tenth century monk, Aelfric (cf. Mitchell & Robinson 2001:190-95)—who complained of the dangers of changing the meaning of the Word of God by translating the bible into the vernacular[1]—to Shakespeare, whose little-educated, love-sick, comic character, Phoebe, soliloquized about the power of words in the mouths of those who are allowed to speak;[2] from J. L. Austin's Speech Act Theory (1962)—which asserts that language is not passive but that each use of language is an assertion of an action and a choice—to Pierre Bourdieu's (1991 [1983]) discussion of the symbolic capital of language in a kind of "linguistic market"; and finally from Virginia Woolf's (1989 [1929]) claim that women have been left out of history because they were not allowed to write to G. Lakoff and

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[1] His complaints arise in the "Preface to Genesis", written in Old English.
[2] "Yet words do well / When he that speaks them pleases those that hear," *As You Like It*, 3.5 (Greenblatt 1997:1638).

Johnson's seminal work, *The Metaphors We Live By* (2003 [1980]), which showed that language is a conceptual system like every other conceptual system in the human mind, integrally connected to every action and choice we make in our daily lives as cause and effect of human conceptualization. Language is therefore a window into human cognition that produces and is influenced by human conceptual systems. Its power is virtually immeasurable. By studying language using the methodologies of cognitive inquiry we can now dissect how the power of language cognitively works. This study will not only seek patterns in gendered language usage or so-called gender differences between groups of language users, but also use language as a tool to examine the conceptual underpinnings of our beliefs about gender. Such knowledge may help us to effect the kind of linguistic or social change so many people have sought in their examination of the relationship between language and gender. While my study does not intend to suggest strategies for change, it seeks to provide a deeper understanding of the connections between one population of current speakers' usage of gendered language and their concepts about gender. With these results, I hope to provide a foundation for further studies that may be able to suggest strategies for conceptual change, and subsequently, for social change.

## 1.2 The Concepts of Sex and Gender

Among our most fundamental cultural inheritances is the organization of gender and gender roles in society. Although gender as a concept is a relatively new creation, the West has generally considered man and woman to be natural and essential reproductive counterparts of our human species (Armstrong 1987:5). This is the basic reproductive potential of biological sex, which some—particularly second wave feminists, such as Simone de Beauvoir in *The Second Sex* (2010 [1949])—have argued is different from gender, while others, such as Judith Butler (2006 [1990]:11), demonstrated that "gender" may be no different from "sex". According to Butler (11), once the "situation" of the body is presupposed, gender is just as much a social construct as is sex. Butler explained that when Beauvoir called the body a "situation", Beauvoir had already confined the body to a cultural interpretation. Butler asserted that biological sex is just as much a cultural interpretation as is gender. Therefore, when I argue that the West has generally assumed that biological reproductive organs dictate the "sex" of a human in terms of one of a binary set—male or female—I am arguing that the West generally interprets sex and gender to be one and the same. Biological sex dictates the gender, while each of the genders in the binary pair is assumed to signify always and only one gender. Consequently, I will not differentiate terminologically between sex and gender. I believe they are both cultural constructs; they are words that capture and enable humans to express a concept, which necessarily delimits the items that can belong within its bounds.

I choose this terminological stance because my research seeks precisely to deal with concepts that are culturally accepted. My purpose here is not to argue a feminist point of view, be that of the second or third wave, but rather to observe through language usage the details of the cultural concepts that are most commonly assumed: for example, the binary construct of male-female. Both sex and gender are equally useful terms because they appear to overlap in the vocabularies of the average human population. The basic assumption is a binary system. Whether the binary system is correct is not the question I am tackling. Instead I am observing that conceptual system through language to discover what configuration of cultural knowledge underlies each item of the binary system. Like Butler, I agree that sex and gender, as linguistic

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terms, are both cultural constructs, insofar as they represent vast and indistinctly bound (or "fuzzy"-edged) bodies of learned details. This is the nature of conceptual systems (cf. e.g. Feldman 2006, G. Lakoff 1987, G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999). They employ strategies of categorization motivated by our species' need to survive. From a cognitive linguistic point of view the terms point us to much the same concept. Our ability to categorize and express these categories using terms with which individuals can mutually understand one another is our adaptation for survival. "Sex" and "gender" are simply two concepts that have developed as a result of our attempt to improve our chances of survival, and "gender" may be the so-called newer of the two related terms.

Of course, not everyone agrees completely about the meaning of each term. But this problem is also a result of the nature of human conceptual systems: they have "fuzzy" borders (cf. 2.2). In fact, I assert that no word is perfectly equivalent in meaning between two different individuals. The commonly held notion that one word equals one thing or stands for one single, indisputable item in the world is impossible, given what we know about the structures of the brain (cf. Feldman 2006). No single word—often referred to as a "representation" of a thing in the world—can be stored in the brain autonomously, unconnected to any other item or concept. Even Saussure in his *Course in General Linguistics* (1966) emphasized this point (65):

> Some people regard language, when reduced to its elements, as a naming-process only—a list of words, each corresponding to the thing that it names…. This conception is open to criticism at several points. It assumes that ready-made ideas exist before words; … it lets us assume that the linking of a name and a thing is a very simple operation—an assumption that is anything but true.

Saussure explained that language does not exist outside of human cognition. Rather it is a product of human cognition. Therefore it is subject to the same functions of the human mind; it is a product of the human mind. When we label a concept, we do not simply choose from a list of pre-existing words that are arbitrary and unconnected. Although Saussure (67) emphasized the arbitrary nature of the linguistic representation or *sign*, arbitrariness only applies to the linguistic sounds that make up a word. There is nothing in those sounds that motivates the connection between the word and the concept that it represents. When we label a concept using a word, this process does not occur in a vacuum without relation to all other words or concepts.

The "simple operation" of "linking a name and a thing" is a fallacy because, as Saussure (67-68) pointed out, "both terms involved in the linguistic sign [the signified and the signifier] are psychological and are united in the brain by associative bonds…. The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image". Even without in-depth knowledge of the physical structures of the brain and how they link information, Saussure was aware of the complicated processes involved in applying language to the concepts we wish to express. His key phrase, "associative bonds", is descriptive of the fuzzy process of conceptual connection. There are many different kinds of possible associative bonds in the process of applying labels to our concepts, and there may in fact be so many different underlying associative bonds that we are neither aware of them all, nor could we begin to count them. This was a deeply perceptive choice of words on Saussure's part, because it describes exactly the nature of the brain's structures (cf. Feldman 2006). It seems as though Saussure, through his intensive study of the nature of language, was able to extract a hypothesis about the physical structures of the brain without the physiological evidence that we now have. Whether or not he was aware of this is

unimportant.  Most crucial to this discussion is that his study illuminated the key structures of language, and we know now that the structures he discovered are essentially verbal manifestations that can be likened to the structures of human conceptual systems and of the human brain itself.  Language is a conceptual system like all other human conceptual systems.  It may be the primary human conceptual system.  Language exists as a result of the human brain. Language is not already "out there" in the world.  It is embodied (cf. G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999); it is a product of our brains and its functions mirror the functions of our brains.

Given this fact, it is easy to see how the countless "associative bonds" involved in applying labels to concepts, i.e. using language, can often hinder agreement between two individuals as to the correct label for a concept; these insights can help explain why two individuals may not think of the same conceptual information when presented with a single label. Mutual understanding is often a victim of our virtually limitless "associative bonds".  In 1956, Philosopher W. B. Gallie presented a paper called "Essentially Contested Concepts" at the meeting of the Aristotelian Society in London.  In this paper he examined the problem of disputed meanings of commonly used abstract terms, which we assume are understood in the same way by everyone.  Gallie called these terms "essentially contested concepts", and he demonstrated how a term can be used by two parties whose views on a subject oppose each other in every detail, yet each party claims that its usage of the term is the "correct" one.[3]  Gallie (1956:189) concluded that it is impossible to pin down one "correct" usage, just as much as it is "impossible to find a *general principle* for deciding which of the two contested uses of an essentially contested concept really 'uses it best'"; however, "it may yet be possible to explain or show the rationality of a *given individual's* continued use (or in the more dramatic case of conversion, his *change of use*) of the concept in question".  His concluding argument provides us with two important perspectives that have major ramifications for discussions about gender and gender practices in a given population.  First, the terms that we use to name concepts are based on highly contextually based and fuzzy, associative bonds that mirror the functioning of the brains creating and using them.  Cognitive and neuroscientific research (cf. e.g. Feldman 2006, Narayanan 2009) subsequent to Gallie's paper has demonstrated what Gallie, like Saussure, could only hypothesize about the functioning of the brain through observation and analysis of our language.  Second, the concepts we choose to employ may be validly employed for a variety of purposes—once again pointing to the fuzzy, associative nature of our neural processing—and we can seek to gain a fuller understanding about each use of any term through comprehensive study of its context and the constellations of meaning surrounding the use of the term.

My work intends to do just that.  Having already determined that the concepts of sex and gender are contested concepts—but that for the purposes of my study, I understand the terms to be generally related and overlapping—I will demonstrate how these terms in the Western Christian milieu may have acquired a primary reference to the male-female binary opposition. This is one of the main kinds of gendered language usage.  Gendered language refers to any linguistic reference or inference to one item from this binary pair or to an overt comparison of the two items, as well as to references that challenge these binary categories.  I will examine the proliferation of linguistic expressions that preserve or fragment this binary opposition of gendered language in the German-speaking milieu through an analysis of contemporary modern German.  First, I begin with an overview of the history of the language and gender debate.

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[3] Gallie (171-72, 180) produced a list of seven properties that make a concept contested.

### 1.3 Virginia Woolf: *A Room of One's Own*

In 1928 Virgina Woolf famously declared in her lecture to the Arts Society at Newnham and Girton Colleges that a woman must have a room of her own and a regular income if she is to be able to write fiction (cf. Woolf 1989 [1929]). Woolf's lecture, expanded the following year into what arguably became one of English literature's most famous texts by a woman, was an indictment of hundreds of years of male establishment and its hegemony over language and culture. Woolf meant both literally and figuratively that money and privacy are necessities for a writer. Without these amenities, a person cannot possibly have the time and space to write. But Woolf's room and income also stand as symbols for freedom and choice, two things possible only when an individual's voice can be heard. Without these two physical supports, a person cannot write, and those who cannot write are doomed to silence. Silence is to Woolf the root of all oppression.

Woolf used the symbols of the room and income to re-tell the history of centuries of silent women. Because women were not afforded basic amenities guaranteed to men, their history has not been recorded by their own voices. Women as a group—and especially women writers—Woolf asserted, have no forbears upon which to model and build their current activities because the women who came before them were silent. Woolf said that women were busied with oppressive tasks that subdued any intentions they might have had for revolt against their male oppressors. Herein lies the key to the relationship between language and gender, according to Woolf. Women were held in a balance of bondage that kept them busy and silenced any inklings of dissent. Without an education, and due to the unending responsibilities and physical burdens of bearing and caring for children and the home, women had no time, ability, or energy to state their plight of inequality. Neither could they share their dissatisfaction with other women and rise up against their oppressors. Males had them caught in a bind, ensuring male dominance. Woolf wrote poignantly (1989 [1929]:24):

> I pondered why it was that Mrs. Seton had no money to leave us; and what effect poverty has on the mind; and what effect wealth has on the mind; … and I thought how unpleasant it is to be locked out; and I thought how it is worse perhaps to be locked in; and thinking of the safety and prosperity of the one sex and of the poverty and insecurity of the other and of the effect of tradition and of the lack of tradition upon the mind of a writer, I thought at last it was time to roll up the crumpled skin of the day, … and cast it into the hedge.

Woolf wished to "cast" the sad history of women into a proverbial "hedge"; she wished to discard the circumstances that have kept women locked out of privileges and locked into bondage, in favor of writing a new history that includes women and affords them a choice about their circumstances. Her book was a call to women aspiring to be writers and a call to rejuvenate the works of the few women who wrote great works, in hopes of instigating a new process: filling the silences of women's history, even if those women were only from the elite classes. Woolf wished to give women a voice, a legitimate language with which to speak. Woolf's cry for an equal voice for the female gender was one of the most important precursors to the language and gender debate that accelerated generations later, when Robin Lakoff published

*Language and Woman's Place* (2004 [1975]), first as an article, and finally as a full book (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 2003:1).


## 1.4 Robin Lakoff: *Language and Woman's Place*

Like Virginia Woolf, Robin Lakoff argued in *Language and Women's Place* (2004 [1975]) that language and gender equality are fundamentally intertwined.  Unlike Woolf's clever mixture of fiction and non-fiction in her persuasive essay, R. Lakoff employed linguistic techniques of analysis common to the time period: gathering and examining data about the structure and content of language used by and about the two different genders.  R. Lakoff's method was that of self-introspection; she used her own knowledge of the English language as the corpus of study, rather than a group of individuals or texts.  In her work, she claimed that men and women use language differently—primarily in speech—and that this difference arises from our culture's male dominance.  Some of the linguistic structures she discovered that support her claims include hedges or mitigators (*like, so, kind of*), "empty" adjectives (*divine, charming*), or "inessential qualifiers" (*really happy, so beautiful*), tag questions (*… don't they?*), euphemisms (*lady* instead of *woman*), and "superpolite" forms (2004 [1975]:47-48, 51-52, 78-81).  All of these structures exemplify women's linguistic style, according to R. Lakoff, and all of them serve to keep women subservient to men by rendering them powerless, indecisive, and trite.  She claimed that these structures are cultural inheritances, taught to girls as they become women, and that men learn another kind of direct and powerful language based on the clear, concise rules of efficient conversation, known as Grice's Maxims (93).

While R. Lakoff's work was crucial in initiating an intense debate and linguistic study of the relationship between language and gender, her methods and insights were limited.  First, because she only studied linguistic knowledge in her own head, her results had limited scope.  Whether her ideas were representative of a larger segment of the population was questionable, and she was blind to the assumptions underlying her own judgments.  Although she brought attention to important aspects of linguistic communicative interactions that had not previously been discussed or challenged, she was also hindered by her own personal and often negative experiences as well as stereotyped beliefs about men and women.  Woolf, in contrast, had recognized much earlier the dangers of anger in producing good writing, good language, and good thinking; she wrote of the important of the "androgynous mind", when she wrote (1989 [1929]:98):

> Perhaps a mind that is purely masculine cannot create, any more than a mind that is purely feminine….  Coleridge certainly did not mean, when he said that a great mind is androgynous, that it is a mind that has any special sympathy with women; a mind that takes up their cause or devotes itself to their interpretation.

R. Lakoff's introspection was plagued by oversimplification and overgeneralization in the atmosphere of the 1970s, in which women were burning their bras and declaring men to be their enemies.  R. Lakoff's conclusions relegated individuals into categories that did not always fit.  Clearly, more viewpoints were necessary to gain deeper insights into the dynamics between men and women and their language usage.

In the aftermath of her book's initial reception, R. Lakoff's two basic claims set in motion two schools of thought about language and gender, known as the "*dominance* and *difference* approaches" (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet 2003:1). The *difference* approach, according to Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (1), was based on the notion that "women and men speak differently because of fundamental differences in their relation to their language, perhaps due to different socialization and experiences early on". In contrast, proponents of the *dominance* approach "argued that differences between women's and men's speech arise because of male dominance over women and persist in order to keep women subordinated to men" (2). One of the champions of the *difference* approach was Deborah Tannen in her wildly popular *You Just Don't Understand* (1990), while her contemporary, Julia Penelope, strongly promoted the *dominance* approach in *Speaking Freely: Unlearning the Lies of Our Fathers' Tongues* (1990), an early deployment and critique of cognitive linguistic and metaphor theory.

## 1.5 Julia Penelope: *Speaking Freely: Unlearning the Lies of Our Fathers' Tongues*

A highly skilled theoretical linguist, Julia Penelope tackled the question of language and gender historically, structurally, and cognitively in *Speaking Freely: Unlearning the Lies of Our Fathers' Tongues* (1990). Her masterful book endorses the *dominance* approach found in Robin Lakoff's work. Penelope took an extreme version of belief that men use language to dominate women and keep them in a subordinate position. She wrote that language "circumscribes women's lives" in its institutionalized, prescriptive forms (xiv). Hailing from the viewpoint that natural language changes and that standardized language is artificial, Penelope catalogued how men's linguistic domination can be traced through the last two thousand years in their attempts at preserving artificial language forms that serve their purposes. Although Penelope's work refers specifically to English, the historical development of other Western languages—particularly German and the family of Germanic languages—is similar because of their shared cultural and Christian religious inheritances. The Catholic Church, institutionally unified across Western Europe and beyond, was the primary facilitator of education for hundreds of years; reading, writing, and the structured use of language was the domain of the Church. Therefore, the use and manipulation of languages throughout Western Europe followed similar paths. When standardization and the writing of grammars began approximately 400 years ago, the leaders were men affiliated with the Church, and their purposes were similar (xvii). Penelope (xvii) claimed that this movement of standardization and prescriptivism sought to terminate natural language change and instill in people's minds a belief in one "pure" and correct dialect, "known only to a small, literary elite, a superior dialect that will open the door to wealth, status, and prestige". Those who control language control wealth, and with it, the rest of the population. She claimed that this process continues today in the proliferation of school textbooks that indoctrinate children in the belief of linguistic purity, so that those who control language and wealth—men—might continue to do so indefinitely.

Using developments in cognitive linguistics and metaphor theory of the time (cf. G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]), Penelope (37) detailed two conceptual versions of discourse— or "consensus reality"—suggested in *Language and Women's Place*: women's language and men's language. Women's language she called a "Cosmetic Universe of Discourse", or CUD, which is a women's "dialect" that "signals acceptance of their subordinate status" (xx-xxi). Building on linguistic structures such as hedges and tag questions suggested by R. Lakoff,

Penelope's detailed features found in each part of a language's grammar—phonology, morphology and word choice, syntax, and semantics—as indicative of a CUD. In contrast, men's dialect represents the culturally legitimated practices of a language's standardized usage under patriarchal auspices, which Penelope (xxxv) called a "Patriarchal Universe of Discourse", or PUD. She claimed that a PUD reproduces men's concepts and "coerces us to perceive ourselves as participants in that universe".

Employing the cognitive linguistic framework that G. Lakoff and Johnson used in their foundational work on Metaphor Theory, *Metaphors We Live By* (2003 [1980]), Penelope criticized their study as yet another example of a linguistic methodology masking a PUD. She claimed that the metaphors which G. Lakoff and Johnson suggested are elemental to all human conceptualization are no more than blatant examples of a PUD lie. To indict them, Penelope cited the Conduit Metaphor of communication (Reddy 1979), in which three metaphors (cf. 2.6 for an explanation of the formal notation for metaphor mapping) combine to enable us to conceptualize language (G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]:10):

IDEAS (OR MEANINGS) ARE OBJECTS.
LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS.
COMMUNICATION IS SENDING.

She then merged the result of the conduit metaphor—summarized by the essential metaphors LANGUAGE IS A CONTAINER and LANGUAGE IS A TOOL (for communicating)—with the metaphor LANGUAGE IS A WOMAN (to be controlled by men), to assert that their seminal work on metaphor theory is little more than a male obsession with sticking their penises into things (metaphorical mapping between "language" and "woman" produces WOMAN IS A CONTAINER and WOMAN IS A TOOL), just one more example of men pushing their concepts on everyone (Penelope 1990:39-46).

The implications of *Speaking Freely* are that we should use current cognitive linguistic and metaphor theories against their creators; men have forced male concepts on women to dominate them. Women should reject the male concepts inherent in traditional, standardized language usage and instead create their own female metaphors by creating a new Women's Language. Among the feminists and female language theorists who shared Penelope's point of view are a group of women who have written dictionaries of so-called "women's language", in an attempt to forge alternative languages that represent women's communication and women's concepts (e.g. Daly 1987; Wittig 1971 [1969]). Such dictionaries, along with multiple alternative and futuristic fiction works by other women who adhered to the *dominance* approach in the language and gender debate, sought escape from dominance through new concepts found in new language (cf. Romaine 1999). While their efforts have been admirable and often herculean, their success has been limited; rarely are new languages taken up by more than a handful of galvanized women. Similarly, many of Penelope's critiques of the standard usages of language which unfairly subjugate subordinate groups are exemplary and virtuous; she condemns (149), for example, "agentless passives", which "protect the guilty" and "deny responsibility" for actions done to innocent victims. Despite such meritorious suggestions for "honest" and egalitarian language usage, I suggest that many of Penelope's criticisms of Metaphor Theory are unfounded and suffer from the same blind acceptance of stereotypes about language and gender borne in the introspection of Robin Lakoff. I choose to reject Penelope's

implementation of cognitive linguistic and metaphor theories in my study of gendered language usage.  My study will seek something very different.


## 1.6 Deborah Tannen: *You Just Don't Understand*

In the same year that Julia Penelope's cognitive linguistic critique of male language dominance appeared, Deborah Tannen's *You Just Don't Understand* (1990) became a nearly instant hit.  The early 1990s were an era in which women were benefitting from the second wave of the feminism, which had already stimulated significant improvements in women's rights.  However, absolute equality with men was still only a dream for many women.  It was also a time when self-help psychology became popular, and Tannen's book framed her discussion of language and gender as an attempt to improve communication between men and women in all of their close relationships.  As a sociolinguist and student of Robin Lakoff, Deborah Tannen advanced the *difference* approach to the relationship between language and gender.  Combining work on language and gender, cross-cultural language conflict, and the established field of conversation analysis (e.g. Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson 1974; Tannen 1984, 1989; Zimmerman & West 1975), Tannen (1990:18) suggested that conversational styles between men and women are different as a result of a complex cultural situation in which "boys and girls grow up in what are essentially different cultures, so talk between women and men is cross-cultural communication".  In her take on *difference*, there is nothing wrong with these two styles or with either sex; they are "equally valid" (15).  Apparently underlying her analysis is the context of the feminist battle for equal civil rights with men, as well as the part of the women's movement that idealized and valorized uniquely female qualities (e.g. Daly 1978, 1987); Tannen emphasized that we should avoid ignoring differences between the genders because we wish to find common ground for communication.  As a result, her work is conciliatory in tone, and she suggests that *dominance* does not explain the discrepancies in male and female language usage.   With the end goal of improved communication between the sexes, her work opened a space for the consideration of other causes for language disparities between men and women besides gender alone.


## 1.7 Deborah Cameron: *Feminism and Linguistic Theory* and "Is there any ketchup, Vera?"

Like Tannen, Deborah Cameron recognized in the 1980s that diversity is an important aspect to consider in any inquiry into miscommunication.  However, rather than accept the male-female binary as the locus of difference, D. Cameron subscribed to and helped carve out a postmodern feminist argument in her book, *Feminism and Linguistic Theory* (1992 [1985]), which held that there is no universal feminism but a diversity of standpoints (13).  Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2003:4) call this the "'discourse turn' in language and gender studies" because it rejected fixed and mutable categories and definitions like "male" and "female" and suggested that we construct and reconstruct our identities in multiple ways depending on the context (cf. D. Cameron 1992).

D. Cameron's 1998 article, "Is there any ketchup, Vera?" takes to task Deborah Tannen's interpretation of two popular vignettes from her book, *You Just Don't Understand*.  Rather than buying into either the *difference* (men and women have different linguistic communicative

strategies) or the *dominance* (men always dominate in conversation, while women have passive strategies) theory of gender differences, D. Cameron suggested that the real topic of concern is a "conflict" about the assumptions as to roles, obligations, and positions that each speaker holds in the individual context of any misunderstanding. She suggested, in fact, that in circumstances where more traditional male and female (gendered) roles are accepted by both parties, there may be no misunderstanding at all, whereas in circumstances indicative of social *change* about gender roles—i.e. where there may actually be less male-female gender differentiation—more misunderstanding may occur, especially if the given expectations about gender are interpreted differently by the two parties involved.

These different perspectives point to the notion of gender *performance*, a concept introduced as early as 1959 by Erving Goffman, and taken up by postmodern and poststructuralist gender theorists, such a Judith Butler (1999, 2006 [1990]) and Chris Weedon (1987). D. Cameron's article, "Performing Gender Identity" (2006 [1997]) demonstrates the malleability of gender identities by asking whether men's conversations really are competitive, hierarchical, and consist of "report talk", as contrasted with women's cooperative, egalitarian, "rapport talk" (424). Through conversation analysis of an all-male student conversation, she found that men engage in many stereotypically "feminine" types of conversation and cooperation, indicating that conversation is a joint production. Strikingly, these male students' primary goal is to create group solidarity by "performing" their own gender identity to themselves and each other in an all-male group. This piece underscores D. Cameron's suggestions in the former pieces (428): "gender-stereotyping … causes us to miss or minimize the status-seeking element in women friends' talk, and the connection-making dimension of men's". D. Cameron's work helped bring to the fore the notion that gender is *performative* (cf. e.g. Goffman 1959), asserting that there are no "essential" male or female ways of speaking, but rather different ways of performing gender based on a large range of contextual factors. Similarly, during this performative turn in the gender discourse, it became clear that feminism itself is a contested concept, also dependent on perspective, context, and performance strategies.


## 1.8 Alan Schwartz: *Contested Concepts in Cognitive and Social Sciences*

An important work whose influence was minimal following its completion, but whose ideas have since proven crucial in a number of social science fields, including the cognitive sciences, gender studies, and political science, is Alan Schwartz's senior honors thesis, *Contested Concepts in Cognitive and Social Science* (1992). Using Gallie's notion of "essentially contested concepts" (1956) and major discoveries about the categorization and reasoning strategies of the brain (cf. Berlin & Kay 1969; Kay & Daniel 1978; Rosch 1973, 1975; Armstrong, Gleitman & Gleitman 1983; Rosch et al. 1976; G. Lakoff 1987), Schwartz argued, like D. Cameron, that conflict arises between different groups when they discuss abstract social science concepts, such as *gender* and *feminism*, because of different assumptions about the content of those concepts (cf. 2.2). Also like D. Cameron, he rejected the eighteenth-century Enlightenment paradigm of reason, which assumes that using an innate capacity for reason, we can all reach the ultimate, single truth about any given topic. This traditional paradigm he called—following G. Lakoff (1987)—the *objectivist paradigm* (Schwartz 1992:8). He suggested that the traditional paradigm causes people to mistakenly believe that there is one agreed-upon conceptual meaning for every word, including these abstract social concepts. Instead, the cognitive sciences have discovered

that the brain's actual categorization and reasoning strategies are fuzzy, generalized, and oversimplified, employing knowledge about stereotyped—or *prototypical* (cf. 2.2, 2.3)—"folk models" of a given domain in "clustered idealized cognitive models" (50-55, 3). In other words, distinct categories, made up of "necessary and sufficient features are often inadequate for characterizing the structure of categories" (9).

Schwartz demonstrated the nature of essentially contested concepts with a case study of the concept *feminism* in all of its varied manifestations that arose during the second wave of feminism. He detailed how each sub-type of feminism shares the basic structure of the central concept of feminism, which itself presupposed folk theories adhering to a binary male-female gender construction and patriarchal dominance (50-55). Using this "underspecified" idealized model of feminism, feminist groups supply the gaps or specifications of the general model with other systems of beliefs by mapping knowledge from these domains onto the domain of feminism to label themselves and specify *what kind* of feminists they are (54). Mapping from one domain to another is the central activity of metaphor-making, and it is the central function of human reasoning (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Feldman 2006). Schwartz demonstrated how liberalism maps onto feminism to create liberal feminism, Marxism to create Marxist feminism, radicalism to create radical feminism, bioculturalism to create cultural feminism and ecofeminism, multiculturalism to create Women of Color feminism. Each of these domains of beliefs supply *entailments* (cf. 2.7), or details, to the basic model of feminism, and it is these entailments that cause conflicts and disputes in understanding among "feminists" (58). The key lesson in Schwartz's work is the pivotal importance of a cognitive understanding of concepts in order to define abstract terms for discussions in the social sciences. More importantly, his work can help us to appreciate the fuzzy structure of any abstract concept, such as "gender", and the complex reasoning structures underlying our beliefs about such concepts (cf. 2.2). For this reason, and given the limitations of prior methods to account for such complexities, I choose to continue the language and gender debate using a cognitive and metaphor-based method of linguistic and scientific inquiry.


## 1.9  The Conceptual Relationship between Language and Gender

The power of language can play out in many ways. It can point out our differences and it can be used to dominate. It can also be used to hide differences and to be submissive. Historically, men have been the primary purveyors of language through male institutions, and they have often used language to highlight differences between themselves and women. They have certainly used it at times to control subordinate groups, among them, women. In contrast, some women's groups have masterfully used language to empower themselves, extricate themselves from subjugation, and even celebrate themselves in healthy and healing ways. Yet, neither of these viewpoints about the interplay between language and gender—*dominance* or *difference*—can explain all of the questions surrounding gender issues, nor right all of the perceived wrongs committed in response to beliefs about gender. Virginia Woolf's recommendation of androgyny in writers is also a misguided goal, since no individual can write without his or her own circumstances, set of experiences, and personal biases, many of which are a result of the beliefs about gender that every culture transmits; "no man [or woman] is an island" (John Donne, quoted in Abrams 1993:1123). One of the most powerful aspects of language is its ability to create and destroy concepts, in effect to breathe life into an idea or to

kill an idea.  Language can do this because, as one of the most fundamental human conceptual systems, it enables us to label, express, and share our concepts with others.  But like all conceptual systems, and like the fuzzy categorization strategies in our brains that allow an immeasurable amount of creativity and possibility, language is not precise and finite.  Its greatest advantage may also be its greatest flaw.  For this reason, we need to study debated or contested concepts, like those in the relationship between language and gender, using a methodology that can account for imprecision and infinity, creativity and possibility, institutional standards and individual whims.  I believe that cognitive linguistic and metaphor theories combined with narrative theory can better accommodate the vast and disparate questions arising from this topic because they are informed by a highly interdisciplinary body of research that takes into account the interconnectedness of the human experience.  Interdisciplinary methods have the potential to accomplish more than single theories or methodologies.  Often, a single discipline or even one branch of linguistics alone cannot adequately explain a particular phenomenon because the phenomenon may be viewed through this one lens as separate and disconnected, or the because perspective may simply be unable to account for all of the details.  In contrast, coupled perspectives can often better explain the interlinking functions, such that the phenomenon can be understood as more than the sum of its parts; better explanations have often been reached via the marriage of two or more disciplines or complementary theories.

   In the following chapters I, too, will employ an interdisciplinary approach to linguistic examination, using a cognitive linguistic foundation.  I will show how our cultural and religious heritage is reflected in the predominant metaphors and narratives—most often fossilized in *folk models* (cf. 1.8, 2.3, 2.10) or prototypical *frames* or *scripts* (cf. 2.5, 3.1.4)—that we use daily to think about our identities and our actions, particularly with respect to sex and gender.  These metaphors and narratives are morals we live by, regardless of whether we are religious or not.  We explain to ourselves our daily existence and our interactions with others using these morals as guides for reasoning.  Because gender is such an integral part of identity and moral decision-making, our own gender and our beliefs about gender provide a key part of the "script".  By examining the language we use daily, we can locate details in these "scripts" (cf. 3.1.4) that point to our conceptual beliefs about gender.

# CHAPTER 2

# COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF CULTURE THROUGH LANGUAGE

## 2.1  The Interdisciplinary Advantage to the Cognitive Linguistic View of Metaphor

The cognitive linguistic view of metaphor and the Neural Theory of Language (NTL) have made prominent inroads in the study of human language and cognition since George Lakoff's and Mark Johnson's book, *Metaphors We Live By* (2003 [1980]), which pioneered the framework that we now call the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor (cf. G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980], 1999; Kövecses 2005).  This framework is based on detailed linguistic observation and analysis, as well as recent discoveries about the human brain and its cognitive functioning. Since the time of Aristotle, we have thought of metaphor as purely figurative speech that is used either in poetic language or for artistic purposes.  The new cognitive linguistic framework holds that metaphor is not just literary ornamentation, but the major means by which human beings understand the world.  The first study to reach this conclusion was the study of "The Conduit Metaphor" by Michael Reddy (1979), in which he showed that our everyday concept of human communication is based on an elaborate metaphor, wherein words are metaphorical containers in which we send ideas along a trajectory or path to one another (G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]:10).  Reddy showed through detailed analysis of common metaphors for communication "that the locus of metaphor is thought, not language, that metaphor is a major and indispensable part of our ordinary, conventional way of conceptualizing the world, and that our everyday behavior [including language usage] reflects our metaphorical understanding of experience" (G. Lakoff 1993:204).  Metaphor is one of our most prevalent ways of conceptualizing, and it manifests itself in both literary and everyday language usage because language itself is one of the primary human conceptual systems.  As a result of its key role in conceptualization, metaphor is also central to every other aspect of our lives, from culture and politics, to moral and social values, to scientific and mathematical reasoning (Kövecses 2005:2).

Given the integral relationship between language and human conceptual systems, it is imperative for a clearer understanding of gender concepts—or any other human concepts—that we probe the functioning of the human mind to its fullest, in all of its facets and disparate capacities.  Such an undertaking appears virtually impossible when we consider the vast number of disciplines that have developed in the social sciences alone, each with the intent of elucidating complex aspects of humanity.  No single discipline can explain humanity in its entirety, nor can a single discipline explain the workings of the world or the universe with absolute certitude.  We have countless theories and ever-changing paradigms to account for the inexplicability of everything in existence (cf. Kuhn 1962).  Yet the major strength of the cognitive paradigm is precisely its ability to bridge disciplines and incorporate disparate kinds of evidence.  Cognitive linguistic and metaphor theories are by nature interdisciplinary.  Their origins and orientation are interdisciplinary, incorporating traditional and sociolinguistics (cf. Whorf 1956; R. Lakoff 2004 [1975]), cognitive linguistics and linguistic anthropology (cf. Fauconnier 1985, Langacker 1987; G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980], 1999; Kövecses; Berlin & Kay 1969; Kay & McDaniel 1978; Fillmore 1985), psychology and sociology (cf. Rosch 1973, 1975; Rosch et al. 1976; Goffman

1959, 1974, 1977), mathematics and narrative theory (cf. Zadeh 1965; Propp 1968 [1928]; Herman 2003a, 2003b), philosophy and history (cf. Austin 1962; Bourdieu 1991 [1983]; Foucault 1978), neuroscience and computer modeling (cf. Feldman 2006; Narayanan 2009), and religious and gender studies (cf. Armstrong 1987; Bynam 1992; Lees 1999; Ruether 1998; R. Lakoff 2004 [1975]; Tannen 1990, 1993, 1994; D. Cameron 1992 [1985], 1998a, 1998b, 2006 [1997]; Butler 2006 [1990], 1999). As a result of such a broad foundation, the cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor has the power to integrate the strengths of all of these fields within the study of human language. Such a methodology has the potential to develop a deeper, more complex understanding of our conceptual systems as they enable us to function in all of our activities within and between our disparate cultures. Its breadth can explain humanity and its functioning in the world better than any single discipline, because it enables us to identify and explain the roots of discrepancies and conflicts within ourselves and between peoples or cultures. This methodology can accomplish such an endeavor via language; it helps us understand complex meanings in the language we use to express ourselves and broadens our capacity for comprehension and volitional change. As a result, the multiple related disciplines above can be mutually enriched by the results of cognitive linguistic and metaphor exploration. This chapter will demonstrate the interdisciplinary underpinnings of the theory while laying out the essential framework for a method of cognitive linguistic inquiry that can generate a deeper understanding of human gender concepts.

## 2.2 Foundational Discoveries in Human Cognition

The cognitive linguistic view of metaphor arose out of a number of key discoveries in other fields, as summarized by George Lakoff in his pivotal book, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things* (1987). I will provide a brief overview of the most important discoveries and their ramifications for the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor. These discoveries caused researchers to question the Enlightenment view of human reason, mentioned in Chapter 1 (cf. 1.8), which asserts that the human faculty of reason is independent of the body and can be utilized rationally to discover essential truths about the world around us. Research of linguistic anthropologists Brent Berlin and Paul Kay (1969), Paul Kay and Chad McDaniel (1978), and psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1973, 1975), among others, suggested that the "truths" about the world around us are "truths" only in relation to our own cognition. In other words, our view of the world and the concepts we hold about it stem from our relationship to it, rather than from anything inherent in the way the world "is". We label and categorize aspects of our surroundings as a result of the way we interact with them, given the bodies we have and the particular manners with which those bodies can interact with the world.

For example, Berlin and Kay (1969) studied the way different languages across the world name and delineate between colors within the color spectrum. They discovered that, regardless of the language and its unique view of color gradations, speakers around the world use "basic color terms" for "*categories,* whose central members are the same universally" (G. Lakoff 1987:25).[4] In other words, the names represent "focal colors", and speakers in every language chose the same focal colors when asked to give the best example of a given color category (24-

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[4] G. Lakoff (31) states that the original notion of basic-level categories comes from Roger Brown's 1958 essay, "How Shall a Thing Be Called?" and his 1965 textbook, *Social Psychology*.

26).  Kay and McDaniel (1978) provided neurophysiological evidence about how the human eye perceives light, supporting and expounding on the earlier findings about focal colors.  They discovered that "focal colors are neurophysiologically most salient" to the human eye; focal colors across languages and cultures are all represented by colors of the same wavelength (Schwartz 1992:9).  In other words, color concepts are "not objectively 'out there in the world' independent of any beings", but are "partly determined by human biology" (G. Lakoff 1987:29).  Our so-called "truths" about the external world are at least partly relative to our biological functions, and thus, to our functional needs.

Berlin further challenged the prevailing notion that the "categories of the mind fit the categories of the world" and reinforced the evidence that the categories of the world are our human inventions resulting from the way we function in the world (G. Lakoff 1987:29).  According to G. Lakoff (1987:46), his and other researchers' work on the classifications of Tzeltal speakers in Mexico (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven 1974; Hunn 1977; Stross 1969), along with other studies (Hunn 1975; Rosch et al. 1976), found that the categories we most frequently use exhibit common characteristics that allow for maximum functionality.  These characteristics are known as *basic-level effects*.  In short, *basic-level effects* allow for ease and speed of perception, function ("general motor program") communication, and knowledge organization (G. Lakoff 1987:47).[5]  These basic aspects can be summarized under the theory of *gestalt perception*, which is the "perception of overall part-whole configuration", such that we know how to interact with given parts, and this knowledge influences how we determine "what motor programs we can use to interact with [a whole] object" (47).  The bodily basis for categorization of physical objects is transferred to the abstract level, as well, as suggested by Tversky and Hemmenway (1984) in their discussion of *event structures* (cf. 2.8, 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7).  G. Lakoff and Johnson also demonstrate the bodily motivation for abstract conceptual constructions in their pivotal work, *Metaphors We Live By* (2003 [1980]), detailing countless metaphors in our daily speech that are based on knowledge we have about physical properties, functions, and our own physical interactions with objects.

In her famous work on prototype theory, psychologist Eleanor Rosch (1973, 1975) expanded on the notion that our categories and concepts about the world have a bodily—or physical—basis and suggested that this basis engenders *prototype effects*.  Just as focal colors represent the best examples of a given color category according to Berlin and Kay, Rosch found

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[5] I cite G. Lakoff's list of complete features of the basic level (46):
-The highest level at which category members have similarly perceived overall shapes.
-The highest level at which a single mental image can reflect the entire category.
-The highest level at which a person uses similar motor actions for interacting with category members.
-The level at which subjects are fastest at identifying category members.
-The level with the most commonly used labels for category members.
-The first level named and understood by children.
-The first level to enter the lexicon of a language.
-The level with the shortest primary lexemes.
-The level at which terms are used in neutral contexts.  For example, *There's a dog on the porch* can be used in a neutral context, whereas special contexts are needed for *There's a mammal on the porch* or *There's a wire-haired terrier on the porch.*
-The level at which most of our knowledge is organized.

that other categories are based on *best-fit* membership conditions in which some elements of a category are judged to be better examples of the category than others. This evidence further contradicts the classical objectivist paradigm, mentioned above (cf. 1.8), which holds that category membership is based on necessary and sufficient conditions and implies that no member should be a better example of a category than any other. Instead, category structure is based on *degrees of membership*, meaning that many categories are not distinct, but have graded or "fuzzy boundaries" (G. Lakoff 1987:56). The degree of membership in a category is the result of individual "goodness-of-example judgments", or "judgments of the degree of prototypicality" (56, 44). *Prototypes* of a category are cognitively the most *salient* members of a category, and G. Lakoff (45) refers to them as *cognitive reference points* because they aid in efficient usage. Less prototypical members of a category are motivated by the central member, and they radiate from, or are motivated by, the relationship to the central member (65). For this reason, cognitive theorists refer to such categories of the mind as *radial categories*; they are not categories with firm boundaries (65). The less prototypical members of a category are variations on the central member, and they demonstrate varying degrees of membership in a category. These typical properties of human categorization are referred to as *prototype effects*. Prototype effects of this sort do not create categories, but their existence explains many of our generalizations that lead us to construct the kinds of categories we construct, which are not predictable by the classical theory of category membership.

## 2.3 Prototypical Radial Category

The following seven radial categories have been discovered by way of detailed studies of the English language and cultural models in the West. According to G. Lakoff, these category types are generic, archetypal (or prototypical) categories or *frames* (cf. 2.5, 2.6) that can be applied to almost any context in Western experience. Providing the structure of common *folk models* (cf. 2.5, 2.10, 4.1.5), they are idealized, culturally shared, and used prolifically within a culture. They help produce the *coherence* (cf. 2.11) within Western cultural models. G. Lakoff defines these prototypical radial categories (2002:9-10):

1. The **central subcategory** of a radial category: This provides the basis for extending the category in new ways and for defining variations.
2. A **typical case** prototype: This characterizes typical cases and is used to draw inferences about category members as a whole, unless it is made clear that we are operating with a nontypical case.
3. An **ideal case** prototype: This defines a standard against which other subcategories are measured. [This category can also be called a *paragon* (G. Lakoff 1987:87-88).]
4. An **anti-ideal** **prototype**: This subcategory exemplifies the worst kind of subcategory, a "demon" subcategory. It defines a negative standard.
5. A **social stereotype***:* This is a model, widespread in a culture, for making snap judgments—judgments without reflective thought—about an entire category, by virtue of suggesting that the stereotype is the typical case.
6. A **salient exemplar***:* A single memorable example that is commonly used in making probability judgments or in drawing conclusions about what is typical of category members.

7. An *essential* **prototype**: This is a hypothesized collection of properties that, according to a commonplace folk theory, characterizes what makes a thing the kind of thing it is, or what makes a person the kind of person he is.

The analysis that follows in later chapters will refer back to these radial categories—often found in the form of folk models and similar cultural conventions—as a cornerstone of the complex metaphor structures we use culturally to talk about women and men in the West.


## 2.4  From Cognitive Evidence to Neural Evidence: Embodiment

Prototype effects help to explain much about our strategies for reasoning, including the ability to create new categories spontaneously (cf. Barsalou 1983).  Prototype effects are a result of the need for quick, efficient judgments about new information; those judgments affect how we interact with new information, whether it be an object with concrete, physical properties or an abstract idea.  We implement prototypes when we make quick assessments in order to understand the world around us with regards to how it will affect us and how we will react to it.  Like prototype effects, basic-level effects are also the result of a need for efficient interaction with the world around us.  The gestalt perceptions that we use to determine our interactions with things are efficient, interworking "clusters" of "interactional properties, … and prototype and basic-level structure can reflect such clusterings" (G. Lakoff 1987:51).  These clusters of properties are not properties that are inherent to that thing but inherent to the way we interact with that thing.  These major discoveries point to the fact that human conceptual systems are *embodied* (cf. G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980], 1999; G. Lakoff 1987, 1993, 2002, 2008a, 2008b).

More recent discoveries about human brain structures substantiate and reinforce the evidence about the categorization strategies described above.  As we now know, physical brain function is analogous to the category structures and connections described above; Feldman (2006:38, emphasis in original) critically notes, "*mental structure parallels active neural structure*".  Our brains "are made up of some 100 billion neurons, each connected, on average to thousands of other neurons.  This comes to some 100 trillion connections…. Neural computation involves *continuously finding a best match* between the inputs and current brain state, including our goals" (5, emphasis in original).  Our neural circuits are connections of these neurons via synapses, where the axon of one neuron sends information to the dendrite of another (51).  The sending of this information is called *firing*, and it can occur at speeds of single milliseconds (55).  We refer to firing as *activation*, and "neurons are useful only when they work together in networks or circuits" (59).  Neurons are meaningless alone, but in networked groups they enable the crucial transfer of information.  These clusters of connections or circuits form neuronal groups called *nodes* (G. Lakoff 2008a:18).  G. Lakoff explains that, "since each neuron can have between 1,000 and 10,000 neural connections, nodes can 'overlap'.  That is, the same neuron can be functioning in different neuronal groups…. The firing of that neuron contributes to the activation of each node it is functioning in" (18).  Some neuronal groups are connected to other neuronal groups in such a way that only one or another of the groups can fire at a time.  This is known as *mutual inhibition*, "and it occurs, for example, when there are two inconsistent, but equally available, ways of looking at a situation" (19).

Let me provide a rough example that enables us to see how this works and to observe the similarities between brain structure function and our categorization strategies. Overlapping neuronal connections are mirrored by our ability to classify a single item into many different categories, depending on the particular attributes most salient for a given purpose. If we are looking at furniture for the purpose of sitting, we will look for all kinds of chairs, as opposed to tables. Certain neurons fire and activate certain circuits, just as certain features are most salient in the classification of an item into a certain category. Aspects about chairs that make them apt for sitting will be most important to us. However, the item may also fit into another category if we consider different features most salient for a different purpose. If we are trying to find furniture that aesthetically matches the interior design of a room, there will certainly be some chairs that we may have considered in the first instance, but that we would now unconsciously overlook, simply because they are not the right color, style, etc. In this case, different neurons fire to activate different circuits, inhibiting the first group of neurons from firing. This variability within the activation of brain structures is mirrored by the variability in our classification systems and our capacity for creativity (cf. 2.10, 2.11). Mutual inhibition is one of the important neural processes that engenders contested concepts (cf. 1.8) and conflicting moral worldviews (cf. 4.1, 4.1.5, 4.1.6, 4.2, 4.2.1).

Finally, of great importance for learning and the building of concepts in the brain are the processes of *spreading activation* and *neural binding*. Spreading activation, or *coactivation,* is the mutual activation of at least two neuronal groups at the same time (G. Lakoff 2008a:19). The more often these nodes are simultaneously activated, the more the synaptic connection between them is strengthened. This process is known as *Hebbian learning*, and is often referred to with the catchy phrase, "neurons that fire together wire together" (cf. G. Lakoff 2008a:19; Feldman 2006:79-80). *Neural binding* is a similar process on a larger scale, involved in blending and creating complex metaphors. It "is responsible for two or more different conceptual or perceptual entities being considered a single entity", such that two different attributes of an individual thing are perceived to be connected and function together as the instantiation of that thing (G. Lakoff 2008a:20). Neural binding is the basis for gestalt perceptions (cf. 2.2), which use clusters of functional properties. Neural binding is what causes us to see all of the different aspects that make up a chair as one complete object in the form that we call 'chair'. Since the chemical and physical connections in the brain provide the basis for our thinking, it is no wonder that our conceptual structures mimic our brain structures in the way they work. They allow for countless different manifestations of connections to achieve specific purposes, and they are malleable, with "fuzzy" borders, for adaptability. This strategy is functional for the healthy operation and preservation of the human body.


## 2.5 Categories as Frames and Schemas

The previous sections of this chapter explained how humans categorize using generalization strategies that generate prototype and basic-level effects. Using these categorization strategies we generate *frames*, *schemas* or *X-schemas*, and *image-schemas* (cf. G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999; Kövecses 2005; Feldman 2006), which were originally called *Idealized Cognitive Models*, or *ICM*s (G. Lakoff 1987). *Frames* and *schemas* of all types are easy-access models of our conceptual categories, which rely on prototypical characteristics and engender central, best-fit examples as model members of each category; they often become crystallized in

shared cultural *folk models* that are used constantly as quick-reference models for making judgments (cf. 2.3).[6]  In cognitive linguistics and neuroscience, *frames* refer to knowledge structures that involve conventionalized roles within those frames and the relationships between the roles (cf. Feldman 2006:10, 135; Kövecses 2005:254, 271).  Like any other aspect of cognition, knowledge about frames stems from bodily experience.  *Schemas* or *X-schemas*, also known as *executing schemas*, refer to the physical programs necessary to execute a basic physical function or task (Feldman 2006:227-29).[7]  X-schemas incorporate *parameters*, which "code the limited range of variability" within a given program (229).  *Image schemas* also deal with bodily motor programs, but they specifically deal with the "conceptualization of physical space and its use in organizing other domains" (136).  Image schemas are the visual images in our minds that help us organize our experiences of physical relationships.  Among the major types of image schemas arguably common to all languages are *topological, orientational*, and *force-dynamic* image schemas (cf. Feldman 2006; Talmy 1988).

An example as to how these image schemas are coded into languages are prepositions, which indicate directionality and location; we can place a cup 'on' a table or walk 'between' two buildings.  We have visual images in our minds that help us understand what 'placing on' and 'walking between' mean.  Prepositions are linguistic manifestations of basic X-schemas.  These schemas structure all of our important purposes dealing with time and space, and they are the basis for all of our abstract concepts into which notions of time and space are coded.  In synthesis, these basic frames, X-schemas, and image schemas structure all of our thought because "thought is physical.  Ideas and the concepts that make them up are physically 'computed' by brain structures" (G. Lakoff 2008a:18).  X-schemas and image schemas in the brain consist of neural bindings, in which certain circuits have "wired together" through repeated firing patterns to create gestalt features (cf. 2.2, 2.4) for motor programs.  It is from knowledge about these concrete experiences that we derive abstract knowledge.


## 2.6  From Frames, X-Schemas, and Image Schemas to Metaphor

Zoltán Kövecses (2005:18) critically notes that all of these schemas are a result of "recurring bodily experiences that get a structure through constant repetition…. [They] are extremely basic experiences that are commonly used in metaphorical thought".  G. Lakoff and Johnson explain that these structures are used in metaphorical thought via *mapping* from a *source domain* to a *target domain* (cf. G. Lakoff 2008a:24, G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980], 1999).  Our basic categorization strategies, detailed above, involve relating new information (the *target domain*) to old information (the *source domain*), and we simply make these connections via best-fit (not perfect or exact) matches (cf. 2.2).  *Best-fit mapping* entails that not all information from an old domain of knowledge (the source domain) must fit perfectly or exactly with all of the information from a new domain (the target domain).  Instead, best-fit conditions necessitate fuzzy borders, but they allow us to make sense of information that is novel or that

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[6] The term "schema" stems from Langacker (1987).  He employed it in a similar way.
[7] Feldman (135-38) provides a clear explanation of the relationships among *schemas, motor schemas, conceptual schemas,* and *X-schemas* in Chapter 11.  They are all essentially the same, referring to the motor programs required to execute certain functions.  They are arguably universal, based on the composition of the human body, shared by the whole species.

varies from information we have previously encountered. This is the basis of what happens in a metaphor. G. Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]:5) originally defined metaphor as "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another", and this definition still holds. When we use metaphor, we understand a target domain in terms of a source domain; we map information from the source domain to the target domain in order to make inferences about unknown information in the target domain. Because our primary knowledge can stem from nowhere else than bodily experience—"experientially grounded mapping" from X-schemas, image schemas, and frames—we must use our bodily knowledge to understand all other kinds of experiences through metaphorical mapping (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:47).

The standard, formal linguistic notation for metaphors is simple but expresses the relationship between the source and target domains, indicating that the target domain is understood in terms of the source domain. The notation consists of a name for the target domain, followed by the capitalized copulative *Is* or *Are*, followed by the name for the source domain, as in INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS (58). Metaphor is crucially different from simile (cf. Glucksberg 2008). It is more than a simple comparison in which one thing is "like" another, yet not that other thing. Metaphor involves much more complex neural strategies, in which we actually do experience one thing "as" (if it were) something else. Metaphor is therefore not a simple comparison, although comparison can be part of the metaphoric use. Metaphor goes one step further than simile, so to speak: metaphor involves categorization of one thing with another thing (Glucksberg 2008:80). For this reason, the notation utilizes the copulative, rather than the copulative + 'like'. This notation expresses the intimate connection of category membership. *Conceptual metaphor* enables us to categorize and thereby understand the world with continuity. It creates permanent neural maps within the brain that structure all thought, "recruit[ing] sensory-motor inference for use in abstract thought" (G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]:256). These fundamental neural maps enable our existence and adaptability as a species. The most fundamental mappings—which are arguably universal because they stem directly from physical experience that we all share as humans—are called *primary metaphors*.


## 2.7  Primary Metaphors

*Primary metaphors* are metaphors "that are directly grounded in the everyday experience that links our sensory-motor experience to the domain of our subjective judgments" (G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]:255).[8] Primary metaphors come from our physical experiences. They are the foundational concepts we use to understand new information because they utilize our most basic, repeated experiences, characterized by frames, X-schemas, and image schemas. According to G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999) the "integrated theory of primary metaphor" includes four parts. The first is the "theory of conflation", which involves the learning stage of children when they are unable to distinguish between sensorimotor and nonsensorimotor experiences that occur simultaneously (46). This is a crucial period of development of the primary metaphors we all use. For instance, the primary metaphor INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS

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[8] Their list of representative primary metaphors includes, among others (50-4): *Happy Is Up, More Is Up, Affection Is Warmth, Intimacy Is Closeness, Difficulties Are Burdens, Time Is Motion, Change Is Motion, Purposes Are Destinations, Causes Are Physical Forces, Knowing Is Seeing, Seeing Is Touching, Understanding Is Grasping*

comes from the connections we make between physical and emotional closeness. We associate and *conflate* the two through experiences we have at the earliest stages of life; as infants we feel safe and happy when we are physically close to our parents. We therefore conflate intimacy—emotional connection—with physical connection. We utilize knowledge of our physical interactions to understand non-physical interactions by transferring details from the physical domain to the non-physical domain. A later stage involves *differentiation*, "during which domains that were previously coactive are differentiated into metaphorical sources and targets" (49).

The second part of the theory explains that "each primary metaphor has a minimal structure and arises naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by means of conflation, during which cross-domain associations are formed" (46). This means that primary metaphors are necessary and unavoidable for us to think and reason. We also use them unconsciously and constantly. The infant cannot avoid associating the emotional with the physical closeness, providing the associative groundwork for the primary metaphor INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS, because this is the way the brain automatically organizes input. When the child feels intimacy from the parent, it is also close to the parent, and the brain automatically "computes" this connection. The neurophysical aspect of primary metaphors is explained by the third part of the theory: "the 'associations' made during the period of conflation are realized neurally in simultaneous activations that result in permanent neural connections being made across the neural networks that define conceptual domains. These connections form the anatomical basis of source-to-target activations that constitute metaphorical entailments" (46-47). *Entailments* are the inevitable additional consequences that result from coactivation (cf. 2.4). They allow us to make additional inferences about a target domain, given what we know about the source domain (47). In other words, entailments preserve the inference structure of the source domain in the target domain. Both of these parts of the theory point to the *systematicity* of conceptual metaphor (cf. G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980], 1999; L. Cameron 2008; Feldman 2006). Information from a source domain is not transferred to a target domain erratically and unpredictably, but rather consistently and completely, preserving crucial structures inherent in the source domain. Metaphorical mapping occurs systematically, coherently, and unidirectionally from physical sources to ever more abstract target domains.

The final part of the integrated theory of primary metaphor indicates how primary metaphors are utilized in complex ways, providing the basis for *complex metaphors*: "distinct conceptual domains can be coactivated, and under certain conditions connections across the domains can be formed, leading to new inferences. Such 'conceptual blends' may be either conventional or wholly original" (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:47). This is how we use primary metaphors to create complex metaphors; primary metaphors can be combined to create ever more complex and abstract metaphors. They are the permanent building blocks for all of our conceptual processes (G. Lakoff & Johnson 2003 [1980]: 256). This part of the theory helps explain the further stages in the process of the infant's development of the primary metaphor. At the early stage, the infant does not have the complex activation structures to express INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS in words. The constant, unavoidable repetitions of the conflated experience strengthen the neural pathways through Hebbian learning, allowing the child as it grows to build complex structures with entailments and to link other pathways, such as those involving language use. An adult who has developed much more complex conceptual structures can verbalize this basic concept in language because the brain structures recruited via neural binding have integrated a much more complex mental map.

G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999:57, my emphasis) importantly note that "not all conceptual metaphors are manifested in the *words* of a language.  Some are manifested in grammar, others in gesture, art, or ritual.  These nonlinguistic metaphors may, however, be secondarily expressed through language and other symbolic means", underscoring the capacity to derive abstract concepts from originally concrete concepts.  In the following sections, I will discuss the processes of creating *complex metaphors*, *conventionalized metaphors*, *novel metaphors*, and *multiple metaphors* for a single concept.  All of these metaphors derive from primary metaphors, and all of them bring us closer to the purposes of metaphor in this study on language and gender.  These secondary types of metaphors lead us from the universality of primary metaphors to the cultural manifestations of metaphorical thought and reasoning.

## 2.8  Primary to Complex, Concrete to Abstract: the Example of *Causation*

One of our major abstract concepts, stemming directly from physical experience and having ramifications for virtually all other human concepts in myriad ways, is *causation*.  *Causation* is a complex concept, consisting of a number of primary metaphors connected through coactivation.  Its prototypical form "is understood in terms of a cluster of interactional properties" including an *agent*, a *patient*, a *transfer of energy*, and a *time frame* within which the transfer takes place (G. Lakoff 1987:54-55).  The agent is the *energy source* who "wills his action", using "his hands, body, or some instrument" to make physical contact with and *transfer energy* to the *patient,* who undergoes a change that is afterwards "perceptible" (54-55). In other words, causation is understood at the most basic level through experience from our own bodies interacting with the world around us.  All other instances in which we perceive causation are understood in relation to this basic-level functional gestalt (cf. 2.2, 2.4) of causation as "direct manipulation" (70).

The central metaphor of causation is the primary metaphor CAUSES ARE FORCES, which is "metaphorically based on our embodied use of force in everyday life" and is "learned automatically and subconsciously in early childhood" (Feldman 2006:203).   We apply force to objects in order to manipulate them.  Therefore, we conceptualize ourselves in the role of the agent.  Other primary metaphors underlying causation involve the other roles involved in this functional gestalt (cf. 2.2, 2.4).  Because the application of force usually causes a change in the location of the object being manipulated, we perceive two different locations as different, mutually exclusive states.  The underlying primary metaphor is STATES ARE LOCATIONS (205).  Because these two states are mutually exclusive, they cannot co-occur, such that the passing of time is inherent in the concept.  The primary metaphors underlying this portion of the concept are CHANGE IS MOTION, ACTION IS MOTION, and TIME IS MOTION (205-6).  While there are many more entailments and varieties of causation, these few coactivated primary metaphors show us how one universal physical experience is made up of a complex cluster of individual parts that work together as a single gestalt for functional purposes, and underlying each part is a primary metaphor that can be combined with other primary metaphors in countless ways to enable creation of all kinds of related abstract concepts with different entailments.

Significantly, *events* or *event structures* (cf. 3.2, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7) are based upon the concept of causation.  Feldman (129) writes that "both children and adults do assume that events have causes".  Studies on how children learn about the world "suggest that children need to postulate external entities to act as the bearers of causation" (129).  They means that they believe all things

have causes initiated by entities of some sort.  These findings are evidence for the theory that causation is a universal human concept, playing a role in our perception of everything we do and the way we comprehend the world around us.  Our lives unfold over time and consist of events that involve many different actors, including ourselves.  Because time and actors are involved, we perceive all things that happen as resultant from actions of those actors upon other actors.  Therefore, causation is built into our understanding of every event.  Feldman (130) describes this state of affairs, writing, "In general, thinking in terms of causes provides a basis for reasoning and acting in the world, which inherently requires us to postulate the existence of entities in the world…. The key idea is that our minds partition the world into entities in a way that enables us to make predictions about what we experience.  This has profound implications for how language is learned".  By breaking down the building blocks of causation into its basic parts, we discover three major ramifications: 1. We have created the categories of the world for our own purposes of efficient comprehension and use.  Thus, the classical view of categories (cf. 1.7, 1.8, 2.2) and taxonomies pre-existing in the world is incorrect; 2. Events structures are based on causation and its entailments, suggesting that narratives—relationships of different actors upon each other over time—are crucial for our comprehension of the world and our place in it. *Narrative structures* are fundamentally built on causative structures, and narratives are indispensable tools for thinking and acting in the world (cf. Chapter 3 for further discussion); 3. Human language structures are functional conceptual structures that enable us to think and communicate about what we perceive.  If causation is fundamental to all conceptualization, causation must also underlie linguistic structures.

Causation is, in fact, a major building block of metaphorical usage in human language.  Found in all languages ever studied, according to Feldman (2006:205), the concept of causation may also best demonstrate the parallels between general human conceptual systems and language as a conceptual system.  G. Lakoff (1987:55) notes that "The concept of causation—prototypical causation—is one of the most fundamental of human concepts.  It is a concept that people around the world use in thought … spontaneously, automatically, effortlessly, and often.  Such concepts are usually coded right into the grammar of languages—either via grammatical constructions or grammatical morphemes".  We can observe countless examples of this fact.  Our most common verbs, such as 'making' and 'doing', and all verbs of motion convey causation, "but each verb has a different logic, and each carries over to metaphorical uses" (Feldman 2006:204).  G. Lakoff and Johnson discuss two different syntactic valence structures for the word 'cause' in their work *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999:200): causation as forced movement and causation as a transfer of effect.  While both structures demonstrate causation metaphors, they demonstrate different combinations of metaphors, which implement causation for different purposes.  We could examine both English and other languages for a wide array of additional examples.  Crucial here is that the categories of our languages mirror our categories of mind, demonstrating how language itself is simply another manifestation of human conceptual systems, rather than a separate apparatus in the human brain.

## 2.9  Language and Metaphor as Central to Conceptualization

The discoveries about human conceptual systems detailed above (i.e. prototype and basic-level effects, clusters of interactional properties and gestalt perception, embodiment, and the coding of basic universal concepts such as *causation* into the grammar of language) provide a

wealth of information about how we name and label things and how we divide up the world around us for functional, interactional purposes, given the kinds of bodies and needs humans have. These interactional needs encompass both the concrete or physical and the abstract, as we have begun to see through the example of prototypical causation and language usage. Understanding this bodily basis is the key to understanding how metaphor works and why it is elemental in human conceptual systems, rather than just a product of traditional poetic language. Because our language is integrally connected to our conceptual systems—as can be seen in the naming of categories alone—language itself is a reflection of our conceptual systems. In fact, G. Lakoff (1987:57) demonstrates how prototype effects can be found in all aspects of the grammar of language, revealing how "linguistic structure makes use of general cognitive apparatus, such as category structure. Linguistic categories are kinds of cognitive categories".[9] Language is the quintessential human conceptual system, enabling us to communicate our concepts. In other words, language is not only a symptom of thought, it also only engenders thought. Language is like a window into our minds; it can tell us much more about our thought processes and beliefs, but we must understand the pervasive function of metaphor in language in order to draw accurate inferences about those thoughts and beliefs. The next sections of this chapter will explain how reasoning with conventional metaphors works.


## 2.10  Metaphor and Culture: Conventionalization

Complex metaphors "are built out of primary metaphors plus forms of commonplace knowledge: cultural models, folk theories, or simply knowledge or beliefs that are widely accepted in a culture" (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:60; cf. 4.1.5). This is known as *conceptual blending* (60). Any complex metaphor can be broken down into these parts. To analyze a complex metaphor, we must identify which primary metaphor(s) are involved, identify the metaphors involved in the commonplace knowledge—or folk models (cf. 2.3, 2.5, 4.1.5)—and list the entailments of all metaphors to understand the inference structures between the source and target domains. These are the consequences of conceptualizing one thing in terms of another. The consequences, or entailments, are the direct result of reasoning in terms of the particular source domain. They cause us to understand the target domain in the particular way that we do. Like primary metaphors, complex metaphors can also be used "in a systematic way to understand new extended metaphors automatically and without conscious reflection" (66). Complex metaphors allow for efficient comprehension and communication between people who share the same complex metaphors, for example, people within a single culture. However, complex metaphors may be different in different cultures because they combine primary metaphors in different ways. This leads us to the notion of *conventionalized metaphors*.

*Conventionalized metaphors* result directly from a discourse community for the purpose of efficient communication. Lynne Cameron (2008:202) defines conventionalization as "a dynamic process that takes place within the talk of a discourse community and from which emerges a metaphor that can act as common currency in future talk". Conventionalization is one of the major processes that define a group of people as participating in a shared culture. While numerous sociologists have attempted to define and redefine culture, Zoltán Kövecses (2005:1)

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[9] G. Lakoff (58-67) demonstrates a number of prototype effects in the linguistic categories of semantics, pragmatics, phonology, morphology, and syntax.

best summarizes the notion of culture in *Metaphor in Culture. Universality and Variation* as "a set of shared understandings that characterize smaller or larger groups of people". His definition is particularly apt for a study on concepts and linguistic usage because it stresses the word "understanding". When we understand something, we hold a concept about it in our minds. Lack of understanding is a lack of the concept under discussion. Therefore, shared understandings are shared concepts. Kövecses (1) clarifies that such shared understandings are "in connection with all of these 'things'"—by which he means "objects, artifacts, institutions, practices, actions, and so on"—demonstrating both the physical, or concrete, and the abstract, which are all integrally connected within a culture. As a result of concrete and abstract conventions, cultures also share ways of communicating ideas in language. All such shared understandings are made possible through metaphor—specifically through conventionalized metaphor. Conventionalized metaphors are agreed-upon ways of combining primary metaphors, enabling a culture to function smoothly, given its particular circumstances and needs. Conventionalized metaphors manifest themselves in the language used by a culture.

Kövecses stresses the cultural aspect of metaphor in all human reasoning, since all of us are rooted in at least one culture. Conventionalized metaphors have major ramifications for our perceptions about the world. Depending on the way our culture uses metaphor, we too will have developed metaphorical structures, and we depend on them for our daily functioning and reasoning. The basic needs of a culture can be identified through the language by extracting the *meaning foci* in each conceptual metaphor of that culture (11). *Meaning foci* are "predetermined conceptual materials" which "each source domain contributes … to the range of target domains to which it applies. This conceptual material is agreed upon by a community of speakers and represents extremely basic and central knowledge about the source" (11). Meaning foci are prototypes of cultural knowledge, crystallized in radial categories (cf. 2.2, 2.3), each of which consists of a prototypical, best-fit central member that "motivates" the other related members that accordingly "radiate" out from the central example with a greater or lesser degree of category membership (G. Lakoff 1987:65). Meaning foci located in radial categories exemplify the central examples of the knowledge shared by a community. However, the variations or "subcategories" of a radial category "are conventionalized [within a culture] and have to be learned"; they "cannot be predicted by general rules" (84). We must study such radial categories within the context of a culture, extracting from the language the metaphors and meaning foci available in that culture, in order to understand the relationships among category members. By deriving prototypes of cultural knowledge and their underlying metaphorical mappings, we can discover more about the culture's purposes and beliefs, drawing inferences through linguistic instantiations of their concepts. One specific example of conventionalized linguistic metaphors in a culture is the *metaphorical idiom*, which "comes with a conventional mental image and knowledge about that image" (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:68). Metaphorical idioms are often found in constellations of words and collocations (cf. 3.4), and they point to conventionalized radial categories, often in the form of folk models. Idioms within a particular milieu express very important information about the level of conventionalization and coherence of a topic within a culture. Idioms can often provide information about some of the most coherent aspects of a culture's conceptual beliefs.

### 2.11  Cultural Coherence, Novel Metaphors, and Aptness

*Cultural coherence* is a matter of degrees (Kövecses 2005:13).  This means that metaphors vary, even within a single culture (13).  In his book, Kövecses seeks to answer questions about the causes of metaphor variation and metaphorical conflict within cultures by studying the metaphorical language.  My study, too, will rely on a comparison and contrast of the apparent metaphorical idioms and metaphorical variation within my population of language consultants.  The kinds of metaphors that indicate variation and point to the degree of cultural coherence are those referred to as *novel* or *deliberate metaphors* (cf. G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999; L. Cameron 2008; Feldman 2006).  *Novel metaphors* are unconventional metaphors that stem from a conventional mapping in a systematic way by extending new inference patterns between a source and target domain (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:66-67).  Novel metaphors indicate a change in the cultural convention, although many of these changes are slight and founded upon unconventional combinations of conventional knowledge.  They can provide both a deeper understanding of the degree of cultural coherence about a topic as well as suggest a potential for cultural change and creativity within an accepted system of beliefs.

Another phenomenon that points to degree of cultural coherence and cultural as well as individual variation is the existence of *multiple metaphors* for a single concept (cf. *Strict Father* and *Nurturant Parent* models of *morality*, 4.1.5, 4.1.6).  G. Lakoff and Johnson (1999:70) write that "abstract concepts are typically structured by more than one conventional metaphor", because abstract concepts arise from a number of different concrete experiences and combine them in complex ways.  G. Lakoff and Johnson illustrate this process using the concept of love, which is a complex and abstract concept that entails all kinds of varied experiences and could not possibly be conceptualized in a simple way (1999:71):

> Each mapping is rather limited: a small conceptual structure in a source domain mapped onto an equally small conceptual structure in the target domain.  For a rich and important domain of experience like love, a single conceptual mapping does not do the job of allowing us to reason and talk about the experience of love as a whole.  More than one metaphorical mapping is needed.

In other words, we reason by *cross-domain conceptual mapping*, another way of describing mapping from source domains to target domains.  But because we must be able to reason about many different kinds of new information that are involved with making judgments about love, we must have recourse to many different kinds of old information from which to draw our assessments about the new information.  The end product is greater than the sum of its parts; a complex of multiple metaphors is not simply an additive process in a concept like love.  Love is its own unique concept, critically mapped to many other concepts that are unique in their own rights.  This is why the persistent use of metaphor for thinking and reasoning is so much more powerful than the use of simple comparisons, as when we use similes.  Metaphors fuse and unify experiences, creating something unique from the original input.  We can also focus on or emphasize different aspects of love by choosing which among the particular metaphors underlying the concept of love we wish to highlight.  Such focus or highlighting also demonstrates that love itself is, in fact, viewed differently in different cultures, and those differences owe themselves to different metaphorical underpinnings and combinations.  Therefore, we may not understand someone else's concept of love or why a person reasons a

particular way about matters of love; he or she may be focusing on different underlying metaphorical mappings.

The variability of complex concepts supports the research of Gallie on contested concepts (cf. 1.8). Abstract complex concepts are made up of multiple metaphorical mappings. As in the case of the concept *feminism,* there can be many different versions of feminism that result from a focus on different metaphorical mappings. Each version is a result of reasoning about the target domain—*feminism*—via a different source domain—such as Marxism or Radicalism—thereby engendering various kinds of feminism—such as Marxist feminism or radical feminism. Given such variability, the abstract concept *feminism* can be contested among those who access alternative metaphorical source domains. When two individuals utilize a single concept, such as feminism, in a discussion with each other, they may not be aware that their reasoning about that concept is based on different and possibly conflicting source domains. Reasoning based on different source domains can generate disagreement and conflict.

Both novel metaphors and complex abstract metaphors allude to the question of *aptness*. *Aptness* refers to the adequacy—or "fit"—of a metaphorical mapping: "how good a metaphor is" (Glucksberg 2008:77). Aptness of a metaphor results when "certain metaphorical entailments based on the logic of the source domain … [are] true because the metaphor structures the experience itself" (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:72). This means that we can create new inferences about an experience that will be "true" for us because of the systematicity (cf. 2.7) of the metaphorical mapping; necessary entailments from the source domain will structure our thinking about the target domain if we accept the metaphorical mapping. For this reason, we can disagree about the meaning of a single concept or create new or novel metaphors, thus generating new mappings that help us understand a concept in a new way, using information we already understand. L. Cameron (2008:203) clarifies the notion of variability, explaining that the "choices of metaphor vehicles contribute to the affective work of metaphor", meaning that a metaphor is chosen for the work that it can do, given the goal of the user. Glucksberg (2008:77-78) expounds on the meaning of aptness by writing, "relative aptness of metaphors, be they conventional or novel … [results when the] metaphor is apt in both categorical and comparison form because both types of referents are available—the metaphorical as well as the literal". A metaphor, which is a best-fit mapping, is apt when there are multiple referents and when both metaphorical and literal referents are available. These data underscore the fact that metaphor is fundamental to conceptualization and understanding. Conceptual thought is rooted in our physical experiences, and metaphor is necessary for humans to conceptualize from the physical to the abstract.

## 2.12  Narrative Theory: The Missing Link in the Chain of Cultural Investigation

While such processes underlying cultural coherence and variance about a given topic exist, how can we implement a broad investigation of the cultural metaphors for an abstract topic, such as beliefs about gender? What metaphors must we examine in order to understand a culture's stance on gender? How do we identify the pertinent metaphors? In the next chapter, we will see how key metaphors and all of the conceptual strategies detailed in this chapter can be found within narrative structures. The study of narratives provides a body of research that most effectively connects the study of language and the study of human cognition for the purposes of illuminating human belief systems. Chapter 3 will explain the connection between narrative

theory and the cognitive sciences, including cognitive linguistic study.  Through narratives, we can identify linguistic manifestations of conceptual metaphors and reasoning strategies shared within a culture in the form of *folk models* (cf. 1.8, 2.3, 2.5, 2.10, 4.1.5) as idealized *frames* or *scripts* (cf. 2.5, 3.1.4).  Shared complex metaphors underlie these cultural scripts and make up the conventionalized moral systems of a culture, crucially depicted through the narratives chosen.  The moral systems of a culture help determine the beliefs that individuals hold and the language that they use to talk about their beliefs.  Moral systems in the West have been influenced greatly by Christianity, and Western concepts about gender reflect that influence.  The study of narratives further enables the interdisciplinarity so crucial to a deeper understanding of humankind in all of its varied facets, including beliefs about gender.   The next two chapters will detail the Christian influence underlying Western culture, the metaphors of morality that compose these beliefs, and the importance of studying language in the form of Christian narratives using the cognitive linguistic framework to extract current concepts about gender from a selected Western population.

# CHAPTER 3

# NARRATIVES AS "INSTRUMENTS OF MIND" AND WINDOWS INTO COGNITION

## 3.1  Metaphor and Narrative Theory

Given that metaphor is indispensible to human thought, we can learn more about human reasoning and belief systems through a close study of the metaphorically based systems used to reach those beliefs.  We often express our beliefs in stories about ourselves and others, such as the biblical *Genesis* story and other creation stories.  These stories are sometimes told in poetic forms that showcase literary types of metaphor.  However, these are not the only metaphors they employ.  Their underlying construction owes its existence to primary and complex conceptual metaphors, but these particular metaphors are generally overlooked because of our classical notion that "metaphor" refers only to literary turns of phrase.  When we focus on the conceptual metaphorical systems of cultural stories and narratives, we often learn much more about the conventionalized beliefs of a group of people than we can learn from the literary metaphors within their stories.  These *inferences*—or extrapolations about the relationships of meanings underlying cultural conventions (cf. 3.5)—are key to understanding the conventions about a given concept, such as gender.  The following sections of this chapter will explain the function of metaphor in narrative, review several of the major discoveries within narrative theory, and assess their ramifications for the study of culture through metaphorical systems in language.  This chapter will lay the narrative foundation for my fieldwork on stories about Christian saints and gender.

## 3.2  Narrative Theory and Narratology

Narratives are crucial to human thinking and reasoning.  One of the first researchers to suggest a scientific study of the structures involved in narrative and their significance for human reasoning was Russian formalist Vladimir Propp in his now-famous *Morphology of the Folktale* (1968 [1928]).  Using the linguistic methods of analysis of the time, Propp discovered that there are basic elements common to cultural folk narratives.  This discovery indicated that narratives are not arbitrarily, but purposefully constructed in relation to a shared, cultural function.  It also demonstrated that there are patterns of elements underlying narratives that have ramifications for our understanding of those narratives.  Building on Propp's discoveries, Tzvetan Todorov (1969) and other French structuralists, such as Roland Barthes (1977), Gérard Genette (1980 [1972]), and A. J. Greimas (1983), developed a framework for a scientific study of narratives, called *narratology*.  Their methods were based on the structural discoveries of Propp, incorporating Saussurean structuralist linguistic methods to derive the *semiotic*, or complex meaning systems underlying narratives (cf. Rauch 1999, Chapters 7 & 8).  These early narrative theorists believed that narrative structures functioned like language structures, communicating messages between people via their symbolic elements, and providing multidimensional levels of meaning.  Roland Barthes (1977) was influential in suggesting that guiding narratives are not only found in folk

stories and other kinds of stories passed from one generation to another, but that non-literary narrative structures can also be found in the context of everyday situations, such as conversations, the various visual and performative arts, and even *events* (cf. 3.3). These views were taken up by Labov and Waletzky (1967) in a socio-linguistic study called "Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience", which initiated the explicit study of non-literary narratives for socio-linguistic inquiry and expanded the study of narrative in an interdisciplinary way, crucially "accomodat[ing] both structural and contextual factors" of narratives (Herman 2003a:7-8).

## 3.3 Frames in Narratives

The contextual significance of narratives was illuminated by sociologist Erving Goffman's essay*, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience* (1974). In this work, Goffman presented the idea that experiential *frames* structure all cultural institutions. Each *frame* contains obligatory *events* and *roles* within the *event structures*, just as do those frames found in cognitive and metaphor structures discussed in Chapter 2 (cf. 2.2, 2.5-2.8). Some examples of frames that contain such obligatory roles and events are hospitals, courtrooms, post offices, schools, universities, and the workplace. Each of these frames contains basic necessary elements in order to be considered a member of one of these categories, for instance the category of 'hospital' or 'school'. Similarly, linguist Charles Fillmore (1985) discovered that words, too, are "defined relative to conceptual frames" (G. Lakoff 2008b:22). In other words, the *context* within which a word is used matters for proper understanding of the meaning of that word. This discovery also had ramifications for a reinterpretation of the Whorfian hypothesis that language determines thought. If the meanings of the words alone were the cause of our concepts, then it would not be possible for the context to affect *how* a word means. Fillmore explained that words fit into different *semantic fields* in which they have *relationships* to one another (G. Lakoff 2008b:22). One common example is the frame composed of 'buying and selling'. Words like 'cost', 'sell', 'goods', 'money', and 'buy' all belong within the semantic field, and they point to roles within the frame, such as 'buyer', 'seller', and 'goods', each of which plays its part in the typical event structure of the frame. However, outside of the frame composed of 'buying and selling'—and within a different frame—these words may be used for very different purposes, highlighting very different connotations. The word 'cost', for example, may allude not to the literal and quantitative monetary value of a thing, but rather to a kind of qualitative loss or sacrifice to a person's time or well-being, among other possibilities. Therefore, the context within which a word is used is crucial to identifying its meaning. It is partly the *relationship* of a word to its *context* that determines its meaning or meanings.

## 3.4 Relationships: Constellations and Collocations

We can think of the relationship of the words in a semantic field as a *constellation* or *collocation* (L. Cameron 2008:208). *Constellations* are groups or clusters of words that bear some kind of relation. *Collocations* are sets of words that bear a relation of co-occurrences that is habitual. Both concepts are useful for understanding frames in narrative. While they are similar, the notion of a *constellation* references the fact that the brain categorizes in best-fit

clusters exhibiting gestalt features for interactional purposes (cf. 2.2). When one of the words in a constellation is used, related words come to mind as a result of the frame that governs the constellation; this effect results from spreading activation in the physical structures of the brain, where stimulation of one neuron causes near-simultaneous stimulation of relevant, connected nodes (cf. 2.4). *Collocations* are activated in the same way in the brain, but this term emphasizes that two or more words fit together as an oft-used phrase through linguistic habit; these word combinations are *culturally conventionalized* (cf. 2.10). Thus, while collocations tend to be culturally shared, constellations can vary more by individual or situation. Accordingly, they may be a major factor in *novel usage* and the human creative capacity (cf. 2.11). In contrast, collocated word sets fit into semantic fields and frames and are paramount for narrative usage across a single culture. How words are defined in relationship to one another tells us what relationships are important to a culture. These relationships point to the culture's needs and enable cognitive interpretation of the culture's narratives.


### 3.5  Scripts, Cultural Convention, and Language Systems

A landmark theory about the cultural interpretation of narratives appeared in 1977 by Shank and Abelson. In their work, *Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry into Human Knowledge Structures*, they explained how culturally conventionalized *scripts*—similar to frames (cf. 2.3, 2.5, 2.6)—provide us with "stereotypical knowledge [that] reduces the complexity and duration of many processing tasks" (Herman 2003a:10). *Scripts* are the basic dynamic event structures underlying sequences in all stories, and we use knowledge about their conventionalized sequences to understand events in our own lives. Scripts provide culturally prototypical structures with unspecified "slots"—or entailments (cf. 1.8, 2.7)—that we can fill in with details from new experiences using the best-fit strategies (cf. 2.6) discussed in Chapter 2. This kind of reasoning enables us to shorten drastically the amount of time and energy it would otherwise take to process new information cognitively. This kind of reasoning is also the basis of metaphorical reasoning, utilizing categorization strategies that demonstrate basic-level and prototype effects, and it supports the theory that we use metaphor constantly in daily cognitive processes of all sorts (cf. 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.10). The source domain in metaphorical reasoning (cf. 2.6) is essentially a script or frame, while the target domain is a new event we seek to comprehend. We systematically transfer entailments from the source domain to the target domain in order to reason about the consequences of a new experience; we use the relationships to be found in the original script in order to understand the features of a new experience.

Scripts can also be referred to as X-schemas (cf. 2.5). Basic executing schemas generate the structure of an event. Each culturally conventionalized event bears an underlying X-schema that is based on the time sequence of the event. These sequences fit together in conventionalized ways because of *neural binding*, which "allows us to bring together neural activation in different parts of the brain to form single integrated wholes" (G. Lakoff 2008b:25). Neural binding creates the relationships between the disparate parts of a time structure, connecting the parts and building their interdependence via the primary metaphors for *causation* (cf. 2.8). Humans apprehend time only with relation to causation. G. Lakoff (26) notes, "even the simplest of narratives has a structure that is activated over time". Because all narratives involve time, all narratives are based in some way on notions of causation, and all scripts encode causation. However, there are many different types of causation, with many different kinds of outcomes.

The way that an individual culture conventionalizes these scripts provides the basis for shared cultural narratives.

The psychologist Vygotsky also highlighted the social convention fundamental to the use of frames and scripts in his work, *Mind and Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes* (1978). This work suggested that all cognition stems from social interaction and the use of sign systems. His viewpoint underscores the interplay between cognition and language. While language does not determine thought, neither does thought alone determine language. Instead, the language available to us through our cultural conventions—our "cultural narratives"—"define[s] our possibilities, challenges, and actual lives" (G. Lakoff 2008b:35). The corollary to this state of affairs is the fact that "when you accept a particular narrative, you ignore or hide realities that contradict it", choosing to believe some things and disregard or not believe the things that do not adequately fit (37). This is the same effect as mutual inhibition (cf. 2.4), meaning that other possible ways of interpreting a situation may be prevented by a particular cultural convention, thereby enabling the culture to reproduce itself.

A culture codes and passes on its concepts primarily, but not only, through language, the quintessential conceptual system. The narratives we tell ourselves and others use the cultural linguistic code available, implementing the cultural concepts and generating culturally shared beliefs. Feldman emphasizes the influence of the brain structures in the process of understanding and creating narratives. He explains that neural binding and spreading activation (cf. 2.4) occur in unquantifiable ways (Feldman 2006:235): "when you hear or read something new, your brain's spreading activation mechanisms automatically connect it to related information". He refers to this as *inference* (cf. 3.1), which, in the brain, is "a process of quantitatively combining evidence in context to derive the most likely conclusions" (235). *Inferencing* involves using constellations and collocations. Feldman (233) explains that when we hear stories and other linguistic input, we are doing *implicit inferencing*, which means that we "automatically encode the consequences of this new knowledge for other things that [we] believe".[10] Our culturally available concepts generate our beliefs through the application of familiar narrative structures; our understanding of new events and narratives is based on our cultural beliefs as promoted by the scripts or narratives available to us.


## 3.6 Narrative as "Instruments of Mind"

Narratives or scripts provide us with "cultural prototypes, themes, images, and icons" (G. Lakoff 2008b: 23). Making inferences from these available scripts helps us make sense of new events and experiences; we use narratives as tools for cognition, or "*instruments of mind*", according to David Herman in his article, "Stories as a Tool for Thinking" (2003b). Building upon the works of Shank and Abelson (1977), Vygotsky (1978), Louis O. Mink (1978), Fiske and Taylor (1991), Jerome Bruner (1991), and Ellen Spolsky (2001), among others, Herman (166) suggests that narratives help us solve "the most basic issues facing human beings—for example, how to divide the manifold of experience into knowable and workable increments, as well as how to reconcile constancy and change, stability and flux". Human beings face a daily

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[10] Feldman (19-20) explains that there are current computational techniques called *belief networks*, which model the narrative function of human language in order to find out how people reason.

dilemma: the need for and dependence on stereotypical knowledge for speed and efficiency of processing, but simultaneously, an unlimited capacity for creativity. Ellen Spolsky (2001) may have provided the most succinct answer to this cognitive conundrum when she argued that "narratives are themselves the process that human beings have evolved to understand, express, and meet the need for revised and revisable behavior in an unstable world (181)" (quoted in footnote, Herman 2003b:165). Herman (163) explains that the narrative holds such status because it supports "problem solving abilities" and has the "power to organize thought and conduct across so many different domains of human activity". Storytelling is not just for children. Storytelling helps us all organize the world conceptually without having to memorize every detail we ever encounter. It is a "tool" or "instrument of mind" used constantly and unconsciously by humans of all ages "in the construction of reality" (Bruner 1991:6).

While Jerome Bruner's (1991) theoretical survey of narrative focuses on showing how narrative is crucial to social cognition, Herman (2003b:164) broadens Bruner's work by tapping into multiple disciplines, such as other literary and discourse studies, cognitive science, and anthropology, in order to demonstrate "how stories constitute tools for thinking". Like many of the theorists mentioned above, Bruner believed that "knowledge is *domain-specific*", meaning that our knowledge about things is directly connected to their contextual function (Herman 2003b:163, my emphasis). We cannot make sense of things without context (cf. 3.3). The domain—or context—of social experience is therefore the domain that enables social cognition, or an understanding of the way people interact with one another and the ability to interact. Bruner identified ten features of stories and demonstrated how those features enable humans to understand and act in the domain of social experience, or as Herman (164) refers to it more specifically, "the domain of social beliefs and procedures". Herman augments Bruner's theory by taking Bruner's findings one step beyond social cognition. Herman (165, emphasis in original) suggests that "stories provide … *domain-general* tools for thinking": stories not only enable social cognition, but also provide general problem-solving resources that "[extend beyond social cognition] into other knowledge domains" and enable humans to "organize [these] multiple knowledge domains". If this theory is true, it suggests that "narrative structure can also be exploited opportunistically" in all human thought processes (169). Herman's theory is highly plausible, given what we know about human brain structures, metaphorical mapping, inference making, and spreading activation (cf. Chapter 2). The human brain uses all resources possible— *opportunistically*—networking millions of pathways at a time through best-fit principles, with the goal of quick and efficient comprehension of a plethora of stimuli at every moment.


## 3.7  The Correlates between Brain Function and Linguistic Expression

We conceptualize in order to make judgments about the world based on our human needs, both physical and emotional. We use all tools available to us for conceptualization, especially narrative structures, because these structures enable the human brain to organize vast amounts of diverse input quickly and provide the brain with efficient problem-solving strategies. *Narrative structures* are conventionalized frames and scripts that demonstrate basic-level and prototype effects, indicating that they arise from the natural categorization strategies of the human brain discussed in Chapter 2. Specifically, narrative structures are made up of conceptual metaphors that arise because the human mind is embodied, meaning that all input is based on metaphorical mapping from elemental physical experiences to the abstract. One of the most

important conceptual metaphors is causation because enables us to reason about time and events, which play a role in everything we experience. Narrative structures are essential to humans because they encode causation, providing templates for reasoning about time and events. The creation of narrative structures for use as "instruments of mind" is innate and universal. However, narrative structures are mediated by cultural circumstances. Our reasoning is based on those narratives available to us from our cultural surroundings. Reasoning enables us to make decisions and to act in the world, and our decisions and actions are a result of our beliefs. In other words, reasoning—thinking in general—enables and even causes us to develop *systems of belief*. Thus, our belief systems are directly related to our cultures and the possibilities inherent in those cultural contexts.

Although neuroscience cannot yet explain exactly what consciousness or subjective experience is (this is most often referred to as *qualia*, cf. Feldman 2006:36, 330), we can see how the electrical and chemical structures of the brain work together, and we can observe the results of these processes in the actions and language that humans use to express themselves. Significantly, the *limbic system*, which produces dopamine and norepinephrine—the two neurotransmitter compounds in the body that create positive and negative emotions respectively—shares connective pathways with other parts of the brain, such as the prefrontal cortex, where information about narrative structures is processed (G. Lakoff 2008b:27-28). The activation sites of such shared pathways are called *somatic markers,* and they "allow the right emotions to go where they should in a story", according to G. Lakoff (28). Feldman (2006:331, emphasis in original) substantiates this data, maintaining that "the neural theory of language, along with much of contemporary cognitive science, is based on the *physiological correlates of experience*…. [This is because] there is overwhelming evidence that experience correlates with measurable brain events". When we conceptualize about anything, we activate the limbic system via neural binding. This process verifies that *emotion* is not separate from our other, so-called "rational" thoughts and experiences, but is instead a key part of all of our thinking, reasoning, and language use. When we use language, we give expression to the inner workings of our thoughts and feelings, and these cannot be separated from our beliefs; in fact, they make up our beliefs. We can therefore study language to make inferences about those beliefs and about the entailments, or details, of those beliefs (cf. 1.8, 2.7, 3.1, 3.5). We can study narratives, shared cultural frames, and metaphors found in speech to deduce beliefs about a topic. We can assess both cultural convention by pooling linguistic data of a group, as well as by analyzing individual beliefs and the creative potential in novel usages that clash with cultural conventions. Beliefs make up a person's moral system, and moral systems are based primarily on cultural conventions. A deeper understanding of the major moral systems in the West can therefore serve as a foundation for comparison of a given population's beliefs about a topic such as "gender". The following chapter explains how moral systems work and lays out some of the basic framework of Western moral systems. With this foundation, I will subsequently analyze the narratives from my linguistic fieldwork to make inferences about my linguistic population's gender beliefs.

# CHAPTER 4

# MORALITY, CHRISTIANITY, AND WESTERN GENDER CONCEPTS

## 4.1 Cultural Reasoning: Systems of Morality

Thinking, reasoning, and decision-making can be crystalized under the notion of *morality*. *Morality* describes the composite system of beliefs guiding how we choose how to act and react in life. A person's moral system accounts for how a person makes decisions, and the details of each of our moral systems can be found in the structures we use to think and reason. A moral system can be thought of as a frame, script, or narrative that a person relies on as an instrument of reasoning (cf. 2.5, 3.3, 3.5). Like all cognitive functions in the brain, the script of a moral system is held together through metaphorical mappings that afford coherence and systematicity (2.7, 2.11). The entailments of source domains are transferred in each mapping to the target domains (cf. 1.8, 2.6, 2.7). Matches between source and target domains are made using best-fit strategies with fuzzy borders (cf. 2.2, 2.6). As a result, no individual's moral system will be exactly like any other individual's, but individuals in a single culture will certainly share common, prototypical features and categories (cf. 2.2, 2.3) in their moral systems. George Lakoff conducted a detailed, metaphorical study of morality in *Moral Politics* (2002), demonstrating the universal bodily basis for moral reasoning, and suggesting that contemporary Western moral views can be divided into two overarching systems, or prototypes, of morality. He calls these systems *Strict Father* morality and *Nurturant Parent* morality, and these systems exemplify the circumstance of a culture having *multiple metaphors* for a single concept (cf. 2.11). I suggest that these moral prototypes are the inheritance of Christianity, the major cultural factor constraining the details of Western moral reasoning. Lakoff (2002) has fleshed out the detailed metaphorical structures of these two systems, and my lingusitic study will apply these systems as he has characterized them, in order to demonstrate the connections between historical Christian beliefs and these moral prototypes with respect to Western gender concepts. The basis for the central Christian moral beliefs can be illuminated with an abbreviated explanation of universal moral reasoning.

### 4.1.1 Morality: The Bodily Basis

All of our reasoning about how to make decisions and what actions to take is based in the experience of how those decisions affect the *well-being* of the body and mind. Because reason is embodied (cf. 2.4), we perceive all decisions in terms of what is good for the body and what is not good for the body. Whatever is good for the body makes the body healthy. Consequently, whatever is not good for the body is unhealthy. The abstract or metaphorical correlate of bodily well-being is well-being of the mind and soul (both of which are often used to refer to *subjective experience,* or *qualia*, as it is called in the cognitive sciences; cf. 3.7); this kind of well-being is baisc *morality*. Accordingly, a healthy mind is moral, while an unhealthy mind is immoral. G. Lakoff writes (2002:43):

Metaphorical morality is grounded in nonmetaphorical morality, that is, in forms of well-being, and that the system of metaphors for morality as a whole is thus far from arbitrary. Because the same forms of well-being are widespread around the world, we expect many of the same metaphors for morality to show up in culture after culture—and they do. … Because it is better to walk upright than to fall down, we find the widespread metaphor of Morality as Uprightness. … Indeed, the commonality of shared metaphors for morality both within and across societies raises a deep question: What are the differences in moral systems and what is the source of those differences?

Nonmetaphorical morality begins with the body. What is good for the body is moral; what is bad for the body is immoral. 'Health', 'wealth', 'strength', 'freedom', 'wholeness', 'light', 'being physically upright', 'being clean', and 'being cared for' are all states of being that are good for the body's existence (41-42). These things are all moral because they are all good with respect to physical well-being. The opposite of these—'sickness', 'poverty', 'weakness', 'enslavement', 'impairment', 'darkness', 'being physically unable to stand', 'being dirty', and 'being uncared for' are states of being that are not good for the physical body. Putting one's body in such conditions is bad for its well-being, and therefore immoral.

## 4.1.2 Relative Morality is Calculated Through "Moral Accounting"

We know that poverty can be most detrimental to the physical body, causing many of the other detrimental physical states; when a person is impoverished, that person often cannot nourish the body with food, the person may not have shelter nor be able to obtain shelter, and such a person usually has no freedom to live otherwise, lacking the financial means to procure such physical necessities. For this reason, it appears that "well-being as wealth" is one of the most basic metaphors in our shared cultural notion of morality (G. Lakoff 2002:44). Well-being is when the body has enough of all of its needs. G. Lakoff (45) also notes that perhaps the most important reason that well-being is understood in terms of wealth is that "it allows us to think about something qualitative (well-being) in terms of something quantitative (money)", which is more concrete and countable than something as intangible as "well-being". The qualitative aspect of existence and thought is abstract, and in order to reason about it best, we relate it to quantifiable, concrete experience. That is, we quantify morality and try to balance it out, the same way we would "balance the books" in accounting, according to G. Lakoff (44-46).

G. Lakoff (cf. 2002:Chapter 4) calls these reasoning strategies *moral accounting*. Every action has a value, and to be a moral person, you must hold a positive sum in your own moral accounting book. If you have debt, you have a negative sum, and you are immoral. Human beings keep accounts between themselves, trying to keep the books balanced at an equal value, so that neither person is indebted to the other. If you have done something good for someone, you have a positive sum, but that person is indebted to you and holds a negative sum. In order to be moral, that person must do something of equal value for you in order to be moral, "balance" the accounts, and no longer be morally "indebted" to you. As we can see from this explanation, we use the very same words for abstract moral and immoral actions as we do for "real" accounting in the financial world. Moral Accounting is a kind of narrative schema, frame, or script (cf. 2.5, 3.3, 3.5) that we use for all of our moral reasoning.

That schema, frame, or script comes with entailments, as follows, listed by G. Lakoff in his book, *Moral Politics* (2002:55-62):

1. Credit and Trust: Moral Capital
2. Justice
3. Rights and Duties
4. Self-righteousness
5. Fairness

You have moral "credit" when you do something good for someone else. This is like giving a person something of value, such as money. The more good that you do for someone, the more credit you build up. The build-up of credit is like a "trust", in that you establish a kind of "moral capital" base. You can then expect the other person to pay you back in equal value by doing something good for you when you need it. If she does not, then she has broken your trust, and she is immoral. Accordingly, it is only right that the moral accounts be settled, especially when one person or party has continued to shirk their moral duties. This is what "justice" is about— finding a means of balancing the moral books when one party has not fulfilled her duty. "Duties" are metaphorical debts to someone that one has a responsibility to "pay". If you do not fulfill your obligations or duties, you are metaphorically stealing, because the other person has "rights" to what is hers. In other words, moral rights are moral "credits", seen as money or property, to which a person is entitled. It is only "fair" that each person has access to what is rightfully hers. "Fairness" is the equal distribution of moral capital; it entails the balancing of the moral books using an accepted *standard*. In contrast, some people may be "self-righteous", which means that such a person never carries moral debt, but only an excess of moral credit. Self-righteousness, however, always entails three main things: when we are "self-righteous"*,* we carefully keep our own books; we balance them on our own standard rather than one accepted by others; and we continually remind others publicly of our moral credit (59). The following sections will demonstrate how universal morality is culturally constrained. Christianity has provided a particular overlay to moral reasoning in the West, complete with entailments affecting all aspects of the culture, including beliefs about gender. We can identify this moral reasoning and its entailments within Christianity's stories, handed down through generations.

### 4.1.3  Culturally Coherent Narratives: The West and Christianity

As Roland Barthes (1977) emphasized, stories transcend disciplinary boundaries; other practices besides purely linguistic ones are involved in the repeated depiction of cultural and religious stories, for example artwork and enacted ritual. Each of these domains demonstrates a rhetoric, frame, or script of the kind Fillmore or Shank and Abelson investigated (cf. 3.3, 3.5). Each fulfills a useful function in helping us to understand our existence and our motivations. They represent conventionalized methods of reasoning that allow us to function within the society in which we live. Clare Lees (1999), a scholar in Old English and Medieval culture, appeals to the notion of repetition as a means of creating and instilling conventions and shared traditions. She suggests that the Institution of the Church was one of the main actors *creating* many of the Western cultural traditions through *reiteration*. The church calendar provides a cycle of stories; believers are reminded again and again of these stories and their meanings, both

through sermons and other church rituals, as well as in iconic and artistic representations of those stories in churches and throughout daily life. Lees suggests that the church both created and reproduced the predominant culture, reaching deep into the daily practices of believers and non-believers alike through its physical, legal, and psychological entrenchment in communities across the West. In this way, Christianity has provided the main systems of beliefs, ensuring cultural coherence and reproduction in the West for around two thousand years.

Evidence for the leading role that Christianity has played lies in its literary legacy. The Church was the main purveyor of education and literacy, and the majority of early Western texts are religious or were produced by those affiliated with the Church. These texts enable us to gather evidence about our human history in the West. The details about beliefs of all kinds, including those about gender, can also be extracted from the available recorded information. This means that religious documents are often our primary literary sources for our cultural history. One of the best types of recorded sources for questions of gender is the *hagiographies*, or the life stories of saints. It is often from such sources that we can best derive the earliest historical evidence regarding Western beliefs and expectations about women, since there are many female saints in Catholicism, and those stories most directly or explicitly depict the female gender as a focal topic. Hagiographies, written and rewritten throughout the Church's history, also mirror the development of the Church and Western culture, providing details about the changes in beliefs about gender over time. Those who profess the faith—and even many who do not—still carry with them parts of these stories or the beliefs underlying these stories. They pass these stories on to subsequent generations in the natural process of cultural reproduction, both orally and in writing.

Stories from as early as the first few centuries A.D. are still known and retold by current believers. Why do people still know and tell the stories of saints' lives? Saints' stories have a meaning for people. But what can that meaning be, and why do people tell such stories that at first appear to be out-dated and often fantastical? When we hear or read about the martyrdom of someone like Saint Perpetua, who was mauled to death in a Roman coliseum by a lion and who appeared to be unaware of any pain, we can hardly help but assume that this fantastical story has little connection to our lives today. And yet the story is still retold. Why? Stories trigger emotions (cf. 3.7). The fact that people still re-tell the saints' stories indicates their emotional significance. People tell stories that mean something to them. As I have explained in section 3.7, the limbic system that processes our emotions is neurally directly connected to all of our other thinking and reasoning structures. People tell stories because they provide a service: stories are used as tools for reasoning, decision-making, and acting in connection with physical and emotional needs (cf. 3.6). We can therefore see how the stories of Christian saints still inform Western people's thinking and reasoning today. They help people construct their own moral systems (cf. 3.7, 4.1), which they use in all of their reasoning and decision-making throughout daily life.


### 4.1.4 Christian Morality

Christianity's central stories are fraught with the concepts of moral accounting (cf. 4.1.2). One of the most central tenets of Christianity is the concept of "moral capital", and its entailed "credits" and "trust". Jesus Christ died on the cross in order to "pay" for human sins. As the son of God incarnate in human form, he represents the universal human, and the creation of God.

Therefore, Jesus' death is the "credit" for all humans, giving us "moral capital". If we believe in these tenets, we "trust" that this moral capital will ensure us eternal spiritual life with our creator when we die our mortal deaths. "Trust" is belief, and true belief in Christ entails both "rights" and "duties". Christianity is founded on the notion that belief in God, Jesus, and the tenets of the faith is required in order to be granted everlasting life. Everlasting life is therefore a "right" of believers, and God has a "duty" to them to reward their belief by fulfilling his promise of everlasting life. This is "just" on God's part. Equal reward to all believers is only "fair"; God must grant everlasting life to all in equal amount for equal requirements. However, if God has "duties" to believers, then believers themselves have "duties" in kind. They must demonstrate true belief through repeated attempts at living morally and striving to do what is good. These are their "duties" to God, to each other, and to themselves, if they expect to attain the "rights" of believers. Finally, those believers who are "self-righteous" flaunt their belief to prove that they are deserving of Jesus' "credit"; they usually think they are more deserving of it than others and show their piety overtly in public. Passages in the Bible warn against self-righteousness, indicating that those people are not true believers and are not truly moral based on the Christian standard.

These major concepts pervade all moral choices. Some people consciously choose the Christian overlay of these concepts when making moral decisions; they actively believe that their choices have the ramifications stated above for their immortal souls. Others do not believe in the Christian aspects, but may make similar moral decisions as a result of the influence of the Christian cultural context. To best understand the entailments of Christianity for questions of gender in the West, we must consider Christian interpretations of their story of origins: the biblical *Genesis* story. A particular interpretation of this story has become one of the major influences on Western morality because it was codified as the official doctrine of the institution of the Church in the West, playing the role of one of the culture's main underlying narrative scripts. Institutional clout, such as suggested by Lees, facilitated the impact of this particular narrative script over the last two millennia. This script can perhaps be best characterized by G. Lakoff's (2002) concept of Strict Father morality.


### 4.1.5  Origins of Sin and Strict Father Morality: Fear, Control, and the Human Body

The *Strict Father* model of morality, according to G. Lakoff (2002:65), "takes as background the view that life is difficult and that the world is fundamentally dangerous … and there are dangers and evils lurking everywhere, especially in the human soul". Karen Armstrong explains in her book, *The Gospel According to Woman: Christianity's Creation of the Sex Wars in the West* (1987), that Christianity's early years were plagued by a notion of imminence of the end times (10-11). The times in which Jesus is said to have lived were harsh times for the Jewish people in Palestine, concurs Rosemary Radford Ruether. In her book, *Women and Redemption* (1998:14-15), she describes how the Jewish communities were undergoing both internal and external struggles "to expel or to adapt to the effects of Greco-Roman cultural colonization". The first Christians were prepared to sacrifice everything with the messianic hope that God would release them from their struggles and provide redemption in this world or the next.

Even centuries after Christ, fears of Barbarian invasions produced a sense of imminence similar to that experienced by the first Christians (Armstrong 1987:20). Key Christian writers around the 4th century A.D. such as Tertullian, Augustine, Jerome, and Ambrose were also

products of the extreme and harsh circumstances in which they lived. Their writings may be primarily responsible for the development of the Strict Father Christian model of morality. Armstrong (33) writes that these figures, like most of the early Church Fathers, were adult converts to the faith; imminence and fear were generally major aspects of their Christian beliefs, "because their conversions were often preceded by a morbid struggle with themselves and a very gloomy outlook on life". Their views of morality are a product of what Armstrong calls a "neurosis" (ix-x): they tended toward absolutist and *binary* fundamental beliefs that could provide irrefutable answers to their existential questions. According to Armstrong (103), such personalities tend to project their own struggles onto others, because by projecting their fears onto an embodied "other", they can combat their own fears in the form of a concrete Enemy, such as the Devil. The Christian Doctrine of Original Sin was codified around this time period as the culmination of many of these figures' writings (29).

The Doctrine of Original Sin and the dichotomous Christian version of Good and Evil are related notions, stemming from the same basic metaphors for causation (cf. 2.8). These Christians believed that God is purely good. God is a good force, causing only good. Therefore, God cannot cause evil. The evil that is to be found in the world must not be from God, but from another source. The source of evil must therefore be a pure evil force. This reasoning is based on category prototypes—central members—without variations. It neither recognizes the fuzzy categorization strategies of the brain that result in radial category membership, nor accepts gradations of meaning (cf. 2.2, 2.3). Gradations allow for many uncertainties in the form of fuzzy boundaries. In contrast, the *binary system* of absolute Good and absolute Evil as mutually exclusive (*mutually inhibiting*, cf. 2.4) opposites provide much more certitude for reasoning. A belief in absolute Good applies only the central member of an ideal case (or *paragon*) radial category, while absolute Evil is an example of the anti-ideal (or "demon") prototype of a radial category (cf. 2.3). It is easier to categorize items into one or the other category, rather than to grapple with the possibility that clearly bounded categorization could be impossible, thereby leading to lack of understanding.

While it may appear to be contradictory to the radial categorization strategies and complex conceptual metaphorical mappings of which the human brain is capable, this kind of absolutist reasoning is quite common. Humans utilize first and foremost those tools that are most readily available for reasoning and understanding. Categorizing itself requires delimiting the boundaries of a category, which means inhibiting inclusion of those items not belonging in a category, given our immediate purposes for the category. As a result, we most consistently categorize items, lending them central membership status. What we fail to realize is that every time we categorize new information, we create ad-hoc boundaries based on the immediate purposes at hand, mapping knowledge from domain of old information to the new domains. Under different circumstances, we may apply the same basic category, but our immediate purposes may be slightly altered, with the result being that our central member's boundaries are slightly different than a previous instantiation. In summary, we are not *aware* of all of our neural metaphorical mapping processes automatically taking place every time we encounter and need to understand (categorize) a new item or experience. Therefore, while we may believe in strictly bounded and stable categories, we innately and always apply categories in a best-fit manner that entails "fuzzy" boundaries any time we encounter new information. We must understand new information through its relationships to familiar information. If we were to try and categorize without setting boundaries, our categories would be inadequate for understanding new

information, and we would lead life in an intellectual fog of innumerable possibilities and total incomprehension.

The Church Fathers who reasoned with binary and clearly delimited categories were simply seeking understanding of a very confusion and difficult world. Their categories served the purposes of providing clarity and certainty. They were unaware of the much more complex processes going on in their brains, for example, which enabled them to apply the category "evil" to countless other categories of individuals, like "women", through best-fit, fuzzy principles. Their reasoning about Good and Evil was much like the problem of contested concepts discussed by Gallie and Schwartz (cf. 1.8); they applied strictly bounded versions of "good" and "evil" for their purposes, while being oblivious to any other possible understandings of "good" or "evil". This reasoning also caused them to label items and events as "good" and "evil" according to their purposes, without realizing that their purposes may not be the only purposes possible. In this version of reasoning, good and evil are mutually inhibited, disallowing any thing or event to contain both simultaneously in the minds of the Church Fathers. Such reasoning had major ramifications for the Church Fathers' interpretation of causes and effects. As we know from one of our primary metaphors for *causation* (cf. 2.8)*,* forces cause things to happen, and forces must be generated by "something". By metaphorical analogy with God as the force causing Goodness, the force causing Evil is personified in the Devil. The Church Fathers sought a physical manifestation of their fears in a concrete enemy whom they could battle. The Christian embodiment of evil in the devil provides believers with that distinct adversary. Evil can thus be battled in many forms, because no matter where it is to be found, it is believed to be a result of the devil's actions, an external and concrete foe who can be eliminated.

Evil can especially be battled within one's own body to eliminate it from the body. To the Church Fathers like Tertullian, Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine, the body's weaknesses were obstacles to what they saw as the life of the soul. Each of these Church Fathers saw their lives previous to conversion as evil and selfishly driven by their bodily, mortal weaknesses (Armstrong 1987:33). Based on their Good vs. Evil reasoning, they produced further dichotomies. The body symbolized for them flesh, pleasure, and pure evil, while the soul was something superior and good. The body and soul were therefore incompatible. Their reliance on prototypes inhibited them from allowing the coexistence of anything from their past lives with that of their new lives; their past was Evil, while conversion was Good. Additionally, Christianity had already had a focus on the body since its inception (21-23). Jesus advocated sacrificing the self for God's work; Jesus took on flesh and blood and allowed his body to be destroyed as a sacrifice for the eternal life of the souls of believers. He not only sacrificed his human body. He was reincarnated physically in a manner that overcame the frailty and mortality of human flesh. This focus on the triumph over the mortal body by the eternal life of the soul was consistent with the Church Fathers' binary worldview, demonstrated by their beliefs in Good versus Evil and God versus the Devil.

Through the human body we can also observe the parallel metaphorical structures between the doctrine of Good and Evil and the doctrine of Original Sin. The Doctrine of Original Sin essentially states that humans are all born sinful, and it is based on an interpretation of the biblical *Genesis* story of human origins and their fall from God's grace. The knowledge of their sexual bodies, which Adam and Eve gained after eating from the tree forbidden by God, marks the origination of sin in the world for the Church Fathers. To them, it is the awareness of the sexual body that symbolizes sin and evil. Armstrong (35) explains that sex, or "concupiscence is the essence of sin because it makes us lose our reason and nowhere is the loss

of rational control more acutely felt than in sex". All physical desires are indices of the body, and sex epitomizes bodily desire.

This version of Original Sin and the rigid, prototypical categories inherent in it represent a kind of reasoning that strives for irrefutable and definitive answers to the vagaries of existence and the profusion of stimuli that we encounter throughout our lives. Just as Spolsky, Bruner, and Herman suggest (cf. 3.7), Original Sin is a narrative script that helps humans make sense of their variegated existence. This particular script chooses to deny many of the possibilities within that profusion of stimuli, in hopes of combatting one basic fear: unpredictability. The human fear of unpredictability lies within our embodied experience of causation. Original Sin is a metaphor for the discrepancies that we encounter throughout life between actions and states of well-being, crucial facets for our understanding of causation and our moral sense of well-being. These discrepancies are embodied in a mistrust of the human body; why do bad things happen even when humans attempt to do good? The narrative script of Original Sin explains why some choices are not good even if they produce bodily well-being. It is a script of metaphors that seeks to simplify complex kinds of causation. It provides an explanation for our different states of well-being, these states being the *effects* of some*thing*. Original Sin is that *thing* that provides us with understanding about our complex existence. Original Sin is the concept that is embodied in this basic human moral quandary; it is the Christian narrative script that helps explain the experiences of physical and subjective well-being or lack of well-being. Original Sin is the Christian overlay to the universal script of morality (cf. 4.1, 4.1.1, 4.1.2).

Similarly, G. Lakoff (2002) has documented a contemporary "folk theory of human nature" that is a secular corollary to Original Sin, which he names "folk behaviorism" (67):

> People, left to their own devices, tend simply to satisfy their desires. But, people will make themselves do things they don't want to do in order to get rewards; they will refrain from doing things they do want to do in order to avoid punishment.

This folk model, similar to the belief in Original Sin, explains the basis for all of the other aspects of the Strict Father moral system. *Folk theories* or *folk models* are "models that make up a culture's shared common sense (cf. 2.3, 2.5, 2.10). There are often good reasons for these models, and in many cases folk theories work sufficiently well to serve everyday purposes" (G. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:352; cf. 2.10). This particular folk model may stem from the quandary we humans often encounter when we take our own bodily well-being—the origin of morality itself—as the ultimate aspiration in decision making. The quandary is that achieving one's own bodily well-being—satisfying one's own desires—may be detrimental to another's well-being. This quandary—and the inability to solve such disparities with absolute rules or guidelines—fuels mistrust of the body itself. If we cannot always trust our bodies—the original, concrete basis for moral judgments (cf. 4.1.1)—then we become suspicious of our own moral reasoning capability, and we seek a higher authority that can guide us by providing absolute (read: prototypical) solutions. This kind of reasoning leads to a Strict Father system of morality, wherein the highest imperative is *obeying authority* in order to keep the authoritative structures of the system intact. Upholding this system with its absolute standards is the only method of ensuring that morality prevails. The rigid dichotomy between good and evil, body and soul reflects the significance of *moral strength*, *moral authority*, *moral order*, *moral boundaries*, *moral essence*, *moral wholeness* and *moral purity* that G. Lakoff (2002:65-107) asserts are among the most crucial aspects of the Strict Father model of morality. Within the Strict Father

moral system all of these aspects demonstrate the rigid dichotomy of category membership or lack of membership.  Only the prototypical members are considered to belong, and there are no fuzzy borders.  For example, a person is either morally pure or not.  The Strict Father system allows for no variance.


**4.1.6  Charity and Empathy: Nurturant Parent Morality**

While the Strict Father moral system is based on dichotomies between paragons and anti-ideals, the *Nurturant Parent* moral system is founded on another kind of prototypical categorization.  This narrative script prioritizes different qualities than the Strict Father system. Two of the most important aspects in Nurturant Parent morality are *moral nurturance* and *moral empathy* (G. Lakoff 2002:114).  Both of these aspects call for the genuine care for the well-being of others.  While *nurturance* entails both physical and emotional caring and provision, *empathy* entails understanding what is truly best for another person by imagining oneself in the circumstances of the other.  I suggest that the figure of Christ and many of the gospel descriptions of his life provide the basis for this Western version of morality.  Christ was a figure who healed the sick and worked miracles to improve people's well-being in a variety of ways. Much of his preaching consisted of well-known sayings, such as, "love your neighbor as yourself" (Mark 12:31; cf. e.g. John 13:34-35; Luke 10:27).  Christ even told his disciples to love their enemies (Mathew 5:43-48).  He also was said to have spent much time with social outcasts, the sick, the poor, and those in society who were generally frowned upon or misunderstood.  The Christian imperative of *charity* stems from Nurturant Parent morality. These priorities have little to do with Original Sin or the version of Good and Evil detailed above, yet they are no less a part of the West's Christian heritage.

Among the other important concepts to this system of moral reasoning are *moral self-nurturance*, *morality as nurturance of social ties*, *morality as self-development*, *morality as happiness*, *morality as fair distribution*, *moral growth*, *moral strength*, *moral boundaries*, and *moral authority* (G. Lakoff 2002:110-40).  While the final two concepts can also be found in Strict Father morality, they contribute different qualities, or entailments (cf. 1.8, 2.7), when viewed from the Nurturant Parent perspective.  G. Lakoff (133) explains that their "role in the service of the metaphors of Morality as Empathy, Nurturance, and the rest, changes how [they] appl[y]…. [They prohibit] actions with anti-nurturant consequences".  Similarly, moral authority in this system is earned by repeatedly demonstrating moral nurturance and empathy, rather than through hierarchies for the sake of obedience, as in the Strict Father system of morality (134). The fact that a single concept, such as moral authority, can be viewed from two very different perspectives, entailing very different details for implementation, illustrates the aspect of mutual inhibition (cf. 2.4) so crucial to the functioning of the brain and helps to illustrate the Church Fathers' similar kind of absolutist employment of the categories of "good" and "evil" discussed in the previous section (cf. 4.1.5).  When one metaphor is implemented, activating certain neuronal groups through its entailments, a contrasting metaphor and its entailments will be simultaneously inhibited.  This example also underscores Gallie's theory of essentially contested concepts (cf. 1.8, 2.4, 2.11); moral authority entails very different qualities, depending on whether it is viewed through Strict Father or Nurturant Parent morality.

It is important to remember, however, that both moral systems as characterized by G. Lakoff and described here are themselves central members of categories.  In other words, while

they each may represent the *ideal* or *paragon* of a particular narrative script, their practical implementation varies.  In "real" life, no person's moral system consists of a perfect match with either of the two moral systems described here.  Instead, each person implements different aspects of a moral system to varying degrees (cf. *gradation* and *degree of membership* in 2.2, 2.11), characteristic of the reality of our brain function.  Both systems of morality described here are themselves prototypes or central members that we use as simplified, narrative tools to help us explain the varied and complex reality of moral reasoning in the West.  The next section will detail how these systems of morality can help us understand Western beliefs about gender through a historical overview.

## 4.2  Gender and Christianity

The result of the Doctrine of Original Sin and its corresponding Strict Father morality has had major ramifications for the last two millennia of women's lives in the West.  Because Eve in the *Genesis* story is the first to give in to the serpent's temptation, and because she presents the fruit of the forbidden tree to Adam, Eve is given the primary blame for original sin.  Armstrong writes (1987:61), "Woman is as much of a temptation to man as Eve was to Adam, not because she is offering him an apple, but because she is offering the forbidden fruit of sex", or bodily pleasure.  The *Genesis* story, a *metonymy* for the origin of all humans, presents Adam and Eve as representatives of all men and women.  According to G. Lakoff and Johnson (2003 [1980]: 36), *metonymy* is used like a metaphor for understanding, but its crucial difference lies in its referential function, in which one thing stands for another.  Metonymies are common resources in human conceptualization, and their function of "standing for something" highlight the human need for quick tools of understanding.  This metonymy is corroborated by Ruether (1998) when she depicts the generally accepted interpretation of Eve's role in this story of origins (4):

> In the fall humanity lost its original spiritual union with God, which brought about a fall into mortality, a corruption of sex into lust, and the bondage of the will by which humans are unable to obey God of their own free will.  Due to the fall, women's subordination has been worsened into coercive servitude, which women must accept as their special punishment for sin.  This continues even for Christian virginal women in the church.

Substantiating the prevalence of this viewpoint, Karen Armstrong's book *The Gospel According to Woman: Christianity's Creation of the Sex Wars in the West* (1987) examines the cultural views about women in the West over the course of our Christian history through detailed study of a vast number of texts that provide insights into our concepts about gender.  Armstrong (ix) asserts that, while "Christian dogma has officially been quite positive about women, … the implications of some of the teachings of Christianity have been sinister and suspect".  As described in section 4.1.5, she calls this particular strain of Christianity a "neurosis" about sex and the body that has been directed at women by many of the male Church figures.  Her main goal is to demonstrate that, although the secularism of contemporary societies in the West appear to function smoothly without Christian guidance, we "continue to reproduce Christian patterns of thought and behavior in secular ways, … translating, subconsciously, Christian myths about women into a secular idiom" (xii).  These myths about women are primarily the ones instigated by the strain of Christian teaching based on a Strict Father system of morality.  Her intention in

the book is to raise awareness about the roots of these problems in hopes of empowering women to use "positive" strategies offered by Christianity to combat the historical unequal treatment of women and to continue to implement positive change begun by the feminist movements (xiv). I suggest that many of these "positive strategies" are reflections of the Nurturant Parent system of morality, and I will expand on this suggestion below (cf. 4.2.6).

Armstrong's ideas are a product of the 1980s in that they reflect the galvanism of her fellow feminists. Yet Armstrong considered the problems of inequality from a fresh and crucial viewpoint; she sought the roots of particularly Western versions of the unequal male-female gender dichotomy and their respective roles and expectations within the major religious belief system of the West. She also sought her evidence in language, much like the cognitive linguists have sought evidence for other kinds of cultural beliefs via language. Her comprehensive study of historical texts led her to the conclusion that images of women in the West are based on two prototypes that represent a binary version of absolute Evil and absolute Good, with Eve's role as the first to succumb to temptation and Mary's role as the pure mother of God at the heart of this dichotomy. All Christian models for women are based on these two prototypes: the *paragon* or *ideal case* and the *anti-ideal case* (cf. 2.3). The prototypes serve as central members of two radial categories that govern all entailments of what it means to be a woman. The influence of Christianity in the West has forced women into one or both of these two categories, disallowing them other conceptual choices about what it means to be a woman. Armstrong's book (1987) details these two prototypes through four representative categories: the Virgin, the Martyr, the Mystic, and the Witch. She asserted that these traditionally religious categories of women manifest themselves even in expected roles for secular women today. These are the Christian stereotypes about women, and they stem from a Strict Father version of morality based on Original Sin and Eve's central role in the fall from Paradise.

### 4.2.1 The Paragon: Virgin, Martyr, and Mystic

The first three conventional categories for women—the Virgin, the Martyr, and the Mystic—represent the paragon of women as imagined by Christianity. These three figures share certain characteristics that are not immediately apparent, but which illustrate the pervasive characteristics expected in Western women for the last two thousand years (cf. Armstrong 1987). Together, these characteristics form a constellation (cf. 3.4) of qualities that compose the category of the ideal woman (cf. 2.3). However, the positive aspects of these characteristics bear a double-edged sword; their virtue can become almost instantly a liability to the women who posses such idealized qualities. I will briefly detail Armstrong's characterization of each category—virgin, martyr, and mystic—describe some of the manifestations of Strict Father morality within them, and demonstrate the similarities among the categories' entailments, which Armstrong suggested have harmed women for hundreds of years. Women have employed the Western Christian narrative of the ideal woman as a reasoning tool for their actions and reactions for centuries, but not all manifestations of this narrative have produced ideal outcomes for women. Those manifestations resultant from the metaphors inherent in a Strict Father moral narrative have arguably produced more harm than well-being for women.

### 4.2.2  The Virgin

According to Armstrong (1987:77-82), the *virgin* is an ideal of purity to be held on a pedestal, such as was done in the Cult of Courtly Love and the in Cult of the Virgin Mary of the Middle Ages.  Both cults idealized women through a notion of "pure" love that was undefiled by sexual desire.  While the Virgin Mary was idealized for her simultaneous virginity and state of motherhood as the Mother of God, the women idealized through Courtly Love were also seen as too perfect to be defiled by sexual desire.  The chivalrous knights adoring these upper class women loved them with religious fervor, but dared not touch them or come near them, for fear of destroying their perfection.  In other words, neither version of the perfect woman is seen as a sexual being; sex and sexuality are far too impure.  The Cult of Courtly Love was the secular version of the religious fervor surrounding Mary's virginity (79-81).  The 19th century Victorian "Angel of the House" (89-90), which depicted a similar, sexless and perfect housewife, was a modern secular instantiation of the cult of virginity, drawing on the notion of martyrdom via self-sacrifice (cf. 4.2.3).  The result of such treatment of women created an ideal for womanhood that was impossible; these women were not normal women, but "freaks" of purity (81).  Both of these cults resulted from the strain of Strict Father morality intent on *moral purity*, *moral wholeness*, *moral essence*, and *moral boundaries*.  They and other strains like them stem from the "myth of virginity" (135), which Armstrong claimed is the "leading myth about the free woman in the West" (187-88), implying that only virginal women are moral.

Virginity's lure for women has been the promise of "independence", "autonomy", and "self-sufficiency", all of which imply that one's "integrity is not threatened" (134); in Strict Father terms, "integrity" is what makes up *moral wholeness* and *moral essence* and ensures that *moral boundaries* have not been marred (by sex).  In fact, the epitome of an independent and self-sufficient woman was thought to be the "virago"—or "mannish woman"—the ideal that women "should aspire to" for many centuries (139).  Joan of Arc is one of many figures venerated for this characteristic, and we can see strands of this ideal in the current boyish figures of the modeling world, where womanly curves are abhorred.  The astonishing consequence of this sexlessness, or androgyny, (cf. 1.3 for discussion of Virginia Woolf and androgyny) is the focus on the *male standard*.  Armstrong (147) asserted, "virtue was the property of the male sex; chastity and virginity entailed becoming male because chastity was a male and not a female virtue".  In other words, only males could truly be virtuous due to Eve's metonymical role in the inception of Original Sin.

If a woman wished to be virtuous, she must pay for it.  She must suffer (149); she must sacrifice not only her sexual desire, but anything that makes her a woman.  This entailed denial of the body in its entirety, and it included fasting and asceticism, undertaken as a war against the impure body in an attempt to recover lost "purity" (176).  Suffering became a quintessential aspect of female virginity.  While such ascetic activities were also undertaken by religious men who also held such a Strict Father moral belief, they believed that women's sexuality was to blame for men's lust; women's sexuality was seen as more inherently evil than men's because of Eve's role in the fall.  These activities led to self-destruction and "mutilation", and rather than accomplishing autonomy, they caused a "retreat" from life into a kind of lonely "fortress" of virginity, where a women was impervious to the world (150-80).  In this lonely but carefully *bounded* existence, a virgin was encouraged to have religious fantasies in which she would give up her worldly sexuality in order to be a bride for Christ (166).  These fantasies were often erotic, demonstrating how the focus on virginity caused unnatural and destructive practices that

perverted the ideal of virginity into its antithesis (166). Rather than providing women with autonomy and freedom from the confines of male dominance or a deeper faith in God, the obsession with virginity often created *isolation* and obsession with the physical self that only confined women more. Armstrong (178) suggested that today's explosion of cases of anorexia are the modern correlate to the same rigid ideals of perfectionism begun with the Christian veneration of virginity. Virginity as an ideal leads to rejection not only of sex, but metaphorically to rejection of the body and of life, causing isolation, physical and psychological damage, and ceding the promised benefits of independence and self-sufficiency. Within the Strict Father moral system, autonomy is not possible for women, because it would undermine the *hierarchy of authority* based on the male standard.

### 4.2.3 The Martyr

The *martyr* echoes many of the details of the virgin's existence described above. Armstrong (1987:189) described martyrdom is an "idealization of failure and the victim". Martyrdom typifies dedication to a cause to the point of giving up one's life for that cause. Armstrong (190-91) wrote, "Christianity has been quite clear that to give your life for the faith is the highest of the Christian vocations" and that as a result, "by becoming a martyr a woman instantly became one of the most honored members of the Church, superior to most men". The early saints fulfilled their martyrdoms with a sense of "euphoria, purpose, and solidarity" because, in view of the persecutions in the early days of the Church, their faith would provide healing (191). Armstrong (202) noted that both healing and martyrdom were understood differently at that time: "healing in the Ancient World was associated with violent pain and dislocation" because it was thought that the effectiveness of a cure was commensurate with the pain involved. As a result, the early believers had a different purpose for undergoing martyrdom than did later believers, for example those in the Dark Ages, who were under no obligations to die for their faith because of persecution. Instead, these later believers had created a metaphorical "alliance of martyrdom and sexual asceticism"—mapping (cf. 2.6) the hatred of the body of asceticism onto death of the body through martyrdom—in which they "took pride in suffering" and in publicly displaying their suffering (202).

Armstrong (194-95) wrote, those early "martyrs were not honored because they bravely put up with pain. The martyrs were glorified because they felt no pain at all" due to the trances of "ecstasy" they experienced during a "supreme form of this religious experience". In other words, early martyrs became *impervious* to suffering because of their great faith, which set the stage for a metaphorical association of the virgin with the martyr. The virgin, too, was pure and impervious to the outside world, so the metaphorical mapping between the two was almost natural, but its entailments were devastating for women. Early female saints like Blandina and Perpetua, many of whom were virgins, "transcend[ed] the boundaries of [their] sex", and later interpretations of their experiences became popular as a means of escaping the limitations that the world placed on women (197). Suffering became a means in itself, and "later women saints would interpret the ideal of martyrdom as a daily warfare on the body" (201). Their actions reproduced the cultural metaphors and entailments of a Strict Father moral system, idealizing *purity* and pure *essences*, believing they could purge themselves of the "affliction" of being female by aspiring to the goals of the dominant moral system and male standard. But when the ideals of such a Strict Father moral system are exaggerated, the outcome can be excessive; the

brain's normal means of metaphorical reasoning through spreading activation can produce surprising effects.

Stories and new interpretations about martyred female saints began to demonstrate this obsession with suffering of the body in the form of. Armstrong (215) described how "by the 13th century the virgin's martyrdom is depicted often as a sexual assault. The way the virgin martyrs are flung into brothels is clearly a popular male hostile fantasy", which paved the way for romance literature of the Victorian era, such as depicted in Emily Brontë's *Wuthering Heights*, in which "love, hatred and brutality are mixed inexorably into a self-destructive complex". Virgin martyr stories often demonstrate the neurotic strain of men's "deep fear of women, which is closely bound up with the erotic. Men can try as hard as they can to destroy them, but the women remain powerful and indestructible, just as sexually they were insatiable and dangerous" (204). In other words, men linked their great fear of sexuality to women (as in the *Genesis* depiction of Eve as the original sinner), and the virgin martyr stories revolved around male assaults on the martyrs' female body parts as a kind of release of men's sexual fears and desires within the safe realm of the controlling force of Christian belief and narrative. Here they could battle their own sexual demons, embodied by female virgin saints. Similarly, female virgin nuns were encouraged to fantasize about their roles as metaphorical brides of Christ, since they had sacrificed their physical bodies to the Church, denying themselves husbands, families, and the chance to be mothers (205).

As a result, motifs of this mixture of love and pain began to surface, as in the image of the "bleeding heart crowned with thorns which vulgarly encapsulates the Christian identification of suffering and love" (209). Armstrong (213) suggested that this constellation (cf. 3.1.3) of ideas has led to our present day, collocated notion of "passion": whereas *passion* once simply meant "suffering unto death"—as in the "Passion of Christ", or Christ's journey to death— *passion* is now the central feature of what Armstrong called the "myth of Grand Romantic Passion": a modern "complex of suffering, love and death" involving extreme sexual emotion, both in sacred and secular realms. Finally, Armstrong suggested that these associations of suffering with sexuality have paved the way for a culture that enjoys seeing women as victims, and whose women wish to be victimized. She suggested that "paradoxically, suffering was seen by women as an act of self-assertion and self-definition", in "an attempt to mark [themselves] out as somebody special" and "rescu[e them] from anonymity" (218). The paradox is simply a result of metaphorical mapping between virginity and martyrdom; the entailments necessitate that autonomy involve suffering. Like the cult of virginity, the myth of martyrdom became an outlet for women to escape their limitations and isolation, but resulted further in self-destruction and an isolation of another kind.

One of the modern reflections of this damaging state of affairs is the appearance of the *stigmata*—the signs of the nails and piercings of Christ's body on the cross—on the bodies of women. Armstrong (221-22) explained that in 1894, Dr. Imbert-Gourbeyre catalogued 321 stigmatic individuals since the time of the first—St. Francis of Assisi—280 of whom were women. The most recent case was in 1962, when a Bavarian woman with a history of neurotic illness demonstrated extreme hysteria and withdrawal alongside her supposed stigmata (223-24). The constant element in all of these events, from the virgin martyrs, to the passionate romances, to the stigmatics, was the "circus element", which draws the attention of important men (225). The men who attended to these women are those in power, whether they were leaders of the Church or the lover whose attention the heroine of a story sought. The antics of suffering provided women with a sense of importance, but at the expense of their own health and

wholeness.  These antics have damaged them to the point of making them "infantile" in their "regression", suffering, and dependence on the attentions of others (230).

Finally, Armstrong (230) pointed out that the motif of "sacrifice is still seen as the real mission of women" and that it has led to the treatment of women as silent, selfless, small, and childlike.  Even the "nice girl" image stems from the motif of *sacrifice* because she "is encouraged not to assert herself", but instead "to suppress too clamorous an assertion of [her] identity" (229).  The tendency to focus on the diminutive aspect of women emerged from these roots and is typified in the "Little Way" of St. Thérèse of Lisieux, who perpetually called herself small and focused on the trivial (226-28).  Armstrong suggested that such diminutive focus reflects a parallel negative treatment of women as themselves trivial; the triviality of the activities is metaphorically mapped onto those conducting them.  She suggested that even the core of the feminist movement has utilized the image of suffering in a similar attempt to seek attention as a means of achieving reparations for unequal treatment (230).  Armstrong (231) asserted that this is the wrong method to obtain equality because it undermines the goals of independence.  It hearkens back to "old images of martyrdom and masochism … [and] bondage that had haunted the female Christian imagination for so long".  Armstrong's final assessment of the negative affects of the myth of martyrdom on women was a call to reject the cult of suffering and self-sacrifice, because glorifying these images undermines the real goals women have sought throughout Christian history: autonomy, independence, and self-sufficiency.  She wrote (233-34): "To perpetuate the myth of the victim and martyr is to abdicate responsibility.  It is denial of truth because it tells women that they are helpless and have no control over their fate.  This denial of responsibility makes women less than human".

### 4.2.4  The Mystic

The third ideal counterpart for Christian women has traditionally been the mystic, and its connections to the other two, though not immediately obvious, are accessible.  Both the virgin and the martyr "very often shared certain mystical experiences" (Armstrong 1987:235).  While the early martyrs experienced the ecstasy that freed them from the pain of tortures and death, the virgin, too, often experienced trances and visions related to her extreme devotion to Christ.  Some examples are figures like Joan of Arc—who was also a martyr—Hildegard von Bingen, Catherine of Siena, and Teresa of Avila.  Mysticism has primarily been associated in Western society with women.  Armstrong explained this phenomenon (237):

> Perhaps one of the reasons why mysticism is so often associated with women in our culture is because our society has valued the rational and intellectual activities of the brain more highly than the more receptive states of mind….  The male world has traditionally been seen as rational, while the woman's is patronizingly seen as the world of the intuition and the heart.  Both men and women have suffered from this sharp division of activities and experience.  Men often remained emotionally retarded because their feelings were not cultivated as much as their brains.  Women, on the other hand, denied for centuries the benefits of education, remained intellectually undeveloped, unable to express themselves rationally or judge their experience critically.

The role of the mystic therefore offered a kind of realm of expertise for women that was not available to them in the male-dominated world of learning. Mysticism "offers [women] a means of achieving liberation from the demanding and self-destructive ego" that they often faced when isolated within their convents and via other limitations in the male-dominated world (239). A more negative perspective of mysticism's lure was that it made religious women "stars" (236). As evident in the example of the stigmatics, who reported visions accompanying their physical wounds, the purported connection to a higher authority (cf. *Strict Father morality*, 4.1.5) afforded these women attention from powerful figures. In a world where women had little authority, the role of a mystic, or "prophetess", could liberate a women from her limitations and give her autonomy (cf. 4.2.2, 4.2.3) by lending her respect from the male religious counterparts (246). In other words, since her "source of authority and leadership was an immediate contact with the Divine, which bypassed the usual male hierarchical channels that the orthodox believed that God should take when he wants to get in touch with us", a female mystic could suddenly become more powerful than a male Church leader (248). In fact, because "the Divine vision or inspiration that came to [a woman] with such a force that it seemed to come from outside herself", this "direct contact with the Divine especially when accompanied by celibacy could justify the 'unnatural' phenomenon of female leadership" (248). Such power was certainly alluring, but its price was denial of all aspects of femaleness. A woman could only gain such power if she became a virtual man, because leadership, authority, and even purity were considered to be male traits. Once again, the metaphorical mapping between states that lend women authority and autonomy in a Strict Father moral system—between virginity, martyrdom, and mysticism—also generated damaging entailments. These entailments are inherent in Strict Father morality; upsetting the "normal" hierarchy of male power would undermine the entire system of morality and lead to amorality.

Some of these negative entailments are most obvious in historical examples of women with mystical experiences. Although women such as Hildegard von Bingen were primarily positive examples of the female mystical role in Christianity, Hildegard was also an imperious leader, who suffered both emotionally and physically from her visions (255-58). Most importantly, though, "she was able to use her illness creatively, and … the solitude it imposed upon her did not make her unbalanced … but creative and original…. [She was] a natural genius whose insights came to her with all the force of a vision" (258). Similarly, Teresa of Avila used mysticism to positive advantage for women, although she did not originally experience her visions this way. At first, she was both "filled with such self-hatred that she undertook hidden penances, … and [was] prone to raptures and ecstasies of the 'frozen statue' type" that pointed to a neurosis (cf. 4.1.5, 4.2) common among women limited by the (isolating) circumstances of their gender (261). However, Teresa changed these circumstances by learning to meditate with the purpose of healing (261). In the wake of her changes, she pushed for reforms in her convent, "guid[ing] her nuns away from the hysterical mysticism that … was so damaging to them" (264). Unfortunately, unlike Hildegard and Teresa, many other women mystics fared less well and remained victims of the idealization of women. Catherine of Siena and other mystics "enjoy[ed] a certain political celebrity, because of their lives of visions, austerity and autonomy"; they gained what other women in a male-dominated culture could not attain (252). Yet, Catherine and many others ultimately suffered from self-deprivation and often starvation through anorexia, as they sought to overcome the body as a result of the typical "hostile Christian misogyny of her time" (263), borne of the Strict Father moral mentality and the metaphorical narratives of Christian doctrine.

Even more recent versions of mysticism have surfaced in the form of hysteria, as with the stigmatics. The Quakers' Great Revivals of the 19<sup>th</sup> century produced women leaders whose "image of the ecstatic women permeated [even] purely secular society" (268). Some of the more recent effects of this ecstasy have brought out the sexual entailments. For example, Sigmund Freud studied women hysterics and came to the conclusion that their antics were a result of repressed sexual desire. His psychological studies engendered the still prevalent stereotype (cf. 2.3) that all women are hysterical, and that their hysteria is a psychological result of their sexual inferiority to men (cf. Freud 1990 [1929]). Similarly, Armstrong (1987:275) noted that the Cult of the Orgasm had become the modern goal of women attempting to transcend and transfigure themselves, but with detrimental effects. A sociological study in the 1990s on female erotica supported Armstrong's position. This study, "Watery Passion: The Struggle between Hegemony and Sexual Liberation in Cognitive Social Science" (Patthey-Chavez et al. 1996), suggested that women's erotica, wildly popular according to sales, attempt to create a safe sexual space for women within the traditional frame of male hegemony, but ultimately rely on the male hero for sexual satisfaction. Armstrong's perspective of the trend in society is similar. She explained (276): "At the very time when women are seeking new independence they have created for themselves a new myth of extreme sexual dependency, as they wait for their men to 'give' them orgasm, seeing it as the man's sole responsibility". Armstrong's assessment of the dangerous line between the positive and negative influences of mysticism, as well as of the myths of virginity and martyrdom, demonstrates the ease with which a strength can very quickly become a weakness through metaphorical entailments. The next section describes how these cultural ideals—the virgin, the martyr, and the mystic—can so quickly become the anti-ideal, often with devastating results.

### 4.2.5 The Anti-Ideal: the Witch

As already detailed above, the Strict Father version of Christianity mirrored in the notion of Original Sin created a dichotomy of Good and Evil, and blamed Eve for the original temptation and fall. Eve is at fault, and she represents the anti-ideal for women, which Armstrong detailed in her book. Eve is considered to be guilty of sin; the belief in absolute Good and Evil necessitates that Eve is evil and entails that she cannot be good. It is precisely this kind of absolutist reasoning that led Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger to produce the rabidly anti-female *Malleus Maleficarum* (*The Hammer of Witches*) in 1487 (Mackay 2009) as a means of countering an "epidemic of sexual anxiety" in late fifteenth century Germany, according to Armstrong (1987:103). The *Malleus Maleficarum* was essentially a handbook about identifying and treating those who were performing witchcraft, and it is a prime example of the recurring Western theme of male sexual anxiety and the tendency to project—or metaphorically map—this anxiety onto an outside enemy that can be battled (cf. 4.1.5): women as witches.

Armstrong described the witch craze that swept Europe from the late 15<sup>th</sup> to the 17<sup>th</sup> centuries as another manifestation of the Christian doctrines, a neurotic fear of the body, and the Church's androcentric bent, all of which display elements of the Strict Father system of morality. The *Malleus Maleficarum* clearly describes how sex is at the center of witchcraft and why women are witches; it "develops Aquinas' theory of women being essentially misbegotten human creatures", Armstrong wrote (104). She explained that, according to Sprenger's (and

Kramer's) reasoning, and following from the belief in Eve's role in creating Original Sin, "God did *not* save women or die for women, and therefore he has abandoned them to sex and thus to the Devil, … made to assume the position of an enemy, in alliance with the enemy of God and man" (105). Within Strict Father morality such defiance of the authority of God could mean only one thing: women are immoral. As witches in this time period, women could be battled like enemies, and by battling witches, society could battle the devil and attempt to reinstate morality. Women were framed as the scapegoat for particular fears of the time. Many of the fears were simply fears about uncontrollable forces and the need to have concrete causes of those forces, which could then be eliminated (cf. 4.1.5).

Among those fears were beliefs that passion and sex caused men to do irrational things, and they sought to identify those who caused these forces beyond their control. The mixing of pagan beliefs about witchcraft with Christian beliefs enabled men to blame women as the cause. The fear of these uncontrollable forces can be found in the prevalence of words in English that were words of witchcraft at that time period. The most prominent is 'glamour', which was a kind of charm; it referred to "a magic power that could castrate hapless men who had the misfortune to cross a woman" (108). Although the word in modern English no longer holds connotations of witchcraft, its associations with sexuality and fear have not been lost. It "now refers to an exotic and powerful feminine beauty, sought after and admired by men and women alike" (108). Such a beauty is considered desirable yet dangerous, just like sex itself, and 'glamour' is still applied today to idealize certain people and lifestyles. It still has power over us; it is an uncontrollable force. According to Armstrong (117), a number of other words with connotations of uncontrollable forces stem from witchcraft: 'fascination', 'magical', 'enchanting', 'ravishing', and 'bewitching'. All of these words are most often used to describe beauty, and it is particularly women's beauty that men fear, because it causes in them sexual lust.

Armstrong asserted that this idealization and hatred of beauty has placed women in a Catch 22; they should be isolated and segregated from men or made to hide their beauty so as not to incite the evils of sexual lust, while at the same time, their beauty and sexuality is desirable. Armstrong claimed that men's answer to this problem has always been to try and destroy or remove the problem through the destruction and removal of women—just like the attempt to remove or destroy the forces that cause unwanted events by battling the devil. The Witch Craze was just one manifestation of the attempt to remove evil. Shutting women away in cloisters and demanding virginity and purity was another method. Victorian England's "Angel in the House" and the protestant housewife ideal isolated women, removing them from the male sphere of *public* life and controlling their sexuality within the *private sphere*. The result of each of these situations was the same, whether a woman is a virgin, martyr, mystic, or witch; she had no other options but the ideal and the anti-ideal. The consequences were always the same: women were isolated, stigmatized, and denied their humanity, but the Strict Father moral system remained intact by preserving the highest ideals—such as authority, order, boundaries, wholeness, and purity—and the unpredictability of life could thus be controlled by men.

## 4.2.6 Nurturant Parent Morality in Modern Western Feminism and Feminist Theology

Like Armstrong, Rosemary Radford Ruether (1998) argued that contrasting strains of Christian belief provide alternative—and positive—roles and opportunities for women. Ruether wrote (2):

The canonical envelope of the New Testament obscures the conflict [of gender relations] by seeking to impose the decisive answer that women were created second, sinned first, and are to keep silent in church, to be saved by subordination and childbearing; but alternative views and practices on women's roles continue.… This process continues in conflicting views of gender in the church, family, and society between feminist and patriarchal Christians today.

She suggested that Christ's life and teachings promised a new kind of community of believers and a "new humanity" that is gender-blind (2). She asserted that the history of Christianity had been a struggle between two kinds of practices and ideas: those "patriarchal relations" of the "normative", institutional Church, and those that believe Christ's incarnation began a new era of total equality and redemption for all, regardless of gender (2). I assert that these two prevailing strains are based on the two contradictory moral narratives for thinking and reasoning: Strict Father morality and Nurturant Parent morality. Ruether's book details the shifts in the history of that struggle and the changing strains of beliefs about gender throughout the history of Christianity. Gender viewed through a Nurturant Parent system of morality is very different than gender viewed through the Strict Father system. The Nurturant Parent system of morality does not condemn women to equally damaging idealized and anti-idealized roles.

Just as I have suggested that the Nurturant Parent system can be seen in the teachings of Jesus, Ruether wrote that Jesus' gospel calls for a less restrictive view of redemption that does not focus on hierarchies or the preservation of systems of authority but on the well-being of all humanity. She writes (7):

Redemption is realized, not primarily in an otherworldly escape from the body and the finite world, but by transforming the world and society into personal and social relations of justice and peace between all humans. This is the true message of Christ and the gospel. The churches have betrayed Christ by preaching a theology of female silencing and subordination.

This is an expression of the main elements of Nurturant Parent morality: community, well-being, empathy, and mutual nurturance (cf. 4.1.6). Similarly, Armstrong suggested that a truly gender-blind system of beliefs can be found in the promises of a new society advocated by peculiarly Christian teachings. She wrote that these aspects of Christianity advocate a "detachment", or "an ability … to free oneself from old, unproductive patterns of behavior and [through which people can] cease to define their sex by hating the other" (Armstrong 1987:345). Ruether substantiated the validity of inclusive rather than exclusive—or idealized—practices of categorizing people. She suggested that postmodernist thought and recent strains of secular feminism and feminist theology from highly diverse groups around the world have already mitigated many of the damaging effects to women stemming from more traditional Church practices. The multitude of voices may be in the process of altering the dominant cultural narrative; Strict Father morality and its institutional clout may be giving way to Nurturant Parent forms of moral reasoning. Like spreading activation in the brain, the more voices that can speak out against the conceptual ruts of gender beliefs in the Christian West, the more conceptual possibilities will emerge for gender and what it means to be male, female, or any other kind of gender.

### 4.2.7  A Synthesized Methodology

Given this synthesized view of narratives study through cognitive and neurosciences, I have chosen to implement storytelling in my own cognitive linguistic study of gender.  Only the most rigorously interdisciplinary and contextually based methods can help illuminate such a qualitative topic as human belief systems.  I, too, believe that we can learn the most about subjective, or personal, human experience by examining the linguistic manifestations of that experience.  By asking consultants to tell and discuss stories, I can unearth the structures and strategies individuals use to focus their beliefs.  Extrapolating inference structures can show me the mechanisms of their causal reasoning and the tools, such as causal scripts, that they implement to express their beliefs to themselves and others.  By identifying which structures, tools, and details are shared among a population, I can assess which beliefs and causal links are culturally shared and which may be novel—or opportunistic—implementations of individual belief systems.  I intend to investigate constellations of words, collocations, and categories and systematic, metaphorically based narratives in the language of consultants to discover current trends about gender beliefs among a particular population.  However, we must not underestimate the creative power of language, the potential for novel metaphorical conceptualization, and therefore, the novel usage of language.  Novel usage is a mechanism of cultural conceptual and linguistic change.  Therefore, I will also be on the lookout for novel usages that may suggest possible directions for future conceptual and linguistic shifts.

*Strict Father Morality* (SFM) and *Nurturant Parent Morality* (NPM)*,* the two prototypical Western moral systems as detailed by G, Lakoff (2002), are a useful resource in assessing current beliefs about topics like gender, because a person's moral system is a kind of general and systematic reasoning script that informs his or her views and attitudes about individual topics.  I will utilize these two moral systems suggested by G. Lakoff as prototypical categories—each with its respective entailments regarding beliefs about gender—against which I can compare the apparent moral systems and gender beliefs of my population of linguistic consultants.  I wish to determine whether and to what extent my consultants' stances on gender correspond to the stances on gender promoted by either of these moral systems.  Given that narratives are "instruments of mind" (cf. 3.7) that are fundamental to our general ability to think and reason, I can investigate the moral reasoning underlying Christian stories that people tell today and the corresponding entailments about male and female characters in the stories.   The saints that consultants love—and the reasons they give for loving or identifying with these saints—show what moral beliefs consultants hold by revealing what they value.  The saints that consultants dislike and the reasons for their rejection of these saints show what moral values they reject.  The details that participants highlight and neglect in their narratives provide evidence for the moral values they accept and reject.  I wish to answer questions such as the following: do my linguistic consultants utilize either of these moral systems in their reasoning about gender, and if so, which one and to what extent?  What patterns of gender morality exist within this population?  Are their views on gender coherent with the prototypes of their Christian heritage?  Are there patterns that contradict the two prototypical systems, and if so, do any of these alternative patterns suggest linguistic or cultural change with regards to beliefs about gender?  Do men and women hold similar or contrasting moral views—and thereby, contrasting views on gender?

# CHAPTER 5

# CONTEMPORARY GERMAN LANGUAGE CORPUS
## AND CONVENTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

## 5.1 The Corpus

My linguistic data comes from modern language interviews. I interviewed male and female native speakers of German about the lives of male and female saints. My linguistic fieldwork corpus consists of recorded spoken data of primarily native German speakers as they answered questions from my self-constructed questionnaire about martyred and non-martyred male and female saints. I conducted research and interviews in Munich, Germany, beginning in October 2009 with a Research Grant from the DAAD (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst,* or German Academic Exchange Service). Interviews began in December 2009, and the last interview took place in October 2010. Consultants were affiliated with the *Katholisch-Theologische Fakultät* (Faculty of Catholic Theology) at the *Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität* in Munich. I interviewed a total of 26 German-speaking language consultants, 13 of whom were self-identified males, 13 of whom were self-identified females. One of the females was a non-native speaker of German, born in Hungary, who lives and works in Munich in a German-speaking household. All other consultants were native speakers of German.

All consultants participated voluntarily after I introduced myself and my study in their courses at the University. I presented myself as a Ph.D. candidate in Germanic Linguistics from the University of California, Berkeley, conducting fieldwork research for her dissertation. I explained that I was seeking native-speaking volunteers who were familiar enough with the stories of saints lives that they felt they could discuss details of several individual saints' stories during an audio-recorded interview. Participants—or language consultants—were of varying ages, born between 1939 and 1989, but all were officially affiliated with the Faculty of Catholic Theology as either student, seminarian, or (senior) auditor. The questionnaire consisted of 93 questions involving retelling the stories of individual saints' lives, commenting on personal connections and feelings about specific saints and saints in general, and assessing other believers' connections to the saints. To avoid biasing the data, I never indicated to the consultants that I was looking for clues about gendered language usage. I simply presented the study as a linguistic study entitled *Gegenwärtige Ansichten über gemarterte und scheinbar-gemarterte Heilige,* 'Current Views on Martyred and Quasi-Martyred Saints'. Each consultant met and spoke with me privately for 45 minutes to two hours, and each interview was recorded in its entirety. I subsequently transcribed all 40+ hours of interviews, but for the purposes of the present work, I have chosen to evaluate only part of the elicited data. I have assessed all 26 consultants' responses to several select questions, which I will detail in section 5.3.

## 5.2 Linguistic Analysis: Study Group Assessment

The characteristics of the group under study are important for delimiting my analysis in a meaningful way. The members of my study group consisted of 26 self-identified males and

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females (13 of each gender) who are speakers of contemporary German and who profess belief in Catholicism.  All consultants affirmed that they are familiar with stories about the Christian saints, and all consultants participated in the study voluntarily.  While the homogenization of this group of consultants may appear to be a limitation to the study, hindering it from providing relevant generalizations about a broader German-speaking or other Western population, I consider this characteristic to be one of the study's strengths.  The similarities within this study group demonstrate general cultural coherence (cf. 2.11).  Not only do consultants share a native language and religious beliefs; they also stem primarily from Bavaria, a single region of Germany, or are currently settled in that region.  Bavaria is culturally conservative in many ways, strongly tied to age-old traditions, and its population still strongly demonstrates the regional dialect.

The cultural homogeneity of the group is nicely off-set by the age range within the group, which spans a half century, from 21-71 years of age at the time of the interviews.  The consultants practice or have practiced a wide range of professions, as well, bridging the social spectrum.  However, according to the background data I was able to collect, none of the consultants stemmed from the working class.  These pooled characteristics generally provide both controls as well as breadth to the sets of data I was able to collect.  They speak to the broad applicability of Christian beliefs across different ages and backgrounds of a population from a small region, exemplifying the overarching cultural effects that the Christian Church might have on a typical region in Germany that consists of both rural and urban occupants.  A study of language usage by such a representative group can help reveal the impact of this cultural influence on a given population with respect to their shared, conventionalized concepts about gender (cf. 2.10).  Such concepts will be deeply rooted in the moral systems (cf. Chapter 4) depicted in their language.


## 5.3  Questionnaire: Modern German

The questions from my questionnaire that I have determined to be of crucial relevance to this study can be grouped into three main categories.  The first set of questions inquires about the function and importance of stories about saints for current believers.  The second I will call descriptions and characterizations of male and female saints.  The last set of questions consists of comparisons between male and female saints.  These sets of questions are detailed as follows:

### I. Importance and Function

The first pair of questions (cf. Chapter 6) I present here, regarding the importance and function of saints today, was presented to consultants near the end of the questionnaire.  Immediately prior to these questions, consultants were asked to assess the importance of individual saints for believers today in general on a scale from 1 to 10, and then to consider whether and in what ways the telling of stories may have changed over time.  In this way, I brought them into a reflective mode to consider their own beliefs and preferences in conjunction and contrast with those of other believers, both past and present.  These questions provide ample support for the value of story-telling as a technique to discover details about people's moral underpinnings and their methods of reasoning.  The first pair of questions are as follows:

*88. Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach den anderen Gläubigen in diesen Geschichten wichtig?*
'In your opinion, what is important in these stories to other believers?'

*92. Was für eine Funktion hat/haben diese Geschichte(n) für Menschen im alltäglichen Leben heutzutage?*
'What function does this story (do these stories) have for people in their daily lives today?'

Answers to these two questions provide a baseline for the applicability of saints' stories in the moral reasoning of my consultants. In addition to the answers provided by consultants to these questions, I will present a brief analysis regarding the list of specific saints whose life stories consultants chose to discuss, and the frequency of certain choices. I will present comments about the familiarity with particular saints and the importance of consultants' choices of saints to discuss for my current research on gender.

## II. Descriptions and Characterizations

The description and characterization questions (cf. Chapters 7 & 8) ask the consultants to provide sentences and single words to generally describe the saints. These questions were the first 6 questions presented to each consultant during each interview. They are as follows:

1. *Wie würden Sie die weiblichen Heiligen allgemein in 3 bis 5 Sätzen beschreiben?*
   'How would you describe the female saints in general, in 3 to 5 sentences?'

2. *Wie würden Sie die männlichen Heiligen allgemein in 3 bis 5 Sätzen beschreiben?*
   'How would you describe the male saints in general, in 3 to 5 sentences?'

3. *Welche Wörter würden Sie verwenden, um die Persönlichkeit, die Merkmale oder Eigenschaften der weiblichen Heiligen zu beschreiben? Bitte geben Sie etwa 5 Eigenschaften oder Merkmale.*
   'What words would you use to describe the personality, qualities, or characteristics of female saints? Please provide about 5 qualities or characteristics.'

4. *Welche Aspekte ihres Lebens sind am wichtigsten?*
   'What aspects of their lives (the female saints) are most important?'

5. *Welche Wörter würden Sie verwenden, um die Persönlichkeit, die Merkmale oder Eigenschaften der männlichen Heiligen zu beschreiben? Bitte geben Sie etwa 5 Eigenschaften oder Merkmale.*
   'What words would you use to describe the personality, qualities, or characteristics of male saints? Please provide about 5 qualities or characteristics.'

6. *Welche Aspekte ihres Lebens sind am wichtigsten?*
   'What aspects of their lives (the male saints) are most important?'

### III. Comparisons

The third group of questions (cf. Chapter 9), requesting that the consultants compare male and female saints, occurred much later in the questionnaire, following detailed discussion of four individual saints and their life stories. By organizing the questionnaire in this way, consultants had four separate stories fresh in their minds about both male and female, martyred and non-martyred saints, before they attempted to assess for a second time what qualities and characteristics male and female saints possess. They were then asked to reassess the qualities of the saints using the overlay of comparison between males and females. These questions are as follows:

76. *Unterscheiden sich die männlichen und weiblichen Heiligen im Allgemeinen wesentlich voneinander oder sind sie wichtig aus verschiedenen Gründen? Wenn ja, bitte beschreiben Sie die Unterschiede.*
   'Are the male saints and female saints in general significantly different or important for different reasons? If so, how would you describe the differences?'

77. *Wir haben gerade von den Heiligen allgemein gesprochen, aber jetzt habe ich eine Frage nur zu den Märtyrern: unterscheiden sich die männlichen und weiblichen gemarterten Heiligen wesentlich voneinander? Wenn ja, bitte beschreiben Sie.*
   'We just spoke about the saints in general, but now I have a question specifically regarding the martyrs. Are martyred male and females saints different from each other? If so, please explain how.'

78. *Sind die nicht-gemarterten männlichen Heiligen anders als die nicht-gemarterten weiblichen Heiligen? Wenn ja, bitte beschreiben Sie.*
   'Are male and females saints not literally martyred (quasi-martyrs) different from each other? If so, please explain how.'

I present my findings from questions 88 and 92, section I above, regarding function and importance (which occurred late in the interviews), first (cf. Chapter 6) because they underscore the premises of my research, providing direct attestation for the claim that narratives provide people with strategies for reasoning throughout daily life. They also provide a groundwork for the main results of this study; they demonstrate the importance of folk models and role models and the major roles these play in human cognition and cultural transmission.

### 5.4 Analysis Premises: Mitigation of Priming Effects

In preparing my language consultants to openly discuss the Christian saints, and to demonstrate accurately their views about trends and commonalities among the saints, I felt that the foundation would be best laid with generalized questions (cf. questions 1 & 2). By beginning with non-comparative questions, i.e. questions that did not explicitly require the consultants to weigh qualities of male and female saints against each other, I avoided priming them directly for considerations of gender. Although the manner of asking first about female saints and then about male saints may have caused an indirect priming effect by assuming an absolute gender

dichotomy, I assert that the effects are not dramatic for two reasons. First, the study was not presented as a study on gender but rather as a study of believers' views of saints. As a result, the consultants' focus was initially directed toward their own personal feelings and connections to saints as a general category; gender was not necessarily an explicit topic foremost in their minds. Similarly, because the binary of male and female is so commonly accepted as a cultural norm, the initial questions dividing male from female would likely not be conspicuous beyond the normal encounters we all have daily with individuals, whom most of us are taught from childhood onward to consider as members of one or the other of the binary gender categories (cf. 1.1, 1.2). Second, the fact that a significant number of consultants refused to name differences between male and female saints, or at least suggested that the differences were minimal, indicates that a percentage of the consultants actively chose to ignore or deny the focus on gender that these questions may have elicited.

Another strategy to avoid priming the consultants about gender was to ask them to discuss male and female saints equally. For this reason, I devoted the second portion of the questionnaire to individual saints' stories. I asked consultants to choose and discuss one example each of a female and a male martyred saint, followed by one example each of a female and a male non-martyred saint. Using this parallel construction I focused consultants' attention more directly on the differences between martyrdom and the lack thereof, rather than on the difference between genders. Their convictions about gender emerged more naturally using this method. The next section provides an overview of the data from this portion of the interview in the form of a list and the inferences we can draw from that list. I begin with this data because it exhibits cultural conventions that I use as a point of departure for comparison with my consultants' personal views.


## 5.5 The List of Saints

Part II of my questionnaire requested consultants to discuss 4 saints' stories, one at a time, in detail. Each consultant was asked to choose first a martyred female saint, then a martyred male saint, followed by a non-martyred female saint, and then a non-martyred male saint. I suggested a particular saint in each category, in hopes of securing a relatively stable baseline for comparison: Agatha, Sebastian, Elizabeth, and Francis of Assisi. However, I allowed consultants to choose a different saint in each category if they felt more familiar with or would prefer a saint other than the one suggested. This circumstance provided me with a different kind of comparison than I originally thought I might obtain. I originally planned to compare what each consultant said about a particular saint with the conventional views about that saint in order to find out what differed in their individual descriptions with respect to gender. For example, I had hoped to discover whether individual men and women speak differently about a particular female saint, such as Agatha; contrastingly, are there differences in characterization due to the age of consultants? In addition, do consultants consistently characterize a male and a female saint—who share a characteristic like martyrdom—differently? With regard to such examples as Francis and Elizabeth, who are both so well-known and loved, such a comparison may be possible. However, the total list of saints chosen by my consultants proves to be more fascinating in regards to stances on gender. I discovered more about which saints are most well-known and well-loved among believers. Instead of using individual saints' stories in direct comparisons with individual consultants' comments about each saint, I choose to

use the list of saints as a generalized foundation of comparison. Below I extract generalizations about gender conventions from the pooled list of saints named by my consultants. I use this foundation as a control or baseline of convention, against which to compare my consultants' stances on gender, discussed in the next five chapters.

Below is the list of all saints discussed, along with the total number of times each was discussed and the list of consultants who chose each (I have spelled the names in German and listed them as they were called by my consultants, using parenthesis for necessary clarifications):

**List of Saints:**

| Total # | Saint | Female Consultants* | Male Consultants* |
|---|---|---|---|
| 23 | *Franz von Assisi* | 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13 | 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,13 |
| 16 | *Elisabeth* | 2,3,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13 | 2,5,8,9,11,12 |
| 12 | *Sebastian* | 2,3,4,12,13 | 2,5,6,7,9,10,12 |
| 7 | *Katharina von Alexandrien/ vom Rad* | 1,3,4,5,8 | 2,13 |
| 5 | *Peter/Petrus* | 1,6,11 | 3,13 |
| 3 | *Edith Stein* | 9 | 5,10 |
| 3 | *Jeanne d'Arc/ Johanna von Orléans/ Johanna der Arc* [sic] | 6,10 | 6 |
| 3 | *Maria* ('Mary') | 5 | 4,6 |
| 2 | *Mutter Teresa* | | 1,3 |
| 2 | *Stephanus* | 5 | 4 |
| 2 | *Teresa von Avila* | 1 | 10 |
| 1 | *Agathe* | 12 | |
| 1 | *Agnes* | | 12 |
| 1 | *Barbara* | 11 | |
| 1 | *Cäcilia* | 7 | |
| 1 | *Fritz Gerlich* | 7 | |
| 1 | *Georg* | | 1 |
| 1 | *Hildegard von Bingen* | | 7 |
| 1 | *Johannes vom Kreuz* | 12 | |
| 1 | *Korbinian* | | 10 |
| 1 | *Laurenz* | | 11 |
| 1 | *Maria Goretti* | | 7 |
| 1 | *Maria Magdalena* | 4 | |
| 1 | *Mauritius* | 8 | |
| 1 | *Philomena* | 13 | |
| 1 | *Rupert Mayer* | 9 | |
| 1 | *Thérèse von Lisieux* | | 13 |
| 1 | *Ursula* | | 4 |
| 1 | *Nepomuk* | 10 | |
| 1 | *Hexenverfolgung* (Witch Hunts in general) | 2 | |
| 1 | *weibliche Heilige allgemein* (general female saint) | 2 | |
| 4 | *keine weibliche Heilige* (no female saint named) | | 1,3,8,9 |
| 2 | *kein männlicher Heilige* (no male saint named) | | 1,8 |

*I have omitted here the F (for *Frau*) and H (for *Herr*) from the consultant identifications (ID) for efficiency. In all other instances throughout this text, I include these indications for clarity.

**5.6  Categories of Qualities and the Moral Systems They Represent**

In the next table I categorize the saints by their outstanding quality or qualities.  I have chosen four main categories that depict the most common qualities: *Virgin*, *Thinker*, *Serving*, and *Battling*.  The category *Virgin* implies sexual purity as one of the highest goals.  *Serving* saints are involved in caring for others, providing for others, and giving up material things that sustain or indulge their bodies.  They often give up much of their time, effort, and own well-being for others.  *Thinkers* are intellectually active as theologians and Church Doctors, teachers and philosophers, and they often play important roles in developing and spreading Church teachings.  Those saints who are *Battling* are most often soldiers, but may have simply been saints who were forced to dispute those in higher positions in order to make reforms or achieve their goals.

Of these four categories, two each fit the conventional, idealized characterizations of female or male characteristics: women tend to be virgins and serving (charitable), while men tend to be thinkers and battling.  These categories refer to central members of *essential prototype* radial categories (cf. 2.3), which demonstrate folk model notions (cf. 2.5, 2.10, 4.1.5) about what makes a particular thing what it is.  Essential prototypes often become *social stereotypes* (cf. 2.3), which is what occurs with such dichotomous gender characteristics, as I will demonstrate below.  I have gleaned these categories as commonly generalized characteristics stemming from the official stories about these saints.  I came up with the names for each category myself, but I based my choices on pooling the details of all the saints' life stories as I found them publicly recorded in *The Oxford Dictionary of Saints* (2003), the online *Ökumenisches Heiligenlexikon* (www.heiligenlexicon.de, 2011), and the website dedicated to Fritz Gerlich (www.gerlich.com, 2011).   These sources provide a generally accepted and summarized version of each story.  I note that not all named persons are saints according to the Catholic Church.  Some are simply beatified (*Mutter Teresa, Rupert Mayer*), and some are neither beatified nor canonized (*Korbinian, Fritz Gerlich*), but these figures embody qualities that my consultants considered to be saintly.  *Korbinian* is known by some of my consultants as a local saint, rather than one officially canonized by the Church, because he was the bishop of Munich-Freising; *Rupert Mayer* was also a locally known figure who was beatified, and *Fritz Gerlich,* was an important figure in recent German history, who sacrificed his safety to denounce the Nazis during WWII.

In the lists below, the categories represent culturally conventional qualities that the saints and saint-like figures are known for, and I have created separate tables for the lists of male and female saints:

| Male Saint (12 named) | Virgin | Serving | Thinker | Battling |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Franz von Assisi* | | ✗ | ✗ | |
| *Fritz Gerlich* | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Georg* | | | | ✗ |
| *Johannes vom Kreuz* | | ✗ | ✗ | |
| *Korbinian* | | ✗ | ✗ | |
| *Laurenz* | | | | ✗ |
| *Mauritius* | | | | ✗ |
| *Nepomuk* | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Peter/Petrus* | | | ✗ | |
| *Rupert Mayer* | | ✗ | ✗ | |
| *Sebastian* | | | | ✗ |
| *Stephanus* | | ✗ | | |
| **Totals** | **0/12** | **5/12** | **7/12** | **6/12** |
| **Percentage** | **0%** | **42%** | **58%** | **50%** |

| Female Saint (17 named) | Virgin | Serving | Thinker | Battling |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Agathe* | ✗ | | | |
| *Agnes* | ✗ | | | |
| *Barbara* | ✗ | | | |
| *Cäcilia* | ✗ | | | |
| *Edith Stein* | | | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Elisabeth* | | ✗ | | |
| *Hildegard von Bingen* | ✗ | | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Jeanne d'Arc/Johanna von Orléans/Johanna der Arc* [sic] | ✗ | | | ✗ |
| *Katharina von Alexandrien/vom Rad* | ✗ | | | ✗ |
| *Maria* ('Mary') | ✗ | ✗ | | |
| *Maria Goretti* | ✗ | | | |
| *Maria Magdalena* | | ✗ | | |
| *Mutter Teresa* | | ✗ | | |
| *Philomena* | ✗ | | | |
| *Teresa von Avila* | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Thérèse von Lisieux* | ✗ | ✗ | | |
| *Ursula* | ✗ | | | |
| **Totals** | **13/17** | **6/17** | **3/17** | **5/17** |
| **Percentage** | **76%** | **35%** | **18%** | **29%** |

In summary, a greater variety of female saints than male saints was chosen. 17 different female saints were named in comparison with only 12 male saints. This result may be due to the great familiarity of St. Francis (*Franz von Assisi*), such that 12 of the women and 11 of the men chose to discuss St. Francis. However, St. Elizabeth (*Elisabeth*) is also very well-known, but 10

women and only 6 men chose to discuss her.  11 different female saints were named by the female consultants as a group, while 12 were named by the male consultants together.  These numbers are comparable and suggest no particular differences between the two groups of consultants.  Similarly, 9 different male saints were named by the women as a group, while the men together named only 7 different male saints.  Again, these numbers are comparable and unremarkable.

The categories to which male and female saints conventionally belong differ drastically.  Of the 17 female saints named, 13—more than 3/4—are known for the virginity.  Over a third are known for their serving qualities, while just under a third are known for their battling qualities.  In contrast, less than 1/5 of these female saints are known for their qualities as thinkers or intellectuals.  The male saints named are known much more often as thinkers and intellectuals: nearly 3/5.  Half of them are known for their battling qualities, and just over 2/5 are known for their serving qualities.  However, not a single one is known for his virginity.  In fact, not even celibacy was named as a crucial aspect for any of these male saints in the published stories that I consulted.  This quality is apparently superfluous or unremarkable for those males saints to whom it applies because celibacy is considered common—or the stereotype—for holy men (cf. 4.2.2).  However, virginity is a highly important—and *marked* characteristic—for female saints.  When a quality is *marked*, it is a characteristic that is emphasized for some purpose.  Such females are considered to be unusually holy, when the norm for females in general is considered to be a sexual being, i.e. *impure* (cf. 4.2.2).  In other words, virginity appears to be a crucial characteristic to delineate those women who are holy—a stereotypically unusual characteristic for women—from those who are typical, non-saintly women.  It is crucial to keep in mind that these are the percentages for this particular pool of saints chosen by my language consultants.  A different pool of saints could elicit much different percentages.  I suggest that these percentages shed some light on the qualities that my language consultants find to be important, yet I still believe that the official versions of the stories provide a baseline for the broader population's cultural conventions about gender.

This data alone can be only suggestive and serve as a simple foundation for comparison.  Just because a saint is known for a certain quality does not mean that that quality is the one that draws the interest of a particular believer.  For instance, while the accepted story of Joan of Arc emphasizes her virginity, a language consultant who chose to discuss her may have spoken only about her battling quality and may have cared little about her virginity.  Nonetheless, the constellation of qualities within any given saint perform together as a general narrative; each detail is an important entailment in the narrative of that particular saint.  Therefore, no entailment is to be overlooked because it has a role within the narrative, and the narrative with all of its entailments is the comprehensive tool used for reasoning (cf. 3.7).  In other words, the details of stories do inform our use of such stories in reasoning about our own moral values.  In the case of Joan of Arc, a particular consultant may downplay her virginity, but it is not necessarily absent from the consultant's knowledge and impressions about her.  To determine whether virginity is important to that particular consultant, we must consider other details of the response and make contextualized inferences about the speaker's view of virginity.  For the purposes of this study, I will not undertake such detailed and individualized inspection of every consultant's discussion of each saint; instead, I merely use the list of saints and their qualities as representative of conventions about these saints so that I may compare my consultants' common views with ostensibly conventional views.  I offer the example about Joan of Arc to demonstrate the extent of possible variation and its complexity.

I assert that these lists with the breakdown of categories for each gender demonstrate the culturally accepted, dominant moral system in the Christian West: Strict Father Morality (SFM). As Lakoff asserted, SFM is founded on a folk theory of human nature that seeks clear and absolute answers (4.1.5). Purity, particularly bodily purity and a lack of sexuality, is one of the highest priorities of SFM. As a result of the Christian Doctrine of Original Sin (cf. 4.1.5), female bodily purity is valued most; female virginity is seen as the antithesis to Eve's guilt and the main path to redemption for women (cf. 4.2.2). The official stories about female saints tend to value female virginity most, a trend that is visible in the list above, in which 76% of the female saints listed are known primarily for their virginity. In fact, 2/5 of the entire list of women (7 of 17) are known almost solely for their virginity as martyrs. Virginity in these stories is inextricably tied to martyrdom, which is self-sacrifice (cf. 4.2.3). As Armstrong has shown, virginity itself is a kind of sacrifice, wherein women sacrifice that which makes them female in order to become more ideal (4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4); the standard is male, and a woman must do away with her womanliness in order to achieve some measure of acceptance in this moral system. When she sacrifices her sexuality for her beliefs, she becomes a *virago* or an honorary male (4.2.2). But she loses the ability to freely be woman.

The step from self-sacrifice to serving others is a small step. One sacrifices one's own needs as a charitable servant of others. This characteristic is important to SFM because it promotes the system over the individual; the individual is willing to give up personal needs for the good of the system (cf. 4.1.5). The individual is fully subject to and obedient to the intact structures of the system. This obedient and serving quality is valued in women, as the 35% above demonstrates. If we were to broaden the category of serving to include the notion of self-sacrifice, as Armstrong's work suggests, then a full 16 of the 17 women listed, or 94%, would be considered to emulate this category:

| Female Saint (17 named) | Virgin | Serving |
| --- | --- | --- |
| *Agathe* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Agnes* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Barbara* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Cäcilia* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Edith Stein* | ✗ | |
| *Elisabeth* | | ✗ |
| *Hildegard von Bingen* | ✗ | |
| *Jeanne d'Arc/Johanna von Orléans/Johanna der Arc* [sic] | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Katharina von Alexandrien/vom Rad* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Maria* ('Mary') | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Maria Goretti* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Maria Magdalena* | | ✗ |
| *Mutter Teresa* | | ✗ |
| *Philomena* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Teresa von Avila* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Thérèse von Lisieux* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Ursula* | ✗ | ✗ |
| **Totals** | **13/17** | **15/17** |
| **Percentage** | **76%** | **94%** |

In contrast, male martyrs are not known for their virginity, even virginity or celibacy was a fact in their lives; it was most often an *unmarked* characteristic. In fact, male saints are known for something quite different than self-sacrifice, even though being martyred is a sacrifice of the body. Self-sacrifice is not highlighted in stories of male martyrdom as it is in the female stories, fused to virginity or the saint's sexuality. Therefore, I choose not to expand the male category of *Serving* to include self-sacrifice. Instead, male martyrs are primarily known for their battling quality, which generally does not coincide with serving. Many male martyrs were soldiers (for example, *Laurenz*, *Mauritius*, and *Sebastian* below). Others fought against the officials of the Church for reforms. In fact, it is common that those saints with the quality of *Thinker*—theologians and Church Fathers—were considered to hold the complementary quality of *Battling*, or strength in the face of opposition, because they were fighting for religious reforms within the Church or demonstrating strength by spreading the Christian belief in missionary style. As with the category of serving for the women, we could therefore expand the category of *Battling* for all male saints to include missionary and Church reform activities. The table would appear thus, with fully 100% of the males embodying some kind of strength under the category of battling:

| Male Saint (12 named) | Thinker | Battling |
|---|---|---|
| *Franz von Assisi* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Fritz Gerlich* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Georg* | | ✗ |
| *Johannes vom Kreuz* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Korbinian* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Laurenz* | | ✗ |
| *Mauritius* | | ✗ |
| *Nepomuk* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Peter/Petrus* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Rupert Mayer* | ✗ | ✗ |
| *Sebastian* | | ✗ |
| *Stephanus* | | ✗ |
| **Totals** | **7/12** | **12/12** |
| **Percentage** | **58%** | **100%** |

While the qualities of battling and strength are also present in at least some of the stories of female martyrs, they are not highlighted in most of them. These data regarding tendential conventions in saints' stories point to mutually inhibiting (cf. 2.4) correlations of gender categories, which form *social stereotypes* for each gender, meaning these qualities are used for making quick and basic judgments about individuals based on their gender (2.3). These categories are used like Gallie's contested concepts (cf. 1.8): when applied to women they entail different details than when applied to men. I will call these *gender-divided concepts* (cf. Chapter 7). The ideal or paragon of the female saint is one who is virginal and self-sacrificing in at least one form—sexually or in acts of charity, serving others (cf. 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4). These qualities are seen as female to a high degree, and one often entails the other. The antithesis of feminine is seen in the qualities possessed by the paragon of male sainthood: he is an intellectual who is strong. One of these male qualities often entails the other. While there are other qualities

that could be discussed and added to the list of entailments for each gender, such discussion would require analysis not pertinent to the main goals of this study.

These qualities are the key conventional categories used to portray male or female saints, and we can situate these four categories in the main metaphors of SFM. The highest value in SFM is *moral strength* (cf. 4.1.5), which we could consider to be the quality of strength or battling discussed above. All male saints embody this quality, exemplifying the central member of the category of moral strength and upholding the highest ideal in SFM; the system must remain intact. Additionally, male saints' intellectual feats pronounce the *authority* of God. Their teachings produce the Doctrine of the Church, and these beliefs are esteemed as "truths". They hold the authority that holds the system together. In SFM, this authority is to be obeyed, and men are the primary architects of Christian authority. Women in SFM should uphold the values of *moral purity*, *wholeness*, and *essence* by remaining virginal, untainted, pure, and intact (cf. 4.1.5, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4). They also fulfill the requirement of *morality as nurturance* (cf. 4.1.6), caring for and serving others. This quality is more often associated with Nurturant Parent morality, and its association here with women is interesting for the discussion of gender stereotypes; I address this overlap in Chapter 10 (cf. 10.1). In the SFM system, it appears that the overlay of gender creates two different metaphorical circuits for reasoning, wherein male and female qualities are mutually exclusive. They are mutually inhibited in the brain; the pathway for "saint" as a concept is qualified the moment that the notion "gender" is added. "Saint" provides a narrative script detailing a paragon of morality, and "gender" is an additive source domain that specifies details about the paragon. Entailments, such as virginity, intellectual talents, self-sacrificing traits or qualities of strength are mapped onto each saint when the notion of gender is applied.

However, because real human logic uses best-fit categorization strategies with fuzzy borders, not all saints fit exactly into these idealized categories of male and female qualities. There are exceptions that are visible even in the list above that serves as a representative of convention. For example, female virgin martyrs such as *Jeanne d'Arc* or *Katharina von Alexandrien* do not fully typify the idealization of women. The former was a battler in the typically male role of soldier, while the latter was an intellectual who outsmarted the leading philosophers of her time. *Teresa von Avila* and *Hildegard von Bingen* are also unusual in that they were both intellectuals and demonstrated strength in the face of opposition. Finally, *Edith Stein* illustrates the typically male qualities more so than the female qualities. She was both an intellectual and is known for the strength she showed against her captors and murderers. *Stein* is a modern saint, however, who lived in the 20th century. Her example suggests possible change in the system of beliefs about gender: have modern ideals for women come to encompass some traditionally male roles? The frequent naming of these 5 female saints may also indicate a change in the gender beliefs of my consultants; they may value less traditionally female qualities in their female paragons. Likewise, some of the male saints named also demonstrate exceptions and possible change in gender beliefs. *Franz von Assisi*, though well-known as an intellectual and theologian, is less well-known for his strength in opposition than for his charitable service to others and even his self-sacrifice in reception of the stigmata on his body. He was one of the most frequently named saints among both male and female consultants, adored in the 21st century precisely for the character traits that are less traditionally male in the SFM system. Similarly, saints like *Johannes vom Kreuz, Korbinian, Rupert Mayer,* and *Stephanus*, although intellectuals and leaders in the faith, demonstrated unusual acts of charitable service, and were named by my consultants because this quality was highly esteemed. These exceptions may point

to a process of change in the dominant system of morality in the today's German-speaking population.  Strict Father morality of the past may be giving way to Nurturant Parent morality, a possibility which I will discuss in subsequent chapters (cf. Chapter 10).

The following chapters present an array of analyses of my consultants' spoken data. Some of their comments reiterate the conventional SFM gender notions suggested by these lists, and others demonstrate contrasting beliefs.  In Chapter 10, I will integrate the various analyses in a final discussion of the moral systems employed by my language consultants as they reason about gender.  I will show how their views on gender can be inferred from their views on male and female Christian saints and how integrally situated the Christian Church is within the generalized Western cultural views of men and women.

# CHAPTER 6

# IDEAL AND CONCRETE:
## CONTEMPORARY OPINIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SAINTS' NARRATIVES

### 6.1  The Reasoning Function of Stories from first-hand authority: Questions 88 and 92

An important question for my study on gendered language is the significance of cultural stories for a larger population and the extent to which individuals are aware of their peers' knowledge of these stories.  The more aware individuals apparently are of others' views on such stories, the more likely the stories are to have a standard place in the culture.  I inquired about these circumstances using the following questions:

> 88. *Was ist Ihrer Meinung nach den anderen Gläubigen in diesen Geschichten wichtig?*
> 'In your opinion, what is important in these stories to other believers?'

> 92. *Was für eine Funktion hat/haben diese Geschichte(n) für Menschen im alltäglichen Leben heutzutage?*
> 'What function does this story (do these stories) have for people in their daily lives today?'

### 6.2  Role Model Function

In response to questions 88 and 92, which ask consultants to assess respectively the importance of saints for other believers and the function of these stories today, my consultants provided a wealth of answers that support my research claims about narrative and cognitive function.  One of the single most frequently used terms to describe the importance or the role of these historical figures was *Vorbild*, 'role model'.  Between the two questions, all but two [H2, H9] of my consultants either implemented the term itself or a comparable term that refers to an exemplary figure who illustrates characteristics most people strive to attain.  In cognitive terms, such a figure is a *paragon*—an idealization and central member of a radial category that we use for understanding and reasoning (cf. 2.3).  Most role models are actively chosen by believers.  Believers utilize or call on one saint or another because each saint is known for certain qualities that are pertinent for specific purposes.  The use of role models is purposeful, just like all of our reasoning (cf. 2.4).  I provide here a number of examples from each consultant:

F1:  *Vorbilder im Glauben, ... sich von dem was abgucken, ... Orientierungsfunktion.*
F2:  *Vorbild zu sein.*
F3:  *Vorbildfunktion.*
F4:  *... eine Orientierung sehen, ... ein Beispiel haben.*
F5:  *... Darstellung eben von Vorbildern.*
F6:  *... exemplarisch.*

F7:   *… diejenigen … finden eben etwas, das sie schon leben oder leben wollen.*
F8:   *… weil das einfach Vorbilder sind an Ausdauer, auch an Beharrlichkeit.*
F9:   *Ich … hole mir da Kraft und Richtung.*
F10: *… beispielhafte[s] Leben und Glauben.*
F11: *… weil sie Vorbildcharakter haben.*
F12: *… dass man eben sieht, wie kann man handeln, oder also auch vielleicht ein bisschen als Beweis, dass es geht…*
F13: *Sie sind natürlich Vorbilder.*


H1:   *… als Vorbild ansehen.*
H3:   *Bei allen ist die Suche nach Vorbildern, … dass die Leute in den Heiligen nachahmenswerte Menschen sehen, … man braucht irgendwelche Vorbilder.*
H4:   *… dass man sich mit diesen Menschen identifizieren kann.*
H5:   *Vorbildcharakter.*
H6:   *Orientierungshilfe.*
H7:   *Vergleichssituation[en], … die einem helfen, wie man sich verhalten soll.*
H8:   *Lebenshilfe.*
H10: *… weil es ja vom Prinzip her auch oft dieses Lehrhafte eben hat, dieses Modellhafte.*
H11: *Das Ausdauern, das Ausharren, auch in schwieriger Situation. Beim Glauben bleiben. Vorbildfunktion.*
H12: *… im Heiligen hat man wirklich ein Vorbild. An ihnen kann man sich aufrichten.*
H13: *Sie sind Vorbildgeschichten.*

Saints are sometimes taken up as role models simply because a person is named after a saint or the saint is the namesake or patron saint of a church. This kind of role model is interesting because the choice to venerate the saint has less to do with a specific goal and more to do with a general acceptance of a cultural norm, which underscores the pervasiveness of cultural models in our reasoning strategies. In other words, it is mere happenstance that a person shares a saint's name—a choice made by the person's parents or, in the case of a church to which the person belongs, simply by someone else. Nonetheless, this coincidence can provide a believer with a means of reasoning about his or her own life situations and choices, simply by virtue of its ready access. Four women [F2, F6, F11, F12] and four men [H2, H8, H9, H11] mentioned this type of role model, including the two male consultants who did not directly state that saints serve as role models [H2, H9]. I suggest that the coincidental aspect of this type of role model underscores the nature of embodied reasoning and metaphorical mapping; thinking and reasoning involves all of the brain's resources that are involved in conceptualization. Conceptualization is *opportunistic*, as suggested by Herman (cf. 3.6), employing all best-fit mappings possible and connecting many different conceptual strands through spreading activation (cf. 2.4). In other words, any material can be accessed as source material to be mapped onto target material, and even the most happenstance of experiences can be utilized by the brain for conceptualization and reasoning, especially if they have a cultural anchor. "Reasoning" may be a deceptively named concept, since the "reasons" underlying some choices are merely chance, as this example demonstrates.

### 6.3 The Paragon

The cognitive function of a role model is the idealization of a certain character: the *paragon* (cf. 2.3). Nearly half of each gender group of consultants (6 women, 6 men) cited words that point directly to the idealization of a character or character traits. They stated that either they themselves or other people find these aspects worthy of mention.

F1: *Verehrung von Heiligen*
F7: *... das imponiert, beeindruckt, ob es jetzt mehr der [sic] Gefühlsebene ist, oder mehr aus dem Staunen heraus ...*
F8: *Das unbeirrbare Zeugnis für den Glauben ...*
F10: *... die Wundertaten, die Heilungen sind sehr wichtig.*
F12: *... dass jemand einfach besonders fasziniert ist, ... so eine Sache, die man wirklich bewundernswert findet, ... dass sie oft eine Bewunderung hervorrufen.*
F13: *... dieses gradlinige Tugendstreben, verbunden mit dem heroischen Akt der Selbstaufopferung.*

H1: *... die werden in einer Form von einer Volksfrömmigkeit tatsächlich angerufen.*
H2: *... da wird der dann irgendwo halt besonders geehrt.*
H3: *... jemanden sucht, den man verehrt, ... dass sie Anlass bieten für die Leute, Idole zu haben.*
H4: *... dass sie unhinterfragbar heilig sind, ... dass sie irgendwie so einen archetypischen Charakter haben, ... einfach für ein Ideal oder sowas stehen.*
H5: *... dass sie anders leben als die anderen, ... es gibt Menschen, die quasi drüber hinaus sind.*
H7: *Die Wunder.*

Both sets of examples—role models and idealizations in general—point to the saliency of ideal characteristics and the tendency for people to attribute extreme qualities (in this case positive ones) to those figures who serve as role models. They 'venerate' (*verehren*), 'marvel at' (*bewundern*), and are 'astonished' (*staunen*) by saints who have 'archetypical characteristics' (*archetypischer Charakter*), have worked 'miracles' (*Wunder*), and have committed 'heroic acts of self-sacrifce' (*heroischer Akt der Selbstaufopferung*). These figures and their stories as a genre provide believers with a *domain-general* script (cf. 3.6) for ideal moral action in every facet of their lives, not just within the practice of their religion. We can make this inference especially through statements like those of F7, F12, F13, H2, H3, H4, H5 above, who mention not only or not necessarily purely religious domains, but also more general domains of life.

### 6.4 Intermediary to God

A further function of a role model or paragon saint for Christian believers is the role of intermediary to God. More than half of each gender group (8 women, 8 men) considered saints to provide a "helping" function in daily life as a means of achieving greater intimacy with their highest moral goals, personified and/or crystallized in the form of faith in the Christian God:

F2:    *Fürsprecher* zu Gott
       **Mittler** zu Gott
       *Unterstützung*
       **Helfer** in bestimmten Situationen
       *Zugang zu Gott finden*
F3:    *erhoffte **Hilfe**stellung*
       *um **Hilfe anrufen***
F6:    *Stütze*
       **Hilfe**
       *kleine Rettungsangabe*
F8:    *den Gläubigen unglaublich **helfen** einfach in ihrem Alltag*
F9:    *dass man sie um **Hilfe anrufen** kann*
F10:   *wenn du was verloren hast*
       *geh nach [Ort] mit deiner Krankheit*
F12:   *welchen Heiligen brauche ich jetzt?*
       **Fürbitte**
       *vor Prüfungen*
       *wenn du was verloren hast*
       *Schutzpatron unserer Stadt*
       *er kann für mich **mitbitten** sozusagen*
       *zu zweit erreichen wir vielleicht mehr als alleine*
F13:   *Sie sind schon so eine Verbindung zwischen Himmel und Erde*

H1:    *die werden in einer Form von einer Volksfrömmigkeit tatsächlich **angerufen***
H4:    *… [den] Leuten was gibt, dem sie bisschen näher kommen können; Gott, das ist so weit*
       *weg.*
H5:    **Fürsprecher**
       *dass man sich an die **wenden** kann*
H6:    *… dass sie durch ihre Geschichten, durch ihre Taten zu Heligen also zu **Bittstellern** bei*
       *Gott wurden.*
       *… die **Bitten** richten kann, die dann weiter geleitet werden.*
H7:    *Vergleichssituation … die einem **helfen**, wie man sich verhandeln soll*
H8:    *Lebenshilfe*
H9:    *… wenn sie sich diesem Heiligen **zuwenden** …*
H11:   **Nothelfer**
       *Aufzählung von Leuten, an die man sich **wenden** kann*
       **Fürsprecher**

Among the most often named functions are 'intermediary' (*Mittler*), 'intercessor' (*Fürsprecher*), 'supplicant' (*Bittsteller*), or 'aide' (*Helfer*), and believers most often 'turn to' (*zuwenden*) or 'call on' (*anrufen*) the saints for 'help' (*Hilfe*), 'intercession' (*Fürbitte*), or 'pleas' (*Bitten*). These are all symptoms of conceptualization strategies. Moral reasoning is filtered through the cultural lens of Christian belief in such cases as these; saints' life stories act as scripts that believers flesh out with their own experiences, and the saints themselves are embodied versions of believers' moral systems. Appealing to a saint involves complex mapping of narrative structures (cf. 2.6, 2.11); appealing to a saint means using the saint and his or her narrative as a frame or script. As

with metaphorical mapping of source and target domains, the believer uses the *script* as a *source domain*, placing the saint in the position of the source domain, along with any details about the saint's life—including causes and effects—as *entailments* of that source domain (cf. 2.6, 2.7). The believer's own situation is the *target domain*, and the appeal involves mapping entailments from the source to the target domain to fill in all empty target domain "slots", or details, according to the source domain's entailments.  In this fashion, the believer "receives help" from the saint; the saint and his or her life provide crucial information for the believer's decision-making processes in his or her own life.  Saints as *source domains* provide valuable help in that they aid and support the reasoning and thinking processes of a believer.  They enable believers to explain causes and effect in their own lives via the causes and effects in the saints' lives, which helps to minimize and manage uncertainty (cf. 2.8, 3.5, 3.7, 4.1.5).


## 6.5  Concretization of the Abstract

Finally, one of the most recurring statements about the function of the saints' stories involved assertions and demonstrations that the stories "concretize" belief for people; they enable comprehension of complex and abstract concepts such as morality and moral action through more concrete means.   8 women and 10 men expressed this sentiment in various ways additional to the function of a role model or namesake:

F2:  *wenn man sich mit den **Texten** beschäftigt ... [und] einen neuen **Zugang** zu Gott erschließt.*

F4:  ***Legenden** sind auch Sachen, die emotional sind, ... ein Volksglaube **zum Ausdruck** kommt.*

F5:  *... einfach also die **Todesart**, also quasi und die **Geschichte** eben darum ... Franz von Assisi ... ja, dieses **alles Weggeben**, quasi dieses Armwerden.*

F6:  *Es gefällt einem sehr diese **blumige Sprache** und diese **Bildhaftigkeit**.*

F8:  *... weil der Glaube selbst nichts **Fassbares** ist, der kommt **zum Ausdruck** in **Taten**, und das wird an Heiligen **sichtbar**.*

F9:  *... das Leben der Heiligen allgemein als konsequente **Nachfolge** Christi. ... Ich versinke gemütsmäßig und anschauungsmäßig in **Tatsachen** aus den **Leben** der Heiligen und hole mir da Kraft und Richtung.*

F10: *... dass die Menschen auf andere Werte **greifen**, die über dem Kapitalismus stehen.*

F12: *... ein **Zeugnis** dafür, dass eben wie groß und wie **schön** die Religion ist, also unser Glauben muss man eher sagen, und auch Gott, ... dass es so **was Schönes** gibt.*

H1:  *die werden in einer Form von einer Volksfrömmigkeit tatsächlich angerufen, in einer **Litanei.***

H3:  *Heilige haben für mich den Charakter, dass man das dann auch **nach außen tragen** kann.*

H4:  *... das ist eine Art **Dekoration** ... für die **Liturgie**, ... für die Tradition, für die Theologie, ... es ist einfach ein **schöner Schmuck**, ... die Funktion ist ... fast so eine **ästhetische** irgendwie, ... man braucht bisschen was **zum Anfassen** quasi, ... Auch bei **Reliquien** spielt es ja mit.*

H5:   *... die **Taten** und **Werke**, und das **Leben**, also **das Ausdrücken**, ... das Evangelium ganz **konkret machen**.*

H6:   *... durch ihre **Taten**.*

H7:   *Der **Lebenswandel**.  Allgemeine **Lebensgeschichte**.*

H9:   *... insoweit wir uns damit auseinandersetzen und auch nachhaltig und über Schwierigkeiten hinweg diesem **Inhalt**, diesem Gott zuwenden, diesem Glauben zuwenden, ... dann wird man versuchen, diesen Heiligen herauszustellen, ... was hat sich hier **abgespielt**?*

H11: *Und natürlich auch **aufzeigen**, wenn man ... die heilige Theologie nimmt.*

H12: *wie er sich da auf die Ebene, auf das Niveau dieses Menschen herablässt und sich wirklich in seinen **Alltag** hineinziehen lässt, ... da sieht man wirklich **ganz konkret**, wie der Allmächtige um diesen einzelnen kleinen Menschen besorgt ist.*

H13: *... sind oft Menschen, die so im Kleinen, **im Alltäglichen**, mitten in der **Welt**, Gutes **getan** haben, und da in Gemeinschaften mit Gott gelebt haben.*

I have highlighted above some of the most important words.   These are words that reference either things that one hears or sees concretely (*Texten* 'texts', *Legenden* 'legends', *Geschichte* 'story', *Nachfolge* 'emulation', *Zeugnis* 'evidence/testimonial', *Litanei* 'litany', *Liturgie* 'liturgy', *Reliquien* 'relics'), story details that reference nameable actions and events (*Todesart* 'manner of death', *alles Weggeben* 'giving everything away', *Taten* 'deeds' (3x), *Tatsachen* 'facts', *Leben* 'life' (2x), *Werke* 'works', *Lebenswandel* 'way of life', *Lebensgeschichte* 'life story', *Inhalt* 'content', *abgespielt* 'played out', *getan* 'done'), physical experiences accessing one or more of the five senses or containing metaphorical references to the five senses (*Zugang* 'access', *greifen* 'grasp', *Fassbares* 'comprehensible' (in terms of "graspable"), *sichtbar* 'visible', *zum Anfassen* '[something] to take hold of'), the importance of making abstractions more accessible through expression and particularly through concrete expression (*zum Ausdruck* 'into expression' (2x), *blumige Sprache* 'ornate/flowery language', *Bildhaftigkeit* 'vividness/picture-like quality', *schön* 'beautiful', *was Schönes* 'something beautiful', *nach außen tragen* 'to project outwardly/demonstrate', *Dekoration* 'decoration', *schöner Schmuck* 'lovely adornment', *ästhetische [Funktion]* 'aesthetic [function]', *das Ausdrücken* 'expression', *ganz konkret machen* 'to make very concrete', *aufzeigen* 'to demonstrate/show', *ganz konkret* 'very concrete'), and the "Ordinary" as a means of concrete access to the abstract (*Alltag* 'everyday life', *im Alltäglichen* 'the daily/mundane', *Welt* 'world').  Many answers to these two questions also demonstrated the need for concrete examples; 10 women [F2, F3,F5, F6, F8, F9, F10, F11, F12, F13] and 2 men [H1, H3] mentioned specific saints to describe situations of need in which believers make appeals (I do not list these saints here because the specific saints are unimportant to this particular discussion).  All of these comments underscore the concrete, *bodily basis* for human cognition (cf. 2.4).  They exemplify how direct experience through the physical senses is the foundation for all thinking and reasoning, used in both literal and metaphorical ways in these responses.


## 6.6  Waning Functionality?

Despite these avid and detailed responses supporting the idea that saints' stories are important or provide an important function to people today, an interesting caveat is that several

of my consultants felt that saints and their stories are losing importance. 4 women and 3 men substantiate this phenomenon:

F7: *Die Schwierigkeit, denke ich, ist auch immer, dass der gesellschaftliche Rahmen so total anders ist.*
F8: *Es ist ja heutzutage leider so, dass nicht mehr viele glauben.*
F10: *... weil die Kirchen sind eigentlich im Rückgang* [sic]*...*
F11: *Für die meisten Leute, glaube ich, haben sie überhaupt keine Funktion, ... für die allermeisten Leute, glaube ich, hat das keine Bedeutung. Es ist ihnen egal, was vor hunderten Jahren war, oder auch heutzutage...*

H2: *... allgemein wird's wahrscheinlich eher geringere Funktion sein, ... das, denke ich mal, muss man realistisch sehen, dass die doch eher gering ist.*
H9: *Ich glaube, sie haben untergeordnete Bedeutung. Aber wenn ich eben von der Bedeutung generell der Heiligen heute spreche, dann hat diese Bedeutung sehr stark abgenommen. Man sucht heute keine Namen mehr aus, nach Heiligen, was noch vor 50 Jahren, oder vor 30 Jahren noch selbstverständlich war.... Das spielt heute eine völlig untergeordnete Rolle.... Es ist säkularer geworden.*
H10: *Es kommt auf's Alter an. ... in diesem Segments* [sic] *der Menschen zwischen 15 und 55, das wieder relativ ausgeklammert ist.*

While F7 suggests that the stories are less important because the cultural frame is so different now, F8 suggests that there are not many believers at all anymore. F10 simply says that belief (metonymically via the Churches) is diminishing, and F11 asserts that people do not care what happened hundreds of years ago, such that the time difference inhibits a connection with the saints. Among the men, H2 asserts that—but gives no reasons why—these stories realistically must have a reduced function; H9 compares the diminished use of saints' names for naming babies in the last 30 to 50 years; and H10 suggests that saints' stories are only less important for people between the ages of 15 and 55. The validity of these assertions is difficult to assess for the purposes of this study. Nonetheless, a similar number of males and females appear to agree about saints' waning function in today's society, such that I would interpret this data to point to one likely conceptual trend in the population: the saints and the things that they stand for play less of a role in German cultural models used for moral reasoning, and this circumstance could indicate conceptual changes in the entailments about saints that pertain to gender. However, these few statements do not provide enough detail to support or refute such a correlation, nor do they necessitate one.

A number of other responses about these circumstances provide further nuance to the possible trend. One consultant suggests an extreme form of this reduced function, saying that saints are even repellent to many people today, mostly due to the word "saint" itself being too aloof, or distanced, from reality:

H3: *Vielleicht müsste man eine andere Bezeichnung für 'heilig' finden, weil das bei manchen Leuten dann schon wieder etwas Abstoßendes ist—oder nicht abstoßend— Agression erzeugend. ... Negativen Touch hat's nach meiner Ansicht dadurch, in der heutigen Zeit, dass das Wort 'heilig' so weit abgehoben ist.*

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However, the same consultant also suggested that saints in general are necessary today, particularly because people seek role models:

> H3: *Man braucht irgendwelche Vorbilder, und dazu sind die Heiligen, nach meiner Ansicht, auch in der heutigen Zeit—oder vielleicht wieder in der heutigen Zeit—notwendig.*

A female consultant echoed this stance, saying that belief in saints and the search for faith is continuously increasing:

> F10: *...die Heiligen- und Glaubenssuche ist nach wie vor sehr im Vormarsch.*

I suggest that these opinions are a valuable reflection of what may be common among the broader population; the Christian saints and their stories are probably waning in importance among the general population and tend to have greater influence in the lives of Catholics who still practice Christianity. However, the population of Catholic Christian believers in the West is large enough and spans enough different segments of the general population—both in terms of age and of profession, according to the statistics of my consultants—that their influence among the general population cannot be overlooked. The values they believe in, embodied by the saints, characteristics, and narrative circumstances they discuss, can still be found in the culture at large. Systems of belief may be changing, enabling more Nurturant Parent moral reasoning, but there may just as well as be persistent values and beliefs based on Strict Father morality (cf. 4.1.5, 4.1.6). The following chapters draw out detailed examples that will shed more light on this question, demonstrating the degree to which SFM and NPM appears in this population sample. Chapter 10 will summarize the results from my German language speakers and suggest paths for further research on larger populations.

# CHAPTER 7

# GENDER CONSTELLATIONS:
# MALE AND FEMALE DOMAINS

## 7.1  Descriptions and Characteristics: Questions 1 and 2

Questions 1 and 2 from my interview questionnaire request that consultants offer their own, free-form, general descriptions of first female, then male, saints in the form of a few sentences:

1. *Wie würden Sie die weiblichen Heiligen allgemein in 3 bis 5 Sätzen beschreiben?*
   'How would you describe the female saints in general, in 3 to 5 sentences?'

2. *Wie würden Sie die männlichen Heiligen allgemein in 3 bis 5 Sätzen beschreiben?*
   'How would you describe the male saints in general, in 3 to 5 sentences?'

## 7.2  Domains of Activity

The most important details that emerged from these basic descriptions are what I will characterize as the different *domains of activity* that saints fill, as perceived by my consultants. Male and female consultants alike named certain domains with regular consistency, and the frequency with which one gender or another was associated with particular domains also showed patterns.  After pooling the data, I found that approximately 15 domains were repeated by more than a single consultant, and could therefore be considered at least somewhat commonly shared cultural information within my pool of 26 consultants; a characteristic or domain must be named by more than one consultant in order to consider it indicative of more than an idiolect.  These domains, as shared cultural concepts, are cultural *frames* for actions and events, which can be seen as narrative *scripts* (cf. 2.5, 3.3, 3.5).  They describe characteristic activities of persons who act "morally".  Therefore, these domains point us to the details of consultants' moral belief systems (cf. Chapter 4).  Through the association of these activities and their details with the two different genders of saints, we can make *inferences* (cf. 3.1, 3.5, 3.6) about my consultants' gender beliefs.  One caveat I must offer is that, because the study population is small, the number of examples discussed in each category below is also limited.  This circumstance enables me to identify possible trends that could be examined for verification in further, larger studies.

The characteristic domains named are as follows, in order from most often to least often used (the number of consultants who referred to each is to the left; the translation/description of each domain in English is to the right):

| Number of consultants utilizing domain* | Domain Keywords (German) | Description (English) |
|---|---|---|
| 15 | **sozial** | 'social' (charitable serving/caring for others) |
| 14 | **Orden**sleute; zu einer Institution gehörig | 'members of a religious order'; 'belonging to a religious institution' |
| 8 | **Schriften** geschrieben; generell gelehrt | 'produced written works'; 'generally educated' (primarily in theology) |
| 7 | **Mystiker**; Visionen oder Erscheinungen gehabt | 'mystics'; 'had visions or spiritual manifestations' |
| 7 | **Märtyrer** | 'martyrs' |
| 6 | ihre Taten/ihr Tun; etwas **Besonderes** gemacht | 'their deeds/actions'; 'accomplished something of distinction' |
| 6 | irgendwie **gegen** das Erwartete in der Zeit | 'somehow against the norms of the time' |
| 5 | **mächtig**e Position | 'position of power' |
| 5 | **Verzicht**: zölibatär, asketisch, ehelos. keusch | 'self-denial/eschewal': 'celibate, ascetic, unmarried, abstinent/virginal' |
| 4 | Gebet; besondere **Beziehung** zu Gott | 'prayer'; 'a distinctive relationship with God' |
| 4 | christliche Botschaft **verkünden**; den Glauben verteidigen | 'spread the Christian message'; 'defend/champion the faith' |
| 3 | **kämpferisch**; Helden | 'militant/warlike'; 'heroes' |
| 3 | **Mutter** | 'mother' |
| 2 | **Bekehrung** | 'conversion' |
| 2 | **Leiden** | 'suffering' |

*A consultant is counted twice if he or she applies the domain to both female and male saints.

In order to refer to these categories, I have bold-faced a single word that will serve as the key word. Each word is simply a kind of notation method for a variety of related activities, described more completely by the various descriptions in the column "Domain Keywords" in the table above. Below is a compact list of categories by key word in order of importance (based on the total number of consultants who utilized a word or phrase pertinent to the category):

**1. Sozial**
**2. Orden**
**3. Schriften**
**4. Mystiker**
**5. Märtyrer**
**6. Besonderes**
**7. Gegen**
**8. Mächtig**
**9. Verzicht**
**10. Beziehung**

**11.** *Verkünden*
**12.** *Kämpferisch*
**13.** *Mutter*
**14.** *Bekehrung*
**15.** *Leiden*

Of these domains, some applied primarily or only to one gender or another, and patterns among male and among female consultants' responses also emerged. In the following paragraphs I will outline the patterns for each category in the above category order. Some individual consultants provided more than one word, collocation, or phrase with respect to a single group; therefore, the total number of examples does not always equal the total number of individuals who provided the examples.

### 7.3  *Sozial*

With respect to *Sozial*, a pattern emerged, indicating that both male and female consultants agreed that this category highly pertains to female saints. Male consultants were far more likely than female consultants to mention it, however: 8 male consultants versus 3 female consultants. The variety of terms or phrases used among the 8 male consultants to refer to female saints was also more substantial than those used by female consultants:

**1.** *Sozial***: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F2, F8, F11] | Male Consultants [H1, H2, H3, H6, H9, H10, H12, H13] |
| --- | --- |
| - *gesellschaftliches Engagement*<br>- *Tat der Nächstenliebe*<br>- *sozial herausragende Taten vollbracht* | - *karitativ*<br>- *Mutter Teresa, die in Kalkutta gewirkt hat*<br>- *sozial-karitativ*<br>- *der Nächstenliebe [verpflichtet]*<br>- *gesellschaftlich aktiv*<br>- *soziales Engagement*<br>- *karitative Schiene*<br>- *zupackende Karitas*<br>- *fürsorglich für andere da*<br>- *karitativer Einsatz* |

In comparison, only 3 male consultants and 1 female consultant used this category with reference to male saints:

**1.** *Sozial***: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F8] | Male Consultants [H5, H6, H9] |
| --- | --- |
| - *auch … Taten der Nächstenliebe* | - *Sozialheilige*<br>- *immer gesellschaftlich aktiv*<br>- *soziales Engagement*<br>- *Taten der Nächstenliebe* |

I suggest this data points to a highly common conceptual structure among today's male believers that female saints are socially active and charitable.  This data reflects the conventions about female saints and *Serving* found in Chapter 5 (cf. 5.6).  Fewer such responses from female consultants suggest that it is likely that female believers are conscious of the charitable quality of female saints, but that this quality is not as important in female saints to female believers as it is to the male believers.

### 7.4  *Orden*

Category 2, **Orden**, reveals a similar agreement among male and female consultants that both genders of saints are associated with their involvement in some kind of religious organization, such as a religious order, a cloister, or the institution of the Church in general. Male and female consultants were more balanced in their references to female saints, as 3 males and 4 females used such descriptions:

**2. *Orden*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F5, F6, F8, F12] | Male Consultants [H2, H3, H9] |
|---|---|
| - *Ordensfrauen* | - *in einem Orden* |
| - *kirchlichen Formen* | - *Klosterschwester* |
| - *Kloster* | - *dem Gebet und Orden verpflichtet* |
| - *je nach welchem Stand oder Orden* | - *Kloster* |

While both genders referred to male saints as belonging to such Church institutions, male consultants provided an unusually large proliferation of terms and titles to refer to these affiliations:

**2. *Orden*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F2, F9] | Male Consultants [H2, H3, H5, H9, H10] |
|---|---|
| - *dem Klerus angehörig* | - *Kleriker* |
| - *große Liebe zu den Geboten* | - *Weltpriester* |
| | - *Weltkleriker* |
| | - *Bischof* |
| | - *Papst* |
| | - *einfacher Priester* |
| | - *Diakone* |
| | - *stärker für die Institution Kirche verpflichtet* |
| | - *Kirchenmänner* |
| | - *Ordenspriester* |
| | - *Priester* |
| | - *stammen aus der Kirche oder der aufkommenen Kirche* |
| | - *Priester* |
| | - *Ordensleute* |

Perhaps more interesting than the fact that 5 male consultants referred to these affiliations of male saints in comparison to only 2 female consultants is the number of different titles associated with males involved in religious orders. These titles actually point to a great variety of positions that males can hold within the church. In comparison, only two different possible positions appear with respect to females: basic belonging to a religious order in general (inferred from the word *Orden*) and belonging to a religious group segregated physically from the general public (inferred from the word *Kloster*). In other words, females are associated with their membership alone, rather than any particular rank of note or position with responsibilities. A further inference is that their membership can also physically separate them from those outside their religious group by keeping them within the confines of their convent. In contrast, males are associated not only with membership in religious orders, but also with all of the different ranks and respective responsibilities. In fact, most of these ranks are leadership roles, such as 'priest', 'deacon', 'bishop', and even 'pope'. Two titles, *Weltpriester* and *Weltkleriker* 'world/secular priest' and 'world/secular clergyman' (a priest who does not officially belong to an order and therefore practices outside of it, in the "secular" world), also suggest that categorization within a religious group does not necessarily mean physical segregation within the confines of a cloister. Instead, male religious persons have the opportunity to go out into the public world, so to speak.

Interestingly, only the male consultants referred to these roles. It is difficult to conjecture as to the significance of these data. Why would women not refer to these roles? Is it so conventional that males hold positions of power that the women found it unnecessary to mention that fact? Why did men, on the other hand, emphasize these roles? Do male believers particularly identify with men in these roles, perhaps as role models (cf. Chapter 6), especially given that several consultants aspired to become priests? Or are men proud of that fact that men hold positions of power? Do these men identify themselves with men in these positions of power regardless of whether they themselves aspire to be priests because they simply wish to identify with other men who are obviously successful? Could there be any other explanations for the responses from either gender of consultants?

Clearly apropos are these questions about men's focus on certain roles, as well as subsequent questions about both genders' reasons for focusing on certain qualities in saints of their own gender. Just within the context of these first two questions from the questionnaire, a number of consultants of both genders referred to the role model function that saints have for believers today:

**Female Saints are role models for believers today:**

| Female Consultants [F10, F12] | Male Consultants [H7] |
|---|---|
| - *weibliche Heilige eher als mutig und vorbildhaft* <br> - *ich finde alle sehr bewundernswert* <br> - *viele können für einen selber ein Vorbild sein* <br> - *ein sehr gutes Bild repräsentieren* <br> - *so allgemeine Ideale, ... wie eine Frau oder ein Mann leben soll* | - *als Vorbild für die Christen* |

**Male Saints are role models for believers today:**

| Female Consultants [F10, F12] | Male Consultants [H7, H10] |
|---|---|
| - *männliche Heilige werden als vorbildhaft...*<br>- *vielleicht finden manche Männer da bessere*<br>  *Vorbilder für ihre Schwierigkeiten oder*<br>  *ihre Anliegen*<br>- *alle gleich ... trotzdem faszinierend sind*<br>- *(so allgemeine Ideale, ... wie eine Frau oder*<br>  *ein Mann leben soll)* | - *ein Vorbild für die Christen*<br>- *auch Sinnbilder für Tugend*<br>- *es sind halt leuchtende Vorbilder an*<br>  *Glauben, an denen man versucht, sich zu*<br>  *orientieren* |

The category *Mächtig* below may also shed more light on these questions, as may the former, more complete discussion about role models (cf. 6.2, 6.3).

### 7.5  *Schriften*

Category 3, *Schriften*, displays a pattern of focused interest among the female consultants in contrast with the male consultants. Only two male consultants mentioned domains of activity having to do with education, producing writing, or other theological accomplishments, and both uses were with respect to male saints. The female consultants, on the other hand, mentioned such accomplishments with equal frequency about both male and female saints:

**3. *Schriften*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F1, F8, F11] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *drei Kirchenlehrerinnen*<br>- *auch was geschrieben*<br>- *haben auf theologischem oder geistigen*<br>  *Gebiete herausgeragt* | |

**3. *Schriften*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F5, F8, F12] | Male Consultants [H1, H9] |
|---|---|
| - *alle was geschrieben*<br>- *ganz viele wertvolle Schrifte hinterlassen*<br>- *Schwerpunkt in der geistigen Durchdringung*<br>- *bestimmte Aussagen* | - *Gelehrter*<br>- *viel Bildung* |

These results suggest that current female believers may place great importance on education and accomplishments that are a result of having a good education. It is not surprising that they admire these accomplishments in saints, since most of the saints they discussed lived in historical periods during which women were not usually afforded the same education or rights to education that men received. The fact that some women nevertheless accomplished such feats stands out as exemplary (cf. *marked*, 5.6), and female consultants may admire such saints as female role models (cf. Chapter 6). The fact that female consultants mentioned these activity domains just as often with respect to male saints simply supports my hypothesis; learning and writing are valued by these female consultants, no matter the gender.

Male saints were obviously expected to be involved in such activities, which is supported by the male consultants' responses. These data are supported by the conventional categorization of males as *Thinkers* in Chapter 5 (cf. 5.6). The fact that male consultants did not mention such activities as often for male saints as did female consultants—and that male consultants did not mention them at all for female saints—may be indicative of a uniquely male perspective: since males have always been privileged with access to learning and the opportunity to produce writing, learnedness is not as important—or *marked*—a quality—though nevertheless an obvious one—for men to mention. It is common that male saints were involved in academic pursuits. However, male consultants may have taken it for granted that academic pursuits were an integral part of many male saints' domains of activity. It was less important for men that their male role models produced such works, since such activities were more commonplace among men and not as indicative of a major achievement as they may have been for women. The female consultants, in contrast, found such achievements noteworthy for both genders because they identify with women as role models; they understand the greater effort required of women in order to achieve these things and therefore believe that learning is a noteworthy privilege. The female consultants likely see learning as a greater privilege than do male consultants.

One objection to these explanations may be that if men are proud of males who have accomplished positions of power, and therefore mention them often, then why would men not also be proud of men who have accomplished important writings through education? Writings and education were commonplace for men, but so was the fact of males being in positions of power. Why would education but not positions of power be taken for granted by the male consultants, when both were similarly commonplace for males versus females? Similarly, if females were not often granted positions of power, nor were they afforded opportunities for education and writing, why would female consultants place so much emphasis on education but not on positions of power? I cannot answer these questions with certainty, but I can suggest that these differences demonstrate differing conceptual patterns between male and female contemporary believers. Positions of power may be simply more important to men currently and less important to women, while education and producing important written works may be more important to women than to men. These conclusions in constellation with further evidence below can tell us more about patterns of conceptual differences that may exist between contemporary male and female speakers.

## 7.6 *Mystiker*

Whereas the category **Schriften** appears to be a male-dominated domain of activity that is valued highly or given great prestige by some consultants, one of the next most-mentioned categories is female-dominated according to both men and women. This category includes the characteristic of **Mystiker**, being a 'mystic', or having visions or wondrous encounters:

**4. *Mystiker*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F2, F3, F10] | Male Consultants [H1, H2] |
|---|---|
| - *Mystikerinnen* | - *hauptsächlich Mystikerinnen* |
| - *mystische Erfahrungen* | - *Visionen* |
| - *Mystikerinnen* | - *Erscheinungen* |

### 4. *Mystiker*: Male Saints

| Female Consultants | Male Consultants [H1, H6] |
|---|---|
| | - *Mystiker* |
| | - *Wundererscheinungen* |

The treatment of this category by the two gender groups of consultants is almost exactly the mirror opposite of the previous category, ***Schriften***.  While the male consultants demonstrated more variety in depicting this category than the females, the females never applied this category to male saints.  It seems that mysticism is most associated with female saints, and that female consultants take it for granted, possibly assigning less prestige to the activities of mystics than they do to the more traditionally male category of learning and writing.  Male consultants, in contrast, appear to give more credence to the activities of mystics than to the activities of the educated.  Each gender of consultant appears to treat the achievements of the opposite gender as particularly special, or marked (cf. 5.6).

When we integrate this evidence with another common statement, however, a different explanation emerges, suggesting that the male consultants did not necessarily focus more in general on the activities of mystics—primarily women—as opposed to those of scholars—primarily men.  Another pattern among both male and female consultants emerged in the form of statements that there are simply more male than female saints, or that when one thinks of saints, more male than female saints come to mind.  Not a single consultant suggested the opposite.  Below are the comments to this effect:

**'There are more male than female saints':**

| Female Consultants [F5, F7, F10, F11] | Male Consultants [H10] |
|---|---|
| - *auf jeden Fall ein paar mehr [männliche Heilige als weibliche]* | - *weibliche Heilige—eher weniger präsentiert* |
| - *sie [die Frauen] hatten natürlich den zweiten Platz….  Männer in der Überzahl* | - *männliche Heilige ist im Allgemeinen eine unheimliche Masse* |
| - *Ein Heiliger ist allgemein eher männlich … das ist irgendwie diese Volksvorstellung* | |
| - *sie [Männer] haben es wahrscheinlich leichter [als Frauen], Heilige zu werden* | |

I suggest that when consultants were presented with the question to describe female saints in general and then to do the same for male saints, they simply had a harder time coming up with representative female than males saints upon which to base their generalized answer.  This suggestion is corroborated by the fact that four different male consultants [H1, H3, H8, H9] could not name and discuss a specific female martyred or non-martyred saint, thereby skipping a section of the interview entirely, and one male consultant [H11] resorted to discussing "generalized" female saints—or *salient exemplars* used in drawing conclusions about "typical" members of the category female saints (cf. 2.2, 2.3)—in lieu of discussing the details of a single individual's story (cf. List of Saints, 5.5).  For those who cannot produce a single, concrete example, the simplest way to describe the female saints is to utilize the domain-general (cf. 3.6) narrative script about female saints, also known as a *social stereotype* (cf. 2.3), which involves the most societally and culturally traditional details: holy women throughout Christianity have always been well-known for their mysticism (cf. 4.2.4).  The women most revered in the

Catholic Church, even by the Church Patriarchs, have been those who were mystics because having holy visions meant having a direct connection to God. In an environment where women were denied prestige of other sorts, such as scholarly activities upon which the doctrine of the Church was built, mystics were afforded the most prestige among women. This appears to be part of the folk theory (cf. 2.3, 2.5, 2.10, 4.1.5) about female saints, drawn from the culturally domain-general narrative script—or *typical case prototype*—about female saints (cf. 2.3). When a consultant could not think of at least one example from which to describe characteristics, he or she may have reverted to a folk theory concept to which most believers have quick access: females are mystics.

The consultants' emphasis on mystics may also be partially a result of the way my questions approached the problem. I asked each consultant to describe female saints and then male saints. When required to first consider the female saints alone as a group sharing a number of qualities (the implications of my framing of two separate genders), consultants felt they had to come up with some way of generalizing about this gender in order to answer the question at all. They accepted the gender division as it was presented to them; most did not consider the option to say they could think of no characteristics associated with a single gender, and only a few consultants, when posed with the very first question about solely female saints, considered immediately dismissing the implication that male and female saints are different as a result of gender. No consultant wholly objected to a rudimentary division into genders when answering the first question. Therefore, each came up with the best summary he or she could for each gender, stating what first came to mind, which most likely is a folk theory about gender. What emerged was the association of female saints with mysticism.

However, an inclination to reject the gender division signaled by these first two questions as a cause for qualitative differences among the saints represents a significant enough number of comments to warrant consideration (cf. Chapter 9 for discussion of overt gender comparison). The women suggest slightly more often (6) than the men (4) that this gender division may be false:

**Male and female saints are not necessarily different:**

| Female Consultants: | F2: *Ja, es ist eigentlich ... eigentlich schon ... schon ähnlich [zwischen Männern und Frauen].*<br><br>F4: *Eigentlich ähnlich. Ich glaub', es gibt wenig Unterschied [zwischen Männern und Frauen].*<br>*Und oft sind es ja auch ... so ... Schutz— eigentlich jetzt für weiblich und männlich, jemanden zu schützen.*<br><br>F5: *Treue zu Christus. Das ist ... entspricht jetzt aber allen Heiligen; das ist jetzt nicht nur die weiblichen.*<br>*Ja, die [männlichen Heiligen] haben das Gleiche, also Treue zu Christus und zur Kirche. Das bezieht sich aber auf die weiblichen auch…. Außerdem sind sie sonst keine Heiligen.*<br><br>F10: *Männliche Heilige werden als vorbildhaft— also wieder auch starke Persönlichkeiten [wie die Frauen].*<br><br>F12: *... dass es eben weibliche Heilige auch gibt ... das ist eigentlich ein schönes Bild dafür, dass alle Menschen gleichgestellt sind vor Gott.*<br>*Also ich glaub', da würd' ich jetzt [bei den Männern] wahrscheinlich dasselbe sagen, wie bei den Frauen.*<br><br>F13: *Wahrscheinlich kann man da [für die Männer] das Ähnliche sagen.* |
|---|---|
| Male Consultants: | H5: *Aber ich glaub', alle Heilige[n] zeichnen sich aus durch Gebet und die Verbindung zu Gott.*<br><br>H7: *Weibliche Heilige. So wie alle Heiligen, als Vorbild für die Christen.*<br><br>H8: *Ich differenziere in meinem Gefühl oder meinem Bewusstsein da gar nicht zwischen männlichen und weiblichen Heiligen.*<br><br>H13: *Eine große Hingabe, ... wobei das unterscheidet sich nicht so sehr von Männern.*<br>*Männliche Heilige sind für mich auch große Menschenkenner, wobei das bezieht sich jetzt auch alles allgemein auf Heilige.* |

These examples, in which consultants suggest that female and male saints are similar or not so different from each other, will be important later in the discussion of my comparative questions, 76-78 (cf. Chapter 9). In contrast to questions 1 and 2, I ask explicitly in questions 76-78 whether the consultants believe there is a gender difference. It is interesting to note that these data above are instances in which consultants offered a comparison of their own accord. In Chapter 9, I will juxtapose these voluntary comparisons with the requested comparisons below to provide more insights on the differing perspectives of male and female contemporary speakers.

### 7.7 *Märtyrer*

Similar to the association of female saints with mysticism is the association of male saints with martyrdom. Category 5, ***Märtyrer***, appears to mirror for male saints the folk theory association of female saints with mysticism:

**5.** *Märtyrer(innen)***: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F3, F4, F11] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *durch ihr Martyrium heilig gesprochen worden*<br>- *haben Martyrien gehabt*<br>- *Märtyrer* | |

**5.** *Märtyrer***: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F3, F4] | Male Consultants [H1, H3] |
|---|---|
| - *überwiegend da die Märtyrer*<br>- *haben ja viele Martyrien oft* | - *hauptsächlich als Märtyrer*<br>- *mehr gemarterte* |

While some women offered martyrdom as a character trait for female [F3, F4, F11] as well as male saints [F3, F4], men [H1, H3] explicitly name martyrdom as a particularly male characteristic. Male believers may associate martyrdom foremost with male saints as a kind of *typical case prototype* (cf. 2.3), due to the tendency for believers to view saints of their own gender as role models (cf. 6.2, 6.3); they are more familiar with the male saints in general. For them, martyrs are more typically male out of greater familiarity with the male saints. While both genders of consultants appear to agree that male saints are considered to be more common than female saints, male consultants are probably less familiar with female (martyred) saints because they do not seek female saints as role models. The female consultants would likely be more familiar with female martyred saints—even if there really are fewer female than male saints— simply because female consultants are likely to seek out female saints as role models. The result is that men are more unfamiliar with female martyrs and therefore tend to associate martyrdom with male saints alone. The male consultants utilize the most available scripts to make such quick assessments. Of the five total consultants who referenced martyrdom, three reflected the belief that martyrs tend to be male [F3, H1, H3]:

**Martyrs tend more often to be men than women:**

| Female Consultants [F3] | Male Consultants [H1, H3] |
|---|---|
| - *überwiegend da die Märtyrer* | - *Es wäre ungerecht den Frauen gegenüber, aber … ich kenne jetzt männliche Heilige hauptsächlich als Märtyrer.*<br>- *Für mich sind die Frauen Heiligen weniger Märtyrer. … die männlichen sind für mich mehr gemarterte….* |

The men's responses in particular demonstrate a personal or emotional attachment to the male saints, suggesting the validity of my theory about the *role model effect*. The single female consultant's response demonstrates little emotion in comparison with the male consultants' responses. Male consultants clearly compared how they felt about female saints as compared to male saints in this category; they compared their emotional responses to the available scripts about males versus those about females. They concluded that martyrdom was more familiar to them with respect to male saints.

## 7.8 *Besonderes*

Ironically, the following category, **Besonderes**, may at first appear to contradict this view of male saints as more often martyrs than female saints. **Besonderes** refers to the actions and deeds done that specially distinguish a saint from average people. Undergoing martyrdom would seem to be such an action, and yet, it appears from the way this category was used by my consultants that **Besonderes** refers to actions and deeds excluding martyrdom. As a result, the women are named more often than men as belonging to this category. Perhaps martyrdom in the folk theory is considered to be such a self-evident or taken-for-granted part of being canonized that it is seen as a deed deserving of its own category, separate from all other distinctive deeds. Below are the comments of consultants who referenced the category **Besonderes**:

**6. *Besonderes*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F3, F11, F12, F13] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *aufgrund ihrer Tätigkeit heilig gesprochen*<br>- *irgendwie sonst was Besonderes für ihre Zeit*<br>  *geschaffen haben*<br>- *besonders herausragend für ihr Tun*<br>- *alle sehr bewunderswert*<br>- *haben was Besonderes geleistet*<br>- *mit klaren Vorstellungen und Zielen*<br>- *einen starken Part gepspielt haben* | |

**6. *Besonderes*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F2, F7] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *hatten sich in irgendeiner Art und Weise*<br>  *hervorgetan*<br>- *durch ihre Lebensweise sich hervorgetan*<br>  *haben, [sich] aufgehoben haben*<br>- *für ihre Tatkraft gerühmt* | |

It is remarkable that none of the male consultants referred to distinctive deeds for either gender of saint, other than the act of allowing themselves to be martyred. The female consultants [F2, F3, F7, F11, F12, F13] referenced these distinctive deeds with respect to both genders, just as with the category **Schriften**; but with **Besonderes**, more consultants referenced female saints, and they used a greater variety of descriptions of such deeds. It appears that some kind of unusual trait or accomplishment distinguishes a saint from "normal" humans in the eyes of the female consultants. Female consultants value these distinctive qualities in both males and females, but given the data in the category **Besonderes**, they appear to value such qualities even more so in females.

This may again be due to the "role model effect": because females consultants identify with female saints, they see the female saints as role models who they wish to imitate. They may also feel a need to highlight the strong qualities of women; the knowledge that women have historically had less opportunity to accomplish distinctive acts than men may cause female consultants to value more highly than male consultants any kind of trait or deed that sets an individual apart from the average female. Such traits and deeds are qualities that enable an

individual to extricate herself from the "meaningless" circumstances of the general, average population.  The women may have mentioned distinctive qualities more than the men because even average men have traditionally accomplished more than average women.  Within the family unit, men have earned the income and the sustenance of the family, thereby proving their individual capabilities.  Those who have such opportunities are often unaware of the value of it, while those who do not have it know of and focus on its importance.  In combination with the above analysis of **Schriften**, this analysis suggests that my female consultants share a concept about the importance of individual identity and the ability and deeds of the individual to forge his or her own identity as a unique person.

## 7.9 *Gegen*

Similar to this female focus on the domain **Besonderes** is the focus on the next category, **Gegen**.  **Gegen** refers to the actions that saints performed which were specifically contrary to the customs of the time.  While it may seem that this category could be included in **Besonderes**, I have separated it because of the particular focus on customs of a specific time period and the act of defying those customs.  This is a more specific kind of action than simply doing anything distinctive; **Gegen** refers to acts of defiance, not simply of perseverance.  Once again, this category was used primarily to refer to female saints, but it was used more equally by both genders of consultants:

**7. *Gegen*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F2, F6, F13] | Male Consultants [H11, H13] |
|---|---|
| - *haben sich immer gegen Konventionen der damaligen Zeit gestellt*<br>- *... sind häufig aus ... kirchlichen Formen ausgebrochen*<br>- *hatten einen starken reformatorischen Charakter*<br>- *wollen das Ausbrechen aus vorgefertigten Strukturen*<br>- *welche, die auch deutlich emanzipiert auftreten konnten, ... gerade für die Zeit unüblich emanzipiert* | - *sich auch gegen Strömungen wenden*<br>- *sich notfalls gegen Vorgesetzte, z.B. Kaiser wenden*<br>- *gegen die Familia, gegen den Einfluss des Pater familias*<br>- *sind aus der gesellschaftlichen Rolle gerade in patriarchalischen Strukturen herausgetreten, ... mutig in ihrer Zeit* |

**7. *Gegen*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants | Male Consultants [H11] |
|---|---|
| | - *dieses Auftreten auch gegen Widerstand*<br>- *Auftreten auch gegen Zeitströmung und gegen Höhergestellte* |

Interestingly, the three female consultants [F2, F6, F13] did not use this concept to refer to male saints, but with respect to females, they provided a great variety of expressions, including the notion of emancipation, which is traditionally the goal of a subordinate group.  The female consultants likely considered female saints to be a subordinate group because of their gender; the

use of the word *emanzipiert* 'emancipated', references gender subordination.  The male consultants [H11, H13] also displayed this focus on gender subordination and acts by female saints as being emancipatory through the use of the words *Pater familias* 'head of the family/household', and *patriarchalischen Strukturen* 'patriarchal structures'.  The reactions of female saints against the traditionally expected roles of women appear to be the commonly important theme to these consultants, whether male or female; whereas when the consultants referenced male saints who acted against customs, they did not suggest that the male saints had to battle circumstances due to their gender, but rather battled general kinds of opposition (*Widerstand* 'opposition', *Zeitströmung* 'trend', *Höhergestellte* 'authority/seniority').

This category supports even more strongly the inferences drawn above about the gender aspects of the category **Besonderes**.  Women seemed to notice and talk about all kinds of qualities that set individuals apart from the average population, and they particularly highlighted those qualities when displayed by females.  They may have even neglected to discuss males who displayed the same qualities, because they felt that it is normal for males to have the opportunity to display extraordinary qualities.  Men, in contrast, noticed and highlighted qualities about females primarily when those females defied the norms for female gender roles, such as those references made for the category **Gegen**.  This may be because such female saints violate the female gender *social stereotype* (cf. 2.3), and their stories are therefore noteworthy, or marked (cf. 5.6).  It may also have to do with a male focus on power and authority; males did not mention the general distinctive acts by females, but only those acts that defy authority, thereby displaying once again their focus on power differences and the importance of power.

### 7.10  *Mächtig*

A category that supports this hypothesis about a male focus on power is **Mächtig.**  The numbers of each gender of consultant who mention this category also demonstrate current acceptance of a common gender stereotype (cf. *Battling*, 5.6).  **Mächtig** refers to the tendency for a saint to be someone in a position of power.  With the male gender clearly being the gender in power, we would expect that consultants would name this characteristic with respect to male saints.  This is, in fact, the case.

**8. *Mächtig*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants | Male Consultants [H13] |
|---|---|
|  | - *Figuren des alten Testaments* |

**8. *Mächtig*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F11] | Male Consultants [H2, H5, H10] |
|---|---|
| - *Staatsmann* | - *Bischof* |
| - *ein König* | - *Papst* |
| - *sonstwer* | - *teilweise in mächtiger Position* |
|  | - *auch Könige* |
|  | - *eben Könige* |
|  | - *Kaiser* |

The single mention above of female saints in positions of power as *Figuren des alten Testaments* 'figures from the Old Testament', is not truly representative of this category; not all figures in the Old Testament stories were people in positions of power, nor were they actually saints (the consultant may have meant 'figures from the *New* Testament'). Yet, I include this characterization in this category because of the tendency to utilize folk models. The Old Testament contains countless stories depicting average people who are admired for something they have done in life. When believers, as an audience to these stories, think of these figures, they imbue them with importance for their roles in human social and religious history, canonizing them in folk narratives. These figures are familiar to all because of the culturally wide-spread stories, and—via metonymic association with their accomplishments in those stories—they are seen as people of importance. Important people are generally in powerful positions, according to the folk model of fame. When believers invoke these figures in the form given above, they imbue them with power via their cultural significance. In this sense, the statement 'figures from the Old Testament' could be a metaphorical reference to people in positions of power, and only male consultants invoked this metaphor for power. Female consultants, in contrast, named positions of power that are not metaphorical, but rather literal ones that only males have traditionally held. It appears again that women were less concerned with power, since it was only males who employed both literal and metaphorical positions of power and because males also mentioned many more types of powerful positions.

However, it is also important to note that this metaphorical position of power was the only one mentioned by either gender of consultant about female saints. In contrast, more traditional and literal positions of power were named by both genders with respect to male saints. The sheer difference in number of references for male versus female saints points out the stereotypical aspect of this category: men hold positions of power, while women do not. Even though this may reflect circumstances of a historical time period, current believers continue to accept this gender-divided concept (cf. 5.6).

## 7.11 *Verzicht*

The next category, **Verzicht,** was mentioned only by male consultants. One of the primary characteristics of this category is celibacy—a stereotypically male trait comparable to virginity in females—or the denial of sexual relations, visible in words like *Ehelosigkeit* 'state of being unmarried', *ehelos* 'unmarried', *keusch* 'chaste', and *zölibatär* 'celibate'. Sexual denial was the only kind of denial referred to in relation to female saints. Male saints were seen additionally as being 'ascetic' (*asketisch*) and having 'self-discipline' (*Disziplin gegenüber sich selbst*). The lack of such comments from female participants suggests that they were not as concerned with these aspects of saints' lives as they were with distinctive actions; this is the only category that female consultants never used.

### 9. *Verzicht*: Female Saints

| Female Consultants | Male Consultants [H5, H6] |
| --- | --- |
| | - *Ehelosigkeit*<br>- *überdurchschnittlich ehelos*<br>- *meistens relativ keusch* |

**9. *Verzicht*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants | Male Consultants [H4, H6, H13] |
|---|---|
| | *- zölibatär gelebt haben*<br>*- zurückgezogen*<br>*- meistens asketisch leben*<br>*- oft auch in einer großen Disziplin gegenüber sich selbst* |

## 7.12 *Beziehung*

Fewer consultants referenced the last 7 categories (2-4 consultants each).  I will present the data, comment briefly on each, and draw synthesized conclusions afterward:

**10. *Beziehung*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F2, F9, F12] | Male Consultants [H5] |
|---|---|
| *- durch einen sehr speziellen Zugang zu Gott herausragen*<br>*- hatten alle eine große Gottesliebe, eine innige Beziehung zu Jesus*<br>*- durch ihre besondere Beziehung zu Gott* | *- sind meistens sehr fromm, große Beterinnen, also im Gebet ziemlich …*<br>*überdurchschnittlich viele [Frauen] …* |

Both male and female consultants commented on the special relationships that female saints have to God, including prayer.  Only one male indirectly implied this kind of a relationship between God and male saints.   He did not explicitly reference male saints, but rather all saints:

   H5:   *Alle Heilige zeichnen sich aus durch das Gebet und die Verbindung zu Gott.*

## 7.13 *Verkünden*

Both male and female consultants deemed male saints to be the primary propagators of the Christian faith:

**11. *Verkünden*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F7] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| *- was sie auf sich genommen haben, um den Glauben zu verteidigen.* | |

**11. *Verkünden*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F7, F8] | Male Consultants [H12] |
|---|---|
| *- weil sie eben Verkündiger des Glaubens [waren]*<br>*- dass sie Glaubenswahrheiten versucht haben, … für den Gläubigen fruchtbar zu machen.* | *- die großen Verkündiger des Glaubens*<br>*- durch die Welt ziehen und allen die frohe Botschaft bekannt machen.*<br>*- die radikal das Evangelium in ihrem Leben umsetzen und sich aufopfern, um das Anderen bekannt zu machen.* |

Both genders of consultants listed male saints' acts of spreading the faith, while the only reference to a female saint in this category is slightly different. It displays defense of the faith, rather than dissemination or diffusion. The reference could arguably be deleted from this category. Alternatively, it could be added to the category **Besonderes** or **Gegen**, because it depicts unusual strength of character displayed by female saints in the face of adversaries. The consultants tended to agree that male saints are the disseminators of Christian belief, meaning that male saints were the ones to travel, to be in public, to be heard in public forums, and to convince others to convert. These viewpoints correspond to historical circumstances. This category is indirectly connected to other categories, such as **Schriften**, **Besonderes**, and **Mächtig**. These male saints used their learning to convince others and bring about religious conversions for the Institution of the Church. They were therefore held in high esteem; proselytizing fits within female consultants' concept of saints as unique and worthy individuals and within male consultants' concept of individuals who are powerful.


### 7.14 *Kämpferisch*

Only female consultants referenced warlike or heroic characteristics, and they offered them for both genders, although with more variety for male saints:

**12. *Kämpferisch*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F10] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *dieses Kämpferische*<br>- *Amazonenhafte* | |

**12. *Kämpferisch*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F1, F7] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *Heldencharaktere*<br>- *kämpferische*<br>- *irgendwie Heldentaten vollbracht haben*<br>- *zu Tode kamen durch den Widerstand* | |

This data supports again the hypothesis that women place a premium on strong characteristics, regardless of gender. Character strength and willingness to fight for one's beliefs is of utmost importance to a subordinate group. Why would male consultants have neglected this category if they are focused on power, since fighting is an act of asserting power? I can only conjecture that both male and female consultants share a similar concept of fighting and heroic action with relation to saints; fighting saints do not fight to assert power, but to uphold and defend belief (cf. *Battling*, 5.6). In this sense, this category resembles **Besonderes** and **Gegen**. It represents unusual actions that distinguish individuals from average humans. Given the analysis thus far, it is logical that the female consultants might value and reference this category, while the male consultants might find it less important.

**7.15** *Mutter*

      While the category **Mutter** 'mother' obviously refers only to female saints because it is a gender-specific parenting role, it is nonetheless interesting that the male counterpart, **Vater** 'father', was never mentioned with respect to male saints:

**13.** *Mutter***: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F1, F5] | Male Consultants [H12] |
|---|---|
| - *der Prototyp bei den Heiligen ist sicherlich Maria, ... für ihre Mütterlichkeit, ... der Prototyp der Mutter*<br>- *obwohl die größte Heilige Mutter war* | - *Typus der mütterlichen Liebe* |

The nurturant qualities of parenting are thought of in folk theories about parenting as being the task of the female parent, the mother, and we call it "mothering" (Bettoni 2006: 70).  In comparison, we traditionally consider "fathering" to be the sexual act of providing half of the genetic material for a baby to be conceived (70).  It appears that at least some of the consultants may still hold this concept, and this result is to be expected, given the importance placed on Mary for centuries of Christianity as both the quintessential mother and the first saint (Farmer 2003).  The question that cannot be answered with certainty is: what concept of motherhood do the three consultants evoke when they cite motherhood?  Do they evoke the motherhood of Mary to depict a peculiarly female strength—as if to say, here is something that women can do but men cannot?  Or do they evoke motherhood using the folk model conception of mothers as caregivers?

      In the folk model of parenting, care-giving is not a necessary defining quality of fathers.  In other words, the folk model concept upholds the traditional view that women remain in the private sphere of the home and tend to the family, while men are the important public figures with freedom to fulfill any choice.  Is this the concept consultants employed when they mention the category **Mutter**?  Or is their usage an image of mothers that celebrates a unique quality of womanhood?  Or is it a mixed concept in the heads of these consultants?  From these minimal data I cannot extract the full concept of motherhood held by these consultants.  I can only provide conjectures as to the possible basic conceptual frame of "Mothers"—the *oversimplified folk model*—and by assessing this category in context with the other categories, provide partial details to fill in the underspecified details (cf. *contested concepts*, 1.8).


**7.16** *Bekehrung*

      Female consultants were once again alone in mentioning the act of conversion as an important characteristic or activity for saints.  They also mentioned this aspect only with respect to male saints:

**14. *Bekehrung*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F11, F13] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *dass man erst … einigermaßen ein normales Leben geführt hat, … und dann …*<br>- *ihr Leben danach wirklich geordnet haben, wie sie etwas als richtig erkannt haben.*<br>- *sich durch irgendein Ereignis zuerst bekehrt haben.* | |

Armstrong (1987) provides a good explanation for a conventionalized concept of male converts among believers. She notes that most of the early Church Fathers were converts to Christianity and had experienced dramatic conversions to the Christian faith (33). Their stories became well-known because these men were also the ones theorizing about and recording their views on belief in the young Christian religion. Men created Church doctrine, and their voices are the foundational voices of the early Christian Church (cf. 4.1.5). Therefore, men's conversion stories are the ones most familiar to today's general believers. Most women who converted never had a chance to record their stories. But why did male consultants not mention this category? Do the male focus on power and the female focus on individualization have anything to do with males neglecting this category? Are conversion and converting others activities similar to the distinctive actions in the categories ***Besonderes*** and ***Gegen***? My data do not provide substantial details that would allow me to assess such possibilities with certainty.

## 7.17 *Leiden*

Although consultants used the category ***Leiden***—referring to the 'suffering' saints underwent on their life paths—minimally, it is interesting to note that only female consultants evoked it within the context of these two questions. The minimal refences to this category inhibit further inferential assessment.

**15. *Leiden*: Female Saints**

| Female Consultants [F4] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *dass sie sehr viel gelitten haben* | |

**15. *Leiden*: Male Saints**

| Female Consultants [F7] | Male Consultants |
|---|---|
| - *was sie in den Umständen erlitten haben* | |

## 7.18 Summary and Results of Questions 1 and 2

I will now supply a summary of these categories and the conventionalized concepts that they point to among my data. In general, women use more categories to refer to all saints, regardless of gender. Whereas women utilize 12 categories to describe female saints and 10 to describe male saints, men use only 8 categories to describe female saints and 9 to describe male saints. Additionally, women's total usage of the categories is more evenly distributed, so that all

categories are represented between 1 and 3 times, and only the category ***Orden*** for female saints emerged more often, with 4 total usages. Men, in comparison, demonstrated one extreme outlier category for each gender of saints, while all other categories were utilized 1 to 3 times, as by the women. The outlier category for female saints among male consultants was ***Sozial***, with 8 total usages; the outlier for male saints was ***Orden***, with 5 usages.

These data are slightly surprising given the fact that mostly female consultants suggested that there are more male saints than female saints, but the women nonetheless came up with more variety of categories depicting female saints than male saints. We would expect the opposite: if there are more male saints, the women should have more examples of male saints from which to draw generalizations about actions and characteristics, and this should be reflected in the data they provide for the two genders. Yet, perhaps the data suggest that female consultants consider male saints to be more similar to each other than are female saints. Or the females identify more personally with female saints—the role model effect (cf. 7.7, 7.8)—and as a result, hold more details in their heads about female than male saints. In contrast, male consultants' responses are more consistent with the idea that there are more male than female saints. Men found more categories to depict male saints, possibly indicating that they were able to come up with more male saint examples from which to draw generalizations. On the other hand is again the *role model effect*: men may also simply identify more with male saints and therefore hold more details in their heads about male rather than female saints. However, these hypotheses remain inconclusive because we cannot determine whether individual consultants drew from specific examples in order to make verbal generalizations during the interviews or whether they hold general, conventionalized metaphors (folk models/folk theories) about saints for ready use in their heads. Both are conceptual uses of narrative as "instruments for thinking", but each demonstrates a different kind of narrative usage. One generalizes from the specific to the abstract, while the other generalizes about the abstract to the specific.

Slightly more striking is the comparison of these numbers with the comment offered more often by male consultants [H2, H5, but also F6] that male saints fulfill a broader spectrum of tasks, characteristics, and roles than do female saints:

> H2:  *… da [bei den Männern] ist das Spektrum na—was heißt natürlich?–Es ist größer irgendwie [als bei den Frauen].*
> H5:  *… es ist [bei den Männern] viel viel breiter gefächert [als bei den Frauen].*

While the male consultants' responses highlight the distinction between male and female saints, the female consultant's response is not comparative, but simply assertive about the circumstance:

> F6:  *[Die Männer sind] eine bunte Mischung … von Märtyrern bis einfache Leute.*

The men emphasize the comparison of males with females more so than the single female consultant's response, suggesting that the men might come up with a greater variety of descriptions based on their own awareness and assessment of that broad spectrum. Indeed, male consultants offer more roles to characterize male saints (9) than female saints (8)—which is really insignificant—but male consultants nonetheless still employ fewer total roles for either gender (10 of 15) than do female consultants (14 of 15). While women openly assert less focus on the variety of descriptions, they nonetheless provide a broad variety. While the only category female consultants never used was ***Verzicht***, male consultants never used a number of other

categories: ***Besonderes, Kämpferisch, Bekehrung, Leiden***.  Why would men call male saints more varied, suggest that more saints are male than female, and yet not mention as many different kinds of categories as women mentioned, and use fewer categories than female consultants to describe male saints?  What difference in perspective might account for these data?  Can the difference between the female focus on individuality and the male focus on power account for these different numbers?  Yet, since only three total consultants offered such comments, the data are not significant enough to draw solid conclusions about a population of speakers, whether for my group of consultants or for a larger population.

However, there may be an interesting correlation that is useful for my analysis.  If men believe male saints fulfill a broader spectrum of roles, why do men name fewer roles than do women?  I suggest that a pattern emerges that might point to a difference in male and female consultants' conceptualization strategies.  It appears that men are more narrowly focused on naming aspects that demonstrate positions or roles of power.  In contrast, women are focused on any roles or actions that enable an individual to demonstrate his or her uniqueness, and there are simply many more ways of accomplishing this than there are for being powerful.  Women may employ a broader range of connections in conceptualization, while men focus more narrowly in a way that we might consider more strictly goal-oriented.  This hypothesis must be studied in greater detail in further studies to assess whether it is significant enough to represent a real difference between the two genders.

Related to this outcome may be the outlier category ***Sozial***, which men used to depict female saints at least twice as often as any other category they offered for female saints.  In fact, over half of the male consultants used this role to characterize female saints.  This usage is much more frequent than any other category for either gender.  If 8 of 13 men believe that female saints are socially inclined, it appears to be a strong convention among male believers, and it may rule out other characterizations of female saints in men's conceptualizations of females saints via inhibition of mutually exclusive categories (cf. 2.4).  For example, if the concept of female saints holds that they care for others, then it is unlikely for a concept in which they wield power over others to co-exist in believers' minds.

Now I will present the summary of what each gender of saint appears to mean for each gender group of consultants, accompanied by the number of consultants who utilized each category (in parenthesis):

**Female Saints for Women:**
- (3) Were socially inclined (***Sozial***)
- (4) Were in a religious order (***Orden***)
- (3) Wrote important things / were educated (***Schriften***)
- (3) Had mystical experiences (***Mystiker***)
- (3) Were martyrs (***Märtyrer***)
- (4) Have accomplished distinctive deeds (***Besonderes***)
- (3) Fought against the customs of the times (***Gegen***)
- (3) Had a special relationship to God (***Beziehung***)
- (1) *Defended* Christian beliefs (***Verkünden***)
- (1) Were warlike/heroic (***Kämpferisch***)
- (1) Suffered (***Leiden***)
- (2) Were motherly (***Mutter***)

**Male Saints for Women:**
- (1) Were socially inclined (***Sozial***)
- (2) Were in a religious order (***Orden***)
- (3) Wrote important things / were educated (***Schriften***)
- (2) Were martyrs (***Märtyrer***)
- (2) Have accomplished distinctive deeds (***Besonderes***)
- (1) Held powerful positions (***Mächtig***)
- (2) *Spread* Christian beliefs (***Verkünden***)
- (2) Were warlike/heroic (***Kämpferisch***)
- (2) Were converts (***Bekehrung***)
- (1) Suffered (***Leiden***)

**Female Saints for Men:**
- (8) Were socially inclined (***Sozial***)
- (3) Were in a religious order (***Orden***)
- (2) Had mystical experiences (***Mystiker***)
- (2) Fought against the customs of the times (***Gegen***)
- (1) Held *metaphorically* powerful positions (***Mächtig***)
- (1) Had a special relationship to God (***Beziehung***)
- (1) Denied their (sexual) selves (***Verzicht***)
- (1) Were motherly (***Mutter***)

**Male Saints for Men:**
- (3) Were socially inclined (***Sozial***)
- (5) Were in a religious order (***Orden***)
- (2) Wrote important things / were educated (***Schriften***)
- (2) Had mystical experiences (***Mystiker***)
- (2) Were martyrs (***Märtyrer***)
- (1) Fought against the customs of the times (***Gegen***)
- (3) Held *literally* powerful positions (***Mächtig***)
- (1) *Spread* Christian beliefs (***Verkünden***)
- (3) Denied their (sexual) selves (***Verzicht***)

From these summaries, we can assess two major topics: 1. the general concepts about male and female saints and how the two genders differ, according to my consultants; 2. the focus of perspective of each gender of consultant and whether and how the concept structures about gender differ between the male and female speakers. To accomplish the first task, I present one more summary. It appears that each of the 15 categories is primarily associated with either male or female saints, and both genders of consultants appear to agree on these associations as a group (I apply categories utilized by only one gender as they are provided by that single gender employing them). The following categories appear to be primarily associated with female saints, accompanied by the total number of consultants applying each category:

**1.** *Sozial* (11 total consultants)
**4.** *Mystiker* (5 total consultants)
**6.** *Besonderes* (4 total consultants)
**7.** *Gegen* (5 total consultants)
**9.** *Beziehung* (4 total consultants)
**15.** *Mutter* (3 total consultants)

The following categories appear to be primarily associated with male saints:

**5.** *Märtyrer* (4 total consultants)
**8.** *Mächtig* (4 total consultants)
**10.** *Verkünden* (3 total consultants)
**11.** *Verzicht* (3 total consultants)
**13.** *Bekehrung* (2 total consultants)

Two categories that seem inconclusive because they are often associated with both genders of saints are *Orden* and *Schriften*. As already noted, these categories are used complexly. Women and men use them differently as groups for each gender, as I have explained above. They are gender-divided concepts (cf. 5.6, 7.10). Therefore, I must qualify the association of these two categories according to each gender of saint. When speakers associate *Orden*—being in a religious order—with female saints, they primarily consider the membership aspects: female saints simply belong to an order. The consequences of this conceptualization— expressed in comparison with the concept of a male saint's role in an order—are that a female saint in an order is separated from society. She is enclosed within the private walls and membership of the convent. Male saints on the other hand, were depicted in various roles within an order, many of which were leadership roles that brought them into contact with other people outside the order or cloister; these are public roles for the institution of the Church, as opposed to the private roles of females within the institution of the Church.

Male consultants associated the category *Schriften* with male saints (2), rather than with females saints (0). Female consultants also agreed that male saints wrote important works (3). I am inclined to consider **Schriften** to be a "male" category, and yet several females also mentioned *Schriften* with respect to female saints (3). I would like to explain this data in two ways. First, those women who mentioned **Schriften** for female saints [F1, F8, F11] also named them as exceptions or provided specific saints as examples of the exception:

F1:  *... die Frauen ... obwohl es ja drei, glaube ich, Kirchenlehrerinnen gibt, ... [werden] im Allgemeinen nicht irgendwie für ihre Geisteskraft—mit Ausnahmen—geschätzt.*

F8:  *Die Frauen haben zwar auch Schriften hinterlassen, aber ihre vordringliche Tätigkeit war doch mehr das Tun.*

F11: *Es gibt vielleicht noch ein paar wenige, die ich jetzt so im Kopf hab', die dann entweder auf theologischem oder auf sonstigem, also, geistigem Gebiete herausgeragt haben; also, ich denke jetzt gerade an die Klara von Assisi oder die Hildegard von Bingen, oder solche Leute….*

In contrast, men appeared to refer to **Schriften** for male saints as a more generalized category, not mentioning examples, but suggesting that it was a quite common role for male saints. Female consultants appeared to do the same when referring to male saints. Second, a key pattern in the female consultants' conceptualization of female saints emerges with respect to this category: female consultants value the ideals of unusual character strength and accomplishments, particularly in female saints. In summary of these details, I will consider **Schriften** to be a primarily male domain, and **Orden** to be a doubled-sided category, used relatively as a *gender-divided* category, meaning that its entailments depend on the gender being referred to. When the category refers to females, its entailments include enclosure and the private sphere, while in reference to males its entailments include power via the auspices of the institution, affording men free movement and voice in the public sphere. Here are the revised summaries of each gender's constellation of categories:

| Female Saints: | Male Saints: |
|---|---|
| **1.** *Sozial* (11 total consultants) | **2.** *Orden - (Public)* (7 total consultants) |
| **2.** *Orden - (private)* (7 total consultants) | **3.** *Schriften* (5 total consultants) |
| **4.** *Mystiker* (5 total consultants) | **5.** *Märtyrer* (4 total consultants) |
| **6.** *Besonderes* (4 total consultants) | **8.** *Mächtig* (4 total consultants) |
| **7.** *Gegen* (5 total consultants) | **10.** *Verkünden* (3 total consultants) |
| **9.** *Beziehung* (4 total consultants) | **11.** *Verzicht* (3 total consultants) |
| **15.** *Mutter* (3 total consultants) | **13.** *Bekehrung* (2 total consultants) |

These constellations gathered from my consultants appear to be fairly consistent with Western culturally conventionalized "sets" (cf. 3.4), of domains of activity for each gender. Females are socially inclined, which also fits the belief that they have a special relationship to God; they are believe to cultivate relationships in general. As mothers, they are caretakers, which is another attribute that correlate with cultivating relationships. As mystics, they fulfill or epitomize a special relationship with God. As socially caring individuals, they are not generally considered to be militant or powerful, because they are not primarily interested in their position, but rather in the maintenance of their relationships. This constellation is consistent with the conventional category *Serving* discussed in Chapter 5 (cf. 5.6). It implies two things: 1. Those who maintain relationships find ways of producing agreement and keeping each party on equal terms; 2. *Serving* individuals are not powerful, and the logical conclusion is that if one does not wield power, she is subject to those who do. She is weaker. As a result, the deeds that agreeable and serving—or charitable—women accomplish are seen as particularly distinctive in comparison with the average, weak woman's capacity. For that same reason, female saints are

often seen as acting strongly against the norms of a time period when they do accomplish distinctive feats. Female saints are not average, weak, agreeable women.

The constellation for the male categories provides the following conventional stereotypes for male saints. They are martyrs, so they have died for a cause. This makes them strong. They are also often in positions of power, many of which are in the institution of the Church itself. Therefore, they are public characters whose roles as philosophers or thinkers for the Church—documented in official writings and doctrine—are crucial to the spread of the Christian beliefs. This constellation is consistent with the conventional category *Thinker* discussed in Chapter 5 (cf. 5.6). These crucial responsibilities are complemented by their roles as travelling proselytizers who spread the faith. Male saints are also so convinced about their beliefs, indicating inner strength, that they have drastically changed their former lifestyles. They converted to Christianity, and they appropriately discipline themselves, denying themselves sexual relations and other comforts.

Finally, the constellation of categories for female saints focuses on the private, the personal, relationships, aspects of individual strength, and caring. It paints a picture of individualized women without harsh or absolutist aspects to their characters or lifestyles, but rather with aspects relative to the requirements of the context. The constellation of categories for male saints focuses on the public, the official, faith, and the institution of the Church. It paints a picture of powerful men in harsh circumstances whose absolutist choices and actions afford them success in their goals. Given these generalized, stereotypical concepts of male and females saints that correspond to the cultural conventions for gender, we can now compare further statements of my consultants in order to see what aspects of these conventions may be disputed or in flux in the current population.

To address the second point above—the focus of perspective of each gender of consultant and whether and how the conceptual structures about gender differs between the male and female modern speakers—I would like to return to the discussion of numbers of categories employed by each gender of consultants. Women gave more examples of categories than men; the men's focus was narrower. I have already suggested that women emphasized characteristics that display an individual's tenacity and ability to defy as well as persevere, while men emphasized roles and positions of power. In order to pursue these tentative assertions further, it will be useful to consider the next sets of questions, 3 and 5, 4 and 6, and 76-78 in the next two chapters. Do women continue to use a greater variety of categories than men as they describe saints in response to different kinds of questions? Do the categories preferred by each gender of consultant continue to demonstrate the same topics or characteristics? Finally, to what kind of moral system do each of these groups' descriptions point?

# CHAPTER 8

# GENDER CONSTELLATIONS:
# MALE AND FEMALE CHARACTERISTICS

## 8.1 Category Structure of Word Constellations for Characteristics: Questions 3 and 5

Following the free-form responses of the first two questions in the questionnaire (cf. Chapter 7), which gave rise to phrases and keywords demonstrating domains of activities of male and females saints, consultants were asked to describe the traits and characteristics that best describe male and female saints using keywords alone:

3. *Welche Wörter würden Sie verwenden, um die Persönlichkeit, die Merkmale oder Eigenschaften der weiblichen Heiligen zu beschreiben? Bitte geben Sie etwa 5 Eigenschaften oder Merkmale.*
   'What words would you use to describe the personality, qualities, or characteristics of female saints?  Please provide about 5 qualities or characteristics.'

5. *Welche Wörter würden Sie verwenden, um die Persönlichkeit, die Merkmale oder Eigenschaften der männlichen Heiligen zu beschreiben? Bitte geben Sie etwa 5 Eigenschaften oder Merkmale.*
   'What words would you use to describe the personality, qualities, or characteristics of male saints?  Please provide about 5 qualities or characteristics.'

In response to these questions consultants provided mostly nouns (qualities saints possess), adjectives (descriptions of traits, stances, or attitudes), and simple collocations to describe the saints.  The consultants as a group produced a wealth of words which, when pooled, point to two main kinds of characteristics through associative constellation (cf. 3.4): either traits, stances, or attitudes that a saint directed toward God or other human beings, or character traits not necessarily directed toward anyone in general, but which are basic components of a saint's character:

1. Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   a. Characteristics directed toward God
   b. Characteristics directed toward other humans
2. Components of saints' characters

Under the two directional relationship types (toward God or others) appear subcategories i and ii that more narrowly define the directionality of a particular descriptor.  For instance, a quality or characteristic that is directed toward God may be more relevant either to a stance or attitude regarding the belief in God or to the deeds done directly because of or toward God.  In other words, some characteristics portray constant habits or 'attitudes' (*Haltungen*) that are directed at maintaining belief (we could consider them moral stances), while other characteristics signify an active quality that indicates actions on the part of the saint (how one acts to maintain

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one's moral stance about belief). Similarly, the characteristics that are directed toward others depict either consistent attitudes (*Haltungen*) about responding to or interacting with others (moral stances about how to act toward other people), or they imply actual deeds or actions done in the service of other people (how one acts to demonstrate a moral stance about interactions with other people):

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
    a) Characteristics directed toward God
        i)   Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding belief
        ii)  Deeds toward God
    b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
        i)   Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding others
        ii)  Deeds toward others
2) Components of saints' characters

Finally, the qualities or characteristics that are less directly involved with the stances toward or interactions with others or with God are components of a saint's character that simply describe the saints' attributes, regardless of their relationship to God or others. These are perceived features or properties of saints that consultants find noteworthy because they are unusual or appear to be exemplary personality traits in general, with or without regard to religious belief or faith. I have placed these traits into four subcategories of constellations: traits can refer to a state of poverty, purity, strength of character, or an excess of strength that can translate into negative qualities:

2) Components of saints' characters
    a) Poverty
    b) Purity
    c) Strength of Character
    d) Excess of Strength

The category Poverty is delimited into 2 further subcategories that can be considered real physical conditions of a saint's life or an attitude/demeanor that indicates self-deprecation and can cause or enable degradation by others in the physical world:

2) Components of saints' characters
    a) Poverty
        i)   Physical conditions
        ii)  Demeanor leading to physical degradation
    b) Purity
    c) Strength of Character
    d) Excess of Strength

The final category structure of the word constellations I have discovered in the data appears thus:

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
    a) Characteristics directed toward God
        i)   Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding belief
        ii)  Deeds toward God
    b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
        i)   Attitudes (*Haltungen*) towards others
        ii)  Deeds toward others
2) Components of saints' characters
    a) Poverty
        i)   Physical conditions
        ii)  Demeanor leading to physical degradation
    b) Purity
    c) Strength of Character
    d) Excess of Strength

When we pool the words and allocate them to the categories above, the predominant values of a given group of speakers about given groups of saints (by gender) emerge. The nuances of differences between groups of speakers by gender about the two genders of saints point to constellations of characteristics that create patterns and provide the details of differing perspectives about gender.


**8.2  Male Consultants Describe Female Saints**

I will begin with the male consultants' descriptions of female saints. Below are lists of word constellations for each final subcategory (those words repeated by more than one consultant are notated with the number of times and *x*, as in (*2x*) for 'two times'. At the end of each list is a number in parenthesis indicating the total number of words belonging to the category offered by the specified group of speakers):

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
    a) Characteristics directed toward God
        **i)   Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding belief**

        (2x) *beseelt* 'inspired'
        (2x) *hingabevoll* 'devoted'
        (2x) *gehorsam* 'obedient/submissive'
        (2x) *treu* 'faithful'
        *gläubig* 'religious'
        *tiefgläubig* 'deeply religious'
        *Glaubensstärke* 'strength of belief'
        *enthusiastisch* 'enthusiastic'
        *demütig* 'humble'
        *Demut* 'humility'
        *selbstbewusst* 'self-aware/confident'
        *unterordnend* 'subordinate'

*fromm* 'devout'
*konsequent* 'consistent/with conviction'
*entschlossen* 'resolute'
*tapfer* 'brave/valiant'
*sturköpfig* [sic] 'tenacious/persistent'
(21)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   a) Characteristics directed toward God
      **ii) Deeds toward God**

      *betend* 'praying'
      *Mystiker[innen]* 'mystics [fem. pl.]'
      *mystisch* 'mystical'
      *visionär* 'visionary'
      (4)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
      **i) Attitudes (*Haltungen*) towards others**

      (2x) *Nächstenliebe* 'charity/altruism'
      (2x) *fürsorglich* 'caring'
      (2x) *mütterlich* 'motherly/maternal'
      *gnädig* 'gracious/merciful'
      *barmherzig* 'compassionate/merciful'
      *sanftmütig* 'meek/gentle'
      *lächelnd* 'smiling'
      *demütig* 'humble'
      *Demut* 'humility'
      *Mitgefühl* 'sympathy/compassion'
      *Einfühlungsvermögen* 'empathy'
      *großherzig* 'magnanimous'
      *gütig* 'kind/benevolent/gracious'
      *zärtlich* 'tender/affectionate'
      *warmherzig* 'affectionate/warm-hearted'
      (18)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
      **ii) Deeds toward others**

      (2x) *fürsorglich* 'caring'
      *karitativ* 'charitable'
      *sozial* 'socially committed'
      *sozial karitativ* 'socially charitable'

*engagiert* 'involved/active'
*aufopferungsvoll* 'selfless'
*Armen- u. Krankenpflege und Seelsorge* 'care of the poor and sick and pastoral care'
*hilfsbereit* 'ready to help'
*unterstützend* 'supportive/providing'
(10)

2) Components of saints' character
   a) Poverty
     **i) Physical conditions**

     *hilfsbedürftig* 'needy'
     *Ausgestoßene* 'outcasts'
     (2)

2) Components of saints' character
   a) Poverty
     **ii) Demeanor leading to physical degradation**

     (2x) *gehorsam* 'obedient/submissive'
     *unterordnend* 'subordinate'
     *demütig* 'humble'
     *Demut* 'humility'
     *aufopferungsvoll* 'selfless'
     *sanftmütig* 'meek/gentle'
     *emotional* 'emotional'
     *naiv* 'naïve'
     (9)

2) Components of saints' characters
   **b) Purity**

     *Jungfrau* 'virgin'
     *rein* 'pure'
     *Keuschheit* 'chastity'
     *naiv* 'naïve'
     (4)

2) Components of saints' character
   **c) Strength of Character**

     (2x) *treu* 'faithful'
     *entschlossen* 'resolute'
     *enthusiastisch* 'enthusiastic'
     *tapfer* 'brave/valiant'
     *sturköpfig* [sic] 'tenacious/persistent'

*konsequent* 'consistent/with conviction'
*sich selbst achtend* 'self-respecting/esteeming'
*selbstbewusst* 'self-aware/confident'
*vorbildlich* 'ideal/exemplary/model'
*engagiert* 'dedicated/involved/active'
*kreativ* 'creative'
(12)


2) Components of saints' character
   **d) Excess of Srength**

   (0)


There is some overlap with respect to which words belong to a category, particularly between the categories of attitudes directed toward God regarding belief and strength of character (*konsequent, enthusiastisch, selbstbewusst, entschlossen, tapfer, sturköpfig*). Such an overlap is to be expected, since maintaining faith in God—especially for saints who were martyred—often requires basic strengths of character that are important for other aspects of everyday life. Another less-common overlap is between characteristics directed toward belief in God and the category of a saint's demeanor that can lead to degradation (*gehorsam, unterordnend, demütig, Demut*). This overlap is also predictable because belief in anything requires some level of adherence to the tenets of that "faith"; believers subject themselves to what that "faith" requires. They therefore display traits or qualities that make them vulnerable. Other minimal overlaps of single words occur between other categories. However, two categories share no words with any other: deeds directed toward God and the characteristics depicting the physical poverty of the female saints.

Upon observation of the word constellations that have emerged and the numbers of words in each constellation, it appears that the two most important categories for female saints according to our male consultants are the traits categorized as attitudes directed toward God in belief (21) and attitudes directed toward others (18). The next most important categories involve the general strength of character female saints display (12), the actions or deeds female saints undertake in the care of others (10), and demeanors that can lead to degradation (9). Male consultants thus associate female saints primarily with the characteristics involved in caring for others and in maintaining their faith in God. This data appears to be consistent with the findings in the previous chapter, in which consultants generally—and especially male consultants—associated female saints with social inclination and a mystical relationship to God (cf. 7.3, 7.6, 7.18). Of secondary importance are the deeds undertaken caring for others and the saints' general strength of character, but balancing this view of strong character is a contrasting sentiment about demeanors that are not associated with strength, but rather with degradation. I will discuss this finding in comparison with female consultants' data below. According to male consultants, female saints' deeds toward God (4) primarily involve communication with God: praying and hearing or seeing God as mystics or visionaries. They do not do things for God that produce or generate results. Instead, they communicate and receive visions and ideas through this communication. Present but not foremost in the imaginations of some of these male consultants are images of female sexual purity (4) and female saints' poor physical circumstances (2). In sum, I would suggest that the male consultants in my study associate

female saints primarily with qualities of being and communicating and secondarily with actions. To these consultants the female saints are almost equally as weak or meek in demeanor as they are strong in character, and their strength of character has little to do with deeds undertaken. For male consultants, female saints never produce an excess of character strength that could be deemed negative.

### 8.3  Female Consultants Describe Female Saints

Below are lists of word constellations provided by female consultants in response to the same question about female saints.

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   a) Characteristics directed toward God
      **i)  Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding belief**

      (4x) *fromm* 'devout'
      (2x) *Demut* 'humility'
      (2x) *Starkmut* [sic] 'fortitude'
      (2x) *Gehorsam* 'obedience/submissiveness'
      (2x) *Hingabe* 'devotion'
      *hingegeben* 'devoted'
      *Hingabebereitschaft* 'ready to devote oneself'
      *berharrlich im Glauben* 'tenacious/persistent in faith'
      *demütig* 'humble'
      *mutig* 'brave/courageous/bold'
      *selbstbewusst* 'self-aware/confident'
      *Wahrhaftigkeit* 'authenticity'
      *tapfer* 'brave/valiant'
      *Liebe* 'love'
      *unbeirrbar* 'unswerving'
      *konsequent* 'consistent/with conviction'
      *Treue bis in den Tod* 'faithful unto death'
      (24)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   a) Characteristics directed toward God
      **ii) Deeds toward God**

      *mystisch* 'mystical'
      *visionär* 'visionary'
      *das Kämpferische für den Glauben* 'warlikeness/militancy for faith'
      *Widerstandskämpfer* 'resistance fighters'
      *opfer- und einsatzbereit* 'ready for sacrifice and service'
      (5)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
    b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
        **i)   Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding others**

        (2x) *Demut* 'humility'
        *demütig* 'humble'
        *liebenswert* 'endearing/loveable'
        *anziehend* 'attractive/appealing'
        *Milde* 'meekness/charity'
        *Güte* 'benevolence/graciousness/kindness'
        *mütterlich* 'motherly/maternal'
        *mildtätig* 'benevolent/charitable'
        *großherzig* 'magnanimous'
        *Großzügigkeit* 'generosity/magnanimity'
        *Liebe* 'love'
        *Sozialkompetenz* 'social competence'
        (13)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
    b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
        **ii)  Deeds toward others**

        *gerecht* 'fair/righteous'
        *opfer- und einsatzbereit* 'ready for sacrifice and service'
        *Überzeugungskraft* 'persuasiveness'
        (3)

2) Components of saints' characters
    a) Poverty
        **i)   Physical conditions**

        (0)

2) Components of saints' characters
    a) Poverty
        **ii) Demeanor leading to physical degradation**

        (2x) *Demut* 'humility'
        (2x) *Gehorsam* 'obedience/submissiveness'
        *demütig* 'humble'
        *leidensfähig* 'capable of suffering'
        *leidend* 'suffering/passive'
        *Milde* 'meekness/charity'
        *opfer- und einsatzbereit* 'ready for sacrifice and service'
        (9)

2) Components of saints' characters
   **b)  Purity**

      (2x) *Keuschheit* 'chastity'
      *Reinheit* 'purity'
      (3)


2) Components of saints' characters
   **c)  Strength of Character**

      (2x) *Starkmut* [sic] 'fortitude'
      *furchtlos* 'fearless'
      *individuell* 'individual'
      *individuelle Menschen* 'distinct/unique individuals'
      *mutig* 'brave/courageous/bold'
      *selbstbewusst* 'self-aware/confident'
      *Wahrhaftigkeit* 'authenticity'
      *tapfer* 'brave/valiant'
      *gerecht* 'fair/righteous'
      *vorbildhaft* 'ideal/exemplary/model'
      *konsequent* 'consistent/with conviction'
      *anziehend* 'attractive/appealing'
      *ernst* 'serious'
      *eigenwillig* 'headstrong/willfull/unconventional'
      *radikal* 'radical'
      *Stille* 'calm/tranquility'
      *feste Persönlichkeiten* 'firm characters'
      *beeindruckende Persönlichkeiten* 'impressive characters'
      *großartig* 'magnificent/admirable'
      *unbeirrbar* 'unswerving'
      *Klugheit* 'wisdom'
      *Treue bis in den Tod* 'faithful unto death'
      *Sozialkompetenz* 'social competence'
      *sich mit fertigen Fragen* [sic] *nicht zufreiden geben* 'unwilling to content oneself with
            ready-made questions'
      (25)


2) Components of saints' characters
   **d)  Excess of Strength**

      *das Kämpferische für den Glauben* 'warlikeness/militancy for faith'
      *Widerstandskämpfer* 'resistance fighters'
      (2)

      Once again, some words overlap into more than one category, and the primary overlap occurs between attitudes directed toward belief in God and general strength of character (2x

*Starkmut, mutig, selbstbewusst, Wahrhaftigkeit, tapfer, unbeirrbar, konsequent*).  Another
overlap exists between attitudes directed toward belief in God and attitudes directed toward
others (*demütig, Demut, Liebe, gehorsam, Gehorsam*).  As with the male consultants'
constellations, other minimal overlaps occur between other categories in the female consultants'
data, but one category does not overlap with any others: the saints' purity.  For the male
consultants a single word referring to the saints' purity (*naiv*) overlaps into the category of
demeanors leading to degradation.  The overlap for the female consultants between the
categories of attitudes directed toward belief in God and demeanors leading to degradation is
comparable (*demütig, Demut, gehorsam, Gehorsam*) to that among the male consultants
(*demütig, Demut,* 2x *gehorsam, unterordnend*).  The overlap in the male consultants' data
between traits depicting general strength of character and attitudes directed toward belief in God
(*entschlossen, enthusiastisch, konsequent, selbstbewusst, tapfer, sturköpfig*) is approximately
comparable in numbers (6) to those of the female consultants' data (8) (2x *Starkmut, mutig,
unbeirrbar, konsequent, selbstbewusst, tapfer, Wahrhaftigkeit*).

      Given the constellations above, it appears that my study's female consultants find the
categories of overall strength of character (25) and attitudes directed toward God regarding belief
(24) to be the most distinctive or important categories describing female saints.  These data are
appear to be consistent with the results from the previous chapter, in which female consultants
particularly highlighted the categories **Besonderes** and **Gegen** to demonstrate the unusual and
noteworthy strength of character they saw in female saints (cf. 7.8, 7.9).  The second most
important category appears to be attitudes directed toward others (13).  Demeanors that can lead
to degradation are significant, while deeds toward God (5) and deeds toward the care of others
(3) are not prominent in these consultants' conceptions.  Nor are images of female sexual purity
very significant for these consultants (3).  In sum, it appears that the female consultants also
associate female saints primarily with ways of being, rather than with actions or deeds.
However, the deeds toward God that the female consultants associate with female saints include
much more active or product-oriented results than do those supplied by the male consultants.
While two words associated with the receptive communicative mode between God and a female
saint emerged (*mystisch, visionär*), another two images associated with action and production
also emerged  (*das Kämpferische für den Glauben, Widerstandskämpfer*).  These last two
characteristics could be considered an excess of strength.  This category will become more
important in comparison with consultants' characterization of male saints.


## 8.4  Comparison of Male and Female Consultants' Data Pools for Female Saints

      While the deeds toward God listed by the male consultants profiled communication with
God, the female consultants named both communicative deeds (*mystisch, visionär*), as well as
the act of fighting for God (*das Kämpferische für den Glauben, Widerstandskämpfer*).  I find this
characterization by the female consultants to fit extraordinarily well with the fact that one of two
most prominent categories for the female consultants is strength of character (25).  The women
view female saints as strong.  These consultants' moral systems are focused on the strength of
female saints as a central characteristic of the model female.  In contrast, the men consider the
strength of female saints to be more of a side-effect to these women being model Christians.
While the men list strength of character traits 12 times, only three of those traits do not overlap
with another category.  6 of them overlap with the category of attitudes directed toward God

regarding belief.  To the men, strength of character in female saints is at least one half the result of their being model Christians.  For the women, however, 8 words overlap with the category of attitudes directed toward God for belief, while a substantial 12 words belong solely to the category of strength of character.  It appears that female saints to these female consultants more often represent model women and human beings, regardless of their faith.

While types of demeanor that can lead to physical debasement are present just as much (9) in the images of female saints held by female consultants and male consultants, not a single female consultant ever referred to actual physical circumstances of poverty or debasement.  It appears that debasement and poverty may not be as strong components of these consultants' concepts about female saints.  In contrast, poverty was a component in some of the male consultants' concepts about female saints (2), although this data is not highly significant.

A marked difference appears between the number of words female consultants supplied regarding saints' deeds toward others (3) and those supplied by male consultants (10), and this data is supported by similar contrast in the previous chapter regarding the category ***Sozial*** (cf. 7.3).  Why is there such a difference?  Do male consultants associate female saints with more action in general than do female consultants, which would contradict the constellations in 8.2?  Or do men associate female saints with obedient service in deeds toward others?  In contrast, do female consultants not associate female saints with action, or do they not see the female saints as obedient servants to others?  In other words, I wish to question two stereotypes about women: the passive female (in contrast to the active male) and the obedient female who serves others (in contrast to the male is who most often served).  Does the evidence point to questions about these stereotypes, or is something else at play?  Male consultants primarily named deeds that involve helping the poor, sick, and otherwise needy: 2x *fürsorglich*, *karitativ*, *sozial*, *sozial karitativ*, *Armen- u. Krankenpflege und Seelsorge, hilfsbereit, unterstützend, aufopferungsvoll*.  Only *engagiert* is indistinct as to whether the kind of activity indicates caring for others or some other kind of activity.  Female participants' sparse responses in this category tend toward activities *not* involved in helping the poor or sick.  Instead, two of the three responses point to activities traditionally involved in theological doctrine and teaching: *gerecht* and *Überzeugungskraft*.  Do women wish to see female saints less as stereotypical passive servants and more in the image of leaders of thought and decision-making?  I suggest these bits of data point to this possibility and are supported by data in the previous chapter (cf. 7.3, 7.5, 7.8, 7.9, 7.14).  Further study could solidify the significance of these suggestive data.  Evidence below will also explore this theme further.

## 8.5  Male Consultants Describe Male Saints

Now let us turn to the male consultants' characterizations of male saints.  Below are the same rubrics for word constellations as in the data about female saints:

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   a) Characteristics directed toward God
      i) **Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding belief**

      (2x) *fromm* 'devout'
      (2x) *Treue* 'faithfulness/constancy'

*treu* 'faithful'
*beseelt in dem Inhalt des Glaubens* 'inspired in the substance of faith'
*hingebungsvoll* 'devoted'
*gehorsam* 'obedient/submissive'
*demütig* 'humble'
*Glaubensstärke* 'strength of belief'
*glaubensstark* 'strong in belief'
*konsequent* 'consistent/with conviction'
*Selbsthass* 'self-hatred'
*frei von gesellschaftlichen Zwängen* 'free from societal dictates/pressures'
*christusbezogen* 'oriented toward Christ'
*standfest* 'firm/stable'
*überzeugt* 'confident/convinced'
*angesteckt* 'enthusiasitic'
*Begeisterung* 'enthusiasm/zeal'
*Mut* 'courage/bravery'
*Standhaftigkeit* 'fortitude/steadfastness'
*Bindung an Gott* 'commitment/loyalty to God'
(22)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
  a) Characteristics directed toward God
    **ii) Deeds toward God**

    *Ordensmänner* 'men of religious orders'
    *Ordensstiftend* 'founders of religious orders'
    *Kirchenlehrer* 'Doctors of the Church'
    *Männer eines gottgeweihten Lebens* 'men of a holy life'
    *Kirchenkämpfer* 'soldiers of the Church'
    *Bildung* 'education/learning'
    *Durchsetzungsvermögen* 'authority/assertiveness'
    *der Wunsch, etwas zu erreichen* 'the desire/wish to achieve something'
    *sind an ihrer Ehre gepackt worden* 'their honor was put to the test'
    (9)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
  b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
    **i) Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding others**

    *zahm im Vergleich mit anderen Männern* 'tame/meek in comparison to other men'
    *zart* 'gentle/delicate/frail'
    *charismatisch* 'charismatic'
    *demütig* 'humble'
    *Güte* 'benevolence/graciousness/kindness'
    (5)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
    b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
        **ii) Deeds toward others**

        *aufopfernd* 'sacrificing/devoted'
        *aufopferungsvoll* 'selfless'
        *zu Opfern bereit* 'prepared to sacrifice'
        *hilfsbereit* 'ready to help'
        *starkes Bedürfnis in der Richtung Soziales* 'strong need/desire for social commitment'
        (5)

2) Components of saints' character
    a) Poverty
        **i) Physical conditions**

        (0)

2) Components of saints' character
    a) Poverty
        **ii) Demeanor leading to physical degradation**

        *aufopfernd* 'sacrificing/devoted'
        *aufopferungsvoll* 'selfless'
        *zu Opfern bereit* 'prepared to sacrifice'
        *zahm im Vergleich mit anderen Männern* 'tame/meek in comparison with other men'
        *zart* 'gentle/delicate/frail'
        *demütig* 'humble'
        *gehorsam* 'obedient/submissive'
        *Selbsthass* 'self-hatred'
        *Leidensfähigkeit* 'capacity for suffering'
        (9)

2) Components of saints' character
    **b) Purity**

        (0)

2) Components of saints' character
    **c) Strength of Character**

        (2x) *Treue* 'faithfulness/constancy'
        *treu* 'faithful'
        *frei von gesellschaftlichen Zwängen* 'free from societal dictates/pressures'
        *konsequent* 'consistent/with conviction'
        *standfest* 'firm/stable'
        *charismatisch* 'charismatic'

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*Durchsetzungsvermögen* 'authority/assertiveness'
*der Wunsch, etwas zu erreichen* 'the desire/wish to achieve something'
*Begeisterung* 'enthusiasm/zeal'
*Mut* 'courage/bravery'
*Standhaftigkeit* 'fortitude/steadfastness'
*überzeugt* 'confident/convinced'
*starke Persönlichkeiten* 'strong characters'
*authentisch* 'authentic'
*ausdauernd* 'persistent'
*energisch* 'energetic/vigorous/emphatic'
*kraftvoll* 'powerful/strong/vibrant'
*Kraft* 'power/strength/vigor'
(19)

2) Components of saints' character
   **d) Excess of Strength**

   *Kirchenkämpfer* 'soldiers of the Church'
    (1)

Overlaps are again highly prevalent (10) between attitudes directed toward God regarding belief and general strength of character (2x *Treue, treu, frei von gesellschaftlichen Zwängen, konsequent, standfest, Mut, Standhaftigkeit, überzeugt, Begeisterung*).  Again, such numerous overlaps between these two categories are to be anticipated because character traits required to be strong in daily life are often the same as those required to maintain a belief.  I will discuss other overlaps in the comprehensive comparison below.

The categories male consultants most associate with male saints are attitudes directed toward belief in God (22) and general strength of character (19).  Secondary are deeds done toward God (9) and demeanors leading to degradation (9).  Less important are the attitudes and deeds done toward others (5 each).   Male consultants gave no mention of the physical poverty of male saints, nor was a concept of sexual purity present in these data.  However, there was one mention of a trait that could be considered an excess of character strength, which could be viewed with negative connotations (*Kirchenkämpfer*).  In summary, I suggest that my male consultants primarily associate male saints with strong faith in God and strong character traits. While this is similar to the male consultants' general view of female saints' faith in God, female strength of character is not so prominent (only 12 versus 19), according to male consultants. Additionally, male consultants believe that the male saints take on far more actions toward God (9) than do female saints (4).  It appears that the stereotypes of the active male and the more passive female may be present in these male consultants' gender concepts.  These results are consistent with the positions of power and public spheres of action highlighted, especially by male consultants in the previous chapter (cf. **Orden**, 7.4; **Mächtig**, 7.10; **Verkünden**, 7.13). Similarly, male consultants appear to subscribe to the stereotype of the female as server, evident in both categories of directionality toward others.  Female saints' inclination toward others, or attitudes directed toward others, are very important in descriptions male consultants provided (18), and deeds toward others done by female saints were named by male consultants twice as often (10) as deeds toward others done by male saints (5).  Male saints' directionality toward

others was far less important overall than that of female saints, according to male consultants.  In summary, male consultants see male saints as stronger in character, more active for God, and less involved in serving others than are female saints.


### 8.6  Female Consultants Describe Male Saints

Below are the final word constellations from these descriptive data.  These lists show the constellations of characteristics female consultants provided about male saints:

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   a) Characteristics directed toward God
      **i)  Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding belief**

      (3x) *demütig* 'humble'
      (2x) *mutig* 'brave/courageous/bold'
      *fromm* 'devout'
      *selbstbewusst* 'self-aware/confident'
      *beseelt von großem Gotteseifer* 'inspired with zeal for God'
      *noch verrückter [als Frauen]* 'crazier/madder [than women]'
      *Glaubensfestigkeit* 'firmness of faith'
      *metaphysische Dimension des Glaubens* 'metaphysical dimension of belief'
      *gehorsam gegenüber der Kirche* 'obedient/submissive toward the Church'
      *Willensstark* 'strong-willed/determined'
      *idealistisch* 'idealistic'
      *das Geistige* 'the spiritual'
      *geistige Durchdringung* 'spiritual penetration'
      *ganz individuelle, starke Persönlichkeiten* 'very individual/unique, strong characters'
      *Einsatz für die Wahrheit* 'dedication/commitment to the truth'
      *ergeben in den Willen Gottes* 'yielding to the will of God'
      *einen klaren Verstand* 'clear reason/mind/intellect'
      *Hingabefähigkeit, obwohl sie so stark männlich Ausdrücke hatten* 'capacity for devotion,
              although they had such heavily masculine means of expression'
      (21)


1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
   a) Characteristics directed toward God
      **ii)  Deeds toward God**

      *Bekennermut* 'courage to profess'
      *Geistesstärke* 'strength/vigor of mind'
      *asketisch* 'ascetic'
      *gelehrig* 'quick to learn'
      *priesterlich* 'priestly/dogmatic'
      *kämpferisch* 'warlike/militant'
      *bereit zu kämpfen und zu sterben* 'ready to battle/fight and die'

*Kampf für den Glauben* 'battle for faith'
*Unterdrückung der Andersgläubigen* 'oppression/suppression of dissenters/those of other
    faiths'
*Strebsamkeit* 'ambition/eagerness'
*öffentliches Auftreten* 'public appearance'
*Verteidigen in Worten oder Taten* 'defense in words or deeds'
*die Aktive* [sic] 'activity'
*Christusnachfolge* 'Christian discipleship'
*Ordensgründer* 'founders of religious orders'
*Ordensmänner* 'men of religious orders'
*sehr missionarisch* 'very missionary'
*wichtige Schriften hinterlassen* 'left behind important writings'
*geistige oder wissenschaftliche Leistungen* 'intellectual/spiritual or scientific
    accomplishments'
*ganz offensichtlich gegen die Erwartungen der Gesellschaft agieren* 'openly acting
    against societal expectations'
*vernunftgemäß versucht haben, die Dinge zu durchdringen* 'attempted to penetrate things
    with reason'
(21)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
  b) Characteristics directed toward God
    **i) Attitudes (*Haltungen*) regarding belief**

    (3x) *demütig* 'humble'
    *großherzig* 'magnanimous'
    *Nächstenliebe* 'charity/altruism'
    *väterlich* 'fatherly/paternal'
    *Milde* 'meekness/charity'
    *gütig* 'kind/benevolent/gracious'
    (8)

1) Directional characteristics, stances, and attitudes
  b) Characteristics directed toward other humans
    **ii) Deeds toward others**

    *gute Zuhörer* 'good listeners'
    *Überzeugungskraft* 'persuasiveness'
    *das Soziale* 'social commitment'
    *sehr missionarisch* 'very missionary'
    *priesterlich* 'priestly/dogmatic'
    *das Bild vom guten Hirten* 'the image of the Good Shepherd'
    (6)

2) Components of saints' character
   a) Poverty
     **i)  Physical conditions**

     *asketisch* 'ascetic'
     (1)


2) Components of saints' character
   a) Poverty
     **ii) Demeanor leading to physical degradation**

     (3x) *demütig* 'humble'
     *weniger das Leiden betont [als bei den Frauen]* 'less emphasis on suffering [than with
         women]'
     *asketisch* 'ascetic'
     *gehorsam gegenüber der Kirche* 'obedient/submissive toward the Church'
     (6)


2) Components of saints' character
   **b) Purity**

     (0)


2) Components of saints' character
   **c) Strength of Character**

     (2x) *mutig* 'brave/courageous/bold'
     *Geistesstärke* 'strength/vigor of mind'
     *Strebsamkeit* 'ambition/eagerness'
     *Willensstark* 'strong-willed/determined'
     *idealistisch* 'idealistic'
     *die Aktive* [sic] 'activity'
     *selbstbewusst* 'self-aware/confident'
     *einen klaren Verstand* 'clear reason/mind/intellect'
     *öffentliches Auftreten* 'public appearance'
     *Verteidigen in Worten oder Taten* 'defense in words or deeds'
     *Einsatz für die Wahrheit* 'dedication/commitment to the truth'
     *ganz individuelle, starke Persönlichkeiten* 'very individual/unique, strong characters'
     *geistige oder wissenschaftliche Leistungen* 'intellectual/spiritual or scientific
         accomplishments'
     *vernunftgemäß versucht haben, die Dinge zu durchdringen* 'attempted to penetrate things
         with reason'
     *ganz offensichtlich gegen die Erwartungen der Gesellschaft agieren* 'openly acting
         against societal expectations'
     (16)

2) Components of saints' character
   **d) Excess of Strength**

   *kämpferisch* 'warlike/militant'
   *bereit zu kämpfen und zu sterben* 'ready to battle/fight and die'
   *Kampf für den Glauben* 'battle for faith'
   *Unterdrückung der Andersgläubigen* 'oppression/suppression of dissenters/those of other faiths'
   *noch verrückter [als Frauen]* 'crazier [than women]'
   (5)

Overlaps occur almost equally as often between character strength and each category of directionality toward God (9 and 7, respectively). Attitudes directed toward God regarding belief (9) include: 2x *mutig; Willensstark; selbstbewusst; idealistisch; einen klaren Verstand; Geistesstärke; Einsatz für die Wahrheit; ganz individuelle, starke Persönlichkeiten.* Deeds toward God (7) include: *Verteidigen in Worten oder Taten; öffentliches Auftreten; Strebsamkeit; vernunftgemäß versucht haben, die Dinge zu durchdringen; ganz offensichtlich gegen die Erwartungen der Gesellschaft agieren; die Aktive* [sic]*; geistige oder wissenschaftliche Leistungen.* The rationale for the overlap between strength of character and attitudes directed toward God for belief is that many of the strengths necessary for daily life are the same as those necessary for maintenance of belief.

Most pronounced among the female consultants' data are male saints' attitudes directed to God regarding belief (21) and deeds done for God (21). Secondarily, female consultants believe that male saints are strong in character (16). Less important but still significant are attitudes directed toward others (8), deeds done for others (6), demeanors leading to degradation (6), and an excess of strength that can be viewed negatively (5). These data indicate that female consultants view male saints as most strongly directed toward God, both in deeds and belief. Male saints are much more active for God (21) than are female saints (5), and even more active in deeds toward others (6) than are females saints (3), according to female consultants. These results are also consistent with female categorizations of male saints in categories such as **Schriften, Verkünden, Kämpferisch,** and **Bekehrung** in the previous chapter (cf. 7.5, 7.13, 7.14, 7.16) In sum total, female consultants view males saints as far more active than female saints, and their actions are primarily involved with intellectual and public deeds toward God. These saints are strong in character, but female consultants appear to associate male strength of character in large part as a result of intellectual and public accomplishments, almost as much as a result of character traits.

In contrast, female consultants view female saints' strength of character not as a result of actions, but as a result of character traits (24 of the 25 are explicitly attitudes, rather than deeds, and the single deed, *gerecht*, can be seen as a trait, though I have classified it as a deed because it implies actions toward others that are righteous). Traits showing strength of character are one of the most important categories female consultants associate with female saints, and the numbers indicate that the female consultants find strength of character to be more salient for female saints than for male saints. Perhaps female saints, because they were not allowed to perform as many intellectual and public actions, were forced to demonstrate their character strength in a different way. Female consultants find it important to express this strength of character; the high number of references to qualities and psychological strength in this data may indicate that female

consultants identify with female saints and even perhaps with their experiences in life, more so than with male saints. This data once again supports the theory of the role model effect (cf. 7.7, 7.8, 7.18) of same-sex role models, and women's categorizations of female saints in the previous chapter into categories of **Besonderes** and **Gegen** (cf. 7.8, 7.9) concur with the results found in these constellations.


## 8.7 Comparison of Male and Female Consultants' Data Pools for Male Saints

Male and female consultants appear to agree on the kinds of deeds undertaken by male saints in the service of God. Whereas both groups of consultants considered female saints to be active in terms of communication with God, male saints were not associated with communication with God as mystics or visionaries. Instead, male saints were characterized as (a) founders and followers of religious orders, (b) intellectual religious leaders, (c) publicly dynamic, and (d) warriors or soldiers for God. Male consultants listed these characteristics as follows: (a-3) *ordensstiftend, Ordensmänner, Männer eines gottgeweihten Lebens;* (b-2) *Kirchenlehrer, Bildung;* (c-3) *der Wunsch, etwas zu erreichen, Durchsetzungsvermögen, an ihrer Ehre gepackt worden;* (d-1) *Kirchenkämpfer.* Female consultants listed these characteristics as follows: (a-4) *Ordensgründer, Ordensmänner, Christusnachfolge, asketisch;* (b-8) *Geistesstärke, gelehrig, priesterlich, Verteidigen in Worten oder Taten, vernunftgemäß versucht haben, die Dinge zu durchdringen, geistige oder wissenschaftliche Leistungen, sehr missionarisch, wichtige Schriften hinterlassen;* (c-5) *Bekennermut, Strebsamkeit, öffentliches Auftreten, ganz offensichtlich gegen die Erwartungen der Gesellschaft agieren, die Aktive [sic];* (d-4) *kämpferisch, bereit zu kämpfen und zu sterben, Kampf für den Glauben, Unterdrückung der Andersgläubigen.* All of these characterizations parallel the culturally conventional categories of *Thinker* and *Battling* found in Chapter 5 (cf. 5.6). They are also supported by the constellations of categories in the previous chapter (cf. 7.18).

Most remarkable about these data, however, is the significant difference in total numbers between male and female consultants. While these deeds toward God were important to male consultants (9), female consultants listed such deeds more than twice as often (21). Additionally, female consultants most often listed intellectual activities (8). I would like to suggest a hypothesis that is concurrence with findings from Chapter 7: female consultants highly value intellectual activities, and they clearly demonstrate in these interviews that female saints were not as involved in such activities as were male saints. In combination with other data (cf. Chapter 9), we see that male consultants also held these views, and that the disparity between the sexes in intellectual activities was a result of social convention that generally barred women from these activities. It seems that the female consultants' long list of male saints activities toward God points to these consultants' preoccupation with such activities.

Character traits of demeanors that lead to degradation were present similarly in both female (6) and male consultants' (9) conceptions of male saints. This time, only one female consultant mentioned a quality that referred to actual physical poverty of the male saints: *asketisch.* I suggest that none of these data are significant for comparison between the genders of saints. However, I find it surprising that among all consultants, the ascetic lifestyle of male saints was mentioned only once. Just as intellectual achievements and the founding of religious orders appear to be abiding concepts with regards to males saints—and mysticism and visions with regards to female saints—I assumed that asceticism would also have emerged as a concept

about male saints.  This concept may have been omitted from discussion due to its *unmarked*, or standard characteristic, similar to the concepts of male celibacy and male education/learning, discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 (cf. 5.6, 7.5).  Further research would be necessary to flesh out the answer to this question.


### 8.8  Comparison of Male and Female Consultants' Composite Data Pools for Male and Female Saints

Female consultants appeared not to associate female saints with service nearly as much as did male consultants.  They did not uphold the stereotype of the serving female as much as male consultants.  However, the stereotype of males being more active and females more passive is supported by the female consultants' data, similarly to that of the male consultants.  Also like the male consultants, female consultants never mentioned any attributes of sexual purity when speaking about male saints, whereas both groups named attributes of sexual purity with respect to the female saints.  The female consultants did, however, list several more descriptions (than did male consultants) for male saints that could be considered a negative excess of character strength (5): *kämpferisch; bereit zu kämpfen und zu sterben*; *Kampf für den Glauben; Unterdrückung der Andersgläubigen*; *noch verrückter [als Frauen]*.  These descriptions can hold negative connotations that may be detrimental to both the possessor of the quality as well as others.  While female consultants named two characteristics having to do with battling when discussing female saints, two of the above characteristics named about male saints are significantly different than the battling traits in the excess category, and these two traits were named by two different consultants: *noch verrückter [als Frauen]*[F1]; *Unterdrückung der Andersgläubigen* [F3].  I suggest that, in addition to an image of fighting for God—i.e. the willingness to kill and be killed for faith—some female consultants have another extreme and negative image associated with male saints: these saints can be both crazy and intolerant toward those who are different.  According to at least one female consultant, this is an attribute specific to males, as when she compares qualities of the two genders: "*... vielleicht für die Frauen genauso, ... nur die Männer sind da vielleicht—wenn sie verrückt sind—noch verrückter*" [F1].

In female consultants' responses about male saints, the overlap of strength of character with deeds toward God is unusual in comparison with the other groups of data (male consultants on male or female saints; female consultants on female saints).  Why do female consultants find many of the deeds male saints do for God indicative of character strength, but they do not have these associations for female saints?  If we look at the constellation of words found in this particular overlap, we can see that these deeds have to do with intellectual strengths; these deeds represent productive and public achievements, activities that female consultants have already implicitly hailed as important when they named the images of *das Kämpferische für den Glauben* and *Widerstandskämpfer* regarding female saints' deeds toward God.  Female consultants value strength and public action in all individuals, even if it can lead to something negative, and this point is substantiated by the results in Chapter 7.  However, female consultants, just like male consultants, named intellectual activities and a much greater number of public activities in general performed by male saints than by female saints.  In fact, neither male nor female consultants named intellectual activities accomplished by female saints, but both groups did name such activities accomplished by male saints.  As stated above, female consultants named

more than twice as many such intellectual and public activities (21) as did male consultants (9) with respect to male saints!

The overlaps between male saints' traits of character strength and other categories differ between male and female consultants. While the female consultants named many deeds done for God that overlap with character strength (7), male consultants named significantly fewer (2). In contrast, male consultants named more traits overlapping between strength of character and attitudes directed toward God regarding belief (10). Female consultants also named a similar number of traits overlapping between strength of character and attitudes directed toward God regarding belief (9). As a result, I would suggest that male consultants view male saints' strength of character as more a result of character in general, while female consultants view male saints' strength of character as more a result of the intellectual achievements of male saints. In contrast to the two groups of consultants' views on female saints, where the male consultants believed female saints are model humans because they are model Christians, and female consultants believed female saints are models human because of characteristic qualities, the situation appears to be reversed. Male consultants appear to believe that male saints are model humans because of character qualities, while female consultants appear to believe that male saints are model humans as a result of being model Christians through accomplishments for Christianity.

To summarize the patterns emerging, it appears that both groups of consultants associate female saints primarily with communicative deeds toward God, while male saints are the public and intellectual leaders who accomplish things for God. Female consultants may believe more than male consultants that female saints can be active for God, although they do not appear to believe that this activity is primarily intellectual, but rather warlike. All consultants view all saints' attitudes directed toward God for belief as primary (21, 24, 22, 24 in respective order as presented above), but female consultants view the male saints' deeds toward God as highly important (21), while male consultants view instead female saints' attitudes directed toward others as highly important (18); both views are in line with the cultural conventions of *Thinkers* and *Serving* saints, outlined in Chapter 5. Male consultants mentioned more often strength of character with respect to male saints (19) than to female saints (12), and female consultants mentioned traits of character strength of female saints (25) significantly more often than those of male saints (16). Male consultants highlight the female saints' qualities of caring and serving others (18 and 10) more than those of male saints (5 and 5), as well as more often than female consultants mention either (13 and 3; 8 and 6). Female consultants appear to find service to others approximately comparable between male and female saints.

It appears that in final summary, each group of consultants may have highlighted some aspect of the opposite gender that they find important: females highlight intellectual and public activities of male saints, and males highlighted females saints' caring for others. The consultants also highlight aspects of their own gender that they found most important, and emphasized them less in the opposite gender: male consultants highlighted strength of character of male saints more than female saints, while female consultants did the opposite. Female consultants also highlighted more extreme deeds on the part of male saints, and male consultants highlighted female saints' passive qualities more. Are these qualities that each gender values in the opposite gender? Or are the qualities simply stereotypes that consultants unconsciously subscribe to? Chapter 9 highlights the difficulty of answering "yes" or "no" to any such complex social questions. The moral system held by each individual can help us determine the answers to these questions. By pooling the analyses of all the data presented in this study, I will attempt to show

which moral system each gender of consultant tends to subscribe to as a group.  In Chapter 10, I will present my final assessments.  I suggest here that the answers to these questions are neither strictly "yes" nor "no".


## 8.9  Comparison of Important Aspects of Male and Female Saints' Lives: Questions 4 and 6

A brief analysis of questions 4 and 6 provides a convenient segue to the discussion of questions 76-78 in Chapter 10.

4. *Welche Aspekte ihres Lebens sind am wichtigsten?*
'What aspects of their lives (the female saints) are most important?'

6. *Welche Aspekte ihres Lebens sind am wichtigsten?*
'What aspects of their lives (the male saints) are most important?'

I have decided not to include a comprehensive analysis of questions 4 and 6 as a separate subsection of the analysis for a number of reasons.  Mainly, I found much overlap between questions 3 and 4 and between 5 and 6.  In other words, when I asked consultants what words would they use to describe the saints (questions 3 and 5) and then followed such a question by asking what aspects of the saints' lives are most important (questions 4 and 6), most of the consultants either repeated the same or similar kinds of words, or they chose to elaborate on what they had listed in the previous question.  There was not always much new information to be gleaned.

One option may have been for me to pool the responses to both questions (3 with 4, 5 with 6) in order to analyze the entire larger set the way that I have done for each of questions 3 and 5.  The pool of data would then have consisted of more phrases than currently present, since questions 3 and 5 asked specifically that consultants list words, while questions 4 and 6 implied that consultants may respond more broadly, in any way that they wished.  However, I felt it was unnecessary to pool the responses because of the frequency of the overlap just mentioned.

A more interesting question was how many of each group of informants stated directly that they found little or no difference between male and female saints in response to the question about what aspects of the saints' lives are more important.  Of the female consultants, 5 [F2, F4, F6, F10, F12] responded this way in answer to question 6.  Given the sequence of the questions, and since they were asked in questions 3 and 4 about female saints first, they responded to question 6 with a variation on "there is not much difference between the men and women":

F2:  ... *es ist für mich eigentlich kein Unterschied.*
F4:  ... *dieselben.  Da ist kein Unterschied, oder ich sehe keinen Unterschied.*
F6:  *Ähnliches wie bei den Damen.*
F10: ... *was genau—wie bei den weiblichen—überraschend schwer zu verstehen ist.*
F12: ... *gar nicht so viele Unterschiede zu den Frauen.*

Four of the male consultants also expressed similar views.  While two of them stated this idea in much the same way as the women [H4, H10], two of them did not provide such a statement, but

instead, simply listed the same aspects for both female and male saints in questions 4 and 6 [H3, H5]:

H4:  *Mir würde jetzt kein Unterschied zu den Weiblichen einfallen….  Also, das wäre auch bei Frauen wiederum genauso.*
H10: *Wie bei den Frauen, …*

H3:  Q4, *Der Dienst am Nächsten;* Q6, *Der Dienst am* [sic] *Nächstenliebe.*
H5:  Q4, *Wie bei allen Heiligen, die Werke;* Q6, *Auch die Werke.*

The number of female consultants and male consultants who indicated similarities between the male and female saints with regards to the most important aspects of their lives is so similar (5 and 4 respectively) that I would not consider this difference significant.  However, these statements are interesting in comparison with questions from the subsection of my analysis found in Chapter 9 (questions 76, 77, and 78), in which consultants are asked in three varying ways to assess whether male and female saints are different from each other.  Are the informants who gave the "similar" response in questions 4 and 6 the same ones who explicitly indicated in questions 76-78 that male and female saints are *not* different?  Is there any relevant comparison?

Of the female consultants above who indicated that the important aspects of saints' lives do not differ, one [F2] had answered all three comparative questions (76-78) in the negative.  Her responses to questions 4 and 6 therefore corroborate her conviction that male and female saints are basically the same or similar.  The other four consultants [F4, F6, F10, F12] responded to two of the three comparative questions (76-78) in the negative, also corroborating a general belief that male and female saints are basically the same or similar.  Of those four, three [F6, F10, F12] only answered yes to one of the comparative questions (76-78) along with a qualification as to why they would consider male and females saints to be different, and that qualification was a reference to the circumstances of the historical time period, which disenfranchised women and did not allow them to do certain things.  Only external forces were responsible for the differences between male and female saints, according to these female consultants.

The male consultants' data is not as clearly corroborative as the female consultants' between questions 4 and 6 and questions 76-78.  While only 2 male consultants [H2, H9] answered completely in the negative to the comparative questions (76-78), indicating that they believed there are no differences between male and female saints, none of those consultants offered a response to questions 4 and 6 indicating that the aspects of saints' lives are the same or similar, regardless of gender.  Both of these men offered differences, instead.  The male consultants who suggested in questions 4 and 6 that the important aspects of male and female saints' lives are similar were among those who believed that male and female saints are indeed different (regarding questions 76-78).  One of these men [H3] even responded in the confirmative to all three comparative questions 76-78, never indicating that male and female saints are similar, but rather consistently pointing out their differences.  He did, however, suggest that there may be exceptions to these differences, as when certain female saints were intellectuals (questions 78).

The other three male consultants who suggested in response to questions 4 and 6 that the important aspects of saints' lives are the same or similar [H4, H5, H10] responded only once in the negative with regards to the comparative questions 76-78.  Two of them [H4, H10] suggested male and female saints may not be different (questions 76-78) by reference to the reasons for

sainthood.  In other words, they suggested that male and female saints are similar insofar as all saints are considered holy or canonized via the same scrutiny.  Therefore, it makes sense that these consultants would say that the important aspects of male and female saints' lives are similar.  This data, however, suggests nothing about their gender views.  Only consultant H5 gave no explanation for one statement (question 77) indicating male and female saints are not different.  However, this is the question that asks whether martyred male and female saints are different.  Because this question focuses on the martyrdom, he may also see "important aspects" of saints lives (questions 4 and 6) to be similar; he may be thinking along the same lines of the previous two consultants and their responses that canonization is the same for all saints.  Therefore, I suggest that this consultant's data are similar to the previous two consultants'; it provides no insight into his views on gender, but only into his views on holiness.  A more nuanced examination of the responses regarding male and female saints' similarities and differences is necessary in order to sift out the gender perspectives of contemporary male and female German language consultants.  The following chapter provides such a nuanced examination and sheds further light on the gender entailments of the moral underpinnings to conventions, categories, and constellations discovered in my consultants' responses thus far.

# CHAPTER 9

# GENDER COMPARISONS:
## DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES

## 9.1  Gender Comparison: Conventional Descriptions of Roles and Traits

This chapter investigates the portion of my interview questionnaire that solicited explicit gender comparisons of Christian saints.  After consultants had previously supplied their own descriptions of male and female saints and discussed four specific saints in detail, I asked them to make generalizations that compared male with female saints.  Pooling their responses generated further constellations of roles or traits and life domains specific to each gender.  Both male and female consultants appeared to agree that these basic roles, traits, and domains have been culturally conventional for each gender, particularly historically.  When consultants named particular roles, traits, and domains, they did not necessarily endorse their implementation or confirm their validity; some consultants did so, while others did not.  This discussion will be fleshed out in the following sections of this chapter.  The lists of descriptions—which include important word collocations (cf. 3.4) with gender inferences—in the next two paragraphs simply demonstrate the consultants' general consensus about gender conventions for Christian saints, providing a foundation for comparison between conventional frames and the actual beliefs of my population of German speakers.

Male saints were described by male consultants with the following roles and descriptions: *Kirchenlehrer* 'Doctor of the Church' [H1], *der Organisation Kirche verpflichtet* 'bound to the organization of the Church' [H3], *Ordensgründer* 'founder of a holy order' [H4, H11], *Patronen der Denker* 'patron of thinkers/intellectual' [H4], *Gelehrte* 'scholars', *Anführer* 'leaders' [H5], *Wanderzeugen* 'wandering witnesses' [H6], *das Wort für den Glaube erhebend* 'announcing the faith/Word of God' [H7], *haben ein Stück aus Wagemut* 'they have a bit of daring/audacity', *Leichtsinnigkeit* 'recklessness' [H10], *in der Öffentlickeit* 'in public', *aktiv* 'active', *frech* 'brash' [H11], *bringen … das Mannsein zur Vollendung, oder verwirklichen den Einfall des Schöpfers, wie der sich Mannsein und Männer gedacht hat* 'they bring manhood to fruition or actualize the idea of the creator—the way he envisioned manhood and men' [H12], *tugendhaft* 'virtuous', *wagemutig* 'daring', *tapfer* 'brave/valiant' [H13].  The female consultants employed far fewer nouns and adjectives to describe the saints, but by and large, they did not dispute these images.  They described male saints similarly: *Kirchenlehrer* 'Doctors of the Church' [F1], *Missionäre* 'missionaries' [F3], *einen heroischen Aspekt* 'a heroic aspect' [F4], *die Öffentlichkeit* 'public' [F6], *Tatkraft* 'energy/vigor', *Machtposition* 'position of power' [F7], *Beichtvater* 'confessor' [F10], *Verdienste auf der rationalen oder wissenschaftlichen Seite* 'merits on the rational or scientific side', *sich gegen die Staatsmacht erheben* 'stand up against the political powers' [F11], *mehr männliche heilige Philosophen* 'more male holy philosophers' [F13].  In summary, both male and female consultants agreed that male saints have been better known for their positions of official power; they were educated leaders, thinkers, philosophers, and teachers or Church Doctors, and they possessed qualities of strength that they wielded in the public sphere.  These results are consonant with the conventional narratives about male saints, as well as the primary categories for male saints found in the data detailed in previous chapters (cf. 5.6, 7.18, 8.8).

The qualities mentioned in connection with female saints contrasted markedly with the male saints, but both male and female consultants agreed once again that these were common circumstances for women and womanhood, at least in the past. The male consultants named the following: *Visionäre* 'visionaries', *Mystikerinnen* 'mystics', *karitative Tätigkeiten* 'charitable activities' [H1, H6], *soziale oder Nächstenliebe-Ecke* 'niche of social commitment or brotherly love', *ihre Rolle in der Familie* 'their role in the family' [H3], *Ikonen der Enthaltsamkeit* 'icons of abstinence', *keusch* 'chaste' [H4], *Milde* 'meekness/charity', *gnädig* 'gracious/merciful' [H5], *mütterlich* 'motherly' [H6], *Reinheit* 'purity' [H7], *das Martyrium im Kauf genommen und erduldet und erlitten haben* 'accepted martyrdom and endured and suffered' [H10], *hatte zu schweigen* 'had to keep silent', *zurückziehen* 'to withdraw', *passiv sein* 'to be passive' [H11], *in idealer Weise Frau sein, so wie der Schöpfer sich das weibliche Charisma gedacht hat* ' to be the ideal woman, just as the creator envisioned female charisma' [H12], *Innerlichkeit* 'inwardness', *Fürsorge* 'care/welfare', *Wohltätigkeit* 'benevolent', *das Erleidende* 'suffering', *das Passive* 'passivity' [H13]. The female consultants provide similar descriptive generalities as normative: *mystisch begabt* 'mystically gifted', *sich für die Armen und Schwachen einsetzen* 'to champion the poor and weak' [F1], *nicht missionarisch* 'not missionary', *tätig* 'active', *kämpferisch* 'warlike/militant' [F3], *bei den Frauen ist das Leiden noch mehr betont* 'with the women, suffering is emphasized more' [F4], *an ihrer privaten Sphäre verankert* 'anchored in their private sphere' [F6], *Zartheit* 'fragility/tenderness', *Schwachheit* 'weakness', *sich mehr um die Beziehung orientieren* 'to orient oneself toward relationships' [F7], *eine gemütsmäßigere Bindung an Christus* 'a more emotional connection to Christ' [F9], *eine Frau kann kein Beichtvater sein* 'a women can't be a confessor' [F10], *häufig eher auf dem sozialen oder sonstigen fürsorglichen Gebiete* 'commonly in the social or otherwise charitable domains' [F11], *sich um die Armen kümmern* 'to care for the poor' [F12]. The female saints are seen by both male and female consultants as being primarily confined to family or private spheres, where they were allowed to care for others, have visions and live mystical lives. But according to both men and women, the female saints are not consistently viewed as highly educated thinkers, teachers, or authorities for the institution of the Church. Nor are they allowed to be strong and or have a strong voice. Instead, they are expected to be passive, silent, and self-sacrificing. Once again, these constellations of words and collocations corroborate the conventional narratives about female saints (cf. 4.2, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 5.6) and the categories that have emerged so far in this study (cf. 5.6, 7.18, 8.8).

## 9.2  Comparing the Void

For practical purposes I supply the questions regarding comparison once again:

76. *Unterscheiden sich die männlichen und weiblichen Heiligen im Allgemeinen wesentlich voneinander oder sind sie wichtig aus verschiedenen Gründen? Wenn ja, bitte beschreiben Sie die Unterschiede.*
'Are the male saints and female saints in general significantly different or important for different reasons?  If so, how would you describe the differences?'

77. *Wir haben gerade von den Heiligen allgemein gesprochen, aber jetzt habe ich eine Frage nur zu den Märtyrern: unterscheiden sich die männlichen und weiblichen gemarterten Heiligen wesentlich voneinander? Wenn ja, bitte beschreiben Sie.*
   'We just spoke about the saints in general, but now I have a question specifically regarding the martyrs. Are martyred male and females saints different from each other? If so, please explain how.'

78. *Sind die nicht-gemarterten männlichen Heiligen anders als die nicht-gemarterten weiblichen Heiligen? Wenn ja, bitte beschreiben Sie.*
   'Are male and females saints not literally martyred (quasi-martyrs) different from each other? If so, please explain how.'

Despite the above consensus about cultural gender conventions, a very different picture emerged about the current conceptualizations of male and female saints and of gender in general. While the consensus suggests that all consultants could answer "yes" to the above questions, this outcome did not manifest itself. As I listened to the responses during the interviews, I was at first greatly dismayed whenever a consultant responded with a "no" to any of these questions. My initial feeling was that a "no" was simply a non-response—a void in my data. Upon closer inspection and comparative evaluation of all 26 consultants' responses, I discovered quite the opposite. The so-called "void" proved to be one of the most telling pieces of evidence. It is a perfect example of a moment, as in music, when the silence carries more meaning than sound itself. The so-called "void" provoked the question: who answered "no" and why?

## 9.3 Tables: Male and Female Consultants' Tabulated Responses to Questions 76, 77, 78

| M ID | # Yes | # No | Diff's Vague | Roles are the Cause | Exception to the Gender Norm | Nature or Traits are the Cause | Time Period is the Cause | Apology or Praise: Reverse-Sexism | Still Unequal? |
|------|-------|------|--------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| H1 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  |  |  |  |  |
| H2 | 0 | 3 | ✗ |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| H3 | 3 | 0 |  | ✗ | ✗ |  | ✗ |  |  |
| H4 | 2 | 1 |  | ✗ |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| H5 | 2 | 1 |  | ✗ |  | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |  |
| H6 | 2 | 1 |  |  |  | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |  |
| H7 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| H8 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| H9 | 0 | 3 |  |  |  | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | no |
| H10 | 2 | 1 | ✗ |  |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| H11 | 3 | 0 |  | ✗ |  | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | no |
| H12 | 3 | 0 |  |  |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| H13 | 2 | 1 | ✗ |  |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| **Totals** | **22** | **17** | **3** | **7** | **1** | **10** | **5** | **4** | **2 no** |

| F ID | # Yes | # No | Diff's Vague | Roles are the Cause | Exception to the Gender Norm | Nature or Traits are the Cause | Time Period is the Cause | Apology or Praise: Reverse-Sexism | Still Unequal? |
|------|-------|------|--------------|---------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|
| F1 | 0 | 3 |  | ✗ | ✗ |  | ✗ |  | yes |
| F2 | 0 | 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| F3 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| F4 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| F5 | 0 | 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| F6 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  |  | ✗ |  |  |
| F7 | 2 | 1 |  | ✗ |  | (✗) | ✗ |  |  |
| F8 | 1 | 2 |  |  | ✗ | ✗ |  |  |  |
| F9 | 0 | 3 |  |  |  | ✗ |  |  |  |
| F10 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  |  | ✗ |  | yes |
| F11 | 3 | 0 |  | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |  | yes |
| F12 | 1 | 2 |  | ✗ |  |  | ✗ |  |  |
| F13 | 2 | 1 |  | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |  | yes |
| **Totals** | **13** | **26** | **0** | **9** | **4** | **7** | **7** | **0** | **4 yes** |

## 9.4 Male Consultants Qualify their "No"-Responses

If we count the sheer numbers of "yes"-responses and "no"-responses from a total of three questions per each of 13 consultants, we find 22 explicit "yesses" and 17 explicit "nos". However, the inferences (cf. 3.1, 3.5) we can draw from the details of the consultants' qualified answers are more telling. Of the 13 male consultants, all but one [H9] explicitly said "yes" to at least one of the questions and another consultant [H2] gave 2 definitive and one noncommittal "no"-responses, while 3 [H3, H11, H12] said yes to all three questions. 8 more [H1, H4, H5, H6, H7, H8, H10, H13] said "no" to one or two of these questions, but 6 of the 10 who offered at least one "no"-response [H1, H2, H4, H7, H9, H10, H13] proceeded to qualify their responses in ways that contradicted the "no"-response. They provided various kinds of details, citing aspects that they believed did, in fact, differ between the male and female saints, such as societal roles or personality traits and characteristics. These details demonstrate the different entailments male consultants apply to the gender-divided concept "saint" (cf. 5.6, 7.10, 7.18), depending on whether they are speaking of male or female saints.

Consultant H1 qualified his "no"-response with differences in roles between the genders:

> *Wenn man von denen, die nicht das Martyrium erlitten haben, spricht, dann sind die einen Visionäre, die anderen Kirchenlehrer—haben die Kirche vorangebracht. Ich würde die Frauen eher auf der visionären Seite sehen, die Männer eher auf der Kirchenlehrer-Seite*
> 'If one speaks of those who did not suffer martyrdom, then the ones are visionaries, the others Doctors of the Church—promoted the Church. I would consider the women rather on the visionary side, the men rather on the Church Doctor side'.

Consultant H2, one of the two to answer "no" to all three questions, qualified that response with the abstract statement:

> *Sie sind eher aus verschiedenen Gründen wichtig*
> 'Rather, they are important for different reasons',

but also:

> *Man kann schon Unterschiede feststellen*
> 'one can indeed establish differences'.

Consultant H9, the other of two to officially respond "no" to all three questions, contradicted his stance by expressing differences in terms of what appears to be a *reverse-sexist comment*, which I will expand on shortly. He said:

> *Es ist … den männlichen Heiligen noch mehr Mut zuzusprechen als den Frauen, da die Männer ja im Allgemeinen doch wesentlich feiger sind als Frauen, ja*
> 'the male saints should be credited with more courage than the women, since men in general are in fact much more cowardly than women'.

Consultants H10 and H13 gave only mild contradictions to their answers in the negative:

*Nee, unterscheiden tun sie sich nicht großartig…. Es sind natürlich verschiedene*
*Aspekte oder verschiedene Schwerpunkte, aber das eigentliche Ziel ist immer dasselbe*
'No, they don't differ greatly…. There are, of course, different aspects or different points
of focus, but the actual goal is always the same' [H10];

*Wesentlich nicht. Kommt drauf an*
'Essentially no. It depends' [H13].

     Two consultants qualified their responses mainly with regards to martyrdom and
sexuality. While H7 suggested that only the martyred female saints are different because of their
sexuality, H4 suggested the opposite: female martyred saints are no different than male martyred
saints, but female saints in general differ from male saints in that their sexual purity is "iconic".
According to H7:

*Die weiblichen wurden oft aufgrund ihrer Reinheit, also oft aus sexuellen Gründen*
*umgebracht. Die Männer eher weil sie etwas verkündet haben, oder weil sie das Wort*
*für den Glauben erhoben haben*
'The females were often murdered because of their purity, or for sexual reasons. The
men more so because they proclaimed something, or because they announced the Word
of God'.

H4 said of martyred saints:

*… weil zum Teil die Gründe dieselben sind*
'… because the reasons are partly the same';

but he spoke in general about male and female saints, saying:

*Beispielsweise … bei beiden [Maria und Ursula] spielt Enthaltsamkeit immer eine*
*wichtige Rolle. Fast schon eine übergeordnete Rolle, so dass sie so zu Ikonen der*
*Enthaltsamkeit werden. Während ich jetzt weder beim Franz von Assisi noch beim*
*Stephanus, noch bei sonst irgendeinem Heiligen, den Eindruck habe, dass da so viel Wert*
*darauf gelegt wird, aber auch bei Weitem nicht so*
'For example … with regards to both [Mary and Ursula], abstinence always plays an
important role. Perhaps even a superordinate role, such that they become *icons of*
*abstinence*. In contrast, I never have the impression with St. Francis of Assisi, or St.
Stephen, or any other male saint, that so much value is placed on abstinence, not by far'
(my emphasis).

Neither consultant suggested definitively that these characteristics are necessarily inherent, but
they did suggest that the culturally accepted way of depicting the two genders differs mainly
with regard to sexuality. They both point out the key role sexuality has played in the history of
Christianity. The iconic quality of female purity cited by consultant H4 demonstrates the
conventionally marked concept of female virginity among saints (cf. 5.6) is still present in the

culture and underscores Armstrong's theory that these narratives still play out in modern views of women and sexuality (cf. 4.2.2).

One consultant who answered in the affirmative to all three questions [H12] based his reasoning on another set of traditional Christian teachings, asserting most strongly of all consultants that gender differences are God-given:

> *In ihrer Heiligkeit bringen sie halt dann entweder das Mannsein zur Vollendung oder verwirklichen den Einfall des Schöpfers, wie der sich Mannsein und Männer gedacht hat, und die Frauen eben ihre Weise, die heiligen Frauen sind eben in idealer Weise Frau, so wie der Schöpfer sich das weibliche Charisma gedacht hat*
> 'In their holiness they either bring manhood to fruition or actualize the idea of the creator—the way he envisioned manhood and men, and the women also in their way— the female saints are similarly ideal women just as the creator envisioned female charisma'.

Such statements repeated throughout the consultants' responses point to this male consultant's conviction that men and women are by nature different and were intended by God to be so. This consultant appears not to question the validity of any cultural conventions of roles or characteristics that place men and women in very different categories. For him more than for any other male or female consultant, men and women are unquestionably different.

In stark contrast, consultant H8 provided both affirmative and negative responses, and qualified them in perhaps one of the most neutral manners used by any of the male consultants. He suggested that it may be characteristics that differentiate male and female saints, but his word choice shows that he likely does not view such characteristics as inherent. Instead, they are likely learned or enculturated:

> *Einen wesentlichen Unterschied gibt's nicht, denn nur in der Ausformung des Verhaltens. Aber sonst, glaube ich nicht*
> 'There's no fundamental difference, because it's only in the implementation of the demeanor. But otherwise, I don't think so'.

His second qualification is more difficult to evaluate:

> *Ich denke mal, dass sie es vielleicht unterschiedlich empfunden haben—das Martyrium— das wohl schon. Aber von der Äußerlichkeit her, glaube ich, weniger*
> 'I think that they may have experienced it differently—martyrdom—that for certain. But outwardly, less, I think'.

In this latter statement, H8 seems to say there may be a different emotional reaction between genders with regards to being martyred. This statement may suggest that the consultant believes the genders differ inherently in their emotional characteristics; the mention of "outwardly" in the sense of outward appearance as a contrasting quality to emotions also suggests that the consultant sees emotions as deeper or more inherent. However, the comments are too sparsely contextualized to reach a conclusive analysis.

Aside from consultant H8, all male consultants who indicated at least once that there exist no differences between male and female genders at some point nevertheless listed character

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traits (often as traits of nature), gender-specific roles, or both as basic differences between the two gender groups of saints.  As quoted above, three of the 13 [H4, H7, H8] found roles and characteristics or traits that are commonly depicted differently between the genders, but these consultants' responses focused on the cultural tendency of these depictions, rather than on endorsing or confirming the validity of these conventions.  Nonetheless, 10 of 13 male consultants asserted directly or indirectly that, "yes," there are some kinds of essential differences between the genders that they found worth noting.


**9.5  Female Consultants Qualify their "Yes"-Responses**

In comparison, the numbers for the female consultants are virtually reversed.  All but one consultant [F11] answered explicitly "no" to at least one, if not all three, of the questions.  In fact, the total number of "yes"-responses among the female group was only 13, and the total number of "no"-responses was 26.  Many of the female consultants followed their "no"-responses with evidence supporting, rather than undermining, their negative assertions, in contrast to what the men had done.  For example, the women listed reasons for similarities—rather than differences—between male and female saints and grounded their assertions with examples, such as:

> *Es sind ihre Ideen und ihre Taten, die sie zu Heiligen machen*
> 'It is their ideas and their deeds that make them saints' [F3];

> *Ich glaube, in der Vollbringung, in der Leistung des Martyriums nicht*
> 'I think not in the accomplishment, in the achievement of martyrdom' [F9];

> *Es ist wichtig, ob sie Märtyrer sind, ... aber nicht so, ob sie Mann oder Frau sind*
> 'It is important whether they're martyrs, … but not whether they're man or woman' [F4];

> *... die Art zu reagieren, oder sozusagen, eben zu handeln, also, von der Mitte eben gesehen ist immer die Gleiche…. Der Mut, die Fürsorge, die Liebe, das ist— ... also die Eigenschaften, die diese Handlungen steuern, sind für mich eigentlich ganz die Gleichen*
> 'The way they react, or, so to speak, act, well, seen from the middle ground anyway, is always the same…. The courage, the care, the love, that is— … well, the traits that govern these actions— for me they're actually exactly the same' [F12];

and:

> *... weil das Merkmal der Heiligkeit ist ja für alle gleich…. Jede Seele ist im Prinzip dazu berufen, Gott zu lieben*
> '… because the mark of holiness is the same for all…. Every soul in principle is summoned to love God' [F13].

They are all suggesting that men and women are capable of the same things with regard to a particular ideal.  In response to questions about explicit gender comparisons, these women appear to contradict the evidence in earlier chapters that suggested consultants generally view

"saints" as a gender-divided concept (cf. 5.6, 7.10, 7.18).  They are rejecting the use of different entailments based on a male or female gendered script.  These women all suggested that being a saint indicates that certain deeds, accomplishments, characteristics, and ways of acting are the same regardless of gender.  Although it could be argued that this data says nothing about gender views about any group beyond Christian saints, I argue that this data suggests much more; if these believers think that both genders can fulfill the obligations of an ideal person—in this case the ideal happens to be a saint—then they are suggesting in principle that both genders are similarly capable of fulfilling all kinds of ideals and are therefore fundamentally more similar than different.

F11, the only female consultant who explicitly responded "yes" to all three questions, indicating that there are differences between the sexes, qualified her answers using a number of different tactics that pointed out the superficial—rather than inherent—nature of these differences.  First, she named roles that historically differed between male and female saints, saying, for example:

> *Die männlichen Heiligen [haben] ihre Verdienste vielleicht eher auf der rationalen oder wissenschaftlichen Seite … während die weiblichen vielleicht, wie halt so häufig, eher auf … den sozialen oder sonstigen fürsorglichen Gebieten erworben haben*
> 'The male saints [have] their merits perhaps more on the rational or scientific side … while the females, perhaps, as is so common, have earned [theirs] more in the social or other charitable domains';

and:

> *Die Männer … haben sich mehr gegen die Staatsmacht erhoben … während sich die Weiblichen vielleicht … gegen die Familie gestellt haben … weil die Familien nicht wollten, dass sie Christen sind*
> 'The men stood up more against the political powers … while the females perhaps … rebelled against the family … because the family didn't want them to be Christians'.

Second, consultant F11 also noted that there are both male and female saints who illustrate exceptions to the traditional dual division of roles for the sexes:

> *… wobei es auch Ausnahmen gibt, ich muss jetzt eher an die Hildegard von Bingen denken, oder die Thérèse von Liseaux, die als Mystikerin….  Auch theologisch, gibt's, also auch beide gleichmäßig, also weibliche und männliche*
> '… although there are also exceptions—I'm thinking of Hildegard of Bingen, or Thérèsa of Liseaux, who was a mystic….  Also in theology, there are, well, also both equally, that is, men and women'.

Only one male consultant [H3] pointed out exceptions like these, while at least three females did [F8, F11, F13].

Another female consultant [F13] who answered "yes" to the first question, but "no" to both of the following questions qualified her affirmative answer by referring to the historical time period of most saints' stories and the socially constructed division of roles between men and women at those times.  She also gave detailed examples of situations that result from that forced

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role division.  One example she gave was how a women might have had *eine extrem ätzende Ehe* 'an extremely miserable marriage'.  She explained that this is likely something that only happened to women, again by referring to the conditions of the historical time period, in which women were more restricted by men:

> *Also das ist … leichter, dass ein Mann in so einer Beziehung zu früheren Zeiten einer Frau das Leben so schwer macht, wie umgekehrt, also*
> 'Well, it is … more likely that a man in such a relationship in earlier times made life that difficult for a woman than the reverse, anyway'.

This same consultant also qualified her affirmative answer using exceptions to the norms, as when she said:

> *Die meisten bedeutenden theologischen Werke werden nun mal von irgendwelchen männlichen Theologen verfasst, also … natürlich gibt's auch viele, viele sehr kluge Frauen—was weiss ich—Katharina von Siena, oder … also auch andere Frauen, die … die 'em Papst ein Briefchen schreiben und wo er sich danach auch richtet, auch damals, schon….*
> 'The majority of significant theological works are simply composed by whatever male theologians, so … of course, there are also many, many very intelligent women—who could I name?  Catherine of Siena, or … well, also other women, who … who wrote some letter to the pope, which he then indeed took note of, even back then already…';

and:

> *Gut, du hast auch weibliche Kirchenlehrerinnen—Heilige Teresa von Avila, zum Beispiel.  Aber trotzdem, wie soll ich sagen?… hast du mehr … also mehr männliche heilige Philosophen, vielleicht*
> 'Sure, you also have female Doctors of the Church—Saint Teresa of Avila, for instance. But still, how should I say? … you have more … well, more male holy philosophers, perhaps'.

A third female consultant [F7], who only once asserted that there are no differences between men and women, employed another tactic to qualify her other two affirmative responses.  She first noted that there are different characteristics between men and women, such as *Zartheit* 'fragility, tenderness' for women and *Tatkraft* 'energy, vigor' for men, but she then repeatedly placed other similar characteristics, like *Schwachheit* 'weakness' for women and *natürliche Machtposition* 'natural position of power' for men in scare quotes, after listing each trait, saying: *in Anführungszeichen* 'in quotations'.  By stating that she wanted these items in scare quotes, she indicated her desire to label these words as "so-called" by society, but not necessarily valid for her own viewpoint on traits belonging to men or women.  Like 6 other women—(7 total of the 13) [F1, F6, F7, F10, F11, F12, F13]—she also referred several times to the significance of these historical stories' time periods, indicating that the so-called gender differences are mostly society's construction, and not necessarily a fact of either men's or women's natural characteristics.  It appears that at least half of the women are very aware of the conventional script of gender division for saints but clearly reject it within their own belief

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systems.  They seem to reject a gender-division in general, often giving examples of how both genders are capable of all of the same ideals.


## 9.6  Historical Time Period and Societal Denial

This pattern among the female consultants of referring to the historical time period as a method of explaining gender differences as social constructions—or conventional *scripts*—rather than as facts of nature, functioned quite differently than the male consultants' slightly sparser references to a historical time period.  4 of the 7 female consultants who invoked the historical period focused their discussions on the aspect of denial; they illustrated what roles or characteristics were unjustly denied women by either the expectations of society or the dominant institution of the Church.  F1 was particularly adamant that particular roles and opportunities were denied women:

> *Das sieht man an einem Beispiel mit den Kirchenlehrerinnen.  Ich weiß nicht, wann sie eingeführt wurden—es ist nicht so furchtbar lange her, dass man überhaupt gesagt hat, Frauen können sowas, Frauen können auch Kirchenlehrer sein.  Und das ist eigentlich ein Feigenblatt, weil es gibt drei Kirchenlehrerinnen; eine davon ist Thérèse von Lisieux—das ist eine Lachnummer! Das ist keine Intellektuelle, … ist eigentlich zu einer Verarschung geworden….  Die Kirchenführer sind natürlich auch nur Männer.  Das wäre auch wieder so eine Kategorie, eine Heiligkeitskategorie—also irgendwie heilige Päpste, oder so—die für Männer reserviert sind.  Ja, da sind die Unterschiede, glaube ich, dass es so bestimmte Kategorien von Heiligkeit angeblich nur bei Männern gibt…oder tatsächlich, weil sie [Frauen] natürlich nicht Karriere in der Kirche konnten*
> 'That's visible in an example of the female Doctors of the Church.  I don't know when they were introduced—it's not so terribly long ago that anyone even said, women can do something like that, women can also be Doctors of the Church.  And that's actually a cover-up, because there are three female Church Doctors; one of them is Thérèse von Lisieux—that's a farce!  She's no intellectual, … the whole thing's become a joke….  The leaders of the Church are, of course, only men.  That's another kind of category, a category of holiness—like holy Popes and such—that is reserved for men.  Yes, those are the differences, I think, that there are particular categories of holiness that apparently exist only for men … or in actuality, because they [women], of course, couldn't have careers in the Church'.

F10 echoed the comments of F1, saying simply:

> *Zum Beispiel, eine Frau kann kein Beichtvater sein … und ein bettelnder Mönch kann ja wenig Essen für die Armen abgeben*
> 'For example, a women can't be a confessor … and a mendicant monk can give up very little food to the poor'.

She explains how the allowed roles simply limited what either gender could do.
Consultant F6 and F7 also offered similar views on the barring of women from certain domains, especially public ones beyond the family.  F6 said:

*Also, ich finde Frauen besonders im Kontext ihrer Zeiten nochmal hervorzuheben, weil es einfach auch ein Akt war, in die Öffentlichkeit zu gehen. Frauen, die ja sonst sehr in ihrer privaten Sphäre verankert waren, die erst mit einem öffentlichen Bekenntnis—an die Öffentlich- ... also, bekannt werden, und dann auch noch also einen unehrenhaften Tod sterben*

'Well, I think women, particularly in the context of their times, should be highlighted, because it was simply a feat to go out in public. Women, who were otherwise anchored in their private sphere and only through public confession—in public- ... I mean, become visible, and then in addition die an ignoble death'.

Consultant F7 suggested beliefs about women's nature placed great limitations on what women could easily do:

*... weil bei den Frauen erwartet man eben, dass sie sich nun mehr an der Beziehung orientieren, und versuchen, eine Beziehung zu schützen. Aber da treten die Frauen aus ihrer Rolle heraus, und geben Beziehungen auf, z.B.... Ja, ob es jetzt Einsiedelei ist, oder ins Kloster gehen, und ein Leben lang dort verbringen—eben aus der Glaubensorientierung heraus—oder was auch immer. Das Risiko einzugehen, eben verstoßen zu werden, also ist mehr von der Beziehungsseite her, denke ich, dass die Frauen dann überraschen durch ihre Entscheidungen—so gegen ihre Natur zu gehen scheinen*

'… because one expects with women that they orient themselves toward relationships and try to preserve a relationship. But these women extricated themselves from their roles and gave up their relationships, for example…. Yes, whether in the form of hermitage or entering a convent, and living out their whole lives there—in alignment with their belief, or however. To take the risk of being cast out, that is—more in terms of relationships, I think—why the women surprise us with their decisions—seemingly going against their nature'.

This comment underscores the extra risks women had to undertake with respect to social acceptance, suggested by Armstrong (cf. Chapter 4). It also demonstrates how pervasive the conventions about gender differences are; the categorization of women into the categories ***Sozial*** and ***Beziehung*** in Chapter 7 are reflected in this woman's depiction of the norm (cf. 7.3, 7.16). F11 mentioned a similar type of social ostracism:

*... weil die Familien nicht wollten, dass sie Christen sind. Ich glaube, das war bei den Männern weniger das Problem, dass die Familie das nicht gewollt hat, sondern dass da eher jemand von Oben...*

'… because the families didn't want them to be Christians. I think it was less of a problem for men that the families didn't want that, than that someone higher up...'.

This comment reiterates the different spheres that were expected for the different genders, such that social customs limited women, particularly in the past. Once again, the inference we can draw from such comments is that only custom limits women, but their innate capabilities are no

different than those of men; to these women, the concept of a gender division is not essential or necessarily a reflection of reality.


**9.7  Historical Time Period and Male Apologies for Potential Sexism**

5 male consultants invoked the historical time period [H3, H5, H6, H9, H11], but applied it with a different perspective.  By invoking this aspect in combination with an answer in the affirmative—that male and female saints are indeed different—the trope is either accompanied by a kind of apology or praise of women in consolation for unequal treatment, or it becomes a means of impersonalizing and self-distancing from the topic of gender differences [H5, H6, H9, H11].  Only H3 did not use an apology or praise as consolation, but instead justified the differences by giving exceptions to the gender norms.  He was the only male consultant to provide such exceptions, but he may have done so in the same manner or for the same reasons as those giving an *apology* or *praise as consolation*.  This premise is inconclusive, however.

The apology or praise as consolation takes a number of forms.  Consultant H5 referred to the time period, but seemed uncomfortable in conceding that women were not allowed to do everything that men were in the Middle Ages.  First he asserted:

> *Natürlich…*
> 'Of course…',

then laughed,

> *… ist die Rolle der Frau eine andere als die des Mannes, nicht jetzt allein, nicht also rein historisch von den Umständen her*
> '… the role of a woman is a different one than that of a man, not only, not just purely historically because of circumstances'.

As he uncomfortably explained this answer, he was unable to finish a single sentence about the women, saying:

> *Das hat, z.B., so ein … das kann die Fau zu dieser Zeit … das war 1200 oder so … das kein … eine Frau, also … gut … ja, aber so … aber auf jeden Fall, niemals …*
> 'That is, for example, such a … a woman at this time can … that was 1200 or so … that no … a women, well … good, yes, but so … but under no circumstances, never …'.

When he finally did finish his statement he evaded a direct explanation.  He provided a consolation statement, in which he essentially apologized for being unable to justify why the circumstances of the time period were not the only differences he found between men and women.  He said:

> *Also ich glaub', z.B., das finde ich z.B. relativ interessant … ich glaub', die weiblichen Heiligen waren teilweise sogar mehr verehrt vom Volk als die männlichen.  Eben, wegen gewisser …*

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'Well, I think, for example, I find it relatively interesting … I think that the female saints were, in fact, somewhat more venerated by the people than the male saints. Yeah, because of certain …'.

In other words, he was embarrassed that he believed there are inherent differences in males and females, most likely because he was familiar with conflicting beliefs in contemporary society about the equality of men and women and the issue of *political correctness*. He was not comfortable acknowledging his viewpoint, because he knew it might be considered sexist by some. He tried to apologize for his sexism—to soften it or make it acceptable—by praising women, or showing how, despite their inequality, they have a redeeming aspect. The fact that I, as his interviewer, am female may also have prompted this uncomfortable response.

The comment by consultant H9 that I called a *reverse-sexist comment* above (cf. 9.4) is similar to this apology. The comment was:

*Es ist—sag' ich mal hier—würde ich denken, den männlichen Heiligen noch mehr Mut zuzusprechen als den Frauen, da die Männer ja im Allgemeinen doch wesentlich feiger sind als Frauen, ja*
'It is—so to speak—I would think, the male saints should be credited with more courage than the women, since men in general are in fact much more cowardly than women'.

This statement is a kind of consolation offered by a male who may be sensitive to the ongoing public gender debate; as a man, he may be uncomfortable with his own historically privileged position and feel that he should apologize for it to prove that he is not sexist. This statement functions like the phenomenon of linguistic *hypercorrection*, which is often characterized by an attempt to imitate a prestige form of "grammatical" rather than colloquial language, but which results in an ungrammatical form. This consultant in effect was asserting that, "no, there are no inherent differences between men and women, but, just to make sure you know that I'm not sexist and do think that men and women are equal, I'll show you how I think even more highly of women than men". In so doing, he undermined his attempt at neutrality and came across as possibly sexist.

Another male consultant who repeatedly invoked the historical time period [H11] used it to distance himself from any personal statement about gender equality. He listed numerous stereotypical male and female traits to demonstrate the differences between male and female saints, such as:

*Die Frau hatte zu schweigen, ja in der Küche zu sein und zu dienen, … die Männer [haben] gekämpft, sei es mit Worten oder mit dem Schwert…. Bei den Männern dominiert das aktive Element; bei den Frauen dominiert das passive*
'The woman had to be silent, be in the kitchen and serve, … the men fought, whether that be with words or with the sword…. In men the active element dominates; in women, the passive dominates'.

When this consultant remarked that these elements are all a product of the historical period, he distanced himself from personal comment on current gender differences by saying:

*Das spielte sich also in der Zeit ab, als die Frau einen anderen sozialen Status hatte als der Mann. Das wäre heute sicher anders*
'That played out in the time when women had a different social status than men. That would certainly be different today'.

He camouflaged his descriptions of differing qualities as an impartial observation of historical circumstances, never commenting on whether he believed this treatment was correct or incorrect. When he mentioned the current time period, he referred to society as a whole, but never commented on his own personal view. The narrative structure of his argument allowed him to list many inherent differences, but enabled him to avoid revealing his personal judgment by describing the differences as if through the eyes of an impartial observer. This stance positioned him as if he were not even part of contemporary society.

One more male consultant who indicated that the historical time period was relevant to explain differences [H6] realized during the interview, however, that the telling of these stories had influenced his own views of gender similarities or differences. He said:

*Ich denke, sie sind geschichtlich anders interpretiert worden, einfach … hineininterpretiert … in das typische Frauen- und Männerbild, also die Frauen eher als die mütterlichen, und die Männer eher als die, die hinausziehen und da irgendwas wirken. Und ich merk'— hab' jetzt während dieses Interviews gemerkt, dass das bei mir ganz schon prägend ist, dieses Bild. Ja, Selbsterkenntnis auch noch geworden*
'I think that they are differently interpreted historically, simply … read into … into the typical perception of women and men, in other words, the women more as the motherly ones, and the men more as those who go out and do something. And I notice—I discovered now during this interview, that that's had a very strong influence on me, this picture. Yeah, self-realization, too'.

In other words, he explained that the historical stories are continually retold with all of the gender inequalities intact. When modern hearers accept these stories uncritically, they also accept the gender differences described in the stories as natural, using these stories and their content at "tools for thinking" and reasoning (cf. 3.7). They accept these gender differences into their own moral systems. The details of these stories continue to proliferate gender differences in the minds of hearers, influencing many to accept these differences as inherent. Only in discussing these topics did this consultant suddenly realize that his own view of inherent differences between men and women had been influenced by the way stories are told.

## 9.8  Parallel Gender Views or Psuedo-Parallelism?

The only male consultant [H3] whose response paralleled in kind that of any of the women was also one who affirmed differences but immediately qualified this as being the effects of the historical time period. His response mirrored almost exactly in content that of the single female consultant [F11] who explicitly answered with the affirmative, that male and female saints are different. There is, however, one important difference, which I point out below. This male consultant said:

*Also sie unterscheiden sich,… ich meine … aufgrund der Rolle in der damaligen Gesellschaft*
'Well, they differ, … I mean … because of the role in the society back then'.

He also later named exceptions to these typical roles, saying:

*Es gab sicherlich auch soziale Heilige bei den Männern, und auch bei den Frauen—wenn ich an die Therese von Avila denke, die auch der Organisation Kirche dann verbunden war—aber die Frauen sind für—mehr … in der sozialen Spalte drin, während die Männer mehr in der Organisationsspalte drin sind*
'There were certainly also socially disposed saints among the men, and also among the women—when I think of Theresa of Avila, who was also very connected to the Organization of the Church—but the women are for—more … in the social rubric, while the men are more in the organization rubric'.

This consultant in essence acknowledged differences, ascribed them to historical circumstances (and underscored the prevalence of conventional gender categories found in previous chapters), admitted there are exceptions, and did not explicitly try to apologize for his opinion or his own gender—although I have suggested above that the naming of exceptions might be considered similar to the apology as consolation (cf. 9.7). Neither did he, however, emphasize the denial of women's rights in the historical period, as did almost all female consultants.

What crucially differs between the response of male consultant H3 and that of female consultant F11, quoted earlier, is that she asserted as an aside the similarities between the historical period and today, whereas he omitted any discussion of the present. She said in contrast:

*… aber ich glaube, ja, das ist schon, wie halt bei vielen, vielen … zwischen Männlein und Weiblein … es ist auch heute manchmal noch so, dass sich die Männer auf das eine und die Frauen auf das andere stürzen, … ich denk', zumindest gibt's immer noch zu wenig Wissenschaftlerinnen, oder?*
'… but I think that it's that way, as with many, many … between men and women … it's also often still that way today, that men jump on one thing and women on the other, … I feel at least that there are still too few female scientists, right?'.

In other words, although this female consultant acknowledged differences between the genders, she asserted that it is not about inherent differences, but about customs that she thinks still need to be changed.

Her statement also highlights the perspective that differences from the past still play a role in contemporary society, a perspective that three other female consultants shared in such examples as:

*… so eine Kategorie sozusagen, von Heiligkeit—die wird Frauen noch nicht unbedingt zugeschrieben*
'… such a category, so to speak, of sainthood—that is not yet necessarily ascribed to women' [F1];

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*Eine Frau zu töten ist dann wieder eine Stufe schlimmer empfunden [als einen Mann].*
*Also das ist bis heute*
'To kill a women is felt to be a degree worse [than to kill a man]. And that still holds today' [F10];

*Also das ist, halt … das hat natürlich schon zum Einen auch was mit der Rollenverteilung*
*in der Zeit zu tun, aber … heute ist es ja auch so*
'Well, that is … that of course has to do, on the one hand, with the division of roles of the time, but … it's still the same today' [F13].

Not a single male consultant asserted anything similar to these comments. Instead of suggesting that today's circumstances between the genders have parallels to the historical ones, in which women were suppressed, the men who made such comparisons of era came to the opposite conclusion. They suggested that those oppressive circumstances for women no longer exist:

*Sicherlich haben's die Frauen noch wesentlich schwerer gehabt in dieser Zeit…. Sie*
*hatten's ja, zu diesem Zeitpunkt beileibe ... noch viel schwerer als heute, ja*
'Certainly the women had things significantly more difficult in this time…. They had it, yes, at this time period, definitely … much more difficult than today, yes' [H9];

and:

*Das spielte sich also in der Zeit ab, als die Frau einen anderen sozialen Status hatte als*
*der Mann. Das wäre heute sicher anders*
'That played out in the time when women had a different social status than men. That would certainly be different today' [H11].


## 9.9  Traits May Not Be Inherent

In summary, the female consultants generally asserted that male and female saints are not really different. A full 9 female consultants [F1, F3, F4, F6, F7, F10, F11, F12, F13] suggested that societal roles constitute the primary causes for differences between the genders, rather than nature or inherent traits. However, 7 female consultants [F3, F4, F7, F8, F9, F11, F13] did name nature or traits. While one of the latter did so with sarcasm [F7], using scare quotes, she and two others [F11, F13] asserted that the historical time period was a greater cause for differences in traits, suggesting by inference that these traits may not be inherent. F3 named roles as well as traits, but placed little emphasis on either and instead emphasized her negative responses to the two other questions:

*Vielleicht in einem Punkt: Dass die männlichen Gemarterten missionarisch auch tätig*
*waren—auch viele—was ich von Weiblichen bis jetzt gar nicht gehört habe. Auch dass*
*die Männlichen vielleicht eher die Kämpferischen waren, aber ich glaube, dieses*
*Missionarische ist ein Punkt, der sie unterscheidet*

'Perhaps on one point: that the male martyrs were missionaries—many in fact—which I have not yet heard about the women. And that the men were perhaps more militant, but I think this missionary work is one point that differentiates them'.

Her response does not suggest a quality that is necessarily natural, but one that is a result of the different spheres of work, or *domains of activity* (cf. Chapter 7), allowed men and women; women were historically not allowed to be missionaries because that was a public role.

F4 named one aspect that she believed is emphasized in the depiction of female saints, but did not suggest that she believed it to be an inherent trait:

> *Bei den Frauen ist das Leiden mehr betont*
> 'With the women, suffering is emphasized more'.

F8 named traits in order to suggest that there are exceptions to the gender norms, rather than to uphold those norms:

> *Bei den Männern steht immer heraus, dass sie ganz besonders ihre weibliche Seite betont zum Ausdruck bringen und bei den Frauen umgekehrt ist die geistige betont; beide haben natürlich vom Beiden etwas*
> 'It always stands out with the men that they express their feminine side with especial emphasis, and with the women, the reverse, their intellectual side; both naturally have something of each'.

Finally, F9 named a single trait hesitantly but answered with a general "no"-response to all three questions:

> *Ich glaube, dass sie sich im Wesentlichen nicht unterscheiden—höchstens in der Gemütslage—dass es unter den weiblichen Heiligen eine gemütsmäßigere Bindung an Christus gibt. Ich weiß es aber nicht genau; ich stelle es aber mir so vor*
> 'I think that they don't differ fundamentally—at the very most in mood—that there is a more emotional connection to Christ among the women. I don't know for sure; I just imagine so'.

All six of these consultants' responses suggest that the women believe differing traits may not necessarily be inherent or that traits are not necessarily different between the genders. Such responses provide an invaluable augmentation of the data analyses of the previous chapters; women do not necessarily agree with the cultural gender conventions, even though they are familiar with these concepts. They appear to hold additional gender concepts, and their narratives may be an indication of cultural conceptual transformation in progress.

## 9.10 Final Conclusions

In summary, I suggest that the female consultants rarely considered differences between the genders to be inherent qualities. According to 7 of the female consultants the only differences we find are a result of the time period and the things that society denied women of

the past.  4 of those female consultants also asserted that the social customs that limited women historically are still at least partially in place.  In contrast to the females' perspectives, male consultants generally suggested and demonstrated with examples that, yes, there are differences between male and female saints.  One consultant was adamant that there are innate differences that were intended by God.  5 of the male consultants suggested that any differences could be due to the time period.  At least 4, and perhaps 5, of these men felt embarrassment either at their own belief in inequality between males and females or at society's unequal treatment of men and women.  But not a single male consultant suggested that today's circumstances still limit women.  On the contrary, two men suggested that differences in treatment no longer exist, while four women suggested that inequality between men and women is a problem today.

The results of this data point to an ironic contrast in the perception of contemporary German speakers about gender relations in the past versus the present.  Both men and women agreed that historical Christian saints fulfilled conventional gender roles, traits, and domains (cf. Chapters 7 and 8). According to my consultants, the dominant male group was educated and had the right to speak in public for the institution of the Church.  The dominant group limited the options of the subordinate female group; women were often denied education, the right to voice their opinions, and freedom of movement in the public sphere.  There were ostensibly exceptions to both of these standards, each with particular ramifications or entailments.  For example, mysticism for female saints may have enabled some women to become exceptions to the rule (cf. 4.2.4).  Many females in the past may have turned to mysticism as a means of filling the intellectual void that resulted from minimal education.  Mysticism may have served as a diversion from their isolated lives behind walls of cloister and family and afforded women a measure of authority directly, so to speak, from God himself.  While the male consultants tended to focus on the factuality of different spheres of importance that male and female saints historically held for the Catholic Church, the female consultants suggested that such segregation by gender was practiced by the Church via these partitioned spheres, but they actively evaluated this fact as unfair.

Presently, there appear to be common differences in male and female perspectives about gender among these German speakers.  Some of the male consultants asserted that the historical situation has changed; women are no longer segregated from traditionally male spheres or limited by social expectations as to which roles they choose to fulfill.  However, many men hinted at possible inherent differences, or differences of nature between men and women.  They seemed to suggest that men and women are now treated completely equally, but at least one male consultant's responses suggest that gender equality need not be a goal [H12].  In contrast, the female consultants widely rejected inherent differences or differences of nature between the genders.  According to these women, male and female believers ought to be afforded equal choice and equal treatment, but they suggested that today's social circumstances still place limits on the rights of women, despite the two genders' equality of nature.

These consultants' pooled responses may point to general patterns of beliefs about gender in a broader population.  I suggest that these data, seen as representative of the greater population, may show how contemporary German speakers still hold various beliefs about gender, divided primarily along gender lines themselves.  Any underlying differences between males and females may or may not be ones of access and resources or of natural traits; clearly, these aspects are still hotly debated.  The advances in women's right in the last century have likely enabled overall perceptual change.  Apparent in my linguistic evidence is that, regardless of actual circumstances, perceptions about gender tend to differ between contemporary men and

women.  Nonetheless, many of the conventional sets of social values are at the roots of these perceptions: questions of natural traits, domination and subordination, strength and weakness. One possibility underlying the different stances on these social values may be two different moral systems, each of which acts as a lens through which to filter the information.  In the final chapter I will discuss how the linguistic evidence in this study suggests that both contemporary males and females tend to hold a Strict Father system of morality, while the women may demonstrate ideas with regard to gender that are indicative of a transformation in conceptualization toward the Nurturant Parent system of morality.  Each moral system's basic narrative supplies the entailments to generate a comprehensive perspective, and I will demonstrate how the details of my data generally point to one or the other moral system.  Most crucial in conceptualization, as my consultants have pointed out, is that there are always exceptions to the rule.

# CHAPTER 10

## RE-MODELING GENDER THROUGH EMPATHY

### 10.1  Preamble: Empathy as the New Commandment

In her historical survey of Christian theology and women, Rosemary Radford Ruether wrote of a *one-nature* and a *two-nature anthropology of gender* (1998:9).  She described the *two-nature anthropology* as a belief system based on essential biological differences between males and females, intended by God as a kind of division of labor.  According to Ruether (9), this system "identifie[s maleness] with reason and moral will, complemented by female intuitive and altruistic qualities,…exalting women as more virtuous than men," but also "exclud[ing] women from being active agents in society".  Ruether (9) explained that *one-nature anthropology* is a theory of equality of all humans that is based on "an asexual image of God given to all humans in creation," and it is the belief system commonly used to argue for equality between males and females because it assumes that both genders are equally capable of all things.  Ruether noted, however, that this system is flawed by an underlying assumption of *androgyny* (cf. 1.4), wherein women and men are said to possess all characteristics equally, but the characteristics that are prioritized and highly esteemed are the traditionally male characteristics of "reason and moral will".  The one-anthropology system negates femininity itself, and reveals itself to be the flip side of the same coin.  These two systems reflect Armstrong's (1987:279-80) assertion that the *paragon* and the *anti-ideal* of womanhood—symbolized by the virgin/martyr/mystic and the witch, respectively—are really not opposites, but the flip side of the same coin.

Both one-nature and two-nature anthropologies are folk models (cf. 2.3, 2.10, 4.1.5) that reflect what Lakoff has described as a Strict Father moral system (SFM), wherein the highest virtues are moral strength, authority, and purity (cf. 4.1.5), all necessary to fend off the threat of evil—the embodiment of uncertainty in human existence.  The overlay of gender—rooted in our creation story about Original Sin, fear of the body, and woman's role in the fall—maps entailments onto individuals, determining what roles are authorized for a given gendered person; traditionally male roles rank higher in the hierarchy than traditionally female roles.  Ruether suggested that the dominant Church hierarchy has used two-nature anthropology to exclude women from positions of power in the Church, a position substantiated by Armstrong (1987) in countless examples throughout her approximately 2000-year history of the Christian Church.  Ruether also suggested that the implementation of one-nature anthropology by feminists has been unsuccessful because it accepts central details of the same folk model of values, using the same metaphors for good and evil: the mind and body are at odds with each other, and feats of the intellect and moral strength are superior to the body and the emotions and sensations that afflict it.  Armstrong's examples of cloistered but successful females, such as Hildegard of Bingen or Teresa of Avila, demonstrate implementation of the one-nature anthropology by women in the past who sought freedoms allowed only to males under the dominant moral system.  These women remained in many ways enmeshed in the mentality of SFM and the limitations on their gender entailed by the metaphors in that value system.

A change has only recently ensued in the accepted folk model of Western values, particularly with regard to gender, and the change is neither all encompassing, complete, nor

even dominant.  Given the evidence in my German language interviews, it appears that this change is wide-spread but still in its infancy.  It seems to be taking place primarily among those in the traditionally subordinate gender group—women—but it is only partially adopted even by many of them.  That change involves the acceptance and implementation of a new folk model of gender, validated by a new moral system that values equality without prioritizing hierarchies of roles or character traits.  This moral system values the body as much as the mind and sees the two as complementary, rather than antagonistic.  That system can be called the Nurturant Parent moral system (NPM), and the only characteristic prioritized above all others is *empathy*.  NPM does not view empathy as male or female, and it does not specify how the quality of empathy must be applied, but it unifies body and mind in its application. This value system is, in fact, quite old, but has never been the dominant system of values in the Christian West, nor has it likely ever enjoyed such reception as it appears to now.  Ironically, it is a system of values that is as fundamental to Christianity as is SFM, but the dominant institution of the Christian Church practiced SFM, which thereby achieved preeminence through cultural transmission.  NPM, in contrast, most closely resembles the system of values promoted by the figure of Christ in his teachings in the gospels (cf. 4.16).

In the NP system of morality, empathy functions as the guiding force and thread that binds infinite possibility together.  Empathy is the only quality that may be a human universal within this system, but according to Simon Baron-Cohen in his recent book, *The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty* (2011b), human beings are not capable of empathy in a universal way.  We all possess empathy, but we demonstrate different levels of empathy on an indefinite scale.  In fact, Baron-Cohen argued against the existence of pure evil, one of the foundational beliefs of the SFM system.  Baron-Cohen (6) asserted that no human being is purely evil, but that some human beings simply have a much lower quotient of empathy, such that their system of values enables them to "objectify" other human beings.  It is such objectification that enables hierarchies, subjecting one being—human or otherwise—to another.  When empathy, rather than a dichotomous and embodied good and evil, becomes the guiding factor in a system of values, hierarchies and divisions break down into meaninglessness.  Limitations of gender can no longer exist because empathy itself is genderless.  Baron-Cohen (2011a) defined *empathy* as a twofold effect: "the recognition of someone else's state of mind" and the "appropriate emotional response".[11]  Real empathy therefore enables an individual to transplant him or herself into the emotional state and reasoning of another.  This action negates all differences, including gender differences, if the person's response then reflects that comprehension of the other's state.  It is no wonder that earlier emergences of NPM were traditionally thought of as a women's model of morality, as claimed by G. Lakoff (2002:108).  Within the metaphorical system of the dominant SFM, the use of empathy looks like emotionality, codified in the Christian doctrine of charity.  SFM metaphorical structures cannot conceive of the unification of mind and body in the production of empathy.  It entailments make the conceptualization of empathy to mean emotion alone, because the mind and body are mutually inhibited concepts in SFM.  Empathy is interpreted in SFM as pure emotion—rather than the two-fold definition involving action in the

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[11] Neither Baron-Cohen's definition (2011a) nor Lakoff's (2002) Nurturant Parent system of morality state explicit *how* empathy should be applied or how one should make a judgment as to how it should be applied.  I suggest that this "fuzziness" is implicit to the category *empathy*; it's boundaries cannot be clearly defined without a context; *empathy* may also be a contested concept.

form of an "appropriate response"—and relegated to the category of weaknesses associated with women, because gender values in SFM associate the body and weakness with women. In SFM as implemented by Church Doctrine, only women succumb to the sensations of the body. They do not have the moral strength and powers of intellectual reason that men have. Women are therefore the main performers of charity, an attempt to channel emotionality through good deeds. Whereas SFM sees the reliance on bodily sensations as dangerous and deceptive, NPM understands and shows compassion for an "Other" through combined emotion and bodily experience.

The NPM system advocates the use of empathy in the face of uncertainty, using sensory information from a unified mind and body, rather than distrusting one of these. Neither mind nor body is pure good or pure evil, and neither can a person or circumstance be relegated to one category or the other. Such reasoning accepts differences and erases hierarchies. Gender becomes mere circumstance rather than a determiner, and concepts can no longer be clearly "gender-divided" (cf. 5.6, 7.10, 7.18, 9.4). From Ruether's and Armstrong's points of view, these are the goals of current third wave feminists, these are the original values of Christ's moral teachings, and they are gaining acceptance in today's Western populations. Despite their proliferation, they are not yet the predominant values of the general population. I assert that the relatively new yet increasing acceptance of the NPM system is rooted in the last century of women's and other minority groups' civil rights movements. These movements have all identified that the values of the status quo privilege some and limit others, fabricating hierarchies and absolute boundaries. The movements have each sought to unify their cause under new sets of values. Unfortunately, as Ruether and many other feminists have suggested, minority groups have often found that they could not unite themselves under universals such as "femaleness" because different groups of women's needs varied drastically, depending on a multitude of other factors, such as race and income. "Gender" alone cannot unite all women in a way that can adequately remedy all the injustices that diverse women experience as a result of the dominant moral system. For this reason, feminists of the third wave, among them Rosemary Radford Ruether (1998:10), have advocated postmodernist thought, which "has rejected the whole concept of universals, not only of different profiles of essential maleness and essential femaleness but even the idea of an essential humanness. All such notions of an essential self and universal human values are declared to be social constructions that veil the universalizing of dominant cultural groups of men and women". Ruether declared that a new system of values embraces difference without using differences to segregate, and in doing so it valorizes possibility, openness, creativity, and the individual. This is the description of an ideal Nurturant Parent moral system.


## 10.2  Folk Models, Role Models, and the Concrete

My interviews corroborate Ruether's stance on the transformation of Western society's system of values. In Chapter 5 we viewed a list of saints that provided a baseline for historical, culturally accepted gender conventions, or scripts. These conventions are founded on a SFM system of moral reasoning which prioritizes male over female as the dominant group and which conceptualizes gender in the form of dichotomous male and female ideals, each of which entails specific roles, traits or qualities, and domains of activity. The *paragon* (cf. 2.3) of each gender performs roles that uphold the primary moral virtues: strength, authority, purity, and nurturance

within the bounds of the system.  Together these virtues accomplish the highest imperative: upholding the moral system itself.  Each person knows his or her own boundaries and obeys them to the ideal extreme.

We also discovered a number of exceptions to this moral system in the form of ideals embodying less traditional gender stereotypes, wherein some male and female ideal saints transgress traditional gender roles of the SFM system.   Some males, such as St. Francis of Assisi, demonstrated serving and caring for others to a high degree, while some females, such as Catharine of Alexandria or Joan of Arc, demonstrated intellectual prowess or battling characteristics traditionally associated with and allowed only among males in the SFM system. These examples of alternatives are nonetheless seen as ideals by some of my language consultants, suggesting that SFM may not be the only system of morality among today's German-speaking populations in the West.  These examples may also point to conflicting systems of morality in the individuals themselves, which illustrates the best-fit and imprecise conceptualization strategies of the human brain that allow for variation relative to need and purpose (cf. 2.2).

Chapter 6 builds on these preliminary findings, illustrating the validity of the premise that saints' stories are narrative structures used as generalized tools for thinking and reasoning.  They are purposeful, conceptual structures employed as needed, or "opportunistically" (cf. Chapter 3). My consultants themselves underscored the functional status of saints' narratives in their responses to my questionnaire.  Two of the major outcomes of their pooled responses are that folk models are primary systems of reasoning employed constantly by everyone, and that role model figures especially are crucial tools for making choices.  Four consultants even mentioned the notion of folk models or popular beliefs and their importance for culture: two consultants spoke of a common *Volksfrömmigkeit* 'popular religion/devotion' [H1, H2]; one mentioned *Volksglaube* 'folk/popular beliefs' [F4]; and another referred to a typical *Volksvorstellung* 'folk concept/model' [F10].  Both folk models about the world and role model figures are composed of narrative structures or scripts filled with metaphors for causation and morality.  Consultants consistently explained how these stories and figures enable believers to reason about causes and effects and to take moral action in their own lives.

A number of important points emerged in the discussion of role models.  Role models are ideals, or paragons, of a category.  The category structure then determines the entailments through metaphorical mappings (cf. 2.6, 2.7, 2.11).  When the category "female" is applied to a gender-divided concept, all entailments of a particular moral system regarding the ideal "female" are mapped onto the target from the source "female".  The same happens for the category "male".  The target gender-divided concept in this case is "saint", and "saint" is a contested concept (cf. 1.8); the entailments of "female" or "male" "saints" differ depending on the system of values, or moral system.  The ideal female in SFM is very different from the ideal female in NPM, and likewise for the ideal "male".  Different entailments apply in each case.  The way that an individual employs or views a role model depends on his or her moral system.  Another aspect of the role model is that it is often partially arbitrary.  Chosen not by the person employing the role model, a saint after whom a person is named can still have a very strong effect on that person's conceptual reasoning if the person chooses to make use of that saint as a role model. This arbitrariness points to the best-fit characteristic of neural connections (cf. 2.2); we are capable of employing an infinite number of source domains for reasoning about a target domain because a perfect match is never necessary to create neural connections.  For this reason we accept conventional knowledge and employ it prolifically in reasoning about our personal lives.

Culturally shared information is accepted as valid, conceptual knowledge based on experience. It helps us manage life's uncertainties, and for this reason, believers often see their role models metaphorically as helpers. They even call their role model saints "helpers" and "intercessors" in life's circumstances. This "helping" function reiterates the use of narratives as tools for thinking, reasoning, and acting.

Finally, consultants unknowingly emphasized the validity of embodied concepts when they asserted that the stories of saints *concretize* belief for people (cf. 6.5). They named and described the physical connection that believers have with stories about saints: stories and writings act as solid proof attesting to belief; decorations and details in stories promote vivid imagination; abstract ideas become visible and tangible; and the act of expression solidifies and transmits concepts by means of bodily accommodation. Stories of saints demonstrate how a human being can act according to circumstances. Nonetheless, several consultants doubted the usefulness of Christian saints' stories for today's greater population. I suggest that they may be correct about dwindling intentional application, but I also maintain that narratives and their conceptual kernels are not so easily discarded. Narratives are so powerful that their meanings remain in our unconscious daily use of metaphor for an indefinable period.


## 10.3  Details of the Status Quo and Conflicting Perspectives

Chapters 7 and 8 reiterate the importance of folk models and role models, by expanding upon and detailing the original four qualities from the list of saints in Chapter 5. These sets of data provided sets of concepts about male and female saints generally accepted by both male and female language consultants. The pooled responses demonstrated the general belief that males and females occupy different spheres of life, in concurrence with the SFM system's division of gender roles. The categories most associated with male saints are ***Märtyrer, Mächtig, Verkünden, Verzicht, Bekehrung, Orden [öffentlich],*** and ***Schriften***. These categories depict the conventional male saints as martyrs, they are powerful or strong, they spread the Christian faith, they live ascetically, they have experienced their own conversion to the faith, they belong to a religious order and often carry out public roles with respect to it, and they produce important theological writings. In addition to the basic characteristics of *Thinkers* who are *Battling*, the nuances of these categories emphasize the various public activities of one who spreads the knowledge of the faith along with the strong and soldier-like characteristics of one who battles, not necessarily the actual act of battling in war. In contrast to the male saints, but mostly in agreement with the SFM system, female saints were associated primarily with the categories ***Sozial, Mystiker, Besonderes, Gegen, Beziehung, Mutter,*** and ***Orden [privat]***. These categories depict conventional female saints as socially active, mystical, distinguishing themselves through unusual feats, defying customs of the time, caring deeply about relationships, being motherly, and being affiliated with closed and private religious orders. These categories expand the basic characteristics of the *Virgin* who is *Serving* others to include the various accepted roles for religious women that kept them primarily isolated within the private boundaries of cloisters, but enabled them to cultivate relationships with God and to fulfill various kinds of roles caring for others.

The overwhelming majority of these characteristics underscore folk theory generalizations about saints and about gender. The discussions in Chapter 7 about the categories ***Märtyrer*** 'martyrs' and ***Mystiker*** 'mystics' demonstrate that the leading folk image of a saint is a

male saint, a point that underscores the priority of the male standard in SFM. The highest idealization of a holy and moral character is more male than female. The result is that a female must shed her sex in order to be accepted as holy. The categories above depict the best ways a female saint may shed her sex and become an "honorary male". Yet, two of the categories for women listed above are not common to SFM: **Besonderes** and **Gegen**. The women who distinguish themselves through unusual feats and the women who act in defiance of customs necessarily defy female stereotypes in SFM. These women demonstrate male qualities of moral strength and complete traditionally male achievements. They are even described as *kämpferisch* 'battling' by some of the female consultants, and one of the female consultants called female saints *emanzipiert* 'emancipated'. These are not concepts that fit within the traditional SFM view of the female gender.

These categories, implemented primarily by women consultants to describe women, suggest a difference of perspective between male and female views of gender today. A number of other categories emphasized by female consultants substantiate this evidence. While male consultants heavily emphasized traditional qualities of both genders—such as social and mystical activities for virginal women isolated in cloisters, and powerful, missionary-type leadership roles for men in the Church—female consultants emphasized the character traits *in both genders* that they value highly. Women value theological and philosophical written works and learning, and they validated this in descriptions of both men and women. They also highlighted a greater variety of ways in which individual saints have shown agency and distinguished themselves as virtuous individuals. This is the value underlying the category **Besonderes**. These individuals, cited by women about females and males, have shown the ability to forge a unique self that extricates them from meaninglessness. Achievements of all kinds thus appear to be the main focus of my female consultants' aggregate responses (cf. Chapter 7). Male consultants' aggregate responses point toward a focus on power and roles that confer power (cf. Chapter 7). In sum total, women employed more features than men to describe all of the saints, regardless of gender, and this variety suggests a breadth of reasoning about ideal characteristics that embraces even unconventional ideals. These descriptions by female consultants may point to a different conceptualization of gender among women and an alternate moral system that allows for possibility and creativity in categories of gender without hierarchies, rejecting the SFM stereotyped gender roles; they may hold ideals that are more characteristic of a NPM system.

The constellations from Chapter 8 reinforce both the stereotyping tendencies of male consultants and the alternate perspective of female consultants. While men viewed female saints primarily as sexually pure caregivers and communicators whose deeds are more passive, receptive, and focused on servitude, women viewed female saints as production-oriented in their service to God, and they highlight female saints' activities in theological and leadership roles. To women, female saints' actions focus little on serving others, and they are even capable of demonstrating an excess of strength, a character trait that is most often associated with the male gender. Men did not view female saints in this light, but view female strength of character purely as a side-effect of their belief in God. In contrast, men viewed male saints as the active individuals whose actions serve God rather than other human beings. Men overwhelmingly supported the gender stereotypes of active males and passive females. Women, on the other hand, also suggested that male saints demonstrate active public and intellectual deeds for God, but they implied that male saints' strength of character stems from these accomplishments. They suggested that male strength of character can become excessive, even to a negative degree. Female strength of character was to these female consultants more inherent, rather than resultant

from faith, and the women did not suggest that females can show a negative excess of character strength.  Instead, character strength was seen as crucial for female saints' achievements.  These data reinforce the preoccupation female consultants appear to have with accomplishments of individuals.

Both sets of data from Chapters 7 and 8 are reinforced by the comparisons in Chapter 9. The two gender groups of consultants continued to agree about gender conventions, but the groups' differing perspectives emerged in an enhanced way in Chapter 9.  Women's perspectives on gender generally differed from men's in that women most often viewed differences between males and females as superficial, rather than inherent.  Men, on the other hand, suggested more often that differences are inherent, although the male consultants' points of view about nature varied considerably in degree.  While some males' perspectives were inclined to see fewer inherent differences between the sexes, other males' perspectives appeared to revive a strong version of SFM and all of its hierarchical entailments (cf. H8 in contrast with H12, 9.4).  Female consultants emphasized that the historical time period often played a substantial role in creating traditional gender differences, supporting their general belief that roles and domains are not necessarily inherent, but socially produced standards (cf. 9.6).  Many of the male consultants supported the historical viewpoint, but did not strongly support the social fabrication stance. They did not emphasize the aspect of limitations on women that female consultants intimated, and only women asserted that similar limitations for women still exist today (cf. 9.8).  A few men, on the other hand, inadvertently demonstrated their reliance on traditional SFM gender stereotypes through their apologies or praise of women (cf. 9.7).  By praising women as superior to men in some way, two consultants [H5, H9] betrayed their reliance on the two-nature anthropology detailed by Ruether; they used the veneer of women being more virtuous than men to justify exclusion of women from traditionally male domains.

Although it may appear that female consultants' value systems differ from male consultants', we must be careful not to overlook the SFM stereotypes that some of the female consultants' responses employed.  When women valorize learning and written works so adamantly, as in the category ***Schriften*** and the emphasis on intellectual and theological accomplishments of both genders, they employ the one-nature anthropology of which Ruether writes; they have not necessarily shed the SFM moral system and its gender entailments.  They have applied the view that men and women possess the same capabilities, but they continue to esteem traditionally male qualities and categories over traditionally female ones; such responses indicate that they are still utilizing the ideal categories and entailments of the SFM system, its hierarchies, and its metaphorical structures of reasoning.  The female consultants' emphasis on the categories of ***Besonderes, Gegen,*** and ***Kämpferisch*** and their admiration for female strength of character demonstrate the same behavior, because these categories are traditionally male qualities that demonstrate moral and physical strength in the SFM system.  It may be accurate that these interview data point to a general contrast between male and female perceptions of gender; males tend to apply a two-nature system, maintaining inherent differences between the genders.  Females, on the other hand, are convinced that there are no inherent differences between genders.  But both genders of consultants tend to employ the basic system of SFM as their primary value system and method of reasoning, relying on either a one-nature or two-nature anthropology, both of which stem from SFM.

Nonetheless, we can reconsider the import of the perspective difference between male and female consultants if we consider the role model function in one more respect.  My consultants demonstrated as a group that they most value traditionally male SFM qualities, such

as writing and learning, physical and moral strength, power, achievements, and a fighting, oppositional quality. Both genders of consultants valued these things in both genders of saints. But the most important role models for my consultants were saints who shared their own gender. Male consultants prioritized male saints and their characteristics, and female consultants prioritized female saints and their traditionally male characteristics. Consultants best identified with role models who shared their gender, because these role models provide the greatest similarity to an individual, allowing for the highest quotient of aptness of fit (cf. *best-fit*, 2.2; *aptness*, 2.11) between source and target domains—saint and consultant. The data from Chapter 8 suggests that despite high admiration for traditionally male roles over traditionally female roles, both genders of consultants admire role models of their own gender more than those of the opposite gender. While men suggested that female saints are paragons of humanity as a result of their being model Christians, women suggested that female saints are paragons of humanity because of their natural qualities. The opposite is true for male saints: men argued that male saints are paragons of humanity because of their natural qualities, while women argued that male saints are paragons of humanity as a result of their being model Christians through their accomplishments for the faith. Similarly, men indicated that male saints' strength of character is natural, while women suggested that it is merely a result of intellectual achievements. Women asserted instead that female saints' strength of character is natural. My data demonstrates that reasoning about gender involves reasoning through one's own gender. The experience of being gendered affects the perspective of reasoning, and the individual seeks role models that can best help him or her reason about his or her own gendered experience. Therefore, if the role models and their stories are permeated with a SFM system of morality—as are the saints' stories—then the individual's own system of reasoning will be permeated with SFM, and his or her views of gender will be structured by this reasoning system. However, the individual may more likely employ either a one-nature or two-nature anthropology of SFM depending on his or her gender; women tend to employ the one-nature anthropology, while men tend to employ a two-nature anthropology. Regardless, SFM scripts appear to predominate in terms of this same-gender role model function. Even the characteristics that each gender of consultant emphasized for the opposite gender of saint correspond to SFM gender stereotypes: men viewed female saints as primarily passive, and women viewed male saints as strong in public and intellectual works, but often exhibiting an excess of character strength. Unclear from these data is an answer to the question: do the consultants value in the opposite gender the stereotyped qualities that they reiterate about that gender, or do they view the qualities as in some way negative?

As a possible response, I believe that the female consultants' perspectives about gender may demonstrate aspects of reasoning more characteristic of a NPM system of morality, despite the SFM stereotypes they replicated. Female consultants employed more variety of categories, detailed more possible ways for an individual to achieve something unique, and tended to reject self-sacrificing categories like ***Verzicht***, asceticism, and sexually pure lifestyles, which some of the men employed. Male consultants demonstrated a narrower focus on power. Could the broader female focus on individuality and accomplishments be indicative of a higher quotient of openness, possibility, creativity and even empathy? I can only suggest this as a possible assessment that must be examined in a study more focused on specific metaphors used in in reasoning about this topic. Within the limits of this study I am unable to offer a definitive explanation for male consultants' focus on roles of power and women's tendency to disregard questions of power in favor of achievements, despite their traditionally subordinate status as a gendered group. The suggestion I offer is based on the role model effect. Women consultants

identified most closely with their gender and therefore with the experiences of their gender. They empathized with the plight of women as a subordinate group and women's lack of access to education and other traditionally male roles and characteristics. Female consultants therefore chose to highlight the aspects of female saints who successfully freed themselves from their gender limitations and accomplished what males could regularly accomplish. Male consultants, in contrast, identified with the experiences of male saints. Not having experienced the same exclusion felt by a minority group, male consultants simply highlighted those aspects of male saints to which they aspire or about which they are most proud. Those aspects tended to be positions of power, because such positions most completely single out the individual, whereas accomplishments like learning and writings were more commonly expected of males in the traditional SFM paradigm. Perhaps the women's status of belonging to a subordinate group alone engenders empathy more readily than does the simplicity of belonging to the privileged dominant group. Perhaps subordinate status predisposes people to a higher quotient of empathy and provides fertile soil, so to speak, for an alternative moral system of reasoning from the status quo.

## 10.4  Final Contemplations

My linguistic data, taken as one representative group within modern German language speakers, suggests that the West still relies primarily on traditional, culturally accepted views of gender based in a Strict Father moral system fostered by the major institution in the West, the Christian Church. This moral system has permeated all aspects of Western life, religious and secular. The narratives passed down over generations have served as tools for reasoning, providing the major cultural scripts about gender and their entailments, and enabling us to determine who we believe we are and how we exist from day to day.

The dominant group has been male, and the subordinate group has struggled and continues to struggle against various forms of subjugation, while nevertheless accepting the dominant group's forms of morality and beliefs. Subordinate groups like women and other minorities have often attempted to use the materials and means of that system to fight the system, but such methods of defiance always come at a price. In the wake of heightened gender struggles during the 19th and 20th centuries, the West is finally beginning to discover an alternate system of morality that rejects the basic assumptions of the prevailing dominant system. This new system of morality is best exemplified by the Nurutrant Parent model of morality described by George Lakoff (2002). Strains of this new form of morality are being embraced by parts of the population, but because we are complex beings who rely on best-fit categorization and conceptualization strategies, we do not always embrace a single system in all that we think and do. Rather, we employ many resources as tools for thinking—and often multiple systems—and the most prevalent moral resource in the West is still the Strict Father version of morality, as a result of our cultural narrative heritage. As G. Lakoff (2002:14) suggests, we often fail to be "coherent" in our use of ideologies. Instead, we employ reasoning strategies on a "case-by-case basis," such that "different models are being used in different instances" (15). This means that some individuals may rely on both SFM and NPM, but may apply them under different circumstances. A complete transition to a NPM system of calues, whether in a single individual's conceptual system or in that of an entire population, requires time. Social change

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requires generations, and the major push for change in gender values has only occurred during the last 150 years. We have only just begun.

Despite this slow state of affairs, many of my German language consultants demonstrated a mixture of moral systems, the women more so than the men. I suggest that the women identify with the subordinate gender group throughout history. They know the limitations that have been placed on women, and they have been galvanized by the social and political public discussions about women's rights throughout their lifetimes. But the major effect of this exposure has been to adjust the perspective within the old, dominant SFM system. The majority of the population, including these women, still reasons about gender primarily using SFM. Those who desire change in gender beliefs may tend to employ a newer version of the SFM system, which can be characterized as one-nature anthropology, described by Ruether (1998). To achieve a complete transformation of conceptualizations about gender, they must reject the SFM system altogether.

This small cognitive linguistic study has provided a foundation for tackling further questions about human conceptualization strategies and their capacity for change. It can serve as a model for other similar linguistic studies regarding other contested concepts like gender. It also offers a new perspective within the gender and language debate, implementing a highly interdisciplinary methodology of understanding social phenomena through language. But much more work must still be undertaken with regards to language, gender, and the possibility for social and linguistic transformations. My study offers a foundation for cognitive linguistic examination of gender views within a limited Western population. Similar studies using larger populations of language consultants in other regions could help determine the extent to which the results of my study are applicable to the West as a whole. Finally, my study opens up many more questions about gender, cognition, and moral systems that could be tackled using a cognitive linguistic framework: given that human beings tend to reason using narratives, generalizations, and simplified models that are based on ideal category members, how difficult might it be to alter any cultural status quo? Is it possible for us to concretize the abstract notion of "empathy" as a central model for morality, such that the model can become conventional? Is it possible for us as a Western culture to think beyond the stereotypes, paragons, anti-ideals, and typical cases that we implement so often and instead, to reject them, as Judith Butler, Karen Armstrong, and Rosemary Radford Ruether suggest is imperative in the quest for social change? In an attempt to replace the SFM system with the NPM system in the broader population, can we create idealized categories that employ empathy? Can we re-conceptualize folk models into a new, "empathetic" social convention? Or is convention the antithesis of the creativity and possibility so central to an empathetic reasoning process? Is it possible to re-conceptualize gender in terms of empathy, and does the majority of the population even wish to do that? It is clear from some of my language consultants that they do not desire such change, while others do. Finally, will change result from the language or the concept? Does that cultural practice precede the linguistic change, can language be a catalyst for cultural change, or does the change in concept and language use occur simultaneously? If language can indeed catalyze change, can change occur through written works like this study, or must it take place in daily usage on the tongues of the average speakers?

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