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Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution

By

Hossein Ayazi

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requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Environmental Science, Policy, and Management

in the

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of the

University of California, Berkeley

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Professor Alastair Iles, Co-chair
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Professor Thomas Biolsi

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Abstract

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Hossein Ayazi

Doctor of Philosophy in Environmental Science, Policy, and Management

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Alastair Iles, Co-chair

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From roughly the early 1940s to the early 1970s, the United States led a set of international capital-intensive agricultural research, technology, and education transfer initiatives. These initiatives were designed to facilitate a more expansive market agrarianism, increase agricultural yields, and combat hunger amidst concerns of a rapidly growing population. Yet, named the “Green Revolution,” these initiatives, in their push for the development of industrial agriculture oriented to the global market, ultimately preempted peasant unrest and undermined larger revolutionary action as they reconstituted states as guarantors of agricultural markets in service of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism.

This dissertation, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution*, recognizes the Green Revolution as an exercise in the risk management of racial capitalism during a period of great social upheaval: when overlapping, internationalized anticolonial and civil rights movements named the limits of racial democracy and risked undercutting postwar U.S. state power and transnational capitalism. *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* argues that the mid-twentieth century technical, scientific, and education cooperation efforts, and paired innovations in governance and administration, elaborated upon U.S. state-led and capital-intensive efforts to cultivate forms of Native and Black market agrarianisms developed in the early-twentieth century.

Operating in service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power, the Green Revolution remade peoples and places in accordance with the anti-Black and settler colonial logics of the plantation and reservation. Additionally, the transit of the plantation and the reservation toward such ends was based upon domestic innovations in U.S. slave and settler capitalisms. The framework of agricultural technical and scientific cooperation and paired innovations in governance and administration during the mid-twentieth crystallized the emergent trope of “development.” Yet, problematizations of the plantation and reservation in the early twentieth century prefigured such developments globally.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	(i)
Acknowledgements	(ii)
Introduction.	
Agricultural Development and the Plantation and Reservation in Transit	1
Chapter One.	
The Reservation in Crisis: From “The Problem of Indian Administration” to a “Bold New Program”	22
Chapter Two.	
The Reservation as Crisis: Termination, (Non)Containment, and the "Indian Point 4 Program”	59
Chapter Three.	
The Plantation in Crisis: Liberian Rubber and “The Native Problem in Africa”	92
Chapter Four.	
The Plantation as Crisis: Racial Liberal Plantation Criticism and Liberia’s “Booker Washington Institute”	127
Conclusion.	
Liberal/Neoliberal Multicultural Plantations and Reservations	162
Notes	169

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Introduction.

Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution

From roughly the early 1940s to the early 1970s, the United States led a set of international capital-intensive agricultural research, technology, and education transfer initiatives. Carried out in conjunction with corporate, philanthropic, and state actors around the world, these initiatives were designed to facilitate a more expansive market agrarianism, increase agricultural yields, and combat hunger amidst concerns of a rapidly growing world population. Later named the “Green Revolution,” such efforts resulted in the adoption of a number of new technologies and practices that supposedly superseded the limitations of “traditional” farming: high-yielding varieties of wheats, rices, and other cereals, in association with agri-chemicals, and with irrigated water-supply, and large-scale mechanized cultivation methods. Where enacted, such measures exponentially increased agricultural yields. Total food production in the Global South in particular more than doubled between 1960 and 1985.¹ The Green Revolution was so successful in this regard that food production surpassed population growth. Between 1950 and 1990, the global population increased by 110 percent while global cereal production increased by 174 percent over the same period.²

Given the radical transformations in agricultural production that took place across the world, it is difficult to not find truth in the words of Norman Borlaug, an agronomist and the “father of the Green Revolution.” In his 1970 Nobel Prize speech, Borlaug stated that “to millions of these unfortunates, who have long lived in despair, the Green Revolution seems like a miracle that has generated new hope for the future.”³ Yet despite the oft-cited production gains of industrial agriculture and the fanfare surrounding the architects of the Green Revolution, it did not “solve the problem of hunger” long term. That is, while true that hunger has decreased over the Green Revolution decades, by the turn of the twenty-first century, the number of hungry people increased by more than 11 percent, growing from 700 million in 1986 to 800 million in 1998.⁴ This story continued in the twenty-first century. With the global economic crisis beginning in 2008, the number of hungry people reached an historic 1.02 billion despite record grain harvests in 2008.⁵ Thus, despite the lofty rhetoric of feeding an impoverished world through modernized methods and relations of agricultural production, the Green Revolution seems to have succeeded in producing more food without actually addressing the problems of hunger and poverty themselves.⁶

The Green Revolution did not simply fail to fulfill the oft-repeated promise of “feeding the world.” According to Raj Patel, the Green Revolution was itself a “moment in struggles around the creation of value, altering the balance of class forces, reconfiguring relations to the means of production, and setting the processes of production and reproduction on a new trajectory.”⁷ Most notably, the injection of high-yielding varieties of a few cereals coupled with the heavy use of subsidized fertilizers, pesticides, irrigation and machinery into the agricultural economies of the Global South, enacted the global push for the development of industrial agriculture oriented to the global market.⁸ This shift in the technologies and practices of agricultural production had devastating impacts globally: it ultimately weakened peasant agriculture,

consolidated peasant lands in fewer hands and increased the power of large landowners, and it pushed peasants onto marginal lands and urban centers.⁹

For the United States and U.S. transnational capital, the story of the Green Revolution was much different. As scholars of rural politics and development argue, it was through the devices of the Green Revolution, in conjunction with surplus foods and the U.S. aid programs at the time, that U.S. state power and transnational capital were consolidated after World War II.¹⁰ That is, the challenges faced by states across the Global South and the transformation of their agricultural economies were part and parcel of such postwar developments for the United States. During this period, commercial mono-cropping transformed rural landscapes as the U.S. model of capital- and energy-intensive agriculture was universalized, with accumulation by agri-food capitalists ultimately undercutting the capacities of states to regulate themselves.¹¹ Ultimately, through the agribusiness deployment of counterpart funds from the food aid program, the Green Revolution's research, technology, and education transfer initiatives, and the transnational restructuring of agricultural sectors, *Pax Americana* reconstituted states as guarantors of markets and thus integral elements of U.S. empire.¹² It did so all the while undermining peasant unrest and larger revolutionary action—*counernationalisms* that would have otherwise undermined such process of geopolitical power and capital accumulation.

The standard history of such global processes for which the Green Revolution is known generally begins in early 1941, when the Rockefeller Foundation sent a team to survey Mexican agriculture. The result of this study was the development of crop breeding and intensified fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation measures under the banner of the Mexican government-backed Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP).¹³ Yet the processes of state reconfiguration, capitalist accumulation, concentration of power, disenfranchisement, and agricultural investment and innovation for which the Green Revolution is known predate this standard history. Even further, these processes were identifiable within the United States itself and not developed strictly in the countryside of the Global South.¹⁴ As early as the 1920s, a few U.S. corporations controlled international grain markets; fertilizers produced through the Haber-Bosch process had been manufactured in the United States since the end of the First World War; national governmental systems for agricultural research and innovation, and outreach and education, had existed for decades, as had plant breeding technologies; and the apparatus of large-scale philanthropy had been established, with the Rockefeller Foundation interested in agricultural technology since 1906 when it funded a science-driven "crusade against the boll weevil" in the U.S. South.¹⁵

The developments for which the Green Revolution was known were thus already in place within the United States itself well before the postwar era. Yet, in light of the fact that the Green Revolution also served to undermine peasant unrest and larger revolutionary action in service of U.S. state power and capital accumulation, scholars have begun to develop a new framework for understanding such developments and their elaboration internationally. Specifically, scholars have begun to see such developments earlier in the twentieth century within the United States as part and parcel of the "risk management" of U.S. racial capitalism. Perhaps most well-known among such incipient genealogies of the Green Revolution, Clyde Woods has

argued that the early-twentieth century establishment of the “neo-plantation complex” gutted the post-Reconstruction-era Black land and labor reform agenda in U.S. South and laid the ground for the U.S. development agenda globally.¹⁶ That is, the containment of sharecropper unrest and the re-entrenchment of the power of the plantation bloc in the U.S. South prefigured the postwar containment of peasant unrest and the transnational restructuring of agricultural sectors in service of U.S. geopolitical power and capital accumulation

An Overview of the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution

Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution aims to contribute to and expand upon such incipient genealogies of the Green Revolution as an exercise in the risk management of racial capitalism. Specifically, this dissertation’s broader objective involves three related objectives: First, this dissertation seeks to outline the significance of the Green Revolution to the postwar context of great antiracist and anticolonial domestic and international social upheaval. This moment was characterized by overlapping, internationalized anticolonial and civil rights movements that named the limits of racial democracy and risked undercutting Cold War U.S. state power and transnational capitalism. In response, such movements were met with the inauguration of what Jodi Melamed names a “formally antiracist, liberal-capitalist modernity over a white supremacist modernity,” which involved the adoption of an official U.S. anti-racism.¹⁷ Second, building off of Woods’ analysis, it seeks to situate the Green Revolution in relation to the genealogy of U.S. anti-Black *and* settler colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance directed toward the cultivation of a U.S. Black market agrarianism and Native market agrarianism beginning in the early-twentieth century. Third, it seeks to situate this comparative, relational, and transnational analysis of the Green Revolution within localized and embodied contexts, attendant to Black and Native peoples’ visions and practices of liberation vis-à-vis agricultural and rural development more broadly during this time period. Ultimately, this dissertation aims to reconceive twentieth century political ecology of agriculture knowledge in relation to histories of global relation, contradiction, convergence, and exchange ordered by shifting formations of U.S. colonialism, the racial regimes that encode and reproduce them, and the spatial logics of both.

Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution develops this genealogy of the Green Revolution by tracing how U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors facilitated certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the need for agricultural and rural modernization domestically and globally across the early and mid-twentieth century, doing so with an eye toward the perpetual anxiety of rural unrest and revolt across each such context. It looks to the legal, bureaucratic, and policy archive that framed and guided the Green Revolution and its anti-Black and settler colonial progenitors: from the 1949 “Point 4 Program,” which set out to “provide scientific and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries in an effort to further economic and social progress and maintain political stability,” to earlier policies and practices that aimed to foster a Black market agrarianism and Native market agrarianism within the plantation economy of the U.S. South and reservations across the United States, respectively, and that aimed to maintain social and

political stability across both such contexts.¹⁸ In order to craft a comparative, relational, intersectional, and transnational analysis of the Green Revolution yet situate it in localized and embodied contexts, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* joins this archive with a second archive: that of the youth, instructors, and administrators from the industrial education and manual training institutes that carried out such work. With an eye toward how they themselves understood and negotiated the work, this archive offers insight into how such racial and colonial power differentials effectuated through agricultural and rural develop were solidified, negotiated, and contested at the time.

Ultimately, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* argues that the mid-twentieth century technical, scientific, and education cooperation efforts, and paired innovations in governance and administration, channeled the migration of the logics of the plantation and the reservation. Operating toward the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power during this time, such efforts remade peoples and places in accordance with the plantation and reservation's anti-Black and settler colonial logics. It was also according to such logics that ambiguous expressions of U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capitalism were inured from critique during the mid-twentieth century. Yet the plantation and reservation have not been static formations, simply exported internationally. Rather, their transit toward such ends was grounded in early twentieth century innovations in the two sets of operations of U.S. slave and settler capitalism that took place domestically—innovations signaled by Woods' terminology of the "neo-plantation complex" and by analogous accounts of changes in federal Indian law and policy at the time. Specifically, while the framework of technical and scientific cooperation and requisite modes of governance and administration during the mid-twentieth seemed to crystallize an emergent trope of "development," the problematization of the plantation and reservation in ways that seemingly necessitated techno-scientific market agrarian fixes in the early twentieth century prefigured such developments globally.¹⁹ The "transit" of these logics can arguably thus be seen as the transit of logics themselves organized and understood in new ways, and offering new promises, without displacing the processes of racial and colonial dispossession at their core.²⁰ Finally, this dissertation argues that the remaking of people and place according to such migratory logics of the plantation and the reservation through the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda drastically reshaped how U.S. empire itself and U.S. racialization was named and negotiated, officially and unofficially.

PART 1.

Green Revolution Plantations and Reservations

Woods' argument concerning the early-twentieth century emergence of the "neo-plantation complex"—which gutted the historic Southern Black land and labor reform agenda and laid the ground for the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda globally—offers a way to conceptualize the anti-Black and settler colonial genealogy of the Green Revolution this dissertation aims to develop. Specifically, the *plantation* itself offers a starting point for elucidating this genealogy vis-à-vis former, and the *reservation* offers a starting point for

elucidating this genealogy vis-à-vis the latter. Each material, spatial, and discursive formation organizes and operates as a channel for, “Black fungibility” and “Indianness,” respectively, as key conditions of possibility for U.S. geopolitical power and transnational capital, and U.S. control of the significations of justice, democracy, law, and terror through which they operate.

Section A.

The Plantation in Transit

In an effort to account for the processes, relations, and symbolic economies that Black bodies and representations of Black embodiment produce and sustain within New World geographies, scholars have gone considerable lengths to show that slavery connotes an ontological status for Blackness.²¹ In other words, the constituent elements of slavery are not exploitation and alienation but accumulation and fungibility—the “raw material” for infinite forms of use.²² As Tiffany Lethabo King states, Black bodies in their “fluttering, stretching, and changing states have operated as a symbol of unstable borders, processes, and the shifting power relations.”²³ As symbols of unstable borders, processes, and shifting power relations, Black fungibility has been key to how peoples and places could be imagined as manipulable, fostering accumulation, and an open landscape of flux. The plantation landscape—both “actual and imagined”—and plantation logics organize such limitless possibility.²⁴ In other words, the plantation is a key spatial unit of Black captivity and fungibility. As Katherine McKittrick states, the plantation logic culminates in long-standing, uneven racial geographies.

The social, political, economic implications of Black fungibility-*cum*-“plantocracy” are far reaching. In working through the socioeconomic logic of the plantocracies, George Beckford had put forth what has become known as his “plantation thesis” or his “plantation economy thesis.” According to McKittrick, Beckford’s thesis names a few dynamics concerning the global expansion and implications of the plantation economy: First, that the plantations of transatlantic slavery constituted a global economy. Second, that this plantation history generated U.S. and European metropolitan wealth while exacerbating dispossession among enslaved and indentured peoples. Third, it instituted an uneven and distinctly racialized economy that remained post-emancipation and post-independence movements in the Americas. Finally, Beckford’s thesis names the colonial logic of the plantation, which continues to define many aspects of post-slave life.²⁵

As a key spatial unit of Black captivity and fungibility, and toward the production of long-standing, uneven racial geographies, scholars thus argue that the logic of the plantation is itself “migratory.” McKittrick states that, in agriculture, banking, and mining, in trade and tourism, and across other colonial and postcolonial spaces a plantation logic characteristic of (but not identical to) slavery emerges in the present both ideologically and materially.²⁶ Such transit regarding the plantation logics vis-à-vis agricultural development across colonial and postcolonial spaces is precisely how this dissertation conceptualizes the implications of Woods’ argument as it develops its U.S. slave and settler capital genealogy of the Green Revolution. As Woods states, the agricultural-social transformation conducted in the Delta was constructed in

four stages: "the capitalization of planters through the [1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act] crop reduction program and other subsidies during the early 1930s; the mass eviction of sharecroppers; the dominance of the tractor and wage labor regime by the early 1940s; and, by the mid-1950s, the introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, the elimination of hired labor, and the diversification of the regional economy, followed by the introduction of high yield cotton, new pesticides, and new herbicides."²⁷ Toward the construction of this "neo-plantation complex," which eliminated the remainder of plantation residents and "thoroughly destroyed and reordered" Southern Black community life, these transformations had the same genealogy as the Green Revolutions launched worldwide by U.S. firms and the federal government.²⁸ From this theoretical, historical, and analytical starting point, this dissertation further attends to how the plantation economy changed in the early-twentieth century, and how such changes extended globally from then on into the 1950s toward the consolidation of postwar U.S. state power and transnational capitalism.

Section B.

The Reservation in Transit

The plantation offers a starting point for developing a genealogy of the Green Revolution that accounts for anti-Black forms of subjection, administration, and governance at the locus of U.S. agricultural and rural development beginning in the early-twentieth century. At the same time, the *reservation* and its logic of containment offers the same with regard to contemporaneous and interlinked *settler colonial* forms of subjection, administration, and governance concerning Native peoples. As with the anti-Black forms of subjection, administration, and governance, this dissertation understands the reservation and the logic of containment as material and discursive structures that organize and channel Indianness as an object of knowledge and governance.

Popular understandings of what precisely constitutes "Indianness" have changed over time and across various contexts.²⁹ The "noble savage," the "brutal savage," the "ecological Indian," and other representations of Native peoples and have been used to evoke fear, desire, and other feelings, and prescribe official and unofficial courses of action by the U.S. settler state and other actors. This collection of the terms of Indianness reflects the capacity of representations of Native peoples to move across time and place—each emerging and circulating in ways that facilitated and buttressed U.S. settler capitalism. At the same time, these terms also reflect the capacity of Indianness to produce and sustain settler spatial potential and facilitate settler self-actualization. That is, as Mark Rifkin argues, figurations of Indianness participate in a broader set of normalizations that cast the social, spatial, political, and economic infrastructure of the U.S. settler state as given.³⁰ So too does Indianness participate in the broader normalization of the watchwords of modern liberalism and thus the global divisions and asymmetries on which the liberal tradition depends.³¹ As Jodi Byrd states, U.S. cultural and political preoccupations with indigeneity and the reproduction of Indianness serve to facilitate, justify, and maintain Anglo-American hegemonic mastery over the significations of justice, democracy, law and terror."³² Altogether, therefore, and not entirely unlike Blackness as the "raw material for

infinite forms of use," Indianness operates as a symbol of unstable borders, processes, and shifting power relations, and as Gerald Vizenor argues, it substitutes for (rather than points to) engagements with Native peoples and "the tribal real."³³

Just as the plantation is a key material, spatial, and discursive formation that organizes, and operates as a channel for "Black fungibility," so too is the migratory potential of Indianness governed by an analogous formation.³⁴ Specifically, settler states maintain their authority not solely through what Patrick Wolfe has termed the "logic of elimination," but also through what Lomawaima and McCarty label a corresponding "safety zone" or as Noelani Goodyear-Ka'opua names a "logic of containment."³⁵ These "safety zones" contain Indigenous relations and knowledge within particular ideological and physical boundaries. Pulling from K. Tsianina Lomawaima and Teresa L. McCarty, Goodyear-Ka'opua states that "such containment can manifest in a number of forms: geographically, particularly as reservations or small school spaces; politically, such as legal-recognition frameworks that seek to subsume sovereignty within the settler state's domestic laws; and ideologically, including school curricula that allows minimal Indigenous history and culture and only does so to maintain its marginality."³⁶

As a key spatial unit of the potential of Indianness for the U.S. settler state, and toward the production of long-standing, uneven racial geographies, the reservation and the logic of containment behind it are also "migratory," like the plantation. In other words, the territorial, political, and economic ambitions of the U.S. settler state manifest through figurations of Indianness and organized by the socio-spatial unit of the reservation extend beyond the borders of the U.S. settler state itself, much like the plantocracies that operationalize Black fungibility toward the production of uneven racial geographies. As Byrd states, not only is Indianness the "contagion through which U.S. empire orders the place of peoples within its purview."³⁷ The United States also routinely uses executive, legislative, juridical means to effectively make "Indian" those peoples and nations who stand in the way of U.S. empire and its economic interests.³⁸ Thus, alongside the plantation, the migratory "logic of containment" offers a way to develop a genealogy of the Green Revolution that accounts for settler colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance at the locus of U.S. agricultural and rural development beginning in the early-twentieth century.

Toward the development of such a genealogy, Philip Deloria's work, like that of Clyde Woods', offers a crucial starting point here. Contemporaneous with the transformation of the plantation economy of the U.S. South, the Indian Reorganization Act of 1933 allowed tribes to draft their own constitutions, and governing and policing structures, yet made the documents subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior while maintaining the supervisory presence of Indian Office employees on reservations. The implications of this seemingly disinterested change were soon clear. Deloria states, "One of the main reasons for creating tribal councils was the need for central authorities to negotiate and approve business or governmental initiatives. Councils, according to the federal government, had the political and legal power to negotiate and sign deals for resource extraction or further land cessions." The ultimately self-interested development of a Native market agrarianism would have far-reaching implications beyond the relation between tribal governments and the federal government alone.

Specifically, Deloria argues, the relation between tribal governments and the federal government developed under the Indian Reorganization Act prefigured how U.S. imperialism worked across the remainder of the twentieth century—an important transformation of the reservation that matched the transformation of the plantation in both timing and global significance. As Deloria argues in detail, early-twentieth century Indian administration and later articulations of U.S. empire shared much: nominally independent governments, largely dependent on the United States, overseen by imperial agents, with a divided populace subject to new forms of exploitation of land and resources. No longer domination, conquest, and dispossession, per se, but now semi-autonomy and limited empowerment under the banners of ‘self-determination’ and ‘freedom.’”³⁹ From these theoretical, historical, and analytical starting points, this dissertation attends to how exactly both such transformations of the plantation and the reservation expanded globally from the 1920s to the 1950s toward the consolidation of postwar U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capitalism.

Section C.

The Plantation and Reservation in Transit

By framing the transformations of the plantation and reservation as analogous and contemporaneous transformations that prefigured the Green Revolution, this dissertation invites an analysis of how slavery’s afterlife and U.S. settler colonialism together interface in mid-twentieth century formations of U.S. imperialism. In doing so it leaves room to build upon joint theorizations of both migratory logics. Tiffany Lethabo King’s scholarship in particular offers much by way of such joint theorizations. “Blackness as expansion and spatial possibility,” King states, “becomes a constituting feature of settler spatial imagination rather than just another human laborer exploited as a mere technology to produce space.”⁴⁰ Conversely, King argues that “settler colonialism’s normalizing power enacts genocide against Native peoples (disappears Native people) but it also shapes and structures anti-Black racism. Settler colonialism’s use of the slave body to make settled space (the plantation) also produces Black bodies as property.”⁴¹ As such, King states, “settler colonial power . . . works through the institutions, everyday cultures and spatial practices of slavery create the plantation as a key spatial unit of Black captivity and Native disappearance.” Thus, understood jointly, the “settlement/plantation” as King describes it, is a transferable (i.e., “migratory”) form of disciplinary and spatial power that is used to make colonial and settler colonial space even without the presence of white settlers themselves.⁴²

While such joint theorization is useful, this dissertation recognizes that anti-Black and settler colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance need not always maintain Black captivity and Native disappearance as their goal. Rather, these become, at times and across contexts, requisite outcomes of the risk management of racial capitalism. Further, this dissertation recognizes that these two dynamics are not always bound in clearly discernable ways, nor always in agreement. As such, this dissertation recognizes that the differently situated histories of Indigeneity, slavery, trade, and immigration give rise to linked, but not identical, genealogies of the mid-twentieth techno-scientific and capital-intensive U.S. agricultural and

rural development agenda. Rather, this dissertation recognizes that these make up a multi-faceted, flexible, and contradictory set of provisions.⁴³ Together, therefore, this dissertation forecloses neither treatment of the archive of the “Green Revolution”—that which might center settler colonialism and that which might center anti-Blackness—nor does it foreclose an analysis of where they overlap and where they diverge. Toward the development of this slave and settler genealogy of the Green Revolution, this dissertation centers on the elements of either dynamics—or both dynamics—enunciated within a particular time, setting, and social, political, and economic context.

PART 2.

Toward a Slave and Settler Genealogy of the Green Revolution: Risk Management as Transit

The establishment of the “neo-plantation complex” gutted the historic Southern Black land and labor reform agenda in the post-Reconstruction-era U.S. South, while the Indian Reorganization Act supposedly set out to assuage the effect of decades of “Allotment and Assimilation” yet ultimately facilitated ongoing settlement, resource extraction, and capital accumulation.

Against the goal of improving Black and Native peoples’ modes of agricultural production and natural resource management, and broader economic conditions, the preemption of unrest and revolt across both contexts invites greater consideration of the ways in which such negotiations of the plantation and the reservation were exercises in *risk management*. Further, that scholars have pointed to these moments in particular as part of the roots of Green Revolution—which itself set out to facilitate a more expansive market agrarianism, increase agricultural yields, and combat hunger and potential unrest amidst concerns of a rapidly growing population—suggests that the rationale of improving agricultural economies and institutions toward the preemption of potential unrest and revolt may be instrumental to how people and places have been made and unmade in accordance with the logics of the plantation and reservation.

Section A.

Race and the Making and Unmaking of Peoples and Places

The anti-Black and settler colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance fashioned to serve the supposed development of Black and Native market agrarianisms are matters of race and racialization. Roderick Ferguson has described race as that which both accounts for the logics by which institutions differentiate and classify, include and exclude, and the logics by which those institutions and modes of governance, law, and the economy are constituted.⁴⁴ Race is thus constitutively directional and differential. As Nikhil Pal Singh argues, race is the “historic repertoires and cultural and signifying systems that stigmatize and depreciate some forms of humanity for the purposes of another’s health, development, safety, profit or pleasure.”⁴⁵ Race is thus continually made and remade, and it continually makes and remakes. Jodi Melamed describes *racialization* as a process that constitutes differential relations of value and valuelessness according to reigning orders, while appearing to be (and

being) a normative system that merely sorts human beings according to categories of difference.”⁴⁶ Thus, Melamed argues “racialization converts the effects of differential value-making into categories of difference that make it possible to order, analyze, organize, and evaluate what emerges out of force relations as the permissible content of other domains of modernity (e.g., law, politics, economy).”⁴⁷ Thus, race enshrines, and racialization produces, the differences requires for capital accumulation—racial capitalism.

Key to such categories of difference made and unmade in service of differential value-making is the creation of such (non)value vis-a-vis what Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes as “distinct yet densely interconnected political geographies.”⁴⁸ Building off of Gilmore’s naming of such socio-spatial elements of race and racialization, Melamed states that process of differentiation and dominant comparative logics create “discrete identities, distinct territorializations and sovereignties, and discontinuities between the political and the economic, the internal and the external, and the valued and the devalued.”⁴⁹ Melamed continues, “In the drawing of the line that constitutes discrete entities and distinguishes between the valued and the devalued, people and situations are made incommensurable to one another as a disavowed condition of possibility for world-systems of profit and governance.”⁵⁰ As material practice, rhetorical logic, and modern episteme, race is thus inextricably intertwined in systems of imperialism, colonization, capitalism, and modern liberal social structures.⁵¹ Of particular importance to this dissertation, therefore, are the “racial regimes” that encode and reproduce formations of U.S. colonialism: the constellation of logics and processes by which institutions differentiate and classify, include and exclude, and remake people and places as things in service of capital accumulation and geopolitical power.⁵² And the principal racial regimes of concern are: the plantation and reservation—seemingly “certain” distinct structures, territorializations, sovereignties, and structures for the supposed well-being of seemingly “discrete” Black and Native identities, communities, and polities.

Section B.

Risk Management as Transit

How, then, are plantations and reservations made and unmade, shaped and reshaped, and transformed and renamed? This dissertation aims to trace how U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors facilitated certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the need for agricultural and rural development across the early and mid-twentieth century—with an eye toward the perpetual anxiety of unrest and revolt. It is this dissertation’s assertion that, by doing so, it is able to reconceive twentieth century knowledge of the Green Revolution in relation to histories of global relation, contradiction, and convergence, ordered by migratory and shifting formations of U.S. colonialism and the racial regimes that encode and reproduce them. That is, tracing the U.S. settler state’s continual invocation of “security” with regard to relations of agricultural production and “agricultural development” offers insight into central processes through which racial classifications and colonial divisions of humanity organized by the logics of the plantation and reservation emerge and travel.

That tracing the specter of violence at the locus of U.S. agricultural and rural development can aid in the recognition of the migration and transformation of the plantation and reservation is an idea grounded in the works of scholars of racial capitalism. Chandan Reddy has demonstrated how the U.S. state has long exercised its monopoly on legitimate violence both in response to “race”—the nation state’s operational code for that irrationality and threat that freedom must exterminate—and as racial cruelty. David Harvey argues that structures of governance “syncopate state management of the circulation of capital and circulate capital in a manner that conditions state functions.” Joining both, Melamed poses the “state-finance-racial violence nexus” which names the “inseparable confluence of political/economic governance with racial violence, which enables ongoing accumulation through dispossession by calling forth the specter of race (as threat) to legitimate state counter-violence in the interest of financial asset owning classes that would otherwise appear to violate social rationality.”⁵³ Yet, conversely, state-counter violence in the interest of financial asset owning classes itself *produces* the racial and colonial difference being invoked. As Singh argues, Whiteness, Blackness, Indianness, and other modern forms of racial and colonial difference, do not issue directly from private property or the lack thereof. Rather, they emerge “from the governance of property and its interests in relationship to those who have no property and thus no calculable interests, and who are therefore imagined to harbor a potentially criminal disregard for propertied order.”⁵⁴

Section C. ***Green Revolution Risk Management***

The terms of “security” help describe and order what emerges out of force relations as the permissible content of the domains of law, politics, and the economy. In this light, an eye toward invocations of security and risk management offers a way to trace the linkages between the science, technology, and education transfer initiatives of the Green Revolution during mid-twentieth to earlier anti-Black and settler-colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance vis-à-vis state-led and capital-intensive agricultural and rural development efforts. Regarding the former, the “neo-plantation complex” was fashioned beginning in the 1920s in the context of a Southern land, labor, and reform agenda that took shape in a number of concerning ways for the “plantation bloc.”⁵⁵ Regarding the latter, the Indian Reorganization Act set out to undermine potential unrest by aiding the advancement of a modern Native market agrarianism, which necessitated self-government and promised improved economic conditions on reservations.⁵⁶ That the Green Revolution set out to undermine famine and unrest amidst growing population concerns across Central and South America, Africa, and much of Asia—moving through and against a number of colonies and post-colonies, and budding and waning plantation economies—points to the risk management of racial capitalism as the connective tissue between them.

As stated, it is this dissertation’s claim that tracing how U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors facilitated certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the need for agricultural and rural modernization across the early and mid-twentieth century, with an eye

toward the perpetual anxiety of unrest and revolt, offers insight into a central process through which racial classifications and colonial divisions of humanity organized by the logics of the plantation and reservation have emerged and travelled. Yet U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors' stated need for agricultural and rural development during this time period—from the U.S. South and reservation geographies, to the Global South—was framed by belief in the transformative potential of agricultural science, technology, and education in particular, and the paired administrative framework and modes of governance that would help realize that potential. In other words, domestic and global U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic-led efforts toward the development of modern agriculture both framed the risk posed to racial capitalism and how it would be managed. Thus, science and technology, and research and education, are recognized within this dissertation as exercises in the production of power—inseparable from racialization, capital accumulation, and colonialization and other such exercises in the production of power. As Sheila Jasanoff states, “so viewed, the workings of science and technology cease to be a thing apart from other forms of social activity but are integrated instead as indispensable elements in the process of societal evolution.” In other words, Jasanoff states, “science and society . . . are co-produced, each underwriting the other’s existence.”⁵⁷

Agricultural science and technology, and research and education—and the paired administrative framework and modes of governance that would help realize their potential—are not simply an exercise in the production of power, but an exercise in the *preemption* of power. The question what would happen should such capital-intensive techno-scientific “solutions” not be offered in response to the stated problems of “hunger,” “poverty,” and “discontent” suffuses the mid-twentieth century archive of the Green Revolution globally, as it does the early twentieth century archives of the plantation and reservation domestically. And that the capital-intensive and techno-scientific fixes of the Green Revolution set out to supposedly undermine famine and unrest amidst growing population concerns across Central and South America, Africa, and Asia—critically, moving through and against a number of settler colonies, colonies, and post-colonies, and plantation economies—points to the capital-intensive and techno-scientific risk management of racial capitalism as the connective tissue between them.

PART 3. **An Archive of Risk Management and its Negotiation**

Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution joins two archives: The first covers the settler-imperial logics, rationales, and practices of Green Revolution by way of the legal, bureaucratic, and policy archive that framed and guided the Green Revolution. The second archive covers the settler-imperial subjects of the Green Revolution, focusing on the accounts of the youth, instructors, and administrators who were involved in such agricultural and rural technical assistance and outreach efforts domestically and internationally.

Section A.
Settler-Imperial Logics, Rationales, and Practices

Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution begins with the legal, bureaucratic, and policy archive that framed and guided the Green Revolution. Scholars recognize that the Green Revolution was a complex of discourse, culture, technology, state power, private investment, education, labor, property relations, ecological transformation, and other such exercises in the production of power tied to local, national, and international relations of agricultural production. In this context, the bureaucratic, legal, and policy archive of mid-twentieth century U.S.-led agricultural and rural development efforts carried out with corporate and philanthropic actors is central to this dissertation because this archive crystallizes the objectives, rationale, and means of the Green Revolution.

Central to this archive is the “Point 4 Program,” announced in 1949 by President Harry S. Truman and operated by the U.S. Department of State’s Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) shortly thereafter.⁵⁸ Although the Point 4 Program began years before the Green Revolution began in earnest, it emblemized the method and rationale of the Green Revolution and posed international capital-intensive agricultural research, technology, and education transfer initiatives as the solution to the problem of hunger and poverty throughout the countryside of the Global South. Alongside President Harry S. Truman’s inaugural address, which outlined the program, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* considers a number of other related documents. Two in particular stand out: First, a July 1949 report, “Point Four Background and Program,” prepared for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representative, which delves into the background, rationale, benefits, scope, and limits of the program, as understood by the U.S. Department of State. Second, a July 1949 report from the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance entitled “Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas,” which not only clarified the U.S. Department of State’s operation of the Point Four Program in parts of Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific, but also functioned as a public relations primer for U.S. Department of State officials in order to help inure the program from growing antiracist, anti-imperial, and anticapitalist critique.

As stated, this dissertation aims to situate the Green Revolution in relation to the genealogy of U.S. settler colonial and anti-Black forms of subjection, administration, and governance at the locus of U.S. agricultural and rural development beginning in the early-twentieth century. Toward this end, I consider two sets of key early-twentieth century U.S. policies—and official and semi-official reports concerning U.S. policies—vis-a-vis Black peoples and Native peoples to be part of this archive. The first of these sets of policies “reservization” and the logics of containment in the early twentieth-century. It includes the 1928 Meriam Report (also called “The Problem of Indian Administration”) and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act that followed from it. The first semi-official indictment of the U.S. Department of Interior and its implementation of the 1887 Dawes Act, the Meriam Report was a comprehensive assessment of the conditions on reservations and in Indian boarding schools, and the role of federal Indian law and policy in producing and maintaining such conditions. The Meriam Report ultimately

proffered new forms of governance that might better facilitate more efficient and profitable natural resource use and a “Native market agrarianism,” and that were ultimately enacted, in part, in the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.

The second of these sets of policies concerns the plantocracy and the logics of the plantation. Critically, this set of policies and semi-official reports orbiting the plantation and its issues accounts for the life of the plantation on both side of the Atlantic. Concerning the U.S. South, it includes the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), key among the hundreds of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal-era federal programs that sought to restore long-term profitability and social peace in the region, yet with devastating consequences for Southern Black tenant farmers.⁵⁹ This set of policies and semi-official reports include important works that frame the crisis of the plantation in the U.S. South in the 1920s and 1930s to which the AAA and other such efforts responded to. Namely, it includes Fisk sociologist Charles Johnson’s 1934 assessment of the U.S. South and Southern schooling, *Shadow of the Plantation*. It also includes a number of memorandums by Phelps-Stokes and Rockefeller, and other philanthropic entities invested in maintaining the relevance of industrial education in the U.S. South at the time.⁶⁰

On the other side of the Atlantic, this set of policies and semi-official reports with regard to the plantation includes *The Native Problem in Africa*, a 1928 report by Raymond Leslie Buell published under the auspices of the Harvard Bureau of International Research and with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and others. Like the 1928 Meriam Report’s focus on Indian administration, this report was the largest indictment of U.S. and European colonial policy in Africa, and was particularly damning for the Firestone Natural Rubber Company and the U.S. Department of State’s involvement in the West African settler state of Liberia. Such points of convergence with Indian administration cannot be understated, for Buell’s report similarly proffered new and revised forms of governance that might better facilitate an African market agrarianism.

Continuing with this dissertation’s aim to situate the Green Revolution in relation to the genealogy of agricultural development-*cum*-anti-Black and settler colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance, this dissertation considers one last set of U.S. policies and official and semi-official reports vis-à-vis the development of Black and Native market agrarianisms. Specifically, it interrogates mid-twentieth century negotiations of the plantation and the reservation that were contemporaneous with and directly relevant to the operation of the Point 4 Program. With regard to the latter, it analyzes texts by members of the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the Association on American Indian Affairs (AAIA), who sought to bring the Point 4 Program home. In the context of the establishment of the Indian Claims Commission in 1946 and impending Indian “Termination and Relocation” policy, such groups attempted to develop an “American Indian Point 4 Program” in 1952—routing the logics of containment through U.S. international agricultural and rural development policy back to the United States where it potentially offered Native peoples a way to *maintain* the reservation. With regard to the former, it analyzes two key texts that framed the crisis of the plantation economy in Liberia and Africa more broadly in the 1940s and 1950s, and that laid the

ground for the development of the Point 4 Program there: First, Raymond Leslie Buell's 1947 report, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947*, which recounted his return to the Black republic. Second, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo, 1882-1947*, a joint Rockefeller Foundation and Phelps-Stokes Fund report. These reports set out to investigate ways that governments, missions, and philanthropic organization could cooperate to reduce disparity in African agriculture and facilitate the move away from both traditional subsistence agriculture and "exploitative plantation production."⁶¹ This final set of texts explicitly negotiate the Point 4 Program in relation to the plantation and reservation.

Section B.

Settler-Imperial Subjects and Identities

In order to craft a comparative, relational, intersectional, and transnational analysis of the Green Revolution yet situate it in localized and embodied contexts, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* joins this bureaucratic, policy, and legal archive of agricultural development domestically and internationally between the early- and mid-twentieth century with a second archive: that of the production of the settler-imperial subjects of the Green Revolution during this time period. Specifically, this dissertation joins this first archive with that of the organizational materials and cultural production of three key vocational agriculture education organizations: the Future Farmers of America (FFA), founded in 1928 and now the largest of the career and technical student organizations in the United States; the New Farmers of America (NFA), its counterpart for Black youth from 1935 until their merge post-1964 Civil Rights Act; and the Future Indian Farmers of America (FIFA), its counterpart for Native youth from 1937 until 1942.⁶² The FFA, NFA, and FIFA were founded with the goal of helping male youth who were studying vocational agriculture in public secondary schools by developing agricultural "leadership, character, thrift, scholarship, cooperation, citizenship and patriotism." In order to meet these objectives, these organizations provided supervised agricultural experience and organized competitions events on topics from communications, mechanics, and planting, to agronomy, crop judging, and farm business management.

These organizations follow from a longer genealogy of pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes, and settlement schools that were founded in contexts of slavery and its afterlife, U.S. settler colonialism, and U.S. imperialism. These origins speak directly to the migratory reservation and plantation logics of central concern in this dissertation. Specifically, born of the plantation complex, settler colonialism, indentured labor, and imperial war, the aim of racial education through such pedagogies of the "head, hand, and heart" developed at manual training and industrial institutes and settlement schools was to compel students to adopt, perform, and desire the embodiment of dominant civilizational norms required for citizenship while simultaneously holding students perpetually at a distance from civilizational embodiment.⁶³ Further, such education was proffered to teach the Black and indigenous students to survive and accommodate themselves to the economic, political, and social upheavals involved with slave and settler capitalisms.⁶⁴ For U.S. Blacks in particular, it was

ultimately designed to prepare them for industrial labor and discipline a racialized character “within” the post-Civil War social order developing in the U.S. South. That is, U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors pushed it in order to accommodate Southern Blacks into their new roles within and outside the plantation economy while alleviating the possibility of unrest and revolt. Thus, as stated by educator and architect of such schooling, Samuel Chapman Armstrong, the goal was to maintain a tractable labor force and “produce wise [Negro] leaders, peacemakers rather than noisy and dangerous demagogues.”⁶⁵

For Native peoples, in particular, such pedagogies were used to instill and assess what Beth Piatote has described as the “performative taxonomy of citizenship” — weighted categories of citizenship relied upon domestic inventories and performances as the measure of competence to occupy land and political rights within U.S. domestic rule. Land linked to citizenship through Allotment and Assimilation-era policy (e.g., the General Allotment Act or the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, and the 1906 Burke Act or Forced Fee Patenting Act), “competency” was linked to “industry” (not blood) with domesticity, land use, and agricultural labor operating as indices for fitness for both citizenship and land allotment, ultimately offering a way to understand how political and land rights were assigned during a period of particularly uneven citizenship for Indians.⁶⁶ Ultimately, the pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes were pushed in an effort to replace the stability lost by the demise of the institution of slavery while maintaining the profitability of the plantation complex, and as a set of dynamic, weighted categories asserted and measured through the normalizing gaze of the state to advance settler capitalism following the “closing of the frontier.”⁶⁷

These organizations were imbricated within the early twentieth century processes of state reconfiguration, capitalist accumulation, concentration of power and disenfranchisement, large-scale philanthropy, and national government systems for agricultural investment and innovation of interest in this dissertation. And through their international tours, goodwill missions, and educational exchanges, they were also part and parcel of the Green Revolution’s projection and circulation of such dynamics globally during the mid-twentieth century. Born of the risk management of racial capitalism, and as agents themselves of such risk management, these archives offer an apt site to interrogate how the logics of the reservation and the plantation travelled and how such racial and colonial power differentials were effectuated, solidified, negotiated, and contested at the time. Further, the longer anti-Black settler colonial, and imperial genealogy of which the FFA, NFA, and FIFA are a part point to the broader archive of agricultural education and manual training from which this dissertation can pull when appropriate. Specifically, where the FFA, NFA, and FIFA archives are sparse, such as the case with the international life of the NFA (which was essentially non-existent), or with the life of Indian education beyond FIFA’s short life (from 1937-1942), this dissertation looks to the archives of Hampton and Tuskegee in the case of the former, and education of Native youth within the FFA in the case of the latter. In other words, this archive of the production of U.S. settler-imperial subjects themselves during this time period includes the Future Farmers of America, New Farmers of America, and Future Indian Farmers of America, and the broader genealogy of racial education through pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes, and settlement schools between the early- and mid-twentieth century. This flexibility

in accounting for the production of U.S. settler-imperial subjects vis-à-vis the pedagogies paired with U.S.-led and capital intensive agricultural and rural modernization efforts between the early- and mid-twentieth century—where various circumstances precluded the life of the FFA, NFA, and FIFA beyond a certain time or place—offers additional sites to interrogate the reservation and the plantation in transit.

The organizational materials and cultural production of the FFA, NFA, and FIFA and related agricultural education, outreach, and assistance efforts also born of manual training and industrial institutes—from ceremonies and competitions, to international activities and promotional materials, to administrative structures—narrate how vocational agriculture education youth, instructors, and administrators made sense of their own activities, histories, and purpose for themselves and for wider audiences. Further, they do so in ways that both cohered with and ran counter to the official legal, bureaucratic, and policy archive of U.S.-led and capital intensive agricultural and rural modernization efforts between the early- and mid-twentieth century. By attending to such materials, this dissertation is able to clarify important avenues through which U.S.-led and capital intensive agricultural and rural modernization efforts between the early- and mid-twentieth century, and the racial classifications and colonial divisions of humanity they effectuated, solidified, negotiated, and contested.

Ultimately, this dissertation concerns itself with narrative culture given its importance to the production of the nation, and the extension of its power to the formation of imperial attitudes, references, and experiences.⁶⁸ Such progressive chronological narratives of national history rely on seemingly discrete social and political categories as colonizer, native, and coerced or intentional migrant all blending over time into one people. Yet rather than instantiating decisive narratives of domination and resistance, such distinctions and the dynamics of power under colonial rule they underwrite, have always been complicated by dynamics that precede and exceed colonial situations.⁶⁹ The study of narrative culture as such, according to Homi Bhabha, helps clarify the negotiation of the “traditional authority of those national objects of knowledge”—from Tradition, the Reason of State to such seemingly discrete social and political categories—“whose pedagogical value often relies on their representation as holistic concepts located within an evolutionary narrative of historical continuity.”⁷⁰ By tracing how FFA, NFA, FIFA youth, instructors, and administrators interpreted and narrated their own activities, histories, and purpose, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* is able to clarify important avenues through which U.S.-led and capital intensive agricultural and rural modernization efforts between the early- and mid-twentieth century, and the racial classifications and colonial divisions of humanity were effectuated, solidified, negotiated, and contested—in narrative, subject and identity formations, memory, and knowledge production.

PART 4.

Chapter Outline

Ultimately, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* argues that the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda channeled the migration of the logics of the plantation and the reservation. It was according to such anti-Black and settler colonial logics that peoples and places were remade in service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power during the mid-twentieth century.⁷¹ It was also according to such logics that ambiguous expressions of U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capitalism were increasingly inured from critique. The transit of the plantation and the reservation, and what it afforded U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capitalism—in terms of the accumulation of wealth, the exercise of geopolitical power, and the evasion of critique—were based upon domestic innovations in the two formations of racial capitalism. Specifically, the framework of technical and scientific cooperation and requisite modes of governance and administration during the mid-twentieth seemed to crystallize the trope of development—the problematization of a space or region and the solution it necessitates rendered in techno-scientific terms. However, such innovations were explicitly cultivated domestically vis-à-vis the plantation and reservation decades prior.⁷² The “transit” of these logics can arguably thus be seen as transit of logics themselves organized and understood in new ways. Specifically, such transit was built into how U.S. state power was officially regarded as anything but “imperial,” while also being part and parcel of Black and Native peoples’ efforts to advance their own goals, domestically and internationally.

This dissertation begins with the U.S. settler colonial genealogy of the Green Revolution. Specifically, **Chapter 1**, “The Reservation in Crisis: From ‘The Problem of Indian Administration’ to a ‘Bold New Program,’” outlines the early-twentieth century “crisis of the reservation” and its supposed resolution, as defined by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors. It also traces how such refashioned settler colonial logics migrated internationally during the mid-twentieth century by way of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda. It does so through close reading of key parts of the 1928 Meriam Report (*The Problem of Indian Administration*) and 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, and the 1949 Point Four Program two decades later, and by tracing the discursive and material links between these official and semi-official policies and policy assessments. It argues that the Meriam Report’s problem areas (i.e., chapters)—from “living conditions,” “economic conditions,” “suffering and discontent,” and the “causes of poverty” and the risk posed by “leaving sub-standard people alone”—were emergent rubrics through which policymakers defined in an official capacity the problems of U.S.-Indian relations. This rationale for managing matters of wealth via agricultural and rural modernization developed in relation to the reservation maintained Indianness as an object of knowledge and governance yet reworked its signifiers and subsequent solutions toward a self-governing techno-scientific market agrarianism. Finally, it argues that U.S.-Indian relations, reinterpreted as such, found new life in the application of the Point 4 Program across the Global South, and particularly in “dependent territories,” which U.S. state officials sought to “modernize” yet in ways that obscured and maintained the ongoing coloniality of such endeavors.

The Termination and Relocation era in the mid-twentieth century was a time when U.S. policymakers felt the crisis of the reservation was one that necessitated its outright dissolution. **Chapter 2**, “The Reservation as Crisis: Termination, (Non)Containment, and the ‘Indian Point 4 Program,’” outlines the significance of attempts by Native organizations and Native advocacy organizations to reorient reservation logics toward the maintenance of tribal sovereignty domestically amidst such threats to Native peoples. It does so by close reading the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the Association of American Indian Affairs (AAIA) and their push for an “Indian Point 4 Program” against cultural production of vocational agriculture education and manual training of the Future Farmers of America (FFA), among other groups, that brought the language of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda home. Of these cultural production, it does a close reading of the 1953 FFA film, “Farmer of Tomorrow.” It argues that, in the territorial peripheries of the U.S. settler state (Alaska, Hawai’i, and elsewhere), and toward settler colonial incorporation, the transit of the logic of containment cultivated in the early twentieth century continued. Yet with “Terminationists” in Congress and elsewhere making the case that the outright existence of the reservation threatened U.S. national cohesion and risked communist infiltration itself took on a new life, “containment” itself was considered untenable. Thus, although its origins were in the United States, the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda toward self-government—and as a panacea for colonial poverty, hunger, and unrest—found little expression domestically. It argues that efforts by the NCAI and AAIA to develop an “Indian Point 4 Program” by drawing on early-twentieth advances in development of a techno-scientific Native market agrarianism were rebuffed through a number of strategies: from the redefining of the logics of the Point 4 Program away from “containment” to the projection of this redefinition backwards in time to the origins of the U.S. settler state itself. From the failure of the NCAI and AAIA’s efforts to impossibility of the Blackfeet tribe and other tribes to “successfully” utilize such strategies toward self-government, the domestic limits were clear.

The last two chapters of this dissertation address the early-twentieth century crisis of the plantation as it was defined by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors, and the solution to the crisis that they offered. Rather than beginning with the plantation economy of the U.S. South, these chapters begin with the international life of the crisis, doing so in order to more fully lay out the stakes of the transit of shifting plantation logics born of the U.S. South, and the pressure the slave crisis and plantation economy placed upon U.S. foreign policy. Namely, it begins with the plantation economy of the West African settler state of Liberia—an economy established in the 1920s in order to foster the economic advancement of the country and its peoples. Firestone Natural Rubber Company’s plantation—the largest contiguous rubber plantation in the world—had garnered much support across both sides of the Atlantic until its unceasing labor requirements sparked a new slave trade perpetuated by the settler Americo-Liberian ruling class.

Chapter 3, “The Plantation in Crisis: Liberian Rubber and ‘The Native Problem in Africa,’” traces how exactly the plantation was problematized in the early twentieth century in light of this crisis in Liberia. It also traces how the prescribed response was built into official and explicit negotiations of U.S. imperialism by state, corporate, and philanthropic actors. It does so

through close reading a 1928 report by Raymond Leslie Buell: *The Native Problem in Africa*, published under the auspices Harvard Bureau of International Research and with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and others. It does so in relation to negotiations of the Liberian slave crisis by U.S. state officials, private actors, and other commenters on the crisis. It argues that Liberia's slavery crisis and the tenuous expressions of U.S. imperial sovereignty it laid bare ignited the need for the United States to assert a shift in U.S. policy toward the West African country. It argues that anti-occupation approach to securing investments in Liberia—the "second Black Republic" after Haiti, and outside the geographic bonds of the Monroe Doctrine and "Dollar Diplomacy"—reshaped the risk management of racial capitalism vis-à-vis the plantation complex in particular. It argues that the disavowal of Liberian settler appropriation—by framing the Liberian slavery crisis as crisis in "Negro self-rule" and Liberian sovereignty and not a crisis in indigenous Liberian dispossession and enslavement—facilitated the elision of processes of racial dispossession constitutive of the plantation complex and plantation geographies as it invited new forms of U.S. intervention. This approach to the Liberian slavery crisis were then built into emergent articulations of an official U.S. anti-imperialism while excising the racial logics of the plantation economy that the crisis illuminated.

Finally, **Chapter 4**, "The Plantation as Crisis: Racial Liberal Plantation Criticism and Liberia's 'Booker Washington Institute,'" traces how by the mid-twentieth century, the "resolution" to the crisis of the plantation in Liberia drew from resolutions to the problem of the U.S. South's own plantation economy that were articulated decades prior. It does so by tracing the links between two late-1940s reports—*Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947* and *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo, 1882-1947*—that aimed to assess and reduce disparity in African agriculture and facilitate the move away from "exploitative plantation production"—and *Shadow of the Plantation*, an analogous 1930s indictment of the U.S. South's plantation economy. It grounds its understanding of the significance of these reports in the Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute (BWI). Founded in 1929 with the aid of the Liberian government, the U.S. government, Firestone, and philanthropic actors, BWI was Liberia's first agricultural and vocational school. It argues that the Booker Washington Institute offered U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors the capacity to reassert the teleological narrative of emancipation vis-à-vis Liberian national development, while also helping inure from critique the global operations of racial capitalism—operations that the U.S. connection to BWI and Firestone laid bare. It argues that this potential was realized in the late 1940s once BWI itself reflected the shift that took place in the plantation economy of the U.S. South in the 1920s (i.e., toward the "neo-plantation complex"). This shift involved the transformation of BWI from a U.S.-run labor source for the Firestone plantation to an Americo-Liberian-run techno-scientific agricultural training institute and hub for the Point 4 Program in Africa.

These last two chapters ultimately account for how early twentieth century U.S. settler colonial and imperial governance interface in visions of Black racial uplift vis-à-vis agricultural and natural resource development, and Black self-government. All four chapters make clear, however, that it was according to the state-led push for Black and Native market agrarianisms—*cum*-anti-Black and settler colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance

beginning in the early-twentieth century that peoples and places were remade in service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power during the mid-twentieth century.⁷³ And it was due to innovations in such forms of governance that the risk posed to expressions of U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capitalism were managed.

Chapter One.

The Reservation in Crisis:

From “The Problem of Indian Administration” to a “Bold New Program”

In his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, President Truman announced the first U.S. plan for international economic development, the Point 4 Program. Named because it was the fourth foreign policy objective in the United States’ “program for peace and freedom,” the Point 4 Program was “a bold new program” that Truman stated would make “the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” This “bold new program” was indeed part and parcel of major shift in postwar foreign economic aid. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) was created on April 3, 1948 to administer foreign aid under the Marshall Plan in order to ameliorate the financial deficit and damaged infrastructure of the war-torn countries of Europe. Yet at this time, many development theorists believed that the cause of persistent hardship was not only war and conflict but the absence of individual initiative, adequate knowledge, and private enterprise. Thus, after 1948 and following this line of thought, the U.S. government moved toward a more comprehensive approach to foreign aid—one concerning agriculture, education, health, resource development, and other technical services. Simultaneously, there was a shift in the geographic scope of such aid. Although most large-scale economic aid went to Europe, other countries outside of Europe received foreign assistance just after World War II (e.g., in Africa, Morocco, Libya, Ethiopia, Tunisia and Somaliland; in South America, Colombia and Venezuela; in Asia, Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, and Indochina.

Coming directly out of the experiences of the Marshall Plan and a culmination of these trends, the Point 4 Program was part and parcel of the development of massive and expansive aid bureaucracies across the world.¹ The program officially began with the Title IV of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1950 and the establishment of the Technical Cooperation Administration within the Department of State that same year.² It stood apart from the Economic Cooperation Administration in that it administered foreign aid outside of Europe to the “underdeveloped areas” of the world and offered both capital investment and technical assistance.³ The reason behind this seemingly disinterested policy objective crystallized these trends and the beliefs and theories behind them. As Truman stated in his 1949 inaugural address, “More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant.” Thus, the benefits of U.S. “scientific advances and industrial progress” to be made available would encompass relations of agricultural production, education, health and sanitation, and resource development and other technical services. Additionally, these benefits would be made available through contracts with U.S. business, educational, and philanthropic organizations, and in conjunction with several new and existing national and international development-oriented organizations. For example, in 1950, there were 215 organizations around the world involved in the provision of such services, with foreign aid programs employing 630 Americans and more than 800 Europeans that year, and foreign grants amounting to almost \$34 billion. With such vast political, economic, and organizational backing, in the years following its establishment in 1950, this keystone policy of

the United States' seemingly disinterested agricultural and rural development agenda was operationalized in at least 35 countries across the Americas, Africa, and Asia—from Mexico, Cuba, and Haiti, to Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil, to Jordan, Iran and Pakistan.

Behind the confidence with which Truman announced this “bold new program” was a certain anxiety from the U.S. Department of State, policymakers, and other protagonists of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda. Specifically, as U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors posed international capital-intensive agricultural research, technology, and education transfer initiatives as the solution to the problem of hunger and poverty, there was a certain awareness of the stakes of such work. Signaling why it was called a “program for peace and freedom,” Truman stated that the reason such benefits of U.S. “scientific advances and industrial progress” needed to be made available was because for the “half the people of the world [who] are living in conditions approaching misery . . . their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.” Thus, Truman continues, “For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to relieve suffering of these people. The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.” To the people of the world living in near-misery and to the people of the world in close proximity to such misery—socially, economically, politically, and geographically—the United States' disinterested efforts would not only relieve the suffering of poverty and hunger, but also relieve the anxiety of unrest that would necessarily follow from such poverty and hunger.

The anxiety from the private and public protagonists of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, and the Point 4 Program in particular, extended to the operation and perception of the program itself. This anxiety appeared in the form of a number of statements and memorandums that circulated within the Technical Cooperation Administration and other agencies that came to administer and oversee the program—some publicly available at and some later declassified. For example, only three months after Truman's inaugural address, the April 12, 1949 memorandum entitled, “Possible Questions and Suggested Answers Concerning the President's Technical Assistance Proposal,” recounted ways for Department of State officials to respond to domestic and international criticism of the program. Toward this end, the anxieties from private and public protagonists of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, and the Point 4 Program in particular, extended to the operation and perception of the program within “Dependent Areas.” In other words, against the criticism of the Point 4 Program as “involving exploitation or imperialism,” the need to address such criticisms within explicitly colonial and imperial contexts was heightened. Highlighting this anxious need, for example, the July 27, 1949 Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance entitled, “Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas,” outlined how the program would operate in precisely such contexts.

This archive of Point 4 Program suggests a number of telling dynamics. First, it suggests that the operation of the Point 4 Program was rife with anxiety of unrest and revolt. Yet it also suggests

that the Point 4 Program was designed and operated in such a way as to alleviate the pressures involved within explicitly colonial contexts—pressures involving both the vast differentials in power and wealth and the unrest following therefrom, and the recognition by exploited and impoverished peoples that such power differentials have been constitutive of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism in particular. In this way, the “phantasmagoric” U.S. empire that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue assumed itself to be benign and ethical, operating “with the purpose of bring order to the world,” was also an empire that was aware of its own fallibility, the risks of its own hubris, and the need to stave off criticism that named it as such. And in this way, the archive of the Point 4 Program also suggests that agricultural and rural development—the agricultural science, technology, and education transfer initiatives under the banner of the Point 4 Program and other such efforts—were considered a way to alleviate hunger and poverty, and assuage such concerns.

On Cold War “Containment” and the Risk Management of Racial Capitalism

The Point 4 Program, which crystallized the United States’ emergent international agricultural and rural development agenda, thus revealed much in terms of how U.S. imperialism might work in the twentieth century. During this period, commercial mono-cropping transformed rural landscapes as the U.S. model of capital- and energy-intensive agriculture was universalized, and accumulation by agri-food capitalists undercut the capacities of states across the Global South to regulate themselves.⁴ Ultimately, through the agribusiness deployment of counterpart funds from the food aid program, the Green Revolution’s research, technology, and education transfer initiatives, and the transnational restructuring of agricultural sectors, *Pax Americana* reconstituted states as guarantors of markets and thus integral elements of U.S. empire. It did so all the while undermining peasant unrest and larger revolutionary action—*counternationalisms* that would have otherwise undermined such process of geopolitical power and capital accumulation.⁵ The focus on hunger and poverty that grounded such attempts at containment and drove such transformations was not conceptually incidental to the Cold War. A 1951 document issued by the Rockefeller Foundation entitled *The World Food Problem, Agriculture, and the Rockefeller Foundation*, crystallized the themes of hunger, population, and insurgency:

*Hungry people are lured by promises, but they may be won by deeds. Communism makes attractive promises to underfed peoples. Democracy must not only promise as much but must deliver more.*⁶

As Raj Patel argues, it is unsurprising that there should be an alignment between U.S. foreign policy and the Foundation’s world. They both share an ideological distaste for communism, the belief that “where hunger goes, Communism follows,” and an abiding faith in U.S. capitalism.⁷ Thus, U.S. policymakers and corporate and philanthropic actors promoted a specific social, cultural, and political worldview and set of prescriptions in their efforts to stabilize and expand capitalist markets.⁸ The Point 4 Program crystallized such shared views and prescriptions, and

highlighted that the program's anti-hunger and anti-poverty objectives at their cores attempts at containment.

The Point 4 Program was positioned as a central part of the United States' postwar strategy of containment in more ways than one. First, it would serve the United States' goal of lessening the risk of communist influence in impoverished areas with supposedly antiquated modes of agricultural production. Hunger and poverty that followed from such "traditional" methods would supposedly be alleviated by capital-intense techno-scientific modes of agricultural production oriented to the global market—for where there is no hunger, communism supposedly could not take root.⁹ Yet, as stated, the particular targets of such efforts were also understood in broader terms by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors—namely, emergent *counternationalisms* not limited to communist leanings but that would have still undermined U.S. geopolitical power and transnational capital. Second, the program was positioned as a central part of the U.S. strategy of containment in that it would also inure from critique the transnational restructuring of agricultural sectors as it helped stabilize and expand capitalist markets and strengthen U.S. geopolitical power. Namely, the program would stave off criticism from overlapping, internationalized anticolonial and civil rights movements at the time that could have easily regarded it as an imperial endeavor. Ultimately, through the seemingly disinterested provision of agricultural science, technology, education, and capital, the agents of the Point 4 Program saw the program as an effective means of undermining counternationalisms across a number of contexts—from independent nations to the United States' "dependent areas"—while also accounting for counternationalisms across such contexts that may have involved explicit indictments of U.S. foreign policy and transnational capital.

This chapter regards both elements of this mid-twentieth century strategy of containment as constitutive of one dynamic: the risk management of capitalism, which is to say the risk management of racial capitalism. As Jodi Melamed states, capital can only be capital when it is accumulating, and such accumulation requires "loss, disposability, and the unequal differentiation of human value." Race and racism enshrine such needed inequalities—hence, *racial capitalism*, which is often associated with the "central features of white supremacist capitalist development," including slavery, colonialism, genocide, incarceration regimes, migrant exploitation, and contemporary racial warfare.¹⁰ Toward this end, the risk management of racial capitalism thus involves not only the remaking of people and places as things "in the service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power."¹¹ In "the drawing of the line that constitutes discrete entities and distinguishes between the valued and the devalued," as Melamed argues, the risk management of racial capitalism also involves making people and situations incommensurable to one another as a "*disavowed condition of possibility for world-systems of profit and governance*" (emphasis added).¹² That is, capital accumulation involves the elision of its racial and colonial conditions of possibility. As an exercise in the risk management of capitalist markets and U.S. geopolitical power, the Point 4 Program need be recognized as involving the need for such elisions. That is, underwritten by the provision of food, technology, knowledge, and capital toward the protection of individual and national liberty, freedom, equality, progress (social and economic), the Point 4 Program-as-"containment" ultimately sought to permit expanded Anglo-American rule through new forms

of global governance, all while attempting to accommodate and inure from critique existing forms of racial and colonial dispossession.¹³

This chapter ultimately elucidates how exactly the Point 4 Program and U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, more broadly, built upon these central features of white supremacist capitalist development, while masking them as such. It holds on to the centrality of “containment” within the archive of the Point 4 Program—from Truman’s announcement of it to the manifold memorandums and briefs explicitly negotiating the colonial contexts within which the program would operate. It does so while recognizing that the “logic of containment” has long been central to these features of white supremacist capitalist development. It focuses on analogous innovations in subjection, administration, and governance with regard to existing forms of settlement in particular (i.e., the risk management of racial capitalism). Specifically, it traces how U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors facilitated certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the need for the cultivation of a capital-intensive and techno-scientific Native market agrarianism in the early-twentieth century. The first part of this chapter outlines the early-twentieth century crisis of the reservation as it was defined by such actors. It does so through close reading of key parts of the 1928 report, *The Problem of Indian Administration*, also known as the Meriam Report. The second part of this chapter attends to the means by which the development of a Native market agrarianism was to be achieved—the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, which intended to improve reservation economies and grant self-government while also containing Native counternationalisms that risked undermining U.S. settler capitalism. The third part of this chapter traces how this strategy of risk management of U.S. settler capitalism migrated internationally during the mid-twentieth century by way of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, broadly, and the Point 4 Program in particular. This chapter ultimately argues that the crisis of the reservation was a moment in which Indianness was reconfigured as a provisional catalyst toward greater incorporation and assimilation into market and colonial relations through innovations and advancements in agricultural production. The modes of subjection, administration, and governance developed therefrom then became central to the Point 4 Program’s attempt to effectuate the risk management of racial capitalism internationally during a period of global crisis.

PART 1.

Early-Twentieth Century Innovations in Indianness: The 1928 Meriam Report

During the 1920s and 1930s, unprecedented social, political, economic, and environmental changes were taking place across the United States. On the heels of the Great Depression, the Dust Bowl, and drastic drop in commodity prices, and the mass farm foreclosures taking place, the national economic crisis swept a reform administration into power that appealed urban and rural voters. As Thomas Biolsi states, if a new economic policy was to save capitalist private enterprise and an agricultural economy in turmoil, a new image of the social responsibility of government for citizens was to save the state from mass civil disobedience.¹⁴ Biolsi recounts how the Office of Indian Affairs (OIA) was within the purview of such reform efforts. John Collier was appointed commissioner of the OIA by Interior Secretary Harold Ickes—Collier was

an effective critic of the OIA and Ickes himself was a proponent of reforming federal Indian law and policy.¹⁵

Collier's reform ideas involved utilizing federal power to protect and rehabilitate Native communities. Along with Felix Cohen, a lawyer who was sympathetic to Collier's ideas, Collier believed that the most effective method for accomplishing this goal was an ambitious federal initiative to end allotment, sponsor federally-sanctioned Native governments, and promote Native leaders.¹⁶ These ideas led to a legislative proposal drafted during at the end of 1933 by Collier, Cohen, and a team of lawyers in the Interior Department. Such extensive statutory and administrative reforms were ultimately put into place on June 18, 1934 under the Indian Reorganization Act (or the Wheeler-Howard Act), which also became known as the "Indian New Deal."¹⁷ Yet, with regard to Native peoples across the United States, the national economic crisis and environmental catastrophe of the Great Depression and Dust Bowl was anticipated by what reform-minded policymakers, organization leaders, and community members considered another crisis: a persistent and deep-rooted social, political, economic, and environmental crisis of the reservation and "Indian administration" more broadly. In what was the sharpest departure from existing Indian law and policy to date, the 1928 Meriam Report, officially titled *The Problem of Indian Administration*, named this crisis and its stakes explicitly. Social responsibility of the U.S. government to Native peoples in particular involved improving reservation economies yet doing so to stave off Native unrest which may have undermined U.S. settler capitalism.

Section A.

"The Problem of Indian Administration" and the Crisis of the Reservation

For reform-minded policymakers, organization leaders, and community members during the 1920s and 1930s, the problem of Indian administration was not Indian administration itself but certain developments within Indian administration that went back only a few decades—namely, the period of "Allotment and Assimilation" inaugurated by Dawes Act of 1887 (also known as the General Allotment Act of 1887). According to Phillip J. Deloria, a key premise behind the Allotment Act was that communal landholding—perpetuated by the fenced-in, segregated reservation—actively hindered Native peoples from developing as "yeoman farmers." Thus, the disinterested "individualizing" of Native peoples could be more effectively enforced in terms of individual landholding.¹⁸ Reservations themselves were to be disaggregated and desegregated, turned into "checkerboarded" landholdings on a grid with an influx of white landowners.¹⁹ With this new arrangement, Deloria states, "a new class of white colonizers might live among Indian people, serving as role models and technical advisers in the development of a Native market agrarianism and a concomitant transition to citizenship within the imperial nation." As such, the Dawes Act represented a finer grain of seemingly disinterested colonial practice yet the impact was still devastating. Between 1887 and 1934, Native peoples' landholdings dropped from 138 million acres to 48 million acres—a loss of some 90 million acres of land, nearly 60 percent of all Native peoples' landholdings since Dawes Act was established.

This rapid transfer of Native peoples' land was alarming to Progressive-era reformers—a concern with federal Indian law and policy that cohered with broader efforts to transform U.S. government agencies and introduce scientific methods within state and federal administration itself.²⁰ Principal among the organizations to concern itself with the administration of Native peoples was the Institute for Government Research (IGR), which would later become the Brookings Institution. As per its mission statement, the IGR cooperated with public officials in the scientific study of government and aimed to “conduct scientific investigations into the theory and practice of government administration” and promote “efficiency and economy in operations and advancing the science of administration.” Reformers at the time viewed the application of scientific methods of analysis to administration as an appropriate response to a certain subset of problems—problems of the organization, personnel, materials, business practices and procedures, and finance. To the problem “Indian administration,” the IGR brought these and other considerations.

The formal process through which the Institute for Government Research was commissioned to study Indian administration began in 1923, when Secretary of the Interior, Hubert Work, appointed the National Advisory Committee (also called the Committee of One Hundred) to review federal policy toward Native peoples. Gathering in Washington in December 1923, the committee elected Arthur Parker as presiding officer and Fayette McKenzie as chairman of the resolutions committee. Their findings were published in 1924 as “The Indian Problem” and their recommendations ranged from curricula and physical facilities improvements in Native schools to better health services on the reservations, and called for the Department of the Interior to be more careful about issues as simple as patents to allotments.²¹ Given the desirability of having such a survey made by a supposedly “impartial group of specialists in the fields of health, education, agriculture, economics, family life, and law,” and in response to a special request by the Board of Indian Commissioners, Secretary Work then asked the IGR to conduct a more comprehensive study of federal Indian law and policy.²² In 1926, Secretary Work chose Dr. Lewis Meriam, a social scientist with experience in the technical study of government operations and employed by IGR, to direct the study and assemble the team of specialists to carry it out. The team Meriam assembled included experts in health, education, economic matters, agriculture, law, and history.²³

In scale, scope, and depth, the survey of the successes and failures of Indian administration was unlike any other. Data was collected by field work for approximately seven months and members of the investigating staff visited 95 different jurisdictions, including reservations, Indian agencies, hospitals, schools, and communities where Native peoples have migrated.²⁴ The methods of the survey were broken down into a number of practices, each recounted in the report itself.²⁵ After six months of field research, Meriam and his staff returned to Washington and spent several more months compiling their findings and drafting recommendations. Published in 1928 as *The Problem of Indian Administration*, more commonly called the Meriam Report, the 872-page study provided details of the conditions experienced by Native peoples while weighing in on what next steps may be needed.²⁶ Ultimately, the report argued that the central “problem of Indian administration” was that Native peoples endured extremely harsh conditions and were not properly “adjusted” to society due to failures

on the part of the federal government. For example, the survey team found Native peoples suffered from diseases more than the general population, and that the federal government had contributed to the poor health of the Native peoples by providing inadequate food allowances and offering no reasonable system to teach adults about public health. Further, they revealed that the Indian service lacked essential statistical information, as the researchers could not find accurate information about population size, birth or death rates, or incidence of diseases. The survey team also found that the Office of Indian Affairs lacked any effective educational program, and that the provisions for students that were available at boarding schools and other such institutions were grossly inadequate. Further, they found that the housing arrangements maintained by the federal government were also unsanitary. Perhaps most importantly, they observed that most Native peoples were extremely poor and could not earn enough money to alleviate their problems. They pointed to the devastating nature of Allotment and Assimilation policy and fraught faith in private land ownership and independent, self-reliant modes of agricultural production as among the core failures of the federal government.²⁷

For a few reasons, the 1928 Meriam Report was unlike any other analysis of federal Indian law and policy that came before it. First, it represented a radical departure from existing beliefs that U.S. state, corporate, philanthropic, and other actors held toward Indian administration. Commissioned by the U.S. Department of the Interior, funded in part by the Rockefeller Foundation, and carried out by the Institute for Government Research, it was the first report of its kind to define the policies of Allotment and Assimilation as failures and the first of its kind to describe how so in extreme detail. At the same time, while economic and other problems were regularly reported in annual reports by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in previous years, no *one single document* has ever been produced that has indicted the U.S. government and DOI in particular for their failures, and that has had such a direct impact on the reform of federal Indian law and policy.²⁸ The dire circumstances on reservations enunciated by the Great Depression and Dust Bowl added extra weight to the extensive data and analysis of the Meriam Report. Specifically, by the beginning of the 1930s, it was clear that any gains made by Native farmers in self-sufficiency during the 1920s, or by Native landowners in financial independence from the Office of Indian Affairs, had been crushed by the prevailing crop conditions and by the Great Depression.²⁹

Framed by the Meriam Report, this moment of crisis prompted the transformation of Indian administration under the Wheeler-Howard Act (P.L. 383), also known as the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), in accordance with many of the report's recommendations. Specifically, agricultural and rural development were the motor vehicle of the IRA's dual goal of improving reservation economies and granting a degree of self-government. The opening of the IRA states this in no clearer terms: "An Act to conserve and develop Indian lands and resources; to extend to Indians the right to form business and other organizations; to establish a credit system for Indians; to grant certain rights of home rule to Indians; to provide for vocational education for Indians; and for other purposes . . . That hereafter no land of any Indian reservation, created or set apart by treaty or agreement with the Indians . . . shall be allotted in severalty to any Indian . . ."³⁰ Grounded in this goal, tribes that voted to accept the IRA (or equivalent legislation addressing the special circumstances of tribal groups in Oklahoma and

Alaska) created democratic or representative forms of government with written constitutions and by-laws. Critically, as W. Roger Buffalohead recounts, once "organized," Native peoples could also develop economic charters and become eligible for credit through the Indian Reorganization Act Revolving Fund. The Act also allowed tribes to establish "business councils" with limited powers of home rule to enable them to develop reservation resources. Organized in such a way, and with such credit available, reservation communities were able to carry out key provisions of the IRA that included economic projects including agricultural development, land restoration, and conservation.

In conjunction with credit made available through the IRA, Office of Indian Affairs' "assistance" and "supervision" was essential to the success of projects undertaken. While the IRA provided for job training and vocational education and stipulated that Indians could gain employment in the BIA without recourse to civil service regulation. As Buffalohead recounts, such technical assistance, educational training, and employment in the Indian Service was made available through a special preference clause.³¹ This clause within the IRA facilitated the prioritizing of Native peoples within existing agricultural and rural technical assistance, outreach, and education efforts.³² The provision of agricultural and rural technical assistance and economic advancement were met with and aided by significant bureaucratic restructuring across various reservations. For example, in April 1936, an agreement between the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture established a Unified Navajo Program whose purpose was to "accomplish the economic rehabilitation of the Indians, to restore their depleted ranges and property [and] to develop their agriculture and other resources." Beginning in the years 1937, the administration of the Land Management Division became the responsibility of the Indian Service, and Soil Conservation Service personnel remaining in the program transferred to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.³³ These dynamics were not limited to agriculture and rangeland management. The IRA also mandated sustained-yield forestry planning on reservations. For example, though not immediately implemented, the idea of sustained yield became the basis for planned management on the Flathead Indian Reservation. Under the 1934 directive, forestry personnel were to conduct an inventory of forest resources, create a plan for managing them, and cooperate with the U.S. Forest Service in forestry matters.³⁴

This chapter thus far has begun to build the case that the Indian Reorganization Act—and the Meriam Report that anticipated it—were key progenitors of the Point 4 Program, and the United States' techno-scientific and capital intensive agricultural and rural development agenda, more broadly. It has done so while implying that this history is perhaps more significant or more relevant than the reports, initiatives, and programs associated with the standard history of such global processes. That is because this standard history generally frames the "Green Revolution" as an attempt at improved agricultural production—an achievement in science and technology and less so an innovation in governance. As such, this standard history begins in early 1941, when the Rockefeller Foundation sent a team to survey Mexican agriculture. The survey team was comprised of experts in three distinct fields: first, corn breeding, given its significance to Mexico; second, soil science; third, plant pathology. Yet scholars looking to complicate the standard history have begun to elucidate how the focus of such survey teams and their significance was not so myopic. As Tore Olsson argues, though the

impetus for the survey was primarily scientific, the three scientists ultimately hoped to aid in the development of a humanitarian program promoting Mexican peoples' health through nutrition and improved economic conditions.³⁵ The result of this study was the development of crop breeding and intensified fertilizer, pesticides, and irrigation measures under the banner of the Mexican government-backed Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP).³⁶ Stepping somewhat outside of this standard history of the "Green Revolution" scholars have also look to the ecological problems facing the agricultural economy of the U.S. South at the same time and even earlier in the century. For example, concerns, surrounded cattle tick fever, a tick-borne disease that if left untreated weakened and could kill cattle, and the boll weevil, a small beetle that feeds on cotton buds and flowers and that if left untreated threatened the Southern cotton economy with massive crop losses. At the time, such challenges invited similar innovations in agricultural production, thus offering scholars an additional account of the Green Revolution's origins.

Where such early-twentieth century endeavors depart from the Meriam Report (and later, the Indian Reorganization Act) is that these endeavors begin with the belief that from the techno-scientific transformation of agricultural production in Mexico and the U.S. South carried with it the capacity to improve or revitalize the broader social, political, and economic circumstances within which they are imbricated. Conversely, the 1928 Meriam Report began first and foremost with broad recognition of the problem of Indian administration. Matters of agricultural production only followed from this base claim. The wide-ranging expertise of the survey team reflects this: The agricultural specialist, William J. Spillman (1863-1931), an agricultural economist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, was one of the survey team's many specialists across many fields.³⁷ Edward Everett Dale, who served as the specialist in economic conditions, was head of the department of history of the University of Oklahoma and a former student of Frederick Jackson Turner's (and a proponent of Turner's "frontier thesis"). W. Carson Ryan, Jr., the professor at Swarthmore College who served as a specialist in education, would later be sworn in as Commissioner of Education for the Bureau of Indian Affairs in August 1930. Thus, Native peoples' poverty and hunger was principally regarded as an outcome of improper Indian administration, broadly defined, with the problems concerning the agricultural economies of reservations reflecting only a subset of issues within this broader problematization of Native peoples' subjection, governance, and administration. Conversely, within the standard and even expanded histories of the Green Revolution scholars have traced to Mexico, the U.S. South, and elsewhere, the problems of existing forms of subjection, governance, and administration are approximated and ostensibly addressed principally through agri-environmental concerns and methods—adhering to the critique of the Green Revolution's "myopic" focus on agricultural science and technology.

The Green Revolution, however, was anything but a "myopic" techno-scientific endeavor, involve as it did the transnational restructuring of agricultural sectors, the undercutting of states' capacities to regulate themselves, and the universalization of the U.S. model of capital- and energy-intensive agriculture. This broader set of transformations was effectuated, in part, by the Point 4 Program. As stated, this program involved the creation of a transnational administrative and bureaucratic framework and set of prescriptions that set out to make

available the benefits of “scientific advances and industrial progress,” and to ensure that such benefits can be effectively attained.³⁸ As the next section argues, what the Meriam Report helped effectuate was the reconfiguration of Indianness itself as an object of knowledge and governance. Specifically, the Meriam Report reconstituted Indianness—a provisional catalyst toward greater incorporation and assimilation into market and colonial relations—in ways that necessitated the same or similar agricultural innovations proffered within Mexico, the U.S. South, and elsewhere. Yet, beyond these examples, Indianness was also reconfigured in ways that invited an even greater set of transformations in governance and administration—transformations necessary for Native peoples to truly benefit from such modern agricultural innovations.

Section B.

On “General Economic Conditions,” Suffering, and the Risk Management of Indian Administration

Slavery, famine, disease, displacement—these and other familiar icons of human suffering index a state of emergency and pose moral demands for quick political action. Yet many scholarly traditions that have rightly critiqued such representations of human suffering, which have been operationalized as a liberal strategy to re-entrench the racial, gendered, sexual, capitalist, and imperial orders from which such suffering emerges.³⁹ Amidst unprecedented social, political, economic, and environmental changes taking place across the United States during the 1920s and 1930, Native peoples’ difficulties regarding health, family life, education, income, and overall quality of life on and off the reservation were represented in such ways, and toward similar ends, as evidenced by the 1928 Meriam Report and the policy changes that followed. The opening pages of the report—within the first chapter, “General Summary of Findings and Recommendations,” and within the subsection, “Suffering and Discontent”—belabor the importance of such representations of suffering vis-à-vis Native peoples:

Some people assert that the Indians prefer to live as they do; that they are happier in their idleness and irresponsibility. The question may be raised whether these persons do not mistake for happiness and content an almost oriental fatalism and resignation. The survey staff found altogether too much evidence of real suffering and discontent to subscribe to the belief that the Indians are reasonably satisfied with their condition. The amount of serious illness and poverty is too great to permit of real contentment. The Indian is like the white man in his affection for his children, and he feels keenly the sickness and the loss of his offspring.⁴⁰

Meriam and the survey staff thus immediately describe what they believe is the source, form, and, experience of Native peoples’ longstanding suffering, as well as the swift political such suffering demands. Each orbited the reservation in particular, which after years of Allotment and Assimilation policy, and in the midst of the Great Depression and Dust Bowl, was essentially “in crisis.” As an exercise in the risk management of U.S. settler capitalism, this crisis of the

reservation aided liberal strategies to re-entrench U.S. state power and capital accumulation, and the processes of racial and colonial dispossession on which they depend.

The risk management of racial capitalism, more broadly, involves the remaking people and places as things in the service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power.⁴¹ Framed by this moment of crisis, what the Meriam Report arguably effectuated was the reconfiguration of Indianness itself as an object of knowledge and governance, and provisional catalyst toward greater incorporation and assimilation into market and colonial relations. Specifically, the Meriam Report reconstituted Indianness in ways that rendered it a call for techno-scientific and capital-intensive agricultural innovations as well as paired innovations in governance and administration. These innovations in governance and administration would supposedly ensure that the greatest possible benefits from such advancements in agricultural production could be attained. Yet the forms of self-government allowed under the Indian Reorganization Act were, as Phil Deloria states, designed to remove “the last safeguards for protecting Indian land, resources, and labor power from the new forces of the market.” According to Deloria, “one of the main reasons for creating tribal councils was the need for central authorities to negotiate and approve business or governmental initiatives. Councils, according to the federal government (if not always the majorities their constituencies), had the political and legal power to negotiate and sign deals for resource extraction or further land cessions.”⁴²

Thus, in response to the crisis of the reservation, the 1928 Meriam Report and 1934 Indian Reorganization Act remade Native peoples and place in ways that undermined Native counter-nationalisms—Native nationalisms that would have potentially undermined U.S. settler capitalism and that may have involved explicit indictments of U.S. state power and capital accumulation. In other words, the strategy of managing the crisis of the reservation laid out by the Meriam Report and put into place by the Indian Reorganization Act effectuated the “containment” of Native relations and knowledge within ideological and physical “safety zones.”⁴³ Specifically, grounded in the belief that Native peoples’ relations and knowledge were of value yet simply out-of-step with the present realities of capitalist development, these flashpoints of reform asserted new approaches to the reservation and to legal-recognition—administrative and governmental frameworks that still subsumed Native sovereignty within the settler state’s domestic laws and discretion while sustaining U.S. settler authority and capital accumulation. In this way, against the crisis facing Native peoples on the reservation, the provision of techno-scientific and capital-intensive agricultural innovations and paired innovations in governance was an exercise in the risk management of settler capitalism. And in the response to this crisis of the reservation, Native peoples and places were remade as *disavowed* conditions of possibility for such systems of profit and governance—disavowed by way of their placement behind the banner of an improved, socially responsible, and wholly disinterested framework for the administration of Native peoples.

The question remains, what new criteria did such ostensibly disinterested prescriptions follow from? Put another way, how was Indianness—as a provisional catalyst toward greater incorporation and assimilation into market and colonial relations—reconstituted toward the

containment of Native counternationalisms? The Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization Act were arguably central drivers of the rearticulation of Indianness as an *economically impoverished, techno-scientific-deficient, and improperly administered* category of colonial difference (with such conditions all but guaranteeing unrest and revolt should they remain unaddressed).⁴⁴ At 116 pages, It is the Meriam Report's second largest chapter (following "Health"), "General Economic Conditions," that most comprehensively describes "the problem of Indian administration" as such. The chapter covers a number of topics, among them: statistics, histories, structures, and challenges of Native peoples' property, income, and "utilization of tribal resources"; the individual allotment of land; agricultural production (including an emphasis on subsistence agriculture); and administrative frameworks for education, outreach, assistance.⁴⁵ Moving across such topics, the chapter thus focuses upon issues relating to agricultural production and the effective, efficient, and profitable use of natural resources, and develops these as the criteria for intervention. This chapter also points to the site of intervention that follows from such gestures toward Indianness as an economically impoverished, techno-scientific-deficient, and improperly administered category of colonial difference: the reservation. As stated in the chapter, "The economic resources of the reservation should be developed to the point where they are capable of supporting in comfort as many Indians as practicable before it is assumed that the permanent solution of the economic problem of these people is to remove them from the unmet problems of the reservation to work elsewhere as wage earners."⁴⁶ Thus, Indianness as a provisional catalyst was reconstituted in ways that pointed to the reservation in particular—Itself impoverishing, non-modern, and improperly administered—as the site of reform.

In developing the criteria for intervention, the chapter in the Meriam Report regards the barriers to the best use of natural resources on the reservation as economic and administrative yet stemming first from environmental variability and precarity. Framing the chapter on "General Economic Conditions," broadly, is the fact that "upon almost every reservation may be seen families living in poverty and yet possessed of potential resources, tribal, individual, or both, that if well utilized should yield a reasonable degree of comfort."⁴⁷ The chapter describes this gap as largely stemming from environmental challenges and concerns: "one of the chief reasons for this state of affairs is that much of the Indian's property consists of land that is often arid, semi-arid, or mountainous, valuable chiefly for grazing, unsalable except in very large tracts, and often capable of little development for other agricultural purposes."⁴⁸ Thus, the authors state, "to administer the affairs of a people so varied in character and so widely scattered as are the Indians is no easy task."⁴⁹ Broadly, this task would be one of "adjusting the Indians to their environment within a generation or two." While this "environment" is framed first according to the diverse and challenging physical and biological features of the land on which Native peoples live, the authors' understanding of Native peoples' "environment" extends to their social, political, and economic circumstances—the modern terrain of U.S. capitalist development.

Lewis Meriam and the survey staff define Allotment and Assimilation as a fraught strategy of Indian administration. Yet they argue that one of the primary reasons it was so destructive was because of the lack of adequate training required for successfully adjusting themselves to their

environment—both their physical and biological environment, and their social, political, and economic environment. The authors state: “Admirable as they were the objects of individual allotment the results have often been disappointing. Too much reliance was place on the sheer effect of individual land ownership and not enough was done to educate the Indians in the use of lands . . . The result has been to put many Indians in possession of allotments of land and of other property before they had advanced sufficiently to feel any real responsibility for the conservation and development of such property.”⁵⁰ Throughout the chapter, the authors continue to assert this point but in even clearer terms and by way of an even stronger indictment of Indian administration:

*The absence of competent industrial or economic teachers and leaders explains in no small measure the comparative failure of several of the large policies of the past, notably, the whole plan of individual allotment of land, the issuance of fee patents, the removal of restrictions, and the declaration of competency which legally removes the Indian from guardianship and declares him ready to take his place as an independent member of the community.*⁵¹

Ultimately, the authors argue that the effective, efficient, and profitable use of the reservation’s natural resources by Native peoples was hindered by the limited provision of adequate scientific and technological training and capital. Thus, with Native peoples displaced onto marginal lands for generations, yet deprived of the knowledge, tools, and capital required to profitably cultivate such land, the authors were clear in their view of the problem of Indian administration and why the reservation in particular was the site of reform.

Indianness, as a provisional catalyst toward greater incorporation and assimilation into market and colonial relations, is thus progressively reoriented within the Meriam Report around gaps in the provision of scientific knowledge, in outreach and assistance, in technology, and in capital. And the reservation is pointed to as the site of reform. In developing the case for reform, Meriam and the survey team are clear in their belief that a number of industries can no longer function as a safety valve for challenging economic conditions on the reservation:

They increase the number of persons who cannot be used effectively in the highly developed modern industrial system and must find what employment they can as sub-standard unskilled workers. In this country, with it great use of power and machinery, the possibility for the utilization of sub-standard labor is rapidly disappearing not alone in manufacturing enterprises but also in mining, lumbering, and agriculture.

Thus, with off-reservation employment increasingly limited and their “sub-standard” skills increasingly obsolete, tension within reservations, and between reservations and the populations that border them, would only increase. Thus, the reservation is not simply salvageable nor are its issues, so defined, impossible to address. Rather, it *need* be salvaged and such gaps in the provision of scientific knowledge, in outreach and assistance, in technology, and in capital *need* be addressed.

Without adequate training and capital, without the safety valve of other industries, and with worsening economic conditions on the reservation, the authors believe that inaction vis-à-vis Indian administration and the reservation would pose a real risk. This supposed risk was one that prompted Meriam and the survey team to explicitly invoke the need for a strategy of containment:

If the doctrine of the survival of the fittest is resorted to, and if these people are let alone and nothing is done for them, they do not quietly and promptly vanish from the face of the earth as unfit. It is here that the theory of the survival of the fittest breaks down at least in modern highly organized society. They become centers for the development and spread of infectious and contagious diseases. Their offspring tend to become progressively less fit physically and mentally for making their way in the world. They contribute out of proportion to their numbers to those who have ultimately to be cared for in penal, correctional, or charitable institutions.⁵²

State intervention—from counter-violence to the “disinterested” provision of knowledge, technology, and capital—in the interest of financial asset owning classes itself produces and reconfigures the racial and colonial difference being invoked. As Nikhil Pal Singh argues, modern forms of racial and colonial difference, do not issue directly from private property or the lack thereof. Rather, they emerge “from the governance of property and its interests in relationship to those who have no property and thus no calculable interests, and who are therefore imagined to harbor a potentially criminal disregard for propertied order.”⁵³ The invocation of “infectious and contagious diseases” when describing the risk of unaddressed poverty and hunger points to precisely this process with regard to Indianness in particular. That is, the rearticulation of Indianness as an *economically impoverished, techno-scientifically-deficient, and improperly administered* category of colonial difference and provisional catalyst follows from such concerns regarding Native peoples’ poverty and hunger.

Meriam and the survey staff continue with their analogy of containment following from such considerations. As stated, without the provision of scientific knowledge, outreach and assistance, technology, and capital by the federal government, and overall improvement of the reservation, Native peoples are understood as having no knowable properties beyond their criminal propensity and open-ended threat potential.⁵⁴ In this context, the provision of knowledge, technology, and capital itself becomes a type of state counter-violence in the interest of financial asset owning classes.⁵⁵ In the same section on “A General Policy for Indian Affairs,” describing the need to salvage the reservation, the authors expressed their objection to “leaving sub-standard people alone.” They feared that in leaving their “real suffering and discontent” unaddressed, without cultivating the habit of self-reliance and social autonomy, they would “furnish fertile fields for the lower type of agitators who take advantage of discontent and ignorance to promote movements which are destructive rather than constructive.”⁵⁶ “Against the perceived threat of Native peoples’ poverty, U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic institutions developed new modes of administration and the provision of new methods of agricultural production and natural resource management to secure their

investment in U.S. capital accumulation. As an exercise in the risk management of U.S. settler capitalism, the crisis faced by Native peoples bound to the reservation—so defined—thus began to find their solution.

PART 2.

Land Reform, Cold War Containment, and the Transit of Empire

Accounts of the hidden and strategic dimensions of early-twentieth century economic assistance are not new. As David Nally and Stephen Taylor recount, in an article titled “Wealth,” first published in the *North American Review* in 1889, the renowned philanthropist Andrew Carnegie (1835-1919) argued for a new way of thinking about the “proper administration” of capital: wealth redistribution, albeit on a limited scale.⁵⁷ Behind these investments in the “proper administration” of capital that were shared by Carnegie, Rockefeller, and others was the fear that massive concentrated wealth, if administered unwisely, might inspire dangerous and destabilizing class tensions. Fears of population growth, shrinking resources, peasant unrest, and communism exacerbated such concerns and gave them shape.⁵⁸ In order to control and contain these emergent threats, “big philanthropy” believed it was necessary to manage the pace and direction of national and global social change.⁵⁹ Critically, Nally and Taylor argue that, in this way, philanthropic strategies begin to dovetail with wider security imperatives and geopolitical objectives of the state.⁶⁰ The Meriam Report highlights that the same concerns are true with regard to Native peoples’ economic conditions. Specifically, behind the provision of agricultural knowledge, technology, and capital toward improved economic conditions was the anxiety of potential unrest following from Native peoples’ poverty and the “improper” administration of Native peoples themselves.⁶¹

So too has there been much scholarship on the early-twentieth century shift in racial thought: from a fixed, biological understanding of race to a more flexible, anthropological, cultural, and economic understanding of race.⁶² Kim TallBear recounts the renowned anthropologist Frances Boas’ development of the notion that “cultures” are plural and relativistic, and that they belong to all societies. Group cultural phenomena, Boas proposed, derived from “specific and complex historical processes” rather than reflecting earlier evolutionary stages in the racial hierarchy of humanity.⁶³ Not only was this early-twentieth century notion of cultures developed through field study of the practices of North American Native peoples.⁶⁴ It was also increasingly central to transformations in the subjection, governance, and administration of Native peoples themselves at the time. Lewis Meriam and the survey team’s take on the “problem of Indian administration” belabors this point. As stated in the report, “The fact must be squarely faced that through governmental action, many really incompetent Indians have been permitted to lose possession of their individually owned property before they were ready to maintain themselves in the presence of the civilization which confronts them. The important question is how to stop further inroads on Indian property until the Indians are adjusted to the prevailing economic system.”⁶⁵ The terms of “(mal)adjustment to the prevailing economic system” speaks more to incongruences in “cultural phenomena” to emerge from “specific and complex historical processes” than an inherent inability of Native peoples to successfully own property,

and participate and be competitive in the market economy. This belief— that Native peoples ultimately did have capacity to adjust themselves to their environment—underlaid the Meriam Report’s problematization of Indian administration and its recommendations.⁶⁶ Yet the cultivation of a Native market agrarianism toward improved economic conditions involved more than addressing the gap in scientific knowledge, in outreach and assistance, in technology, and in capital. As Lewis Meriam and the survey staff argued, and as the Indian Reorganization Act put into place, it involved innovations in governance and administration—namely, the paired provision of self-government.

Section A.
Toward a Native Market Agrarianism

Characterizing the world view of many U.S. economic elites in the early twentieth century was a dominant mode of “geo-economic imaginings.” This view held that every nation and all peoples could be made “modern” through the purchase of U.S. commodities, that all can potentially be made equal through commercial development, and that all able to achieve a degree of self-reliance and social autonomy through the provision of agricultural science, technology, education, and capital.⁶⁷ To these “geo-economic imaginings” Lewis Meriam and the survey staff contributed a framework for utilizing capital-intensive and techno-scientific agricultural and rural assistance as a pathway to—and indeed necessitating—self-government and nationhood. As argued, the need to address the barriers to the effective, efficient, and profitable use of the reservations natural resources by Native peoples themselves was seen as a strategy of containment. Thus, the view that self-government was required for a successful Native market agrarianism suggests that agricultural and rural assistance aided both the deflection of counternationalisms and the development of nationalisms congruent with U.S. settler capitalism. Put another way, Indianness offered agricultural and rural technical assistance-*cum*-self-government as a strategy of containing anticolonial aspirations that followed from the inequality capitalism requires.

As the previous section argued, in the early twentieth century Indianness was rearticulated as an *economically impoverished, techno-scientifically-deficient, and improperly administered* category of colonial difference. As a provisional catalyst, it was reconstituted in ways that pointed to the reservation in particular—Itself impoverishing, non-modern, and improperly administered—as the site of reform. Concerning the provision of self-government as an essential part of such reform, Meriam and the survey staff’s recommendations were clear. In Chapter 5 of the report, “Organization of the Federal Indian Work,” the authors pose three recommendations toward this end:

- (1) The creation, in connection with the Washington office, of a professional and scientific Division of Planning and Development*
- (2) A material strengthening of the school and reservation forces that are in direct contact with the Indians and are responsible for developing and improving*

their economic and social condition through education in the broadest sense of the word

(3) The maximum practical decentralization of authority so that to the fullest possible extent initiative and responsibility may be vested in the local officers in direct contact with the Indians.⁶⁸

At the core of each of these recommendations was Meriam and the survey staff's recognition that they were not working with a "concentrated homogeneous population embraced in a comparatively small area, but . . . widely scattered groups often living in almost unbelievable isolation and varying all the way from extremely primitive to those who have reached approximately the same scale of development as the prevailing white civilization of their communities." As such, the authors continue, "the economic and social conditions with which the Service must deal are equally varied."⁶⁹ Described as ranging from "extremely primitive" to approximating "white civilization," the form of racialization imbedded in this assessment reflects the research staff's adherence to belief in what Beth Piatote names the "developmental scales of assimilation" with regard to Native peoples.⁷⁰ Instead of entire regions, peoples, or nations being collapsed into a point along this scale, Native peoples were seen as simultaneously existing along manifold many points of development. A sharp break from how Indian administration was imagined and carried out, the Meriam Report's damning critique required the federal government to institute a more formalized administrative framework that could adequately account for the racialized variability of Native peoples' capacity for economic development

The rationale behind Meriam and the survey staff's recommendations was the need to provide agricultural and rural assistance that was congruent with Native peoples' needs, so defined. Such assistance, they believed, would need to account for the variability of social, political, economic, and environmental conditions among Native peoples themselves as well as the capacity of Indian Service to meet such diverse needs. For example, following their recognition of the diverse and "widely scattered" nature of Native peoples that the Indian Service must account for, Meriam and the survey staff stated that:

Many different kinds of agriculture must be known to the Service ordinary farming with a sufficient rainfall, dry farming, farming under irrigation in a climate which will give seven cuttings of alfalfa in a year, fanning under irrigation where the season is so short that maturing a crop is a problem, livestock raising whose summer and winter feed are both available, and livestock raising where the problem of wintering stock is serious. The economic resources of the wards vary all the way from those of the Osages, submerged by a flood of unearned income,' to the many Indians submerged by extreme poverty occasioned by the utter lack of agricultural or industrial resources on their lands.⁷¹

The authors' problematization of Native peoples' conditions thus centered upon the lack of agricultural and rural technical assistance that accounted for the social, political, economic, and environmental variability between reservations. The same belief drove their recommendations

concerning Indian administration. Specifically, as the authors state in the chapter on “General Economic Conditions,”

What is needed . . . is not only a local program for separate reservations, but a general program for the service as a whole, that will seek to utilize the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent, and develop the Indian himself by providing education in earning, conserving, and spending money that will create in him both the desire and the means for maintaining a scale of living somewhat commensurate with that of his white neighbors.⁷²

Without doing so, “the Indian Office has shown its most conspicuous weakness in providing for the future welfare of its wards.” Thus, “the problem of Indian administration” may be resolved through the provision of agricultural and rural technical assistance in accordance with the social, economic, and environmental conditions faced by Native peoples across the United States.

“To administer the affairs of a people so varied in character and so widely scattered as are the Indians is no easy task.” These words at the opening of the chapter framed each solution to problem of Indian administration posed by Meriam and the survey team. Their discussion of “material relief” in particular belabors this point and highlights the urgent need for a major departure from existing policy and the stakes of not doing so. Meriam and the survey staff state: “Problems of material relief are always difficult, but they are *especially* acute among the Indians, because relief has never been effectively administered.”⁷³ The report states:

The present “ration system” is carried over from the old army plan of feeding in wholesale fashion Indians concentrated upon reservations, largely as a military measure to prevent hostile outbreaks by a people whose natural food supply has been destroyed by the slaughter of the buffalo and other game. The system is antiquated and unsound in principle and has long outlived whatever usefulness it may have once had. It is merely palliative in character, with no other object than the relief of immediate suffering.⁷⁴

While the authors are clear that the risk of hostile outbreaks are still are still ever-present, they are also clear that economic relief should be a means to an independent income rather than a source of income—namely, outreach, assistance, training, and education. Thus, even in the topic of material relief, Indianness is progressively rearticulated within the Meriam Report as an economically impoverished, techno-scientifically-deficient, and improperly administered category of colonial difference—a call for a new approach to Indian administration that accounts for the variability of such peoples and needs, so defined, and that points to the reservation as the site of reform.

At the core of the “problem of Indian administration” in the early twentieth century was what Beth Piatote has described as the problem of Indian administration broadly: the “paradoxical situation of both too much and too little care [that] emblemizes the case of Indians under

federal paternalism.”⁷⁵ With such care, assistance, and relief newly defined around managing matters of wealth on the reservation via agricultural and rural development, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) would seemingly resolve this paradoxical situation. Under the IRA, tribes were allowed to create certain governing and policing structures such as tribal councils and constitutions, but these did not displace the supervisory presence of Indian Office employees on reservations. By allowing tribes to craft their own governing structures yet making such structures subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior, the IRA allowed the federal government to respond to both critiques of “over-administration” and calls for strengthening the federal government’s activities.

In line with the Meriam Report’s recommendations, the Indian Reorganization Act was that broader policy that could foster greater agricultural and rural technical assistance while adequately account for the various degrees of economic development and environmental considerations across all reservations. Further, it could do so while evading the criticism that Indian administration had long faced. As an exercise in the risk management of U.S. settler capitalism—in both practice and perception—the Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization Act offered a model of, and basis for, U.S. intervention that could ground otherwise tenuous expressions of U.S. sovereignty and inure them from critique.⁷⁶ That is, the strategy of containment developed in the early-twentieth century U.S. settler colonial context—against the threat that Native peoples’ unrest and potential revolt posed to U.S. state power and capital accumulation—came to constitute the executive, legislative, juridical means that the United States effectively made “Indian” those peoples and nations who stood in the way of U.S. empire and its economic interests during the mid-twentieth century.⁷⁷

Section B.

Land Reform and Agrarian Counernationalisms

Through the Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization Act, Indianness came to describe gaps in agricultural and rural technical assistance, particularly in ways that accounted for the variability of such peoples, conditions, and needs across reservations, so defined. By the early twentieth century, the infrastructure for Indianness to serve as the ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself as settler-imperial was already in place.⁷⁸ Specifically, the Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization Act were already imbricated within the “foreign policy” directives of the Rockefeller Foundation and the Institute for Government Research (IGR) who funded and carried out the research, respectively. By the 1910s, the Rockefeller Foundation had already been engaged in philanthropic activities internationally. By the late 1920s, the foundation had formally identified international relations, economic stabilization, and public administration as the basis for the its research and activities. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that IGR dealt with “foreign policy” matters in an official capacity. Yet their work in the Meriam Report sedimented agricultural and rural development as a key objective and area of expertise of the organization and paved the way for such work to be done internationally.

The first of such IGR projects focused on agricultural and rural development was the comprehensive study of the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Administration, published in 1936 and led by Edwin Nourse. An agriculture economist and director of the Institute of Economics, Nourse would later become the first chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Harry Truman and a key advisor to the President on the Point 4 Program. By the late 1950s and early 1960s, the IGR, now the Brookings Institution, expanded its agricultural and rural development agenda globally, building the repertoire of Green Revolution efforts. For example, in 1961, Brookings scholar John Lewis, who later became the USAID India Mission director, published “The Quiet Crisis in India,” an in-depth study of India's agricultural rural development. By the mid-twentieth century, the institutional means for the Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization Act to serve as the ground through which U.S. settler colonialism could enact itself as settler-imperial were already in place.

While the infrastructure for such transit of empire was in place by the mid-twentieth century, fears of agrarian unrest worldwide grounded the framework for U.S. intervention and containment developed between the Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization Act. In other words, the counternationalisms that grew from agrarian movements and that threatened U.S. geopolitical power and transnational capital stamped in minds of U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors the need for a policy of containment on a greater scale.⁷⁹ Contemporary formulations of agrarian reform began prior to the Second World War, when Russia, China, Guatemala, and Mexico had begun to engage in various forms of rural transformation. Such reforms were aimed at addressing the persistent, uneven distribution of wealth and power, and were carried out as a central part of their plans for independence and national development. These early efforts ranged from the anti-peasant, top-down, and state-led transformations of the Soviet Union to the more peasant revolution-driven land reforms in China, to the radical agrarian struggle of Mexico, and to the reorganization of export agriculture coupled with the rise of popular struggle in Guatemala.⁸⁰ While these movements had varying degrees of success, they ultimately pointed to the larger structural dimensions of agrarian change.

At the core of such agrarian unrest across “underdeveloped” and conflict-ridden states was a host of troubling dynamics: land tenure patterns and vague property rights, the erosion of subsistence security associated with economic growth, the transition to capitalist labor relations, the distribution of ownership, neglected peripheries, and frontier regions populated with subsistence sharecroppers.⁸¹ Against this backdrop, what that these early-twentieth century movements had also pointed to was the risk that agrarian reform potentially posed to the United States and U.S. transnational capital.⁸² By the mid-twentieth century, this risk had only expanded. By this time, land reform movements had become significant to a number of contexts—from Cold War proxies and postwar allied consolidations to endogenous social revolutions and political compromises. The decolonial movements that took place following World War II only deepened the crisis for U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors. It was between 1945 and 1960 that over three dozen new states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America achieved autonomy or outright independence, with questions of agriculture and land frequently appearing front and center.⁸³

On April 7, 1950, the United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, better known as NSC 68—a 66-page top secret National Security Council (NSC) policy paper drafted by the Department of State and Department of Defense—was presented to President Harry S. Truman.⁸⁴ The document details the United States’ postwar policy objectives: “Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community.” The report also outlines clear strategies for achieving such objectives: “This broad intention embraces two subsidiary policies . . . one is . . . attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of ‘containing’ the Soviet system.” Backed by decades of evidence of its significance vis-à-vis broader movements for independence and national development—particularly in ways that undermined U.S. state power and transnational capitalism—the United States enrolled agrarian reform in achieving such joint subsidiary policies.

On March 9, 1951, the “Policy Statement Prepared by the Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems” explicitly established this particular strategy.⁸⁵ The statement poses two clear policy objectives:

1. The basic objective is to improve agricultural economic institutions in order to lessen the causes of agrarian unrest and political instability. This objective should be sought by improving the position of the farmer on the land to the end that he may have (a) greater security of tenure, (b) an incentive to increase production and conserve resources (including the utilization of technological advances suitable to each economy), and (c) an equitable share of the output . . .

2. A secondary objective is to disengage “land reform” from the complex of ideas exploited by Soviet Communism, by making clear to the various peoples and governments of the world that genuine land reform can be achieved through their own governmental processes, and that steps in the direction of accomplishing the basic objective will receive U.S. support, as appropriate.⁸⁶

These policy objectives were prefigured by the recommendations made in the Meriam Report—namely, that what is needed, according to Meriam and the survey staff, was “not only a local program for separate reservations, but a general program for the service as a whole, that will seek to utilize the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent, and develop the Indian himself by providing education in earning, conserving, and spending money.”⁸⁷ The objectives outlined in the policy statement also relied upon similar representations of the underlying problem named in the Meriam Report two decades earlier: gaps in scientific knowledge, in outreach and assistance, in technology, and in capital, and the risk posed should such gaps not be addressed.

That these strategies echo nearly word-for-word the objectives, practices, and rationales that Indian administration was reoriented toward during the early twentieth century is not incidental. The statement opens with the following declaration:

In most countries, including our own, economic progress and political stability are closely related to the prevailing system of agricultural economic institutions. In many areas present unsatisfactory institutional arrangements are a source of persistent discontent and unrest. This has been recognized in U.S. domestic policy and more recently emphasized in our foreign policy as illustrated by far-reaching land reform in Japan and support of land reform measures in Formosa.⁸⁸

The recognition that such lessons were learned in U.S. domestic policy, and “more recently,” in foreign policy, points to ways in which the framework for managing matters of Native peoples’ wealth on reservations via agricultural and rural development earlier in the century was central to the United States’ postwar strategy of achieving a “healthy international community” and containing unrest. The final part of this chapter delves into these dual objectives with regard to the Point 4 Program in particular. These objectives and the operating method and broader philosophy of the Point 4 Program offer clarity on precisely how the early-twentieth century lessons from U.S. domestic policy helped remake the subjects and sites of the Point 4 Program in service of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism.

PART 3.

Indians and Insurgents: “Two Ways of Life Meet”

In his inaugural address on January 20, 1949, President Truman announced the first U.S. plan for international economic development, the Point 4 Program. Named because it was the fourth foreign policy objective in the United States’ “program for peace and freedom,” the Point 4 Program was “a bold new program” that Truman stated would make “the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” Practically, doing so involved capital-intensive investments by state, corporate, philanthropic actors in the development of agricultural technology, the inculcation of this technology within the habits of governments and farmers, and paired reforms in land tenure and ownership and government, more broadly.⁸⁹ Although assistance to “underdeveloped areas” under the Point 4 Program would be carried out as part of multiple institutional arrangements over a number of years—from the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) to the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA)—the program would consistently operate in a nearly identical fashion as earlier “U.S. domestic policies” concerning Native peoples in particular. Harold E. Fey and D'arcy McNickle, in their 1959 text, *Indians and Other Americans Two Ways of Life Meet*, outline the congruencies between early-twentieth century “administration of Indian affairs in this country” and the Point 4 Program, nearly a decade after the inauguration of the program.⁹⁰ The first and very few such texts of its kind, Fey and McNickle state:

It is the operating method of Point 4 programs which has greatest significance for the administration of Indian affairs in this country. The Meriam survey report had made the emphatic plea that “the task of the Indian Service be recognized as primarily educational in the broadest sense of the word, and that it be made an

*efficient educational agency, devoting its main energies to the social and economic advancement of the Indians . . . This is exactly the operating philosophy of Point 4 programs, as described by William E. Warne, formerly Assistant Secretary of the Interior.*⁹¹

William E. Warne would later director of the Point 4 Program in Iran. In his 1956 book, *Mission for Peace: Point 4 in Iran*, Warne recounts the operation of the program in the country from 1952 to 1956. Fey and McNickle quote his book at length in order to describe the particular operating method and philosophy that early-twentieth century innovations in Indian administration share with the Point 4 Program:

*It would have a life of five years. The first year would be spent in preparation training Iranian technicians, locating sites and importing the required tools and equipment. During the second year the newly trained Iranian technicians would launch the field work and demonstration projects, working through the agency sponsoring the project. Activity would reach its peak in the third year. The American technicians, the Iranian technicians and all cooperators would then be putting every ounce of energy into the operation of the project. In the fourth year the American technicians would turn their responsibilities over to their Iranian counterparts. And in the fifth year the Iranians would conduct project activities with little or no assistance, except for occasional consultation or advice, from the American technicians.*⁹²

Fey and McNickle also recognize the parallels in the scope of Indian administration and the Point 4 Program. They state, for example, that the agreement with Iran “included assistance in health and sanitation, education and training, student assistance, industry, sugar importation, transportation, community housing, natural resources development, communications, land distribution, public administration, agrarian development, and land reform.”⁹³ Although some the 35 or so countries with science, technology, education, and capital transfer initiatives and paired administrative reforms under the Point 4 Program did not involve efforts to transform health and sanitation and education, effectively all of them involved the transformation of agricultural production, resource development, and industrial and other technical services. The parallels between early-twentieth century Indian Administration reforms and the Point 4 Program were far-reaching.

According to Fey and McNickle, the operating methods and philosophies of Indian administration and the Point 4 Program are not identical. They state, “there is a fundamental difference between the programs operated by the United States in [sic] behalf of the Indian people and the technical assistance programs commonly referred to as Point 4.” Specifically, the two argue that this difference concerns the degree of control reservation populations and peoples in the world’s underdeveloped areas have in the operation of agricultural and rural technical assistance efforts toward the “improvement and growth” of such areas:

The United States decides what programs should be initiated on an Indian reservation; it alone determines how much shall be expended, how long it will continue, and when it shall terminate. It employs the personnel, establishes the qualifications of those employed, and at all times is in full control of operations. If Indians are consulted at all, it is a formality, and their opinions can have no deciding effect, since a federal program need not have their approval and they are not required to pay any part of the cost . . . In contrast, a Point 4 Program is not undertaken unless the people of a country request it. Within the limits of its financial ability, the requesting country must share the cost in money, goods, or services. Management is jointly shared, with the requesting country having full authority to veto any items within a proposal; and operations are carried out through existing agencies and facilities of the requesting country.⁹⁴

Yet Fey and McNickle arguably understate the degree of control Native peoples had—or were intended to have—in the operation of programs geared toward “utiliz[ing] the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent.”⁹⁵ Toward this end, Meriam and the survey staff argued that the “real progress” has been made under the Office of Indian Affairs’ “Five-Year Agricultural Program.” Specifically, they state:

The Indians are organized on a community basis, into farm chapters with women's auxiliaries. The chapter meetings offer a substitute for less productive and more harmful gatherings. They bring the Indians together where the superintendent and his assistants can meet with them, discuss common problems, and arouse the enthusiasm of accomplishment. The Indians themselves participate in the discussions, and thus the seed is sown for the development of real Indian leadership.⁹⁶

“Indian leadership” within and among reservations, and toward the improvement of reservation economies, was thus considered a necessary goal of such programs—one that has offered moderate success thus far.

At the same time, Fey and McNickle arguably *overstate* the amount of control the Point 4 Program offered peoples from “underdeveloped areas.” Toward this end, Philip J. Deloria offers a fairer appraisal of the great similarities in the program while accounting for the power differentials Fey and McNickle attempted to approximate across both domestic and foreign contexts. As Deloria states, and as recalled above, the “relations between tribal governments and the federal government” recommended within the 1928 Meriam Report and established with the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act,

“ . . . can be seen to demonstrate how U.S. imperialism might work in the twentieth century and beyond: nominally independent governments, largely dependent on the United States, overseen by imperial agents, with a divided populace subject to new forms of exploitation of land and resources. No longer domination, conquest, and dispossession, per se, but now semiautonomy and

limited empowerment under the banners of “self-determination” and “freedom.”⁹⁷

Both contexts thus offered greater involvement and control yet only in service of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism, and at times only in name.

Despite the clear operational similarities in the programs that Fey and McNickle outline, and the similarities in the power differentials established and maintained across the programs, still unaddressed is how exactly the Point 4 Program and broader agricultural and rural development agenda came to mirror key elements of early-twentieth century Indian administration. In other words, what lessons were learned from U.S. domestic policy vis-à-vis Native peoples and how did these lessons ultimately help remake the subjects and sites of the Point 4 Program as a function of U.S. geopolitical power and transnational capital? As this chapter opened with, the confidence with which Truman announced this “bold new program” was met with a certain anxiety from the U.S. Department of State, policymakers, and other protagonists of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda. Truman himself stated in his inaugural address that the reason such benefits of U.S. “scientific advances and industrial progress” needed to be made available was because for the “half the people of the world [who] are living in conditions approaching misery,” “their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.” Yet Truman also asserts that “the old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans.” Rather, he states that “what we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.” What these elements of the Point 4 Program offer that the “Policy Statement Prepared by the Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems” does not offer is insight into another dimension of risk management beyond the unrest following from poverty and hunger: that the United States’ postwar strategy of achieving a “healthy international community” and containing unrest itself not be perceived as an imperial endeavor, particularly in “dependent areas.”⁹⁸ It is precisely these anxieties—and the ultimate anxiety that hunger- and poverty-induced unrest and revolt would be oriented around and against the racial and imperial dynamics of U.S. domestic and foreign governmentality in particular—that reveal how exactly the early-twentieth century reinterpretation of the problems of Indian administration, the rearticulation of Indian administration itself, and the reorientation of both around agricultural and rural development, served as the grounds upon which U.S. settler colonialism enacted itself as settler-imperial during the mid-twentieth century.

Outlining the function and mechanics of these anxieties in “transit of empire,” the first section traces how the conceptual framework of “underdevelopment” behind the Point 4 Program and other programs facilitated U.S. intervention toward the deflection of counternationalisms while inviting representations of such programs as explicitly “non-imperial.” In other words, “underdevelopment” accounted for both the concern over unrest and revolt following poverty and hunger, as well as the concern that such unrest and revolt would be oriented around and against the racial and colonial conditions of possibility of U.S. state power and transnational capital. The following section addresses the significance of this framework within dependent areas, which enunciate the broader difficulties U.S. policymakers faced regarding the

deployment of the Point 4 Program during an era of heightened suspicion of U.S. foreign policy and antiracist and anti-imperial movements. Yet in accounting for the operation of the Point 4 Program in dependent areas, the section argues that the particular lessons learned in "U.S. domestic policy" (i.e., early reforms in Indian administration) that informed the mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda involved not only the development of "a local program for separate reservations [and] a general program for the service as a whole, that will seek to utilize the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent."⁹⁹ These lessons also included new ways of viewing the disciplinary potential of capital and new cultural and political modes of Indianness that necessitated the application of this potential. In short, counteracting the supposed distance from capital through the nominal control of its flow was seen to counteract both hunger and poverty, and suspicion of U.S. state power and transnational capital, all while remaking people and places in the service of capital accumulation and the exercise of U.S. geopolitical power.

Section A.

Appearing Non-Imperial: Underdevelopment and Containment

During the mid-twentieth century, "underdevelopment" became a permanent feature of the landscape of U.S. geopolitical power and transnational capitalism. Not simply the first time President Truman used the word, but the first time the word was used altogether, the term forced the immeasurable diversity of the Global South into a single category, "underdeveloped," and toward a single goal, "development." In his inaugural address, Truman himself used the term to organize and understand half the world as such: "More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas."¹⁰⁰ Despite lumping them into one such category and trajectory, the economic logic behind "underdevelopment" left room for U.S. policymakers to differentiate among this half of the world's people. According to political theorist Timothy Mitchell, "the development of the economy as a discursive object between the 1930s and 1950s provided a new, everyday political language in which the nation-state could speak of itself and imagine its existence as something natural, spatially bounded, and subject to political management."¹⁰¹ Notions of the modern economy as a self-evident totality underwrote an emergent conception of the nation-state and its indispensable role in economic growth measured by such abstractions as "gross national product." This new perspective, consistent with the consolidation of "national history," provided a geo-spatial representation of global economic relations "in which the world was pictured in the form of separate nation-states, with each state marking the boundary of a distinct economy."¹⁰² Former United Nations Development Program administrator Majid Rahnema argues that with this epochal shift "entire nations . . . [came] to be considered (and consider themselves) as poor."¹⁰³ "Underdevelopment" was thus a broader terms that invited technical and economic assistance where applied, yet could still adequately account for the various degrees of economic development across all nations.

Underwritten by such economics logics, the geo-spatial representations of development and underdevelopment became an organizing principle for international affairs and U.S. containment efforts during the Cold War. Specifically, these terms became central to the U.S. policymakers' efforts to recognize and organizing the emergence and threat of unrest and revolt during the Cold War. President Truman's plan to extend U.S. foreign assistance through technical aid was directed toward what Truman referred to "underdeveloped areas," and whether underdeveloped or prosperous, "area" in this sense was synonymous with nation-state.¹⁰⁴ U.S. policymakers' anxieties of agrarian reform tied to national independence platforms earlier in the century— Russia, China, Guatemala, and Mexico—were thus enunciated during the early Cold War and organized around economic underdevelopment as an emergent category of poverty at the time. U.S. policymakers ascribed value based on a nation's proximity to the United States' "liberal social values, capitalist economic organizations, and democratic political structures."¹⁰⁵ Thus, for many U.S. policymakers after World War II, poverty, hunger, and the threats of unrest and revolt to follow therefrom, were increasingly ascribed to an identifiable collection of cultural deficiencies shaped in isolation from the capitalist marketplace. The need for a dynamic strategy of containment on a greater scale was clear—a strategy that would function as an exercise in the risk management of U.S. state power and capital accumulation globally, in both practice and perception.

The term "underdevelopment" itself was not conceptually incidental to the Cold War. Rather, as Alyosha Goldstein states, the "U.S. policymakers promoted a specific social, cultural, and political worldview in their efforts to stabilize and expand capitalist markets."¹⁰⁶ And such efforts to stabilize and expand capitalist markets necessitated fostering nationalisms *congruent* with U.S. state power and transnational capitalism. Yet this framework for U.S. intervention and the contours of such nationalisms were shaped by a distinct shift in the relationship between race and capitalism at the time. Howard Winant has described the postwar period as the time of a "racial break" — an era when overlapping, internationalized anticolonial and civil rights movements posed challenges to the limits of racial democracy of such global magnitude that they produced a permanent crisis in white supremacy.¹⁰⁷ The interjection of U.S. geopolitics into this shifting field of racial liberal formations and meanings was decisive. As Jodi Melamed argues, this process involved the suturing of an "official antiracism" to a U.S. nationalism itself bearing the agency of transnational capitalism. This suture produced a "racial liberal nationalism" that normed and restricted the field of race politics, such that antiracist discourse itself came both to deflect U.S. *counternationalisms* (especially, as Melamed states, in the context of early Cold War Americanism) and to limit awareness of the racial logics of exploitation and domination in transnational capitalism.¹⁰⁸ In this field of race politics, new categories of "privilege and stigma" determined by ideological, economic, and cultural criteria overlay older, conventional racial categories, so that traditionally recognized racial identities can now occupy both sides of the privilege/stigma opposition.¹⁰⁹

As part of a broader effort to show that the social relations of capitalist modernity offered *respite* from hunger and poverty, the geopolitics of "underdevelopment" and its ideological, economic, and cultural criteria arguably meshed perfectly with this transformation. U.S. policymakers recognized that the liberal social values, capitalist economic organizations, and

democratic political structures that they judged nations by—and according to which such nations were remade—could no longer be recognized as involving the “central features of white supremacist capitalist development,” including slavery, colonialism, incarceration regimes, and migrant exploitation, among others.¹¹⁰ The April 12, 1949 memorandum entitled, “Possible Questions and Suggested Answers Concerning the President’s Technical Assistance Proposal” belabors this point and the significance of agricultural and rural development in particular to such disavowals of the condition of possibility of U.S. state power and transnational capital. The questions addressed in the memorandum ranged from logistical clarifications to entirely political concerns: “Will this plan involve making large scale guarantees to private investment abroad?” “Which of the many underdeveloped areas of the world did the President mean?” “Would the program envisage technical assistance behind the Iron Curtain?” The memorandum’s prescribed response to these concerns echoed the criticisms President Truman tried to stave off in his inaugural address. The memorandum states, “the President . . . was stressing the point that this technical assistance program could in no sense be described as involving exploitation or imperialism.”¹¹¹ Throughout the archive of the Point 4 Program, the anxious need to stave off criticism of the program—particularly criticism that framed the program as imperial or governed by any other features of white supremacist capitalist development—was ever-present. As Truman himself stated during his inaugural address: “the old imperialism-exploitation for foreign profit-has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.”¹¹²

Section B.

Poverty, Capital, and Reservations and Dependent Areas

The core drive of the Point 4 Program globally was to make the benefits of the United States’ “scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas” and against the poverty and misery that characterizes underdevelopment as such. U.S. policymakers understood the work involved in this task as even greater and more urgent in dependent areas. The July 27, 1949 Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance report entitled, “Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas” belabors this point: “technical cooperation programs for dependent areas, whether multilateral or bilateral, must be consistent with the broad objectives of Point IV, which are the same for dependent areas and independent states; namely, cooperative development to raise the standards of living of the people.”¹¹³ Yet, the report states, “Dependent areas are, in most instances, the most underdeveloped parts of the world . . . Taking these territories as a whole their outstanding characteristic is that their economies are subsistence economies based on primitive agricultural methods.” Thus, in the context of this even greater distance between existing “primitive” methods of agricultural production and the “modern” methods fostered through the Point 4 Program and related efforts, the risk of unrest and revolt was even greater. By extension, the need for U.S. intervention in such areas was even greater. Critically, these most “underdeveloped parts of the world” necessitated U.S. intervention for two key reasons: First, because of poverty and hunger and the risk of unrest and revolt such conditions would foster—an objective that Truman and countless U.S. state officials made clear as they hoped to

aid such peoples and protect “more prosperous areas.” Second, given their “dependent” nature (i.e., their distinctly colonial circumstances), such areas also required U.S. intervention because they posed the risk of breeding agrarian movements—*cum*—counternationalisms that framed their grievances explicitly in relation to the exceedingly clear racial and colonial dynamics of U.S. state power and capital accumulation.

Prompted by ongoing and growing critiques of U.S. empire within dependent areas, and antiracist and anticolonial critiques between such areas and the United States during the mid-twentieth century, the need for U.S. intervention was monumental. Peasant organizing and resistance have long been central to anticolonial movements. For example, in the late 1840s, Javanese peasants abandoned the tobacco plantations that were a function of Dutch colonial rule.¹¹⁴ Mid-nineteenth century “coolie” resistance in the Assam tea industry in British India—a predominantly colonial enterprise controlled by white British planters—were key to broader anticolonial resistance.¹¹⁵ Early-twentieth century peasant resistance within Burma’s rice economy under British colonial rule played a similar role in broader anticolonial resistance.¹¹⁶ In the early years of the Cold War, the land reforms in China, Cuba, Mexico, North Vietnam, and India similarly characterized circumstances of endogenous social revolution organized around agrarian movements. In these cases, land reform was implemented along with more comprehensive agrarian reforms aiming to address longstanding inequalities regarding access to land and to reduce persistent rural poverty.¹¹⁷ Not U.S. dependent areas, per se, but still deeply imbricated within transnational circuits of U.S. state power (e.g., U.S.-backed governments) and transnational capitalism, these reforms emerge in respect to social pressures, revolutionary platforms, and national struggles for independence.

The Cuban revolution was one site where overlapping, internationalized anticolonial and civil rights movements interfaced around agrarian reform in ways that posed challenges to the United States and the limits of racial democracy. The U.S. military intervention of 1898 established the conditions for U.S. control of the Cuban political-economic system and entrenchment of the plantation economy. By 1920, U.S. corporations directly controlled 54 percent of sugar production 80 percent of sugar exportation.¹¹⁸ Following the Cuban revolutionary 26th of July Movement’s attack on the Moncada Barracks, in a speech entitled “History Will Absolve Me” given during his October 16, 1953 sentencing, Fidel Castro cited the conditions of foreign ownership, high levels of tenancy, poverty, and destitute housing. As an integral part of the platform against the U.S.-backed Batista dictatorship, Fidel proposed a number of concrete agrarian reform measures.¹¹⁹ This platform cohered existing alliances between Cubans and U.S. Blacks.¹²⁰ Lisa Brock argues that even before the 1959 revolution, Cubans and U.S. Blacks had forged working relationships: abolitionists jointly formed organizations, and leftists and trade unionists exchanged strategies. Afro-Cubans themselves—disproportionately restricted participation in civil and state institutions and disadvantaged in the increase in U.S. control of Cuban land—were central to creating the Cuban revolutionary stage between 1930-1959 in part through unions and “secret societies.” Additionally, journalists, novelists, musicians, poets, and athletes aroused mutual sensibilities, and shared many of the same cultural venues between both countries. When the Cuban revolution culminated in 1959, Brock argues that most U.S. Blacks applauded its success.¹²¹

The “dependent” status of U.S. territories opened additional room for the cultivation of decolonial counternationalisms explicitly poised against the growth of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism. Thus, U.S. anxieties around the risks posed by underdeveloped areas orbited the need to deflect or contain such counternationalisms. Returning to the “Policy Statement Prepared by the Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems,” the United States response to this concern with regard to underdeveloped nations, more broadly, was to show that “genuine land reform can be achieved through their own [and not Soviet or other] governmental processes.”¹²² In other words, U.S. policymakers tried to ensure that any national development efforts were in line with the United States foreign policy interests and goals by only supporting national movements that offered that. That such national development trajectories would not be influenced by Soviet or other non-U.S. agents was a plus. Within dependent areas, however, the contrast and incommensurability between competing nationalisms was more pronounced, and the opportunities to assert the narrative of nurturing a nation’s “own governmental processes” was more limited. Even further, the “dependent” status of such areas and the national movements that needed containing made Truman’s explicitly anti-imperial stance vis-à-vis the United States’ mid-century agricultural and rural development agenda nearly impossible to maintain. In other words, within dependent areas—and against the need to disavow such conditions of possibility for world-systems of profit and governance—the United States’ ostensibly disinterested provision of scientific, technological, and capital-intensive tools for national development could only appear imperial.

In this way, the anxious need to deploy the program while staving off criticism of exploitative and excessive involvement was critical for U.S. policymakers, particularly with regard to the program’s operation in dependent areas. Yet this problem facing U.S. policymakers—and defined this way—was not a new one. Rather, as the first part of the chapter outlined, it was one that was negotiated explicitly within the United States with regard to Indian administration earlier in the twentieth century. As stated, the “problem of Indian administration” in the early twentieth century was what Beth Piatote has described as the “paradoxical situation of both too much and too little care [that] emblemizes the case of Indians under federal paternalism.”¹²³ With such care, assistance, and relief newly defined around managing matters of wealth via agricultural and rural development, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act would seemingly resolve this paradoxical situation. By allowing tribes to craft their own governing structures (e.g. tribal councils and constitutions) yet making such structures subject to approval by the Secretary of the Interior and maintaining the supervisory presence of Indian Office employees on reservations, the IRA allowed the federal government to respond to both critiques of “over-administration” and calls for strengthening the federal government’s activities. This broader policy could adequately account for the various degrees of economic development across all reservations, thus containing any Native nationalisms threatening to U.S. settler capitalism.

Early-twentieth century innovations in Indian administration involved key imperatives later associated with the Point 4 Program and broader agricultural and rural development agenda: First, preempting unrest and revolt following from hunger and poverty, particularly in the wake of decades of allotment and assimilation policy. Second, preempting the orientation of such

unrest around and against the U.S. settler state itself. The resolution was the Indian Reorganization Act, which aimed to foster a Native market agrarianism, which itself necessitated and promoted a greater degree of self-government. As outlined above, the disciplining procedures of capitalism under the IRA remade Native peoples and place in service of U.S. capital accumulation and geopolitical power, ultimately facilitating greater agricultural and rural technical assistance and granting a nominal degree of self-government while removing, as Deloria argues, “the last safeguards for protecting Indian land, resources, and labor power from the new forces of the market.”¹²⁴ Thus, early-twentieth century innovations in Indian administration not only contributed to the repertoire of the U.S. differential modes of governance the recognized need for, as per the Meriam Report, “a local program for separate reservations [and] a general program for the service as a whole, that will seek to utilize the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent.”¹²⁵ These lessons also included new ways of viewing the disciplining potential of capital and new cultural and political modes of Indianness—hunger, poverty, and Native peoples’ “general economic conditions”—that necessitated the application of this potential.

It was the Cold War that established the terms through which “the poor” were constituted as a distinct and singular social group with a discernable culture to be studied, and wherein poverty was defined not as a consequence of capitalist market relations but rather a lack of attachment to the capitalist economy.¹²⁶ Yet, under the banner of “utiliz[ing] the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent,” the disciplining procedures of capitalism vis-à-vis Native peoples earlier in the century adhered to precisely this definition. Specifically, driven by this emerging belief that poverty is a consequence of a lack of attachment to the capitalist economy, the supposed distance from capital was addressed through new administrative structures that granted Native peoples nominal control of its flow. The supposed benefit of this was two-fold: not only did such control of the flow of capital ostensibly counteract hunger and poverty by fostering more effective, efficient, and profitable use of natural resources on the reservation. Under the banner of self-government, it also offered a way to counteract Native peoples’ suspicion of U.S. state power and transnational capital, all while remaking people and places in the service of capital accumulation and the exercise of U.S. geopolitical power.¹²⁷ The 1928 Meriam Report’s description of the source of Native peoples’ suspicion and ways in which U.S. government officials could counteract such suspicions belabor this doubly transformative capacity of capital. A key source of such suspicion is the unfair treatment and limited transparency such officials offer Native peoples in business affairs. The report states:

*A superintendent or any other local officer who has no faith in Indians and who cannot treat them with the respect and courtesy he would show a white man in ordinary business relations has lost a fundamental qualification for his work. A superintendent who has perhaps unwittingly permitted himself to be actively drawn into the social and business life of those elements of the white community which are believed by the Indians to be preying upon them may not in all cases merit dismissal, but he has gone a long way toward destroying his usefulness in that jurisdiction if not to the service as a whole.*¹²⁸

Thus, to offer anything but fair treatment and transparency would otherwise justify Native peoples' suspicions of the federal government and its agents. As such, the report continues, "in business affairs, if not in social affairs, the superintendent should keep himself above suspicion. Local officers must also behave in such a way, particularly given the recognition that "Indians like to understand what is done with their property and are capable of understanding . . . [and] it would be not only kind but polite to satisfy them with information in regard to their financial affairs." Critically, to not treat Native peoples' distinctly financial affairs accordingly would arouse and confirm such suspicions: "On reservations where the office is secretive or where the officers are merely arbitrary and do not take the trouble to explain business affairs to their clients, distrust, suspicion, antagonism, and lack of respect for the government and the white race all develop among the Indians."¹²⁹ Transparency, fairness, and the involvement of Native peoples in their own financial affairs and toward the betterment of their "general economic conditions" would preempt any sort of resistance to the federal government and its agents.¹³⁰

Toward simultaneously counteracting hunger and poverty, and allaying suspicion of the federal government, the financial affairs U.S. state officials needed to involve Native peoples in were those concerning Native peoples' landholdings and the potential for effective, efficient, and profitable use of natural resources on the reservation. "As pointed out in other portions of the staff report," Lewis Meriam and survey staff state, "Indian property can be used as a valuable means of educating the Indian to economic competency. Too often at present the government officers, in order to avoid the trouble and time spent in making the Indians cognizant of the methods and policies pursued in the management of their property, accept the undesirable alternative of keeping them in the dark concerning their own property. Such a practice furnishes a breeding ground for suspicions and indictments, which, though usually unfounded, are due in no small measure to the government's own short-sighted policy." Thus, grounded in the emerging belief that "poverty" was a consequence of a lack of attachment to the capitalist economy, the supposed distance from capital was counteracted through new administrative structures that granted Native peoples nominal involvement in and control of its flow. Such disciplining procedures of capitalism were best effectuated through the science, technology, and education transfer initiatives involved in agricultural and rural development, as well as the paired provision of self-government.

These early-twentieth century strategies to "utilize the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent," and the emergent belief in the source of poverty and disciplinary potential of capital, offered U.S. policymakers a way to both describe and resolve the central anxieties concerning dependent areas during the mid-twentieth century. Specifically, driven by the same belief that "poverty" is a consequence of a lack of attachment to the capitalist economy, the supposed distance from capital was addressed through new administrative structures that granted peoples within dependent areas nominal control of its flow. As with Native peoples earlier in the century, the supposed benefit of this concerning dependent areas was two-fold: First, such control of the flow of capital ostensibly counteract hunger and poverty by fostering more effective, efficient, and profitable use of natural resources within such areas. Second, under the banner of encouraging nominal involvement and control, it offered a way to counteract colonial peoples' suspicion of U.S. state power and transnational capital, all while

remaking such peoples and places in the service of capital accumulation and the exercise of U.S. geopolitical power. The July 1949 report from the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance entitled "Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas" clarifies such congruencies in the disciplinary potential of capital and the suspicions that greater proximity to and control of capital would ameliorate. According to the report:

Colonial peoples have a long heritage of suspicion of their respective metropolitan powers. Projects which owe their initiative to the United States will, to a degree, run up against the same psychological problem because the highly-respected political record of the United States in the Philippines has been to some extent cancelled out by increasing knowledge of the American color bar, by what appear to be genuine fears of American "big business", and by the suspicion, not confined to communist circles, that colonial territories are being increasingly viewed by the United States as sources of materials, bases, and manpower for a future war with Russia . . . If the Point 4 program is to serve the long-term foreign policy interests of the United States, it is important that this government do what it can to meet and overcome these suspicions.¹³¹

These conceptualizations of the anxieties at the core of the operation of the Point 4 Program in dependent areas attempt to redefine the relationship between race, capital, and state power. First, they police the epistemological boundaries of what counts as a race matter by attempting to divorce "knowledge of the American color bar" from the administration of "colonial territories." Specifically, the "highly-respected political record of the United States in the Philippines" gestures toward Philippine independence from the United States on July 4, 1946, and supposed efforts toward economic development, the peaceful transition to full independence, and the provision of a degree of autonomy before then.¹³² Thus, the authors of the report suggest that the United States' decades-long supposedly disinterested economic and political involvement in the Philippines did not merit the projection of troubled U.S. race relations (i.e., the "American color bar") onto this political record. The authors do so against the overwhelming evidence of the manifold ways that racial politics served U.S. empire in the Philippines, and how empire-building in turn transformed ideas of race and nation in both the United States and the Philippines.¹³³ Additionally, the report polices the epistemological boundaries of what counts as a race matter by attempting to divorce "genuine fears of American 'big business'" from the administration of "colonial territories." Specifically, the report states that this "highly-respected political record" of U.S. international presence is undermined by analogous concerns and fears of U.S. transnational capital and the exploitative extraction of resources from the United States' dependent areas in particular. Thus, the report states that fears of U.S. "big business," and not just fears of U.S. race relations, need be divorced from colonized peoples' perception of the United States' international presence. Ultimately these conceptualizations of the anxieties at the core of the operation of the Point 4 Program in dependent areas arguably attempt to mask the racial logics of transnational capitalism and bracket the global political economic critique of race and capitalism.¹³⁴

Although these conceptualizations of the anxieties at the core of the operation of the Point 4 Program in dependent areas appear characteristic of the post-war interjection of U.S. geopolitics into the shifting field of liberal racial formations and meanings, they mirror early-twentieth century developments in Indian administration. Specifically, the report expressed the belief that racism is primarily a problem of attitude or prejudice—a belief generally associated with postwar racial liberalism. Yet, as state above, the authors of the Meriam Report believed that “On reservations where the office is secretive or where the officers are merely arbitrary and do not take the trouble to explain business affairs to their clients, distrust, suspicion, antagonism, and lack of respect for the government and the white race all develop among the Indians.”¹³⁵ Non-secretive business affairs therefore supposedly preempt any distrust, suspicion, antagonism, and lack of respect for the U.S. government and the “white race.” Thus, a case built within the Meriam Report and Indian Reorganization Act twenty years prior, the particular reasons for the “attitude or prejudice” of colonial subjects, and their fear of and resistance to the U.S. ostensibly disinterested intervention in particular, was their inadequate exposure to and involvement in both the workings of “big business” and of political relations. Therefore, in much the same way, in order for U.S. policymakers “meet and overcome these suspicions” and preempt such seemingly ill-founded sentiments during the mid-twentieth century, they would need to encourage exposure to and involvement in the workings of capital and state power within colonial contexts. This would prevent seemingly irrelevant information from “cancell[ing] out” and undermining the United States’ “highly respected political record” within such contexts and the economic advancements and gradual self-government to follow therefrom.

Following this shared belief in the particular source of poverty and hunger, and the disciplining power of capitalism, the recommendations within July 1949 report from the Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance entitled “Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas” were nearly identical to those within the 1928 Meriam Report: offering greater involvement in state power and the flow of capital. According to the report, the goal would be clear: “In formulating Point IV programs and plans for the execution, the importance of the cooperation of colonial peoples should be recognized and all possible means of obtaining such cooperation should be explored.”¹³⁶ That is, a key strategy was the dispatching of U.S. racial and colonial subjects as “cultural ambassadors,” which would prove the supposedly unfraught nature of race relations within the United States on its peripheries. Such “cultural ambassadors” would not only be people from “American dependent territories” but also “qualified persons from American cultural minority groups.” The report states that these people “might serve with special usefulness in the fields of their competence in dependent areas when, in addition to technical qualifications equal to those of other candidates, they have special experience of the problems of simpler economies, knowledge of the language, or of the psychology or cultural patterns of the peoples to be assisted.”¹³⁷ The report goes into detail regarding which racial and colonial subjects could go where, with the goal of staving off such suspicion directed toward the growing program: “The use of qualified Puerto Ricans in the program thus might have an excellent psychological effect on other dependent peoples, as well on the Puerto Ricans themselves, and, by emphasizing the high level of Puerto Rican advancement and the readiness of the United States to use its own dependent peoples in positions of responsibility, would have

considerable public relations value for the United States."¹³⁸ The "public relations value" to be garnered from the involvement of Puerto Ricans, U.S. Blacks, and others, was clearly in the self-interest of U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors—agents of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism—given the circumstances at the time. That is, the "involvement" of such groups aimed to undermine "knowledge of the American color bar," preempt antiracist and anticolonial suspicion, and improve the efficiency in operations.¹³⁹

In conjunction with the strategy, the report states that attention should be given "to the possibility of associating representatives of colonial peoples [from the target country] as rapidly possible."¹⁴⁰ "While the problem of providing for colonial participation is admittedly a difficult one," the report states that "two possibilities should be explored"—both exceedingly reminiscent of early-twentieth century efforts to "utilize the economic resources of the Indians to the fullest extent."¹⁴¹ The first of these possibilities concerns involving colonial peoples in decision-making with regard to the program and governance more broadly:

Where legislative bodies exist in the territories, plans might be submitted by the metropolitan governments to these bodies. Of the 11 territories in Africa which are under the British Colonial Office, 4 (Nigeria, the Goal Coast, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia) either have or are about to obtain unofficially African majorities in their legislative councils. Even in territories where legislative councils are less representative, it would seem important, both to the United States and to the Metropolitan Powers, that the latter should use what means exist for allowing native peoples to consider technical projects affecting them. The possibility of local committees, on which colonials could be represented, to advise on certain types of local problems arising during the implementation of specific projects might also be explored.¹⁴²

The second of these possibilities concerns involving colonial peoples in the actual operation of the such technical assistance programs:

Exploring with metropolitan government the extent to which, with respect to plans in specific colonies, colonials may be used above the menial level in the execution of plans. While this can only be done with extremely narrow limits at present in most territories, it should be borne in mind that colonial territories vary significantly in the number of trained people available. The West Indian and West African colonies have a relatively large number of skilled persons . . . Whereas in the past the legal profession attracted the largest number of students, the trend today is more toward the fields of medicine, engineering, and agriculture.¹⁴³

With both possibilities grounded in the idea that greater proximity to and involvement in government and capital accumulation would improve the economic conditions across dependent areas and allay suspicions concerning the imperial nature of U.S. intervention, the report states: "It is highly important that colonials be given unambiguous evidence that there

exists a positive desire to use them to the limits of their capacity and to train them to take over increasingly responsible posts.”¹⁴⁴ The disciplining power of U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capitalism—effectuated through nominal self-government and control of capital, would remake “dependent” peoples and places in service of U.S. capital accumulation and U.S. geopolitical power, and against the development of counternationalisms that would potentially hinder both (i.e., counternationalisms). With the “Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas” and other such reports framing and responding to anxieties of unrest and revolt in this way, early-twentieth century innovations in Indian administration effectively enacted themselves as settler-imperial during the mid-twentieth century.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this chapter argued that the crisis of the reservation was a moment in which Indianness was rearticulated as an economically impoverished, techno-scientific-deficient, and improperly administered category of colonial difference—reconstituted in ways that pointed to the impoverishing, non-modern, and improperly administered reservation in particular as the site of reform. It argued that the modes of subjection, administration, and governance developed therefrom were central to the Point 4 Program’s attempt to effectuate the risk management of racial capitalism internationally during a period of great social and political upheaval globally. Toward this end, this chapter held on to the centrality of “containment” within the archive of the Point 4 Program—from Truman’s announcement of it to the manifold memorandums and briefs explicitly negotiating the colonial contexts within which the program operated—while recognizing that the “logic of containment” is constitutive of U.S. settler capitalism. At the core of both was the emergent belief that poverty is a consequence of a lack of attachment to the capitalist economy.

What early-twentieth Indian administration offered that the Point 4 Program later enacted globally was a new administrative structure and broader strategy of containment that required granting Native peoples nominal self-government and greater control of the flow of capital. Such descriptive and prescriptive elements of Indianness redefined in the early twentieth century were, as Jodi Byrd states, the “contagion through U.S. empire orders the place of peoples within its purview” using executive, legislative, juridical means.¹⁴⁵ This was most true within the United States’ “dependent areas” during the mid-twentieth century and by way of the Point 4 Program.

Chapter Two.

The Reservation as Crisis:

Termination, (Non)Containment, and the "Indian Point 4 Program"

During the mid-twentieth century—within twenty years of the Indian Reorganization Act and broader efforts to develop the economic base of reservations and foster a greater degree of Native self-government—the Blackfeet reservation had one of the highest average incomes of any reservation.¹ As Paul Rosier argues the Blackfeet attempted to balance the “cultural dictates of long-standing customs and the logic of American democracy and twentieth-century agricultural capitalism.” In doing so, Rosier continues, they created a “fluid political economic system and a protean demos and thus new considerations of ethnicity, class, and race, that altered traditional conceptions of Indian identity and tribal obligation.”² In other words, beginning with the establishment of the Blackfeet Nation’s Tribal Business Council in 1935 (and with their constitution and elected representative government coming shortly after), the Blackfeet Nation had more or less “succeeded” at the model of agricultural and rural development and self-government that U.S. policymakers had pushed from the early twentieth century onward. Toward this end, Rosier also recounts how, by 1952, the Blackfeet Nation had fulfilled its credit obligations to the government, assumed responsibility for welfare payments in conjunction with county agencies, reached an agreement with county agents to conduct soil conservation studies, and maintained a law and order program for dealing with Indian offenses.³ Unlike other Native peoples, the Blackfeet had “taken the opportunity to learn by doing,” thus proving itself fully capable with regard to each of the concerns and intentions behind the 1928 Meriam Report and 1934 Indian Reorganization Act.

The political and economic success of the Blackfeet Nation was visible everywhere its members were. A key site of the production of the subjects of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, the Future Farmers of America (FFA) was founded in 1928 and is now the largest of the career and technical student organizations in the United States. Although the FFA was founded as a vocational agriculture education organization for white male youth, and while the New Farmers of America was the organization’s counterpart for Black male youth until the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Native male youth were the only non-white group to be readily incorporated into the organization.⁴ Youth from the Blackfeet Nation were particularly adept at negotiating the demands of a capital-intensive Native market agrarianism, and they were recognized for such achievements. In the Fall 1953 issue of the *National Future Farmer*, the official magazine of the FFA, was an article on the Browning, Montana FFA chapter—an FFA chapter within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation—and their performance a Blackfeet tribal grass dance at the National FFA Silver Anniversary Convention that year.⁵ A year later, on the cover of the Fall 1954 issue of the *National Future Farmer*, appeared Floyd Middle Rider, sitting with his legs crossed in full regalia in front of “Going-to-the-Sun” mountain in Blackfeet Nation in Montana. Middle Rider was a member of the troupe that performed the Blackfeet tribal grass dance in 1953 and even earlier at the 1946 National FFA Convention.

On August 1, 1951, amidst such celebratory reflections on the success of the Blackfeet Nation, the U.S. Congress issued House Concurrent Resolution 108, which announced the federal government's official policy of "Termination." The resolution called for the immediate termination of the Flathead, Klamath, Menominee, Potawatomi, and Turtle Mountain Chippewa, among other Native peoples. By way of the combined effects of House Concurrent Resolution 108, Public Law 280, which turned over criminal enforcement to states, and the Indian Relocation Act of 1956, also known as Public Law 959 or the Adult Vocational Training Program, approximately 109 tribes were terminated and 2,500,000 acres of trust land were removed from protected status from 1953 to 1964. The Blackfeet Nation's success at a capital-intensive and techno-scientifically proficient Native market agrarianism did nothing to remove them from the crosshairs of federal Termination policy. Rather, the Blackfeet Nation's relative success cohered with one of the key justifications for Termination: reduce Native peoples' dependence on a bureaucracy whose mismanagement had long been documented, and eliminate the expense of providing services for Native peoples. As Rosier states, Blackfeet Nation members had embraced the idea of self-support, or "self-termination," for more than two decades, both out of confidence in themselves and out of recognition and fear that the federal government would otherwise ultimately make the decision unilaterally.⁶ Their success only hastened the process.

Further, despite the achievements of Blackfeet youth in the FFA, such success ultimately translated into failure as Native peoples themselves. The article that appeared in the *National Future Farmer* was entitled "The Last Dance" and was written by R.W. Harris, a non-Native FFA instructor. Harris recounted the chapter's "colorful pageant of the Buffalo Grass Dance . . . at Kansas City in October by the Blackfoot Indian boys," yet stated it might be "given for the last time." Harris' reasoning is clear here: "it is almost certain that there will never be another demonstration by the Browning, Montana, Chapter since most of the boys are cutting their braids and are growing away from the Tribal rituals and customs." Thus, despite the work Blackfeet tribal members have done to preserve their "tribal rituals and customs" alongside—and by way of—their mastery over the conditions and relations of "agricultural capitalism," it could only be a failure as Native peoples. "Cutting off their braids" altogether—a seemingly less violent and more agential take on boarding school rhetoric of "Kill the Indian, Save the Man"—suggests that Blackfeet entrepreneurialism supposedly implicated them in their own "demise" amidst the looming threat of Termination itself.

The case of the Blackfeet Nation and Blackfeet youth in the *Future Farmers of America* reveals a number of telling dynamics. First, the growing Termination sentiment at the time outweighed their success as a relatively self-governing and wealthy Native people and their success at a capital-intensive and techno-scientifically proficient Native market agrarianism in particular. Even further, such successes were not only outweighed by Terminationist drive. They also came to actively aid it, thus *undermining* tribal sovereignty itself. Put into perspective, therefore, the Blackfeet Nations' success at framework for U.S. settler colonial incorporation and containment under the 1928 Meriam Report and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act that followed it—and that collectively sought to preserve the self-governing tribal unit (albeit nominally) in order to aid the particular strategy for improving economic conditions on reservations—came to

contribute to the erosion of tribal sovereignty itself by the mid-twentieth century. Furthermore, that the Future Farmers of America's existence began domestically in 1928, and that its international operations in agricultural and rural technical assistance and outreach began shortly after then, highlights that the paired framework for national development and agricultural and rural development that Blackfeet excelled at was not unknown to the organization. Altogether, therefore, the case of the Blackfeet Nation in and outside of the FFA during the mid-twentieth century suggests that the rationale for and model of Native market agrarianism that operated in service of U.S. geopolitical power and transnational capitalism was itself *repurposed*. That is, it was moved away from self-government and toward the dissolution of Native polities.

From the Reservation in Crisis to the Reservation as Crisis

The case of the Blackfeet Nation's simultaneous success and failure, and the Blackfeet youth "cutting off their braids," lay the ground for this chapter. Specifically, this chapter seeks to trace how the logics, rationales, and practices behind the Point 4 Program—as a program born of the drive to improve reservation economies through technical proficiency in agricultural production and paired modes of self-government yet afforded added weight in the context of the Cold War and "era of decolonization"—came to exist within the United States itself. In other words, this chapter seeks to trace how the mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda came to function as a mode of U.S. settler colonial incorporation and transnational capitalism congruent with major shifts in federal Indian law and policy (i.e., Termination and Relocation). At the same time, this chapter considers how the paradigmatic Indianness developed in the 1920s and 1930s had operated within Native peoples' mid-twentieth century liberatory struggles in ways that moved between the racial and national identities, threat and contagion, and internal and external imaginings upon which U.S. colonialist discourses transit.⁷ In short, this chapter asks: As the early-twentieth century strategy of "containment" itself became untenable by the mid-twentieth century, how was the strategy repurposed Native and non-Native peoples in ways that supported and undermined Native peoples' struggles for sovereignty?

Thus far, this dissertation has developed a genealogy of the Green Revolution by tracing how the U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors facilitated certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the need for agricultural and rural development domestically and globally between the early and mid-twentieth century. It has done so by attending to the question posed by such actors of what would happen should such capital-intensive techno-scientific "solutions" to the problems of hunger, poverty, and discontent not be proffered. This chapter continues to attend to such questions while accounting for how, as part of impending Termination policy, the reservation itself became understood as an altogether untenable socio-spatial formation—one that ostensibly hindered any resolution to such stated problems.

This perceived risk of maintaining an administrative structure that undermined efforts to improve the general economic conditions of Native peoples—particularly through capital-

intensive and techno-scientific modes of agricultural production—eventually cohered with longstanding beliefs in the reservation an “un-American” space prone to exploitation by “disruptive forces.” Representative E.Y. Berry, a South Dakota Republican and a vocal Terminationist, used anticommunist rhetoric in attacking the Indian Reorganization Act, claiming that it “Communizes the Indian Reservation just as completely and just as fairly and just as ungodly as Communist Russia can hope to do.” Senator George Malone, Republican of Nevada, broadened the scope of that charge, complaining that the United States was “spending billions of dollars fighting communism” while it was “perpetuating the systems of Indian reservations and tribal governments, which are natural Socialistic environments.”⁸ Still hinging upon concern over the “general economic conditions” of Native peoples developed at the time of the Indian Reorganization Act, U.S. policymakers’ fight against the reservation as a hotbed for unrest and revolt (“communistic” or otherwise) took on the paradigmatic disinterested note—one characteristic of postwar U.S. liberal democracy . During this time, the conditions of abject poverty morphed into concerns over “confinement,” with the view that reservations were “concentration camps” from which Native peoples must be “liberated.”⁹ At the same time, such conditions were still viewed as providing a hotbed for communist activity. For example, according to Paul C. Rosier, “In its Navajo series the Los Angeles times report that Senator Harlan J. Bushfield, a South Dakota Republican, had claimed “he had reports [that] Communists are trying to win over Indians on South Dakota Reservations.”¹⁰

This chapter ultimately traces how, against this backdrop of anxiety and unrest—grounded not only in the troubled economies of the reservation but now more so in the supposedly troubling nature of existence of the reservation itself—the Point 4 Program and paired land reform policy operated as a flexible path for U.S. settler colonial incorporation. The first part of this chapter focuses on the periphery of the U.S. settler state and its territorial ambitions. Specifically, it identifies how, in Alaska, Hawai’i, and elsewhere, the Point 4 Program still had the capacity to offer Native peoples self-government yet such possibilities were foreclosed as part of the move toward statehood (i.e., further settler incorporation). The second part argues for the significance of attempts by Native advocacy organizations to call upon, within the *contiguous* United States, this component of the Point 4 Program. Yet such organizations did so toward the maintenance of Native peoples’ self-government during the beginning of the Termination and Relocation era—a time when U.S. policymakers felt the crisis of the reservation was great enough that it necessitated the dissolution of the reservation altogether (i.e., “containment” as such became untenable). It does so by close reading the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the Association of American Indian Affairs (AAIA) and their push for an “Indian Point 4 Program” in the 1950s. The third and final part of this chapter reads this push for an Indian Point 4 Program—and U.S. state officials’ resistance to it—against the 1953 Future Farmers of America film, “Farmer of Tomorrow,” and other cultural production of the FFA. As this chapter opened up with, the FFA and other groups at the time, themselves rerouted the language of U.S. agricultural and rural development domestically again yet toward the rejection of Native peoples’ claim to the land, self-government, and historical legitimacy.

PART 1.

Risk Management on the Edge of the U.S. Settler State

Alaska was a Russian colony from 1744 until the U.S. government bought it in 1867 for \$7.2 million. Hawai'i was a sovereign constitutional monarchy until 1893, when the last Queen, Lili'uokalani, was deposed by a group of sugar planters and missionaries from the United States, with the military backing of the U.S. government. A sharp turn away from decades of non-self-governing and dependent status, Alaska and Hawai'i were admitted as the 49th and 50th states of the Union, respectively. This first part of the chapter argues that the particular expression of the logic of containment that was cultivated in the early twentieth century within the United States not only operated as a function of settler colonial incorporation by way of the international U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda during the mid-twentieth century. It also operated as a function of settler colonial incorporation when strategically applied to the non-self-governing territories on the periphery of the U.S. settler state—principally, Alaska and Hawai'i. In other words, such constructions of Indianness and the reservation as the site of reform were routed through U.S. foreign policy by way of the Point 4 Program. However, they “came back” to serve the mid-twentieth century territorial ambitions of the U.S. settler state and U.S. settler capitalism (i.e., statehood, in the case of Alaska and Hawai'i).

Section A.

On the Edge of Termination

During the mid-twentieth century period of Termination and Relocation, Native peoples and their territories, Mishuana Goeman states, were “administered as somewhere in between the domesticated and the foreign.” Goeman clarifies, however, that this ambivalence was only in the political language manipulated to usurp Native peoples’ resources. Ultimately, Goeman argues, “Native bodies and land were considered potential sites of absorption into the nation mobilized through the ideologies of the melting pot and Lockean equations of private property as the foreground for freedom and equality.”¹¹ Practically, Termination and Relocation were accomplished through the use of three main tools: The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) relocation program, actual termination of some tribes, and the extension of state jurisdiction into Indian country through Public Law 280. The use of these tools extended in one way or another to a number of reservations across the contiguous United States. While Alaska and Hawai'i were also within the purview of the mid-twentieth century territorial ambitions of the U.S. settler state, the strategies for incorporation differed greatly from those that Native peoples within the contiguous United States experienced.

At the core of the use of different strategies toward incorporation was the fact that Termination and Relocation law and policy did not extend to these not-yet-incorporated territories. With regard to Alaska, for example, against the 1936 “Alaska Indian Reorganization Act,” which made Section 5 of the IRA applicable to the territory of Alaska, the three measures of Termination and Relocation found little footing.¹² First, relocating people from reservations and Alaska Native villages into the big U.S. cities for training and employment became a general

trend after World War II. Indian Commissioner Glen Emmons started the BIA Relocation Program in 1948. By 1953 placements had reached 2,600, and they peaked in 1957 with some 7,000. By 1960 a total of 33,466 Native peoples had been relocated. House Concurrent Resolution 108 (HCR 108) called for ending the special federal relationship with tribes and terminating their status as tribes as rapidly as possible, and which fomented the termination of over 100 tribes and removal of over a million acres of land from trust status. Yet the resolution did not have a notable impact on tribes in Alaska largely because Alaska was not a state until 1959 and by then Termination and Relocation policy were on the wane. Finally, Public Law 280 (P.L. 280), which was passed by Congress in 1953 and which extended state criminal and some civil jurisdiction onto reservations in many states, only came to be applied to Alaska upon statehood in 1959 (with the exception of the Metlakatla Indian Reservation).¹³

Native peoples within the United States held an ambiguous place between “the domesticated and the foreign”—grounds for the questions of governance addressed by the 1928 Meriam Report and 1934 Indian Reorganization Act operated. Yet the non-self-governing status of Alaska and Hawai’i meant that questions of “the foreign” and U.S. foreign policy questions of governance concerning the two territories even more pressing. As such, perhaps more relevant to the territories of Alaska and Hawai’i than Termination and Relocation policy was the Point 4 Program and paired foreign policy vis-à-vis land reform. As addressed in the previous chapter, the “Policy Statement Prepared by the Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems” compelled U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors to offer “practical assistance to desirable land reforms in addition to its economic and technical assistance programs.”¹⁴ As with the Point 4 Program, the primary objective outlined in the policy statement was to “improve agricultural economic institutions in order to lessen the cause of agrarian unrest and political instability.” The policy statement then offers a way to achieve this objective: “improving the position of the farmer on the land to the end that he may have greater security of tenure, an incentive to increase production and conserve resources (including the utilization of technological advances suitable to each economy), and an equitable share of the output.”¹⁵ Thus far, the Policy Statement appears as relevant in Alaska and Hawai’i as it does within the contiguous United States.

Alongside such attention to agricultural economic institutions of the “foreign areas” of interest, the second objective engages the question of governance, and self-government, more broadly. Specifically, it states that the secondary objective of U.S. “Policy Regarding Land Reform in Foreign Areas” was to disengage “land reform” from the “complex of social ideas exploited by Soviet Communism, by making clear to the various peoples and governments of the world that genuine land reform can be achieved through their own governmental processes.”¹⁶ The “complex of social ideas exploited by Soviet Communism” that the report points to are precisely those that follow from the poverty and hunger that the set of policies aim to counteract, and thus the “agrarian unrest and political stability” and risk to U.S. settler capitalism that the policies aim to undermine. Put another way, the risk, as U.S. policymakers saw it in the mid-twentieth century in Alaska and Hawai’i, was that which was identified elsewhere: famine and unrest amidst growing population concerns across Central and South America, Africa, and much of Asia within a number of colonies and post-colonies. The

difference in Alaska and Hawai'i was that the two territories were within the purview of the territorial ambitions of the U.S. settler state. Thus, the "own governmental processes" that the Point 4 Program and land reform policy sought to cultivate were not necessarily, nor strictly, the postcolonial self-governing polities suggested elsewhere (nor a government of Soviet doing). Rather, the language of "own governmental processes" left room for U.S. settler colonial appropriation. Thus, the Point 4 Program and related policies functioned as strategies for the risk management of U.S. racial capitalism and, specifically, U.S. settler capitalism—manifest as statehood in the case of Alaska and Hawai'i.

Section B.

Statehood and Incorporation as Risk Management

Although the Point 4 Program guided the provision of agricultural and rural technical assistance and self-government globally, Alaska Natives and Native Hawaiians, and their lands, were also regarded as potential objects and sites of absorption into the nation. Specifically, the political language of the Point 4 Program in particular, and paired foreign policy vis-à-vis land reform policy, were similarly "manipulated" vis-à-vis Alaska and Hawai'i and toward similar ends—the territorial ambitions of the U.S. settler state and the incorporation of both territories into the nation itself. How did the set of Green Revolution or U.S. agricultural and rural development policies reshaping the world hold the capacity to work toward dissolution within the U.S. settler state and not guarantee self-government, as appeared to be the case elsewhere? Again, tracing the risk management of racial capitalism offers a way to see how the existing political language of the Point 4 Program itself could be manipulated in order to remake people and places as things in the service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of U.S. geopolitical power—here, Alaskan and Hawai'ian statehood.

The Hawai'ian Admission Act (P.L. 86–3, 73 Stat. 4, enacted March 18, 1959), enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, dissolved the Territory of Hawai'i and established the State of Hawai'i.¹⁷ Although the vote showed approval rates of at least 93 percent by voters on all major islands, during the 1950s, debates over Hawai'ian statehood reached a fever pitch. Among those that resisted were Southern members of Congress who were wary of the election of John A. Burns from the Hawai'ian Democratic party as delegate of the Territory of Hawai'i to Congress. The coalition for the Democratic Party that Burns helped craft included the Communist Party, 442nd Regimental Combat Team veterans, International Longshore and Warehouse Union, other organized labor groups, and Japanese-Americans. Although he was ultimately credited with strengthening the party, Southern leaders charged that Burns' election was evidence of Hawai'i as a haven for communism while they and others also resisted Burns and others' push for statehood because of the national racial and ethnic demographic shift that admitting a largely non-white territory would cause.¹⁸

Yet more telling than the anti-communist and white national preservationist fears behind Hawai'ian statehood is Burns' and others' own rationale for statehood. In short, Burns framed self-government as a problem of an elite few holding power at the expense of, and much to the displeasure of, the majority of the population. Echoing Truman's inaugural address and announcement of the Point 4 Program, Burns sought to do away with the "old imperialism" that described Hawai'i's circumstances. To not incorporate the territory into the U.S. settler state—either by maintaining its territory status or by making moves toward national independence—was a recipe for unrest and revolt. Grounding this anti-imperial (but ultimately settler colonial) message in Hawai'ian history, Burns stated in a 1959 article entitled, "Statehood and Hawai'i's People":

The [1893] overthrow of the monarchy was a decidedly unpopular event, and so as the report of Presidential Commissioner Blount, who investigated the "revolution," clearly showed- was the proposed annexation to the United States. The small group which overthrew the monarchy was distrusted by the people at least as much as it in turn distrusted them. The people's opposition to annexation was not at all a sign of antagonism to the United States, for which, on the contrary, they had deep affection and respect but rather a sign of antagonism to the ruling group in Hawai'i. The form of government, which this group provisionally set up was much more rigidly centralized than that of the previous constitutional monarchy. The mass of the people were prevented from voting, and power remained in the hands of a very few, the propertied class . . . Still, the territorial form of government itself was decidedly centralized and constricting, especially in its executive structure. The Territorial Governor, appointed by the President of the United States, himself controlled by appointment the entire administrative machinery, exercised a two-thirds veto power over the elected legislature, and had such powers on the whole that he would have been considered un- usually strong even if he had been an elected Governor. And there was no local government of any kind.¹⁹

Thus, existing expressions of the logic of containment—namely, self-government —was not a tenable option for this territory on the edge of the U.S. settler state and within the line of sight of its territorial ambitions. Toward incorporation into the U.S. settler state, Burns essentially argued that self-government would have been in line with the longer imperial history of the United States toward the islands—a relationship that U.S. state officials sought to distance themselves from. In other words, even independence and self-government would have been an issue, supposedly maintaining the centralized wealth and power that came to define both the Hawai'ian monarchy and U.S. involvement.

Statehood would thus seemingly offer decentralization and greater representation, drastically reducing resentment and the risk of unrest and revolt. Burns makes these points clear in his

description of the “motives for statehood” in the same article, yet, critically, he does not altogether abandon “self-government”:

Clearly the issue in the events I have described is between a deep antipathy toward popular government on the one hand and the pressure of the people on the other. I have described statehood as the resolution of this issue, as a victory of the people, because the same principles and desires were at work in the movement toward statehood as in, for one instance, the movement for county government. The desire was for a free, open system as against a closed one whose control came from the top—for democracy, in other words, as against hegemony rule. Only statehood would bring full self-government and confer upon Hawai'i's citizens full, responsible participation in the life of their country. It is interesting that, while the first statehood bill introduced by a Hawai'ian Delegate to Congress came in 1919, the Territorial legislature as early as 1903 had petitioned the Congress to pass an enabling act permitting Hawai'i to adopt a constitution. The initiative clearly came from the people through their elected representatives.²⁰

Apparent here is Burns' repurposing of the meaning of self-government altogether. Specifically, “self-government” to Burns no longer means the tribal constitutions and other measures for which the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act was known, and that the Point 4 Program stated was necessary to reap the full benefits of an agricultural and rural modernization program. Rather, in a strange twist, incorporation is itself rendered an avenue toward “self-government” by way of the representative nature of U.S. liberal democracy.

By World War II, the territory of Hawai'i was still in many ways a colonial plantation society, where a tiny white elite controlled vast estates of sugar cane, pineapples, and coffee on which a quarter of the mostly nonwhite population lived.²¹ Yet despite the leaders of the plantation economy exerting substantial political influence in territorial Hawai'i through the Republican Party, Burns' and the Democratic Party's push for statehood—rather than “self-government” or the continuation of Hawai'i's territory status—had overwhelmingly received their backing.²² Driven by a similar anxiety as that which was outlined by Burns yet rooted in the specifics of relations of agricultural production, they understood that a nominally self-governing plantation economy would have been politically, socially, and financially disastrous. In other words, the seemingly disinterested strategy of risk management that Jones' espoused was more firmly grounded in the politics of the territory's plantation economy and concern of further diminished “home rule.” Prior to 1935, the “Big Five” leaders of the plantation economy—Castle & Cooke, Ltd., Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd., C. Brewer and Company, Ltd., Theo H. Davies & Company, Ltd., and American Factors, Ltd.—had shown “little interest” in statehood. Nearly all commentators, both critics and official company histories, agree that the Big Five were not unhappy with territorial rule, given their ability to influence the appointment of the territorial

governor and their ability to gain reasonable treatment of the sugar industry in the U. S. Congress.²³

The greater degree of democratic representation that would come with full home rule and an elected governor might complicate their established level of control, yet the primary impetus for support for statehood was financial. In 1934, Congress passed the Jones-Costigan Sugar Act, which established quotas for the entry of Hawai'ian sugar into the United States and effectively treated the Hawai'ian product as foreign sugar. With this Act, the "Big Five" and other leaders of the territory's plantation economy immediately changed their position on statehood. According to John S. Whitehead, "discriminatory treatment by Congress, which could not take place if Hawai'i became a state, was much more feared than any increased level of home rule." Even as early as 1935, Charles Hemenway, vice-president of Alexander & Baldwin and chairman of the Board of Regents of the University of Hawai'i, spoke in favor of statehood and that "a great many others in the sugar industry" with their acceptance of the prospect of statehood due largely to the Jones-Costigan Act.²⁴ Ultimately, such negotiations of Hawai'i's entrance into statehood—particularly concerning the former territory's plantation economy and anxieties of unrest and revolt stemming it—reveals much about the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, broadly, and the Point 4 Program in particular. Specifically, such negotiations reveal how the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda and the Point 4 Program left a great deal of room for settler colonial appropriation despite the centrality of administrative reforms-*cum*-self-government. The founding logics of the Point 4 Program were thoroughly settler colonial and, as such, the program itself was ultimately responsive to conditions that threatened the U.S. settler state and U.S. settler capitalism at the time. Whether the Point 4 Program or the broader mission of agricultural and rural development against poverty, hunger, and unrest was resisted or embraced, the outcome would have been the same: incorporation into formations of U.S. colonial and racial capitalism.

PART 2.

Managing the Risk of Termination

In Hawai'i, the goal of lessening the risk of agrarian unrest and increasing political stability was achieved by settler colonial incorporation of the territories (i.e., statehood). Critically, the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda was operationalized toward such ends, despite the narrative of social autonomy and self-government that defined the agenda, in part. At the same time as Hawai'i's incorporation, Guam, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, and elsewhere—without the same national interest in granting them statehood, and without large agricultural economies to "repair"—all retained their status as territories of the United States (and their strategic importance as such). Yet Alaska, which was also without a large agricultural economy, was granted statehood. Despite the "troubling" nature of each of their agricultural economies and modes of production, the Point 4 Program, and paired efforts to transform local forms of governance, administration, and subjection, retained the ability to operate toward imperial *and*

settler colonial ends (be they wholly assimilationist or tending toward self-government and national sovereignty).

This chapter turns now to U.S. policymakers' negotiation of the Point 4 Program within the *contiguous* United States, where the looming threat and enactment of Termination and Relocation policy was most real. It does so in order to elucidate how exactly the Point 4 Program—at its height globally—may or may not have cohered with the dramatic shift in federal Indian law and policy domestically at the time. In other words, how the technology of U.S. settler-imperialism born of one era of U.S. settler colonial administration, governance, and subjection could become *repurposed* during another era of U.S. settler colonial administration, governance, and subjection. This chapter also turns to Native peoples' mid-twentieth century resistances to Termination and Relocation. It does so in order to elucidate the utility of Native and non-Native deployments of the paradigmatic Indianness articulated in the 1920s and 1930s yet now during Termination and Relocation when this existing strategy of “containment” was no longer tenable. Simply put, how was the strategy repurposed in ways that supported and undermined Native peoples' struggles for sovereignty? How did Termination and anti-Termination efforts strategically deploy Point 4 Program rhetoric in ways that pulled from racial and national identities, threat and contagion, and internal and external imaginings upon which U.S. colonialist discourses have transited?

The following sections outline, first, the new approach by the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), the Association of American Indian Affairs (AAIA), and other Native and non-Native organizations for advocating for Native peoples amidst Termination and Relocation: an “Indian Point 4 Program.” It attends to how the NCAI and AAIA made the case against Termination and Relocation by invoking the present and *past* of the Point 4 Program—going beyond the 1920s and 1930s all the way to the founding of the U.S. settler state itself. The second section attends to how—against the proposal for an “Indian Point 4 Program”—the Point 4 Program was regarded by U.S. state officials as irrelevant to U.S.-Indian affairs, at the time of Termination and Relocation and even prior to then. Statements by Olin Hatfield Chilson, Assistant Secretary of U.S. Department of the Interior from 1956 to 1957, and Undersecretary of Interior from 1957 to 1958, frame the denial of the Indian Point 4 Program in ways ultimately retract the capacity for Native peoples to govern themselves, claim land, and secure historical legibility.

Section A.

Reframing “Accountability”: An “Indian Point 4 Program,” Past and Present

In 1951, D'Arcy McNickle, a Salish intellectual and chairman of the Indian Tribal Relations Committee of the pan-tribal alliance known as the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) proposed a ten-point plan targeting Native peoples' poverty. Modeled on Truman's foreign technical assistance program, the Point 4 Program, the plan emphasized the role of self-help and increased federal appropriations for Indian reservations.²⁵ In 1953, McNickle authored a report that developed this theme entitled, “Proposed Elements to be Included in a Point Four

Program for American Indians.” McNickle stated in this proposal: “Surely the United States, which would like to see undeveloped and under-developed areas of the World brought into more fruitful functioning, is capable of achieving the development of its own native population.”²⁶ Thus, in building the case for such a program, McNickle asserted the parallel between conditions facing Native nations domestically and foreign nations by using the language and rationale developed by U.S. state officials and corporate and philanthropic actors themselves that originated vis-à-vis the former yet spanned both—namely, troubled economic conditions as the provisional catalyst for U.S. intervention.

During its annual convention the following year in Omaha, Nebraska, the NCAI put forth another proposal based on McNickle’s earlier plan.²⁷ The proposal was submitted to the U.S. Congress as the “Point IX Program” (one point of McNickle’s list of ten having been resolved during the intervening years), again deliberately invoking U.S. technical assistance abroad as an alternative to forced termination. Beyond simply the angle of self-help and increased federal appropriations for reservations that McNickle pushed for earlier, the text of the proposal asserted Native peoples’ autonomy against the threat of Termination and Relocation while stipulating specific rights with regard to U.S. society originating from the historical conditions of colonization:

*This program shall be offered to the American Indian communities without exacting termination of the federal protection of Indian property or of any other Indian rights as its price; that Indian culture and identity shall not be restricted or destroyed; that technical guidance and financial assistance shall be made available; that the request for assistance shall come from the Indians themselves after each Indian group has studied itself in terms of its own needs.*²⁸

The proposals put forth increasingly accounted for, and replicated the language of, self-government as a central provision of the Point 4 Program’s technical assistance operations internationally as well as the “rights” guaranteed to Native peoples as a fact of their colonization.²⁹

Members of the NCAI as well as members of the Association on American Indian Affairs—a New York-based organization consisting primarily of non-Native academics, patricians, and retired government bureaucrats engaged in the politics of federal Indian policy during the 1950s and early 1960s—recognized the power of drawing such parallels. This power was both logistical and sentimental, particularly for people who otherwise had no comprehension of the difficulties facing Native peoples and the reservation itself.³⁰ An “American Indian Point 4” program, LaVerne Madigan of the AAIA asserted, “was a phrase which commanded the attention and understanding of the public.” It suggested “a new, dynamic approach to Indians, already tested overseas.”³¹ In building this case, Madigan was unafraid to state where exactly this approach was tested, recognizing that U.S. policymakers’ focus on technical support and the expansion of industry and market relations was combined with an emphasis on national self-determination in order to attract the participation of newly decolonized states.³² Specifically, Madigan labeled tribal communities “America’s colonies.” Like many “Third World”

nations, Madigan argued that Native peoples had “their self-government restricted,” that they took directives from a “distant bureaucracy over which they had little control,” and that they languished under the “paternalistic limitations upon their home rule.”³³ The parallels drawn—not ignorant to the racial and colonial power differentials within which the Point 4 Program was imbricated—could possibly afford Native peoples some degree of continued self-government, however nominal, against the threat of termination.³⁴

Altogether, cooperation among the AAIA, the NCAI, and other organizations, crystallized into Senate Concurrent Resolution 3, introduced by Senator James E. Murray of Montana in January 1957.³⁵ Entitled “An American Indian Point IV Program,” this resolution proposed the repeal of House Concurrent Resolution 108, denounced assimilation, and called for the reduction of the BIA’s role to one of providing only technical and financial assistance, leaving the remainder of responsibilities vis-à-vis Native peoples to be managed by Native peoples themselves.³⁶ Yet the connections Madigan and others drew to the Dependent Areas of the world did not end with the contemporary operation of the Point 4 Program. Specifically, such efforts to reframe accountability of the U.S. settler state to Native peoples and to assert the political claims and economic demands of Native peoples—in the present, amidst Termination and Relocation—extended to the origins of the U.S. settler state itself. The NCAI, AAIA, and others pushed not simply for an “Indian Point 4 program.” Rather, they argued that the United States had, from the outset, the same responsibilities to Native peoples as those that were laid out by the operation of the Point 4 Program globally and in Dependent Areas in particular. In other words, the United States—its origins, its method of development and expansion, its belief systems, its relationship to Native peoples—was the *original* Point 4 Program. AAIA General Counsel Felix Cohen, in his 1953 essay entitled, “First Americans First,” asked “How can we expect to aid backward people abroad and avoid ill feeling when our original Point 4 Program—for the American Indian—is still foundering after 162 years of operation?”³⁷ This date refers to the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, thus operationalizing the watchwords of liberty, freedom, civilization—seemingly foundational principles of the U.S. liberal democracy—toward the provision of technical assistance vis-à-vis agricultural production to, perhaps more critically, the provision of self-government. Despite its limits, this seemed like one of the better strategies available.³⁸

Ultimately, Cohen elaborated on the relationship between Native peoples and the Point 4 Program beyond simply rendering the “help” given abroad as misplaced. Rather, the denial of the political and economic claims of Native peoples via termination goes against the supposed obligations of the U.S. settler states to Native peoples foundationally. Yet Cohen and others were distinctly aware of settler colonial logics, rationales, and practices from which the Point 4 Program, as an innovation in U.S. imperial governance, took cue. Specifically, Cohen himself was one of the key architects of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act alongside Indian Commissioner John Collier, and was thus familiar with the rationale for and practices of managing matters of Native peoples’ wealth on reservations via rural modernization and self-government developed at the time. He went on to author the foundational Handbook of Federal Indian Law in 1941, a text that refuted the notion of wardship by painstakingly detailing the inherent rights possessed by tribes. As reflected in still another essay, “Colonialism: U.S.

Style,” published in 1951 Cohen questioned the capacity of the BIA to change or to act as anything other than a “benevolent dictatorship.”³⁹ Yet instead of pointing to this early twentieth U.S. settler colonial history of the mid-twentieth century Point 4 Program, Cohen, Madigan, McNickle, and others work primarily with the language of the Point 4 Program itself. They projected it backwards beyond this early-twentieth century moment onto the founding of the U.S. settler state itself. In doing so, they recognized that the Point 4 Program, and the international U.S.-led agricultural and rural development agenda, offered Native peoples something that Terminationists tried to take away.⁴⁰

Section B.

Evading “Accountability”: A New Indianness Without Self-Government

Despite such cooperation between the NCAI, AAIA, and others, their efforts yielded only a partial victory.⁴¹ When Congress recessed in January 1958, the resolution died. This surge of activism, however, influenced the Eisenhower administration’s decision to ultimately retreat from immediate termination.⁴² Although the proposal for an Indian Point 4 Program fell dead, Put another way, accounts of U.S. state officials’ rejection of an Indian Point 4 Program shed light on how exactly the language its key language—of “improv[ing] agricultural economic institutions in order to lessen the cause of agrarian unrest and political instability,” and “making clear to the various peoples and governments of the world that genuine land reform can be achieved through their own governmental processes”—was reoriented away from self-government and toward Termination. Particularly instructive here are Undersecretary of the Interior Otis Hatfield Chilson’s 1957 statements explaining his objection to the legislation. Chilson stated:

*We think that the application of the Point 4 concept to the Indian program would be unfortunate in two respects: first, because it implies that the government has not been providing similar services for the Indian people; and second, because it tends to restrict the present Indian program to the type of technical and economic assistance provided to foreign governments, which is much more limited than the presently authorized program for Indians.*⁴³

Both reasons that Chilson gives operate in ways that deny Native peoples’ nationhood. With regard to his first point Chilson is effectively arguing that the government has indeed been providing “similar services” for Native peoples as those peoples living in and outside of the “underdeveloped” areas of the world—both colonial territories and independent states. Yet this statement might only make sense if Chilson were to believe that the Point 4 Program is confined to technical assistance and has little or nothing to do with “improv[ing] agricultural economic institutions” and, more broadly, cultivating forms of governance that would allow the benefits of such assistance to be maximized. In doing so, the “own governmental processes” through which the reform of the agricultural economies can be achieved becomes a moot point. That is to say, Native peoples’ self-government is altogether denied as the relationship

reasserted is simply one of technical assistance within a relationship between a nation (the U.S. settler state) and its people (Native peoples).

With regard to Chilson's second point, the ends are the same. Chilson states that the Point 4 Program and the "type of technical and economic assistance provided to foreign governments" is a "more limited" program than that which is "presently authorized" for Native peoples. As the previous chapter outlined, this was far from the truth, for the Point 4 Program offered "assistance" in land distribution, public administration, agrarian development, and land reform, student assistance, and education and training, as well as health and sanitation, industry, transportation, community housing, natural resources development, and communications. Yet even if Chilson were to account for these, he would be ignoring altogether the fact that even the more comprehensive program that is "presently authorized" for Native peoples is one that—by way of House Concurrent Resolution 108 four years prior, as well as Public Law 280—had declared the United States goal "to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States." That is, the "presently authorized" system that ostensibly offers *more* than the Point 4 Program was one completely void of the ongoing provision of self-government and the provide for the reservation itself (regardless of how flawed such political and spatial frameworks vis-à-vis Indianness were).

The invented epistemological machinery and the legitimating logics of U.S. settler colonialism and imperialism retracted Native peoples' capacity for claiming land, governing themselves, and securing historical legibility by pointing to the present and past of U.S.-Indian relations—just as the proposal by the NCAI, AAIA, and others had. By altogether ignoring the Point 4 Program's roots in federal Indian law and policy, while suggesting that the Point 4 Program was a subset of said law and policy, Chilson skirts the question of the Point 4 Program's origins and the claim by NCAI, AAIA, and others that the obligation the U.S. settler state holds to Native peoples to provide such services is one central to the nation's founding. Against efforts to use it toward the preservation of Native peoples' self-government and the reservation itself, the Point 4 Program had effectively been operationalized in ways that took foreclosed any recognition of the legitimacy of Native socio-spatialities, past and present.

The Point 4 Program could thus be understood and deployed in ways that buttressed settler relationality, past and present. Yet this was not limited to the United States. For example, in May 1952, shortly after the start of construction of the Israeli settler of Kfar Truman—named after President Harry S. Truman, in honor of his expedient recognition of Israel—the President spoke to a dinner reception with members of the Jewish National Fund, and Israeli and U.S. governments. "The people of the Truman village are very fortunate," Truman stated, "in having the Jewish National fund behind them. Through that fund you have been working on the 'Point 4' idea for 50 years."⁴⁴ Here, Truman is referring to the creation of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) at the 5th Zionist Congress in Basel: "You have been buying land in Israel, reclaiming it, irrigating it, and planting trees on it. That was the farsighted way to build a new nation—start with the land itself." Conceived of by Dr. H. Schapira, the JNF was dedicated to purchasing and reclaiming land in order to create a Jewish national homeland. The land was bought and leased

to settlers for a period of forty-nine years. Thus, through metaphors akin to the “original” Point 4 Program articulated by the NCAI, AAIA, and others, the invented epistemological machinery and the legitimating logics of U.S. colonialism could confer and retract the capacity for Native peoples and other indigenous peoples to govern themselves, claim land, and secure historical legibility.

Ultimately, against such efforts to dissolve the reservation itself and terminate tribal status, the National Congress of American Indians, the Association of American Indian Affairs, and other Native and non-Native organizations took a new approach to advocating for Native peoples. They drew upon early-twentieth century advances in the development of a techno-scientific Native market agrarianism—and, critically, the new weight afforded to such advances by way of the mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda—and pushed for an “Indian Point 4 Program” in order to preserve the reservation, however imperfect. Yet, in the contiguous United States, the Point 4 Program offered Native peoples and their counternationalisms none of the flexibility that it offered U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors on the peripheries of the U.S. settler state (i.e., Alaska, Hawai’i, Guam, and other U.S. territories). Specifically, as “Terminationists” in Congress and elsewhere increasingly made the case that the existence of the reservation and strategy containment itself was altogether untenable—as it undermined U.S. national cohesion and risked communist infiltration—they forced the Point 4 Program to follow suit. In other words, although its origins were on reservations within the United States, the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda—a seeming panacea for colonial unrest that moved colonized peoples toward a techno-scientifically advanced and capital-intensive market agrarianism, and toward a nominal degree of self-government—found little expression domestically.

PART 3.

The “Seeds of Democracy” and the Settler-Imperial Subjects of the Point 4 Program

The NCAI and AAIA proposals as well as the justification for why they were rejected thus reveal much about the flexibility the program afforded U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic vis-à-vis the particular form of colonial incorporation experienced by the peripheries of the U.S. settler state (i.e., Alaska, Hawai’i, Guam, and other U.S. territories), Native peoples within the contiguous United States, and peoples seemingly outside the sphere of influence of U.S. empire. First, the language of the Point 4 Program, the NCAI and AAIA’s proposals for an Indian Point 4 Program, and the rejection of such a program again point to the U.S. settler state’s continual invocation of “security” and “risk management.” Such invocations of were a key process through which racial classifications and colonial divisions of humanity organized by the logics of the reservation emerged and travelled in ways that could remake people and places in the service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power. That is not to say that the seemingly disinterested narrative of tackling hunger and poverty stemming from outdated and “traditional” modes of agricultural production played no role in the negotiation of the domestic life of the Point 4 Program. This narrative is what first enticed NCAI and AAIA

members to deploy their particular strategy. Rather, it is to account for how the entire context of, and buildup to, Termination and Relocation was shaped by such anxieties.

Second, the language of the Point 4 Program, the NCAI and AAIA's proposals for an Indian Point 4 Program, and the rejection of the program point to the importance of narrative culture to the production of U.S. state power settler colonial and settler-imperial attitudes, references, and experiences.⁴⁵ Both the NCAI and AAIA's proposal and Congress's rejection of it point to the power of narrative in defining and negotiating the "obligation" the U.S. government has had to Native peoples. Yet their strategy of asserting such obligations or lack thereof—invoking metaphors of the founding of the United States, Israel, and elsewhere, as an "original" Point 4 Program of sorts—gestures toward Raymond Williams' formulation of "tradition," or what Williams calls the "significant past." According to Williams, the intentionally selective transmission of the knowledge, history, and culture of only certain groups or classes from the larger universe of possible knowledge, history, and culture is central to the process of social and cultural definition and identification. Critically, the projection of such as "tradition" does not simply provide historical and cultural ratification of the social order, this "hegemonic" culture. It is a vital element of it. Further, "tradition" is itself a key site of incorporation *and* contestation and negotiation, vulnerable as "tradition" is to the production of alternative "traditions" or counter-hegemonies.⁴⁶ Thus, the narratives told about the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, particularly in relation to broader national narratives including those concerning the nation's founding, carried a great deal of weight at a particularly charged time with regard to postwar formations of U.S. colonialism and the racial regimes that encode and reproduced them.

Given these lessons, the final part of this chapter joins this mid-twentieth century bureaucratic, policy, and legal archive of the Point 4 Program and Termination and Relocation with a second archive: the organizational materials and cultural production of a key vocational agriculture education organization, the Future Farmers of America (FFA), founded in 1928 and now the largest of the career and technical student organizations in the United States as well as the Future Indian Farmers of America (FIFA), its counterpart for Native youth from 1937 until 1942. An archive of the production of U.S. settler-imperial subjects vis-à-vis agricultural technical assistance, these organizations follow from a longer genealogy of pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes, and settlement schools, that were founded in contexts of slavery and its afterlife, U.S. settler colonialism, and U.S. imperialism. Further, these organizations were imbricated within the early twentieth century processes of state reconfiguration, capitalist accumulation, concentration of power and disenfranchisement, large-scale philanthropy, and national government systems for agricultural investment and innovation. And through their international tours, goodwill missions, and educational exchanges, they were also part and parcel of the Green Revolution's projection and circulation of such dynamics globally during the mid-twentieth century. Thus, born of the risk management of racial capitalism and U.S. state power, and as agents themselves of such risk management, these archives offer an apt site to interrogate how Indianness and the logics of the reservation travelled.

The organizational materials and cultural production that constitute these archives are central to the last part of this chapter because they narrate how FFA and other vocational agriculture education youth, instructors, and administrators made sense of their own activities, histories, and purpose for themselves and for wider audiences. Such narratives are not only visible within, but also structure, their ceremonies and competitions, their international activities and promotional materials, and their administrative structures. Even further, such narratives rest upon ideas of tradition, thus pointing to students', instructors', and administrators' strategic use of the past in order to make sense of their present work. Tracing how FFA and FFA youth, instructors, and administrators interpreted and narrated their own activities, histories, and purpose—including the training of Native youth in particular—offers a way to unpack the Point 4 Program's flexibility as a mid-twentieth century technology of U.S. settler-imperialism and transnational capitalism. Specifically, the Point 4 Program was rearticulated away from the paired provision of Native peoples' self-government and agricultural and rural technical assistance, and toward the altogether dissolution of Native peoplehood itself. These archives offer a way to trace how this transformation was sedimented, contested, and negotiated in narrative, memory, and subject and identity formation.

Section A.

Tradition and "The Seeds of Democracy"

The Future Farmers of America's mission of cultivating youth leadership across the rural United States through agricultural education reflected the longstanding values, rationales, and performances required to occupy land and political rights within the United States.⁴⁷ The FFA emblem—consisting an ear of corn, the rising sun, the plow, the eagle, and the owl—crystallizes these values, rationales and performances. While the rising sun signifies "progress and holds a promise that tomorrow will bring a new day," the plow signifies the vehicle of progress itself, "labor and tillage of the soil, the backbone of agriculture and the historic foundation of our country's strength," and the eagle, a "reminder of our freedom and ability to explore new horizons for the future of agriculture." Finally, the owl represents where exactly the FFA inserts itself into this trajectory of national development, symbolizing as it does "the knowledge required to be successful in the industry of agriculture." These watchwords of progress, labor, freedom, and liberty, all orbiting the "industry of agriculture"—were the materials of national tradition and the FFA's tradition. Students repeat as part of the FFA creed: "I believe that rural America can and will hold true to the best traditions in our national life, and that I can exert an influence in my home and community which will stand solid for my part in that inspiring task."⁴⁸ National traditions are to be "held true" by the U.S. countryside and, by extension, FFA students, teachers, and administrators.

The traditions "held true" by Future Farmers of America youth, instructors, and administrators were not all timeless practices. Despite the organization's preoccupation with the longstanding values, rationales, performances of the U.S. countryside, the FFA also had a global presence that situated it squarely within the growing U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda beginning in the early twentieth century. Shortly after it was organized in 1928, FFA youth,

instructors, and administrators began traveling overseas to officially promote the FFA model of agricultural education and training. The National FFA Archives contains hundreds of letters from local government officials, educational professionals, and community organizations from around the world requesting information about the FFA—each letter receiving mostly enthusiastic response from FFA administrators and instructors.⁴⁹

By the early 1950s, there were already FFA “counterparts” in Japan, Brazil, Colombia, Korea, Mexico, Panama, Philippines, Thailand, and elsewhere. They took root where organizations and programs— such as the Rockefeller Foundation, church and religious groups, U.S. agencies such as the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, and eventually the Point 4 Program under the Technical Cooperation Administration—had already begun to offer food assistance, agricultural tools, educational exchange programs, technical training, and financing. These vocational agriculture education and youth development organizations were modeled after the FFA in their goals, structure, and aesthetic (under such names, for example, as the “Future Farmers of the Philippines”). Further, they were foundation for the appropriate reception of such disinterested agricultural and economic contributions by U.S. state, corporate, philanthropic, and others. By 1955, international student exchange programs had begun between the FFA and these counterparts. By the late 1950s, the annual domestic National FFA Officers' Good-Will Tour—which was established in 1948 in order to “promote a better understanding between agriculture, business and industry, farm organizations and the public”—was extended internationally. Over the next two decades, as part of knowledge-sharing efforts with non-U.S.-based FFA counterparts and budding national vocational agriculture education programs across the world, the FFA sent student delegates on national and regional tours within the Middle East and North Africa, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Western Europe, and Central and South America. The W. Paul Gray Pacific Tour, 1959, the Joe Martinez “South America Tour,” 1968-1969, the Dave Dietz “Far East Tour,” 1970, and the Lennie Gamage “Pacific Tour,” 1973—each of these tours reached flashpoint Cold War locations, at times at their height (e.g., the “Pacific Tour” reached Vietnam during the war itself).⁵⁰

Still rooted in the longer genealogy of pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes, and settlement schools, that were founded in contexts of slavery and its afterlife, U.S. settler colonialism, and U.S. imperialism, the FFA in particular was undeniably a product of its time. While U.S. policymakers as well as the NCAI and AAIA projected the Point 4 Program onto the founding of the United States itself, so too did Future Farmers of America youth, instructors, and administrators project the dynamic and global circumstances of which they were a part onto their own history and traditions, and, by extension, the supposed history and traditions of the United States itself. Further, just as the risk management of U.S. settler capitalism through the provision of agricultural technical assistance was the channel through which early-twentieth century settler colonial logics, practices, and rationales migrated globally, so too did the risk management of U.S. settler capitalism facilitate the inward projection of the Point 4 Program and broader U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda of which the FFA was part. The full-page letter entitled “Seeds of Democracy” written by the editor in the Summer 1953 issue of *The National Future Farmer* belabors this point:

From the early seeds of democracy planted in the thirteen colonies has come a nation unequalled in industrial and agricultural production a nation great in spiritual as well as material resources.

But every farmer knows that you can't plant seeds one year and then sit back and watch them grow for the rest of your life. You have to keep sowing seed year after year.

So it has been with America. Through the years other Americans have continued planting new seeds of democracy to make our country what it is today. But two World Wars and Korea have shown that it isn't enough to foster the growth of democracy just at home. More and more folks are realizing we need to sow the seeds of democracy all around the world.

Future Farmers, individually and by chapters, are joining in this effort. Through organizations such as the Christian Rural Overseas Program (CROP), they are sending crops and livestock to places in foreign lands where the need is great. They are building friendship by proving their eagerness to be friends.⁵¹

The democratic pattern of the Future Farmers of America is serving as a model for similar organizations in other countries . . .

Knowing that understanding of folks in other parts of the world goes a long way toward promoting peace among nations, the FFA joins in exchange programs with other lands . . .

Without a doubt, America's agricultural leaders of tomorrow are today spread the FFA ideals and purposes to the far corners of the earth. They are sowing the seeds of democratic thinking and living—for a better world for all of us.⁵²

What this document suggests is that the FFA's international efforts and postwar political consciousness came to be rendered as part and parcel of U.S. democratic values and thus *timeless* traditions that FFA youth ostensibly held true to. Critically, these supposedly timeless national traditions of international agricultural and rural technical assistance and outreach were framed by the preemption of violent conflict. As the author states, "two World Wars and Korea" offered reminders to U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors, as well as organizations such as the FFA, that their work was not complete until it was global in reach. It also offered reminders to such organization that by doing so they would be living up to the demands of "democratic thinking and living" that have defined the United States from its earliest days. In this way, the risk management of additional conflict born of poverty and hunger offered a way to understand the values supposedly at the core of the nation, and the opportunity for organizations such as the FFA to embody such timeless values. Planting the "seeds of democracy" and rooting out the source of unrest and geopolitical conflict toward a "better world for all" thus referred to the increasingly expansive work of the FFA globally as well as the supposed origins of the United States itself.

Taken together, the risk management of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism (i.e., racial capitalism) provided a clear channel for mid-twentieth century technologies of U.S. empire—from the agricultural and rural development agenda, broadly, to the Point 4 Program

in particular—to be projected onto the origins of the United States itself. By extension, this narrative of their international work as timeless traditions of the United States, guided the beliefs FFA youth, teachers, and administrators held about themselves and the organization’s purpose, origins, and significance, more broadly. Following from this archive, the next section outlines how the rearticulation of the Point 4 Program—away from the paired provision of Native peoples’ self-government and agricultural and rural technical assistance, and toward the altogether dissolution of Native peoplehood itself—was sedimented, contested, and negotiated in narrative, memory, and subject and identity formation. In relation to metaphors akin to the “original” Point 4 Program articulated by the NCAI, AAIA, and others, the invented epistemological machinery and the legitimating logics of U.S. settler colonialism and imperialism ultimately retracted the ability for Native peoples to govern themselves, claim land, and secure historical legibility (i.e., Termination). The Future Farmers of America, which educated white and Native male youth within the United States and cultivated an analogous model for male youth from “underdeveloped” nations globally, aided in this retraction through similar projections onto the United States’ origins as well as the FFA’s origins. The following section turns to the 1952 script for a film entitled “Living to Serve”—the last part of the FFA motto, “Learning to Do, Doing to Learn, Earning to Live, Living to Serve”—which pronounces this shift in the logics, practices, and rationales of the Point 4 Program in ways that cohere with the shift toward Termination and Relocation. Produced by General Motors, renamed “Farmer of Tomorrow,” and shown during the 1953 FFA National Convention (the FFA’s 25th anniversary) and nationally over the next decade, the weight of the film was felt by many.

Section B.

Risk Management in the Production of U.S. Settler Colonial Tradition

In 1952, H. N. Hansucker, West Virginia state supervisor of vocational agriculture, sent to Dr. A.W. Tenney, the national advisor of the FFA, a script for a film by the title of “Living to Serve”—the last part of the Future Farmers of America’s (FFA) motto, “Learning to Do, Doing to Learn, Earning to Live, Living to Serve.”⁵³ With the script was a note by Hansucker, stating it was “a wonderful story” and that “it should make a grand picture!” The script was written by Charles W. Cromer of the Chicago-Based production firm, Stanley Neal Productions, Inc., which specialized in “training, public relations, sales training, consumers sales films,” and which the FFA film would fit well into. The script (and a year later, the film) was created in collaboration with the Future Farmers of America and the U.S. Office of Education. By 1953, the film was renamed “Farmer of Tomorrow” and was produced by General Motors. It was directed by Victor Solow who also produced and directed a number of well-known films during the 1950s and 1960s and it included an original score reminiscent of “songs of American folklore,” as per the script.⁵⁴ The film premiered at the 1953 FFA national convention in Kansas City, the 25th anniversary of the FFA, and it received much praise from FFA students, instructors, and administrators. As an educational and inspirational cultural production of the FFA, the film was made available by the organization and the U.S. Office of Education for additional showings. Over the next decade, the film was shown across the country, with stories of the film told in local newspapers, from the Poughkeepsie Journal on February 16, 1955 to the Idaho State

Journal on July 9, 1961.⁵⁵ Among the FFA's films that have long provided a venue for the organization's members and administrators to document and share the possibilities, activities, and accomplishments of the FFA with one another and with the general public, this film in particular was seen by many.

The story ultimately resonated with FFA youth, instructors, and administrators because it was based on the circumstances of a member of the FFA. According to an article entitled, "Farmer of Tomorrow" in the 1953 issue of the *National Future Farmer*, "If the hero of the new Future Farmers of America movie, *Farmer of Tomorrow*, gives the audience the impression of complete sincerity and truth, it is because the star's role in the film is almost an exact counterpart to his own personal experience on a farm near Gettysburg, PA."⁵⁶ The article recounts 17-year old Mike Wertz' story, which is the basis of the story of the film's protagonist, Walt Peabody (simply named "Bill" in the script). As in the movie,

Mike's father told him he was going to sell the farm when Mike was only a Freshman and just getting into the FFA. Mike, however, asked if he could take over the 106 acres. His father not only granted permission, but added that if the farm was operated successfully, he would give it to Mike when he was a Junior. Today, Mike has 14 dairy cows, 1,200 chickens, and raises corn, oats, wheat, hay and other crops so successfully that he plans to rent an additional 60 acres.

In telling Mike's story as a story beginning in the earliest days of the United States, the script moves between a number of scenes: from the "small colonial village c. 1780" to the "little red school c. 1850" to the "farmhouse c. 1900" to the "classroom c. 1923-28" to the "modern vo-ag classroom" and eventually "state FFA meeting," with a number of other scenes in between.⁵⁷ According to the *National Future Farmer* article, "Gettysburg was chosen as the locale for the movie not for its historic background but rather for its overall scenic qualities and appearance as a representative cross-section of many American farms. In the area farmers raise dairy and beef cattle, swine, a great variety of crops and fruit."⁵⁸ Not only reflective of Peabody's life in particular, but also of rural U.S. life more broadly, Gettysburg would supposedly get the story across like no other site would.

"Farmer of Tomorrow" did indeed hold the potential to be a particularly "grand picture," for as these scenes point to, it had a historical scope not limited to the experience of "Walt Peabody" taking over his father's farm. Like no other film produced by the FFA, the first third of the film took its viewers through what the authors and advocates for the film considered 150 years of FFA history prior to the organizations' 1928 founding. According to the script, the FFA's roots were in the early years of the United States itself, represented by an iconic and particularly dramatic frontier scene, which the Gettysburg setting offered access to. The script begins by fading into a nighttime countryside. Two horsemen, later identified as a uniformed peace officer and a circuit-riding minister, are at full gallop—here and there in silhouette against the dark blue sky, through heavily wooded country, leaping fallen trees. They pull up to the village green of a small town in remote Virginia, "circa 1780." They rein in quickly to avoid running down the bent figure of an old man. To their demands to see Lem Dobie, the old man replies:

“Lem don’t have no truck with Peace Officers—new Preachers, neither!” Yet after threatening him, the old man, panting, says “Lem... uh... Lem Dobie’s up atop Tarkey Bluff. He’s up thar a-killin’ a witch! And the likes o’ you hain’t a-gonna stop a witch-master like Lem Dobie, neither!”⁵⁹ As the peace officer and circuit riding minister pull up to the hilltop, they see Lem, a shabby farmer lit by the flickering light of a large fire. Declaring his motives for the witch-hunt—failing crops and dairy production—Lem states, “Witches gotta be kilt! Nawthin’ hain’t a-growed in weeks... cows never give no milk in ten days.” As the woman screams and protests, Lem continues: “Load th’ gun with a silver bullet—gotta be silver... *plumb through the heart!*” Within moments, the peace officer and minister two dismount their horses, rush to Lem, and take him by the arm. “Witchcraft... black superstition—false teachings born of ignorance and festered by the remoteness of frontier,” the narrator states, as the scene begins to draw to a close, “these comprised the basic education of many young farmers in Colonial Times, and in the early days of our Republic.” The threat of poverty and hunger born of “false teachings” and the “basic education of many young farmers” was successfully vanquished—detained by the state and excised from the community of which he was part.

As the frontier scene dissolves away, the narrator makes clear the broader and distinctly national significance of the scene that just unfolded: “The New Government, aided by Circuit Riding Ministers of the Gospel, worked hard to break the power of self-appointed witch-masters... while in Virginia, General Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and other leaders in conference on the colonnaded terrace of a Virginia mansion pondered the problem of providing [agricultural] education for young people who were to grow up as citizens of the United States.”⁶⁰ The fabric connecting the site of debate in Virginia to the violent scene in the colonial village on the periphery of the emerging Republic was the issue of and need for an adequate education for farmers. The scene that just unfolded illustrated not simply the broader and distinctly national significance of agricultural education. In this scene, the supposed history of agricultural education within the incipient nation was also the supposed history of the nation itself, from its earliest days onward—an act of projection achieved by the supposed risk of not providing adequate education for farmers. In this way, the script recounts in more dramatic fashion and, in further detail, the first planting of the “seeds of democracy” that made “our country what it is today”—later recognizable in narratives such as those that appeared in *The National Future Farmer*. By pointing to “two World Wars and Korea,” the narrative in the *National Future Farmer* highlighted how the risk management of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism (i.e., racial capitalism) provided a clear channel for mid-twentieth century technologies of U.S. empire to be projected onto the origins of the United States itself. So too is the projection of mid-twentieth century conditions, concerns, and terms onto the origins of the United States itself achieved in the film via risk management in this frightening colonial situation.⁶¹

This act of projection onto the “significant past” sparked by Lem Dobie continued with the 150 years between this opening colonial scene and the year of the founding of the Future Farmers of America itself. These 150 years were retold in a way ultimately mirrored the dominant narrative of agricultural and rural modernization put forth by members of the Populist and Progressive movements of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries—particularly

those that strongly supported scientific methods as applied to agriculture and industry, the economy and finance, government (including federal Indian law and policy), medicine, and schooling and education. As Charles Postel states, these movements “sought to improve their domestic economy and their national government. They sought renewal in local schoolhouses and federal credit systems. They sought to refashion associated ties with neighbors and commercial relations with the world. They sought new techniques, new acreage, and new avenues of spiritual expression.”⁶² Indeed, this was a key part of the broader social and political terrain upon which the 1928 Meriam Report was carried out and innovations in U.S. administration, governance, and subjection of Native peoples established. This was also a key part of the broader social and political terrain upon which pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes, and settlement schools became state-funded national endeavors—with organizations such as the Future Farmers of America following from major legislative pushes for agricultural education and research, beginning with the 1887 Hatch Act and ending with the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act.⁶³

The FFA story cohered most with the explanations and consequences of rural poverty such advocates for national reform put forth at the time—namely, that the farmers’ supposed “late entry” into the “modern business world” explain slow “rural growth” and rural poverty and hunger itself.⁶⁴ Following the FFA script’s declaration of the problem of agricultural education that plagued George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and “other leaders of the period” (one defined by crises such as the one sparked by Lem Dobie) the narrator states:

*The Founding Fathers, like most citizens of the era, were men of the soil. They knew the problems, were aware of the uncertainties, and they appreciate the vital importance of agriculture, its place as a key industry in the economy of any nation.*⁶⁵

The “leader” of the group—neither Washington nor Jefferson, according to the script, but rather a spot supposedly held for whoever would recognize the need for “modern” relations of agricultural production—poetically declares that the “business of farming is the arch of industries under which all time must pass.” Thus, unmistakable was the projection of early-twentieth century explanations of discrepancies in political and economic power across various industries and segments of society—particularly with regard to the difficulties facing the “business of farming”—onto the earliest moments of the Republic.

“Farmer of Tomorrow” used this supposed problem facing the “business of farming”—and the clear consequences of inaction *a la* Lem Dobie—to narrate the build-up to the Future Farmers of America and the national institutionalization of vocational agricultural education, more broadly. Following the opening scene with Lem Dobie, the script moved between iconic sites that reflected the advancement of, and education into, the “business of farming.” From the earliest years of the Republic on the colonnaded terrace of the Virginia mansion, to the iconic “little red schoolhouse” in 1830, to the vocational agriculture school building in 1917, to the first national FFA convention in Kansas City in 1928—each offered a clear stepping stone from the originary colonial encounter until the FFA’s founding.⁶⁶ Additionally, this narration of the

FFA's history was crafted in a way that necessitated the interventions of the organization and its predecessors and maintained that their existence can always only be a disinterested one.⁶⁷ Thus, "Farmer of Tomorrow" was indeed a "grand picture," as Hansucker and others stated, because from Washington, Jefferson, and other "leaders of the nation" to U.S. domestic and efforts toward the development of industrial agriculture oriented to the global market, everything led to this moment and the FFA's ability to create "a better world for all of us."

The story told that led up to the formation of the Future Farmers of America itself was thus one that contained many inconsistencies and inaccuracies. Yet such inconsistencies and inaccuracies did little to hamper the power of the narrative itself. For example, although Thomas Jefferson's history of planting, ownership of 135 slaves and 11,000 acres of land, were part and parcel of the creation of the formative wealth of U.S. settler capitalism, and its joint "biocapitalist innovation" and "necrocapitalist prerogative," as Nikhil Pal Singh has described, the "yeoman" agrarian social theory Jefferson espoused was ultimately unfit for the reality of commercial capitalism.⁶⁸ Yet Jefferson—known more for his "yeoman" agrarian social theory than his investment in secular and scientific education—still appears as a central figure in such narratives. Again, the specter of threat is central to production of this "grand picture," operating in the elision of such inconsistencies. Specifically, as Postel states, the inconsistencies and inaccuracies of such invocations of Jefferson are elided by the "protean nature of the [Anglo-]American watchwords of [individual] liberty" and the political utility of trope of the "immanent threat to freedom" that has remained a constant of U.S. political life. It is this trope that has undergirded the recurring appearance of this seemingly outmoded social theory in political debate since the early Republic.⁶⁹

Concerns of unrest and revolt, and the threat they posed to the promises of liberty and freedom, guided the joint U.S. Office of Education and Future Farmers of America film's questions around the need for agricultural and rural modernization. Critically, the defense of such promises through "order and progress" itself involves and aids the disciplining procedures of race and capitalism. As Singh states, race is indispensable to the "active management of spatiotemporal zones of insecurity and existential threat."⁷⁰ Toward this end, Jodi Melamed poses the "state-finance-racial violence nexus" which names the "inseparable confluence of political/economic governance with racial violence, which enables ongoing accumulation through dispossession by calling forth the specter of race (as threat) to legitimate state counter-violence in the interest of financial asset owning classes that would otherwise appear to violate social rationality."⁷¹ In this way, Lem Dobie clearly stands in as this specter of race (as threat)—or more accurately, given the colonial setting, Indianness as threat—toward the legitimation of state counter-violence. Yet the specter of race (as threat) does not just invite state action, it also remakes peoples and places in service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power. In other words, state counter-violence in the interest of financial asset owning classes itself *produces* the racial and colonial difference being invoked. Thus, the enlistment of the "significant past" by way of the colonial village and "founding fathers," and the description of Lem Dobie and his actions, helps reshape Indianness as such, doing so in ways tied to contemporary material conditions, relations, and desires.

While this dissertation has thus far argued that the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda—as a function of risk management—also channeled the migration of the logics of the reservation in particular through constructs of Indianness, the story of Lem Dobie and the colonial village in particular suggests additional work is being done. As this chapter has argued thus far, as “Terminationists” in Congress and elsewhere increasingly made the case that the existence of the reservation and strategy of containment-*cum*-self-government itself was altogether untenable, the Point 4 Program was made to follow suit. The following section attends to the enrollment of the “significant past” by the FFA and the U.S. Office of Education toward the foreclosure of such use of the U.S. agricultural and rural modernization agenda against the danger of Termination and Relocation. It does so while accounting for the particular place and time from which the FFA was operating—not the late 1920s moment of the FFA’s founding that the film narrates. Rather, it accounts for the place and time the film was made: during the mid-twentieth century, when the FFA’s international efforts and global political consciousness were growing, and when the “active management of spatiotemporal zones of insecurity and existential threat” within the United States meant their outright dissolution.⁷²

Section C.

Settling to Live, “Living to Serve”: The Future Farmers of America and the Frontier

The story of “Farmer of Tomorrow” narrates the role of vocational agricultural education in the protection of the abstract promises of human freedom, liberty, rational progress, and social equity since the first days of the “early Republic.” It did so in relation to a clear approximation of Indianness, or approximation of engagement in supposedly *Indian-like* behavior—specifically, it did so against the specter of Lem Dobie, and his impoverished and *impoverishing* ways of living, as threat. Yet in the telling of this colonial story, the script arguably suffuses the “significant past” of the Future Farmers of America and the United States itself with the terms, rationales, and logics of the Point 4 Program and mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, more broadly. Even further, the script arguably helped sediment a shift in the subject of the “own governmental processes” being aided through the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda and its focus on managing matters of wealth, hunger, and unrest. In other words, the “tradition” narrated by the film helped normalize the shift from Native polities being the “own government” empowered through agricultural and rural development to the *U.S. settler state* itself as the “own government” being empowered. This section addresses the specific ways in which the use of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda *against* the danger of Termination and Relocation—as in efforts by the National Congress of American Indians and the Association of American Indian Affairs and their push for an “Indian Point 4 Program”—was foreclosed. Specifically, it argues that when Indianness appears as a provisional catalyst in the script, such as Lem Dobie and his witch-hunt, it does so in ways that appear as an ostensibly foreign threat to an always already constituted U.S. settler state. Even further, Indianness appears as an altogether *baseless* and illegitimate socio-spatiality. Thus, represented as constitutive of the nation’s origins, the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda leaves room for Native peoples only as entities to be excised

from the U.S. settler state—through their imprisonment or their education and what might be considered “cutting off their braids.”

Toward the continued deferral and denial of Native peoples’ sovereignty, the script represents Lem Dobie and his witch-hunt as an ostensibly foreign threat to an always-already constituted U.S. settler state. Critically, it does so by centering the colonial village as the settler colonial setting at risk and needing protection, and not the otherwise iconic frontier. Specifically, the encounter between the peace officer, circuit-riding minister, and Lem Dobie happens in what the script states “might logically be the Village Green of a small town in remote Virginia, circa 1780.”⁷³ The distinction between the colonial village and the frontier is key. As Mark Rifkin argues, the frontier is not a juridical subject, in that it does not name a legal or administrative mapping. Rather, it presents itself as a way of envisioning place beyond government requirements and categories in the sense of not being beholden to them due to the location of the frontier beyond the perimeters of official oversight—past the edge of the law’s effective sphere of exercise.⁷⁴ Conversely, Rifkin argues, terms like “public lands,” “homestead,” “municipality,” and arguably “colonial village” do name a legal or administrative mapping and thus present the juridical problem of settler sovereignty as always already resolved one. Thus, any such interactions within the colonial village are unquestionably within the law’s effective sphere of exercise.⁷⁵ Thus, when the peace officer as a figure of the legal order of the U.S. settler state rides up to Lem shouting, “Hey there! Stop! Name of the law!” the viewers not only hears a cliché statement of police authority, but a statement that would otherwise be impossible on or beyond the frontier.

Although the settler colonial frontier lies beyond the reach of the legal, administrative, and juridical apparatus of the settler state, it is not geopolitically distinct and under the legitimate governance of another sovereign. Thus, Rifkin argues, the frontier is not “foreign.”⁷⁶ Yet although the frontier does not signify the “foreign” or entrance into the “foreign,” the “colonial village” just behind it opens up the space to recognize and negotiate *foreignness*—doing so within the legal or administrative mapping of the settler state and thus within the law’s effective sphere of exercise.⁷⁷ Even further, the frontier is what Rifkin refers to as a structure of feeling that avoids the anxiety of settler movement envisioned as invasion and conquest (i.e., not entering another geopolitical entity and thus rendered as always already within the sovereign order of the state).⁷⁸ The “colonial village,” on the other hands, arguably *inverts* this logic and rests as the structure of feeling of *being invaded*. Together, therefore, the “Village Green of a small town in remote Virginia, circa 1780” is a site upon which foreignness as invasion can be negotiated in ways that fix in place the legal, administrative, and juridical apparatus of the settler state.

Although the colonial village is the site upon which foreignness as invasion can be negotiated in ways that fix in place the legal, administrative, and juridical apparatus of the settler state, the story of the encounter with Lem Dobie still follows the familiar genre of the *frontier* racial monstrosity. Specifically, the story invokes the simultaneity of the triumphalism of the United States’ frontier myth as well as the darker twin of this frontier myth: the fear of the frontier as a

site of the production of racial monstrosity.⁷⁹ According to Louis S. Warren, late nineteenth century progressive frontier myth and the literature of gothic horror represented homologous fictional worlds that seemed divergent but sprung from common origins on mythic settler colonial frontiers.⁸⁰ In other words, the witches and “witch-masters” of the genre of Gothic horror, and the pioneers, peace officers, and circuit-riders of Anglo-American frontier mythologies—the wellspring of imagery upon which the opening scenes of the FFA film draws—took cue from the same anxieties of *invasion* and conquest borne of settler movement on the frontier.

Such frontier “racial monstrosities” can hold dual meaning when the reference point is the colonial village and not strictly the frontier itself. As Rifkin states, “proximity to Indians or engagement in supposedly Indian-like behavior”—the racial monstrosity that Lem Dobie approximates—“can signal entry into the place of exception in which non-natives can conjure an escape from the state without the difficulty (logistical and moral) of envisioning that movement as invasion/conquest.”⁸¹ Yet with the colonial village being the central frame of reference, “Indian-like behavior” leaves room for more nuanced negotiation of racial and colonial difference. Specifically, monstrous “Indian-like” behavior within the colonial village now represents *a threat to* just to the sovereignty of the U.S. settler state—as has might have only been articulable vis-à-vis the frontier—but also a threat to its legal and administrative orders. As such, invocations of the colonial village open up the possibility to name and negotiate other supposed *polities* by way of the legal and administrative orders of the settler state they push up against. In other words, the “exceptions” to appear in the colonial village are not only Indian exceptions to the settler states’ modes of selfhood, regulations, and codifications, but also foreign exceptions to the administrative apparatus of the settler state itself. In other words, the colonial village offers a place to administer Native peoples as “somewhere in between the domesticated and the foreign,” as Mishuana Goeman states.

Representations of the anxieties surrounding Native peoples and polities have long wavered between the “domesticated” and the “foreign.” From the earliest days of “New World” conquest, Native peoples, have been regarded as infidels, antithetical to human civility, and with whom settlers are in “continual war.” Native resistance to Euro-American intrusion has been regularly cast as a threat to the security of settler sovereignty, thus rationalizing war and suppression.⁸² These concerns have persisted in the anxieties over the continued existence of an intransigent and opposing set of socio-spatial formations—most notably, the reservation—and paranoid fear of “revenge” and ultimate decolonization. During the nineteenth century, following the 1851 Appropriations Act, which authorized the creation of Native reservations, the rhetoric of the reservation as “un-American” space took root.⁸³

Beginning in the early-twentieth century, this rhetoric had found a new home—extending to the Indian Reorganization Act itself—and by the mid-twentieth century, the reservation itself became untenable for reasons both “domestic” and “foreign.” Representative E.Y. Berry, a South Dakota Republican and a vocal “Terminationist,” used anti-communist rhetoric to attack the Act, claiming that it “communizes the Indian Reservation just as completely and just as fairly and just as ungodly as communist Russia can hope to do.” Republican Senator George

Malone of Nevada broadened the scope of that charge, complaining that the United States was “spending billions of dollars fighting communism” while it was “perpetuating the systems of Indian reservations and tribal governments, which are natural Socialistic environments.”⁸⁴ Further, in its “Navajo” series, the Los Angeles Times report that Senator Harlan J. Bushfield, a South Dakota Republican, had claimed “he had reports [that] Communists are trying to win over Indians on South Dakota Reservations.”⁸⁵ Representations of the anxieties surrounding Native peoples and polities have thus long wavered between the “domesticated” and the “foreign” in ways reflective of the times. Yet these representations extended beyond the reservation and its people as a threatening and increasingly untenable vestige of conquest at risk of exploitation by foreign (e.g. Soviet) forces. For example, the mid-twentieth concerns over abject poverty and “confinement” associated with Native peoples bolstered the view that reservations were “concentration camps” from which Indians must be “liberated.”⁸⁶

The tense encounter with Lem Dobie in the colonial Virginia village crystallizes this broader dynamic of administering Native peoples as “somewhere in between the domesticated and the foreign,” in ways justified by the threat they posed and the disinterested intentions of the United States itself, and against the dismal economic matters which lay at the core of both. Specifically, “Farmer of Tomorrow” opens with a scene that adheres entirely to U.S. policymaker conceptions of economic underdevelopment and their deployment of the conjunction between foreignness and underdevelopment as a provisional catalyst for the process of incorporation and assimilation into market and colonial relations.⁸⁷ That is to say, the story of Lem Dobie is arguably the story of the Point 4 Program and U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, more broadly. This is not entirely unsurprising given that, as this dissertation has argued, the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda’s roots were in federal Indian law and policy. Returning to the opening scenes of “Farmer of Tomorrow,” Lem declares his motives for why “witches gotta be kilt!” He states, “Nawthin’ hain’t a-growed in weeks... cows never give no milk in ten days. Cain’t risk no boggle in killin’ a witch, neither.” That proclivity toward violence against the colonial village, and human life and property interests, is represented as emerging directly from Lem Dobie’s economic failure. That is, Dobie’s violence stems from the diminished capacity of his land and livestock to produce value.⁸⁸ During his 1949 inaugural address, Truman stated that “more than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate . . . Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.”⁸⁹ This view similarly frames Lem Dobie’s own placement in the colonial village, his economic circumstances, and the threat he posed to himself and to more prosperous peoples and areas as a result of them.

Altogether, the setting of the settler colonial village, offers a way to negotiate and rearticulate Indianness as a provisional catalyst in ways not irrelevant to U.S. foreign policy and the broader global political consciousness that the FFA brings to its work. During the mid-twentieth century, through the Point 4 Program and paired land reform efforts, the official objective of the U.S. government—concisely stated within the previously discussed 1953 “Policy Regarding Land Reform in Foreign Areas”—was to improve the “position of the farmer on the land to the end that he may have greater security of tenure, an incentive to increase production and conserve

resources (including the utilization of technological advances suitable to each economy), and an equitable share of the output"⁹⁰ Lem Dobie lacked each of these (a point that will be discussed further below). As a provisional catalyst, should the state response to Lem Dobie have followed the broader objectives of the mid-twentieth U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, the peace officer and circuit-riding minister might have strived to disengage Dobie's attempt at fixing his situation from complex of ideas exploited by outside forces—during the mid-twentieth century, this was "Soviet Communism," yet projected backward in time to 1780, the influence could have come from any other threatening foreign government or entity. The response, according to the mid-twentieth century framework of U.S. agricultural and rural development under the Point 4 Program and other programs, would have been to make clear "to the various peoples and governments of the world," including Lem Dobie himself, "that genuine land reform can be achieved through their own governmental processes." With the colonial village as the central site through which Indianness as a provisional catalyst is negotiated, the "own governmental processes" encouraged are ultimately figured as those processes of the U.S. settler state.

Every move Lem Dobie makes and every point of interaction with him presupposes this dynamic: an always already constituted and infallible U.S. settler state in relation to U.S. policymaker conceptions of economic underdevelopment and against Native peoples' use of such conceptions to assert their capacity to govern themselves, claim land, and secure historical legibility. Returning to the official response to Dobie's false teachings, the presence of the peace officer speaks not just to a presence impossibly on or beyond the frontier. It also speaks to the particular historical function of policing vis-à-vis U.S. settler capitalism. According to Nikhil Pal Singh, policing itself can be understood as those preventive mechanisms and institutions for ensuring private property *within* public order, including access to the means of violence, their legal narration, and their use . . . [where] security ensures the proper circulation of multitudes of people and things across great distances."⁹¹ Police, in this sense, is a "paradigmatic institution for a society founded on individual liberty."⁹² As such, policing the colonial village, then, transforms the anxiety of viewing Dobie's movement as invasion—or more accurately, his stationary albeit just as menacing sovereign over—into one of shared relief afforded by the prospect of Dobie's assimilability according to such rubrics of progress, labor, freedom, and liberty, all orbiting the "industry of agriculture." The peace officers' first actions, in "Farmer of Tomorrow" belabor this point. Returning to this moment, the peace officer rides up to Lem shouting, "Hey there! Stop! Name of the law!" In this moment the viewer hears not only a cliché statement of police authority but also a statement that hails a subject of the U.S. settler state and its sovereign, legal, and administrative order—the only true and valid one.

Section D.

"Witches Gotta Be Kilt! Else Things Ain't Never Gonna Grow:" The Settler-Imperial Episteme of Rural Technical Assistance

As the previous section argued, every move Lem Dobie makes and every point of interaction with him presupposes this dynamic: an always already constituted and infallible U.S. settler

state in relation to U.S. policymaker conceptions of economic underdevelopment and against Native peoples' use of such conceptions to assert their capacity to govern themselves, claim land, and secure historical legibility. The same extends to every idea Lem Dobie holds. For example, the film belabors this point in the fact that Lem Dobie was a "*self-appointed* witch master." Dobie is not a witch-master by way of some innate quality, but by way of his belief in his capacity to appoint himself as witch master. It is this capacity that is not only questioned within the script but is itself represented as being at the core of the threat Dobie poses: "false teachings born of ignorance and festered by the remoteness of frontier." The falseness of such teachings suggests that neither Lem Dobie nor his designation as a witch-master was sanctioned by the U.S. settler state itself, and thus represents an anomaly to the ordered modes, and safety and security, of U.S. settler colonial life. In other words, while he is administered "somewhere in between the foreign and the domestic," any claim Dobie makes to some sort of legitimate governance or sovereign order is undercut at an epistemological level. In the grim scene of the witch-hunt, the viewer recognizes him as judge, jury, and executioner. Yet, despite carrying his own rubrics and means of justice, he is of a wholly *unsanctioned* administrative and legal order. Thus, when Indianness appears as a provisional catalyst in the script—namely, Lem Dobie and his witch-hunt—it does so in ways that appear as not only ostensibly foreign threat to an always already constituted U.S. settler state, but also altogether *baseless* as a coherent socio-spatiality.

Critically, "witchcraft" is central to this figuration of Lem Dobie's legal and administrative mapping as a *baseless* and incoherent socio-spatiality, and thus the broader rearticulation of the Point 4 Program away from the paired provision of Native peoples' self-government and agricultural and rural technical assistance, and toward the altogether dissolution of Native peoplehood itself. As Truman stated in 1949, the goal of the Point 4 Program was to foster capital investment and make available the United States' "store of technical knowledge" in order to aid people whose "economic life is primitive and stagnant," and whose "poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas."⁹³ Yet as the previous chapter recounted, "poverty," and economic underdevelopment as an emergent category of poverty during the Cold War, was persistently regarded in some fundamental way as a question of culture.⁹⁴ The script approximates Lem Dobie's impoverished and impoverishing culture—the source of his economic hardship and the misguided nature of his attempts at remediating such economic hardship—through references to "witchcraft." Yet script represents witchcraft in a fairly novel way. Returning to that opening scene, the film states:

*Witchcraft... black superstition—false teachings born of ignorance and festered by the remoteness of frontier life. These comprised the basic education of many young farmers in Colonial Times, and in the early days of our Republic. The New Government, aided by Circuit Riding Ministers of the Gospel, worked hard to break the power of self-appointed witch-masters.*⁹⁵

In these lines and throughout the opening scene of the script emerge a profound inversion of the typical narrative of "witchcraft." Historically, the Western cultural association of "witch" that discounts the use of the term to symbolize anything "real," such as the notion of Native

"witchcraft." Vine Deloria Jr., for example, explains how ceremonies have been misrepresented by academics in order to support incorrect translation and knowledge claims: "Some tribal ideas have been classified as witchcraft by anthropologists, primarily because such phenomena occurring within the Western tradition would naturally be interpreted as evil and satanic. What Westerners miss the larger logical implication of the unity of life. If all living things share a creator and a creation, is it not logical to suppose that all have the ability to relate to every part of creation."⁹⁶ Furthermore, certain ceremonies and tribal ideas, while interpreted as witchcraft, have constituted modes of governance and means of wealth redistribution—part of the contours of contemporary Native peoplehood not otherwise accounted for as "real" within U.S. formulations of political subjectivity and the field of U.S. and tribal politics more broadly.⁹⁷

Apart from this longer association—and amidst the mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda globally, and Termination and Relocation domestically—within "Farmer of Tomorrow" it is not "witches" or "witchcraft" that were deemed threatening to liberal society and its abstract promises of liberty, freedom, rational progress, and social equity. Rather, the threat to these values and political structure is the *belief in* witches and witchcraft.⁹⁸ In other words, the script situates the condition of possibility for the witch-hunt taking place not in the *existence* of witches, but in the remnants of an outmoded and wholly non-rational and non-modern belief system that *thinks* witches exist. It does so in ways that adhere to the questions of culture attached to poverty. Specifically, poverty by this time was understood not a consequence of capitalist market relations but rather the result of cultural differences that fostered a "lack of attachment to the capitalist economy"—namely, the lack of cultural proclivities toward "achievement, acquisition, individualism, and deferred gratification in the service of long-term objectives."⁹⁹ Lem Dobie's inability to even produce milk and crops sets him outside the relations of the marketplace, and his *belief in* witchcraft reflects his lack of such elements of U.S. national character required to foster such attachment to the capitalist economy. His "easy fix" of carrying out a witch-hunt—backed by the erroneous belief that witchcraft was the issue and that it even exists—cemented Dobie's position as a problem to be solved in accordance with the problems of the mid-twentieth century, as they were understood by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors, and by members of organizations such as the Future Farmers of America.¹⁰⁰

Through this invocation of belief in witchcraft, the script seemingly frames the central issue facing the community as one of a "knowledge-gap," with Lem Dobie as the provisional catalyst for the United States' capital investment and distribution of its "store of technical knowledge." It does so while discrediting as baseless other knowledge systems and legal and administrative mappings in favor of a more truthful, rational, progressive, just, and equitable one—represented by legal and administrative order of the U.S. settler state, and its peace officers and circuit-riding ministers. Critically, however, the official response to Lem Dobie was not his education and training. As stated, policing the colonial village transforms the anxiety of viewing Dobie's movement as invasion—or more accurately, his stationary albeit just as menacing sovereign over—into one of shared relief afforded by the *prospect* of Dobie's assimilability according to such rubrics of progress, labor, freedom, and liberty, all orbiting the "industry of agriculture." However, this prospect of Dobie's assimilability is not achieved by educating him

into the wealth of technical knowledge nor providing capital investment. In fact, Dobie's assimilability is not achieved at all. Rather, he was excised from the colonial village altogether. In this way, Lem Dobie stood in solely for the risk of the continued existence of such knowledge systems and legal and administrative mappings, and the impossibility of reconciling it with those models proffered by the "new government." Dropped was the social and cultural relativism constitutive of early-twentieth century anthropological thought that left room to hold Native peoples' economic misfortunes as reparable through the provision and technical assistance and appropriate modes of administration and governance. During Termination and Relocation, Indianness—administered somewhere between "the domesticated and the foreign"—was reconfigured as both a provisional catalyst for the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda *and* the altogether dissolution and excision of Indianness itself within the contiguous United States.

Conclusion

Ultimately, against such efforts to dissolve the reservation itself and terminate tribal status, the National Congress of American Indians, the Association of American Indian Affairs, and other Native and non-Native organizations took a new approach to advocating for Native peoples. They drew on early-twentieth century advances in the development of a techno-scientific Native market agrarianism—and, critically, the new weight afforded to such advances by way of the mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda—and pushed for an "Indian Point 4 Program" in order to preserve the reservation, however imperfect. Yet, in the contiguous United States, the Point 4 Program offered Native peoples and their counternationalisms none of the flexibility that it offered U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors on the peripheries of the U.S. settler state (i.e., Alaska, Hawai'i, Guam, and other U.S. territories). Specifically, as "Terminationists" in Congress and elsewhere increasingly made the case that the existence of the reservation and strategy containment itself was altogether untenable—as it undermined U.S. national cohesion and risked communist infiltration—they forced the Point 4 Program to follow suit. In other words, although its origins were on reservations within the United States, the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda—a seeming panacea for colonial unrest that moved colonized peoples toward a techno-scientifically advanced and capital-intensive market agrarianism, and toward a nominal degree of self-government—found little expression domestically. Tracing how Future Farmers of America youth, instructors, and administrators interpreted and narrated their own activities, histories, and purpose offered a way to trace how the rearticulation of the Point 4 Program toward the dissolution of Native peoplehood itself was sedimented, contested, and negotiated in narrative, memory, and subject and identity formation.

Chapter Three.

The Plantation in Crisis:

Liberian Rubber and “The Native Problem in Africa”

Founded in the early nineteenth century by Black emigres from the United States with the aid of the American Colonization Society as both a safety valve for the institution of U.S. slavery and an avenue of racial uplift for U.S. Blacks, Liberia's establishment and history is one through which problems of race and racial capitalism were seemingly resolved through an apparatus of African settler colonialism. As the second Black republic in the world, following Haiti, and as the first Black republic in Africa itself, Liberia was seen by U.S. Blacks and whites as an experiment in Black self-government. Accordingly, the West African country received U.S. social, political, and economic support since its inception. The supposed investment in the well-being of the growing republic extended into the twentieth century and was shared by the U.S. government and by U.S. corporate, missionary, and philanthropic actors. Mostly notable among such investments was in the mid-1920s, when the U.S.-backed Firestone Natural Rubber Company established the largest contiguous rubber plantation in the world—a move widely hailed by commentators as a clear pathway toward the success of the experiment in self-government, with U.S. support and broad backing from both U.S. Blacks and whites. Thus, in 1929, when a U.S. missionary in Liberia reported that settler Americo-Liberian officials were using soldiers to force indigenous Liberians to work on the Firestone rubber plantation and cocoa plantations on the Spanish island colony of Fernando Po, it was seen as a major crisis for Firestone, the U.S. Department of State, and the Liberian government.

What quickly became known as the “Liberian slavery crisis” threw into question a number of matters for Liberian and U.S. state officials, the League of Nations, Firestone Natural Rubber Company, and U.S. Blacks and whites with various emotional and political investments in the experiment and reputation of Liberia. Principal among the issues raised was what precisely the Liberian slavery crisis signified. Many wondered how and why a nation founded on the premise of offering respite from slavery itself succumbed to and reproduced the horrors of the institution itself. Yet the crisis was seemingly greater than the enslavement of indigenous Liberians by the Americo-Liberian ruling class and military. Following word of the crisis, the League of Nations established a commission to investigate what precisely was taking place. Named the Christy Commission, the 1930 investigation was led by Cuthbert Christy, an English doctor and zoologist and Charles S. Johnson, a Black sociologist at Fisk University in Tennessee. Framing his greater concern and a concern held by many Johnson stated in 1930 that, “with all of Africa gone [under European domination] this little 40,000 square miles might well be an experiment in Negro self-rule.”¹ Johnson worried at what precisely this meant. Thus, while many wondered how and why a nation founded on the premise of offering respite from slavery itself succumbed to and reproduced the horrors of the institution itself, the crisis at was a crisis in Black self-government particularly in relation to U.S. and European imperialism. In other words, the presence or absence of slavery was merely a metric of success of the experiment in Black self-government.

Surrounding the crisis were questions about how a new slave trade could come about in the first place. Many pinned the new slave trade on the inherent proximity between Blackness and enslavement. Upon news of the crisis, R.B. Eleazer, a member of the Atlanta-based Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC), "One would suppose that two hundred years of bondage in America would have weaned Negroes completely from the traditional practice of slavery. Set free and repatriated on their own continent, one certainly would not have expected American Liberians to enslave benighted natives, less fortunate members of their own race. Yet it appears that this is just what many of them did."² These questions were tackled even prior to word of the Liberian military's role in shipping indigenous Liberians to the Spanish colony of Fernando Po, without pinning the crisis on an inherent inferiority of Black peoples. Most notably, in 1928, a report by Raymond Leslie Buell published under the auspices of the Harvard Bureau of International Research, *The Native Problem in Africa*, predicted the impending slave crisis and indicted the governments of the United States and Liberia, and the Firestone Natural Rubber Company for created the conditions for forced labor on the Firestone plantation. Buell ultimately stated that, backed by the United States "secret diplomacy," the "Firestone Plantations Company is making it financially worthwhile for the government [of Liberia] and for the chiefs to keep the plantations supplied [with slave labor]."³ As Buell stated, what was taking place between the United States, Liberia, and Firestone was a clear example of "economic imperialism."⁴

Unsurprisingly, the crisis also invoked questions of what response from the United States this supposed failure in Black self-government necessitated. The prescriptions and concerns of inaction were wide-ranging. After news of the slavery crisis broke, U.S. commentators on U.S.-Liberian relations—both Black and white—had made the case for the necessity of an ongoing and reenergized U.S. presence in the West African country. Harvey Firestone himself made repeated calls for U.S. military and diplomatic intervention—largely to ensure his investments in the West African country were secure. As the following chapter delves into, such calls were also put forth on the basis of the educational opportunities that would otherwise be lost. Lester Walton, a journalist and Liberia commentator with *New York World*, and a soon-to-be-appointed U.S. Minister to the country, made the case in 1931—at the height of the slavery crisis—that a "wholesale withdrawal of Americans would close 108 of the 164 schools operating in the Republic. And without education, future generations of Liberians would be as helpless as their ancestors to create modern conditions."⁵ On the other hand, the response to the crisis taken by U.S. state officials was one of altogether non-intervention. Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of State in 1930, stated that "this government has no intention whatsoever . . . of intervening in Liberia."⁶ J.P. Moffat of the U.S. Department of State stated that "if by intervention is meant the use of a form of compulsion by this Government against Liberia it is quite correct to say that this Government has *never* intervened in the affairs of Liberia."⁷ Ultimately, nearly all such questions of what response from the United States this supposed failure in Black self-government necessitated orbited the degree of respect of such self-government. Put another way, the Liberian slavery crisis quickly became the crisis "Negro self-rule" and of respect for a still-incipient Liberian sovereignty.

Empire and Emergency/Emergence in Slavery's Afterlife

The first half of this dissertation had shown that the United States' seemingly disinterested strategy of recognizing and institutionalizing Native peoples' capacity for self-government was an emergent technology in the risk management of settler capitalism. The justification was that such structures of governance would alleviate hunger and poverty and thus the threat of unrest and revolt, and that they would also preempt the orientation of such unrest and revolt around and against the U.S. settler state itself. The first half of this dissertation had also shown that, through the mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, these logics, practices, and rationales of early-twentieth century transformations in Indian administration had come to enact themselves imperially, toward the ongoing accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power. As Phil Deloria stated with regard to the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act:

... relations between tribal governments and the federal government can be seen to demonstrate how U.S. imperialism might work in the twentieth century and beyond: nominally independent governments, largely dependent on the United States, overseen by imperial agents, with a divided populace subject to new forms of exploitation of land and resources. No longer domination, conquest, and dispossession, per se, but now semiautonomy and limited empowerment under the banners of "self-determination" and "freedom."⁸

The first half of this dissertation had traced how such transit took place. It ultimately argued that, beginning with the 1928 Meriam Report and 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, and ending with the Point 4 Program in relation to dependent areas, the paired provision of self-government and agricultural technical assistance and capital was an exercise in the risk management of racial capitalism—one that had reconfigured colonial peoples and place as the disavowed conditions of possibility for world-systems of U.S. profit and governance.⁹

As with the transit of innovations in Indian administration during the first half of the twentieth century, early-twentieth century U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors' negotiations of the plantation complex also came to shape the mid-twentieth century U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda. Most notably, the late Black geographer Clyde Woods argued that the establishment of the "neo-plantation complex" in the early-twentieth century U.S. South shared the same genealogy as the Green Revolution globally. Woods drew this connection clearly, arguing that the neo-plantation complex was created in four stages that ultimately enacted themselves imperially: First was the capitalization of planters through the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act's (AAA) crop reduction programs and other subsidies during the early 1930s.¹⁰ Second was the mass eviction of sharecroppers. Third was the dominance of the tractor and wage labor regime by the early 1940s. The last stage was the introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, the elimination of hired labor, and the diversification of the regional economy by the mid-1950's.¹¹ Yet the reconfiguration and outward projection of the plantation complex was not limited to this decades-long agricultural-social transformation beginning in the U.S. South. As W.E.B. Du Bois argued, the end of slavery in the United States in the nineteenth

century marked the generalization on a global scale of the racial and imperial vision of the "empire of cotton," at the fulcrum of which lay, in part, the "Negro."¹²

Building upon these genealogies, what Liberia in particular offers is insight into how the Point 4 Program and the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda, more broadly, were also routed through negotiations of plantocracies around the world in ways that were analogous to the contemporaneous crisis of the reservation within the United States. Specifically, the Liberian slavery crisis invoked questions of the capacity for, and successes and failures of, "Negro self-rule." It also invoked questions of how the United States could work to ameliorate the situation while respecting Liberian sovereignty. Globally, through the mid-twentieth century agricultural and rural development agenda, there were many homes for the transit of early-twentieth century negotiations of Liberia's plantation economy. By 1953, alongside Liberia, the Point 4 Program was established in Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Indonesia and other Latin American and Asian plantocracies. More concretely, Liberia's own Booker Washington Institute—the central educational endeavor that U.S. Minister to Liberia, Lester Walton, expressed anxiety about—partnered with Prairie View A&M University in the 1950s. This educational endeavor was Africa's flagship Point 4 Program and was modeled across Africa, even outside of nations without the official science, technology, and education transfer initiatives under the Point 4 Program.¹³

The first two chapters of this dissertation developed a settler colonial genealogy of the Point 4 Program by attending to the question posed by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors of what would happen should such capital-intensive techno-scientific "solutions" to the problems of hunger, poverty, and discontent on Native reservations not be proffered. Chapter 1 focused on what it called the "crisis of the reservation" that the 1928 Meriam Report described, and the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act addressed. Chapter 2 focused on what it called the "reservation as crisis," which described the significance of the Point 4 Program to Indian administration at a time when Native peoples and the reservation itself was at risk of dissolution under House Concurrent Resolution 108—the announcement of the federal government's official policy of "Termination." The following two chapters follow a parallel trajectory. This chapter follows the "crisis of the plantation," which is to say the early-twentieth century Liberian slavery crisis. The following chapter follows what it terms the "plantation as crisis," which describes the mid-twentieth century moment when U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors considered the plantation complex as not only an altogether untenable economic foundation for a nation and mode of agricultural production, but also one that necessitated U.S. involvement under the Point 4 Program.

This chapter traces how and an anti-occupation approach to securing investments in Liberia—the "second Black Republic" after Haiti, and outside the geographic bonds of the Monroe Doctrine and "Dollar Diplomacy"—reshaped the risk management of racial capitalism vis-à-vis the plantation complex in particular. The first part of this chapter describes Liberia's origins and evolution as a settler state born of the plantation complex of the U.S. South that ultimately succumbed to a new plantation complex with Firestone Natural Rubber Company at the center. The second part of this chapter describes how the shared settler colonial and plantation

genealogy of Liberia's founding later took shape with regard to how the Liberian slavery crisis was understood by U.S. and Liberian state officials, private actors, and public commentators. It argues that the disavowal of Liberian settler appropriation—by framing the Liberian slavery crisis as crisis in “Negro self-rule” and Liberian sovereignty and not a crisis in indigenous Liberian dispossession and enslavement—facilitated the elision of processes of racial dispossession constitutive of the plantation complex and plantation geographies as it invited new forms of U.S. intervention. The third part of this chapter describes how this approach to the Liberian slavery crisis were then built into emergent articulations of an official U.S. anti-imperialism while excising the racial logics of the plantation economy that the crisis illuminated.

PART 1.

Settlers, Planters, and Slaves: Liberia, Firestone, and the Crisis of the Plantation

Founded in the early nineteenth century by Black emigres from the United States and the American Colonization Society (ACS), Liberia's origins were without question a product of its time. Although it was not recognized by the United States until the Civil War, Liberia acquired formal status and a republican constitution in 1847. Among the many immigrants that settled Liberia's coast between 1822 and 1890, the American Colonization Society took credit for the emigration of nearly 20,000 U.S. Blacks, and the U.S. Navy took credit for another 5,000 Africans that were found aboard slave ships crossing the Atlantic.¹⁴ These emigres constituted the real and fictive origins of the “Americo-Liberian” settler population and ruling class, and their motivations were constitutive of the Liberian state itself. Among the most recognizable motivations for the establishment of Liberia was a vision of Black racial uplift. This vision was grounded by familiar liberal forms of political economy, culture, government, and history propose a narrative of freedom overcoming enslavement.¹⁵ The very name “Liberia”—from the Latin *liber*, meaning free, itself the root of the word *liberty*—was selected by the colony's governors, who worked for the ACS. Beneath the emblems in the national seal are the words REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA, and above the emblems, the national motto, THE LOVE OF LIBERTY BROUGHT US HERE. This “love of liberty” and the values imbedded within the phrase framed Liberian modes of administration, governance, and subjection, and U.S.-Liberian relations, from the moment of the Black republic's founding onward.

Section A.

“The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here”: Slave Histories and Settler Dreams

A number of seemingly disparate social, political, and economic affiliations and orientations came together in Liberia's origins. Some Black and white abolitionists collaborated on the relocation of manumitted slaves, as they were discouraged by the racial discrimination they faced in the North and believed there would be little acceptance of them, and refuge for them, in the United States altogether. Yet, for the ACS-appointed white U.S. colonial governors of Liberia and the legislative councils elected by the colonist, it was not that they believed Black

racial uplift was unattainable in the United States. It was that they felt it altogether undesirable.¹⁶ The ACS itself was made up of white nationalists and abolitionists, and the founding of Liberia was carried out with the help of proslavery forces in the U.S. South who sought the deportation of free Blacks and rebellious slaves, as they believed the free people threatened the stability of their slave societies.¹⁷ From the early 1840s, the influence of the ACS in Liberia declined substantially, facing assault by abolitionists within the U.S. who questioned its motives and activities and who charged the Managers with seeking to perpetuate slavery in America. Some of the growing Americo-Liberian population were also already demanding autonomy of the colony from ACS control.¹⁸ With these and other issues, ACS and the Board of Managers of the Society ultimately ceased to take active interest in the internal affairs of Liberia. In 1841, settler Joseph J. Robert was the first Americo-Liberian appointed to the position of governor, inaugurating Americo-Liberian management of their colony and anticipating their formal declaration of independence in 1847.¹⁹

With Liberian self-government established and now under Americo-Liberian control, the Liberian state reflected all the hallmarks of a settler state modeled in the United States' image. Americo-Liberian settlers carried with them not only U.S. sensibilities—from sentimental attachments to the U.S., to clothing preferences, home construction methods, diet, the English language, the Christian religion, and monogamy—they also carried with them practices, logics, and rationales of settler expansion.²⁰ Expansion was secured by "purchase" with European and U.S. trade-goods, by voluntary cession of territory from, and formal treaties of cession with, indigenous Liberians to secure the emergent state's protection, trade benefits, and infrastructure; and by forceful acquisition, especially after a military victory over the African peoples gained mostly through the aid of U.S. naval officers and ships. Thus, it was not simply Americo-Liberians in supposed positions of power. It was also the institutions, logics, practices, and rationales through which such power was enacted—namely Euro-American conceptions of (private) property and peoplehood, and other such political traditions.²¹ These Euro-American ideas and institutions were central to the foundation of the Liberian settler state itself, even prior to the Black republic's formal declaration of independence. For example, according to David Kazanjian, the ACS appropriated the first of its land in West Africa from indigenous leaders through fee simple treaties that had very different meanings to the two parties: "to the ACS representatives, the treaties conferred land as property in exchange for a one-time payment of cash and goods; to the Africans, who did not think of large tracts of land as private property, the treaties simply allowed the Americans to live on the land and to engage in trade."²² These remained the terms of Liberian settlerhood from then onward. An attempt at establishing a new homeland for manumitted slaves and freedmen from the United States in order to foster a better life, for the next 100 years following its formal independence, Liberia experienced the extremes of uneven development in ways that enunciated its slave and settler past.²³

Section B.
The Liberian Slavery Crisis and the Christy Commission

Liberia was born of the plantation economy, yet through U.S. state power and settler migration was founded on the principle of offering respite from the plantation. Thus when U.S. involvement in the early twentieth century seemingly fomented reproduction of the most abject expression of the plantation economy—a Liberian crisis of slavery in the late 1920s—both the experiment in Black self-government and international expressions of U.S. state power were thrown into the spotlight. The crisis in particular originated in debt which had enmeshed the country in a financial tangle and only grew worse with time. An 1871 loan of roughly \$500,000 obtained from a British bank had proven disastrous, with most of the money never arriving in the hands of the Liberian government.²⁴ A British-engineered loan of 1906 promised to repay the debt, but it also brought under British influence Liberian affairs. In 1908, the Liberian government under president Arthur Barclay sent a commission to the United States to ask for additional financial and diplomatic aid.²⁵ Continuing the diplomatic dialogue, the following year, a U.S. government commission visited the West African country "to investigate the interests of the United States and its citizens in the Republic of Liberia" and recommended reforms and financial assistance.²⁶ The commissioners returned from Liberia suspicious of the designs of not only the French and Germans, but also the British. Their report recommended an U.S.-only banker's loan to refund the entire debt of Liberia and free it of dependence upon any colonial power. It also urged that the United States arrange for a firm delimitation of Liberia's political boundary, take over the Liberian customs service, and furnish United States Army officers to lead and retrain the Liberian Frontier Force.²⁷ By 1912, the Liberians succeeded in obtaining a new loan overseen by customs receivers from the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany. In 1918, the United States converted the receivership into an all-U.S. one. The First World War, however, interrupted these plans and was disastrous to Liberia's economy precisely because it stopped all trade with industrial countries. The loan was ultimately insufficient and U.S. fiscal aid itself was only a rescue measure for Liberia.²⁸

This "better day" for Liberia awaited the arrival of large-scale rubber investment under Firestone Natural Rubber Company.²⁹ In 1926, following nearly a decade of extreme economic hardship, the Liberian government granted a major rubber concession to the Firestone and accepted a large loan from a subsidiary of Firestone's, the Finance Corporation of America. The bill passed by the Liberian legislature bound the Liberian government to borrow \$5 million dollars (at 7 percent interest) from the Firestone subsidiary while it granted the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company the right to grow rubber on a maximum of one million acres of land.³⁰ Beyond the immediate relief offered by the loan, the seeming benefits of Firestone's involvement in the West African country were manifold. According to Frank R. Chalk, the Firestone Natural Rubber Company imported foresters, soil experts, architects, builders and engineers in 1927 to clear needed land and build houses, hospitals, schools, and stores. Public health and sanitation in the West African state were overseen by the Harvard School of Tropical Medicine and Dr. S. Vaughn, who was part of the Gorgas mission to Panama. Working at a record pace, the development of the Mt. Barclay plantation and the processing facility in the town of Harbel were well underway.³¹ Furthermore, aware of charges from Liberian critics that

“the Government was being sold to American interests,” Liberian legislators added a number of amendments that seemingly aided the defense of Liberian sovereignty while still meeting Liberian economic needs.³² Specifically, the legislators barred the Firestone from bringing more than 1,500 white employees into the country—a reaction to press reports that Firestone planned to employ 30,000 U.S. workers to supervise the plantation.³³ Within the first year, the 2,000-acre Mt. Barclay plantation outside of the Liberian capital Monrovia employed more than 12,000 Liberians at wages of 24 cents a day, with 100,000 pounds of rubber produced per month.³⁴ Noting the rapid progress of the project, Harvey Firestone anticipated a time when 300,000 Liberian workers would cultivate and tap 1,000,000 acres of trees.³⁵ Despite the plantation not seeing that much growth—with only about 55,000 acres cleared and roughly 18,000 laborers employed by 1930—rubber quickly became the backbone of the Liberian economy.³⁶

Despite the seeming social and economic benefits it offered Liberia, Firestone’s entrance into the West African country was prefigured by the United States’ and U.S. corporations’ recognition of the hyper-extractive potential of plantation rubber. Prior to the rise of plantation rubber, poor labor conditions were constitutive of wild rubber cultivation. Forced to tread tapping routes laid over miles of difficult terrain, rubber workers were recruited and retained through a combination of impoverishment and physical violence and intimidation. In the Congo, for example, Belgian authorities and European rubber operators coerced entire tribes to labor on rubber plantations. In the Amazon Valley, the conscription of indigenous peoples from the drought and famine-ridden state of Ceara, Brazil looked much the same.³⁷ Yet, for the foreign-owned companies that ran these wild rubber operations, low productivity undermined profits and fomented the collapse of the wild rubber industry in Africa and Latin America in 1912.³⁸ Whereas the United States and U.S. corporations had earlier shown little inclination to achieve a share of wild rubber production because of the associated labor difficulties and lack of profitability, according to Frank R. Chalk, the early-twentieth century rise of plantation rubber sparked massive U.S. public investments in the rubber industry. Between 1898 and 1910, the U.S. public invested millions of dollars in the stock of rubber companies that offered plans to start rubber plantations across Mexico and Central America.³⁹ In other words, massive labor control and capital accumulation were central to the United States’ entrance into and expansion of the rubber industry.

Even further, despite the seeming social and economic benefits it offered Liberia, Firestone’s entrance into the West African country was framed by broader U.S. imperial interests and anxieties. Specifically, the company’s interest in West Africa arose out of the U.S. need for an alternative to British and Dutch control of the major sources of natural rubber. Rubber production had greatly exceeded consumption since the end of World War I. Yet the sharp depression in the United States in 1920 and 1921 greatly decreased the price of rubber. Although by 1922, when the depression in the United States had ended and rubber consumption was on the rise, the British government, and British planters and investors, still took efforts to increase the price of rubber. They did so by passing the Stevenson Plan that year, which reduced the amount of rubber exported from Great Britain’s colonies in Asia.⁴⁰ However, this drastic move was taken at a time when Great Britain’s colonies produced 75

percent of the world's rubber and the United States used 70 percent of it. This situation created concern in the U.S. Congress, and a bill was unanimously passed to provide \$500,000 for an investigation of rubber resources. This sparked Harvey Firestone's independent worldwide search in late 1923, when he sent an expert to Liberia to explore the possibility of rubber production. Firestone had sought greater support by stoking growing fears of "British imperial advantage." He had advocated aggressive U.S. economic nationalism, which he argued could be best achieved by proving that the United States could produce its own rubber. Ultimately, Firestone's study concluded that Liberia offered "the best natural advantages" for such needed production efforts.⁴¹ Yet, driven by the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power Liberia offered Firestone and the United States what nowhere else could: not simply "the best natural advantages" but also, as Firestone later declared in 1925, a labor supply that is "practically inexhaustible."⁴²

That the Firestone Natural Rubber Company's involvement in Liberia was framed by this longer trajectory of capital accumulation and U.S. geopolitical power concerning rubber in particular leaves it of little surprise that the conditions on the Firestone plantation and transformation of Liberian society ran counter to the otherwise positive narrative put forth by Harvey Firestone and others. The establishment and operation of a large rubber plantation required a national labor market. Yet the employment "opportunities" the Firestone plantation offered ultimately outweighed the labor supply available, and so the Liberian government initially assumed the main responsibility for the recruitment of the plantation's workforce.⁴³ Adhering to Article II of the Act Establishing the Firestone Plantation—which necessitated that the Liberian government encourage, support and assist the efforts of Firestone to secure and maintain an adequate labor supply—the Liberian government ordered indigenous Liberian chiefs to draft laborers for the plantation.⁴⁴ Forcibly recruited workers received the same salary, fringe benefits, and working conditions as free workers.⁴⁵ Yet, the latter had chosen to come to Firestone while the former did not have this freedom, instead ordered to leave their families and homes.⁴⁶ And while desertion was relatively common, it was considered a serious offence to disobey a chief's orders—a problem exacerbated by the traditional practices and modern state law that dictated that residing outside one's tribal area was legally punishable.⁴⁷ Ultimately, therefore, the labor system established to implement and maintain the rubber plantations was built on state-led coercion.⁴⁸

Section C. ***The Liberian Slavery Crisis and the Christy Commission***

The labor recruitment for the Firestone plantation, led and enforced by the Liberian government by way of the Liberian Frontier Force, emboldened what could only be described as an even larger slave trade that now extended across Liberia's national borders. In late 1927, a Liberian armed customs enforcement ship (i.e., a "cutter service"), with Postmaster General Reginald A. Sherman on board, came upon a "large barracoon" at Sinoe, Liberia, containing "a shipload of slaves destined for the Spanish plantations at Fernando Po and Spanish Guinea." It was also believed that President Charles D.B. King and other members of the Liberian

government and armed forces benefited financially from the transaction. The incident was soon reported to U.S. government by the U.S. minister in Monrovia, James G. Carter. The West African island has its own history of migration and coerced labor—one which Firestone was ultimately a part.⁴⁹ In 1848 Fernando Po was described by British colonial surveyors as a place “where a lazy population of liberated Africans from Sierra Leone neglected the advantages of one of the richest soils in the world.”⁵⁰ The Black settler population on the island was established in the early nineteenth century and was composed of immigrant Creoles from Sierra Leone and recaptured slaves (“Fernandinos”). In the mid-nineteenth century, the introduction of cocoa production from Brazil shifted the island’s economy from trade in palm oil to agricultural production.⁵¹ As I.K. Sundiata states, Cocoa was king on Fernando Po; competing crops were abandoned as the race to participate in the cocoa boom continued.⁵² By 1909, Fernando Po was producing more than 2.7 million kilograms of cocoa per year—becoming the world's tenth largest producer—and by 1913, 5.3 million kilograms were exported from the island.⁵³

Despite the rapid growth of the cocoa economy during this period, by the 1920s, cocoa production soon slowed down. Among other reasons, labor was in short supply on most of the island’s cocoa plantations (many of which were owned and operated by Black planters).⁵⁴ Fernando Po's demand for workers coincided with other colonial regimes' attempts to organize labor for U.S. and European use by wresting it from subsistence economies, and Liberia was a major source of such labor. Ultimately, the same methods in supplying labor for Firestone were used to recruit labor for Fernando Po—similarly to the benefit of Liberian government and military officials. Between the end of 1928 and the end of 1929, 2,431 workers were sent to the island from Liberia, sanctioned by and to the benefit of the Liberian government. Of those workers, 1,005 came from Cape Palmas and 1,426 came from Sinoe—the same port that Sherman witnessed the exchange.⁵⁵ In June 1929, Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson charged high Liberian officials and the Liberian Frontier Force—what was effectively the Liberian military—with arranging the shipment of Liberian laborers to the Spanish island of Fernando Po under a system which Stimson found “hardly distinguishable from organized slave trade.” Stimson contended:

*The reports reaching the Department of State would indicate that these conditions of forced labor are not confined to labor exported to Fernando Po but are general throughout the Republic of Liberia, particularly in the interior where forced labor procured with the assistance of the Liberian Frontier Force and high government officials is reported to have become a common and usual practice.*⁵⁶

Therefore, although the Liberian government and military condoned and facilitated the exportation of indigenous Liberian forced labor, it was the legal, political, and military structure for labor recruitment fostered by the Firestone agreement that ultimately guided this even larger slave trade.

The Liberian government denied the charges and the matter was brought to the attention of the League of Nations. The League of Nations then appointed a commission of inquiry under

the British jurist, Cuthbert Christy, to investigate the allegations made against Liberia.⁵⁷ The Commission, which included Liberia's then-secretary of state, Arthur Barclay and Charles S. Johnson of Fisk University in Tennessee, spent several months in Liberia observing conditions and conducting interviews. The commission began work on 8 April 1930. While Arthur Barclay remained in Monrovia for reasons of health, after six weeks Christy and Johnston left the capital and travelled first together, then separately, into the interior where they took testimony. They returned to Monrovia in July and conducted further interviews. Altogether the commission members heard 264 people including politicians, officials, chiefs and ordinary people. In its report, published in 1930, the Christy Commission accused high-ranking Liberian government officials of complicity in procuring involuntary labor by impressment and of other practices illegal under international law.⁵⁸ According to the report produced, "The Commission finds that there has been no evidence that leading citizens of the country participate in domestic slavery, but there is evidence that some Americo-Liberians take natives as pawn."⁵⁹ Specifically, the Commission asserted that the Liberian government and Liberia Frontier Force were guilty of forcibly recruiting the indigenous Liberians as laborers for services on the Firestone plantation in Liberia and the Spanish colony of Fernando Po off the west coast of Africa, for extortion of the indigenous population, and for misgovernment in the tribal areas. Revelation of these conditions was regarded by Great Britain as a failure on Liberia's part to abide by Article 23 of the Covenant of the League, which stipulated that members of the League of Nations should secure just treatment of the indigenous inhabitants of territories under their control.⁶⁰

Johnson and Christy disagreed on many points of interpretation of the situation facing Liberia despite producing a unified report. On the issue of slavery, the two men held different opinions, disagreeing on the definition of slavery itself and its prevalence in Liberia.⁶¹ Critically, the two men also disagreed on how best to alleviate the problems found in the West African country. According to Johnson, Christy believed it was a situation that "could not correct itself now by American Negroes, because they could not have the standards."⁶² In other words, Christy favored administration by white men—U.S., British, or otherwise. Conversely, Johnson believed that Black self-rule should not be imperiled and that U.S. Blacks might play a significant role in rehabilitation. Ultimately, despite their different opinions, the commission presented a number of relatively cohesive recommendations: First, that Liberia abandon its policy of discouraging of foreign investment. Second, that the country reestablish the authority of Liberia's indigenous chiefs. Third, that the country appoints U.S. Blacks and whites to administrative positions in the government (commissioners, district officers, etc.). Fourth, that the country declare domestic slavery and pawning altogether illegal. Fifth, that it cease the shipment of laborers to Fernando Po, in particular, as well as other foreign places. Sixth, that it increase discipline over military forces. Finally, that it encourage greater migration of U.S. Blacks in particular.⁶³

Based in part on the findings of the Christy Commission, and in order to finance its recommendations following an appeal by the Liberian government, the League of Nations presented the Liberian government with a "Plan of Assistance." According to Ronald Charles Lindsay, British Ambassador to the United States, its main feature was the "proposal to appoint a white Chief Adviser with certain assistants to supervise the essential administrative reforms.

At the instance of the Firestone [Natural Rubber] Company, and supported by the representative of the United States Government, the authority of the Chief Adviser was emphasized” In short, financial assistance from Liberia and others was based largely on the willingness of the Liberian government to accept a U.S. or European Chief Advisor.⁶⁴ Yet although Monrovia clarified that it was willing to accept any such assistance from the League, following the Christy Commission report, it did so on the condition that such avenues of redress not impinge upon Liberian sovereignty and independence.⁶⁵ Ultimately, in April 1934, the League of Nations council withdrew the plan of assistance that it had developed for the Black republic, on the grounds that reservations expressed by the Liberian legislature were equivalent to their rejection of the plan.⁶⁶ As a result, Liberia lost the opportunity to finance the Christy Commission’s recommendations. It was not until years later, following the implementation of some portion of the suggested reforms, including the banning of forced labor and the phasing out of pawns, that the Liberian government could end the crisis and salvage its reputation internationally.

PART 2.

The Liberian Slavery Crisis and the Disappearance of Plantation Racial Dispossession

Slavery, famine, disease, displacement—these and other familiar icons of human suffering both index a state of emergency and pose moral demands for swift political action. Yet there have been many scholarly traditions that have rightly critiqued the representation of human suffering for the ways in which they have been operationalized as a liberal strategy to re-entrench the racial, gendered, sexual, capitalist, and imperial order from which such suffering emerged.⁶⁷ As Saidiya Hartman has argued, liberal anti-slavery reform discourses across the nineteenth century that were used to promote progressive causes actually facilitated violent, symbolic forms of domination post-emancipation.⁶⁸ Accounting for how the Liberian slavery crisis and the indigenous Liberian suffering may similarly have been operationalized as a liberal strategy to re-entrench the racial, gendered, sexual, capitalist, and imperial order requires accounting for how exactly the crisis was defined.

Section A.

The Planation Crisis and the Crisis of the Negro

The Liberian slavery crisis quickly reenergized liberal anti-slavery reform discourses, yet now through incipient international bodies and agreements—namely, the League of Nations and the League’s 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery.⁶⁹ The response the Liberian slavery crisis drew arguably followed from the risk that the crisis posed to what Lisa Lowe has termed the “liberal economies of affirmation and forgetting.” Such economies of affirmation and forgetting at once deny colonial slavery, erase the seizure of lands from indigenous peoples, displace migrations and connections across continents, and internalize these processes in a national struggle of history and consciousness.⁷⁰ In describing what precisely is denied,

Lowé recounts the work of Hartman, stating that “slavery founded the conditions of possibility for liberal civil society to emerge, reproducing Black exile from individual will, domesticity, property, and social recognition in the aftermath of so-called emancipation.”⁷¹ The post-Emancipation re-emergence of a slave trade within the “first Black republic in Africa”—a state established by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors to offer respite from U.S. slavery—ultimately put pressure on this ongoing denial of colonial slavery as the condition of possibility for civil society itself, broadly, and the denial of the plantation economy and its racial logics as the motor vehicle of capital accumulation and state-building, in particular. Such pressure materialized as a League of Nations inquiry and resolute condemnation of the practice, the United States and England ceasing diplomatic ties with Liberia, waves of calls for U.S. diplomatic and military intervention, and the existing elements of U.S. foreign policy the slavery crisis put into question.

The Liberian slavery crisis put pressure on this ongoing denial of colonial slavery and the plantation economy as the condition of possibility for civil society itself because the circumstances of its emergence obstructed the usual avenues of dissociation. As Lowé argues, this denial is constituted through dialectic that simultaneously relies upon two factors: First, the spatialization of the “unfree” as exteriority. Second, the temporal subsuming of that unfreedom as internal difference or contradiction.⁷² By way of the placement of the condition of slavery as geographically and presently outside the Western political sphere; or a regrettable previous moment in the history of the Western political sphere, “freedom” is imaginable and affirmed within the domain of modern liberalism. Thus, as Lowé states, the “overcoming” of internal contradiction ultimately resolves in “freedom” within the modern Western political sphere in part through displacement and elision of slavery (as well as its coeval conditions with settler colonial dispossession and indentureship).⁷³ Yet, the Liberian slavery crisis seemingly offered neither form of resolution. The crisis was neither an event of the past—having taken place against backdrop of the recently-passed 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, which was created under the auspices of the League of Nations and set out to advance the suppression of slavery and the slave trade. Nor was it geopolitically divorced from U.S. state power, with each apparent connection between the United States and Liberia highlighting the racial logics of the plantation economy as a key condition of possibility of U.S. civil society, wealth, and state power.

With regard to the spatialization of the “unfree” as “exteriority,” Liberia could have represented such an “unfree” exteriority were it not for its direct social, political, and economic ties to the United States. These ties began at the Liberian state’s origins, founded as it was by Black ex-slaves from the United States with the aid of the American Colonization Society. The Liberian state reflected all the hallmarks of a state modeled in the United States’ image, from its framework, logics, and rationales and modes of governance, to the narrative of liberty and freedom behind such modes of governance that attempted to temporally subsume the internal contradiction of enslavement.⁷⁴ That is, Liberia was based in part on the premise that the expansion and adoption of Western modes of governance contained within it the supposedly inherent capacity to offer “freedom,” suggesting that slavery was and should remain a regretful moment in the United States’ past and not a constitutive element of the United States itself.

Even further, Liberia would offer added faith in such modes of governance, for as Susan Curtis states, Liberia represented hope and inspiration for U.S. Blacks struggling to attain full rights as citizens and escape the violence of Jim Crow.⁷⁵ At the time of the Liberian slavery crisis, this connection between the origins and modes of governance of both states were invoked, albeit in a more negative light. For example, a 1933 article in *American Mercury* by George S. Schuyler stated that the "Aframerican who goes there a resolute advocate of Liberian independence" instead "finds a government combining the worst corruptions of American democracy with complete incompetence and barbaric cruelty."⁷⁶

The Liberian slavery crisis was also impossible to divorce from U.S. state power and Western modes of governance because the United States' principal role in generating the crisis itself. As Schuyler continues in the same article, the "Aframerican" who goes to Liberia also,

*... finds a ruling class that is lazy, shiftless and unprincipled. He finds the trade of the country in the hands of Germans, Britishers, Frenchmen, Dutchmen and Syrians, and the only bank, controlled by the Firestone [Natural Rubber] Company, an American concern. He learns that no one will employ Liberians because of their incurable untrustworthiness.*⁷⁷

These connections made by commentators were of course not baseless. The Firestone Natural Rubber Company and the U.S. government were quickly faulted for the unfair terms of Firestone's lease, and complicity from Americo-Liberian leadership in both the terms of Firestone's tenure in the country and the slavery crisis itself. Even prior to the slavery crisis, the Liberian government recognized that certain provisions were required in the loan agreement with Firestone in order to avoid what they referred to as another "Haiti affair" (i.e., the U.S. occupation of Haiti). The United States' "overcoming" of internal contradiction of colonial slavery was thus long impeded by accounts of the United States' responsibility for many of the corruptions of Liberia and tragedies that may befall it—narratives that were energized come the Liberian slavery crisis.

In telling of the Liberian slavery crisis, U.S. and Liberian commentators frequently pointed to the racial logics of the plantation economy by narrating the crisis in relation to Black peoples' proximity to re-enslavement (including the act of re-enslaving). For example, a longtime advocate of racial equality, R.B. Eleazer, a member of the Atlanta-based Commission on Interracial Cooperation, scored the Liberians in the aftermath of the League of Nations investigation. "One would suppose that two hundred years of bondage in America would have weaned Negroes completely from the traditional practice of slavery. Set free and repatriated on their own continent, one certainly would not have expected American Liberians to enslave benighted natives, less fortunate members of their own race. Yet it appears that this is just what many of them did."⁷⁸ Further, a Brooklyn newspaper remarked on its editorial page in 1931, "It is strange that [in] a country founded as a haven for escaped American Negroes long before the Civil War, and ruled ever since that time by the Negro race, slavery still rears its horrid head."⁷⁹ As Ibrahim Sundiata argues, "the forced labor scandal quickly became part of a revived debate on 'the Negro's place in nature.'"⁸⁰ Yet such accounts of the crisis moved

between negotiations of Black peoples' proximity to re-enslavement as a fact of indigenous Liberians' enslavement by Americo-Liberians, or as a fact of slavery unfortunately befalling the second Black republic, which was regarded as a self-contained unit of sorts. In other words, one set of accounts centered the racial logics of the plantation while another set of accounts privileged the nation itself—a distinction of great importance with regard to U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors' negotiations of the crisis.

Given the political, social, and historical attachments between Liberia and the United States—from the West African country's origins to decades of questionable U.S. involvement in its affairs—U.S. state officials long attempted to maintain the wellbeing of the former. Critically, they did so precisely in relation to the racial logics of the plantation economy. Reminding us that, as Lowe states, “the constitution of knowledge often obscures the conditions of its own making,” U.S. Secretary of State, Elihu Root, stated on January 18, 1909 that “it is unnecessary to argue that the duty of the United States toward the unfortunate victims of the slave trade was not completely performed by landing them upon the coast of Africa, and that our nation rests under the highest obligation to assist them, so far as they need assistance, toward the of free, orderly, and prosperous civil society.”⁸¹ Root's statement performs a number of actions: principally, enunciates the “overcoming” of internal contradiction of slavery by reiterating the U.S.-fostered achievement of freedom and liberty by victims of the slave trade, which itself is narrated as a regrettable moment in the nation's past. Root also overcomes this contradiction by reasserting that the existence of Liberia as a free, orderly, and prosperous civil society is the fullest expression of such freedom and liberty.⁸² These ideas were maintained by U.S. state officials and others, such that once news of the Liberian slavery crisis broke, not only did the slave trade to the Firestone plantation and to Fernando Po need to end, so too did it need to be shown that the social relations of the plantation economy in particular were not hopelessly compromised by white supremacy.

As Root's comment suggest, ending the Liberian slave trade and obfuscating the centrality of racial dispossession to plantation economies would seemingly be achieved through a focus on the ideas of liberty and freedom associated with Liberia, which is to say a “free, orderly, and prosperous civil society” and independent state. Doing so would bolster Western modes of governance and capital accumulation by projecting Liberia's “free, orderly, and prosperous civil society” as the logical extension of Black incorporation within such modes of governance, while distracting from the centrality of racial dispossession to the social relations of the plantation economy, broadly, and the Firestone plantation, specifically. The Liberian slavery crisis coalesced precisely into such a crisis of “Black self-government.” Charles S. Johnson, Black sociologist and one of the primary investigators of the League of Nations' Christy Commission wrote in 1930 that:

*The point at issue is not what is to be done with Liberia, but what is wrong . . . Questions of autonomy, the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a Republic in Africa in the midst of colonies; the capacity of Blacks for self-government; the experience of the British in colonization; the inexperience of America are issues, to my mind, better to be determined by the home government.*⁸³

The Liberian slavery crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s was seen as a crisis not in indigenous Liberian dispossession and enslavement, particularly as constitutive features of the plantation economy. Rather, it was increasingly seen as a crisis in “Black self-government” and Liberian sovereignty. Ultimately, while the Liberian slavery crisis and longer history of U.S.-Liberian relations put pressure on the need to displace of slavery (as well as its coeval conditions with settler colonial dispossession and indentureship), re-orienting the question of slavery away from the plantation and toward the state maintained “freedom” within the modern Western political sphere.⁸⁴ Furthermore, as Lowe states, race itself “is an enduring remainder of the processes through which the human is universalized and freed by liberal forms, while the peoples who created the conditions of possibility for that freedom are assimilated or forgotten.”⁸⁵ In this context, race remained an enduring reminder of such processes yet in a way that maintained “freedom” within the modern Western political sphere while leaving the plantation economy and its racial logics untouched. The following section argues that this diversion was structured by Liberian settler colonialism and its capacity to internalize questions of race.

Section B.

A Crisis in “Negro Self-Rule”: The Slave and Settler Politics of the Liberian Slavery Crisis

The introduction of this dissertation briefly recounted an expansive body of scholarship on plantation geographies and racial capitalism that framed the plantation as a migratory technology of colonization, imperialism, and processes of racial dispossession. Specifically, from Cedric Robinson’s *Black Marxism* to George Beckford’s “plantation economy thesis,” such scholarship argues that the rise of Atlantic slave economies and new world plantation societies generated European and U.S. wealth and exacerbated dispossession among the unfree and indentured, and instituted an incongruous racialized economy that lingered long after emancipation and independence movements in the Americas.⁸⁶ Drawing from this body of scholarship on the entangled geographies—of slavery, post-slavery, and Black dispossession, and capital accumulation, geopolitical power, and racialization—Katherine McKittrick clarified what, precisely, is “migratory” about the plantation. Specifically, McKittrick argues that, as a key spatial unit of Black captivity and fungibility, and toward the production of long-standing, uneven racial geographies, the plantation logic characteristic of (but not identical to) slavery has continued to emerge both ideologically and materially since its inception.⁸⁷ Toward this end, Kris Manjapra elucidates precisely how the [initial] [modern liberal] calling forth of new kinds of post-slave laboring subjects involved manifold ideological and material migrations and “trans-hemispheric entanglements.”⁸⁸ Specifically, looking to the global expansion of the “plantation complex” during the nineteenth century Age of Abolition in the British Empire, Manjapra recounts how the monumental migration of indentured laborers from Asia to the West Indies was matched by other large-scale migrations that traveled in the opposite direction: the movement of assets, capitalists, biota, and discourses about labor mobilization and labor control from the West Indies to Asia.⁸⁹

The movement of assets, capitalists, and biota involved with the migration of the plantation logic that Manjapra attends to also neatly frames the trans-hemispheric entanglements between the Americas, the West African republic of Liberia during the early-twentieth century. As stated, the material and ideological migration of the rubber plantation economy to Liberia began with the massive investment in rubber companies—including Goodyear, the United States Rubber Company, and Firestone Tire and Rubber Company—that had plans to establish rubber plantations across Mexico and Central America.⁹⁰ Such excitement followed from innovations in rubber cultivation that both secured the U.S. supply of rubber and did so much more efficiently and profitably than wild rubber cultivation. Edgar B. Davis, a U.S. entrepreneur had become increasingly familiar with British rubber plantation in Ceylon, South India, Federated Malay States, Strait Settlement, and Java, and the value of vertically integrating rubber plantations with processing and manufacturing.⁹¹ According to Frank Chalk, in May 1910, Davis purchased an old tobacco plantation on the east coast of Sumatra from the Holland American Plantation Company for \$700,000 cash. The 14,511-acre estate, with a labor force of 6,000 Javanese “coolies,” became the nucleus of the U.S. Rubber Company plantations, thus relieving any dependence on an insufficient and wildly fluctuating supply of wild rubber from the Amazon Valley and Africa, and drawing attention away from Mexico and Central America toward Asia.⁹² Following World War I and the British empire’s Stevenson Plan, however, the Asian supply of rubber was no longer tenable. As stated, this led to Harvey Firestone’s venture within Liberia and the establishment of a new and lasting rubber supply.

The movement of discourses about and practices of labor mobilization and labor control also characterizes the trans-hemispheric entanglements between the Americas and the West African republic of Liberia during the early-twentieth century. The emergence of the equivalent of a slave trade between Liberia and the Spanish island of Fernando Po belabors such ideological and material plantation migrations. As stated, it was the labor regime of state- and corporation-coercion to have emerged from Firestone’s plantation in Liberia that informed the relationship between Liberia and Fernando Po, and the destitute conditions laborers across both areas had faced. Even the methods and materials of cocoa production—and, specifically, the cocoa plantations upon which such forced laborers worked—had migrated from the Amazon Basin only a few decades prior. Ironically, although these trans-hemispheric entanglements were constituted by U.S. and European colonization, imperialism, and processes of racial dispossession, the slave crisis they effectuated in Liberia offered U.S. and European state, corporate, and philanthropic actors something else. Specifically, the Liberian slave crisis took place against the backdrop of the 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, which was created under the auspices of the League of Nations and set out to advance the suppression of slavery and the slave trade. In this context, the crisis offered U.S. and European state, corporate, and philanthropic actors a way to ostensibly distance themselves from the colonial, imperial, and racial logics dynamics of the plantation economy and retain the generally hopeful narrative first attached to Firestone’s foray into Liberia.

Taken together, these intertwined histories enunciate the materially and ideologically migratory nature of the plantation. Yet the introduction of this dissertation and the first two chapters addressed the transit of another structure imbricated within global geographies of

colonization, imperialism, and processes of racial dispossession: U.S. settler colonialism. Highlighting one such instantiation of transit, the Liberian state reflected all the hallmarks of a settler state modeled in the United States' image. Americo-Liberian settlers carried with them U.S. sensibilities—from sentimental attachments to the U.S., to clothing preferences, home construction methods, diet, the English language, the Christian religion, and monogamy. They also carried with them practices, logics, and rationales of settler expansion [CITE: AKPAN whole article]]. Alongside being an outgrowth of the U.S. settler state, Liberia's origins are also entangled with the global expansion of the plantation complex. As stated, Liberia was founded in the early nineteenth century by Black ex-slaves from the United States with the aid of the American Colonization Society (ACS). Critically, it was founded with the widely-held belief that settlement could act as a safety valve for the United States' own plantation economy while also offering manumitted slaves a new life. The intertwined transit of the plantocracy and the settler state that Liberia encompasses was crystallized by Booker T. Washington's statement to the Liberian president, Daniel Howard, that "the whole future of Liberia hinges upon its ability to get hold of the native population," that a redress of the very real grievances of tribal Liberians was a prerequisite to both civil concord and settlement of chronic border disturbances.⁶³ Although Washington had died before Firestone got a foothold in the West African country, he long advocated for the development of the same model of industrial education and manual training that aimed to accommodate Black peoples to the postbellum plantation economy of the U.S. South.

The success of Firestone Natural Rubber Company's rubber plantation in Liberia, and the overwhelming profit and influence that came with it, hinged upon this settler relationality. Americo-Liberian hut taxes, work taxes, crop liens, and forced work commands, prompted many such rebellions: from the Grebo Rebellion of 1910 and the Kru rebellion in 1915, to the Gola Rebellion in 1918 and the Kpelle rebellion in 1920. While these rebellions were ultimately crushed by armed and U.S.-backed counterinsurgency efforts, the broader strategy of the Americo-Liberian government was to "increasingly implement a framework of indirect rule by which local chiefs friendly to the government were recognized as proper representatives of their respective tribes."⁹³ When the Firestone Natural Rubber Company was established outside Monrovia, this relationship between the government and local chiefs was utilized toward the drafting of forced laborers for the rubber plantation. Put another way, indigenous Liberians from the "hinterland" were the raw material for the accumulation of wealth and exercise of political power that was the U.S. government and Firestone sought in the West African country. Furthermore, the forced labor of indigenous Liberians empowered the Liberian government and military as well. As Theodore Marriner of the Department of State told Assistant Secretary of State William Castle that "it is believed possible that President King may have derived some profit from the transaction" that was witnessed in the port of Sinoe.⁹⁴

Following the 1930 Christy Commission's confirmation and condemnation of the Liberian slave trade, U.S. state officials had only a handful of options: (1) withdraw from Liberian affairs, leaving the country alone to contend with the European colonial powers; (2) accept a League of Nations mandate over the country; (3) exercise camouflaged control through the Firestone Natural Rubber Company; (4) assist Liberia in its own program of reform; or (5) collaborate with

the League of Nations in drafting inaugurating a plan of reform.⁹⁵ Despite conflicting tendencies within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, U.S. state officials made clear that the U.S. would not intervene in ways that it had in years past and elsewhere. For example, Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of State in 1930, declared stated that "this government has no intention whatsoever . . . of intervening in Liberia."⁹⁶ Even further, J.P. Moffat of the U.S. Department of State stated that "if by intervention is meant the use of a form of compulsion by this Government against Liberia it is quite correct to say that this Government has *never* intervened in the affairs of Liberia."⁹⁷ The United States maintained that position despite mounting public pressure. The United States also maintained this position despite pressure from Firestone himself. Alongside pushing for intervention through the League of Nations, Firestone urged the federal government to intervene in Liberian affairs when it became apparent that Firestone's loans to the Black republic were in jeopardy.⁹⁸ The U.S. (and British) government ultimately opted to follow the first of the Christy Commission's recommendation by cutting diplomatic ties entirely with the Liberian government. In May of 1935, only after the Liberian government's implementation of some portion of the suggested reforms, did President Franklin D. Roosevelt restore formal diplomatic recognition of the Liberian government.

The trans-hemispheric entanglements behind the Liberian slave crisis, and Firestone and the United States' relationship to the crisis, opened up new discourses about and practices of labor mobilization, labor control, and the plantation economy, and new negotiations of existing discourses and practices of each. Critically, these and existing elements of the expansion of the plantation complex into West Africa during the early-twentieth also hinged upon the structure of Liberian settler colonialism. Specifically, Firestone's push for the United States to intervene politically and militarily in Liberian affairs, and the United States' response of non-intervention (and non-engagement altogether until some reforms were put into place), illustrates a distinct approach to the crisis: the Liberian slave crisis was a crisis not in indigenous Liberian dispossession and enslavement, but a crisis in "Black self-government" and Liberian sovereignty. As Lisa Lowe states, the development of modern racial governmentality in which a political, economic, and social hierarchy ranging from "free" to "unfree" was deployed in the management of the diverse labors of metropolitan and colonized peoples. Critically, Lowe states, this racial governmentality managed and divided through the liberal myth of inclusive freedom that simultaneously disavowed settler appropriation and symbolized freedom as the introduction of free labor and the abolition of slavery.⁹⁹ Yet, through its shared migratory plantation and settler genealogy, the Liberian context offers further insight into the development of modern racial governmentality. Specifically, it offers a way to trace how the disavowal of Liberian settler appropriation—by framing the Liberian slavery crisis as a question of Liberian sovereignty—facilitated the elision of processes of racial dispossession constitutive of the plantation complex and plantation geographies. The Liberian context also offers insight into the ways in which this approach to the crisis facilitated new ways for the United States to remake peoples and places as things in the service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power. Put another way, it offers a way to early-twentieth century innovations in U.S. imperialism and the risk management of transnational racial capitalism.

Section C.

“The Native Problem in Africa”: On Economic Imperialism and Plantation Reform

The implications of the 1930 Christy Commission were indeed far-reaching: U.S. state officials agreed with the report’s findings, and when the Liberian government failed to incorporate most of the suggested reforms and Liberian President Charles D. B. King and Vice-president Allen N. Yancy both resigned, diplomatic ties between the United States and Liberia were severed. Yet the Christy Commission was not the only major indictment of the United States’ and Firestone’s influence in the second Black republic. In 1928—two years prior to the Christy Commission, and one year before the U.S. Department of State received word of an ongoing slave trade in the West African country—Raymond Leslie Buell authored a comprehensive report, *The Native Problem in Africa*.¹⁰⁰ Published under the auspices of the Harvard Bureau of International Research, and with support by the Rockefeller Foundation, the report predicted an impending slave crisis and indicted the governments of the United States and Liberia, and the Firestone Natural Rubber Company for their role in creating it. Like most U.S. state officials, private actors, and public commentators, regardless of their stance on whether the United States should intervene diplomatically, politically, or militarily, Buell framed the Liberian slavery crisis as a question of Liberian sovereignty more so than one of indigenous dispossession. In other words, the “native problem in Africa” was thus a problem of colonial governance and foreign economic influence. In order to trace how exactly the problem of the Liberian slavery crisis was oriented principally toward questions of sovereignty and toward what ends, this section follows the case developed by Buell and the response it received from U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors. In short, Buell’s indictment framed the crisis as principally an administrative and economic concern, and the recommendations involving a move away from U.S. “economic imperialism.”

Raymond Leslie Buell (1896-1946) was born in Chicago, Illinois. Despite a relatively short life, produced much research and held many distinguished positions in international affairs. Buell taught history, economics, and government at Harvard, Princeton, and Columbia; from 1927 to 1933, he was research director for the New York City-based Foreign Policy Association, and in 1934 he became the organization’s president. During his leadership of the organization, he was also chairman of the Commission on Cuban Affairs in 1934, which was organized in response to an invitation extended on March 28, 1934 by Cuban President Carlos Mendieta to Buell himself.¹⁰¹ The attention Buell garnered followed in part from the extensive work and incisive critique involved with his report, *The Native Problem in Africa*. Buell spent fifteen months in 1925 and 1926 in Africa and in the European capitals of the colonial powers. Across both sites, he travelled, observed, conversed, and collected documents on the matter of European colonial governance in Africa and U.S. involvement in African affairs (given that at the time, the United States held no official colonies on the continent). Buell treated each of the fourteen territories (including Liberia, although not an official “territory”) in separate sections of his report. Across each, he gives attention to the histories of each territories; their systems of colonial government, justice, and policing; indigenous land and labor issues within each territory; the effect of U.S. and European agricultural concessions, mining operations, industry and settlement; and the health, education, and welfare of indigenous peoples. His two-volume

report received a great deal of attention across a number of outlets, with lecture invitations, reviews appearing in a number of international affairs journals, and initiations from non-U.S. state officials to conduct analogous investigations.¹⁰²

Not unlike Lewis Meriam's 1928 report, *The Problem of Indian Administration*, which set out to assess the ways in which U.S. federal Indian law and policy had for years undermined both Native peoples' wellbeing and U.S. governance of Native affairs, *The Native Problem in Africa* similarly assessed colonial involvement in Africa with the same goals: improving the wellbeing of indigenous peoples across the continent and ensuring the smooth continuation of colonial governance. While Liberia was not a colony nor an official U.S. protectorate, the moral, social, political, and economic obligation U.S. state, corporate, philanthropic, and missionary actors maintained toward the country was not unknown to Buell. In *The Native Problem in Africa*, Buell ultimately charged that the "Firestone Plantations Company is making it financially worthwhile for the government [of Liberia] and for the chiefs to keep the plantations supplied [with slave labor]." Further, in its ongoing support for Firestone, the U.S. government had "apparently thrown its influence against the native farmer in favor of the outside capitalist."¹⁰³ In response to the report's publication, the U.S. Department of State soon carried out a concerted effort to discredit Buell. The campaign involved all the main actors: Assistant Secretary of State William Castle, Acting Secretary of State Reuben Clark, Liberian President Charles D.B. King of Liberia, the *Associated Press*, the Firestone family, and Thomas Jesse Jones. For example, Buell was expected to give a talk in Williamstown, Virginia, on August 29, 1928 as part of the report's release. Yet, under pressure from the U.S. Department of State, he chose not to. Additionally, the U.S. Department of State arranged for the *Associated Press* to handle a statement from King if he wished to rebut Buell along the lines suggested by the Firestone Natural Rubber Company.¹⁰⁴ The *Wall Street Journal* at this time also reported the U.S. Department of State's criticism of Buell's numerous "inaccuracies."¹⁰⁵

As seen in the topics of the 1928 Meriam Report, "suffering and discontent," the "causes of poverty" and the risk posed by "leaving sub-standard people alone" were emergent rubrics through which policymakers defined in an official capacity the problems of U.S.-Indian relations. In other words, the problem of U.S. settler colonialism that the Meriam Report posed was supposedly one of poverty, which then necessitated the provision of nominal self-government and a constellation of efforts to facilitate a Native market agrarianism. *The Native Problem in Africa* makes similar moves with regard to colonial policy across Africa, U.S. policy toward Liberia, and the Liberian slavery crisis in particular. While it is clear the provision and maintenance of Liberian self-government was long-standing, the nature of the slavery crisis forced a more nuanced engagement, which Buell's report prompted and clarified immensely. Not strictly a threat posed by the "capitalist," but the "outside capitalist," such terms of Buell's analysis—terms that would be negotiated by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors—involved three linked sets of translations, so to speak: First, such terms maintained labor and economic relations as the governing frame of the slavery crisis. Second, such terms framed the risk management involved with the Liberian slavery crisis as one oriented toward the threat that the U.S.-backed "outside capitalist" posed to Liberian sovereignty—the second Black republic in the world. These elements of the report ultimately hinge upon the capacity of the

administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism to internalize race matter, in effect leaving the racial logics of the plantation economy untouched.

First, by framing the risk of Africa's contact with Euro-American power as one born of unfair labor conditions and poverty, Buell's particular negotiation rendered economic the crisis itself as well as the plantation economy more broadly. Buell's central contention regarding colonial governance in Africa, including the United States' unofficial protectorate of Liberia, follows from the supposedly inherent difference between Africa, and American and European powers. As he states, "Africa is in contact with Western industrialization, and its economic development seems inevitable." Already, Buell begins to suggest the troublesome labor conditions that grow from economic development and the impact upon indigenous lifeways. Buell continues:

. . . the violent change in the habits of the native in entering upon continuous labor, the extensive labor necessary for the construction of roads and railroads, which are a sine qua non of further development, and the spread of diseases incidental to the increase of communications, not to mention the probable introduction of abuses like military service, alcoholic beverages and social evils, are likely to destroy the native.

Buell is stating that the problem with colonial governance across Africa is that its own massive labor needs and the troublesome means by which they are met would ultimately "render impossible the very economic development which was planned."¹⁰⁶ In doing so, Buell essentially translated questions of indigenous dispossession into questions of the form and pace of economic development. This framing was effective in obfuscated the ways in which race permeates capitalism's social structures, broadly, and the plantation economy, in particular. Rather, *The Native Problem in Africa* privileged the economy as a normative category for governance under the rubrics of liberty and sovereignty.¹⁰⁷

Second, Buell's approach to the crisis also privileged the nation as a normative category for governance under the rubrics of liberty and sovereignty. That *The Native Problem in Africa* translated the issue of the growing trade of enslaved indigenous Liberian into a number of geo-economic concerns was consistent with broader shifts taking place at the time. As addressed in Chapter 1, according to political theorist Timothy Mitchell, "the development of the economy as a discursive object between the 1930s and 1950s provided a new, everyday political language in which the nation-state could speak of itself and imagine its existence as something natural, spatially bounded, and subject to political management." In other words, notions of the modern economy as a self-evident totality ultimately underwrote an emergent conception of the nation-state and its indispensable role in economic growth.¹⁰⁸ While Buell's report moves toward such ends, it is most notable for the fact that the plantation economy in Liberia and its racial logics are the raw material of the development of the economy and nation as normative categories for governance. In other words, Buell effectively translates questions of indigenous dispossession into questions of the form and pace of economic development, and the resilience of Liberian sovereignty and self-government against the incursion of U.S. transnational capital.

The administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism was central to this emphasis of Liberian resilience against the incursion of U.S. transnational capital—a shift that took place in service of the elision of the racial logics of the plantation economy. One of Buell’s central arguments and recommendations concerns the increasingly familiar need to reduce colonial administration in order to foster some degree of self-government. Buell suggests that to do otherwise would again undermine the very economic development which was planned—not unlike that which Lewis Meriam and his team argued with regard to Indian administration that same year in the Meriam Report. Buell argues that the violent change in the livelihoods of indigenous Africans, which undermined national and economic development across the continent, necessitated new efforts and strategies to ensure such maintenance and “development.” Principal among such efforts would be colonial administration that is as indirect as possible.¹⁰⁹ Such a policy would indeed be a clear break from the decades and centuries of direct colonial rules, territorial expansion, and labor expropriation across the continent.¹¹⁰ Yet in the Liberian context, Buell approaches the “maintenance and development of native tribal life,” beginning with his understanding of the source of the growing slavery crisis: Firestone’s U.S.-backed role in the West African country. Buell states:

By accepting the Firestone concession and the Firestone loan, the Liberian Government has accomplished its diplomatic aim; it has anchored American interests in the country and thus forestalled the real or imaginary aggressions of England and of France. But increased economic activity in Liberia will impose additional exactions upon the native population which may lead to grave abuses. The United States may thus find itself in the position of fostering conditions in Liberia which will make forced labor almost inevitable, and at the same time of shielding Liberia from the efforts of outside opinion to protect the native population.¹¹¹

Buell follows his understanding of the issue and the United States’ role in it with a statement on how, exactly, he believes “the maintenance and development of native tribal life” could be secured. First and foremost, he points to the need for the Liberian administration to cope with the burden of U.S. capital. Only if the “administration proves unable to cope with the increasing burden which the entrance of American capital will impose upon it,” Buell states, “the American Government may by the sheer force of events be obliged to terminate the independence of Liberia, not only to protect American interests but to safeguard the aboriginal population.”¹¹² Put another way, in pinning the deterioration of indigenous Liberian life on the unsustainable labor demands of the Firestone plantation on Firestone and the United States, and stating that “the development of native production . . . will be necessarily checked by the Firestone operations,” Buell defers to the Americo-Liberian settler population and Americo-Liberian leadership.¹¹³ In this light, Buell quickly frames the primary anxiety not as one of the further deterioration of indigenous Liberian life, but of what the failure of the Americo-Liberian leadership in reining in the problem might lead to. Referring to U.S. occupation, Buell states, “Already some Liberians are beginning to wonder they are not going the way of Haiti and the Philippines.”¹¹⁴ While Buell may have entered his investigation into Liberia with the wellbeing of indigenous Liberians of principal concern, the administrative structure of Liberian settler

colonialism forced Buell to defer to the nation and economy as normative categories for governance under the rubrics of liberty and sovereignty.

In this context, Buell's report aids in the rhetorical shift in the subject of Black peoples' proximity to re-enslavement that was often invoked in assessments of the crisis. As stated, critical accounts of the crisis by U.S. state officials, commentators, and private actors moved between negotiations of Black peoples' proximity to re-enslavement as a fact of indigenous Liberians' enslavement by Americo-Liberians, or as a fact of slavery unfortunately befalling the second Black republic. In other words, one set of accounts centered the racial logics of the plantation while another set of accounts privileged the nation itself. For the reasons described, *The Native Problem in Africa* privileged the latter, thus alleviating the pressure the crisis placed on the ongoing need within the Western political sphere to deny colonial slavery and the plantation economy as the condition of possibility for civil society itself. While the racial logics of the plantation disappeared, race remained as a category for governance, yet one strictly framed by the economy and nation. Specifically, identification with the Americo-Liberian oligarchy—rather than the indigenous Liberians who were the ones enslaved—still left room to cultivate and prove the capacity of Blacks to govern themselves. The conversation in this light was then one of moving away from the defunct or potentially "pre-capitalist" modes of governance toward something that could be akin to U.S. governance post-emancipation. Regardless of the continued existence of the Firestone Natural Rubber Company's massive plantation outside the capital of Kakata, it could still supposedly be shown by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors that the social relations of capitalist modernity were not hopelessly compromised by white supremacy.

The privileging of Liberian resilience against the incursion of U.S. transnational capital by notable Black critics of U.S. racial capitalism belabored the capacity of the administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism to elide the racial logics of the plantation economy. As Robinson states, W.E.B Du Bois in the 1920s was himself "importuning the American government and American capital"—from white philanthropic and corporate capital to Black venture capital—"to support his own versions of Liberian development."¹¹⁵ For example, in January 1923, writing to Secretary of State Hughes, Du Bois had spoken of federal protection for Black venture capital: 'If the matter were properly presented to Black America, and if the colored people were safe-guarded from the exploitations which might arise in such a project, they could loan considerable money to Liberia.'¹¹⁶ Robinson recounts how in October 1925, DuBois wrote to Harvey Firestone, suggesting that Firestone's "experiment in Liberia" might employ "Colored Americans of education and experience" among his "industrial personnel." Declaring his hope for a new day for Liberia under Firestone, he told Firestone: "I believe that in this way you can inaugurate one of the greatest and most far reaching reforms in the relations between white industrial countries like America and Black, partly developed countries like Liberia." Du Bois is clear in his investment in the success of the state of Liberia and, by extension, Black peoples globally. His vision of improved relations and a better day for Black peoples globally, and the second Black republic in particular, hinges upon the same promises Firestone and others offered: "if it can once be proven that industry can do the same thing in a Black country like Liberia that it does in a white country like Australia: that is, invade it, reform

it and uplift it by incorporating the native born into the imported industry and thus make the industry a part of the country.”¹¹⁷ Du Bois’ thoughts on Firestone’s potential in the West African country are thus suffused with statements reflecting his faith in the Liberian government, the social relations of capitalist modernity, broadly, and the plantation economy, in particular. In other words, the racial and colonial logic of the plantation get elided while the supposed achievements that would come to the Black republic get privileged.

The capacity of the administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism to internalize the racial logics of the plantation was apparent in Du Bois own definition of “the native problem in Africa.” In October 1928, Du Bois put forth a critique of Buell’s report that was published in *The World Tomorrow* magazine. As Du Bois states:

*The fact is patent that capitalistic industry as organized at present does work and achieve surprisingly successful results in Europe and America. But all men know that these results are becoming in great measure dependent upon the profits of capitalistic industry in Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world.” Especially in Africa, modern industry is working untold ill and the difficulty with Mr. Buell’s otherwise excellent work is that he either does not realize this or does not think it wise resolutely to face this aspect of the problem.*¹¹⁸

What these lines in Du Bois’ review offer is continued recognition that the end of slavery in the United States in the nineteenth century marked the generalization on a global scale of the racial and imperial vision of the “empire of cotton,” and that the wealth and power accumulated still went to U.S. and European whites. Yet Du Bois proposed resolution to the problem within the African context is simply Black leadership of such relations of capital, which itself requires greater education of Black Africans, among other investments. Drawing on his understanding of capital accumulation and state power within the United States, Du Bois states:

*We Black men in America have lived through all this desperate attempt to deprive us of educated modern leadership, to laugh Black college men out of court, and to make us dumbly accept white tutelage. We have beaten this effort into submission to the fact that Black America is going to have a voice in Black America’s fate. Black Africa must and will do the same or die trying.*¹¹⁹

In short, Du Bois joined Buell’s warning about U.S. economic imperialism with calls for a strengthened Black leadership without differentiating between the Americo-Liberian settler population from the indigenous Liberians who served as raw material for the operation of Liberia and Fernando Po’s plantation economies. In doing so, Du Bois’ ultimately contributes to the obfuscation of the racial logics of slavery as well as its coeval conditions of capital accumulation, colonial dispossession, and indentureship. Even after official word of the Liberian slavery crisis broke, DuBois, at least in public, still minimized the injustices perpetrated by the Americo-Liberian ruling class and its foreign collaborators. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1933, Du Bois concluded: “Liberia is not faultless. She lacks training, experience and thrift. But her chief crime is to be Black and poor in a rich, white world; and in precisely that portion of the world

where color is ruthlessly exploited as a foundation for American and European wealth."¹²⁰ While Robinson attributes this ongoing investment in Black self-government, broadly, to Du Bois' bourgeois faith in the state, it was arguably a faith made actionable through the administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism, which could internalize questions of race, broadly, and obfuscate the racial logics of the planation, specifically.¹²¹

Section C.

The Imperial Problem in Africa; The Race Problem in the United States

Buell wrote much on the form of United States' and Firestone's involvement in Liberia and the consequences should it continue. As stated, Buell charged that the labor demands of the Firestone plantation fomented the slave trade and that U.S.-backing of Firestone should also be met with U.S.-led constraints on its operations. Specifically, Buell states, "the American State Department cooperated in this plan and [thus] . . . Liberia today is under the financial domination of the Firestone interests and its allies."¹²² Yet Buell's indictment of U.S. state power and transnational capital, and his analysis of their role in the Liberian slave trade, goes even further. Pointing to the U.S.-backed Firestone Natural Rubber Company's central role in the crisis, Buell states that Firestone and other investors in the fledgling republic "are confident that the labor is there . . . [yet] after investing their capital, they find that the labor is not forthcoming in large enough numbers to keep their capital employed, and having thousands of dollars at stake, knowing little of the social organization of the continent, and believing that the native would work if he was not lazy, they come to demand that the government impose compulsion not only to spare them financial loss but 'to do the native good.'"¹²³ Buell asserts that his analysis and prediction of the increasing need to secure and maintain an adequate labor supply through compulsion is not simply conjecture: "Already this cycle has begun to turn in Liberia . . . and the time will soon come when, confronted by an acute labor shortage, he will utilize the machinery at his disposal to conscript men wherever they can be found." In 1928, *The Native Problem in Africa* was the greatest indictment of U.S. state power and transnational capital in Africa.

Buell was not incorrect in his predictions. Within two years the Christy Commission confirmed any remaining suspicions of modern day slave trade—one carried out by the ruling class and military of the West African country and done so with under the terms of U.S. and Firestone economic and political influence. Yet the terms of Buell's indictment extended beyond the circumstances within Liberia alone. Instead, Buell pointed to Liberia as emblematic of a number of troubling dynamics of U.S. foreign policy and transnational capital. During a lecture give during a press conference after the report's release, Buell stated, "The State Department gladly accepted obligations which may sooner or later make Liberia into another Haiti or Nicaragua. It is difficult to find in the history of international relations a better example of secret diplomacy in the worst sense of the word."¹²⁴ Such "secret diplomacy," Buell argued, led to the circumstances witnessed then. Buell's indictment of the United States and Firestone went even further, ultimately framing his case against U.S. policy toward the West African country as one of "economic imperialism." This was the title of a 1930 piece in *Forum and Century* that Buell

published concerning the United States' and Firestone's involvement in Liberia. Buell's framing of the "native farmer" against the "outside capitalist" thus signaled his broader understanding of the U.S. role in Africa. In other words, the circumstances in Liberia emblemized the most destitute expression U.S. empire and transnational capitalism.

From this particular indictment of the United States' and Firestone's involvement in Liberia and exploitation of its indigenous population, Buell states what he believes their responsibility to the West African nation should be. Given his framing of the issue as one not limited to Liberia alone, which represents only one example of "secret diplomacy" and "economic imperialism," Buell's recommendations are just as expansive. He states:

In a colony, the administration of which is responsible to European opinion, the activities of European capital are subject to some form of restraint. But Liberia is an independent country in control of a Negro aristocracy which in the past has not been over-diligent in its concern for the aboriginal population. In such a country, it is probable that foreign capital, once entrenched, will have a relatively free hand. In theory the American State Department should attempt to prevent the abuses of American capital abroad. Instead of controlling the investment of such capital, it seems to have indiscriminately encouraged it without consideration of the social consequences.¹²⁵

According to Buell, while colonial administrations are beholden to popular opinion in the metropole, no such natural restraints existed for the Firestone corporation. In other words, the administrative structure of Liberian settler colonialism *necessitated* this focus on national and economic matters—namely, U.S.-led restraints upon U.S. transnational capital. In this way, unrestrained transnational capital is rendered a corrupting agent. It can corrupt labor relations and governance, and place unsustainable demands on indigenous peoples. Yet, according to Buell, and through the lens of the administrative structure of Liberian settler colonialism, transnational capital also carries with it the potential to propel Liberian national development and improve the wellbeing of Liberia's indigenous peoples. All that is required is supposedly more regulatory involvement by U.S. state officials, ultimately effectuating the elision of the dynamics of racial dispossession constitutive of the plantation economy.

Thus far, this chapter has argued that Buell effectively translated questions of indigenous Liberian dispossession vis-à-vis the Firestone plantation into questions of the form and pace of economic development, and the resilience of Liberian sovereignty and self-government against the incursion of U.S. transnational capital. In doing so, Buell privileged the economy and nation as normative categories for governance while the racial logics of the plantation economy were effectively elided. Yet, as Buell's attention to the "Negro aristocracy" throughout the chapter on Liberia within *The Native Problem in Africa* suggests, the privileging of one over the other were linked processes, with the latter serving as the raw material for the former. As Buell states, "Africa is the one continent of the world where the application of intelligence, knowledge and goodwill . . . will prevent the development of the *acute racial difficulties* which have elsewhere

arisen, and the evils of which have been recognized only after they have come into existence" (emphasis added).¹²⁶ The significance of Buell's statement and the distinction drawn cannot be understated. Where Buell understands the U.S.-backed "outside capitalist" as pitted against the "native farmer," a more favorable approach to Liberian affairs by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors would supposedly undermine the possibility of the further dispossession of the "native farmer." As it was "secret diplomacy" and "economic imperialism" in Africa began to reproduce the "acute racial difficulties" that have arisen elsewhere and elsewhere, reformed U.S. state power and transnational capitalism would resolve the "native problem in Africa" (or at least in Liberia). In this way, the dynamics of racial dispossession constitutive of plantation economy are entirely elided and in fact serve as the raw material for the privileging of the economy and nation as normative categories for governance under the rubrics of liberty and sovereignty. It is not difficult to assume that the "acute racial difficulties" Buell referenced were the dynamics of racial dispossession involved with the plantation economy. After all, Buell published *The Native Problem in Africa* at the height of Jim Crow and in the wake of the failure of Reconstruction and the race riots that inaugurated the 1920s, and amidst concerted efforts to make segregation palatable to both U.S. Blacks and whites. The reemergence of such abject racial violence born of the plantation economy in the African context—particularly with U.S. support—would be both undesirable and unacceptable, because it would recall the United States' own "growing pains."¹²⁷

Where exactly Buell located the "acute difficulties of race" vis-à-vis the emerging Liberian slavery crisis further clarifies how the racial logics of the plantation economy also served as the raw material for the privileging of the economy and nation as normative categories for governance. Specifically, *The Native Problem in Africa* arguably locates the "acute difficulties of race" not in the Black peoples' enslavement (i.e., the enslavement of indigenous Liberians), but in Black peoples' enslaving of others. This problem is represented as a crisis in Americo-Liberian self-government, which itself serves as a proxy for a crisis in Black self-government more broadly. Buell states, "the Liberians realize . . . the negro race is on trial before the world. They feel, with some justification, that the white races have not given them a fair chance to prove their capabilities." Yet, as Buell states, "the task of the educated negro in Liberia is much more difficult than the problem merely of governing himself." He continues, "It is particularly difficult because of the even greater problem of ruling the aboriginal native in the hinterland."¹²⁸ This framing of the "native problem in Africa," and Liberia in particular, effectively cements the translation of the racial logics of dispossession into problems of self-government and the economy—these become the terms and frameworks through which race is governed. In other words, the exploitation of indigenous Liberians vis-à-vis Liberia's plantation economy all but disappears in Buell's approach to the Liberian slavery crisis, ultimately internalized within the administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism and invited a new approach to the United States involvement in Liberian affairs.

PART 3.

The Liberian Slavery and the Limits of U.S. Empire

Despite conflicting tendencies within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus, one position was clear: when it came to the Liberia slavery crisis, U.S. unilateral military and political intervention and control were not on the table. In response to calls for intervention by Henry Carter, the interim U.S. Charge d’Affaires at Monrovia, Henry L. Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of State in 1930, asserted the anti-occupation stance of the United States.¹²⁹ As stated, J.P. Moffat of the U.S. Department of State further distanced the U.S. Government from such a response, stating political and military intervention in Liberia were “never” on the table.¹³⁰ It was clear that the U.S. did not want the full “burden” of Liberia. The previous two parts of this chapter argued that disavowal of Liberian settler appropriation—by framing the Liberian slavery crisis as crisis in “Negro self-rule” and Liberian sovereignty and not a crisis in indigenous Liberian dispossession and enslavement—facilitated the elision of processes of racial dispossession constitutive of the plantation complex and plantation geographies. These statements by U.S. state officials signal how this approach to the Liberian slavery crisis—an approach that normed the nation and economy as objects of governance—was built into emergent articulations of what could be considered an official U.S. anti-imperialism. In other words, the racial logics of the plantation economy served as the raw material not just for the privileging of nation and economy vis-à-vis Liberia, but also U.S. imperial governmentality more broadly.

Section A.

From Occupation to Assistance: A Genealogy of an Official U.S. Anti-Imperialism

Much of the reason for the United States’ seemingly non-interventionist and non-coercive stance on the Liberian slavery crisis came down to preempting the risk posed to U.S. state power and transnational capital should it be seen as operating in some imperial fashion. U.S. Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson clearly stated that the United States would not intervene in Liberian affairs. Yet the underlying rationale of this stance was laid out by U.S. Department of State official Ellis O. Briggs (Division of Western European Affairs) in a special memorandum that quickly followed Stimson’s declaration. Briggs stated any sort of overt involvement in Liberia, the United States would have risked leaving the lasting impression that Liberia was a “virtual American colony in Africa.”¹³¹ Yet the concern over a “virtual colony” extended beyond the financial and political burden involved with such involvement and was more so a matter of the lasting impression itself. Specifically, Briggs states that such control would unquestionably arouse “the suspicion of Europe and South America.” Thus, Briggs concluded, “no compensating gain, in profit or in prestige, would accrue to the United States.” As such, any control would have to be indirect, temporary, and multilateral, akin to the institution of an International Governing Commission through the League of Nations.¹³² In this way, U.S. state as well as corporate and philanthropic actors, may ameliorate any such growing suspicion directed toward them and thus preempt any major destabilization of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism.

Toward the adoption of what might be considered an “official anti-imperialism” with regard to Liberia, U.S. state officials from diplomats to the U.S. president followed the terms and recommendations so neatly crystallized by Buell. Specifically, it adopted an official anti-imperialism that spoke to Buell’s indictment of U.S. involvement in Liberia as one of “secret diplomacy” and “economic imperialism.” Specifically, it ruled out an official occupation of Liberia yet did so largely in relation to the demands that Harvey Firestone was placing upon U.S. state officials. Specifically, Secretary of State Stimson directed his declaration of non-intervention directly to Firestone himself, stating that he “saw no likelihood of the American government being willing to assume responsibility in Liberia across the Atlantic” and that the problem of reform in Liberia “would have to be eventually handled by the League of Nations with such advice or help as [the United States] can give them, whatever that might be.”¹³³ Instead, the U.S. position more closely followed Buell’s assessment of the crisis: “instead of controlling the investment of such capital, it seems to have indiscriminately encouraged it without consideration of the social consequences.”¹³⁴ Upon this terrain of critique of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism, the push by U.S. state officials was one toward seemingly fairer economic relations. Specifically, U.S. state officials gestured toward offering something akin to the application of intelligence, knowledge and good will that Buell suggested—the material practices of what might be considered an “official anti-imperialism” with regard to the West African country.

And as the previous section argued, Buell’s framework ultimately framed capital in particular as the primary corrupting agent (of labor conditions and conditions of governance) and invited a more “appropriate” and regulative response. The official anti-imperialism cultivated by U.S. state officials was one that increasingly figured U.S. imperialism not solely as territorial ambitions and political control, but, more centrally, as coercive economic involvement. This cohered with Buell’s framework of the ills of unrestrained capital and the more disinterested and regulatory role that the United States should play. This particular approach to an official anti-imperialism with regard to Liberia culminated in the mid-1930s under President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Refusing to interfere in Liberian internal affairs, FDR wrote in a 1933 memorandum to the U.S. Department of State that, “I think we should continue the present policy [of working with the League of Nations] with, however, the clear understanding that we are not guaranteeing moneys due the Firestones or making our continued interest depend on Firestone’s financial interest.” In the sharpest turn away from Firestone, and the clearest declaration of how exactly U.S. state officials understood the regulatory role that the United States would play with regard to U.S. transnational capital, Roosevelt continued, “At all times we should remember that Firestone went into Liberia at his own financial risk and it is not the business of the State Department to pull his financial chestnuts out of the fire except as a friend of the Liberian people.”¹³⁵ The “fire” was that of the difficulty of the Liberian government’s loan repayment to Firestone sparked by the Great Depression-induced revenue shortfall for the country—an otherwise ideal pretext for U.S. intervention given its history with Firestone and the country. Yet, by the mid-1930s, such a course of action was effectively politically unacceptable. Instead, the anti-imperial stance that U.S. state officials put forth extended beyond an ostensibly anti-occupation approach to U.S. foreign policy and hinge upon a seemingly fairer economic relationship to other countries.

Toward a new type of U.S.-Liberian relationality, U.S. imperialism with regard to Liberia was defined by Buell, U.S. state officials, and commentators as principally an economic matter, with the lack of outright occupation an increasingly foregone conclusion. The growing emphasis on economic imperialism vis-à-vis U.S.-Liberian relations paralleled broader material and discursive shifts taking place globally vis-a-vis U.S. foreign policy—namely, from U.S. state officials describing the United States ostensibly involvement abroad in relation to territorial ambitions to describing such involvement in relation to economic ambitions. The adoption of an official anti-imperialism began with the ostensibly non-interventionist framework of the "Monroe Doctrine" of 1823. Specifically, the stated objective of the Monroe Doctrine was to free the newly independent colonies of Latin America from European intervention and avoid situations which could make the New World a battleground for the Old-World powers. Under the doctrine, efforts by European nations to take control of any independent state in North or South America were viewed as "the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."¹³⁶ At the same time, the doctrine noted that the United States would recognize and not interfere with existing European colonies, nor would it meddle in the internal concerns of European countries. In other words, the doctrine served to separate "New World" conflicts from "Old World" conflicts. Yet the goal of avoiding intervention only extended to European colonial power, for this central tenet of U.S. foreign policy took shape in the frequent deployment of armed forces across Latin America, recurring dynamics of social, political, and economic intervention, and ongoing occupations.

Toward the early twentieth century adoption of an official anti-imperialism oriented around economic relations, a key shift in the Monroe Doctrine took place during the turn of the century: the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine and the policy of "Dollar Diplomacy." President Theodore Roosevelt's 1904 "Roosevelt Corollary" maintained that if any nation in the Western Hemisphere appeared politically and financially unstable so as to *appear vulnerable* to European control, the United States had the right and obligation to intervene. The non-interventionist approach to U.S. and European affairs in Africa and elsewhere thus led to even greater U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs. Such frameworks for intervention and involvement in Latin American affairs took on precisely the note that Buell warned against: from 1909 to 1913, under the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary, President William Howard Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox characterized and carried out such foreign policy as one of "Dollar Diplomacy," which was set out to advance U.S. interests abroad by encouraging the investment of U.S. capital in other states. In other words, financial investment, with the support of U.S. military and political strength, was cemented as a central strategy in securing U.S. interests across the region. This approach to U.S. influence across the region extended to Liberia, where U.S. loans were given in 1913 amidst a troubled Liberian economy.

These policies set the stage for an official anti-imperialism with a distinctly economic and national governing frame—one positioned against U.S. support of the most extractive and destructive operations of U.S. transnational capital. For example, incoming President Woodrow Wilson's March 1913 "Declaration of Policy with regard to Latin America" strove to convince Latin American governments of the United States' "honest purposes" vis-a-vis its activities across the region. Wilson stated:

*The United States has nothing to seek in Central or South America except the lasting interests of the people of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the advantage of both and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither.*¹³⁷

The narration of an official anti-imperialism had increasingly privileged the economy and nation as normative categories for governance under the rubrics of liberty and sovereignty. Put another way, ostensibly fairer economic dealing guided U.S. state officials' declaration of a new, non-imperial approach to U.S. foreign policy that first and foremost respected the sovereignty of other nations—a declaration that soon be emboldened by the U.S. response to the Liberian slavery crisis. The clearest and among the earliest examples of such a declaration came from Woodrow Wilson during his September 1919 address in Reno, Nevada, Wilson's address was given near the end of his "Western Tour" through which he sought to promote U.S. membership in the League of Nations. During his address, Wilson stated:

*[There were] many cynical smiles on the other side of the water when we said that we were going to liberate Cuba and then let her have charge of her own affairs. They said, 'Ah, that is a very common subterfuge. Just watch. America is not going to let that rich island, with its great sugar plantations and its undeveloped agricultural wealth, get out of its grip again.' And all Europe stood at amaze when, without delay or hesitation, we redeemed our promise and gave Cuba the liberty we had won for her. They know that we have not imperialistic purposes.*¹³⁸

The U.S. official anti-imperialism had thus become an official anti-economic imperialism that took non-occupation and respect of national sovereignty as an ostensibly foregone conclusion.

Section B.

The Global "Good Neighbor": Toward an "Anti-Imperial" Plantation Complex

The growth of an official anti-imperialism culminated in the 1933 announcement of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy." Its main principle was: non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries with the goal of establishing more reciprocal economic exchange. While the goal was outwardly one of fairer economic exchange, it was ultimately clear that such a shift in policy came in response to the growing discontent and suspicion directed toward the United States and U.S. transnational capital and their involvement in domestic affairs, and thus the risk such discontent posed for U.S. state power and capital itself. For example, Wilson's interventions in Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua had clarified the failure of "Dollar Diplomacy" in particular to counteract economic instability and the tide of revolution. As such, the announcement was not in name alone. Rather, it framed the 1934 abolishment of the Platt Amendment, the removal of the last

Marines from Caribbean ports, and Secretary of State Cordell Hull's acceptance of the ban on intervention by one state in the affairs of another, "directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason" at the 1936 Buenos Aires Pan-American Conference.¹³⁹

Although the official anti-economic imperialism of the early-twentieth century under the "Good Neighbor Policy" was developed explicitly in relation to U.S. foreign policy across Latin America, Roosevelt's 1933 announcement of the new policy framework was global in scope. Roosevelt stated that "In the field of World policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor, the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others." Yet Roosevelt's definition of neighborliness and the broader context he invokes invites more than the United States' national neighbors across the Americas: "the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a World of neighbors." Despite its departure from the Monroe Doctrine and "Roosevelt Corollary"—policies grounded in developing and securing U.S. control across Latin America—Roosevelt's neighborhood was a neighborhood comprised of all the world's nations.¹⁴⁰ Yet while Latin America was site through which the Monroe Doctrine and "Roosevelt Corollary" were conceived, the Liberian slavery crisis arguably pressed U.S. state officials to assert that they would be "Good Neighbors" to any nation. In other words, the early-twentieth century crisis in Liberia necessitated not only a political departure but also a geographic departure from an otherwise Latin America-specific policy framework. Through the negotiation of the Liberian slavery crisis and plantation economy in relation to the Monroe Doctrine, "Dollar Diplomacy," and "economic imperialism," it was part and parcel of such new articulations of empire.

For a time, the connection between U.S.-Liberia relations and the Monroe Doctrine and its successors was muted. For example, Albert Bushnell Hart, recognized as one of the first professionally trained U.S. historians, stated in 1915, that "Liberia for the time being [is] out of the hurly-burly of African territorial struggles, [although] it may develop into a regular colony of the United States. The only direct bearing of Liberia on the Monroe Doctrine is that it is one of several indications that the United States cannot in the nature of things, keep out of the eastern sphere of human affairs."¹⁴¹ Thus, Liberia was relevant to the Monroe Doctrine by way of U.S. involvement in the West African nation's "human affairs"—involvement absent any sort of explicit territorial ambitions. However, the Liberian slavery crisis shined a spotlight on any such relevance of Liberia to the Monroe Doctrine and the policies to follow. For example, the 1926 agreement that brought Firestone to Liberia put the republic in the news again. Much of the reporting at the time focused on Firestone's determination to cultivate a valuable commodity to serve the needs of U.S. consumers, and in doing so, the United States was "unlocking the tropics."¹⁴² As such, Sundiata points to the fact that many had come to see this episode as "nothing more than a last flagrant manifestation of Dollar Diplomacy"—a policy framework that had largely been understood only in relation to U.S. political, economic, and at times military involvement in Latin America.¹⁴³

Accounts of the Liberian slavery crisis explicitly addressed the geographic bounds of the Monroe Doctrine and the pressure that Liberia placed upon them. Buell himself stated in *The Native Problem in Africa* that the involvement of former commerce secretary Herbert Hoover (who was

running for U.S. President at the time) and the U.S. Department of State demonstrated that the United States was not simply engaged in “economic imperialism.” It demonstrated that the United States was engaged in such activity so for the first time “outside of the area covered by the Monroe Doctrine.”¹⁴⁴ The 1930 memorandum by U.S. Department of State official Ellis O. Briggs, which expressed his fear that the “establishment of a virtual American colony in Africa . . . would unquestionably arouse the suspicion of Europe and South America,” also expressed his concern that it would “render the continued espousal of the Monroe Doctrine difficult to justify.”¹⁴⁵ This pressure was the pretext for FDR’s “Good Neighbor” policy. Although the policy emerged in supposed contradistinction from the history of the Monroe Doctrine and specifically “Dollar Diplomacy” across Latin America, it inured from critique U.S. state power and transnational capitalism, which is to say U.S. economic imperialism. As the outer geographic limit of the question of the Monroe Doctrine and “Dollar Diplomacy,” Liberia was part and parcel of the negotiation of the global terms of fairer economic dealing that came to be a staple of U.S. foreign policy from then on into the mid-twentieth century.

This chapter has argued that a key feature of the administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism was its capacity to internalize race matter—namely, the racial logics of the plantation economy. The crisis that was the enslavement of indigenous Liberians by Liberian government officials and the Liberian military served as the raw material of the development of the economy and nation as normative categories for governance in ways that ultimately obfuscated the racial logics of the plantation. Through the pressure the Liberian slave crisis placed upon the geographic bounds of the Monroe Doctrine, and thus through Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy, these elements of Liberian settler colonialism were incorporated into U.S. imperial governmentality. Specifically, U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors could narrate their involvement in Liberia and elsewhere as “disinterested,” “fair” economic dealing without any imperial motive while obfuscating the racial logics of the U.S.- and Firestone-led plantation economy that sparked their intervention. Put another way, whatever economic measures enacted under the “Good Neighbor” policy could be represented as distinct from any ongoing or emergent racial dynamics. For example, Ellis O. Briggs of the U.S. Department of State ties such developments within U.S.-Liberian relations directly to the negotiation of the Monroe Doctrine and “Dollar Diplomacy.” Again, Briggs stated that, “[s]hould the United States assume this responsibility [of occupation of Liberia] alone, it would inevitably lead to active and long-continued participation in Africa which, while doubtless justified by many on philanthropic or racial grounds, could not fail to arouse the hostility of others as imperialism.” Briggs pairs affirms the racial justification of territorial occupation yet in the same statement vehemently opposes territorial occupation for the reasons listed throughout this chapter. Thus, implied in Briggs statement is that any involvement of the United States in Liberia that is not occupation would be absent any such racial justification.

The approach U.S. state officials took toward Haiti belabors the apparent globalization of the framework developed by U.S. state officials, private actors, and public commentators’ approach toward Liberia. In 1930, two years after Buell’s report, and the same year as the League of Nations investigation into the Liberian slavery crisis, the U.S. government—in a resoundingly similar effort to calm critics of U.S. “Dollar Diplomacy”—sent two commissions to Haiti, which

was under U.S. occupation at the time. The impetus for what would be known as the Forbes Commission following the growing “threat to American business interests in the country, especially the Haitian American Sugar Company.”¹⁴⁶ Under the guise of holding U.S. state power and business interests accountable to the people of Haiti, the Forbes Commission ultimately praised the material improvements that the U.S. administration had achieved yet criticized the continued exclusion of Haitian nationals from positions of real authority in the government and the constabulary, which had come to be known as the Garde d'Haïti. In more general terms, the commission asserted that “the social forces that created [instability] still remain – poverty, ignorance, and the lack of a tradition or desire for orderly free government.”¹⁴⁷ Liberia, as the premier Black republic outside the Western Hemisphere—one that asserted the geographic and political limits of the Monroe Doctrine by way of its status as an unofficial protectorate of the United States and the nature and origins of the Liberian slavery crisis—was formative for the displacement and elision of slavery and its coeval conditions with colonial dispossession and indentureship.¹⁴⁸

Conclusion

Ultimately, the plantation economy and its most destitute expression—slavery—were, alongside the reservation system within the United States, part and parcel of the genealogy of U.S. postwar formations of U.S. colonialism and transnational capitalism. Focusing on the interwar period, this chapter traced how an anti-occupation approach to securing investments in Liberia—the “second Black Republic” after Haiti, and outside the geographic bonds of the Monroe Doctrine and “Dollar Diplomacy”—reshaped the risk management of racial capitalism vis-à-vis the plantation complex in particular. This chapter traced the shared settler colonial and plantation genealogy of Liberia’s founding later took shape with regard to how the Liberian slavery crisis was understood by U.S. and Liberian state officials, private actors, and public commentators. It argues that the disavowal of Liberian settler appropriation—by framing the Liberian slavery crisis as crisis in “Negro self-rule” and Liberian sovereignty and not a crisis in indigenous Liberian dispossession and enslavement—facilitated the elision of processes of racial dispossession constitutive of the plantation complex and plantation geographies as it invited new forms of U.S. intervention. This approach to the Liberian slavery crisis were then built into emergent articulations of an official U.S. anti-imperialism while excising the racial logics of the plantation economy that the crisis itself illuminated.

Chapter Four.

The Plantation as Crisis:

Racial Liberal Plantation Criticism and Liberia's "Booker Washington Institute"

In 1929, when a U.S. missionary in Liberia reported that settler Americo-Liberian officials were using soldiers to gather indigenous Liberians and employ them on the Firestone rubber plantation and ship them to the Spanish island colony of Fernando Po as forced laborers, it was seen by many as a major crisis for Firestone, the U.S. Department of State, and the Liberian government. How and why did the experiment in Black self-government founded on the premise of offering respite from slavery itself succumb to and reproduce the horrors of the institution itself? As we saw in the previous chapter, by the early 1930s, shortly after news of the slavery crisis broke, U.S.-based commentators on U.S.-Liberian relations—both Black and white—had made the case for the necessity of an ongoing and reenergized American presence in the West African country on the basis of the education that would otherwise be lost. Lester Walton, a journalist and Liberia commentator with *New York World*, and a soon-to-be-appointed U.S. Minister to the country, made the case in 1931—at the height of the slavery crisis—that a “wholesale withdrawal of Americans would close 108 of the 164 schools operating in the Republic. And without education, future generations of Liberians would be as helpless as their ancestors to create modern conditions.”¹ On the surface, Walton’s statement suggests that U.S. state presence could be justified in terms of the inherent benefit of the schools, which supposedly offered a clear avenue toward attaining some vision of modern conditions under Liberian control.

Walton’s statement and the broader sentiment it conveys appears to ring true over the course of the next two decades. Despite a tumultuous first few years following its establishment in 1929, the Booker Washington Institute (BWI) in Kakata, Liberia was principal among such schooling efforts. The Institute emblemized the trajectory of national independence and development for which U.S.-backed agricultural and rural development efforts were known. Specifically, the U.S. Department of State increasingly provided BWI guidance and assistance by specialists in agricultural production, building, health, mechanics, and a community health program.² By 1946, the first Black principal of the institute was appointed—a Black man from the U.S. South. By the 1950s, following years of financial difficulties and political concerns, larger shifts in the leadership and management of the institute took place, when in 1951 BWI not only became a component of the University of Liberia but was also headed by an indigenous Liberian. The U.S. board of the Institute dissolved itself in February 1952 and the Liberian government assumed full control in 1953. Under this new leadership, U.S.-Liberian relations took the form of the U.S.-led science, technology, and education transfer initiatives for which the Green Revolution was known. For example, between 1957 and 1958, under the auspices of the Point 4 Program, twenty-five United States staff members—seven from Prairie View A&M University and many others from Tuskegee—supported the institute and country through technical cooperation and assistance. In this light, the Booker Washington Institute was so successful that it came to serve as the model for vocational agriculture education across the continent.

The Afterlife of Slavery, the Future Life of the Plantation

This dissertation has demonstrated that the Point 4 Program was tremendously influential in helping generate postwar formations of U.S. settler colonialism and imperialism, and the racial regimes that encoded and reproduced them. The story of BWI's resounding success ought to be understood, in this light, as a significant site for cultivating U.S.-backed national government systems for agricultural investment and innovation—in service of U.S. state power, transnational capitalism, and white supremacy. Even further, the settlement and growth of Liberia, as a safety valve for the institution of slavery and avenue for Black racial uplift, suggests the ongoing evolution of the plantation economy within the United States itself and its relation to the plantation economy within Liberia as part of the genealogy of the mid-twentieth century Green Revolution. This is precisely where the previous chapter found its footing. As Clyde Woods argues, the establishment of the “neo-plantation complex” beginning in the 1920s and 1930s gutted the historic Southern Black land and labor reform agenda in the post-Reconstruction-era U.S. South and laid the ground for the U.S. development agenda globally.³

The previous chapter contributed to this genealogy by tracing the discursive, political, and economic management of the Liberian slavery crisis. Among the most extreme expressions of the plantation economy and the “empire of cotton,” the slavery crisis was a moment in which the plantation was in crisis and U.S. foreign policy needed a dramatic overhaul. This chapter focuses not simply on the slavery crisis but on the discursive and political management of the “plantation” itself, which was increasingly considered an untenable social, political, economic, and environmental formation by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors from then on into the mid-twentieth century—even outside of the Liberian slavery crisis. Against this backdrop, this chapter continues to attend to two key dynamics of U.S. state power and transnational capital vis-à-vis agricultural and rural development discussed throughout this dissertation: The first concerns the problems of hunger, poverty, and discontent around the world, and the question posed by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors of what threats such hunger, poverty, and discontent would pose should they not be addressed. The second concerns the particular solutions put forth by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors, which included the provision of both capital-intensive and techno-scientific agricultural and rural technical assistance, as well as the provision of self-government. As in previous chapter, the provision of self-government or respect for national sovereignty was considered necessary because it would not only offer more effective, efficient, and profitable use of natural resources by the population of concern. It would also supposedly preempt of any suspicion directed toward U.S. state power and transnational capital amidst such interventions. While the first half of this dissertation traced how such issues and prescribed solutions were organized around the reservation within the United States and “dependent areas” globally, this chapter traces how they were organized around the plantation economies of the U.S. South and Liberia.⁴

As stated, the Booker Washington Institute emblemized the trajectory of national independence and development for which U.S.-backed agricultural and rural development efforts were known. As such this chapter uses BWI—its evolution, operations, and significance

to U.S. Blacks and whites, and Liberians alike— to trace how the U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors facilitated certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the need and strategy for intervention in Liberia’s plantation economy. This chapter does so in relation to two key texts that frame the crisis of the plantation economy in Liberia and Africa more broadly in the 1940s and 1950s: First, Raymond Leslie Buell’s 1947 report, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947*, which recounts his follow-up visit to the country nearly twenty years after his original report, *The Native Problem in Africa*. Second, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo, 1882-1947*, which was authored by Jackson Davis, Thomas M. Campbell, and Margaret Wrong, and support by The Rockefeller and The Phelps-Stokes Fund.⁵ Even further, the chapter traces the connection between BWI, these texts, and key texts that frame the crisis of the plantation in the U.S. South in the 1920s and 1930s: Charles Johnson’s (the Fisk sociologist hired for the League of Nations’ Christy commission) 1934 assessment of Southern schooling, *Shadow of the Plantation*; and a number of memorandums by Phelps-Stokes, Rockefeller, and other philanthropic entities invested in maintaining the relevance of industrial education in the U.S. South at the time.⁶

The first part of this chapter argues that the Booker Washington Institute seemingly offered U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors the capacity to ameliorate the crises of Liberian slavery discursively and materially, and in ways that cohered with the broader efforts covered in the previous chapter. The Booker Washington Institute theoretically could have offered a way to simultaneously accommodate indigenous Liberians to the U.S.-backed Americo-Liberian settler plantation economy while reformulating the nature of U.S. involvement in the fledgling Black republic. Further, backed by Booker T. Washington’s own involvement in aiding Liberian national development and self-government earlier in the century, BWI similarly could have translated the racial logics of the growing plantation economy into problems of self-government—a key framework through which race is governed. The second part of this chapter argues that, despite its strategic value, U.S. state officials could not officially endorse the institute, for the Hampton-Tuskegee model was overdetermined by racial and colonial difference across British and German Africa, and BWI supplied the Firestone plantation with laborers during the crisis and in its wake. As such, the relationship between the U.S. Department of State and the Booker Washington Institute remained hidden until the 1940s, when official U.S. involvement in Liberia grew as a fact of the North Africa theater during World War II. Critically, the Booker Washington Institute was central to such involvement.

The remainder of the chapter traces how, from this point, BWI soon became a model for vocational agriculture education across Africa and a channel for the Point 4 Program in Africa. The third part of this chapter argues that BWI ultimately left enough in its wake—materially and discursively—that an official relationship with the U.S. Department of State could be salvaged and what potential it offered could be realized. Given the historically fraught relationship between BWI and Firestone, taking advantage of the potential that BWI offered in the postwar context required a broader renegotiation of the plantation economy itself. In other words, the problem with the Firestone rubber plantation was simply indicative of a problem with the plantation as a mode of agricultural production and capital accumulation. The renegotiation of Liberia’s plantation economy propelled a broader renegotiation taking place: one where U.S.

state, corporate, and philanthropic actors rendered the plantation a non-scientific, non-modern, impoverishing, and anti-statist model of agricultural production. In doing so, they cultivated the ability to secure the moral and material ground for a new relationship to BWI and a more secure foothold for U.S. state power bearing the agency for transnational capitalism—what this chapter terms “racial liberal plantation criticism.” Critically, this post-plantation future, *or plantation futurism*, was one where Liberia and other African nations’ social relations of capitalist modernity were supposedly not hopelessly compromised by white supremacy. The remainder of this chapter argues this transformation of the global plantation economy was prefigured by and actively pulled from an analogous renegotiation of the plantation economy of the U.S. South in the 1920s and 1930s carried out toward similar ends. This chapter ultimately argues that the renegotiation of the plantation complex *within the United States itself* was the condition of possibility for the consolidation of U.S. postwar hegemony in part through the constellation of practices, rationales, and logics of the Point 4 Program.

PART 1.

The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here Too: Manual Training and Industrial Education in Liberia

The previous chapter argued that the crisis of Liberian slavery put pressure on what Lisa Lowe has termed the “liberal economies of affirmation and forgetting.” By framing colonial slavery as a regrettable moment in the history of Western modes of governance, such economies deny colonial slavery, and the coeval conditions of capital accumulation, colonial dispossession, indentureship, and differential racialization. Further, what this denial masks is that colonial slavery was a condition of possibility for civil society itself, broadly, and that the plantation economy and its racial logics as the motor vehicle of capital accumulation and state-building, in particular. Yet, the Liberian slavery crisis made it difficult to internalize these processes in a national struggle of history and consciousness.⁷ The crisis was neither an event of the past—having taken place against backdrop of the recently-passed 1926 Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, which was created under the auspices of the League of Nations and set out to advance the suppression of slavery and the slave trade. Nor was it geopolitically divorced from U.S. state power, with each apparent connection between the United States and Liberia highlighting the racial logics of the plantation economy as a key condition of possibility of U.S. civil society, wealth, and state power. The chapter traced how the Liberian slavery crisis subsequently encouraged a new orientation of U.S. imperialism: an anti-occupation approach to securing investments in Liberia that aimed to inure U.S. state power and transnational capital from critique. Toward these ends, the Booker Washington Institute offered the United States much in the way of the Liberian slavery crisis: from helping accommodate indigenous Liberian’s to the plantation economy while obfuscating its racial logics to representing a seemingly new day for U.S. foreign policy and transnational capital.

Section 1.
Pedagogies of Land and Empire

The potential power of the Booker Washington Institute to ameliorate the Liberian slavery crisis for Liberians and Americans alike rested in the fact that BWI's pedagogy follows from a longer history of pedagogies of race-based education developed at manual training and industrial institutes and settlement schools. From 1848 on, Richard Armstrong, the Minister of Public Instruction in Hawai'i, had built an industrial school system to mold indigenous Hawaiians in disciplinary ways that would preempt labor unrest in the island's plantation economy.⁸ Armstrong obtained the position under Kamehameha III (who created the position in 1846) and ultimately oversaw the creation and administration of over 500 schools in Hawai'i. These schools were founded on the principles of "Practical Christianity," which Armstrong believed would ameliorate the impact of the destruction of Hawai'i's land tenure system by teaching indigenous Hawaiians how to successfully work within the material conditions of the island's new land tenure system and emerging plantation economy.⁹ Armstrong's son, Samuel Chapman Armstrong, who was born in Hawai'i in 1839, took with him his experiences of what was essentially the colonial schooling system of Hawai'i (despite Hawai'i's sovereign status until the end of the eighteenth century) when he moved back to the United States. These schools served as a model, to some extent, for the Hampton Normal and Agricultural Institute, which was founded in Virginia in 1868 as a Black industrial school with the assistance of the Freedmen's Bureau and the American Missionary Association. In 1878 Armstrong initiated a program for Native students at Hampton, which lasted until 1923 and inspired some of the most well-known Indian boarding schools, including Carlisle Indian School.¹⁰

Shared among these manual training and industrial institutes was devotion to the concept of educating the "head, hand, and heart," with an emphasis on handiwork and obedience.¹¹ Yet, born of the plantation complex, settler colonialism, indentured labor, and imperial war, the aim of racial education through these pedagogies was to compel Black and indigenous students to adopt, perform, and desire the embodiment of dominant civilizational norms required for citizenship while simultaneously withholding the privileges of citizenship from such students.¹² Further, these pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes education served to teach such students to accommodate themselves to the economic, political, and social upheavals involved with the expansion of slave and settler capitalisms. For U.S. Blacks in particular, their education was ultimately designed to prepare them for industrial labor and to discipline them into a racialized character "within" the post-Civil War social order and plantation economy developing in the U.S. South. The ultimate goal, as Armstrong said, was to maintain a tractable labor force and "produce wise [Negro] leaders, peacemakers rather than noisy and dangerous demagogues."¹³ The curriculum was not intended to simply create "small individualistic entrepreneurs" or to offer "Negroes the technical training necessary for effective competition in an industrial age." It was designed mainly to train Black ideologues, who were expected to exemplify and propagate further white philosophies on Southern Reconstruction to the Southern Black working class.¹⁴

Booker T. Washington himself espoused such accommodationist views regarding the post-Civil War social order and plantation economy developing in the U.S. South, and ushered them into the twentieth century.¹⁵ He was the eponymous namesake of Liberia's school, Armstrong's pupil and a student of the Hampton Institute, head of the experiment in Black self-education in Alabama—the Tuskegee Institute—and the symbol for industrial school and Black accommodationism. In his 1895 Atlanta Address, Washington urged U.S. Blacks to "put down your buckets where they are, make peace and common cause with your white neighbor, seek a white patron, but also improve yourself slowly through education and property," through "severe and constant struggle rather than . . . artificial forcing."¹⁶ This would offer "mutual progress," Washington argued. His message was not simply aimed at the Southern Black working class, however. It was also meant to appease the "white neighbor," the "white patron," and ultimately the white planter. Washington stated that he was pushing for the development of a Black laboring class that would "buy your surplus land, make blossom the waste places in your fields, and run your factories."¹⁷ In short, Washington believed that U.S. Blacks should fashion a coalition with whites who held power and make themselves indispensable to the prosperity of the South and the nation. This would be done not by joining labor unions or participating in direction action, but by being a tractable, reliable, and economically profitable labor source.¹⁸

Section B. ***Agricultural Education for a "Negro Aristocracy"***

What possibilities, then, did the school system in Liberia offer U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors, and for the Americo-Liberian "Negro aristocracy," in the buildup toward the Liberian slavery crisis? Principally, it supplied what Washington stated it would offer during his 1895 Atlanta speech: "the most patient, faithful, law-abiding and unresentful people that the world has seen." For indigenous Liberians who needed to acquiesce to their new social, political, and economic circumstances, including those orbiting the labor needs of the Firestone Natural Rubber Company, this was key. By the 1920s, this truth and the threat of unrest and revolt by Liberia's indigenous population was stamped in the minds of the Americo-Liberian leadership. Americo-Liberian hut taxes, work taxes, crop liens, and forced work commands prompted many indigenous people revolts: from the Grebo Rebellion of 1910 and the Kru rebellion in 1915, to the Gola Rebellion in 1918 and the Kpelle rebellion in 1920. While these uprisings were ultimately crushed by armed, U.S.-backed counterinsurgency efforts, the broader strategy of the Americo-Liberian government was to "increasingly implement a framework of indirect rule by which local chiefs friendly to the government were recognized as proper representatives of their respective tribes."¹⁹ The threat of unrest and revolt by Liberia's indigenous population necessitated a number of strategies that spanned all domains of indigenous Liberian life.

Critically, education, and manual training and industrial education in particular, was one such important strategy of controlling Liberia's indigenous population. By 1922, the Americo-Liberian leadership commenced public education for indigenous Liberians. Principal among such

educational endeavors was a "Tuskegee Institute in Liberia," the brainchild of Olivia Egleston Phelps Stokes of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, and endorsed by Anson Phelps Stokes and Booker T. Washington himself in 1910. Their belief was that a "little Tuskegee" could ensure indigenous Liberian success in agriculture and national progress just as its U.S. Southern counterpart aspired to do.²⁰ During the mid-1920s, Liberian President Charles D. B. King visited the United States and toured the Tuskegee Institute, lending further weight behind the idea in Liberia. With the backing of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Rockefeller Foundations General Education Board, the New York State Colonization Society (NYSCS), the American Colonization Society, and the Liberian government, an official charter for the "Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute of Liberia" was established and approved in 1928.²¹ Critically, support from the Americo-Liberian-led government extended to the donation of the land that the Booker Washington Institute would occupy in Kakata. According to historian of nineteenth and twentieth century Black labor and education, Donald Spivey, such great support to the institute was extended because the Americo-Liberian government believed the "the school would benefit them and their hegemony over the country by providing the native masses with an education that would create a more tractable and productive laboring class."²² Thus, while enslavement of indigenous Liberians was to be avoided, the cultivation of a labor force that acquiesced to the needs of the Americo-Liberian leadership under the banner of national development would have seemingly been ideal.

Pulling from the longer imperial history of pedagogies of the "head, hand, and heart," the Hampton-Tuskegee model of education, and the Booker Washington Institute, offered the development of tractable and non-threatening workforce yet masked by a narrative of seemingly disinterested U.S. intervention and the universality of Western modes of governance. As stated, the colonial schools in Hawai'i, the Hampton Institute, and the Tuskegee Institute all pushed students to adopt, perform, and desire the embodiment of dominant civilizational norms required for citizenship while simultaneously denying them the privileges of citizenship.²³ At these educational institutions—and later at the Booker Washington Institute and the vocational agricultural education programs covered in previous chapters—students were bound to public performances disciplining their racialized bodies, relations, desires, and understandings of self. Through parades, drills, speeches, creeds, writing, and through manual labor itself, these performances eased anxieties of the insurgent threat they posed to national civilization while facilitating greater state power and capital accumulation. For Black students in particular, these civilizational norms reflected familiar modern liberal forms of political economy, culture, government, and history that proposed a narrative of freedom overcoming enslavement.²⁴ Black peoples' supposed emancipation was the beginning of their teleological incorporation into "universal" Western modes of governance. As Washington stated during his famed 1895 Atlanta Compromise speech: "If anywhere there are efforts tending to curtail the fullest growth of the Negro, let these efforts be turned into stimulating, encouraging, and making him the most useful and intelligent citizen."²⁵ Thus, according to the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy and pedagogy, Industrial education for Black youth evidenced such universality by offering a clear and tangible avenue for progress.

Yet the Hampton-Tuskegee model of education, and the Booker Washington Institute in particular, offered something additional that was specific to the administrative structure of Liberian settler colonialism: a supposed avenue toward Americo-Liberian rule-*cum*-Black self-government. Just as the previous chapter described the translation of the racial logics of dispossession into problems of self-government and the economy—the terms and frameworks through which race is governed—so too does manual training and industrial education effectuate this translation. Specifically, as the last chapter argued the Liberian slavery crisis was not primarily depicted by Black and white U.S. commentators as a crisis of Black peoples' enslavement—namely falling back into the conditions from which they emerged and which undermined the universality of Western civilizational norms. Rather, the Liberian slavery crisis was regarded primarily as a crisis in Black peoples' capacity to self-govern precisely because of the Americo-Liberian leadership's enslavement of indigenous Liberians. The crisis was due to their inability to govern according to Euro-American standards, which figured slavery as the antithesis of civil society or at least at a regrettable early moment in the development of civil society, as opposed to its condition of possibility. In other words, U.S. sentiments favored the "Negro aristocracy" and not indigenous Liberians, in effect eliding the racial logics of the plantation economy and folding all race matter into questions of the state. Critically, the pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes, and for which Booker T. Washington was known, neatly enunciated this teleological end point of freedom overcoming slavery. He states:

[I]gnorant and inexperienced, it is not strange that in the first years of our new life we began at the top instead of at the bottom; that a seat in Congress or the state legislature was more sought than real estate or industrial skill; that the political convention or stump speaking had more attractions than starting a dairy farm or truck garden.²⁶

Put another way, Washington speaks of the endpoint of emancipation as ultimately leading to government and self-government—an important first step toward emphasizing the importance of manual training and industrial education to Liberia in particular.

With emancipation broadly framed this way, Washington describes industrial training in particular as aiding the movement toward its end-point of self-government. He repeatedly refers to the selfhood that training of agricultural labor would encourage. "What is it that makes a successful laboring force?", Washington asks. "It is laborers of education and natural intelligence, reasonably satisfied with their conditions, inspired with certain ideals of life, and with a growing sense of self-respect and self-reliance."²⁷ While accommodation to the present conditions was a central part of Washington's advocacy for agricultural labor through industrial training, the progress afforded to the modern individual—progress born of proximity to and interaction with the land—is clear. As Lowe states, according to political philosophers from Locke to Hegel to Kant, "the individual's possession of his own person, his own interiority, is a first sense of property. He then invests will and work into nature, making that nature objective, transforming world and himself."²⁸ In other words, "freedom" is achieved through the putting of one's will in an object through labor and the subsequent "contract to exchange the thing."²⁹

Self-possession easily slides into self-government by way of this economic basis—the contract to exchange the thing. As Du Bois states in a 1907 collection of essays co-authored with Washington, “it is certain that so far as the Negroes are land holders, and so far, as they belong to a self-employing, self-supplying group economy, no possible competition from without can disturb them.”³⁰ Self-government, therefore, neatly grew from the condition of freedom itself. And the focus on Black self-government in particular not only privileged the economy and nation as normative categories for governance under the rubrics of liberty and sovereignty, but also reflected the supposed universality of these rubrics. The Booker Washington Institute and the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy more broadly was framed as an invaluable tool in achieving such ends and in putting this universality on display.

The cultivation of Black self-government in Liberia through the Booker Washington Institute and its educational pedagogies reflected a longer history of Booker T. Washington’s own efforts at aiding Liberian sovereignty and soliciting the aid of U.S. Blacks in this enterprise. According to Washington’s biographer, Louis R. Harlan, in the early twentieth century, it was in Liberia that Washington played his greatest role in Africa.³¹ By 1909, Liberia faced significant external threats to its sovereignty from the European colonial powers following the West Africa nation’s unpaid foreign loans and gradual annexation of its borderlands. As an adviser on Black and Southern affairs to President Taft, Washington selected the members of the U.S. Commission to Liberia in the context of the debt crisis. The commission recommended an all-U.S. banker’s loan to refund the entire debt of Liberia and free it of dependence upon any colonial power; urged that the United States arrange for a firm delimitation of the Liberian boundary and take over the customs service; and pushed for the use of United States Army officers to lead and retrain the Liberian Frontier Force.³² Additionally, backed by the belief that “subterranean forces are at work to prevent anything being done for Liberia,” Washington influenced both the U.S. Black and white press against Southern and isolationist opposition to a Liberian protectorate as a stop-gap, and encouraged U.S. capital investment in Liberia.³³ This foreign money would stave off both internal collapse and absorption by its European colonial neighbors.

Critically, Washington's views on Liberia's indigenous population paralleled how he viewed Southern Blacks, albeit without the filters he might have had were he speaking to the population of which he envisioned himself a part. Specifically, he warned President Daniel Howard of Liberia that “the whole future of Liberia hinges upon its ability to get hold of the native population,” and that redressing the very real grievances of tribal Liberians was a prerequisite to both civil concord and settlement of chronic border disturbances.³⁴ Not unlike the “Negro problem” in the post-emancipation U.S. South, Washington pushed for ways to secure the stability of Liberian society and its sources of revenue. Ultimately, Washington's approach to Liberian affairs prior to the Liberian slavery crisis translated questions of colonial dispossession and the racial logics of Liberian society and its extractive economies, which differentiated between the Americo-Liberian settler population and indigenous Liberians, into questions concerning the tenacity of Liberian self-government and the form and pace of economic development.³⁵

Altogether, what the Hampton-Tuskegee model of industrial education offered U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors in Liberia, and the Americo-Liberian "Negro aristocracy," was the ability to justify and, in fact, necessitate the ongoing U.S. presence in the West African country. As this chapter opened with, Lester Walton stated anxiously, the "wholesale withdrawal of Americans" would close many schools in Liberia, and "without education, future generations of Liberians would be as helpless as their ancestors to create modern conditions."³⁶ This line of argumentation followed Buell's own damning, albeit fraught, critique of U.S. and European policy in Africa: the violent change in the livelihoods of indigenous Africans, which undermined national and economic development across the continent, necessitated new efforts and strategies to ensure such maintenance and "development." Critically, Walton's dire call for the maintenance of a U.S. presence in Liberia also followed Buell's own recommendations, given the circumstances he outlined—namely, the "application of intelligence, knowledge and good."³⁷ The Booker Washington Institute carried with it the potential to aid what Buell's report and the broader set of U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors worked toward: the obfuscation of the coeval conditions of slavery, capital accumulation, colonial dispossession, indentureship, and differential racialization that constituted Liberian civil society and the West African nation's plantation economy. It also carried with it the potential to mutually reinforce President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy of fairer economic dealing between the United States and the governments of the world. Specifically, BWI could have done so by disciplining Liberia's indigenous peoples into a tractable, reliable, and economically profitable source of labor in service of Liberia's burgeoning "Negro aristocracy" and economy yet under the banner of a disinterested effort to aid the second Black republic in the world through training and technical assistance.

PART 2.

A Veiled Affair: War and the Hidden Ties to the Booker Washington Institute

The geopolitical importance of Liberia to the United States was clear to U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors in the early decades of the twentieth century. By the 1920s, rubber became known as perhaps the most crucial material for the United States to have readily available should another world war broke out. At the time, the new Firestone plantation in Liberia was the only major source of rubber that the United States could count on should supplies on the Malay Peninsula, and in Java and the Philippines, be lost.³⁸ To U.S. and Liberian state officials, and U.S. corporate and philanthropic actors, the Booker Washington Institute, and the weight of the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy behind it, promised a number of things. It promised the supposed ability to persuade indigenous Liberians into acquiescing to their place within the growing plantation economy, while obscuring the nature of their very real slavery, the racial logics of the plantation, and the relationship between Liberia's plantation economy and U.S. state power and transnational capital.

Despite what BWI offered, particularly amidst the Liberian slavery crisis, this potential was not quite realized. That is, although U.S. Department of State officials were involved from the outset, the interactions between the governments, philanthropic organizations and businesses

behind the Booker Washington Institute in the United States and Liberia were hidden from public view.³⁹ This changed, however, nearly a decade after the school's founding. The first public acknowledgement of the United States' interest in the Booker Washington Institute came in 1938, on the eve of World War II. At this time, Liberia was of great geopolitical importance to the United States, and BWI was effectively at the center of their wartime bond. BWI not only provided laborers to the Firestone-led rubber economy, which was essential to the U.S. war effort. It also housed military personnel. Given these circumstances, the relationship U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors had to BWI became undeniable.

Why then, despite what it offered parties across both sides of the Atlantic, was the U.S. interest and involvement in the Booker Washington Institute kept from public view? This part of the chapter argues that the central reason that the United States' relationship to the Booker Washington Institute was hidden for so long, despite what it offered, was because it was overdetermined by a number of other circumstances that would have made a public relationship between them a liability. Namely, it would have put added pressure on the liberal economies of affirmation and forgetting, which internalize processes of racial and colonial dispossession in national struggles of history and consciousness.⁴⁰ As the following sections show, these circumstances and the limits they imposed emerged between British and German Africa, Liberia, and the United States: First, the British and German empires adopted the Hampton-Tuskegee model of education for their African colonies. In doing so, the dynamics of colonial and racial dispossession at the core of such pedagogies became difficult to deny. Second, BWI itself supplied Firestone with laborers, even amidst the Liberian slavery crisis. In this way, the institution that could promise distance from the crisis in fact helped fuel it. Third, the same U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors involved with BWI were promoting "interracial cooperation" within the United States. To support BWI, given these circumstances, would have undermined such efforts within the United States, however fraught they were. In other words, nothing about BWI suggested "interracial cooperation."

Section 1.

The Imperial Routes of the Booker Washington Institute

That the relationship between the U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors and the Booker Washington Institute was hidden was something that was known and discussed among those involved with the education endeavor. Yet scholars have pointed to reasons outside the school's racial and colonial logics and practices in an effort to explain the elision. Diplomatic historian, George J. Hill, for example, recounts how in July 1929, Jackson Davis, who was assistant secretary of the Rockefeller Foundation's Graduate Education Board, wrote to James L. Sibley, the first principal of the Booker Washington Institute, that Davis "understood the intimate relationships between Liberia and the United States." While Hill states Davis was referring to the "nexus of relationships between individuals, businesses, governments, and Protestant churches in these two countries," he focuses on the latter two as reason behind the secrecy of the U.S. Department of State's relationship to BWI. Specifically, Hill frames the collaboration itself as one between "church and state" (i.e., the U.S. Department of State and

missionary societies) and so to announce such collaboration publicly would "contravene the spirit of the constitutions of both the United States and Liberia."⁴¹ Yet Hill's treatment of this archive has shown that all of the principals in what he dubs the "Liberia Education Project" were "demonstrably patriarchal, and most of them were elitist and racist." Critically, Hill states that in this context, those involved with BWI went to extraordinary lengths in order to avoid revealing these characteristics except to each other and to their close associates.⁴² While Hill frames these characteristics as secondary considerations, the goal of hiding racial and colonial logics of the Booker Washington Institute was arguably at the core of efforts to hide the relationship between U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors and BWI.

In Liberia, Booker T. Washington offered aid to a (Americo-Liberian) Black nationalism-in-need. Elsewhere in Africa, however, Washington was known for his cooperation with white colonial authorities.⁴³ Indeed, Washington sought to transport the Hampton-Tuskegee model to educational institutions across the British and German Empires—a perfect fit given history of pedagogies of race-based education developed at manual training and industrial institutes and settlement schools from which it grew. Yet in these explicitly colonial and white supremacist contexts, the Hampton-Tuskegee model of education was evacuated of the narrative of disinterested investment and intervention that carried in the U.S. South and elsewhere. In the German colony of Togo in West Africa, for example, Washington's explicit support for the colonial structure began in 1901 when the Tuskegee Institute sent an expedition to Togo with the purpose of developing a cotton plantation economy there akin to that of the post-Reconstruction U.S. South.⁴⁴ After years of working with German colonial officials, Washington ultimately gave German colonial policy toward the African population a sweeping endorsement. On the occasion of a visit to Berlin in 1910, Washington stated:

*I have followed with great care the policies and the plans according to which the German officials have dealt with the natives of Africa . . . Their work succeeds by these means in a wholesome and constructive manner. They do not seek to repress the Africans, but rather to help them that they may be more useful to themselves and to the German people. Their manner of handling Negroes in Africa might be taken as a pattern for other nations.*⁴⁵

Even in an explicitly colonial setting, Washington and others deployed the narrative of disinterested support to both Europeans and indigenous Africans alike. In Togo, however, German colonial administration had been so disruptive to tribal organization and traditional ways that the colonial indigenous population altogether refused to cooperate. The German parliament investigated and insisted on some reforms in 1907, but even after that the tenor of Togo administration remained less than "wholesome and constructive."⁴⁶ With the case for racial uplift and even self-government vis-a-vis manual training and industrial education across the vast majority of the continent near-impossible to make—and with U.S. policymakers trying to restrict their influence to within the geographic bounds of the Monroe Doctrine and thus out of the "Eastern sphere of influence," as the previous chapter addressed—official U.S. support for BWI in particular would have been a hard sell.

The same sentiments were shared by both Washington, who lay behind the philosophy and its institutionalization in the United States, and the architects of the Booker Washington Institute in Liberia, even after Washington's death in 1915. Those were Olivia Egleston Phelps Stokes of the Phelps-Stokes Fund; Thomas Jesse Jones, a white affiliate of Hampton Institute, the Phelps-Stokes fund's educational director; and James L. Sibley, the first president of the Booker Washington Institute. For example, Thomas Jesse Jones, a key figure in the growth of industrial schooling across Africa based on the Hampton-Tuskegee model, believed that industrial schooling could ultimately strengthen the United States' foreign alliances by helping British, German, and other colonial powers reverse patterns of African aspirations for independence and thus stabilize such powers' place in Africa.⁴⁷ In 1920, Jones headed a special commission to examine education in British West Africa, which led to his open endorsement of the "great accomplishments of the British Empire in Africa."⁴⁸ The commission and Jones' work were well-received by the British, leading to their decision to adopt a policy of industrial schooling and educational cooperation between colonial authorities in Africa and the U.S. proponents of industrial education. By the 1920s, the practice of colonial governments sending officers to study educational developments in the southern United States was commonplace.⁴⁹ By 1927, the idea of industrial education for Africa had gained a long list of colonial supporters: the British Colonial Office, British universities and schools, the Belgian Colonial Office and the Red Cross, the French Colonial Office, the Portuguese colonial representative, the mission societies of America and Europe, and South Africa. Although the British were the only European power that readily moved to adopt industrial schooling throughout its colonies, all others implemented it on at least a limited scale.⁵⁰ Thus, viewed as an avenue for leading Blacks into harmless social channels and undermining colonial unrest while maintaining and increasing their economic value, industrial education was considered invaluable by each of these supporters.

Section 2.

The Plantation Roots of the Booker Washington Institute

Official U.S. support for the Booker Washington Institute effectively became impossible when it was clear that the institute was tied to the Firestone Natural Rubber Company and, by extension, the slave crisis. That the school had a firm relationship with the Firestone Natural Rubber Company is of little surprise, given that Firestone was among the school's funders. Further, as Spivey argues, the relationship between the two entities is clear in the course of study at BWI.⁵¹ R.R. Taylor, head of the 1928 Commission to Liberia that set out to find a suitable site for establishing what would become the Booker Washington Institute, stated that "much of the wealth of the country is bound up in the trees, the rubber . . . These trees have all the highest commercial value, and such a course would include not only a study of the trees themselves and their products but particularly methods of improving the product and increasing the yield."⁵² To take advantage of this potential wealth grounded in the country's rubber plantation economy, the course of training at BWI promised greater use of indigenous labor. Donald Ross, the efficiency manager of the Firestone plantation, stated that "one person well educated could attend four acres [of rubber trees]" and that the goal was not the elevation

of such laborers to the highest skilled position. Those positions were reserved for whites from the United States and Americo-Liberians.⁵³ As Spivey states, James L. Sibley, a white Southerner, a former State Agent of Negro Rural Schools in Alabama, a strong advocate of industrial schooling, and the first principal of the new school following its opening on March 17, 1928, set out to cultivate a firm working relationship with the Firestone plantation and bring BWI "into complete harmony with the local tribes and villages."⁵⁴ While those involved with BWI withheld official endorsement, particularly amidst the Liberian slavery crisis, it was clear that they saw a role for BWI in facilitating even greater capital accumulation.

This "working relationship" that Sibley aimed to build took shape as BWI's coercive training and utilization of indigenous labor for the Firestone plantation—a dynamic that ultimately characterized the Liberian slavery crisis itself, as details in the previous chapter. As stated, most students at BWI were indigenous Liberians. Toward getting indigenous Liberians to be "more efficient" in planting rubber trees and harvest the rubber, the typical school day for BWI students was grueling. Spivey recounts it in detail:

*[Their] day started at sunup, the first few hours being devote to morning chores such milking, feeding livestock, and tending the garden plots. This was followed by breakfast, which never last more than half an hour. The student would then have two hours of classroom work. After that, they returned to the fields to the more demanding tasks of planting, harvesting, roadwork, maintenance of school buildings and facilities, and work on the Firestone plantations. The day's work ended at sunset, followed by dinner in the school mess hall. It was a fourteen-hour routine of hard work and no play . . .*⁵⁵

Even during World War II, when wages were higher than any other previous time in the history of Liberia, there were just as many abuses of indigenous labor both in and outside of BWI. In 1942, in the name of the war effort, the Liberian government seized the rice crops of its citizens, at a great disadvantage to Liberia's indigenous population. Those who refused to deliver their rice to the Liberian government were beaten or shot.⁵⁶ Conditions at BWI differed little from prior circumstances, and Firestone still benefitted their labor. Thus, with the origins and structure of the Booker Washington Institute long tied to Firestone through the provision of laborers for its rubber operations, official support for BWI would have not only undermined the potential it held to develop an intractable labor force for the Firestone plantation while inuring U.S. state power and transnational capital from critique. Such support would have also energized ongoing critiques of U.S. imperialism and global plantation complex.

Section 3.

Settler-Imperial Pedagogies and the Commission for Interracial Cooperation

During the 1920s and 1930s, the Booker Washington Institute in Kakata, Liberia was overdetermined by racial and colonial projects that U.S. state officials increasingly sought to distance themselves from, at least in appearance. Their behavior was shaped not only by the

pressure the Liberian slavery crisis placed upon the liberal economies of affirmation and forgetting, which would otherwise internalize processes of racial and colonial dispossession in national struggles of history and consciousness. Nor was it strictly shaped by the risk of growing animosity of Latin American peoples and governments toward the United States amidst, and in the wake of, Monroe Doctrine-era occupations and extractive relations.⁵⁷ Alongside these dynamics, the denial of an official relationship with the Booker Washington Institute was also influenced by the need to ameliorate growing anxieties of unrest vis-à-vis the United States' own Black population. The threat of unrest was real and spanned both urban and rural settings. Inaugurating the decade was the "Red Summer of 1919," which was marked by race riots that occurred in more than three dozen U.S. cities and one rural county, leading to almost 1000 deaths (primarily Black people). The riots resulted from a variety of ongoing and postwar tensions, including the demobilization of veterans of World War I, both Black and white, and the Jim Crow South that many such veterans returned to; increasing competition for jobs and housing among Blacks and whites; and proliferating labor unrest, when factory owners and other employers used Black people as strikebreakers.⁵⁸

Discontent was distinctly rural too. Following World War I, cotton prices plummeted, with devastating effects. The drop forced planters to drastically decrease acreage despite rising debts. Then the stock market collapsed and cotton prices reached an all-time low. Most affected by such market volatility were small landholders who were forced into tenancy as well as existing tenants whose material was further compromised.⁵⁹ As Robin D.G. Kelley argues, "it is no coincidence that Black farmers straddling the line between tenancy and ownership formed the nucleus of some of the predominantly communist-led rural movements" of the Black Belt" (and Alabama in particular, as Kelley's work attests to).⁶⁰ Such resistance was built upon a long history of rural opposition during the few decades prior, wherein Black and white populists waged a losing battle against the expansion of tenancy. When demands were not met, many landless farmers resisted debt peonage by abandoning the land altogether. That is, debt-ridden tenants often broke their contracts and left unsuspecting landowners at critical moments of the planting cycle.⁶¹ With Blacks outnumbering white four to one in some counties across the U.S. South, and with increasingly organized rural strikes, white planters, state officials, and others who benefitted from the region's plantation economy became increasingly concerned.⁶²

By the 1920s and 1930s, the race riots across the urban U.S. and growing unrest and labor movements vis-a-vis the Southern plantation economy had been stamped in the minds of U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors. Critically, there was growing belief in the need for an institutional framework for "interracial cooperation," particularly within the U.S. South. As Jodi Melamed states, during this time, philanthropy put its faith in "social engineering," or the idea that the gradual adjustment of white Southern beliefs and attitudes was the most effective method for improving racial conditions.⁶³ Yet, the flipside of shifting white attitudes towards peaceful and voluntary internal reform of the Southern racial system was preempting more threatening Black attitudes. In other words, as Pilkington states, "instead of organizing support among Black citizens as they were doing in the Southern white community," the people behind such efforts "viewed the Black masses as a disruptive force, something to be checked."⁶⁴ Further, although Melamed argues that the network of actors seeking to change racial attitudes

and alleviate the racial inequalities of Jim Crow was eventually absorbed by the state, U.S. state officials sanctioned such efforts earlier on. Principal among the government-sanctioned, organized efforts that aimed to sway the views of liberal Southern whites while undermining Black unrest, was the Commission on Interracial Cooperation. Founded in Atlanta, Georgia in 1918 and officially incorporated in 1929, the Commission for Interracial Cooperation represented the cutting edge of a quiet, limited attempt at peaceful and voluntary internal reform of the Southern racial system and plantation economy.⁶⁵

The Commission had barely started organizing committees when race relations had reached a breaking point by the 1920s and 1930s. Although the clashes in Longview, Texas, Washington, Chicago, Knoxville, Omaha, and Elaine, Alaska, played no direct role in the formation of the organization, the intensity of the violence combined with the apparent threat of Black rural unrest likely dictated the Commission's initial course of action. Pilkington shows that the minutes of the meetings as early as Summer 1919 were filled with discussions about racial violence and how to stop it, and reports from many Southern states alarmed numerous Commission members.⁶⁶ Thus, the Commission's response to the need to cultivate an antiracist mentality among Southern whites while undermining Black unrest was to build a working partnership between Northern philanthropic leaders, governmental leaders, and "thoughtful educated Negro leaders" who, crucially, adhered to the Tuskegee philosophy in order to "circumvent radical Black appeal to potentially excitable Black followers."⁶⁷

The Booker Washington Institute and Commission for Interracial Cooperation were not simply contemporaneous negotiations of Liberia's and the United States' plantation economies and their dynamics of racial dispossession, respectively. Rather, the leaders brought together under the CIC were those very same leaders proffering the Hampton-Tuskegee model across Africa and in Liberia in particular. Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stoke Fund—a key architect of the Booker Washington Institute—was one of the founders of the CIC itself; R. R. Moton was the president of the Tuskegee Institute; and Jackson Davis was the president of BWI's Board of Trustees, was on the Rockefeller Foundation's General Education Board, and later authored *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo, 1882-1947*. Members of a number of missionary organizations, universities and colleges, and youth organizations were also involved. While advancing industrial education across British and German Africa and crafting a pipeline for indigenous Liberians to work on the Firestone rubber plantation, these individuals and organizations pushed an agenda in the U.S. that sought to maintain the premise of *Plessy v. Ferguson* yet push Black and white Southerners to keep true to the *equal* part of "separate but equal."

Importantly, where the two intertwined efforts depart was in the degree of state sanction they were afforded. Specifically, these individuals' and organizations' domestic mission was officially endorsed by the U.S. government, *not* their mission in Africa and Liberia. In December 1929, in a statement to R. R. Moton, the president of the Tuskegee Institute following Washington, U.S. President Herbert Hoover commended the work of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation. Hoover wrote that he was "[g]reatly impressed by the constructive work of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation," stating that "the solution of all conflict is that men and women of

good-will shall search and find the areas where we can cooperate, and thus minimize differences." Anticipating Melamed's idea of the post-break racial liberalism that envisioned a national project of social engineering, Hoover stated that the work of the CIC is of "real national importance."⁶⁸ In other words, within the United States, grounded by the need to not fuel "radical Black appeal[s] to potentially excitable Black followers" amidst a highly contentious urban and rural landscape, particularly across the U.S. South, such connections and objectives were readily framed as national in scope and significance. Outside the U.S. context, however, it was a different story. In Africa and elsewhere—where the work of these actors and organizations, particularly around manual training and industrial education, was entirely overdetermined by racial and colonial power differentials—the United States' relationship to these organizations and their work remained entirely hidden.

Ultimately, during the first few decades of the twentieth century, industrial education quickly became part of an emergent liberal ideology that shaped the politics of development and "assistance" across what would become known as the Third World or Global South. Africa was a key site for the cultivation of such pedagogical and institutional developments, as evidenced by the Booker Washington Institute. Framed by broader efforts by U.S. state officials to assuage any concern of imperial intention—namely, the move toward "fairer economic dealing," a vision consolidated in 1933 under the banner of President Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor" policy—official U.S. support for BWI could have aided both the school and the perception of the United States globally. Yet, amidst the development of this official anti-imperialism, endorsement of BWI would have only been a liability given the circumstances surrounding the school. Further, endorsement of BWI would also been a liability given the state-backed development of "interracial cooperation" in the U.S. South (and the fact that BWI's proponents were also proponents of such efforts). Specifically, given the adoption of the Hampton-Tuskegee model of industrial education and manual training across British and German Africa—including Togo, the Gambia, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria—and given the racial logics of the plantation economy across the continent that BWI enunciated, official support of the school would have been detrimental. Finally, the fact that the Booker Washington Institute was directly tied to the Firestone Natural Rubber Company's rubber plantation amidst the Liberian slavery crisis made a public connection between the U.S. government and the school an outright impossibility.

PART 3.

The Plantation in Flux

After ten years of what Raymond L. Buell called "secret diplomacy" between the United States and Liberia—diplomacy organized around the Firestone Natural Rubber Company, the Booker Washington Institute, and the country's plantation economy—it was only at the outset of World War II that such diplomacy could no longer be secret. By 1939, it was clear to the United States that Liberia, with its rubber resources and strategic location, would be vital to the U.S. war effort.⁶⁹ And it was clear that increasing U.S. militarization in anticipation of and amidst the conflict would ultimately trigger the public acknowledgement of such diplomacy. The Firestone Natural Rubber Company, the Booker Washington Institute, Phelps-Stokes, and the country's

plantation economy were central to this wartime militarization and warming of relations. The first public announcement of cooperation between the U.S. government and the Phelps-Stokes Fund and others involved with the Booker Washington Institute was during a “shakedown cruise” of the newly commissioned USS Boise (CL-27) to Monrovia, Liberia—a cruise to test the performance of a ship prior to entering service. On the “shakedown cruise” was the first Liberian flag—designed by Phelps-Stokes and officially gifted to the Black republic upon their arrival in Monrovia.⁷⁰ As the strategic importance of the Booker Washington Institute increased, so did the public projection of the relationship. Although remaining neutral, the Liberian government signed an agreement with the United States in March 1942, granting the U.S. armed forces the right to construct bases and commercial airports on its territory.⁷¹ The U.S. armed forces collaborated with BWI in particular for both noncombat and combat reasons: the institute would be a prime U.S. military outpost in Africa, would produce food, materials, and shelter, and actively assisted the Firestone plantation’s efforts to increase yields of Liberian rubber for military needs.⁷² The hitherto discreet expressions of U.S. sovereignty across the region therefore began to take shape more, and BWI and Firestone were at the center.⁷³

Although BWI thrived in part because of U.S. state, military, and corporate investment, and although the circumstances were such that official endorsement of the school by U.S. state officials was commonplace, exploitation of indigenous Liberians at BWI and on the Firestone plantation was still rampant.⁷⁴ As Spivey argues, this was largely due to the control that Firestone exerted over BWI. In the name of the war effort, BWI’s predominantly indigenous students performed the various chores that Firestone staff requested. Washing, ironing, cooking, helping employees with work around their homes, chopping trees and cutting bushes, clearing land, and running errands—BWI students and staff were the ever-available labor force for Firestone needs.⁷⁵ Thus, the newly visible U.S. support of the school because of its military and economic importance did not curtail the continuation of indigenous exploitation nor did it curtail growth of internal and external criticism of the institute, its program, and its administrative structure.⁷⁶ In other words, by the late 1930s and early 1940s, the racial and colonial logics of Liberia’s plantation economy were laid to bare again. This time, however, the dynamics of indigenous dispossession at the center of BWI and Firestone came with official U.S. endorsement and utilization of their operations for the war effort.

Thus, once the relationship between the United States and the Booker Washington Institute became public as a fact of BWI’s importance as a key staging area for the North African theater of the war, and once it came to bear that the dynamics of indigenous exploitation that defined the Liberian slavery crisis two decades prior were energized again with U.S. backing, a new provisional catalyst that justified U.S. intervention needed to come to light. The underlying need was the same as what it was during the Liberian slavery crisis two decades prior: to maintain “liberal economies of affirmation and forgetting” that at once deny colonial slavery, erase the seizure of lands from indigenous peoples, displace migrations and connections across continents, and internalize these processes in a national struggle of history and consciousness.⁷⁷ The previous chapter recounted how U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors maintained such liberal economies of affirmation and forgetting by translating the racial and colonial problems of Liberia’s plantation economy into the racial and

colonial problems of (Americo-)Liberian self-government. Yet, such recourse was not available during and following World War II, when then relationship between the United States, BWI, and Firestone was more deeply entrenched and far more public. While the previous chapter outlined a moment when the plantation was in crisis—an institution temporarily marred by a modern-day slave trade—this moment was one where the plantation itself was the crisis. Just as the reservation within the United States became an untenable socio-spatial formation during the mid-twentieth century—renegotiated as a provisional catalyst for further incorporation into the U.S. national body and transnational capitalism through their dissolution—so too did the plantation complex undergo a similar transformation toward similar ends.

Section A. ***A New Day for Plantation Criticisms***

As Clyde Woods argues, criticism of the U.S. plantation economy in the 1930s crossed racial, ethnic, class, and regional boundaries. The challenges faced by Southern sharecroppers gained national attention while both academic and popular literature in support of rural transformation grew, lending needed weight to calls for change by sharecroppers themselves. The development theories of African Americans, Southern White tenants and sharecroppers and Northern industrial unionists began to intersect to form a broad attack on the Southern plantation bloc.⁷⁸ Yet as Woods states, the plantation bloc's preeminent seniority in Congress was still capable of strangling social, labor, and civil rights reforms aimed at plantation agriculture.⁷⁹ Additionally, a key demographic shift undermined such plantation criticism. Woods states that planters across the region introduced more tractors and new mechanical cotton pickers into the fields, which eliminated another third of the families living on plantations at the beginning of the Depression. Amidst demographic transformations and transformations of the plantation economy itself, for many U.S. Blacks, the historic Southern land, labor, and cultural reform agenda took a back seat to other agendas: Civil Rights, the desegregation of facilities, and the urban industrial employment agenda.⁸⁰

By the mid-twentieth century, Woods argues that plantation criticism was no longer center stage in the U.S. South. Specifically, Woods states that at this time, the “nationally dominant alliance of regional blocs and the emerging social science disciplines anointed mass-production agriculture, manufacturing, and science as the centers and sources of modern civilization and progress” had displaced plantation criticism.⁸¹ Yet by the end of World War II, the emerging geopolitical imperatives of the Cold War and the challenges that overlapping, internationalized anticolonial and civil rights movements posed to the limits of racial democracy had made it difficult to lose sight of the untenability of the plantation economy. Even further, the United States’ ongoing ties to and buttressing of the plantation economies of Liberia and elsewhere made it outright impossible to not address the untenability of plantation economy in an official way. Specifically, the “nationally dominant alliance of regional blocs and the emerging social science disciplines” that Woods points to arguably came to appropriate and incorporate plantation criticism and refashion it as a provisional catalyst for U.S. intervention by way of the Point 4 Program and other agricultural and rural development efforts. In other words, this mid-

twentieth century “racial liberal plantation criticism” ultimately reformulated plantation criticism in ways that not only weakened the premise of prior schools of plantation criticism but also re-entrenched the plantation economy and offered social, political, economic, and moral justification for ongoing U.S. involvement in it.

The focus here on plantation criticism from the late 1920s to the 1950s serves to complement Woods’ account of the establishment of the “neo-plantation complex” beginning in the 1930s. Woods argues that the neo-plantation complex was created in four stages: The first stage was the capitalization of planters through the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act’s (AAA) crop reduction programs and other subsidies during the early 1930s. As Woods states, the institutionalization of starvation grew from AAA-financed tractor purchases and eviction, the end of furnishings, the demolition of housing and communities, and payment below-subsistence wages. The second stage was the mass eviction of sharecroppers because they could not meet their debt and because target violence drove sharecroppers out. The third stage of the neo-plantation complex was the dominance of the tractor and wage labor regime by the early 1940s. Finally, by the mid-1950s, the introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, the elimination of hired labor, and the diversification of the regional economy was the last stage.⁸² Ultimately, Woods argues that the agricultural-social transformation conducted in parts of the U.S. had the same genealogy as the Green Revolutions launched worldwide by U.S. firms and the federal government and shared the goal of preempting peasant rebellions. Yet part of this genealogy of agricultural and rural transformation is how the problem of the plantation and plantation labor was posed. As the last chapter argued, the shifts in U.S. foreign policy were prompted in part by certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the problems of the Liberian slavery crisis (e.g., non-occupation and “fairer” economic relations). The problematization of the global plantation complex altogether—and not just the problematization of a period of forced conscription of labor, as in the Liberian slavery crisis—governed how such U.S.-driven agricultural and rural transformations under the Point 4 Program and other such programs found their footing and took shape.

Section B.

In the Shadow of Empire and the Planation

As these shifts in the U.S. South from the plantation complex toward the “neo-plantation complex” took place, so too did the terrain of plantation criticism shift accordingly—appropriated, “mainstreamed,” and repurposed toward *inviting* elements of the neo-plantation complex. Principal among such “mainstream” criticisms in the early 1930s was *The Shadow of the Plantation*, written by Charles S. Johnson, a sociologist at Fisk University and principal investigator as part of the League of Nations 1930 commission on the slavery crisis in Liberia. Johnson viewed the existing system of “separate but equal” as bankrupt, yet in this text and in his 1941 text, *Growing Up in the Black Belt*, he avoided alienating potential white allies by omitting the most inflammatory material uncovered by his investigators.⁸³ In doing so, his work did little to undermine the plantation economy and in fact provided extra cover for actions taken by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors within the U.S. South across the next

two decades. Johnson's text readily describes the plantation economy across the U.S. South according to the longstanding mythology of plantations as rigid, static, and effectively "pre-capitalist." He writes, "It has been impossible to escape the force of tradition, as represented in the customs established under the institution of slavery, and adhered to, by the white population in their relation to the Negroes, and by the Negroes in relation to themselves. What has resulted is an inevitable outcome of these traditions as expressed in the life of the subjects of this study. The community studied reflects a static economics not unlike the Mexican *hacienda*, or the condition of the Polish peasant—a situation in which the members of a group are "muffled with vast apathy." It is unquestionably the economic system in which they live, quite as much or even more than the landlords, that is responsible for their plight.⁸⁴ Johnson goes on to argue that the problem of the plantation is not simply a problem for Black peoples alone, nor for the U.S. South:

*The greatest pressure is being felt at present by the tenants, dulled and blocked in by a backwardness which is a fatal heritage of the system itself. But the fate of the tenant is but an aspect of the fate of the Southern farmer generally, and the plight of all of these awaits a comprehensive planning, which affects not merely the South but the nation.*⁸⁵

The nationalization of the problem of the plantation—rigid, static, pre-capitalist, technologically deficient, and ultimately impoverishing as it was—was central to the development of this "racial liberal plantation criticism" between the early- and mid-twentieth century.

Responding to these problems of the plantation, so defined, Johnson's text also prescribed ways that U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors could address this emerging national concern. The issue was like that which Lewis Meriam stated vis-a-vis Native peoples within the United States, and like that which Raymond Leslie Buell stated vis-a-vis indigenous peoples across Africa and Liberia in particular: isolation from the relations of capital (as a fact of governance and industry), and the poverty and risks of unrest to follow, necessitated the provision of greater techno-scientific agricultural knowledge and advancement and an even greater degree of control over decision-making and the flow of capital. Quickly establishing the terms of technological backwardness to define the plantation, Johnson states that "Farming implements are practically the same as they were three or four generations ago." Following from this technological deficiency, Johnson offers a number of avenues through which greater agricultural techno-scientific knowledge and technology acquired and advancement achievement: "On the other hand, however, there has been definite cultural penetration through the medium of the school, the church, the influence of persons educated outside the community, the exposure to demonstrations in health and agriculture, and through returned migrants." Yet Johnson is clear that that barriers toward such advancement still exist and that they are in part cultural. In no clearer terms, he states that "the weight of tradition, as would be expected, has resisted these changes."⁸⁶

The perceived consequences of inaction echo a theme present throughout this dissertation: the danger of unrest and revolt following from the impoverishing conditions of the plantation,

which itself follows from the lack of techno-scientific proficiency, which itself follows from the supposed isolation and “distance” from capital from which the cultural barriers emerge. Johnson states, “the very fact of this cultural difference presents the danger of social disorganization in any sudden attempt to introduce new modes of living and conceptions of values. The situation is one clearly of isolation and cultural lag. Changes are occurring slowly, however, and it is possible to observe and to measure them.”⁸⁷ Charles Johnson’s *Shadow of the Plantation* thus clearly mirrors elements of the liberal developments of reservation criticism within the United States and criticism of the extractive plantation economies across Africa and the sudden changes imposed upon indigenous Africans.

Ultimately, therefore, the emergent “racial liberal plantation criticism” beginning in the 1920s and 1930s that Johnson’s work bolstered involved representing the plantation and its problems a national concern that necessitated the provision of techno-scientific knowledge and advancement and an even greater degree of control over decision-making and the flow of capital. In this way, U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors aimed to preempt unrest that might have followed from not only the dispossessing practices of the plantation economy but also the United States tacit endorsement of them. The need to redefine the plantation itself as an exercise in the risk management of racial capitalism in order to maintain the underlying racial and colonial logics of dispossession while undermining unrest was not new. Paul Outka recounts this exact dynamic as it took place in the nineteenth century. As Outka argues, white supremacy has long found its ahistorical normative identity in an association with a “pure idyllic nature.”⁸⁸ Outka argues, however, the abject conditions and limitless violence of the plantation had done much to undermine this relationship, post-Emancipation. As a result, a new articulation of the plantation—not overdetermined by white supremacist capitalism development—needed to be established.⁸⁹ “Forced to reckon with mixed-labored pastoral and absolve their own guilt,” Outka states, various cultural productions by U.S. whites inaugurated a new idea of the plantation. Specifically, these cultural productions involved “reductive pastoral nostalgia” and the genre of the ex-slave novel, which was dominated by Blackface narrators were used to rewrite the traumatic history of the antebellum plantation into a racially harmonious garden.⁹⁰

As *Shadow of the Plantation* made clear, in the early twentieth century, the reconfigured representations of the plantation similarly served to maintain yet mask the processes of racial and colonial dispossession that constitute the plantation economy as such.⁹¹ These transformative representations of the plantation and coalescing “racial liberal plantation criticism” were of course not limited to Johnson’s report. Rather, they took place across the U.S. South within manifold institutions tied to the Southern plantation economy. Of particular importance was the transformation of industrial education and manual training—pedagogies originally developed at manual training and industrial institutes education that served to teach such students to accommodate themselves to the economic, political, and social upheavals involved with slave and settler capitalisms. As Black education historian, James D. Anderson, argues, Hampton and Tuskegee had abandoned their industrial training programs because of racially enforced agricultural and industrial outmigration beginning in the late 1920s.⁹² Yet this action had not resulted in the wholesale rejection of the industrial education and manual

training agenda. Rather, by the late 1920s, industrial education had been imbued with new potential that served the needs of an outmoded and increasingly charged economic system in the U.S. South.

As understood by the largest funders of Southern U.S. Black education, the need became one of pushing for further industrial training yet without "increasing competition between the races."⁹³ The Rosenwald Fund attempted to resolve this dilemma by defining skilled labor as practical knowledge, supplemented by industrial education, thereby resulting in increased labor efficiency and productivity.⁹⁴ Under this definition, any "unskilled" work could be transformed by industrial education into "skilled" work, and workers could move from unskilled to skilled labor without changing occupations. According to Anderson, "this represented the Rosenwald Fund's idea of how to increase Black skilled labor while avoiding "increas[ed] competition between the races."⁹⁵ Thus, a key element of the articulation of the problem of the plantation economy was the redefinition of labor itself, particularly with regard to techno-scientific knowledge and advancement in agriculture and other industries. The importance of this redefinition of labor, given the circumstances, cannot be understated. It effectively left room for industrial education and manual training despite the ostensibly increasingly outmoded nature of the plantation economy itself. This was crucial to the maintenance of institutions like the Booker Washington Institute even when Liberia's plantation economy went out of favor.

Even in the 1920s, these ideas of the plantation and plantation labor appeared internationally. The initial justification for the Firestone rubber plantation in Liberia, as well as administrative control of plantation operations by U.S. whites in particular, sheds light on the new terms through which the plantation economy was negotiated internationally and how criticisms like Johnson's *In the Shadow of the Plantation* grew over the following decades when carried abroad. Specifically, such justifications orbited scientific and technological proficiency and the benefits derived therefrom. A 1925 newspaper clearly outlined this scientific and technological justification for U.S. white control of the Black republic's fledgling plantation economy:

At the Census of 1920, only one colored man in the entire country gave his occupation as that of a forester; fifty reported themselves as architects; eighty as civil engineers and thirty-one as mechanical engineers . . ., "due to the fact so few of our young [Black] men have taken up these profession, because of the difficult of obtaining employment, it appears that Firestone Company may be obliged to select a mixed, if not all white, administrative force to put over this great piece of constructive work in the Black Republic, in whose progress all of us are greatly interested."⁹⁶

That same year, a writer in the *Chicago Defender* praised Harvey Firestone as a "great man with great wisdom" whose plantations would benefit not only Liberians but also U.S. Blacks. Black Americans, he believed, might find an outlet for their talents under the auspices of the company."⁹⁷ Similarly, the *Newport News Start* ran a story headlined "Firestone \$100,000,000 Puts Republic of Liberia Definitely on Map of World: New Field Affords Outlet for Negroes, Skilled Artisans, Mechanics, Physicians, and Others to Be Taken to Liberia." Apparent in these

accounts is that the entrance of Firestone into the country led to the recognition of a new opportunity. The establishment of the Firestone plantation in Liberia, its administrative apparatus, and U.S. state-sanctioned channels for capital and other forms of support, hinged on attaining techno-scientific proficiency. The plantation itself was thus a salvageable material and discursive formation, because U.S. Blacks—and by extension, Americo-Liberians and indigenous Liberians—could take the reins. This is what Cedric Robinson named the “most terrible species of technocracy” that DuBois had subscribed to and eventually disavowed.⁹⁸

PART 4.

Containment in Black: The Last Breath of Postwar Plantations

By the mid-twentieth century such racial liberal plantation criticism matured internationally. Critics spoke of gradual social, political, and techno-scientific transformation toward better economic conditions and the preservation of national life. They suggested that plantation areas were characterized by the existence of a class-caste system based on differences in the racial origins of workers and owners.⁹⁹ By the end of World War II, they were arguing the plantation economy was altogether indefensible. Given the sanctioning of the training of indigenous Liberian laborers on the Firestone Natural Rubber Company’s rubber plantation toward the war effort, the stationing of U.S. military personnel at the Booker Washington Institute, and the development of military and Cold War infrastructure (e.g., a “Voice of America” relay station, Liberia was a flashpoint for such criticism. Yet as this chapter has argued in detail, the Booker Washington Institute in Kakata, Liberia, held a great deal of potential to buttress U.S. state power and transnational capital while obfuscating the coeval conditions of slavery, capital accumulation, colonial dispossession, indentureship, and differential racialization at their core. Specifically, BWI could have done so by disciplining Liberia’s indigenous peoples into a tractable, reliable, and economically profitable source of labor in service of Liberia’s burgeoning “Negro aristocracy” and economy yet under the banner of a disinterested effort to aid the second Black republic in the world, more broadly, through training and technical assistance. In doing so, it also carried with it the potential to mutually reinforce President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy of fairer economic dealing between the United States and the governments of the world, and the culmination of this mantra in Truman’s announcement of the Point 4 Program.

In order to account for the ways in which BWI’s potential was ultimately realized by the mid-twentieth century, this final part of the chapter traces how Liberia’s plantation economy in particular was rendered altogether untenable, and how it was done so in ways that necessitated the ongoing presence of BWI and the establishment of analogous institutions across Africa. The previous chapter traced how U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors in the early twentieth century translated questions of indigenous Liberian dispossession into questions of the form and pace of Liberian economic development and the resilience of the sovereignty and self-government of the second Black republic in the world against the incursion of U.S. transnational capital. By the mid-twentieth century, the last stubborn vestiges of racial and colonial dispossession of Liberia’s plantation economy were represented as the grounds for

its outright dissolution. These vestiges of colonial and racial dispossession were represented as emerging from the plantation's nature as a rigid, static, non-dynamic, technologically deficient, and ultimately impoverishing prior stage of national development. Toward this end, the Booker Washington Institute and other such educational endeavors—which offered techno-scientific training and a new, dynamic, and wholly “modern” approach to agricultural production—were represented as facilitating the move toward a post-plantation future. Critically, this future was one where Liberia and other African nations' post-plantation social relations of capitalist modernity were supposedly not hopelessly compromised by white supremacy. This development describes what the final part of this chapter refers to as a “plantation futurism.” In this way, the racial liberal plantation criticism of the early twentieth century in the United States matured internationally by the mid-twentieth century, ultimately salvaging—by way of the Booker Washington Institute and the Point 4 Program science, technology, and education transfer involved—a place for U.S. state power and transnational capital inured from critique. Ultimately, the racial liberal plantation criticism that emerged in the U.S. South in the early-twentieth century matured in Liberia and elsewhere in Africa in the mid-twentieth century, crystallizing the vision of an ostensibly post-racist and wholly “modern” agricultural future that followed from the troubled dynamics of racial and colonial of the plantation economy.

Section A.

African Advancing: Settler-Imperial Plantation Futurism

The second chapter of this dissertation traced how “tradition” (as per Raymond Williams) was invoked by U.S. state officials and organizations such as the Future Farmers of America in ways that provided historical and cultural ratification of the United States' mid-twentieth century federal Indian Termination and Relocation policies. Specifically, creative references to historical sites and figures by such U.S. public and private actors were used to support the case that the existence of the Native reservation and the United States' provision of a nominal self-government to Native peoples were altogether untenable. Conversely, and simultaneously, within the racial liberal plantation criticism developed in the U.S. South and animated internationally in Liberia and elsewhere, “tradition” disappears.” Instead, the ratification of the social order vis-à-vis the plantation emerges as a fact of a *post-plantation futurism*. Agricultural “futurisms,” broadly, involve speculative visions for more techno-scientific agricultural landscapes and egalitarian futures, and the appropriation of these visions and technologies toward different ends. As Curtis Marez states regarding *agribusiness* futurisms in particular:

*Agribusiness futurism projects a corporate utopia in which technology precludes labor conflict and where new machines and biotechnical research eliminate some workers while enabling the expanded exploitation of others. Agribusiness futurism fetishizes new technology in an effort to eliminate resistance and subordinate workers of color to the machinery of production . . . optimistically framed in terms of progress and new tomorrows . . .*¹⁰⁰

The “linear, progressive temporality of ‘futurism,’” Marez states, “tends to displace discontinuities, contradictions, exclusions, and violence, in favor of a celebratory monumental future time.”¹⁰¹ The same framework can be used to understand the material and discursive transformations of the plantation economy in particular. Earlier in the twentieth century, Liberia’s new and “modern” Firestone plantation was being envisaged as a site of scientific resource production—it was “clean” and technologically optimistic. There was hope for both Firestone and, more importantly, the Black republic. By the mid-twentieth century, this technological optimism—still inviting of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism and control—hinged upon the supposed dissolution of the plantation altogether, pulling from the strategic elision of the U.S. South’s racial and colonial “discontinuities, contradictions, exclusions, and violence” in the early-twentieth century. That is, this agribusiness futurism vis-à-vis the postwar global plantation complex in particular enabled U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors to re-entrench the racial and colonial power differentials of the plantation economy while ostensibly working against it.

Between the 1920s and 1950s, the techno-scientific and technocratic negotiation of the plantation economy that at first still had hope in it eventually matured into one that pivoted around the *flaws* of the plantation economy. This racial liberal plantation criticism appropriated the momentum and analysis of prior plantation criticisms yet did so in service of re-entrenching racial and colonial power differentials against which they operated. Critically, a technocratic framing of the problem and response to the plantation economy was central to this racial liberal plantation criticism, and the scientific and technical training at Booker Washington Institute and elsewhere in Africa was central to this process and the materialization of such criticism. By characterizing the existing plantation economy as a paternalist, anti-statist, non-racial, and techno-scientifically impoverished and impoverishing system, U.S. government officials, corporate executives, and educational leaders could create a new agrarian future that still required U.S. agricultural assistance in order to be realized. As a result, capital accumulation’s disposability and unequal differentiation of human value are masked by the provision or promise of the provision of just the opposite: sovereignty and self-government, capital accumulation, and techno-scientific knowledges and modes of production.

Principal among such postwar racial liberal negotiations of the plantation complex was *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo, 1882-1947*.¹⁰² The report set out to investigate how governments, missions, and philanthropic foundations could cooperate to reduce disparity in African agriculture. According to historian Debra Reid, its objective was to move away from both traditional subsistence agriculture and, critically, “exploitative plantation production.”¹⁰³ The report was commissioned in 1944 by the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Foreign Missions Conference of North America, and the British Conference of Missions, with financial assistance by the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board and added support from the U.S. Department of Agriculture—private and public actors that supported Firestone’s vision only two decades prior. The report’s primary author, Jackson Davis, was President of BWI’s Board of Trustees, a member of the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board, and among the Northern philanthropic leaders, governmental leaders, and conservative Black leaders brought together under the Commission

for Interracial Cooperation. Collaborating with Davis was Thomas M. Campbell, who was trained at Tuskegee, worked under agricultural scientist George Washington Carver, and was the United States' first Black agricultural extension agent. Finally, joining them was Margaret Wrong, secretary of the International Committee on Christian Literature for Africa (ICCLA).

Over six months, the team visited several countries, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, French Equatorial Africa, Cameroon, and the Belgian Congo. Reid states that the team ultimately believed that success depended on the extension and improvement of education, sanitation, health and self-direction in agriculture, business and community affairs, which would reverse the plantation system of agriculture without threatening indigenous agriculture.¹⁰⁴ Yet, in building the case for the U.S.-driven grafting of "modern scientific technique on to the primitive stock of native land custom," the report defined the problem with the plantation economy as a distinctly colonial problem and not a racial phenomenon. That is, like earlier in the century, the racial logics of the plantation economy were translated into questions of self-government and national and economic development, yet it was now the plantation itself hindered such advancements. The report's framing of the issue with and of Africa's plantation economies left room for an official U.S. anti-imperialism grounded in U.S. backed agricultural science, research, capital and technology transfer initiatives—a seemingly disinterested set of technical assistance efforts that supposedly respected the inherent sovereignty of nations yet ultimately inured transnational articulations of racial capitalism from critique. In this way, the cases developed throughout the report and beyond evokes the multiple opportunities that the Booker Washington Institute offered. It was arguably by way of such frameworks that BWI was able to become the most prominent model of "neo-colonial educational systems" throughout the African continent.¹⁰⁵

In building the case for an U.S. anti-plantation policy that is nominally anti-imperial, *Africa Advancing* frames the plantation economy as a distinctly *paternalistic* relationship. Under the section, "New Colonial Policies," the authors, Jackson Davis, Thomas M. Campbell, and Margaret Wrong, state that the "real task in Africa" is to "educate and develop the African, through self-discipline and responsibility for self-government." This case was one that had been made explicitly in the Liberian context (vis-a-vis Americo-Liberians) for at least three decades, and that Booker T. Washington himself explicitly advocated for. Yet rather than uphold the plantation economies through which such goals were to be achieved—such as the case made for the Firestone Natural Rubber Company in Liberia in the 1920s—the authors of the report invoke the goal of educating and developing the African for self-government *against* the plantation economy. On the surface, this maneuver supposes that, as a matter of fact, the plantation economy represents a prior stage of national development and the evolution of capitalism, for as the authors state, "development must be through the same gradual processes of education and evolution which have been responsible for the development of Western nations."¹⁰⁶ Yet in building the moral, social, political, and economic case for U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capital, the plantation is regarded as a conduit for colonial and imperial relationality. As Davis, Campbell, and Wrong argue, "at this stage there is a great deal of paternalism in government and in the economic and plantation life." As such, "this must

give way rapidly as the African is trained to think for himself and to act for himself in coping with the forces of the modern world."¹⁰⁷

The plantation is regarded as a structure that maintains its people in a state of dependency—robbing them of the capacity to cope with the forces of the modern world, which necessarily requires being organized within self-governing entities. Critically, this argument diverges from an understanding of plantations as simply undermining the embodiment of civilizational norms by Black peoples, Native peoples, and other such racial and colonial subjects. Rather, the plantation economy keeps *peoples* within a state of dependence, thus undermining the potential of self-governing polities.¹⁰⁸ This connection between state control and the plantation economy in particular is not untrue. As Clyde Woods states, plantations have evolved as total social institutions with distinct spatial, electoral, administrative, and judicial practices. In an international context, a plantation economy governed by a corporation such as Firestone, established with the aid of U.S. state officials, distinctly undermines national aspirations in effectively constituting its own state. Ultimately, the move away from the plantation—and specifically, the foreign role in maintaining the plantation economy—is both a move away from colonial relationality and toward independence and self-government. An official anti-U.S. imperialism thus necessitated the dismantling of the plantation economy in ways that aided national development and undermined such threats to self-government.

Section B.

Toward the Post-Plantation Without Race

Critically, self-government and anti-imperialism as the governing frame of the push by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors to move away from the plantation economy necessitates a more nuanced understanding of the particular threat that this newfound concern sought to undermine. What form would discontent and unrest have taken vis-a-vis the plantation economy during the mid-twentieth century, and what might have been an appropriate response by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors? This manifestation of the risk management of racial capitalism arguably located the threat of unrest and discontent as following from *plantation criticisms that invoked race*—and not economic well-being and self-government—as their governing frame. In other words, while schools of plantation criticism in the mid-twentieth century had increasingly clarified the nature of plantations as a class-caste system based on racial differences between workers and owners, the plantation criticism being developed here actually coopted such criticisms at the expense of their central race critique. As stated by Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, the authors of *Africa Advancing*:

*It is false to assert that the backwardness of Africa is due to the exploitation by the European and to the colonial system. It is equally false for Europeans to say that the African is inherently inferior, that his present condition is due to his inferiority, and that consequently, no great promise is to be expected from efforts to educate and develop him.*¹⁰⁹

In building the case for the "gradual processes of education and evolution," the authors' statement here aims to do two things: First is salvaging the idea of foreign involvement against a history of U.S. and European influence in Africa otherwise overdetermined by colonial accumulation, territorial acquisition, slavery, and racial differentiation. The push away from the plantation economy supposedly leaves room for more disinterested involvement in African affairs by U.S. and European entities, for the backwardness of Africa does not owe itself to Euro-American involvement historically. Second, by arguing that Americans and Europeans cannot claim Africans are inherently racially inferior, the authors effectuate the new flexibility in racial procedures—a racial liberal framing of why the United States and Europe should intervene in the plantation economy. In other words, they reject the idea that educational programs and technological progress cannot uplift Africans simply because of racial differences. Even as part of the disavowal of the plantation altogether, U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors translated indigenous Liberian dispossession into African possibility.

While this move away from biological essentialism had been around since at least the early twentieth century—such as Boas' understanding that "cultures" are plural and relativistic, and that all societies have their cultures, rather than more biologically essentialist figurations of racial thought—Davis, Campbell, and Wrong effectively police the epistemological boundaries of what counts as a *race matter* more broadly.¹¹⁰ Specifically, the authors extend the concern around race beyond belief in inherent racial inferiority to the invocation of racial difference altogether. In contending that neither colonialism nor inherent racial inferiority produced the "backwardness of Africa," the authors state that, "efforts of *racialists* to use colonial conditions as a sounding board for their own advantage will be met by stiffening resistance on the other side" (emphasis added). They continue: "Such *political and racial agitation* tends to obscure and make more difficult the constructive work of missionaries, education and colonial officials" (emphasis added).¹¹¹ That is, in building the case for how exactly U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors can move African nations away from the plantation economy, Davis, Campbell, Wrong, and their team make the leap from framing "belief in inherent racial inferiority" as the problem to framing "belief in racial difference" altogether as the problem. That is, the authors ultimately make the case that centering race—rather than culture, class, or nationality—would actively undermine such efforts. "Racial agitation," which is to say race matter altogether, therefore seemingly had no place within the strain of mainstream plantation criticism being developed by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors during the mid-twentieth century. In building the case for the U.S.-driven grafting of "modern scientific technique on to the primitive stock of native land custom" and undercutting the plantation economy itself, race was removed.

Critically, therefore, this plantation criticism speaks to what Melamed states was the new flexibility in racial procedures after World War II: "that racism constantly appears as disappearing according to conventional race categories, even as it takes on new forms that can signify as nonracial or even antiracist."¹¹² The seemingly nonracial category of the "African," and nonracial efforts to secure the provision of "African self-government," make efforts to center race within the problematization of the plantation economy appear misguided and outdated, at least when understood apart from national terms. Trying to do so is also distinctly "agitating,"

appealing to the easy-to-sway sentiments of peoples domestically and abroad—a sign of Black pathology, like Black socialist internationalism.¹¹³ Moreover, what "racialism" did exist within plantation criticisms was subsumed within this criticism. Jackson Davis, Thomas M. Campbell, Margaret Wrong, Raymond Leslie Buell, and others shared with other schools of plantation criticism the recognition that the many "permutations of the plantation economy"—including slavery, sharecropping, mechanization, prison, wage and migratory labor—made it untenable. But they pressed to turn the plantation economy into a problem of national governance and economic development, not a problem of race.

Section C.

Salvaging the Booker Washington Institute: Techno-Scientific Post-Plantation Futures

The move away from race (i.e., Black self-government) as the governing frame of mid-twentieth century racial liberal plantation criticism, and toward a "non-racial" African self-government—and, critically, one that necessitated continued U.S. involvement in the form of agricultural outreach, assistance, and exchanges—hinged upon a distinctly *technocratic and techno-scientific* teleology of national development. Specifically, the framing of the need to "educate and develop the African, through self-discipline and responsibility for self-government" that Davis, Campbell, and Wrong advance follows the plantation mythology of the plantation economy itself as a rigid, static, non-dynamic, prior stage of national development. Yet this newly emerging plantation criticism dramatically builds upon this mythology by adding that the plantation, as it has been, is distinctly non-scientific. Thus, the solution is to foster the capacity for development in government and economic life, and this involves educating Africans with national aspirations in resolutely techno-scientific market agrarianism. The authors outline this teleology quite clearly: "European peoples, or the western world, throwing off the feudal system in the Middle Ages, rediscovered the ancient culture of Rome and Greece and at first enthroned philosophy, theology and a new humanism as their ideals. Then modern industry, in the form of capitalism, took the place of feudalism in economic society." They suggest, "the increase of scientific knowledge resulting from education charted a course of development with results undreamed of."¹¹⁴ Scientific and technological knowledge is the crux of the "development of Western nations." Critically, the rationale behind this narrative progression enunciates a key part of the Hampton-Tuskegee philosophy behind the Booker Washington Institute—the role of agricultural labor in particular offering self-possession and, by extension, self-government—by reorienting it around techno-scientific proficiency. "Using technical knowledge to subdue the forces of nature and turn them to man's use," the authors state, "the Western world has achieved a standard of living vastly superior to anything heretofore attained by man. This has given the Western nations command of material resources. The industrial nations, in particular, have achieved a standard of life which no nation not cultivating the sciences and not practicing universal education can approximate."¹¹⁵ Put another way, scientific and technological knowledge is understood as the clear pathway to emancipation-*cum*-national and economic development.

Underlying the emphasis on scientific and technological knowledge as the pathway to development and emancipation is the idea that self-government follows from individual freedom and agency. It is worth recalling again that political philosophers have long believed an individual's "interiority" is their first possession, which, through labor, transforms the world and self.¹¹⁶ From this understanding, self-possession easily slides into self-government, particularly by way of the economic exchange that grows from the investment of such work into nature. The use of "technical knowledge" in particular, the greater command of material resources this knowledge offered "Western nations," and the subsequently unrivaled "standard of life" achieved added incredible force to this teleological narrative—a narrative historically used to produce a tractable colonial and racial subjects (i.e., the Hampton-Tuskegee model). At the core of the resolutely "disinterested" call for U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic intervention in the plantation economies of Africa being developed in *Africa Advancing* and elsewhere are the transformative capacities of science and technology—In selfhood, self-government, and economic wellbeing.

This angle within the report offers clarity about precisely what efforts are seen as being actively undermined by the seemingly misguided and inflammatory commentary of "racialists", and the true risk of inaction involved therein. Again, as Davis, Campbell, and Wrong argue, "Such political and racial agitation tends to obscure and make more difficult the constructive work of missionaries, education and colonial officials" (emphasis added).¹¹⁷ This constructive work follows from the fact that "the industrial nations, in particular, have achieved a standard of life which no nation not cultivating the sciences and not practicing universal education can approximate." The authors name those nations not cultivating the sciences and practicing universal education: "The darker races of the world have, to a great extent, lived apart from the western or European races, pursuing their own way of life and following the path of tradition, custom and religion of their ancestors."¹¹⁸ Thus, toward the "advancement" of African government and economic life, the authors build the case that such Western nations owe it to themselves and others to spread their wealth of scientific and technological knowledge.

Critically, Davis, Campbell, and Wrong build this case by stating the *risk* of inaction—a distinct logic that would suffuse the Point 4 Program two years later yet was routed through the newly represented plantation economies of Africa and elsewhere. The authors state:

*Questions of distribution and of equitable sharing in the benefits of social and scientific advance have created tensions within many of the Western nations. Wide differences between sections of the population, and handicaps of various kinds, threaten the soundness of the national structure. These differences are emphasized in older agricultural areas where laborers and tenants follow the traditional plantation system, a lineal descendant of feudalism. The wealth produced is frequently drained off through this system into the hands of a few—not always into the hands of the owners, for the plantation owner is often 'owned' by the bank or whatever agency furnishes credit. A system utilizing outmoded practices in the twentieth century has been subjected to scrutiny in the strain of war.*¹¹⁹

The mythology that situates the plantation as a non-scientific prior stage of capitalism is clear in the naming of the plantation economy as characteristic of “older agricultural areas,” as a “lineal descendant of feudalism.” The result of this “[in]equitable sharing in the benefits of social and scientific advance” is distinctly *economic*, given that the “wealth produced is frequently drained off through this system into the hands of a few.” The plantation then, as a fact of its lack of social and scientific advancement and inequitable economic structure, produces vast material inequities between it and more advanced areas. Further, the primitive and non-techno-scientific proficient plantation is rendered in national terms: the existence of the plantation economy in a country would both threaten the soundness of its own “national structure” and the “national structure” of neighboring nations as a fact of the unrest that would follow and spread therefrom. Finally, subsuming all plantation criticism within this technocratic teleology of national development, Davis, Campbell, and Wrong state that these “outmoded practices” have been “subjected to scrutiny in the strain of war.” In other words, the potential criticism that plantation economies around the world would garner through the “racial break” comes to be neatly understood as posing an economic dilemma requiring a techno-scientific fix, not a manifestation of the coeval conditions of slavery, capital accumulation, colonial dispossession, indentureship, and differential racialization.

Education, science and technology, national development and eventually foreign aid all cohere around the plantation economy, the threat it poses, and the desired move away from it. As Truman stated in his 1949 inaugural address when announcing the Point 4 Program, the plantation represented, par excellence, an “economic life [that] is primitive and stagnant,” and “poverty [that] is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.” Similarly, the stated need for a different type of U.S. relationality to the plantation economy, driven by U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors, anticipated Truman’s announcement of the need to “embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas.” Davis, Campbell, and Wrong write:

It would be absurd to disregard the great advantage which liberal colonial powers offer for stability, continuity and mutual aid in well-ordered plans of development toward the achievement of clearly defined aims. The important thing is to find a platform of agreement on which Europeans and Africans can work for their mutual respect and advantage. Wherever this is taking place in Africa, there progress is most rapid and substantial.

Thus, the inverse of the plantation economy is economic well-being and self-government offered through “mutual aid” and “mutual respect” toward “mutual . . . advantage.”¹²⁰ This racial liberal plantation criticism hinging on a technocratic teleology of national development fostered by U.S. aid is neatly summed up in the authors’ conclusion: “The facts seem to warrant the conclusion that the odds are favorable to the plantation as a producer for export of certain commodities such as palm oil, but that export can be maintained by methods of native holdings and cultivation. Skilled management is the controlling factor, and if this can be obtained through the cooperation and education of small farmers there is no reason why they cannot hold their

own against the plantation system.”¹²¹ Skilled management, cooperation, and education are again the (non-)plantation future, juxtaposed against the perils of an economically primitive and inequitable plantation complex. This future will mitigate the “conflict between modern production on a scale of world markets on the one hand, and primitive land-ownership on the other.”¹²²

Even further, the goal of U.S. aid should not exacerbate what Buell stated twenty years prior was the “Native Problem in Africa”—“the violent change in the habits of the native in entering upon continuous labor, the extensive labor necessary for the construction of roads and railroads, which are a *sine qua non* of further development.” Instead, it would respect and further cultivate self-government by embarking on a plan of “agricultural research and education which aims at grafting modern scientific techniques on to the primitive stock of native land custom.”¹²³ And as with the Point 4 Program in “Dependent Areas,” this process would indeed be a slow one: “Quick results are not expected, but it is heartening to see plans that look to the development of the people with the expectation that they will participate increasingly in the intelligent development and self-government of the country.”¹²⁴ In this way, Davis, Campbell, and Wrong center economic and national wellbeing in ways that necessitate the provision modern scientific technique.

This racial liberal plantation criticism, calling for increased U.S. aid to enable Liberians themselves to take the reins of agricultural modernization and national development, was neatly crystallized in Raymond Leslie Buell’s own report on Liberia, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947*, following his return to the West African country nearly twenty years later and published in 1947, two years after *Africa Advancing*. Pointing to the technocratic organization of the Liberian plantation economy, Buell states, “numerous criticisms of the Firestone operations are made by Liberians and others . . . it is alleged that about 125 Americans monopolize all managerial and scientific positions, and that no Americo-Liberians or American negroes are employed in any such capacity.”¹²⁵ Against a colonial solution to the educational and economic dilemma facing the country, and the preservation of the “habits of the native,” Buell continues:

*The importance of finding an alternative that is not either mere protection of our strategic rubber interests or outright political annexation is fortified by the considerable social and political progress made in colonial Africa between the two wars. During this period many African colonies have enacted social legislation; created wage-fixing machinery; encouraged labor unions and naive cooperatives; established a system of labor inspectors; and showed a real concern over native education, nutrition, and public health.*¹²⁶

Buell then points to British Africa in his suggestion that U.S. state, philanthropic, and corporate actors make similar such efforts: “the British Parliament created in 1940 a ten-year colonial development fund to be used not to pay off government deficits but to secure positive development of resources and the welfare of the Natives . . . [and] in British West Africa appropriations from this fund have been made to train Native teachers, specialists in agriculture, and to set up a veterinary training school.”¹²⁷

The Booker Washington Institute, founded in 1929, with the aid of U.S. state and philanthropic actors and the Liberian government, and directly connected to the Firestone Natural Rubber Company's rubber plantation, emblemized and propelled this new trajectory of national development. As outlined in the previous chapter, the administrative apparatus of Liberian settler colonialism offered a way to internalize issues of race, particularly in relation to those issues that racial liberal planation criticisms sought to elide. In the 1940s, the pressing need to internalize questions of race became clear. In a 1946 letter from Thomas Jesse Jones to BWI's American white president, Revington L. Embree, Jones argued that the social and political realities of the American-Liberian relationship mandated the change in race: "If we are to secure more support from the Government [of Liberia] and more voluntary support from the people of Liberia, then Negro leadership will be most helpful. I think we have all recognized this and realized that it was merely a question of time."¹²⁸ As Spivey states, "foreign policy considerations and nationalist sentiment combined to provide a power inducement to bring BWI more closely in tune with its American counterparts," namely, the Black-run Tuskegee Institute.¹²⁹ The Liberian government shared this goal and felt BWI was an important asset to Americo-Liberian rule and maintaining the status quo.

The selection of Walter C. Wynn, a Black U.S. agricultural specialist, as the president of BWI temporarily allayed concerns and served these goals for a period of time. Yet such racial concern was ultimately subsumed within questions of resolutely *Liberian* control as part of the turn to self-government vis-à-vis national and economic development. In 1950, Edward R. Dudley, Black U.S. ambassador, argued that the United States needed to make a gesture that would halt any lingering suspicions against U.S. interests in Liberia and urged that control of BWI be turned over to the Liberian government.¹³⁰ The Americo-Liberian-led government embraced the idea of having complete control over BWI. As Spivey states, "it would end apprehension, put the education of indigenous Liberians completely in its charge, and serve as a symbol nationalism, and of goodwill between the Americo-Liberian government and the indigenous population."¹³¹ Ultimately, all parties agreed, and on January 21, 1954, BWI became the property of the Republic of Liberia. BWI was no longer a white- and U.S.-run institution but was celebrated for now being a Liberian-led institution that offered training in "modern" and techno-scientific methods of agricultural production.

By this time, U.S. assistance had taken a new form. Techno-scientific agricultural assistance and outreach was offered by students and faculty from Prairie View A&M (a historically Black college) under the Point 4 Program. Although Libya, Egypt, and Ethiopia would later be other African nations included in the Point 4 Program, Liberia and BWI were the first.¹³² It was also the most important: by the end of World War II, the Booker Washington Institute was the most prominent industrial school in all of Africa, and its particular model of education became the model of foreign-backed education systems throughout the continent.¹³³ Unsurprisingly, however, little had truly changed under this rearticulation of U.S. and Liberian relationality, and the new role that U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors played in "advancing" Africa. As Spivey states, work for the Firestone Natural Rubber Company continued unhindered.¹³⁴ Further, although the school principal was indigenous Liberian, little else had changed since the

official declaration of the transfer to the Americo-Liberian government. The Americo-Liberian government still dictated the school's policy and direction, and U.S. entities were the main funding source for the institute.¹³⁵ After 1961 the USAID took over where the New York State Colonization Society, the Firestones, the Phelps-Stokes, and others left off, providing the financial and technical assistance that kept the institute going, and the day-to-day management of the school was overseen by the joint Liberian-United States Commission for Economic Development.¹³⁶ The story of the Booker Washington Institute became a familiar one as both the Green Revolution and plantation futurism spread worldwide. By 1953, almost all of the largest plantation economies in the world had substantial science, technology, and education transfer initiatives and training taking place under the Point 4 Program, including Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Brazil.

Conclusion

While the previous chapter developed this genealogy by outlining representations of the Liberian slavery crisis as the extreme-most expression of the plantation economy, this chapter returned to a major theme explored throughout this dissertation: the development of techno-scientific market agrarianisms through outreach, education, and governance between the early- and mid-twentieth century. Beyond the Liberian slavery crisis alone, it focused upon the discursive and political management of the "plantation" itself through such techno-scientific agricultural and industrial education initiatives, particularly vis-à-vis national and economic development—the Liberian plantation economy, in particular, and the plantation, broadly. This chapter argued that realizing the potential of the Hampton-Tuskegee model of education and the Booker Washington Institute, particularly after World War II, required a renegotiation of the plantation economy itself, given the fraught history of the industrial education and manual training across the U.S. South, Liberia, and Africa more broadly. Turning the plantation into a non-scientific, non-modern, impoverishing, and anti-statist model of agricultural production allowed U.S. state, philanthropic, and corporate actors to secure the moral and material ground for postwar formations of U.S. racial capitalism. Thus, BWI both emblemized the ills of the plantation economy and seemingly offered respite from the plantation economies from which it was born.

Conclusion.

Liberal/Neoliberal Multicultural Plantations and Reservations

This dissertation, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution*, has developed a “slave and settler” genealogy of the mid-twentieth century U.S.-led international agricultural science, technology, and education transfer initiatives that later became known as the “Green Revolution.” It has looked to the legal, bureaucratic, and policy archive that framed and guided the Green Revolution and focused on the 1949 “Point 4 Program,” which was operated by the U.S. Department of State’s Technical Cooperation Administration and set out to “provide scientific and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries in an effort to further economic and social progress and maintain political stability.” Each chapter has investigated the anti-Black and settler colonial progenitors of this cornerstone of postwar agricultural and rural technical assistance, tracing how U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors facilitated certain ways of posing and resolving questions around the need for agricultural and rural development across the early and mid-twentieth century, and in relation to Black and Native communities within the United States and colonial geographies globally. Maintaining an eye toward the perpetual anxiety of unrest and revolt stemming from poverty and hunger across each such context has offered a way to recast how the risk management of U.S. slave and settler capitalisms beginning in the early twentieth century informed the Point 4 Program, itself an exercise in the risk management of a globalizing racial capitalism.

Ultimately, *Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution* has argued that the mid-twentieth century technical, scientific, and education cooperation efforts, and paired innovations in governance and administration, channeled the migration of the logics of the plantation and the reservation. Specifically, operating in service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power during this time, such efforts remade peoples and places in accordance with their anti-Black and settler colonial logics. It was also according to such logics of the plantation and reservation that ambiguous expressions of U.S. state power bearing the agency of transnational capitalism were inured from critique. Even further, the transit of the plantation and the reservation toward such ends was based upon domestic innovations in the two sets of operations of U.S. slave and settler capitalism in the early twentieth century.

It was according to the state-led push for Black and Native market agrarianisms-*cum*-anti-Black and settler colonial forms of subjection, administration, and governance beginning in the early-twentieth century that peoples and places were remade in service of the accumulation of wealth and the exercise of geopolitical power during the mid-twentieth century. And it was due to innovations in such forms of governance that ambiguous expressions of U.S. state power and transnational capital were inured from critique. This dissertation traced such transit as a fact of the problematization of the plantation and reservation beginning in the early-twentieth century. Specifically, as early twentieth century exercises in risk management of U.S. slave and settler capitalisms, the plantation and reservation were problematized in ways that supposedly

ushered in a new era of U.S. disinterested state power and that seemingly necessitated technoscientific market agrarian “fixes.” Thus, while the framework of technical and scientific cooperation and requisite modes of governance and administration during the mid-twentieth century seemed to crystallize an emergent trope of “development,” the early-twentieth century problematization of the plantation and reservation prefigured such developments globally, as in the Point 4 Program.

Each chapter located distinct moments in which the plantation and the reservation posed problems that only the provision of agricultural science, technology, education, and capital—and paired innovations in governance and administration—could seemingly ameliorate. The first and third chapters of this dissertation addressed early-twentieth century “crises of the reservation” and “crisis of the plantation,” respectively. In the United States, the 1928 Meriam Report identified areas of potential intervention that emerged as rubrics through which policymakers defined in an official capacity the problems of U.S.-Indian relations and the need for a new approach to agricultural production and Indian administration. At the same time, what quickly became known as the “Liberian slavery crisis” threw into question a number of matters for Liberian and U.S. state officials, the League of Nations, Firestone Natural Rubber Company, and U.S. Blacks and whites with various emotional and political investments in the Liberian experiment of Black self-government. Principal among the issues raised was what precisely the Liberian slavery crisis signified. Many wondered how and why a nation founded on the premise of offering respite from slavery itself succumbed to and reproduced the horrors of the institution itself.

The second and fourth chapters of this dissertation moved to the mid-twentieth century and addressed U.S. state, corporate, and philanthropic actors’ belief that the continued existence of the reservation and plantation altogether was itself the crisis. Specifically, in the mid-twentieth century, “Terminationists” in U.S. Congress and elsewhere made the case that the outright existence of the reservation threatened U.S. national cohesion and risked communist infiltration, thus rendering “containment” itself an untenable practice of Indian administration. And just as the reservation within the United States became an untenable socio-spatial formation during the mid-twentieth century—renegotiated as a provisional catalyst for further incorporation into the U.S. national body and transnational capitalism through their dissolution—so too did the plantation complex undergo a similar transformation toward similar ends. Across both the U.S. South and Liberia, improved modes of agricultural production and social and economic relations necessitated the dissolution of the plantation altogether and in fact seemingly countered the violence and impoverishment of the plantation economy.

The genealogy of the Green Revolution this dissertation developed went from the late 1920s to the mid-1960s. In addition to accounting for early elements of each, this period encompasses the Green Revolution according to its standard history as well as the first two decades of the postwar “racial break” and adoption of an “official anti-racism.” Of course, after this time period, race continued to justify the unevenness of capitalist wealth, yet the historical articulations of race and capital within the postwar race-liberal hegemony have continued to shift. Beginning after this dissertation’s time period of concern, the second phase of postwar

race-liberal hegemony, liberal multiculturalism, was inaugurated during the mid- to late-1960s and lasted until the early 1990s, and was followed by the current phase, neoliberal multiculturalism. As Jodi Melamed argues, liberal multiculturalism involved the displacement of materialist antiracisms by restricting discussions of race, culture, and anti-racism to “assimilationist or positive cultural pluralism.”¹ Currently, neoliberal multiculturalism portrays the United States as an ostensibly multicultural democracy and the model for the entire world. It does so by deploying the key principles of neoliberalism (e.g., “open societies” and “economic freedoms”) and the terms of liberal multiculturalism (e.g., “openness,” “diversity,” and “freedom”) in ways that posit global neoliberal restructuring as the key to a post-racist world of freedom and opportunity.² The non-generalizability of capitalist wealth takes shape in two key ways: first, the privileging of the multicultural U.S. citizen as a subject more universal and legitimate than even the multicultural world citizen; and second, the stigmatizing of “monocultural” personhood at odds with neoliberal subjectivity.³ A defining feature of postwar racial liberalism altogether, each phase has effectively naturalized the unevenness of global capitalism and obfuscated race as the guiding procedure of this unevenness of capital.

How were these shifts in the articulations of race and capital within the postwar race-liberal hegemony relevant to the slave and settler genealogy of the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda developed within this dissertation? In other words, how were the logics of the plantation and the reservation that were reorganized and renamed in the early twentieth century, and that took on a new life globally by the mid-twentieth century, later incorporated into liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism? The answer to this question requires its own dedicated investigation. Yet some elements of the present life of the industrial education and manual training institutes that carried out such work, and the plantation and reservation economies within which they did such work, shed light on their transformation within the latter phases of postwar racial liberalism—a more complete transformation in some ways than in other ways.

For over 30 years, the New Farmers of America (NFA)—the segregation-era counterpart to the Future Farmers of America (FFA)—educated Black rural youth within secondary schools in the U.S. South. The NFA shared with the FFA a similar organizational structure and set of activities, similar commitments to developing skills in agricultural trades and social and recreational life through established chapters. Following the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which mandated that all federally-funded programs not discriminate on the basis of race, the FFA and the NFA merged. A March 30, 1965 memorandum to FFA and NFA instructors and administrators, illustrates racial liberalism’s antiracist discourse framed by early Cold War Americanism. It states, “Let us use the problems and challenges that are ahead as personal challenges to each of us to make the organization better and to help it survive in a manner that will reflect Americanism and democracy at its best.”⁴ Yet the merger was by no means an “equal” one or at all amiable. Many NFA instructors and administrators approached the merger with masked fear and apprehension, concerned that it would facilitate the greater loss of resources for Black youth. It ultimately played out precisely as NFA instructors and administrators had anticipated, highlighting the superficiality of racial liberalism’s promises. In a 2001 study of the effects of the merger on such members of the NFA, one former instructor was quoted saying, “Change was

very tense. The end results were that there were a lot of promises that were made that were not kept and the NFA was swallowed up rather than merged.”⁵ The language of the NFA being “swallowed up” by the FFA, rather than a more even “merge,” would later appear throughout the archive of the joining of the two organizations.⁶

Despite the circumstances that necessitated a separate organization for Black youth, and despite racial liberalism’s shallow promises and the clear dissolution of the NFA within the FFA, the history of the organization dedicated to Black youth was celebrated decades later, well after this dissertation’s time period of interest. Critically, this celebration was narrated in ways that cohered with liberal multiculturalism’s terms of “openness,” “diversity,” and “freedom,” and neoliberal multiculturalism’s recycling of such terms, characteristically doing so in ways that re-authorized the still-global reach of the Future Farmers of America. For example, in October 1991, the National FFA Board of Directors established a “Multicultural Task Force” that set out to “develop educational activities to create multicultural awareness and to infuse diversity into a number of National FFA activities,” and to respond to the fact that “historically, agricultural education and the FFA have been most attractive to white male students in rural areas.” The task force included instructors and administrators from the FFA as well as consultants from the Kellogg Foundation and instructors and administrators from agricultural universities. Their recommendations included changes to FFA administration and activities that would be more “inviting” to “females and members of minority groups.” The articles and research pulled together for the report they produced invoked a number of new mantras of liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism: a 1993 *Fairfax Journal* article entitled, “Multiculturalism is Nothing to be Afraid of”; a 1993 article in *The Agricultural Education Magazine*, entitled “Addressing Cultural Diversity in the Agriculture Classroom”; and two 1993 articles in the *Vocational Education Journal*, entitled “Teacher Confront Biases in Sex Equity Training” and “How Accessible is Your Agriculture Program?”⁷

Following from these developments within the FFA, a number of changes were made to the structure of the organization and its activities. The H.O. Sargent award program—whose namesake helped found the New Farmers of America—was established in 1995. The award, was “designed to recognize both FFA members and non-FFA members who have achieved and promoted diversity in agricultural education and FFA.”⁸ Further, FFA members and local communities would “promote diversity” during “special months,” such as Black History Month (February) and National American Indian Heritage Month (November).⁹ As part of Black History Month every year since the Multicultural Task Force formed, various FFA chapters explicitly celebrate the NFA. They do so by framing the organization as part of the shared heritage of the Future Farmers of America and essential to its ongoing strength and global reach. In 2005, the FFA (since renamed the National FFA Organization) released a filmed entitled, “New Farmers of America: 40 Years of Brotherhood,” celebrating the 40th anniversary of the merger.

Such efforts at inviting and rewriting these elements of the troubled history of the Future Farmers of America extended to Native communities as well. A 2011 National FFA Organization video celebrates Native peoples’ “rich history in FFA, agriculture, and agricultural education.” Invoking a number of familiar U.S. settler colonial tropes in order to authorize the current

beliefs and practices of the organization and elide its role in naturalizing settlement and Native dispossession, the narrator in the film states: "Native Americans have always been stewards of the land, living off the land and using resources to their ultimate potential. Native Americans have a rich history in the FFA . . . Even though our lifestyles are different . . . [m]any values of Native Americans overlap with the FFA: Character, Teamwork, Stewardship, Sustainability." The terms of liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism are clear here. The 1990s thus inaugurated a period of the National FFA Organization that celebrates multiculturalism and diversity, and that ultimately incorporates histories of the plantation economy and U.S. settlement vis-à-vis agricultural education into the supposedly timeless truths and values of the organization: modern agricultural education for all, for a better future for all.

As this dissertation has shown, early-twentieth century transformations of the plantation economy and U.S. settlement extended across the world. In particular, this dissertation looked to the Firestone Natural Rubber Company and the U.S. Department of State's involvement in its establishment in the West African settler state of Liberia. This dissertation also looked to the significance of the Booker Washington Institute in such involvement from the early-twentieth century onward. Just as the NFA's history still lives on in the FFA, so too does this history in Africa live on. Most importantly, the Firestone rubber plantation and the Booker Washington Institute still exist within the West African country. There is even a renowned Future Farmers of America chapter at the Booker Washington Institute. However, in the case of Firestone, BWI, and the FFA, liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism's re-narration of their relationship and re-authorization of U.S. state power and transnational capitalism has been a little less complete.

This tenuousness of the terms of Firestone and BWI's presence in particular is likely due in part to the explicit, obvious failure of the "post-plantation" promises described in the last part of this dissertation. That is, with the most exploitative and violent components of U.S. state power and transnational capital still in place in Liberia (e.g., the rubber plantation economy itself) and not out of sight, even racial liberalism's narratives of racial democracy, and racial liberal plantation criticism in particular, could not find solid footing.

Two troubling dynamics highlight this fact. First, for years now, the Firestone Natural Rubber Company itself has taken over much of the West African country's schooling. According to the company's website, Firestone is "committed to helping Liberia rebuild to protect the interest of the country and improve the lives of all Liberians." Their website states that, since the end of the Liberian Civil Wars (1989 to 1997, and 1999 to 2003), Firestone has injected more than \$1 billion USD into the Liberian economy, and more than \$137 million into "effort[s] to rebuild homes, schools, health care facilities and other infrastructure, as well as to replant rubber trees."¹⁰ Second, Firestone was directly involved with the country's civil wars near the end of the twentieth century. In 1980, Samuel Doe had led a coup d'état that overthrew the elected government and in 1985 the elections held were widely considered fraudulent. In December 1989, former government minister Charles Taylor moved into the country from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire to start an uprising meant to topple the Doe government. Ultimately, the International Criminal Court found Taylor "responsible for acts of terrorism, murder, rape, sexual slavery, cruel treatment, recruitment of child soldiers, enslavement and pillage." A

recent ProPublica and Frontline investigation revealed that between 1989 and 1992, Firestone struck a deal with Taylor and channeled millions of dollars to him so as to keep the plantation in business. Taylor himself stated that this money provided the "financial assistance that we needed for the revolution."¹¹

That the promised mid-twentieth dissolution of the plantation was instead met with a rubber company that further imbedded itself in the social, political, and economic infrastructure of the country highlights just how limited even the racial liberal plantation criticism was. Yet evidence of a partially effective and lasting racial liberal plantation criticism does exist. First, on the Firestone Natural Rubber Company website, there exists no use of the word "plantation." Instead, their rubber plantation is referred to by the company as the Firestone "rubber farm," arguably to rid Firestone's place in the country of its negative connotations. Conversely, the media continues to refer to Firestone's operations as a plantation, highlighting racial liberal plantation criticism as a work in progress and Liberia's post-plantation future still on the horizon. However, outside of Firestone's own public relations materials, there is some evidence of the capacity of racial liberal plantation criticism to effectively transform how the plantation economy is problematized. For example, what criticism of the Firestone rubber plantation does exist largely does not involve accounts of indigenous Liberian dispossession and Americo-Liberian control of the country and the plantation economy—thus eliding some of the racial and colonial logics of the plantation economy. Therefore, such criticism was wholly appropriated by Firestone itself while U.S. and Liberia commentators still adhered to its terms at the expense of indigenous Liberians.

The patchy continuation of such racial liberal plantation criticism is not to say that liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism have not shaped how race, capitalism, and U.S. and Liberian state power interface in the West African country. In fact, it was according to such terms that, since the early 1980s, U.S. state officials have sided with Samuel Doe, who was in fact indigenous (Krahn) and who sought to end Americo-Liberian control of the country, despite the unethical nature of his rise to power. In 1981, U.S.-based journalist with *The Atlantic*, Sanford J. Ungar, recounted how Doe's insurgent army "took thirteen of the wealthy Americo-Liberian officials who had been arrested . . . marched them nearly naked through the streets of Monrovia, to ensure that they lost their dignity, tied them to seaside post at the Barclay Training Centre, and executed them at point-blank range."¹² In October 1985, he effectively stole the election that was to have ushered in civilian rule and what power Americo-Liberians held was simply taken by Doe's own Krahn people.

Despite the violence of Doe's own coming into power—the military takeover and the rigged election—the Reagan Administration ultimately supported the new indigenous Liberian president. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker, the Administration's chief spokesman on African affairs, reflected upon the "positive aspects" of the election and about the standards of "a part of the world where the norm is single-party rule."¹³ The support for Doe maintained a favorable environment for U.S. transnational capital and the Firestone plantation itself. However, the nature of such U.S. involvement in Liberian affairs was masked by the fact that such support was premised upon the ideas of liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism, apart from

the “monoculturalism” that seemingly defined Liberian affairs prior to the (corrupt) election. That is, election coverage cohered well with the new privileged and stigmatized racial formations semi-detached from conventional racial categories that define this latest phase of liberal race formation.

These brief vignettes of the present life of the Future Farmers of America, Firestone, and other such actors and organizations covered in this dissertation demonstrate that today’s terms of liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism are layered upon the earlier terms of postwar racial liberalism in ways that continue to guide and obfuscate the anti-Black and settler colonial dynamics at their core. With material and discursive vestiges of the early days of postwar racial liberalism still operating across these contexts and within the U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda more broadly, and with the terms and procedures of liberal and neoliberal multiculturalism increasingly grounded within this agenda, the need to incorporate more expansive anti-racisms, anticolonialisms, and anti-capitalisms in transformative approaches to global agricultural production is just as great as ever. Specifically, the frameworks offered by *abolition* and *decolonization* need to find a more central place within scholarship on the political economy and political ecology of agriculture. Doing so would foster more effective push-back on reformist approaches to global agricultural production—approaches that funnel our collective political imaginations toward more “inclusive” and “diverse” market agrarianisms without addressing the slave and settler capitalist dynamics at their core.

Notes

Introduction.

Race, Containment, and the Settler-Imperial Politics of the Green Revolution

¹ George Conway, *The Doubly Green Revolution: Food for All in the Twenty-First Century* (London: Penguin Books, 1997).

² Gabriela Pechlaner and Gerardo Otero, "The Third Food Regime: Neoliberal Globalism and Agricultural Biotechnology in North America," *Sociologia Ruralis* 48, no. 4 (2008).

³ Cited in Raj Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 40, no. 1 (2013): 7.

⁴ Peter Rosset, "Lessons from the Green Revolution" (Oakland: Food First, 2000); Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," 7; Eric Holt Giménez and Annie Shattuck, "Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements: Rumbblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 38, no. 1 (2011): 112.

⁵ Holt Giménez and Shattuck, "Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements," 112.

⁶ Eric Vanhaute, "From Famine to Food Crisis: What History Can Teach Us About Local and Global Subsistence Crises," *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 38, no. 1 (2011): 47–65; Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," 7.

⁷ Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," 3.

⁸ Holt Giménez and Shattuck, "Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food Movements," 110.

⁹ Holt Giménez and Shattuck, 110.

¹⁰ Such analyses—dubbed food regime analysis—have focused on distinguishing specific relations of food production and consumption during the periods of British and U.S. hegemony. Prior to the proliferation of Green Revolution transfers and food aid programs, among other U.S.-led global efforts in the development of modern agriculture, the "first food regime" was "anchored in Britain's model of "free trade imperialism," the deployment of a policy of economic liberalism designed, in part, to gain access to the economies and colonial empires of its rival European states, and thereby consolidate British commercial dominance in the world economy. Yet, by the mid-twentieth century, as Harriet Friedmann argues, "'free trade in agriculture, key to British hegemony, gave way under U.S. hegemony to managed agriculture within the Free World.'" This was the 'second food regime.' "Philip McMichael, "Global Development and The Corporate Food Regime," *Research in Rural Sociology and Development* 11 (November 17, 2005): 274, [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-1922\(05\)11010-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1057-1922(05)11010-5); Harriet Friedmann, "Feeding the Empire: The Pathologies of Globalized Agriculture," *Socialist Register* 41, no. 41 (March 19, 2009), <http://socialistregister.com/index.php/srv/article/download/5828>.

¹¹ Harriet Friedman and Philip McMichael, "Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present," *Sociologia Ruralis* 29, no. 2 (1989): 104.

¹² Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire* (London: Merlin Press, 2004), 17; Philip McMichael, "Global Development and The Corporate Food Regime," *Research in Rural Sociology and Development* 11 (November 17, 2005): 265–99.

¹³ Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," 2.

¹⁴ Including, for example, the fact of the first "food regime" establishing the conditions for the second "food regime," of which the Green Revolution was a key part.

¹⁵ Murphy 2006; Brand 1945; Macconnell 1953; Carnegie 1901; Fitzgerald 1986, As cited in Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," 7.

¹⁶ Clyde Woods, *Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the Mississippi Delta* (London: Verso, 1998).

¹⁷ Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011), 7.

¹⁸ By pulling from such texts, this dissertation engages in what Patel describes as a “longue dure’e analysis” of the Green Revolution. As per Patel, this type of analysis recognizes the transformations at hand as decades-long and not limited to the subset of plant science programs geared toward the development and distribution of pest-resistant and high-yield crop varieties for which the Green Revolution is known.

¹⁹ Tania Murray Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); James C Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); Mona Domosh, “International Harvester, the U.S. South, and the Makings of International Development in the Early 20th Century,” *Political Geography* 49 (2015): 3.

²⁰ This particular line of argumentation is drawn from Lisa Lowe’s *Intimacies of Four Continents*. As Lowe argues, the promises of liberty and freedom, and the defense of such promises, should not be understood as apart from the global histories and formations of colonialism and capitalism which they depend, for maintaining “order and progress” has long permitted expanded Anglo-American rule domestically and globally. Specifically, by reading India Office and Foreign Office records regarding post-Opium War coastal China and Hong Kong together with John Stuart Mill’s writings on free trade and representative government, Lowe demonstrates how the new form of imperial sovereignty (i.e., the elaboration of imperial trade and the innovation of new forms of governance) expressed by Nineteenth century “free trade” in India and China was justified by the need to “keep the peace” and defend wage labor, free trade, and liberal government against “foreign barbarism and despotism.” It is in this way that the risk management of settler and slave capitalism—underwritten by modern notions of rights, emancipation, free labor, and free trade—permitted expanded Anglo-American rule through new forms of trade, migrant labor, and security and governed mobility all while accommodating existing forms of settlement, slavery, monopoly, and military occupation. Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 2, 16.

²¹ Tiffany Lethabo King, “The Labor of (Re)reading Plantation Landscapes Fungible(ly),” *Antipode* 48, no. 4 (2016): 1022.

²² Frank B. Wilderson III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2010), 14; Cited in: King, “The Labor of (Re)reading Plantation Landscapes Fungible(ly),” 28.

²³ King, “The Labor of (Re)reading Plantation Landscapes Fungible(ly),” 1023.

²⁴ King, 1023.

²⁵ George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 1999); Cited in: Katherine McKittrick, “Plantation Futures,” *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 17, no. 3 (42) (2013): 3.

²⁶ McKittrick, “Plantation Futures,” 3.

²⁷ Woods, *Development Arrested*, 10.

²⁸ Woods, 10.

²⁹ The turn of the twentieth century saw the “inversion” of representations of Native peoples, which laid the ground for the early- to mid-twentieth century transformations of Indianness and the migratory logics of the reservation. Specifically, for much of the nineteenth century, negative representations of “primitive” Native peoples “exterior” to white civilization had contrasted with positive images of Native peoples’ assimilation. These representations were further cemented following the closure of the frontier in the late nineteenth century and the heightened “necessity” of a valorized assimilation. Yet, at the turn-of-the-century, in the context of modern urban industrialization, Indianness was figured as refuge

from the worst elements of such transformation. As Philip J. Deloria argues that the “positive exterior Indian other represented authentic reality in the face of urban disorder and alienating mass society,” while “Indians who had assimilated into modern society were now negative Others [that] could only reflect the savagery and degradation of that world back into American eyes.” Philip J. Deloria, *Playing Indian* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 74; Cited in: Elizabeth Carolyn Brown, “Pedagogies of U.S. Imperialism: Racial Education from Reconstruction to the Progressive Era” (PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2016), 214, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/36627>.

³⁰ Mark Rifkin, *Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 195.

³¹ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 3.

³² Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011), xx.

³³ Gerald Vizenor, *Manifest Manners: Postindian Warriors of Survivance*, 2nd ed. (Hanover: Wesleyan, 1993); Cited in: Mark Rifkin, *Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 198.

³⁴ While this dissertation suggests that Blackness and Indianness, and the plantation and reservation, can be understood as somewhat analogous racial and colonial procedures, Tiffany L. King, Frank Wilderson III, Jared Sexton, and others who have helped develop the Afro-pessimist school of thought argue that they are intertwined yet fundamentally different. Specifically, they argue that Blackness is entirely “non-geographic” raw material that may be necessary to the production of space, civil society, and infinite meaning yet Black bodies are not subjects that humanly inhabit such space, institutions, and meanings. In this way, Blackness connotes an ontological non-position. while Indianness operates in the realm of political economy existing in “conflictual harmony” with settlerhood and its spatial and self-actualizing ambitions. This dissertation recognizes the strength of such theorizations yet aims to leave greater room for the capacity of both to function as the raw material for U.S. state power and transnational capitalism and sites of resistance to it. Despite this, greater theorization of precisely how Blackness and Indianness co-constitute one another as well as their incommensurabilities vis-à-vis the contexts analyzed throughout this dissertation could be an area of further work. Frank B. Wilderson III, *Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Jared Sexton, “The Vel of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” *Critical Sociology* 42, no. 4–5 (2016); Tiffany Lethabo King, “The Labor of (Re)reading Plantation Landscapes Fungible(Iy),” *Antipode* 48, no. 4 (2016): 1022–1039.

³⁵ Noelani Goodyear-Ka’opua, *The Seeds We Planted: Portraits of a Native Hawai’ian Charter School* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); K. Tsianina Lomawaima and Teresa L. McCarty, *To Remain an Indian: Lessons in Democracy from a Century of Native American Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006).

³⁶ Lomawaima and McCarty, *To Remain an Indian*; Cited in: Goodyear-Ka’opua, *The Seeds We Planted*, 26. Additionally, alongside the fact that Indianness itself authorizes Anglo-American hegemonic mastery over the significations of justice, democracy, law, and terror, and emboldens settler spatial potential and self-actualization, Goodyear-Ka’opua states that the logic of containment is driven by the pragmatic acknowledgement by settler authorities that Native peoples will not just disappear despite efforts to remove and assimilate. Goodyear-Ka’opua, *The Seeds We Planted*, 25.

³⁷ Byrd, *The Transit of Empire*, xiii.

³⁸ Byrd, xx.

³⁹ Philip J. Deloria, “From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations,” in *The Cultural Turn in U. S. History: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. James W. Cook, Lawrence B. Glickman, and Michael O’Malley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 367.

- ⁴⁰ King, "The Labor of (Re)reading Plantation Landscapes Fungible(ly)," 1023.
- ⁴¹ Tiffany Jeannette King, "In the Clearing: Black Female Bodies, Space and Settler Colonial Landscapes" (PhD diss., University of Maryland, 2013), 19, <http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/14525>.
- ⁴² King, 40.
- ⁴³ This treatment of the archive of the Green Revolution concerning slavery and settlement is drawn, in part, from Lisa Lowe's treatment of the archive of modern liberalism. Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 12.
- ⁴⁴ Ferguson also argues that race names the processes by which people internalize those logics. Roderick Ferguson, "Race," in *Keywords for American Cultural Studies*, ed. Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 192.
- ⁴⁵ Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy* (Harvard University Press, 2005), 223; Cited in: Melamed, *Represent and Destroy*, 13.
- ⁴⁶ Melamed, *Represent and Destroy*, 11.
- ⁴⁷ Melamed, 219.
- ⁴⁸ Ruth W. Gilmore, "Race and Globalization," in *Geographies of Global Change: Remapping the World*, ed. R. J. Johnston, Peter J. Taylor, and Michael Watts, 2 edition (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002), 261.
- ⁴⁹ Jodi Melamed, "Racial Capitalism," *Critical Ethnic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 79, <https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.1.0076>.
- ⁵⁰ Melamed, 79.
- ⁵¹ David Theo Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning* (Wiley, 1993); Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 1 edition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Denise Ferreira da Silva, *Toward a Global Idea of Race* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), <http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780816654383/>; Cited in: Junaid Rana, "Race," in *Keywords for Asian American Studies*, ed. Cathy J. Schlund-Vials, Linda Trinh Võ, and K. Scott Wong (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 203.
- ⁵² Alyosha Goldstein, ed., *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 2.
- ⁵³ Melamed, "Racial Capitalism," 78.
- ⁵⁴ Nikhil Pal Singh, "The Whiteness of Police," *American Quarterly* 66, no. 4 (2014): 1091.
- ⁵⁵ As Robin D.G. Kelley states, "it is no coincidence that Black farmers straddling the line between tenancy and ownership formed the nucleus of some of the predominantly communist-led rural movements" of Alabama and other parts of the "Black Belt." Ultimately, Blacks outnumbered whites four to one in some counties in the region, and they maintained increasingly organized—and largely communist—rural strikes and other such efforts to move toward the open collective rebellion that the demography and layout of the plantation made near possible. As a result, the anxiety white planters, government officials, and others felt and the ongoing violence through which it took take shape was reaching a fever pitch. Robin D.G. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 35–37.
- ⁵⁶ Thomas Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota: The Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations* (University of Arizona Press, 1998), 109; Deloria, "From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations," 362.
- ⁵⁷ Sheila Jasanoff, ed., *States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- ⁵⁸ Established within the Department of State in September 1950, the Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA) was responsible for the technical cooperation programs authorized by Title IV of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1950, also known as the Point 4 Program. According to the National Archives, the Point 4 Program "provided scientific and technical assistance to underdeveloped countries

in an effort to further economic and social progress and maintain political stability.” The agency was ultimately abolished in August 1953 and its functions transferred to the Foreign Operations Administration, which administered the program. “Records of U.S. Foreign Assistance Agencies,” 1963 1942, RG 469, National Archives, <https://www.archives.gov/research/foreign-policy/related-records/rg-469>.

⁵⁹ As Woods argues, these farmers were largely displaced once white planters had the means and the incentives to substitute them with machines and unemployed casual labor. Woods, *Development Arrested*, 9.

⁶⁰ The Phelps-Stokes fund was a nonprofit fund established in 1911 by the will of Caroline Phelps Stokes. Its stated goal was to advance social and economic development across the Americas and Africa, focusing on Black and indigenous peoples across the United States and indigenous peoples and Black settler populations across Africa (e.g., Liberia and Sierra Leone). Highlighting the shared objectives and strategies of such philanthropic groups at the time, both Phelps-Stokes and Rockefeller funded the 1928 Meriam Report and reform directed toward the reservation system at the same time that they helped fund administrative and educational reform vis-à-vis plantation economies across Africa.

⁶¹ Debra Ann Reid, *Reaping a Greater Harvest: African Americans, the Extension Service, and Rural Reform in Jim Crow Texas* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 172.

⁶² The organization began as the Future Farmers of Virginia, founded in 1925 at Virginia Polytechnic Institute by agriculture teachers, Henry C. Groseclose, Walter Newman, Edmund Magill, and Harry Sanders.

⁶³ Brown, “Pedagogies of U.S. Imperialism: Racial Education from Reconstruction to the Progressive Era,” 12; Donald Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation: The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia, 1929-1984* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 1.

⁶⁴ Brown, “Pedagogies of U.S. Imperialism: Racial Education from Reconstruction to the Progressive Era,” 8.

⁶⁵ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 2.

⁶⁶ Beth H. Piatote, *Domestic Subjects: Gender, Citizenship, and Law in Native American Literature* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

⁶⁷ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 3; Piatote, *Domestic Subjects: Gender, Citizenship, and Law in Native American Literature*.

⁶⁸ Homi K Bhabha, *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990); Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Chatto & Windus, 1994).

⁶⁹ Alyosha Goldstein, ed., *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 3.

⁷⁰ Bhabha, *Nation and Narration*, 3.

⁷¹ Goldstein, *Formations of United States Colonialism*, 2.

⁷² Li, *The Will to Improve*; Scott, *Seeing like a State*; Domosh, “International Harvester, the U.S. South, and the Makings of International Development in the Early 20th Century,” 3.

⁷³ Goldstein, *Formations of United States Colonialism*, 2.

Chapter One.

The Reservation in Crisis: From “The Problem of Indian Administration” to a “Bold New Program”

¹ While the Point 4 Program was a relatively short-lived part of the longer and quite complex history of postwar U.S. foreign aid, this dissertation frames it as a keystone piece of policy worth of in-depth

analysis for a few reasons: First, it was the first official U.S. plan for global economic development. Second, the rationale behind the program and its goal of technical assistance and economic aid paired with administrative changes crystallized the broader array of U.S. foreign aid efforts; and third, its focus on agricultural economies in particular enunciated the longstanding importance of domestic and global relations of agricultural production to U.S. state power and transnational capitalism.

² Once established, the program grew rapidly. In September 1950, Congress appropriated \$26.9 million. The following year, it appropriated \$147.9 million. In 1952, it appropriated \$155.6 million.

³ To administer foreign assistance to “underdeveloped areas” more efficiently, President Eisenhower integrated management into a single agency, the newly created Foreign Operations Administration (FOA). The MSA, TCA (which had been under MSA's direction), and the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) were all abolished as of August 1953, and their country offices all became known as “United States Operations Missions” (USOMs) under the newly created Foreign Operations Administration (FOA). Critically, President Eisenhower directed other U.S. government agencies to place their technical assistance operations within “underdeveloped” countries under FOA's management as well. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), for example, transferred the technical assistance programs of Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations (OFAR) to FOA and reconstituted the Foreign Agricultural Service to focus on building global markets for U.S. farm products, influencing international trade agreements and negotiations, and collecting relevant statistics and market information.

⁴ Harriet Friedman and Philip McMichael, “Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present,” *Sociologia Ruralis* 29, no. 2 (1989): 104.

⁵ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *Global Capitalism and American Empire* (London: Merlin Press, 2004), 17; Philip McMichael, “Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime,” *Research in Rural Sociology and Development* 11 (2005): 269–303.

⁶ “The World Food Problem, Agriculture, and the Rockefeller Foundation” (Rockefeller Foundation, June 21, 1951), RG 3.1, Series 908, Box 14, Folder 144, Rockefeller Archive Center, Rockefeller Foundation Records, Administration, Program, and Policy, *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 40, no. 1 (2013): 11.

⁷ David Rieff, “Where Hunger Goes: On the Green Revolution,” *The Nation*, February 17, 2011, <https://www.thenation.com/article/where-hunger-goes-green-revolution/>; Cited in: Patel, “The Long Green Revolution,” 11.

⁸ Alyosha Goldstein, “On the Internal Border: Colonial Difference, the Cold War, and the Locations of ‘Underdevelopment,’” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 1 (January 2008): 30, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417508000042>.

⁹ Adolfo Gilly, *The Mexican Revolution* (London: NLB, 1983); John Harris, *Capitalism and Peasant Production: The Green Revolution in India* (London: Penguin Books, 1988); Cited in: Patel, “The Long Green Revolution,” 10.

¹⁰ Jodi Melamed, “Racial Capitalism,” *Critical Ethnic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 77, <https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.1.0076>.

¹¹ Alyosha Goldstein, ed., *Formations of United States Colonialism* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 2.

¹² Melamed, “Racial Capitalism,” 79.

¹³ Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 16.

¹⁴ Thomas Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota: The Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations* (University of Arizona Press, 1998), 61.

¹⁵ Biolsi, 62.

¹⁶ Frederick Hoxie, “Indian Reorganization Act—75 Years Later: Renewing Our Commitment to Restore Tribal Homelands and Promote Self-Determination,” § Committee on Indian Affairs (2011), 6, <https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg68389/html/CHRG-112shrg68389.htm>.

¹⁷ According to Biolsi, however, by the mid-1930s, any gains in yield, income, and self-sufficiency made by Native farmers and landowners during the 1920s had been undermined by the prevailing crop conditions and by the Great Depression. Thomas Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota: The Political Economy of the New Deal on the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Reservations* (University of Arizona Press, 1998), 111.

¹⁸ Philip J. Deloria, “From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations,” in *The Cultural Turn in U. S. History: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. James W. Cook, Lawrence B. Glickman, and Michael O’Malley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 361.

¹⁹ Deloria, 361.

²⁰ Such Progressive-era reforms aimed to improve administrative efficiency, reduce waste, and eliminate corruption.

²¹ James Stuart Olson and Raymond Wilson, *Native Americans in the Twentieth Century* (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 100.

²² Olson and Wilson, 100.

²³ Specifically, the team included: Ray A. Brown, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin who would serve as the specialist in legal aspects of Indian problems; Henry Roe Cloud, President of the American Indian Institute in Wichita, Kansas who would serve as the Indian adviser; Edward Everett Dale, head of the department of history of the University of Oklahoma, who would serve as a specialist in economic conditions; Emma Duke, a health practitioner that would serve as a specialist on conditions of Indian migrants to urban communities; Dr. Herbert R. Edwards with the New Haven Department of Health who would serve as a specialist in health; Fayette Avery McKenzie, a professor of sociology at Juniata College who would serve as a specialist in existing material relating to Native peoples; Mary Louise Mark, professor of sociology at Ohio State University who would serve as a specialist in family life and activities of women; W. Carson Ryan, Jr., professor of education at Swarthmore College who would serve as a specialist in education; and William J. Spillman, an agricultural economist with the United States Department of Agriculture who would serve as a specialist in agriculture.

²⁴ The report states that the staff did not visit the following jurisdictions: In Arizona, Camp Verde and Kaibab; in Michigan, Mackinac; in Nevada, Moapa River and Western Shoshone; in North Carolina, Eastern Cherokees; in North Dakota, Standing Rock and Turtle Mountain; in Oklahoma, Cantonment; in South Dakota, Crow Creek and Lower Brule; in Wisconsin, Hayward, Lac du Flambeau, Laona, and La Pointe. All other jurisdictions across the United States were visited by members of the survey team.

²⁵ These included: the study of existing material, including records of the Indian Office and the Board of Indian Commissioners “relating to the major subjects of interest for that jurisdiction”; conferences with superintendents, which involved discussion of conditions on the reservation and the goal of getting “the views and opinions of the superintendent himself”; examining and checking statistics secured from the Washington office and discussing problems with the chief clerk and others in the office; examining health activities by meeting with doctors and visiting the hospitals and clinics; visiting school, including non-reservation boarding schools, reservation boarding schools, day schools, and public schools that have Native children, and visiting “Indian homes and attended Indian councils to get first hand impressions of the school problems from the Indian point of view”; visiting farms, with the specialist in agriculture seeking out primarily the school and the agency farmers, and visiting “the farms, the dairy barns, the horse barns, the hog pens, and the poultry houses, and to attend the class room work in agricultural education”; visiting homes and schools “to observe work with girls and family life”; work to “determine general economic conditions,” which involved visiting boarding school and paying “particular attention to the pre-vocational and vocational industrial work, and to the purely productive

work of maintaining the institution” while on the reservations the work was to “look into the chief economic resources and to visit the various activities in company with those who were primarily responsible for them”; attain a general background on Indian courts, jurisdiction over criminal offenses, Indian claims, and other legal affairs; interpret the survey to Native peoples and vice-versa, ultimately “establishing contact with the Indians” with “conferences with Indians and Indian councils . . . a regular part of the work of the survey”; and interview missionaries, “Indian traders,” officers of state and local governments, and “friend of the Indians.” Lewis Meriam, “The Problem of Indian Administration (the Meriam Report)” (Washington D.C.: Institute for Government Research, February 21, 1928), x–xxii, National Indian Law Library, <http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/meriam.html>.

²⁶ Lewis Meriam, “The Problem of Indian Administration (the Meriam Report)” (Washington D.C.: Institute for Government Research, February 21, 1928), National Indian Law Library, <http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/meriam.html>.

²⁷ These findings are covered in many of the report’s chapters: Health (Chapter 8), Education (Chapter 9), General Economic Conditions (Chapter 10), Family and Community Life and the Activities of Women (Chapter 11), the Migrated Indians (Chapter 12), Legal Aspects of the Indian Problem (Chapter 13), and Missionary Activities among the Indians (Chapter 14).

²⁸ Beth H. Piatote, “Comparative Discourses of Community Health and Social Relations in the Meriam Report.” (Native American and Indigenous Studies Association Conference, Austin, 2014).

²⁹ Biolsi, *Organizing the Lakota*, 111.

³⁰ “Indian Reorganization Act (Wheeler-Howard Act),” Pub. L. No. H. R. 7902 (1934).

³¹ W. Roger Buffalohead, “The Indian New Deal: A Review Essay,” ed. Lawrence C. Kelly and Robert Fay Schrader, *Minnesota History* 48, no. 8 (1983): 339.

³² The Indian preference clause inserted into the IRA was not new, for the 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act had also provided for “Indian preference.” In 1974, this clause received a number of challenges by non-Native employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), arguing that the clause constituted illegal racial discrimination that violated equal-protection and due-process guarantees in the U.S. Constitution. In the landmark case, *Morton v. Mancari*, the Supreme Court found that the BIA’s hiring preferences were based not on racial discrimination but on Native peoples’ status as semi-sovereign nations. *Morton V. Mancari*, No. 417 U.S. 535 (U.S. Supreme Court 1974).

³³ Alan Fusonie and Leila Moran, eds., *Agriculture and American Indians* (U. S. Department of Agriculture; National Agricultural Library, 1978), <http://archive.org/details/CAT31330515>.

³⁴ The Indian Reorganization Act also retained a number of troubling elements of Allotment and Assimilation Era law and policy with regard to agricultural and rural development. For example, the new constitutions called for the election of council members. However, such elections were based on the old “boss farmer” districts, which had been drawn when the allotment policy had dictated that Native peoples would be taught to farm under the disciplinary supervision of a non-Native official of the Office of Indian Affairs. Additionally, although the IRA ended allotment and ensured all remaining trust allotments would stay in trust indefinitely, it did not prevent land from passing out of trust when it was inherited by a non-Native heir. Further, the IRA maintained key provisions of the General Allotment Act: probates still increased “fractionation” and the number of common interest holders per allotment; loans were still provided by the Farmers Home Administration to purchasers of highly fractionated land; the trust system maintained the federal government’s supervisory presence; and a Native nation’s sovereignty only extended to those lands held in trust.

³⁵ Tore C. Olsson, *Agrarian Crossings: Reformers and the Remaking of the US and Mexican Countryside* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 125, https://getd.libs.uga.edu/pdfs/olsson_tore_c_201305_phd.pdf.

³⁶ Clyde Woods, *Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the Mississippi Delta* (London: Verso, 1998), 118.

³⁷ Even, Spillman himself—considered a scientist, popular agricultural educator, and the founder of agricultural economics—was involved with manifold transformations in agricultural production within the United States. His concepts shaped the response to the crisis of overproduction following World War I, the field of genetics, the conflicts regarding agricultural education, and the creation of the Cooperative Extension Service.

³⁸ This set of goals, strategies, and practices constitute, in part, what this dissertation has regarded as the broader U.S. agricultural and rural development agenda. In this way, this dissertation regards the “Green Revolution” as arguably somewhat of a misnomer in that, at no point, could the science, technology, and education transfers for which the Green Revolution is known exist without some broader political-economic infrastructure, and without some broader conceptual frameworks through which they could be understood. In this light, the relatively strict focus on the Green Revolution as the adoption of high-yielding varieties of wheats and rices, agri-chemicals, irrigation, and large-scale mechanized cultivation methods has constrained the development of genealogies of the Green Revolution to analogous efforts earlier in the century. That is, this focus has foreclosed accounts of broader shifts in subjection, governance, and administration domestically and abroad, of which the provision of the benefits of “scientific advances and industrial progress” were only a part. In this way, this dissertation subscribes to what Raj Patel states is a “longue durée analysis” of the Green Revolution, which “helps in understanding the transformations at hand as a decades-long complex of discourse, technology, state power, class politics, national and international relations, private investment, cultural intervention, education and ecological change.” Yet, it does so without limiting itself to efforts explicitly described as part and parcel of the “Green Revolution” (after the fact), as in the case of the Point 4 Program, which embodied each of these dynamics without formally being described as a Green Revolution endeavor. Patel, “The Long Green Revolution,” 2.

³⁹ These traditions range from literary scholars’ critique of sentimental literature, to Black studies scholars’ critique of Black life, post-emancipation, to political theorists’ critique of the politics of injury.

⁴⁰ Meriam, “Meriam Report,” 8.

⁴¹ Goldstein, *Formations of United States Colonialism*, 2.

⁴² Deloria, “From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations,” 367.

⁴³ Settler states maintain their authority not solely through what Patrick Wolfe has termed the “logic of elimination,” but also through what Lomawaima and McCarty label a corresponding “safety zone” or as Noelani Goodyear-Ka’opua names a “logic of containment.” These “safety zones” contain Indigenous relations and knowledge within particular ideological and physical boundaries. Noelani Goodyear-Ka’opua, *The Seeds We Planted: Portraits of a Native Hawai’ian Charter School* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); K. Tsianina Lomawaima and Teresa L. McCarty, *To Remain an Indian: Lessons in Democracy from a Century of Native American Education* (New York: Teachers College Press, 2006).

⁴⁴ Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Alyosha Goldstein, “On the Internal Border: Colonial Difference, the Cold War, and the Locations of ‘Underdevelopment,’” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 1 (January 2008): 27, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417508000042>.

⁴⁵ Other sub-sections covered the “agricultural education of Indian children”; grazing and stock farming; forestry; irrigation; “labor problems in the Indian Service”; industrial training in school and vocational guidance, placement, and follow-up; Native products and industries; and personnel.

⁴⁶ Meriam, “Meriam Report,” 522.

⁴⁷ Meriam, 430.

- ⁴⁸ Meriam, 430.
- ⁴⁹ Meriam, 431.
- ⁵⁰ Meriam, 461.
- ⁵¹ Meriam, 470.
- ⁵² Meriam, 90.
- ⁵³ Nikhil Pal Singh, "The Whiteness of Police," *American Quarterly* 66, no. 4 (2014): 1091.
- ⁵⁴ Nikhil Pal Singh, *Race and America's Long War* (University of California Press, 2017), 49–50.
- ⁵⁵ Melamed, "Racial Capitalism," 76.
- ⁵⁶ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 91.
- ⁵⁷ David Nally and Stephen Taylor, "The Politics of Self-Help: The Rockefeller Foundation, Philanthropy and the 'long' Green Revolution," *Political Geography* 49 (2015): 52.
- ⁵⁸ Nally and Taylor, 52; See also: Marcos Cueto, *Cold War, Deadly Fevers: Malaria Eradication in Mexico, 1955–1975*, 1 edition (Washington D.C.: Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press / Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Nick Cullather, "'Stretching the Surface of the Earth': The Foundations, Neo-Malthusianism and the Modernising Agenda," *Global Society* 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 104–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2013.848190>; Lily E. Kay, *The Molecular Vision of Life: Caltech, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Rise of the New Biology*, Reprint edition (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- ⁵⁹ Nally and Taylor, "The Politics of Self-Help," 52.
- ⁶⁰ Nally and Taylor, 52; Anne-Emanuelle Birn, *Marriage of Convenience: Rockefeller International Health and Revolutionary Mexico*, 1 edition (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006); Cullather, "Stretching the Surface of the Earth"; Inderjeet Parmar, *Foundations of the American Century: The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power* (Columbia University Press, 2012).
- ⁶¹ Further, the report was commissioned by the U.S. Department of the Interior, funded in part by the Rockefeller Foundation, and carried out by the independent Institute for Government Research, thus highlighting the shared security needs and geopolitical objectives of state, corporate, and philanthropic actors following from such anxieties.
- ⁶² Susan Schulten, *The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Cited in: Mona Domosh, "International Harvester, the U.S. South, and the Makings of International Development in the Early 20th Century," *Political Geography* 49 (2015): 2.
- ⁶³ Kim TallBear, *Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise of Genetic Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 36.
- ⁶⁴ TallBear, 36.
- ⁶⁵ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 472.
- ⁶⁶ Such language of "adjustment" and "adaptation" is used throughout the chapter, reflecting the growing move away from biological notions of race and toward notions of race-as-culture taking place at the time the report was written. As Meriam and the survey staff states, "the government must continue and strengthen its activities to help the Indians in making this economic transition successfully. The main reliance for accomplishing this purpose must be placed on an adaptation, for use among the Indians, of those activities which have proved successful in advancing the condition of other agricultural or rural people." Meriam, "Meriam Report," 491.
- ⁶⁷ Susan Schulten, *The Geographical Imagination in America, 1880-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Cited in: Mona Domosh, "International Harvester, the U.S. South, and the Makings of International Development in the Early 20th Century," *Political Geography* 49 (2015): 2.
- ⁶⁸ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 113.
- ⁶⁹ Meriam, 114.
- ⁷⁰ Piatote, "'Comparative Discourses of Community Health and Social Relations in the Meriam Report.'"

⁷¹ Meriam, “Meriam Report,” 114.

⁷² Meriam, 432.

⁷³ The authors offer detailed insight into such problems, so defined: “On some reservations horse meat has been issued as a ration in spite of the protests of the Indians, who regard it with distaste. Old, crippled, almost helpless Indians are required to come to the agency office in all sorts of weather to get their supplies. On several reservations the survey staff saw poorly clad, old people, with feet soaked by long walks through snow and slush, huddled in the agency office waiting for the arrival of the superintendent or other officer who could give them an order for rations to keep them from actual starvation.” Meriam, 486–87.

⁷⁴ Meriam, 486–87.

⁷⁵ Piatote, “Comparative Discourses of Community Health and Social Relations in the Meriam Report.”

⁷⁶ Put another way, the Indian Reorganization Act helped disavow the friction between state mappings and Native mappings. Mark Rifkin, *Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014). Rifkin, *Settler Common Sense*.

⁷⁷ Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), xx.

⁷⁸ Byrd, xix.

⁷⁹ It is worth noting that agrarian reform cannot be labeled as conservative or revolutionary, per se. Rather, it is a tool, and what makes the difference is who controls it, how it is carried out, and toward what ends. Thus, as Raj Patel argues, agrarian reform can best be characterized as a “contradictory process of transforming production and power relations that depends, in its formulation and implementation, on the correlation of political forces and the specific course of economic [and racial, gender, colonial, and other] struggle.” Peter Rosset, Raj Patel, and Michael Courville, eds., *Promised Land: Competing Visions of Agrarian Reform* (Oakland: Food First Books, 2006), 267.

⁸⁰ Rosset, Patel, and Courville, 11, 14.

⁸¹ Michael Albertus and Oliver Kaplan, “Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy Evidence from Colombia,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 2 (April 1, 2013): 200, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712446130>; See also: Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale University Press, 1968); James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

⁸² Drawing from a number of cases that linked land and land reform to rebellion—including El Salvador, Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, and South Africa—Albertus and Kaplan argue that the net effect of land reform on insurgent support ultimately depends on the extent of reform, which helps reconcile some of the disparate findings on how land reform impacts insurgency. Albertus and Kaplan, “Land Reform as a Counterinsurgency Policy Evidence from Colombia,” 200.

⁸³ Ramon Gutiérrez recounts how by the 1960s, “economic underdevelopment” was understood as having a distinct and particular morphology. He states, “National markets were too small to support the establishment of intermediate and heavy industry. Income distribution was too skewed to promote large-scale national consumption markets. And land concentration was too profound to spur the consumption of manufactured goods by the rural masses” Ramón A. Gutiérrez, “Internal Colonialism: An American Theory of Race,” *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 1, no. 2 (2004): 285.

⁸⁴ National Security Council, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security” (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, April 7, 1950), 811.16/3–2351, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian.

⁸⁵ Established by President Truman in 1951, the Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems aimed to offer recommendations to the Secretary of State on United States foreign policy with respect to land tenure problems. Under the chairmanship of Under Secretary Clarence J. McCormick, it included

representatives from twenty-six agencies active in the field: the Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and Labor; the Chairman of the U.S. Tariff Commission; the Director of the Bureau of the Budget; the Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Federal Reserve Board; the Export-Import Bank; the National Security Resources Board; the Interstate Commerce Commission; the Administrator of the Federal Works Agency; the Chairman of the U.S. Maritime Commission; the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency; the Chairmen of the Federal Communications Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board; the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency; the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers; the Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration; the President of the Institute of Inter-American Affairs; the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.

⁸⁶ The footnote in the report details the institutions and processes of interest vis-à-vis land reform. Specifically, it states, "Land reform is concerned with improvement of agricultural economic institutions, i.e. agricultural land ownership and tenancy, land rents, taxation of agricultural land or income from land, and also agricultural credit and producer marketing. Agricultural technology, physical problems of land utilization and development, conservation of resources, methods and levels of productivity, and problems of rural industries will be included insofar as they are relevant to the institutional problems enumerated above." Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems, "United States Policy Regarding Land Reform in Foreign Areas" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, March 9, 1951), 811.16/3-2351, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v01/d743>.

⁸⁷ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 432.

⁸⁸ Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems.

⁸⁹ Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," 16.

⁹⁰ D'Arcy McNickle (1904-1977), was the most senior American Indian advisor to the Indian Reorganization Act's (IRA) principal architect, John Collier. During the 1930s, he also became one of the agency's principal representatives in the campaign to win ratification of the IRA. McNickle was Metis-part Cree and had grown up on the Flathead Reservation in northwestern Montana. Harold E. Fey (1898-1990) was a pastor, an educator, and an editor of the Christian magazines, *World Call* and *The Christian Century*.

⁹¹ Harold E. Fey and D'Arcy McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans: Two Ways of Life Meet* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 1986.

⁹² William E. Warne, *Mission for Peace: Point 4 in Iran* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956); Cited in: Fey and McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans*, 199–200.

⁹³ Warne, *Mission for Peace*; Cited in: Fey and McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans*, 199–200.

⁹⁴ Fey and McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans*, 199–200.

⁹⁵ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 432.

⁹⁶ Meriam, 498.

⁹⁷ Deloria, "From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations," 367.

⁹⁸ In April 1951, Secretary of Agriculture Charles F. Brannan informed the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, that the policy statement printed had been approved by all the participating agencies in the Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems other than the U.S. Department of State. Brannan asked that the policy statement be accepted as official policy of the U.S. Department of State and be transmitted to responsible officials abroad. "Charles E. Brannan to Dean Acheson (Secretary of State)" (Foreign Relations of the United States National Security Affairs, 1951, April 11, 1951), 811.16/4-1151, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v02/d684>.

- ⁹⁹ Meriam, “Meriam Report,” 432.
- ¹⁰⁰ Harry S. Truman, “Inaugural Address” (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, January 20, 1949), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13282>.
- ¹⁰¹ Timothy Mitchell, “Economists and the Economy in the Twentieth Century,” 2005; Cited in: Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,” 17.
- ¹⁰² Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,” 30.
- ¹⁰³ Majid Rahnema, *Global Poverty: A Pauperizing Myth* (Montreal: Intercultural Institute of Montreal, 1991); Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,” 30.
- ¹⁰⁴ Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,” 28–29.
- ¹⁰⁵ Michael E. Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Cited in: Daniel M. Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty*, Reprint edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 398.
- ¹⁰⁶ Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,” 29.
- ¹⁰⁷ Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011); Howard Winant, *The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy Since World War II* (Basic Books, 2001), 2, 3.
- ¹⁰⁸ Melamed, *Represent and Destroy*, 54.
- ¹⁰⁹ Melamed, 12.
- ¹¹⁰ Melamed, “Racial Capitalism,” 77.
- ¹¹¹ “Possible Questions and Suggested Answers Concerning the President’s Technical Assistance Proposal” (U.S. Department of State, April 12, 1949), OF 426, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/pointfourprogram/documents/index.php?documentid=4-7&pagenumber=1.
- ¹¹² Truman, “Inaugural Address.”
- ¹¹³ Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), “Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas” (Washington D.C., July 27, 1949).
- ¹¹⁴ Michael Adas, “From Footdragging to Flight: The Evasive History of Peasant Avoidance Protest in South and South-East Asia,” *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 13, no. 2 (1986): 64–86.
- ¹¹⁵ Jayeeta Sharma, “‘Lazy’ Natives, Coolie Labour, and the Assam Tea Industry,” *Modern Asian Studies* 43, no. 6 (2009): 1287–1324.
- ¹¹⁶ Ian Brown, “‘Blindness Which We Mistake for Sight’: British Officials and the Economic World of the Cultivator in Colonial Burma,” *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 33, no. 2 (2005): 181–193.
- ¹¹⁷ Rosset, Patel, and Courville, *Promised Land*, 16.
- ¹¹⁸ Charles McKelvey, *The Evolution and Significance of the Cuban Revolution: The Light in the Darkness* (Springer, 2017), 39.
- ¹¹⁹ Fidel Castro, “La Historia Me Absolverá (History Will Absolve Me)” (October 16, 1953).
- ¹²⁰ Yet the line between “peasant movements” and other histories of resistance to colonial rule and racial capitalism is one that is sometimes arbitrarily drawn, or a vestige of the historiography of each as seemingly discrete dynamics and histories. For example, while Javanese resistance against the Dutch plantation economy in the mid-nineteenth century is broadly recognized as a peasant revolt, Black sharecroppers’ resistance from within and against the plantation economy of the United States later in the century and early-twentieth century is generally not regarded in the same way. This dissertation does not advocate for one framing versus another—only to recognize such movements as intertwined.

¹²¹ Lisa Brock, "Back to the Future: African-Americans and Cuba in the Time(s) of Race," *Contributions in Black Studies* 12, no. 1 (1994): 9.

¹²² Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems, "United States Policy Regarding Land Reform in Foreign Areas.

¹²³ Piatote, "'Comparative Discourses of Community Health and Social Relations in the Meriam Report.'"

¹²⁴ Specifically, as Deloria states, "one of the main reasons for creating tribal councils was the need for central authorities to negotiate and approve business or governmental initiatives. Councils, according to the federal government (if not always the majorities their constituencies), had the political and legal power to negotiate and sign deals for resource extraction or further land cessions." Deloria, "From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations," 363, 367.

¹²⁵ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 432.

¹²⁶ Goldstein, "On the Internal Border," 29.

¹²⁷ On the ascension of postwar U.S. imperialism inured from critique, Harry Magdoff wrote in the 1960s and 1970s on what he termed "imperialism without colonies"—an imperialism defined not by colonial rule but by the global capitalist market. What this dissertation contributes to Magdoff's analysis is that the explicit (yet nominal) departure from colonial rule was part and parcel of the authority afforded to the global capitalist market, and vice versa. That is, greater attachment to the capitalist economy was regarded as an avenue toward, and expression of, national independence and development. Additionally, this dissertation contributes an analysis of this dynamic beginning in the early twentieth century. F. Magdoff et al., "Hungry for Profit: The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment.," 2000, 248.

¹²⁸ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 148.

¹²⁹ Meriam, 580.

¹³⁰ Collectively, such efforts need also stand out above the efforts of other "proponents of . . . Indian interests." As the report states, "the injury [of not doing so] is particularly great when voluntary proponents of the Indian interests present the Indian claims more strongly than does the authorized guardian of Indian interests, and are successful in so doing. The Indian then ceases to regard the government as his protector, but is prone to look upon it with suspicion, a state of mind too often one of the greatest obstacles in the government's task of preserving and advancing the Indian." Meriam, "Meriam Report," 784.

¹³¹ Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), "Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas."

¹³² This "highly-respected political record" would later involve advances in agricultural production. As Raj Patel recounts, the Rockefeller Foundation had entertained the possibility of a Filipino rice research institute in 1950 when Placido Mapa, the Philippine Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, invited John D. Rockefeller III to begin a project similar to the 1943 Mexican Agricultural Program. By the end of the 1950s, with sufficient urging by the U.S. Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency to stave off famine in the Philippines and across Asia, the Ford Foundation joined the Rockefeller Foundation and together they established the International Rice Research Institute. Edmund K. Oasa, "The International Rice Research Institute and the Green Revolution: A Case Study on the Politics of Agricultural Research" (Thesis, 1981), 108, <http://scholarspace.manoa.hawaii.edu/handle/10125/10099>; Nick Cullather, "'Stretching the Surface of the Earth': The Foundations, Neo-Malthusianism and the Modernising Agenda," *Global Society* 28, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 104–12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600826.2013.848190>; Cited in: Patel, "The Long Green Revolution," 14.

¹³³ See: Paul A. Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).

¹³⁴ Melamed, *Represent and Destroy*, 57.

¹³⁵ Meriam, "Meriam Report," 580.

¹³⁶ Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), "Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas," 7.

¹³⁷ Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), 9.

¹³⁸ "It should be noted," the report continues, "that American Negroes have been used effectively in U.S. technical assistance programs overseas and that other Caribbean territories, as well as Latin American countries have demonstrated considerable interest in Puerto Rican development programs." Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), "Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas" (Washington D.C., July 27, 1949), 9.

¹³⁹ The involvement of both groups also highlights the shifting and context-specific ideas of who can be an "expert." As Sheila Jasanoff argues, through "boundary work" scientists decide who belongs to relevant professional and policy communities, thus holding up an appearance of scientific authority even in the face of uncertainty. Whereas white men historically were seen as experts, the appearance of scientific authority allowed both Puerto Ricans and U.S. Blacks to be understood as having the capacity to serve as emissary experts. Sheila Jasanoff, *The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 12.

¹⁴⁰ Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), "Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas."

¹⁴¹ The report explores such possibilities after pointing to the importance of doing such work through the United Nations in order to highlight the "disinterested" nature of the Point 4 Program. Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), 3.

¹⁴² Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental), "Point Four Program in Relation to Dependent Areas."

¹⁴³ Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental).

¹⁴⁴ Advisory Committee on Technical Assistance (Interdepartmental).

¹⁴⁵ Byrd, *The Transit of Empire*, xx, xxiii.

Chapter Two.

The Reservation as Crisis: Termination, (Non)Containment, and the "Indian Point 4 Program"

¹ Paul C. Rosier, *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation, 1912-1954* (University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 5.

² Rosier, 7.

³ Rosier, 278.

⁴ These students were not solely FFA members, however. A decade after the organization's founding, the FFA's model of vocational agriculture education was applied to Native youth yet within an altogether separate organization. From 1937 to 1942 there existed the Future Indian Farmers of America (FIFA). Yet the organization was short-lived because. As per correspondence between FIFA administrators and the federal government, "[d]ue to the fact ['Indian schools'] are government schools and not public schools, vocational agriculture and FFA service is not extended to them and cannot be under the provisions of the National Vocation Education Acts." Thus, all potential Native FIFA students would be a part of FFA chapters instead. W.A. Ross, "Memorandum to All National Officers of F.F.A. by W.A. Ross, Specialist in Agricultural Education," June 21, 1937, Box 42, Folder 11, National FFA Organization Records, Ruth Lily Special Collections and Archives, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, <http://www.ulib.iupui.edu/special/ffa>.

⁵ First published in 1952, the *National Future Farmer* was the FFA's official magazine. The nationally-distributed periodical recounted FFA achievements and advancements in production, as well as FFA activities and events.

⁶ Rosier, *Rebirth of the Blackfeet Nation, 1912-1954*, 221.

⁷ Jodi A. Byrd, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011), 150.

⁸ Paul C. Rosier, *Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 132.

⁹ Rosier, 111.

¹⁰ Rosier, 132.

¹¹ Mishuana Goeman, *Mark My Words: Native Women Mapping Our Nations* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2013), 91.

¹² It was not until the early 2000's that an analogous bill (now known as the "Akaka Bill") was pursued for and by Native Hawaiians.

¹³ One damaging effect of P.L. 280 was a policy by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to not fund the operation of tribal courts in states where the law applied, which also reduced courts' access to federal assistance.

¹⁴ Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems, "United States Policy Regarding Land Reform in Foreign Areas" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, March 9, 1951), 811.16/3-2351, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v01/d743>.

¹⁵ Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems, 1667.

¹⁶ Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems, 1667.

¹⁷ "An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the Union," Pub. L. No. PL 86-3, § 1, 73 Stat 4 (1959).

¹⁸ In 1959, Burns reflected on the primary source of resistance to statehood being Hawaiians themselves: "The reasons why Hawaii did not achieve statehood, say, ten years ago—and one could without much exaggeration say sixty years ago—lie not in the Congress but in Hawaii. The most effective opposition to statehood has always originated in Hawaii itself. For the most part it has remained under cover and has marched under other banners. Such opposition could not afford to disclose itself, since it was so decidedly against the interests and desires of Hawaii's people generally." John A. Burns, "Statehood and Hawaii's People," *State Government: The Journal of State Affairs* 32, no. 3 (Summer 1959): 151–55.

¹⁹ Burns.

²⁰ Burns.

²¹ Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 30.

²² Hawaii's prewar plantation economy was dominated by a handful of sugary companies known as the "Big Five": Castle & Cooke, Alexander & Baldwin, C. Brewer and Company, Theo H. Davies & Company, and American Factors. John S. Whitehead describes in detail the precise nature of their control: "These companies controlled the territory's economy and were the focus of most commentators' awe, enmity, or consternation . . . By the early 1930s, the Big Five firms controlled 96 percent of Hawai'i's sugar crop as well as a substantial portion of the pineapple industry. They dominated shipping to and from the islands through the Matson Line, and they also controlled the major wholesale and retail mercantile functions in the islands. In addition to their dominance of the economic sphere, the Big Five exerted substantial political influence in territorial Hawai'i through the Republican Party, which dominated the territorial legislature prior to World War II. Many of the appointed territorial governors had a connection to the Big Five firms as officers or investors." John S. Whitehead, "Western Progressives, Old

South Planters, or Colonial Oppressors: The Enigma of Hawaii's 'Big Five,' 1898–1940," *Western Historical Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (1999): 296.

²³ Whitehead, 309.

²⁴ Whitehead, 309.

²⁵ Alyosha Goldstein, "On the Internal Border: Colonial Difference, the Cold War, and the Locations of 'Underdevelopment,'" *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 1 (January 2008): 32, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417508000042>.

²⁶ Rosier, *Serving Their Country*, 192.

²⁷ Daniel M. Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty*, Reprint edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 405.

²⁸ Thomas W. Cowger, *The National Congress of American Indians: The Founding Years* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999); Cited in: Goldstein, "On the Internal Border," 33.

²⁹ Goldstein, "On the Internal Border," 33.

³⁰ Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America*, 401.

³¹ Cobb, 401-402.

³² Goldstein, "On the Internal Border," 33.

³³ LaVerne Madigan, "Indian Survival on the Great Plains," *Indian Affairs* 22 (September 1957): 7; Cited in: Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America*, 406.

³⁴ Members of the NCAI, AAIA, and other organizations were indeed animated in their recognition of what the Point 4 Program, and an analogous program within the United States, could offer Natives people. One of the impetuses for negotiating the Point 4 Program domestically was President Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1955 declaration of his intention to ask Congress to create a Point 4 Program for economically distressed areas, broadly defined, within the United States. AAIA Executive Director, LaVerne Madigan, wrote that "the Point IV angle gives us a much more positive, challenging issue on which to hang our resounding appeal for Indian rights . . . After all, Point 4 is modern America at its best and most sympathetic." LaVerne Madigan to Oliver La Farge, October 26, 1955; Madigan to La Farge, October 27, 1955; La Farge to Madigan, October 28, 1955; and La Farge to Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 10, 1955, Box 170, Folder 1, Association on American Indian Affairs Archives, Rockville. Daniel M. Cobb, *Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty*, Reprint edition (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 400.

³⁵ Senate Concurrent Resolution 3 was introduced by Senator Murray on behalf of the leading groups interested in Indian affairs. Senator Murray also introduced an earlier version, SCR 85, on July 6, 1956.

³⁶ The concept of underdevelopment at the core of the Point 4 Program and broader development agenda was also crucial to left critique outside of the context of U.S. settler colonialism and Indian administration. In "How Europe Underdeveloped Africa," historian and political activist Walter Rodney was among the first to reframe the question of African "underdevelopment" altogether. At nearly the same time, Gunder Frank, then a professor of economics at the National University of Mexico in Mexico City, postulated the "development of underdevelopment." Frank argued that, so long as Latin American nations participated in the capitalist world's division of labor, this legacy would not be erased easily. As Frank stated in 1972, it would be changed only when Latin Americans "destroy the capitalist class structure through revolution and replace it with socialist development." The "internal colonialism" thesis shared this genealogy of left critique. I.F. Stone stated in 1966 that, "in an age of decolonization, it may be fruitful to regard the problem of the American Negro as a unique case of colonialism, an instance of internal imperialism, an underdeveloped people in our very midst." Yet, by adhering to the language of "underdevelopment" in describing the outcome of U.S. and European empire, rather than recognizing the concept itself as a technology of U.S. and European imperialism, ultimately highlights the power of the term to incorporate left critique. Andre Gunder Frank, "Economic Dependence, Class

Structure, and Underdevelopment Policy,” in *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America’s Political Economy*, ed. James D. Cockcroft, Dale L. Johnson, and Andre Gunder Frank (Doubleday & Company Inc, 1972); Cited in: Ramón A. Gutiérrez, “Internal Colonialism: An American Theory of Race,” *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race* 1, no. 2 (2004): 285; I.F. Stone, “People Without a Country; The Negro American,” ed. Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark, *New York Review of Books*, August 18, 1966, 8–12; Cited in: Gutiérrez, “Internal Colonialism,” 287.

³⁷ Daniel M. Cobb, “Indian Politics in Cold War America: Parallel and Contradiction,” *The Princeton University Library Chronicle* 67, no. 2 (2006): 399.

³⁸ By “limits,” I refer to Haunani-Kay Trask’s argument that the U.S. Constitution “has nothing to say to Chamorro, Samoans, Hawaiians, Inuit, and American Indians.” That is, Trask states, Native peoples are all “outside the Constitution, the settler document that declares ownership over indigenous lands and peoples. Since the Constitution is an imposed colonial structure, nothing therein prevents the taking of Native lands or the incorporation of unwilling Native peoples into the United States.” Further, such efforts do little to shake what Joanne Barkers called “self-aggrandizing Euro-American conceptions of . . . modernity’s Human as the precondition on which all international and constitutional rights to self-determination are based.” Haunani-Kay Trask, *From a Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawai’i* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1993); Joanne Barker, “The Specters of Recognition,” in *Formations of United States Colonialism*, ed. Alyosha Goldstein (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 34.

³⁹ Felix S. Cohen, “Colonialism: U.S. Style,” *The Progressive* 15, no. 2 (1951); Cited in: Cobb, “Indian Politics in Cold War America,” 399–400.

⁴⁰ This selective invocation of the agricultural and rural development agenda stands out against left critique that would increasingly come to challenge the framework of “underdevelopment” itself. For example, a series of W.E.B. Du Bois’ articles published from 1947 to 1949—the same year Truman announced the program—examined the influence of U.S. capital on the African continent. These articles describe the situation as a “new imperialism” and a kind of “stream-lined slavery,” without necessarily falling into the pitfalls of “underdevelopment” as a provisional catalyst for U.S. intervention. W.E.B. Du Bois, “Kenya’s People on the Move,” *People’s Voice*, November 29, 1947; Reprinted in: W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Correspondence of W.E.B. Du Bois: Selections, 1877-1934*, ed. Herbert Aptheker, vol. 1 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997), 830; W.E.B. Du Bois, “Watch Africa,” *National Guardian*, January 3, 1949; Du Bois, *The Correspondence of W.E.B. Du Bois, Vol. 1*, 1:863. More recently, Anibal Quijano discusses and attempts to undercut the “development-underdevelopment debate” altogether by focusing upon the “so-called theory of modernization” that has long dominated it. Specifically, Quijano attempts to undercut the category of “underdevelopment” as a provisional catalyst for U.S. intervention by recognizing the differences in scientific and technological developments across societies while arguing that peoples outside of the United States and Europe are, and can be, modern in their own way, if modernity is understood as such. It is worth quoting Quijano at length here. He states, “the fact that Western Europeans will imagine themselves to be the culmination of a civilizing trajectory from a state of nature leads them also to think of themselves as the moderns of humanity and its history, that is, as the new, and at the same time, most advanced of the species. But since they attribute the rest of the species to a category by nature inferior and consequently anterior, belonging to the past in the progress of the species, the Europeans imagine themselves as the exclusive bearers, creators, and protagonists of that modernity.” Yet, Quijano states, “If the concept of modernity only, or fundamentally, refers to the ideas of newness, the advanced, the rational-scientific, the secular (which are the ideas normally associated with it), then there is no doubt that one must admit that it is a phenomenon possible in all cultures and historical epochs. In this light, “apart from their symbolic contents, cities, temples, palaces, pyramids or monumental cities (such as Machu Picchu or Borobudur),

irrigation, large thoroughfares, technologies, metallurgy, mathematics, calendars, writing, philosophy, histories, armies, and wars clearly demonstrate the scientific development in each one of the high cultures that took place long before the formation of Europe as a new id-ntity. The most that one can really say is that the present period has gone further in scientific and technological developments and has made major discoveries and achievements under Europe's hegemonic role and, more generally, under Western hegemony." "Aníbal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Social Classification," in *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, ed. Mabel Moraña, Enrique D. Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008), 191–92.

⁴¹ Cobb, "Indian Politics in Cold War America," 401.

⁴² Cobb, 407.

⁴³ Hatfield Chilson, "A Legislative Program for American Indians, An American Indian Point IV Program, Senate Concurrent Resolution 3," *Indian Affairs* 19 (January 1957); Cited in: Harold E. Fey and D'Arcy McNickle, *Indians and Other Americans: Two Ways of Life Meet* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 198–200.

⁴⁴ Harry S. Truman, "Address at a Dinner of the Jewish National Fund," May 26, 1952, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1311>.

⁴⁵ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Chatto & Windus, 1994), xii.

⁴⁶ Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford University Press, 1977), 117.

⁴⁷ Beth H. Piatote, *Domestic Subjects: Gender, Citizenship, and Law in Native American Literature* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 5.

⁴⁸ E.M. Tiffany, "Future Farmers of America Creed," 1953, Box 42, Folder 3, IUPUI University Library Special Collections and Archives, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, <http://www.ulib.iupui.edu/special/ffa>.

⁴⁹ Sometimes those that reached out to FFA officials were agricultural educators from that particular country, while at other times, U.S. agricultural educators or government officials living abroad were those that sought FFA involvement in local agricultural education efforts. James J. Connors, "The History of Future Farmer Organizations Around the World," *Journal of Agricultural Education* 54, no. 1 (2013): 63.

⁵⁰ "Proposed FFA Programs and Itineraries," 1973 1967, Box 55, Folder 16, National FFA Organization Records, Ruth Lily Special Collections and Archives, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

⁵¹ The Christian Rural Overseas Program was established in 1947 in order to solicit and receive donations from U.S. farmers for "needy people overseas."

⁵² First published in 1952, the National Future Farmer was the FFA's official magazine. The nationally-distributed periodical recounted FFA achievements and advancements in production, as well as FFA activities and events. Lano Baron, "Seeds of Democracy," *National Future Farmer*, Summer 1953, sec. Editor's Desk.

⁵³ A first draft of the shooting script was completed on July 1, 1952 and approved on July 9, 1952. The production script was completed by July 14, 1952 and sent to Hansucker on September 22, 1952. Charles W. Cromer, "Living to Serve" (Stanley Neal Productions, Inc., July 14, 1952), Box 59, Folder 50, IUPUI University Library Special Collections and Archives, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

⁵⁴ The script was originally prepared for The Buchen Company and The Oliver Corporation—two Chicago-based production companies.

⁵⁵ "Future Farmers Map Plans For Chapter at Pine Plains," *Poughkeepsie Journal*, February 16, 1955; "The Street," *Idaho State Journal*, July 9, 1961.

⁵⁶ B.W. Crandall, "Mike Wertz Stars in New FFA Movie 'Farmer of Tomorrow,'" *National Future Farmer*, Fall 1953, 27.

⁵⁷ Cromer, "Living to Serve."

⁵⁸ Crandall, "Mike Wertz Stars in New FFA Movie 'Farmer of Tomorrow,'" 27.

⁵⁹ A "witch-master" or "witch-doctor" in colonial America refers to someone who is not a witch themselves but someone who is able to "doctor" the effects of witchcraft by supplying spells or plant remedies, or more violent measures, as in Lem Dobie's approach. In this way, witch-masters inhabit a supposedly supernatural and pre-Enlightenment space.

⁶⁰ The U.S. government did not actually take full constitutional form until the late 1780s, further complicating the mythology of the script.

⁶¹ Baron, "Seeds of Democracy."

⁶² Charles Postel, *The Populist Vision* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 10.

⁶³ Specifically, the establishment of the FFA was the result of three major legislative pushes for agricultural education and research: the 1887 Hatch Act, which established federally funded agricultural experiment stations in order to serve as "general bureaus of information" in farming districts; the 1914 Smith-Lever Act, which established a system of cooperative extension services that were connected to the land-grant universities; and the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act, which expanded and modified the Smith-Lever Act and helped establish vocational agricultural within high schools. The FFA did not merge with its segregation-era Black counterpart, the New Farmers of America, until 1965. Even then, the integrated organization did not include women until 1969.

⁶⁴ Specifically, according to Postel, late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century Populist and later Progressive belief held that, as a result of farmers' "late entry" into commercial capitalism, farmers needed to be organized from a "business standpoint." Specifically, Postel states, "farm reformers recognized that the survival of their operations depended on commercial innovation, including a more direct connection to national and international markets, and that the future lay with organizational consolidation and economies of scale." Charles Postel, *The Populist Vision* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 16–17.

⁶⁵ Cromer, "Living to Serve."

⁶⁶ Cromer.

⁶⁷ Of course, this history is one that could be more accurately portrayed as part of the longer genealogy of pedagogies developed at manual training and industrial institutes, and settlement schools founded in the contexts of slavery and its afterlife, U.S. settler colonialism, and U.S. imperialism.

⁶⁸ Nikhil Pal Singh, "On Race, Violence, and So-Called Primitive Accumulation," *Social Text* 34, no. 3 128 (2016): 30.

⁶⁹ Postel, *The Populist Vision*, 142.

⁷⁰ Singh, "On Race, Violence, and So-Called Primitive Accumulation," 39.

⁷¹ Jodi Melamed, "Racial Capitalism," *Critical Ethnic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 78, <https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.1.0076>.

⁷² Singh, "On Race, Violence, and So-Called Primitive Accumulation," 39.

⁷³ Cromer, "Living to Serve."

⁷⁴ Mark Rifkin, "The Frontier as (Movable) Space of Exception," *Settler Colonial Studies* 4, no. 2 (2014): 176.

⁷⁵ This follows from Rifkin's larger argument that the "frontier" allows for settlers to envision a space within the boundaries of the state, yet beyond its jurisdiction. In this way, the concept of the frontier translates the ongoing institutional exceptionalization of Native peoples and lands into a space of settler possibility. Mark Rifkin, "The Frontier as (Movable) Space of Exception," *Settler Colonial Studies* 4, no. 2 (2014): 176–180.

⁷⁶ Which is also to say, as Rifkin argues, that the frontier does not occupy a space exterior to the sovereignty of the settler state. Rifkin, "The Frontier as (Movable) Space of Exception," 176.

⁷⁷ In part through such ideas of foreignness, the heuristic of the “colonial village” offers clear yet flexible racial designations.

⁷⁸ Rifkin, “The Frontier as (Movable) Space of Exception,” 176.

⁷⁹ Louis S. Warren, “Buffalo Bill Meets Dracula: William F. Cody, Bram Stoker, and the Frontiers of Racial Decay,” *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 4 (October 1, 2002): 1130, <https://doi.org/10.1086/532666>.

⁸⁰ Warren, 1127.

⁸¹ Rifkin, “The Frontier as (Movable) Space of Exception,” 178.

⁸² Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 9; Philip J. Deloria, “From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations,” in *The Cultural Turn in U. S. History: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. James W. Cook, Lawrence B. Glickman, and Michael O’Malley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 376; Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 81.

⁸³ Paul C. Rosier, *Serving Their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), 132; Yet the terms of confinement and concentration vis-à-vis Native peoples did not have such connotations earlier on. Although the first formal use of the term “reservation” appeared in the First Treaty of Prairie du Chien in 1825, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Luke Lea articulated the idea of a reservation “system” in 1850. Lea argued that “any plan for the civilization of our Indians will, in my judgment, be fatally defective, if it does not provide, in the most efficient manner, first, for their concentration; secondly, for their domestication; and, thirdly, for their ultimate incorporation into the great body of our citizen population.” Paul C. Rosier, “‘They Are Ancestral Homelands’: Race, Place, and Politics in Cold War Native America, 1945–1961,” *The Journal of American History* 92, no. 4 (2006): 1305.

⁸⁴ Rosier, *Serving Their Country*, 132.

⁸⁵ Rosier, 132.

⁸⁶ Rosier, 111.

⁸⁷ Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,” 28.

⁸⁸ This narrative is neatly framed by, and familiar to, classical liberal political theory. Such theory, as Lisa Lowe, involves the belief that “the move from the state of nature to political society is justified by the need to contain the natural condition of war in which human life and property interests are threatened by violence.” This transition is ultimately “executed through laws that ‘protect’ the subjects within civil society and constitute other peoples as the very limit of that body.” Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 8.

⁸⁹ Harry Truman, “Truman’s Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949,” Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, accessed November 6, 2016, https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/50yr_archive/inagural20jan1949.htm.

⁹⁰ Inter-Agency Committee on Land Reform Problems, “United States Policy Regarding Land Reform in Foreign Areas (743).”

⁹¹ Nikhil Pal Singh, “The Whiteness of Police,” *American Quarterly* 66, no. 4 (2014): 1092.

⁹² Singh, 1092.

⁹³ Truman, “Truman’s Inaugural Address, January 20, 1949.”

⁹⁴ Goldstein, “On the Internal Border,” 26.

⁹⁵ Cromer, “Living to Serve.”

⁹⁶ Vine Deloria, *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion* (Fulcrum Publishing, 2003), 89.

⁹⁷ See: Mark Rifkin, *The Erotics of Sovereignty: Queer Native Writing in the Era of Self-Determination* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

⁹⁸ The 1953 film's enrollment of the "significant past" through the invocation of witchcraft, let alone belief in the witchcraft, cannot be divorced from the context of mid-twentieth century critiques of "McCarthyism." The "Second Red Scare," which roughly lasted from 1950 to 1956 and characterized by heightened fears of communist influence on U.S. institutions and espionage by Soviet agents. Originally coined to criticize the anti-communist pursuits of Republican U.S. Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, "McCarthyism" in this context took on a broader meaning, describing "the practice of making accusations of disloyalty, subversion, or treason without proper regard for evidence," and "the practice of using unfair investigative techniques, especially in order to restrict dissent or political criticism." The ill-informed and destructive "witch-hunt" became the perfect symbol for pushing back on McCarthyism. In this light, what the opening scene of "Farmer of Tomorrow" shares with critiques of McCarthyism, including those that invoke the specter of the witch, such as Arthur Miller's *The Crucible*, is that it critiques not only the shaky epistemological ground upon which such beliefs must be based, but also the ways in which such beliefs take shape—namely, as specific peoples and practices standing apart from, and posing threats to, the norms U.S. liberal democracy.

⁹⁹ Goldstein, "On the Internal Border," 29.

¹⁰⁰ Goldstein, 29.

Chapter Three.

The Plantation in Crisis: Liberian Rubber and "The Native Problem in Africa"

¹ Charles S. Johnson, "African Diary," June 14, 1930, 89, Box 88, Folder 15, Charles S. Johnson Papers, Amistad Research Center, New Orleans; Cited in: Ibrahim Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940* (Duke University Press, 2004), 133.

² Susan Curtis, *Colored Memories: A Biographer's Quest for the Elusive Lester A. Walton* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 214.

³ Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Company, 1928), 834.

⁴ Raymond Leslie Buell, "Economic Imperialism," *Forum and Century*, October 1930, 215.

⁵ Lester A. Walton, "Liberia Suffers Bad Sanitary Conditions," *New York World*, February 1, 1931; Cited in: Curtis, *Colored Memories*, 212.

⁶ "Henry L. Stimson to Henry Carter" (U.S. Foreign Relations, May 19, 1930), RG 59, 882.51/2093, U.S. National Archives; Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 142.

⁷ "J.P. Moffat to P. Gilbert (Geneva)," April 29, 1930, RG 59, 882.00/820, U.S. National Archives; Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 142.

⁸ Philip J. Deloria, "From Nation to Neighborhood: Land, Policy, Culture, Colonialism, and Empire in U.S.-Indian Relations," in *The Cultural Turn in U. S. History: Past, Present, and Future*, ed. James W. Cook, Lawrence B. Glickman, and Michael O'Malley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 367.

⁹ Jodi Melamed, "Racial Capitalism," *Critical Ethnic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 79, <https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.1.0076>.

¹⁰ As Woods states, the institutionalization of starvation grew from AAA-financed tractor purchases and eviction, the end of furnishings, the demolition of housing and communities, and the payment below-subsistence wages. Clyde Woods, *Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the Mississippi Delta* (London: Verso, 1998), 159.

¹¹ Woods, 159.

¹² W.E.B. Du Bois, *Black Reconstruction in America: An Essay Toward a History of the Part Which Black Folk Played in the Attempt to Reconstruct Democracy in America, 1860-1880* (Harcourt Brace, 1934);

Walter Johnson, "To Remake the World: Slavery, Racial Capitalism, and Justice," Text, Boston Review, February 20, 2018, Cited in: <http://bostonreview.net/forum/walter-johnson-to-remake-the-world>.

¹³ The following chapter covers the life of the Booker Washington Institute and its significance in detail.

¹⁴ Raymond Leslie Buell, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947), 23; Cited in: Cedric Robinson, "DuBois and Black Sovereignty: The Case of Liberia," *Race & Class* 32, no. 2 (October 1, 1990): 41, <https://doi.org/10.1177/030639689003200203>.

¹⁵ Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 3.

¹⁶ The final authority within the fledgling West African nation, however, ultimately laid not with the governors but with the Board of Managers of the Society at Washington, D.C. which ratified, modified, or annulled laws formulated for the colony by the Governor and legislative council. M. B. Akpan, "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule over the African Peoples of Liberia, 1841-1964," *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 7, no. 2 (1973): 218, <https://doi.org/10.2307/483540>.

¹⁷ Although many Blacks who were born within the United States moved to the growing Black republic for the "love of liberty," most sought to work toward a better life within the United States rather than emigrate. David Kazanjian, "The Speculative Freedom of Colonial Liberia," *American Quarterly* 63, no. 4 (2011): 864.

¹⁸ American Colonization Society, Dispatches of Thomas Buchanan, Buchanan to Wilkeson, Monrovia, 22 June 1841. Cited in: Akpan, "Black Imperialism," 218.

¹⁹ Despite the country's formal independence in 1847, the United States did not recognize it until February 5, 1862, during the American Civil War and amidst the rise of European colonization of the continent. Akpan, "Black Imperialism," 218.

²⁰ Akpan, "Black Imperialism," 219.

²¹ Akpan, 221.

²² Kazanjian, "The Speculative Freedom of Colonial Liberia," 864.

²³ Robinson, "DuBois and Black Sovereignty," 41.

²⁴ Less than \$100,000 of the loan eventually reached Liberia given its unfavorable conditions. These conditions specified that Liberia's future customs revenues guaranteed the repayment of the loan; the loan had to be repaid within 15 years; the loan carried an interest rate of 7 percent per year; and an advancement of three years interest payment was withheld by the British. F. P. M. van der Kraaij, *The Open Door Policy of Liberia: An Economic History of Modern Liberia* (Bremen: Im Selbstverlag des Museums, 1983), 25–26.

²⁵ Driven by fears that they would be taken over by the French or German empires, the Liberian commission wanted the United States to cooperate with the British cooperation concerning matters regarding the West African country. Peter Duignan and L. H. Gann, *The United States and Africa: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 195–96.

²⁶ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 30; Emmett J. Scott, "Is Liberia Worth Saving?," *The Journal of Race Development* 1, no. 3 (1911): 283.

²⁷ Suggestions Submitted to the American Commission by the Government of Liberia (1909): 394. Cited in: Louis R. Harlan, "Booker T. Washington and the White Man's Burden," *The American Historical Review* 71, no. 2 (1966): 456, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1846341>.

²⁸ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 30.

²⁹ Firestone Natural Rubber Company is a subsidiary of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, which was founded by Harvey Firestone in Akron, Ohio in August 1900. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company was the first company to mass-produce pneumatic tires for wagons, buggies, and automobiles. Despite the eventual development of natural rubber operations in Asia, Firestone's Liberian operations were central to the mass production of rubber products during the first half of the twentieth century.

- ³⁰ Frank Chalk, "The Anatomy of an Investment: Firestone's 1927 Loan to Liberia," *Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines* 1, no. 1 (January 1, 1967): 12, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.1967.10803470>.
- ³¹ Frank Robert Chalk, "The United States and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941" (University of Wisconsin, 1970), 152, <https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/999783859702121>.
- ³² Chalk, 139.
- ³³ Chalk, 140.
- ³⁴ Chalk, "The Anatomy of an Investment," 152.
- ³⁵ Frank Robert Chalk, "The United States and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941" (University of Wisconsin, 1970), 153, <https://search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/999783859702121>.
- ³⁶ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 100.
- ³⁷ Howard Wolf and Ralph Frank Wolf, *Rubber: A Story of Glory and Greed* (New York: Covici, Friede, 1936), 58.
- ³⁸ Chalk, "The United States and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941," 5.
- ³⁹ Chalk, 5–6.
- ⁴⁰ Chalk, "The Anatomy of an Investment," 15.
- ⁴¹ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 99.
- ⁴² Sundiata, 99.
- ⁴³ Robert W. Clower et al., *Growth Without Development; An Economic Survey of Liberia* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
- ⁴⁴ "Agreement Number 1 Between the Government of Liberia and the Firestone Plantations Company" (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, September 17, 1925), 882.6176 F 51/128, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian.
- ⁴⁵ See: Robert W. Clower et al., *Growth Without Development; An Economic Survey of Liberia* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).
- ⁴⁶ "Rubber Production In Liberia: An Exploratory Assessment of Living and Working Conditions, with Special Attention to Forced Labor" (Amherst: Verite, 2012), 9, <https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/globaldocs/1589>; See: Clower et al., *Growth Without Development; An Economic Survey of Liberia*.
- ⁴⁷ "Rubber Production In Liberia," 49.
- ⁴⁸ "Rubber Production In Liberia," 8.
- ⁴⁹ The island—now Bioko, part of Equatorial Guinea—has long been associated with European-driven slave trades. A Portuguese colony beginning in 1494, the Dutch East India Company established trade based on the island in 1642 without Portuguese consent. Shortly thereafter, the Dutch company used the island as a hub for its slave trade in the Gulf of Guinea. The Portuguese reestablished their control of the island in 1648 with their own analogous trade company and slave trade. Under the 1778 Treaty of El Pardo, Portugal ceded the island to Spain while Spain ceded to Portugal much of present-day Brazil.
- ⁵⁰ William Allen and Thomas Richard Heywood Thomson, *A Narrative of the Expedition Sent by Her Majesty's Government to the River Niger in 1841, under the Command of Capt. H.D. Trotter*, vol. 2 (London: R. Bentley, 1848), 226, <http://archive.org/details/narrativeexpediialle>; Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 91.
- ⁵¹ I. K. Sundiata, *From Slaving to Neoslavery: The Bight of Biafra and Fernando Po in the Era of Abolition, 1827-1930* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996), 98.
- ⁵² Sundiata, 100.
- ⁵³ Juan Bravo Carbonell, "Fernando Póo Y El Muni: Sus Misterios, Sus Riquezas, Su Colonización" (Madrid: Imp. de Alrededor del Mundo, 1917), 126, <http://www.opensourceguinea.org/2013/05/bravo-carbonell-juan-fernando-poo-y-el.html>; Cited in: Sundiata, *From Slaving to Neoslavery*, 100.

⁵⁴ Sundiata, *From Slaving to Neoslavery*, 102.

⁵⁵ Cuthbert Christy, "International Commission of Enquiry in Liberia" (Geneva: League of Nations, December 15, 1930), 36; Sundiata, *From Slaving to Neoslavery*, 100.

⁵⁶ Henry L. Stimson, "Appointment of the International Commission of Inquiry into the Existence of Slavery and Forced Labor in the Republic of Liberia" (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, June 5, 1929), 882.5048/20, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1929v03/pg_274.

⁵⁷ At the time, only Britain, Sweden, Australia, Denmark, and the Irish Free State appeared to have ratified the Draft Convention on Forced Labor adopted by the International Labor Office in 1930. Neither the United States, France, Germany, nor Spain had ratified it then.

⁵⁸ Christy, "International Commission of Enquiry in Liberia (the Christy Commission)."

⁵⁹ "Pawnage," describes a form of servitude wherein a debtor provides another human being as security or collateral for a debt, with the creditor afforded use of the labor of the pawn until the debt is paid off. As such, the Commission considered "pawnage" a form of slavery despite its limited use of the latter term. "The 1930 Enquiry Commission to Liberia," *African Affairs* XXX, no. CXX (July 1, 1931): 277–90, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a101655>; Cuthbert Christy, "International Commission of Enquiry in Liberia" (Geneva: League of Nations, December 15, 1930), 279.

⁶⁰ "The Covenant of the League of Nations (Art. 1 to 26)" (1919), 11, 3, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1919Parisv13/ch10subch1>.

⁶¹ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 133.

⁶² Sundiata, 134.

⁶³ Sundiata, 134.

⁶⁴ R. C. Lindsay, "The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State" (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, June 12, 1934), 882.01 Foreign Control/841, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v02/d684>.

⁶⁵ The next three years were marked by unsuccessful attempts to work out such a plan. The Liberian legislature accepted the League of Nations' plan of assistance by early 1934 yet such assistance would have been given pending twelve major conditions. These conditions would have greatly diminished the sovereign status of Liberia and were grounds for Liberian resistance to the plan. "Memorandum from the Government of Liberia to the League of Nations Committee of the Council Appointed to Examine the Problem Raised by the Liberian Government's Request for Assistance" (Liberia Department of State, 1934), MS 312, Special Collections and University Archives, University of Massachusetts Amherst Libraries, <http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums312-b071-i032>.

⁶⁶ Specifically, according to a June 1934 statement by the British Ambassador, R.C. Lindsay, to the U.S. Secretary of State, "Liberia rejected on the financial side the not ungenerous terms obtained for her by the League from her chief foreign creditor, the Finance Corporation of America. Indeed, she has, I understand, repudiated most of her obligations to that body. On the administrative side she made reservations which, if accepted, would render it impossible for the white officials, who were to be appointed under the League Plan, to secure any serious administrative reform. In these circumstances the League Council have felt impelled to withdraw the plan of assistance offered to Liberia and His Majesty's Government feel that the whole situation must be reconsidered. They feel that it would be a dereliction of duty to civilization if the misgovernment of the native tribes by Liberia were to be allowed to continue, resulting, as it would infallibly result, in the encouragement of such evils as slave trading and the slaughter and maltreatment of the two million natives by the corrupt and inefficient oligarchy of Monrovia." R. C. Lindsay, "The British Ambassador (Lindsay) to the Secretary of State" (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1934, June 12, 1934), 882.01 Foreign Control/841, U.S.

Department of State, Office of the Historian,
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v02/d684>.

⁶⁷ As stated in Chapter 1, these traditions range from literary scholars' critique of sentimental literature, to Black studies scholars' critique of Black subjection after emancipation, to political theorists' critique of the politics of injury.

⁶⁸ Saidiya V. Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

⁶⁹ This was an international treaty created under the auspices of the League of Nations, which aimed to advance the suppression of slavery and the slave trade.

⁷⁰ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 3.

⁷¹ Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*, 119; Cited in: Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 12.

⁷² Lowe, 39.

⁷³ Lowe, 39.

⁷⁴ Akpan, "Black Imperialism."

⁷⁵ Curtis, *Colored Memories*, 209.

⁷⁶ George S. Schuyler, "Uncle Sam's Black Step-Child," *American Mercury* 29, no. 114 (June 1933): 147–56; Cited in: Curtis, *Colored Memories*, 215.

⁷⁷ Schuyler, "Uncle Sam's Black Step-Child," 147; Cited in: Curtis, *Colored Memories*, 215.

⁷⁸ R.B. Eleazer, "Now Liberia Rubbed into American Negro," *Negro World*, January 31, 1931, 1; Cited in: Curtis, *Colored Memories*, 215.

⁷⁹ "Editorial Page," *Brooklyn Citizen*, January 11, 1931; Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 2.

⁸⁰ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 2.

⁸¹ Elihu Root, "Letter to President Theodore Roosevelt from Secretary of State, Elihu Root" (U.S. Department of State, January 18, 1909).

⁸² In response to a toast to "Liberia and the U.S." made at a 1909 gathering of U.S. Blacks in New York, Dr. Ernest Lyon declared: "I want to see Liberia saved, not merely for the Liberians as such, but for the whole Negro race. It is sad to think that out of twelve million square miles of territory which constitute the area of the continent of Africa, only about forty thousand square miles remain in the hands of Black people. Eleven million, nine hundred sixty thousand square miles have been parceled out among the European nations. You feel with me that this little spot, known as Liberia, ought to be saved and held as an experiment station on the West Coast of Africa for the practice and development of Negro self-government . . . No argument is sufficiently potent no matter by [whom] made, that can release the race in the United States of its responsibility and obligation in Liberia. The reputation of the race is bound up with the success of the experiment in government on the West Coast of Africa." Ernest Lyon, "Three Needs of Liberia Republic," *New York Age*, November 25, 1909, sec. 5; Cited in: Susan Curtis, *Colored Memories: A Biographer's Quest for the Elusive Lester A. Walton* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 209.

⁸³ Johnson, "African Diary," 205; Cited in: Phillip James Johnson, "Seasons in Hell: Charles S. Johnson and the 1930 Liberian Labor Crisis," 2004, 268.

⁸⁴ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 39.

⁸⁵ Lowe, 7.

⁸⁶ George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 1999). Beckford, *Persistent Poverty*.

⁸⁷ Katherine McKittrick, "Plantation Futures," *Small Axe: A Caribbean Journal of Criticism* 17, no. 3 (42) (2013): 3. Additionally, McKittrick cites a number of scholars here whose addresses each such context: George L. Beckford, Ian Gregory Strachan, Robert Staples, Billy Hawkins, and Angela Davis.

⁸⁸ Kris Manjapra, Sven Beckert, and Christine Desan, “Plantation Disposessions: The Global Travel of Agricultural Racial Capitalism,” in *American Capitalism: New Histories* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 361–88.

⁸⁹ Manjapra, Beckert, and Desan.

⁹⁰ Chalk, “The United States and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941,” 5–6.

⁹¹ Chalk, 6.

⁹² Chalk, 9.

⁹³ Donald Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation: The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia, 1929-1984* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 18.

⁹⁴ “James Longstreet Sibley, Anson Phelps Stokes, Thomas S. Donohugh, and R.L. Embree, 9 Letters” (Drew University, October 1927), 3, United Methodist Church Archives; General Commission on Archives and History; Cited in: George J. Hill, “Intimate Relationships: Secret Affairs of Church and State in the United States and Liberia, 1925–1947,” *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (n.d.): 476, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00628.x>.

⁹⁵ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 142.

⁹⁶ “Henry L. Stimson to Henry Carter”; Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 142.

⁹⁷ However, Moffat would go on to say in this same statement that “the U.S. desire for heavy political and economic influence was never in question.” “J.P. Moffat to P. Gilbert (Geneva),” April 29, 1930, RG 59, 882.00/820, U.S. National Archives; Cited in: Ibrahim Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940* (Duke University Press, 2004), 142.

⁹⁸ Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 143; Additionally, within international newspaper headlines were constant reminders of the slavery scandal in Liberia: “Liberian Slavery Taken up by the League” (the Afro-American); “Shocking conditions in Liberia Disclosed in Report” and “Horrors of Slavery and Conscript Labor in Liberia are Bared” (The New York Times); and “Liberia: Brutal, Arrogant, Prejudiced” (Time). Each article focused on reprisals against indigenous Liberians who testified before the Christy Commission. Charles Wesley Ford Jr. and Dwedor Morais Ford, *Dr. Francis W. M. Morais: His Fight for Humanity* (Bloomington: AuthorHouse, 2016).

⁹⁹ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 24.

¹⁰⁰ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*.

¹⁰¹ See: Raymond Leslie Buell, *Problems of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1935), <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001447387>.

¹⁰² Arthur P. Scott, “The Native Problem in Africa. Raymond Leslie Buell,” *American Journal of Sociology* 35, no. 1 (July 1, 1929): 128–29, <https://doi.org/10.1086/214924>; Quincy Wright, review of *Review of The Native Problem in Africa*, by Raymond Leslie Buell, *Political Science Quarterly* 44, no. 2 (1929): 276–79, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2142999>; H. A. Wyndham, review of *Review of The Native Problem in Africa*, by Raymond Leslie Buell, *Journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs* 7, no. 5 (1928): 335–37, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3015149>.

¹⁰³ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 831.

¹⁰⁴ State Department Press Conference, 30 August 1928. Cited in: George J. Hill, “Intimate Relationships: Secret Affairs of Church and State in the United States and Liberia, 1925–1947,” *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (n.d.): 477, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00628.x>; Additionally, Buell’s report triggered foreign governments to look into the crisis at hand. In 1929, Lady Simon, the wife of a British League official, published a survey on world slavery and devoted a chapter to Liberia. Henri de Junod, President of the International Society for the Protection of Natives, presented a petition to the League Mandates Commission that condemned Firestone, stating that, “based upon the conclusions drawn in Buell’s book . . . Firestone’s concession and loan . . . will lead to confiscation of native lands and forced labor.” Henri de Junod, “Memorandum to American Consul,” July 28, 1928, RG 59, 882.5045/24, U.S.

National Archives; Cited in: Greer Feick and Advisor Emma Winter, *Red, White and Blue Rubber: American Involvement in the Liberian Slavery Crisis, 1928-1934*, 2011, 48.

¹⁰⁵ “Rubber Production In Liberia,” 78.

¹⁰⁶ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*; Wright, “Review of The Native Problem in Africa,” 279.

¹⁰⁷ Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 7. Additionally, discussing slavery in relation to economic development was not new at the time. In 1921, in the wake of the race riots of the summer of 1919 and ongoing lynching across the U.S. South and elsewhere, President Warren G. Harding during his first annual address drew such connections explicitly. Harding stated: “It has been perhaps the proudest claim of our American civilization that in dealing with human relationships it has constantly moved toward such justice in distributing the product of human energy that it has improved continuously the economic status of the mass of people . . . On the way up from the elemental stages of society we have eliminated slavery and serfdom and are now far on the way to the elimination of poverty.” Such concerns surrounding labor and poverty thus situate slavery in the past as a prior undesirable economic arrangement. Buell’s report however situates slavery as an expression of economic development, particularly when labor demands become too great. Both elide, however, that race enshrines the inequalities required by capitalism. Warren G. Harding, “Inaugural Address” (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, December 6, 1921), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2956>.

¹⁰⁸ Timothy Mitchell, “Economists and the Economy in the Twentieth Century,” in *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others*, ed. George Steinmetz (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2005), 126–41; Cited in: Alyosha Goldstein, “On the Internal Border: Colonial Difference, the Cold War, and the Locations of ‘Underdevelopment,’” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 1 (January 2008): 30, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417508000042>.

¹⁰⁹ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*; Wright, “Review of The Native Problem in Africa.”

¹¹⁰ Wyndham, “Review of The Native Problem in Africa.”

¹¹¹ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 851.

¹¹² Buell, 851.

¹¹³ Buell, 836.

¹¹⁴ Buell, 851.

¹¹⁵ Robinson, “DuBois and Black Sovereignty,” 45.

¹¹⁶ “W.E.B. Du Bois to Charles Evans Hughes,” January 5, 1923; In: W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Correspondence of W.E.B. Du Bois: Selections, 1877-1934*, ed. Herbert Aptheker, vol. 1 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997), 260; Cited in: Robinson, “DuBois and Black Sovereignty,” 28.

¹¹⁷ Du Bois to Firestone, 26 October 1925. Cited in: W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Correspondence of W.E.B. Du Bois: Selections, 1877-1934*, ed. Herbert Aptheker, vol. 1 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997); Cedric Robinson, “DuBois and Black Sovereignty: The Case of Liberia,” *Race & Class* 32, no. 2 (October 1, 1990): 46, <https://doi.org/10.1177/030639689003200203>; Additionally, Du Bois writes about Liberia extensively in *Dusk of Dawn* (1940), particularly his trip to the country in the early 1920s. It is also worth noting that Du Bois had a similar modernizing orientation to Zionist settlement in Palestine. W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1940).

¹¹⁸ W.E.B. Du Bois, “Africa: Review of the Native Problem in Africa, 1928,” *The World Tomorrow* 11 (October 1928).

¹¹⁹ Du Bois.

¹²⁰ W.E.B. Du Bois, “Liberia, the League and the United States,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 1933, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/liberia/1933-07-01/liberia-league-and-united-states>; Cited in: Robinson, “DuBois and Black Sovereignty,” 47.

¹²¹ Cedric Robinson states that what Du Bois pushed for was precisely the relationship between the state and private capital that had precipitated the occupation of Haiti, which had begun in 1915, and that Du Bois' immersion in the ideology of the state hid this consequence from him. Robinson recounts how Du Bois would eventually disavow his faith in the supposed race neutral character of capitalist development as an avenue toward Black self-government. He stated that he knew what "European imperialism has done to Asia and Africa; but, nevertheless, I had not then lost faith in the capitalist system, and I believed that it was possible for a great corporation, headed by a man of vision, to go into a country with something more than the mere ideal of profit." W.E.B. Du Bois, "Liberia, the League and the United States," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1, 1933, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/liberia/1933-07-01/liberia-league-and-united-states>; Cited in: Robinson, "DuBois and Black Sovereignty," 45-46.

¹²² Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 833-34.

¹²³ Buell, 834.

¹²⁴ "Carter (Department of State) to Harvey S. Firestone Jr.," August 29, 1928, Roll 14; Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 121.

¹²⁵ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 835.

¹²⁶ Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Company, 1928), vi. As the following chapter argues, agricultural industrial education was among the interventions invited.

¹²⁷ Only later did Buell's account of Liberia's risk of a race problem, particularly concerning the plantation economy, account for the settler colonial structure that subsumed it. By the end of World War II, Buell's indictment of U.S.-Liberian relations included Americo-Liberian dominance within the country, arguing that, should such conditions continue, indigenous Liberian unrest and revolt was all but guaranteed. Specifically, Buell warned that "unless something radical is done to narrow the gap between the governing oligarchy and the Liberian people it is not impossible that within twenty-five years fighting in Liberia will break out, as it has recently done in Java and Indo-China. Indeed, such fighting might have already broken out except for the presence of American troops in Liberia." Raymond Leslie Buell, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947). The following chapter describes how this line of thought would constitute an emerging "racial liberal plantation criticism."

¹²⁸ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 734. Additionally, the goal of translating the racial logics of the plantation into the challenges facing Black self-government was quite explicit and was evidenced even in the selection of the members of the Christy Commission. As Secretary of State William Castle suggested, "We feel that, from many points of view, it would be better if we could get the right kind of color man to have as our delegate . . . If the investigation proves that slavery, or something like it, exists with the connivance of the Government, it would make a much better impression among the negroes of this country if the report were signed by a man of their own race" (emphasis added). Thus, by employing a Black professor of sociology, the U.S. Department of State sought to place more U.S. Blacks on the side of the growing Black republic. Elizabeth L. Normandy, "African-Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Liberia, 1929-1935," *Liberian Studies Journal* 28, no. 2 (1993): 204.

¹²⁹ Carter attributed Liberia's desperate condition to three factors: "the venality and incapacity for high office of most of the high officials"; "the precarious state of Government finances," including a deficit of \$200,000 in an annual budget of \$1,000,000; and the activities of the Christy Commission, which would "in all probability discredit many of the high officials in office." "Henry Carter to Edward Akerson (Assistant to President Herbert Hoover)," April 20, 1930, 1-I, Box 857, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library; Cited in: Chalk, "The United States and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941," 181.

¹³⁰ "J.P. Moffat to P. Gilbert (Geneva)," Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 142.

¹³¹ Ellis O. Briggs, "Memorandum" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, December 27, 1930); Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 143.

- ¹³² Chalk, "The United States and the International Struggle for Rubber, 1914-1941," 184.
- ¹³³ Henry L. Stimson, "Memorandum of an Interview with Harvey Firestone" (U.S. Foreign Relations, December 10, 1930), U.S. National Archives; Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 143.
- ¹³⁴ Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*, 835.
- ¹³⁵ McEneaney Werlich, "The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Liberia (Werlich)" (Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, August 22, 1933), 882.01 Foreign Control/625a, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v02/d684>.
- ¹³⁶ James Monroe, "Seventh Annual Message" (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, December 2, 1823), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29465>.
- ¹³⁷ Woodrow Wilson, "Declaration of Policy with Regard to Latin America" (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913, March 12, 1913), 710.11/102a, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1913/ch6>.
- ¹³⁸ Woodrow Wilson, "Address at the Reno Auditorium in Reno, Nevada" (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, September 22, 1919), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=117396>.
- ¹³⁹ "Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Reestablishment of Peace," *The American Journal of International Law* 31, no. 2 (April 1937): 57. Additionally, the 1901 Platt Amendment was passed for the course under the Monroe Doctrine. Following the Spanish-American war, the United States agreed to withdraw its troops from Cuba under the condition that the United States could intervene in Cuban affairs if needed, and that Cuba would lease to the United States land for naval bases (e.g., part of Guantánamo Bay). Despite recognizing Cuba's transition into an independent republic, the Platt Amendment provided the grounds for repeated U.S. military intervention in Cuban affairs over the next 20 years—between 1906 and 1909, in 1912, and between 1917 and 1922—until its repeal following the inauguration of President Roosevelt's "Good Neighbor Policy."
- ¹⁴⁰ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Inaugural Address" (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, March 4, 1933), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14473>.
- ¹⁴¹ Albert Bushnell Hart, "The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation," *The American Journal of International Law* 9, no. 4 (October 1915): 808.
- ¹⁴² "America's Answer to the Rubber Monopoly," *American Review of Reviews* 78 (November 1928): 518; Cited in: Curtis, *Colored Memories*, 208.
- ¹⁴³ Nnamdi Azikiwe, *Liberia in World Politics* (Ilfracombe: A. H. Stockwell, 1934); Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 108.
- ¹⁴⁴ Russel B. Porter, "Sees Imperialism in the Firestone Deal," *New York Times*, August 30, 1928, 12.
- ¹⁴⁵ Ellis O. Briggs, "Memorandum" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, December 27, 1930). Additionally, while U.S. Colonization of Hawaii, the Philippines, and elsewhere in and along the Pacific Ocean mirrored the Monroe Doctrine outside of its designated geographic limits (namely, Latin America), they did not receive the same pushback that the Liberian slavery crisis and the movement of the policy into a different (hemi)sphere of affairs did. Albert Bushnell Hart, "The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation," *The American Journal of International Law* 9, no. 4 (October 1915): 802–17.
- ¹⁴⁶ W. Cameron Forbes, "Report of the President's Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti (the Forbes Commission)" (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1930); Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 106.
- ¹⁴⁷ Forbes, "Report of the President's Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti (the Forbes Commission)."

¹⁴⁸ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 39. The following chapter delves further into how this was incorporated into U.S. foreign policy—a slave genealogy of mid-twentieth century formations of U.S. colonialism—by looking at how the Liberian plantation economy itself was negotiated.

Chapter Four.

The Plantation as Crisis: Racial Liberal Plantation Criticism and Liberia’s “Booker Washington Institute”

¹ Lester A. Walton, “Liberia Suffers Bad Sanitary Conditions,” *New York World*, February 1, 1931; Cited in: Susan Curtis, *Colored Memories: A Biographer’s Quest for the Elusive Lester A. Walton* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 212.

² “Oswald Garrison Villard and Channing H. Tobias, 2 Letters,” May 1946, Administrative History, Phelps Stokes Fund Archives, New York Public Library; Cited in: George J. Hill, “Intimate Relationships: Secret Affairs of Church and State in the United States and Liberia, 1925–1947,” *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (n.d.): 500, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00628.x>.

³ As stated in the previous chapter, Woods argued that the neo-plantation complex was created in four stages that ultimately enacted themselves imperially: First was the capitalization of planters. This was done through the 1933 Agricultural Adjustment Act’s crop reduction programs and other subsidies during the early 1930s. Second was the mass eviction of sharecroppers. Third was the dominance of the tractor and wage labor regime by the early 1940s. The last stage was the introduction of the mechanical cotton picker, the elimination of hired labor, and the diversification of the regional economy by the mid-1950’s. Clyde Woods, *Development Arrested: The Blues and Plantation Power in the Mississippi Delta* (London: Verso, 1998), 10.

⁴ By 1953, alongside Liberia, the Point 4 Program was established in Nicaragua, Panama, Bolivia, Indonesia and other Latin American and Asian plantocracies. These and other countries were some of the principal sites where such renegotiations of the plantation economies of the U.S. South and Liberia would “migrate.”

⁵ Jackson Davis was a field agent for the Rockefeller Foundation’s General Education Board (GEB) from 1915 until 1929 when he became assistant director. In 1933, Davis became associate director of the GEB. Between 1923 and 1938, he served as secretary of the International Education Board. He was also a trustee of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, a member of the Committee on Interracial Cooperation, and president of the board of trustees of the Booker Washington Institute. Thomas M. Campbell was a leader in agricultural education and extension work in the U.S. South. With the backing of Booker T. Washington and George W. Carver, the U.S. Department of Agriculture appointed Campbell as its first Black extension agent. During World War II, Campbell served on the USDA’s National Advisory Committee for Community Service Projects. He co-authored the report while serving as an international consultant on farming methods and rural life in Africa. Finally, Margaret Wrong was secretary of the International Committee on Christian Literature for Africa. Wrong also held a number of university teaching position and worked with the Student Christian Movement and the World’s Student Christian Federation. In 1926, she was invited by Thomas Jesse Jones of the Phelps-Stokes Fund (and key actor in the development of the Booker Washington Institute) to extend her work to Africa.

⁶ The Phelps-Stokes fund was a nonprofit fund established in 1911 by the will of Caroline Phelps Stokes. Its goal was to advance social and economic development across the Americas, particularly Black and Native peoples, and Africa. Additionally, the Rockefeller Foundation was the primary funder of the 1928

Meriam Report (*The Problem of Indian Administration*) yet Phelps-Stokes also offered a grant to the Institute for Government Research, which carried out the study.

⁷ Lisa Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 3.

⁸ Elizabeth Carolyn Brown, "Pedagogies of U.S. Imperialism: Racial Education from Reconstruction to the Progressive Era" (PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2016), 8, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/36627>.

⁹ Known as the "Great Māhele" (to "divide or portion"), Kamehameha III's land reform efforts aimed to keep land in Hawai'ian hands yet fomented the transfer of large amounts of land to U.S. planters and corporations. It was against this backdrop of displacement and dispossession that Armstrong stated: "If depopulation here is to be arrested; if the vices which are consuming the natives are to be eradicated; if an indolent and thriftless people are to become industrious and thrifty; if Christian institutions are to be perpetuated, the work must be accomplished . . . in the education of the young." Robert Francis Engs, *Educating the Disfranchised and Disinherited: Samuel Chapman Armstrong and Hampton Institute, 1839-1893* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1999); Cited in: Elizabeth Carolyn Brown, "Pedagogies of U.S. Imperialism: Racial Education from Reconstruction to the Progressive Era" (PhD Thesis, University of Washington, 2016), 114, <https://digital.lib.washington.edu/researchworks/handle/1773/36627>.

¹⁰ Richard Pratt, the founder of Carlisle Indian school, was employed by Armstrong at Hampton.

¹¹ Donald Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation: The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia, 1929-1984* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 1.

¹² This line of argumentation is adopted in part from the dissertation of Elizabeth Carolyn Brown, who pulls from the work of Hortense Spillers and Alexander Weheliye in her discussion of post-Reconstruction settler colonial and imperial pedagogies. Produced within a national grammar as the "other" to the citizen subject, Brown states that the captive flesh is held perpetually at a distance from civilizational norms and thus "becomes a source of irresistible, destructive sensuality" at the same time that it "reduces to a thing, becoming being for the captor." The flesh, in the words of Weheliye, produces the "Black subject as not-quite-human," and, according to Spillers, captures this subject within "cultural vestibularity." Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (1987): 67; Alexander G. Weheliye, *Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human* (Durham: Duke University Press Books, 2014), 11; Cited in: Brown, "Pedagogies of U.S. Imperialism: Racial Education from Reconstruction to the Progressive Era," 19.

¹³ Donald Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation: The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia, 1929-1984* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 2.

¹⁴ James D. Anderson, *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 47.

¹⁵ See: W. Fitzhugh Brundage, ed., *Booker T. Washington and Black Progress: Up From Slavery 100 Years Later* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2003); August Meier, *Negro Thought in America, 1880-1915: Racial Ideologies in the Age of Booker T. Washington* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963); Jacqueline M. Moore and Nina Mjagkij, eds., *Booker T. Washington, W.E.B. Du Bois, and the Struggle for Racial Uplift* (Wilmington: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003).

¹⁶ Booker T. Washington, "Cotton States and International Exposition Speech (Atlanta Compromise Speech or Atlanta Exposition Speech" (September 18, 1895).

¹⁷ Washington.

¹⁸ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 3.

¹⁹ Donald Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation: The Booker Washington Institute of Liberia, 1929-1984* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1986), 18. It is also worth noting that this strategy was not

unlike that which the U.S. government used to undermine unrest by Native peoples within the United States, as the first half of this chapter addressed.

²⁰ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 19.

²¹ This was not the first time these actors collaborated within the West African country. In 1919, the Phelps-Stokes Fund, the Rockefeller Foundations General Education Board (GEB), the New York State Colonization Society (NYSCS), the American Colonization Society, and various missionary groups surveyed the country's history, commerce, agriculture, flora and fauna, and methods of administration.

²² Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 34.

²³ Brown, "Pedagogies of U.S. Imperialism: Racial Education from Reconstruction to the Progressive Era," 21.

²⁴ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 3.

²⁵ Washington, "Cotton States and International Exposition Speech (Atlanta Compromise Speech or Atlanta Exposition Speech."

²⁶ Washington.

²⁷ Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. Du Bois, "The Economic Revolution in the South," in *The Negro in the South, His Economic Progress in Relation to His Moral and Religious Development*: (Philadelphia: George W. Jacobs & Company, 1907), 113.

²⁸ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 28.

²⁹ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Philosophy of Right [Philosophie Des Rechts]*, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1821); Cited in: Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 29.

³⁰ Washington and Du Bois, "The Economic Revolution in the South," 118.

³¹ Louis R. Harlan, "Booker T. Washington and the White Man's Burden," *The American Historical Review* 71, no. 2 (1966): 452, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1846341>.

³² Harlan, 453.

³³ Harlan, 458.

³⁴ Booker T. Washington, "Booker T. Washington to James J. Dossen," March 19, 1910, 905, Booker T. Washington Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Cited in: Louis R. Harlan, "Booker T. Washington and the White Man's Burden," *The American Historical Review* 71, no. 2 (1966): 457, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1846341> Additionally, this call would soon become even more urgent when the racial logics of Liberia's extractive and exploitative plantation economy enunciated such power differentials and undermined civil concord from within and outside the country.

³⁵ As the previous chapter discussed, the Liberian slavery crisis accelerated this act of "translation."

³⁶ Walton, "Liberia Suffers Bad Sanitary Conditions"; Cited in: Curtis, *Colored Memories*, 212.

³⁷ Raymond Leslie Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Company, 1928), vi.

³⁸ Hill, "Intimate Relationships," 502.

³⁹ Hill, 485.

⁴⁰ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 3.

⁴¹ George J. Hill, "Intimate Relationships: Secret Affairs of Church and State in the United States and Liberia, 1925–1947," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (n.d.): 467, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2007.00628.x>; Additionally, as Hill states, "[s]eparation of church and state, is supposedly ensured by both the U.S. and Liberian constitutions, which call for 'free exercise' of religion and prohibition of a 'religious test' for public office." Hill also suggests that BWI was a relatively hidden affair because Anson Stokes possibly learned as a child "that there were such things as 'family secrets' and 'family business.'" Stokes' involvement in secret societies and in the traditions of his church supposedly buttress this line of argumentation of Hill's. Hill, 502.

⁴² Hill, "Intimate Relationships," 502.

- ⁴³ Although Washington offered such aid to Americo-Liberians, the substance of political and economic power ultimately went to U.S. officials and international bankers.
- ⁴⁴ See: Andrew Zimmerman, *Alabama in Africa: Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).
- ⁴⁵ "Tropenflanzer," 1910, Booker T. Washington Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; Cited in: Harlan, "Booker T. Washington and the White Man's Burden," 446.
- ⁴⁶ "Tropenflanzer"; Cited in: Harlan, "Booker T. Washington and the White Man's Burden," 446.
- ⁴⁷ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 6.
- ⁴⁸ "You Will Solve Your Problems All Right," *East African Standard*, March 3, 1924; Cited in: Donald Spivey, "The African Crusade for Black Industrial Schooling," *The Journal of Negro History* 63, no. 1 (January 1978): 4.
- ⁴⁹ Spivey, "The African Crusade for Black Industrial Schooling," 11.
- ⁵⁰ "Memorandum of British Empire Advisory Committee on Education" (Kakata, Liberia, 1935), 221, International Education Board Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center; Cited in: Spivey, "The African Crusade for Black Industrial Schooling," 9, 14.
- ⁵¹ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 34.
- ⁵² R.R. Taylor, "Report on Educational Needs and Opportunities in Liberia" (Kakata, Liberia: Booker Washington Agricultural and Industrial Institute, October 1929), 8, 290, International Education Board Collection, Rockefeller Archive Center; Cited in: Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 35.
- ⁵³ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 35.
- ⁵⁴ Taylor, "Report on Educational Needs and Opportunities in Liberia," 2; Cited in: Spivey, "The African Crusade for Black Industrial Schooling," 11.
- ⁵⁵ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 37–38.
- ⁵⁶ Spivey, 96.
- ⁵⁷ Nor the risk of growing animosity of Native peoples toward the United States in the wake of the dispossession and violence of Allotment and Assimilation-era policy, as the previous chapters addressed.
- ⁵⁸ Warren C. Whatley, "African-American Strikebreaking from the Civil War to the New Deal," *Social Science History* 17, no. 4 (1993): 525–58, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1171303>.
- ⁵⁹ Robin D.G. Kelley, *Hammer and Hoe: Alabama Communists During the Great Depression* (Durham: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 35.
- ⁶⁰ Kelley, 35.
- ⁶¹ Kelley, 37.
- ⁶² Kelley, 37.
- ⁶³ As Melamed argues, pre-break racial liberalism focused on changing white Southern attitudes while post-break racial liberalism envisioned social engineering on a national scale. Its goal was to remake U.S. culture as a whole so that U.S. whites would lose their habit of prejudice and U.S. Blacks would be seen as culturally embodying the U.S. nation. Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011), 19, 22.
- ⁶⁴ Charles Kirk Pilkington, "The Trials of Brotherhood: The Founding of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 69, no. 1 (1985): 77.
- ⁶⁵ Pilkington, 56.
- ⁶⁶ Pilkington, 75.
- ⁶⁷ "Minutes, 'Support of Inter-Racial Program, Exhibit B—The Attitude of Negroes, Whites,'" September 17, 1919, Commission on Interracial Cooperation Papers, Trevor Arnett Library, Atlanta University; Cited in: Pilkington, "The Trials of Brotherhood," 77.

⁶⁸ Herbert Hoover, “Message Commending the Work of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation” (Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, April 6, 1930), The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=22143>.

⁶⁹ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 73.

⁷⁰ George J. Hill recounts the buildup to this moment in detail. In June 1938, U.S. Department of State Foreign Service officer, Henry S. Villard, asked Anson Phelps Stokes whether a flag could be prepared for him to take to Liberia on the USS Boise. Stokes replied that the Phelps-Stokes Fund would have a small flag made and would get it to Villard in time to present at the new legation during the visit of the Boise. The gift of the flag to Liberia was announced in a press release on September 22, 1938 and the Boise visited Liberia from October 29 to November 3 that year. Hill, “Intimate Relationships,” 493.

⁷¹ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 74. A far cry from the frigid relations between the two countries a decade earlier, President Roosevelt himself visited Liberia in 1944.

⁷² Spivey, 79.

⁷³ Spivey, 86.

⁷⁴ By contrast, Americo-Liberians sent their children to the College of West Africa or to the historically Black colleges in the United States to study law, business, and liberal arts. As Donald Spivey states, “industrial schooling was not for them, it was for the indigene.” Spivey, 86–87.

⁷⁵ Spivey, 87.

⁷⁶ For example, Spivey recounts that Black staff felt that they were subject to a greater level of scrutiny than white staff members. They also questioned the relationship between BWI and the Firestone plantation, and its role as a U.S. war instrument. Spivey, 90.

⁷⁷ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 3.

⁷⁸ Woods, *Development Arrested*, 45.

⁷⁹ Woods, 45.

⁸⁰ Woods, 46.

⁸¹ Woods, 51.

⁸² Woods, 160.

⁸³ Charles S. Johnson, *Growing up in the Black Belt* (Washington D.C.: American Council on Education, 1941); Cited in: Phillip J. Johnson, “Confronting the Dilemma: Charles S. Johnson’s Study of Louisiana’s Black Schools,” *Louisiana History* 38 (1997): 152.

⁸⁴ Charles S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1934), 208.

⁸⁵ Johnson, 212.

⁸⁶ Johnson, 212.

⁸⁷ Johnson, 209.

⁸⁸ Paul Outka, *Race and Nature from Transcendentalism to the Harlem Renaissance* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 83.

⁸⁹ Outka, 83.

⁹⁰ Outka, 8.

⁹¹ Plantation criticisms were not limited to U.S. Blacks and those sympathetic to their cause. For example, Clyde Woods recounts how white small farmers and laborers believed that opportunities for them to accumulate wealth would rapidly evaporate in the face of plantation growth—namely, the monopolization of land, natural resources, infrastructure, institutions, capital, and labor. Most such sentiments and subsequent movements were either coopted by the plantation bloc or were ineffectual in transforming the plantation economy, and none did much to undermine white supremacy itself. Woods, *Development Arrested*, 41.

⁹² Anderson, *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935*, 234.

⁹³ Anderson, 216.

- ⁹⁴ This redefinition was not detached from the material circumstances of education in the region. Namely, Julius Rosenwald himself funded the development of Black schools across the U.S. South with the encouragement of Booker T. Washington and the supervisory presence of Tuskegee, among other people and institutions.
- ⁹⁵ Anderson, *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935*, 216.
- ⁹⁶ "Anonymous News Clipping," 1925, Claude A. Barnett Papers, 1918-1967, Chicago History Museum; Cited in: Ibrahim Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers: Black Zion, Black Slavery, 1914–1940* (Duke University Press, 2004), 222.
- ⁹⁷ Charles A. Bodie, "The Images of Africa in the Black American Press, 1890– 1930" (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1975), 189; Cited in: Sundiata, *Brothers and Strangers*, 222.
- ⁹⁸ Cedric Robinson, "DuBois and Black Sovereignty: The Case of Liberia," *Race & Class* 32, no. 2 (October 1, 1990): 44, <https://doi.org/10.1177/030639689003200203>.
- ⁹⁹ George L. Beckford, *Persistent Poverty: Underdevelopment in Plantation Economies of the Third World* (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 1999), 67.
- ¹⁰⁰ Curtis Marez, *Farm Worker Futurism: Speculative Technologies of Resistance*, 3 edition (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2016), 11.
- ¹⁰¹ Marez, 9.
- ¹⁰² Jackson Davis, Thomas M. Campbell, and Margaret Wrong, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo* (New York: The Friendship Press, 1945), <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001066421>.
- ¹⁰³ Debra Ann Reid, *Reaping a Greater Harvest: African Americans, the Extension Service, and Rural Reform in Jim Crow Texas* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007), 172.
- ¹⁰⁴ Reid, 172.
- ¹⁰⁵ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 115.
- ¹⁰⁶ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo*, 88.
- ¹⁰⁷ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo*, 88.
- ¹⁰⁸ As stated, this dynamic was not limited to the plantation. The 1928 Meriam Report, for example, stated that "government employees could take time to require of Indians the conduct of adults instead of often hastily according them the treatment given small children. Officers should recognize that morale, self-confidence, and self-respect are not developed by paternalism." By the mid-twentieth century, historic demands to escape paternalism were inverted by U.S. policymakers into an antithetical argument for assimilation and the dissolution of Native polities (i.e., Termination and Relocation policy). Lewis Meriam, "The Problem of Indian Administration (the Meriam Report)" (Washington D.C.: Institute for Government Research, February 21, 1928), 537, National Indian Law Library, <http://www.narf.org/nill/resources/meriam.html>.
- ¹⁰⁹ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo*, 88.
- ¹¹⁰ Franz Boas, "Race and Progress," *Science* 74, no. 1905 (1931): 1–8; Cited in: Kim TallBear, *Native American DNA: Tribal Belonging and the False Promise of Genetic Science* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 36.
- ¹¹¹ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo*, 87–88.
- ¹¹² Jodi Melamed, "The Spirit of Neoliberalism: From Racial Liberalism to Neoliberal Multiculturalism," *Social Text* 24, no. 4 89 (2006): 3.
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- ¹¹⁵ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, 86.
- ¹¹⁶ Lowe, *The Intimacies of Four Continents*, 29.
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- ¹¹⁹ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, 86.
- ¹²⁰ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, *Africa Advancing: A Study of Rural Education and Agriculture in West Africa and the Belgian Congo*.
- ¹²¹ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, 98.
- ¹²² Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, 97.
- ¹²³ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, 97.
- ¹²⁴ Davis, Campbell, and Wrong, 100.
- ¹²⁵ Raymond Leslie Buell, *Liberia: A Century of Survival, 1847-1947* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947), 51.
- ¹²⁶ Buell, 64.
- ¹²⁷ Buell, 64.
- ¹²⁸ Thomas Jesse Jones, "Thomas Jesse Jones to Edwin Rogers Embree," February 27, 1946, MS 198, Edwin Rogers Embree Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University Library; Cited in: Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 122.
- ¹²⁹ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 122.
- ¹³⁰ "Confidential Letter of Ambassador Edward R. Dudley to Channing H. Tobias," January 31, 1950, Sc MG 162, Edward R. Dudley Papers, Phelps Stokes Fund Archives, New York Public Library; Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 136–37.
- ¹³¹ Spivey, *The Politics of Miseducation*, 137.
- ¹³² Critically, the Point 4 Program in Egypt was established following the 1952 overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy. S March 3, 1953 memorandum by the Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration to the Deputy to the Director of the Mutual Security Agency for Program and Coordination, describes what exactly the development of the program would entail: the "proposed Point 4 Program consisted of a \$10,000,000 joint-fund agreement for community development and rural rehabilitation, including housing, health, agricultural extension, farm-market roads, cooperatives, vocational education and training in the province of Beheira, near Alexandria, and in the province of Fayoum, south of Cairo. It will be carried on primarily by Egyptian technical and custodial personnel with heavy emphasis on training at each step. The Egyptian contribution is currently estimated at 5,500,000 Egyptian pounds (equivalent to \$15.7 million), or more than half again as much as our \$10,000,000." Stanley Andrews, "Memorandum by the Administrator of the Technical Cooperation Administration (Stanley Andrews) to the Deputy to the Director of the Mutual Security Agency for Program and Coordination (John H. Ohly)" (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, March 3, 1953), 874.00 TA/3-353, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v09p2/d11110>.
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- ¹³⁴ Spivey, 147.
- ¹³⁵ Spivey, 148.
- ¹³⁶ Spivey, 149.

Conclusion.

Liberal/Neoliberal Multicultural Plantations and Reservations

¹ Jodi Melamed, *Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism* (Minneapolis: University Of Minnesota Press, 2011), xx.

² Melamed, xxi.

³ Melamed, 2.

⁴ "The Merging of the New Farmers of American into the Future Farmers of America," March 30, 1965, Box 42, Folder 25, National FFA Organization Records, Ruth Lily Special Collections and Archives, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, <http://www.ulib.iupui.edu/special/ffa>.

⁵ Dexter B. Wakefield and B. Allen Talbert, "Historical Narrative on the Impact of the New Farmers of America (NFA) on Selected Past Members," *Journal of Agricultural Education* 44, no. 1 (2003): 101.

⁶ In 1965, at the time of the merger, the NFA had over 1,000 chapters across 18 southern and eastern states. NFA members made up approximately 52,000 of the 454,000 total FFA membership. Cecil L. Strickland, *New Farmers of America in Retrospect: The Formative Years, 1935-1965* (Prairie View: Prairie View A&M University, College of Agriculture and Human Sciences, Department of Agriculture, 1995).

⁷ "Multicultural Task Force," 1994 1990, Box 15, Folders 1-4, National FFA Organization Records, Ruth Lily Special Collections and Archives, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, <http://www.ulib.iupui.edu/special/ffa>.

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⁹ "FFA Diversity Resource Kit" (Indianapolis: National FFA Organization, 2005).

¹⁰ "Firestone Natural Rubber," Firestone Natural Rubber Company, accessed July 13, 2018, <https://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com/>.

¹¹ "Firestone and the Warlord," *Frontline*, November 18, 2014, <https://www.propublica.org/article/firestone-and-the-warlord-editors-note>.

¹² Alexander B. Dryer, "Our Liberian Legacy," *The Atlantic*, July 30, 2003.

¹³ Quoted in: Bill Berkeley, *The Graves Are Not Yet Full* (New York: Basic Books, 2001).