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Publication Date

1990

A1458
No. 90-10
1990

3/19/90

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IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVE-BORN CITIZENS

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Working Paper 90-10 ✓

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IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVE-BORN CITIZENS

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

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This project was funded by a grant from the Seaver Institute. We thank Bob Brischetto, Amita Shastri, and Chris Gallant for their assistance in carrying out this research. We would also like to thank Paul Abramson, David Brownstone, Chris Garcia, and Rudy de la Garza for their comments.

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ABSTRACT

In this paper we examine the acquisition of partisanship by immigrants and subsequent generations of Latinos and Asian-Americans. The data we analyze are derived from a survey of California residents in late 1984. We find that the longer Latino immigrants have been in the United States, the more likely they are to identify as Democrats and to have strong party preferences. We find age-related gains in both Democratic support and in the strength of partisanship among subsequent generations of Latinos as well. In line with our hypotheses about their foreign policy concerns, the data also suggest that immigrants from China, Korea, and Southeast Asia become more Republican with increased exposure to American politics. Other Asian immigrants and subsequent generations of Asian-Americans exhibit no such trends in either the direction of their party preferences or in partisan intensity.

THE ACQUISITION OF PARTISANSHIP BY LATINOS AND ASIAN-AMERICANS: IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVE-BORN CITIZENS

I. INTRODUCTION

After decades of tight restrictions on immigration, changes in policy enacted in 1965 and in the years following have allowed millions of immigrants to enter this country during the past few decades. In contrast to most previous immigrants to the United States, who came primarily from Europe, a large majority of recent arrivals have come from Asia, Mexico, and the rest of Latin America. The eventual impact that Latinos and Asian-Americans will have upon American electoral politics depends on many factors, including the relative attractiveness of the two major parties to new citizens, the rate at which immigrants and their children develop partisan attachments, and the strength of these attachments (Bean, Stephen and Opitz, 1985). Understanding how partisanship develops in immigrant populations has been hampered by the fact that modern survey research developed well after the previous major surge in immigration to the U.S. had ended.¹ Indeed, previous individual-level studies of this phenomenon have been confined to countries that have experienced much higher rates of immigration in the post-war era than the United States, including Canada (Black, Niemi, and Powell, 1987), Israel (Gitelman, 1982) and Australia (Kahan, 1972; Wilson, 1973; Finifter and Finifter, 1989). This study, which examines the acquisition of partisanship by immigrant and second and later generation Latinos and Asian-Americans, is thus important for understanding the political experiences of immigrants. More generally, learning more about how first and second generation individuals develop party preferences can enrich our overall understanding of partisanship.

We begin this study by first outlining a general model of partisan choice developed by Fiorina (1981). Many of the hypotheses we derive from this model are the same as or similar to

those that inform the large body of previous research known as "cohort analysis." Among other things, we consider: 1) factors that influence the relative attractiveness of the parties to immigrant and native-born Latinos and Asian-Americans; 2) the effect of continued exposure to American politics upon the strength of immigrants' partisan attachments; 3) the extent to which the partisan predilections of immigrants are affected by the political climate in the U.S. at the time of their arrival.

The data on which our analyses are based are drawn from a statewide survey of Californians undertaken in late 1984. Although large numbers of Latino and Asian immigrants have settled in several states, their impact has been felt most dramatically in California. Non-Hispanic whites, who accounted for 67 percent of the state's population in 1980, are expected to constitute less than half the population of California in 2010. This survey yielded complete interviews with 574 Latinos and 308 Asian-Americans. The Latino sample contains 213 immigrants (citizens and noncitizens) and 152 second generation citizens. The corresponding figures for the Asian sample are 177 and 63. The remaining respondents in each sample are third and subsequent generation citizens. (For ease of exposition we henceforth refer to "Asians" when we mean Asian-Americans). Information on the sampling design is reported in Appendix A.

Previous studies by Abramson (1979, 1983) and others have shown that there have been dramatic differences between whites and blacks in their patterns of partisan change. This is because political events and conditions during the past several years have affected blacks and whites in very different ways. Gitelman (1982), furthermore, reports that Soviet immigrants develop ties to Israeli parties much more rapidly than do American immigrants to Israel. In light of these findings it behooves us to be sensitive to the possibility of major differences between Asians and Latinos in their patterns of partisan acquisition.

II. MODELING PARTISANSHIP

Competing models of partisanship differ not so much in what they identify as the basic determinants of party choice as in the relative weights they assign to them. Social psychological models emphasize the importance of parental socialization and downplay the role of short-term influences (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960). Rational choice models, in contrast, emphasize the continuous incorporation of new information into cumulative evaluations of the parties (Downs, 1957). As our intent is not to choose between competing formulations of partisanship but rather to employ a general theoretical framework to guide our investigation, we find most useful the model developed by Fiorina (1981). Fiorina expresses individual i 's evaluation of party q (or, if one prefers, i 's party identification) as:

$$PID_i^q = PPE_i^q - PPE_i^z + G_i$$

where:

PPE_i^q and PPE_i^z are the "past political experiences" (defined below) that individual i has had with parties q and z , respectively.

G_i are biases inherited from one's parents and from others prior to entry into the electorate.

The G vector, which registers the effects of parental influence and other sources of pre-adult socialization, sets an initial value for party identification. This is subsequently modified by information, registered by the PPE term, that reflects the relative merits of the parties. More specifically, Fiorina defines PPEs as the weighted, discounted sums of utilities that the parties have provided the individual in the past:

$$PPE_i^q = \sum_{j=1}^n s_{ij} a_{ij} [u_{ij+1}^q - u_{ij}^q]$$

where:

s_{ij} is the time discount for past experiences.

a_{ij} is the importance assigned to each experience.

u^{i^q}, u_{ij+1}^q is the utility of the party q 's action or policy position at time j or $j+1$.

Although information can be acquired through direct personal experiences with such things as unemployment, inflation, crime, or military service, this term also reflects the impact of information acquired vicariously from the news media, friends and neighbors, reference groups, etc.

The Fiorina model portrays party identification as a continuum of evaluations ranging from extreme support for one party to extreme support for the other. In order to better place our analyses in the context of previous research, however, we differentiate between the *direction* of partisanship and the *strength* of partisanship. We examine first the directional component, i.e., Republican versus Democrat, of Latino and Asian party preferences.

III. DIRECTION OF PARTISANSHIP

The theoretical framework provided by Fiorina's model guides our thinking about the acquisition of partisanship, but in and of itself it provides no insight into why Latinos or Asian-Americans might come to prefer one party over the other. Hypotheses about the direction of their party preferences must therefore be derived from the actual nature of the experiences (the PPEs) of Latino and Asian immigrants in coming to this country.² We think that one very important feature of their immigration experience is that of becoming a member of an ethnic minority in the United States, usually after being a native of an ethnically homogeneous society back in their homeland.³ Some evidence concerning the impact this has had in the lives of the Asians and Latinos we interviewed is presented in Table 1. As the figures there show, a large share of Latino and Asian immigrants report having personally experienced discrimination. Interestingly, reports of discrimination peaked among second generation respondents and then dropped off again among third generation respondents. (Here and in the remainder of the paper we use "third generation" to refer to third, fourth, and all subsequent generations).

Table 1 here

There were also differences between the two ethnic groups. Two-thirds of the Asians who reported being personally discriminated against felt that the most serious episode had been in social situations, e.g., snubs, ethnic jokes, or insults, but not something that was economically injurious. Latinos were more likely to report personal experiences with economic discrimination, e.g., not getting a job or an apartment. Similarly, in response to another question in our survey, Latinos were considerably more likely than Asians to report that as a group they received fewer opportunities than they deserved. As with reports of personally experienced discrimination, perceptions of unequal opportunities were most frequent among second generation respondents.

For the past several decades the Democratic party has had the image of being more supportive than the Republicans of policies favoring minorities and other disadvantaged groups. We thus expect that because of experiences with discrimination, the longer immigrants have been in the U.S., the more they identify with the Democrats. We henceforth refer to this as the *minority group status* hypothesis. The differences present in Table 1 indicate, of course, that minority group status is felt more keenly by Latinos than by Asians. Because Latinos are more likely to report that the discrimination they experience is economic in nature (and so presumably more injurious) and to perceive that the structure of opportunities is biased against them, the hypothesized gains in Democratic support should be greater for them than for Asians. As discussed above, the Fiorina model also posits that politically relevant experiences of parents enter into the G vector (inherited predispositions) of their children. This implies that second generation respondents in both groups should be more Democratic than the immigrants themselves, and that third and subsequent generation Asians and Latinos should be more Democratic still. Finally, it is possible that like immigrants, native-born Asians and Latinos also become more cognizant of the implications of minority status as they grow older. If so, they would display age-related gains in Democratic support that parallel the gains of the immigrant generation resulting from increased time spent in the United States.

The minority group status hypothesis does not imply that support for the Democrats is confined only to those who report having personally experienced discrimination or lack of opportunity. We suspect, first of all, that such concerns and experiences were under-reported.⁴ Every instance of personally experienced discrimination, furthermore, is augmented by knowledge of a friend, neighbor, or relative who has received unfair treatment, as well as by information garnered from the mass media. It should also be noted that the accumulation of experiences associated with minority group status does not in and of itself mold party preferences; according to Fiorina's model, such experiences must be politically relevant before they impinge upon partisanship. We thus expect support for the Democrats among Asians and Latinos to increase over time and across generations not because individuals have accumulated more experiences with discrimination *per se*, but rather because the political relevance of being a member of a minority group increases with more and more exposure to American politics and to the major political parties. Finally, the minority group status hypothesis should be construed very broadly. The appeal of the Democratic party to Asians and Latinos should be seen not merely as a function of its overall, pro-minority group image, but also of its more congenial positions on issues related to minority group status, such as immigration, bilingualism, and especially public education (de la Garza and Brischetto, 1982).

Becoming a member of an ethnic minority is not the only experience that Latino and Asian immigrants share with each other. Another feature common to most immigrants is the persistence of ties to their country of origin. As reported in Table 2, the vast majority of immigrants continue to keep in touch with friends and relatives in their native country even sixteen or more years after their arrival in this country. Almost a third of the respondents in this category report sending back money, as do somewhat higher percentages of those who have spent fewer years in the U.S. Information about events and conditions in their homelands also comes to immigrants through native language newspapers, television, and radio broadcasts. There is, in short, considerable

evidence that most Asian and Latino immigrants maintain an abiding interest in the affairs of their native country.

Table 2 here

That immigrants continue to care about the country from whence they came implies that the major parties' policy positions vis-à-vis their former homeland will strongly influence their party preferences. In this respect the Latino and Asian immigrants of today are no different than the Irish, German, and Italian immigrants of previous decades, whose party loyalties were informed at least in part by foreign policy concerns (Morgan, 1969; Gamm, 1989). This does not in and of itself lead to predictions about the direction of the party preferences they come to acquire. There are, however, several Asian nationalities that seem especially likely to have a common set of experiences and perceptions regarding U.S. foreign policy—those from South Korea, which has faced a hostile communist regime to the North since the end of the fighting in 1953; those from the countries of Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) whose governments fell to communist forces in 1975; the Chinese, who are primarily from Taiwan and Hong Kong. Those from Taiwan are coming from a country whose very reason for existence is its opposition to the communist government on the mainland. Hong Kong, of course, is scheduled to be turned over to the control of the PRC in 1997.

Although party differences in the United States are much sharper in domestic policy than in foreign policy, since World War II the Republican party has been seen to usually favor a tougher stance in dealing with communist regimes. What we henceforth refer to as the *anticommunist emigré* hypothesis thus predicts that as immigrants from these countries learn about American politics, they become increasingly supportive of the Republican party.⁵ The plausibility of the anticommunist emigré hypothesis is bolstered by the fact that 55 percent of the Chinese, Korean, and Southeast Asian immigrants we interviewed favored "an increase in federal spending for

military and defense purposes," compared to 42 percent of the other Asian respondents and 37 percent of the Latinos.⁶ We also know from previous research that the strong support afforded the Republicans by Cuban-Americans is rooted in their anticommunist, pro-defense attitudes (Brischetto, 1987).

The source of a third set of predictions concerning the acquisition of party preferences derives from differential rates of economic progress. Although immigrants usually enter the U.S. labor force at low wage rates, on average they reach earnings equality with native Americans within ten to fifteen years (Chiswick, 1978). As Chiswick and others have observed, these rapid gains are in large measure the result of self-selection; those willing to leave family, friends, and everything familiar behind to seek a better life are highly motivated individuals. Evidence of the economic gains made by the immigrants we interviewed is presented in Table 3. As the figures in this table show, over time both Latino and Asian immigrants earn more and become more likely to own their own home (no mean feat in California). Members of subsequent generations, in turn, tend to be materially better off than immigrants. Table 3 also reports the percentage of respondents whose head of household had been unemployed in the previous year. For Latinos, the figures exhibit a strong downward trend after the surprisingly low first category (less than 7 years in the U.S.). Although we can only speculate, a major reason for the low levels of unemployment reported by recent arrivals is that a high percentage of them work in construction, gardening, and in restaurants. Although the amount of work varies from week to week, these are usually not jobs from which they can technically be laid off. The data in Table 3 also indicate that Asians have made more rapid progress than Latinos, which is consistent with other findings by Chiswick (1980). Similarly, unemployment figures for Asians, although more erratic, are on average lower than for Latinos.

Table 3 here

For the past several decades, economically advantaged, higher income groups have been

disproportionately supportive of the Republican party. On the basis of what we henceforth refer to as the *economic advancement* hypothesis, we would expect that as immigrants' material well-being improves, so does their support for the Republicans. This would seem to run counter to the minority group status hypothesis, but it is possible for both to operate simultaneously. More specifically, it could be that support for the Democrats among immigrants increases with time spent in the U.S., but that those who do better economically become less Democratic than those who do not do as well. Similarly, we would expect that Asian immigrants, given their more rapid rate of economic progress, come to be more supportive than Latinos of the Republican party. This last prediction is consistent with available evidence on the partisanship of Latinos and Asians. National opinion polls regularly find Latinos to favor the Democrats over the Republicans, but because of the small number of Latino respondents typically contacted the size of the margin varies widely. Surveys specifically targeted at the predominantly Mexican-origin Latinos of Texas and California generally find about a 3-1 advantage. Evidence on the partisanship of Asians is harder to come by, as national surveys never contact more than a handful of Asian respondents. What there is, however, suggests that the percentage of Asians who identify with the Republicans is roughly the same as the percentage who identify with the Democrats.

The predictions derived from the hypotheses discussed so far fall loosely under the rubric of what cohort analysts call "age" effects, which, as Converse (1969) argues, are seen more accurately as experience effects. For natives, age corresponds to experience. For immigrants experience is measured by the amount of time they have been in the United States, which could be the same for individuals of different ages or different for individuals of the same age. But the other major concern of the field—"generational" effects—also follow from Fiorina's model. New voters (either immigrants, or, more commonly, native-born voters reaching majority age) have few observations of the competing political parties, and so have weaker priors, less stable party affiliations, and are more susceptible to new information. Events of the day thus have a greater

impact upon the preferences of these less experienced, more impressionable voters. Kahan (1972) finds strong evidence for these propositions in his study of immigrants to Australia. He reports that the votes cast by new native born voters mirror the national swing from one party to another, but at a much higher amplitude. Foreign born new voters, furthermore, exhibit even sharper swings in favor of the ascendant party.

Carrying the imprint of the same formative experiences, members of a particular cohort can exhibit distinctive patterns of partisanship over the course of their lifetime (Abramson, 1976). Thus "New Deal Democrats" refers to the generation of voters who continued to strongly support Democratic candidates long after they cast their first ballots in the Thirties and early Forties. Even though members of such a cohort transmit some partisan bias to their children, such socialization fails to impede the dissipation of a particular pattern of party loyalties (Beck, 1974).

Assigning immigrants to a particular cohort is problematic, as nothing to rival the magnitude of the Great Depression has occurred since then.⁷ A second problem derives from the fact that they enter the country at different ages. If they arrive as adults, they are presumably strongly influenced by political conditions at the time of their arrival. Those who arrive as children can be expected to be more like native Americans, and to pick up the imprint of the political state of affairs that obtains at the time of early adulthood. We thus think it makes most sense to designate immigrants' cohorts in terms of the first presidential election in which they would have been old enough to vote had they been native Americans. If any cohort effects are present, we would expect that if the presidential election by which a cohort is defined were won by a Republican, members of that cohort would subsequently bear a Republican imprint. If it were won by a Democrat, we would correspondingly expect the relatively impressionable immigrants in that cohort to be disproportionately Democratic in their partisan preferences.

Data Analysis

Before turning to the data, it is probably useful to summarize our major hypotheses concerning the direction of party choice. According to the minority group status hypothesis, the longer Latino and Asian immigrants have been in the U.S., the more they tend to support the Democrats. Similarly, native-born Latinos and Asians may display age (i.e. exposure) related gains in Democratic identification. Given the evidence that Latinos are more likely than Asians to perceive discrimination and lack of opportunity, they should also display larger gains in Democratic support. The Fiorina model also leads us to expect identification with the Democrats to be higher among members of the second generation than among immigrants, and that the third generation should be more Democratic still.

According to the economic advancement hypothesis, as the material well-being of immigrants improves, their support for the Republicans increases. Because of economic advancement, second and third generation individuals should be more supportive of the Republicans than are immigrants, and Asians should be more Republican than the Latinos.

The anticommunist emigré hypothesis, finally, predicts that immigrants from South Korea and Southeast Asia become increasingly supportive of the Republican party as they learn about American politics. As in the case of the minority group status hypothesis, these pro-Republican effects could be amplified in the second generation as a result of parental socialization. There are no second generation Korean or Southeast Asian respondents in our sample, however, so there is no way to examine this possibility.

To provide an exploratory overview of the data, in Figures 1 and 2 we chart the percentages, by generation, of Latino and Asian respondents respectively who identify as Democrats, Republicans, or who support neither party. (These categories are derived from responses to the standard NES party identification questions; independents who subsequently reported "leaning" toward a party are classified as identifiers with that party). These figures also break down immigrants into categories defined by how long the respondent has lived in this

country; i.e., 7 years or less, 8 to 15 years, or 16 years or more.

Figures 1 and 2 here

The data in Figure 1 conform nicely to the minority group status hypothesis. Democratic identification among Latino immigrants increases steadily with time spent in the U.S., while the percentages of Independents and Republicans fall. The propensity to favor the Democrats remains high among second generation respondents, and the third generation is more Democratic still. There is, then, evidence of experience-related gains in Democratic identification among Latino immigrants, and some indication that these gains are amplified in subsequent generations—presumably by the effect of family socialization. As indicated earlier, these data do not rule out the alternative economic advancement hypothesis. Nevertheless, we can infer that any pro-Republican effects of economic advancement on the party preferences of Latinos are dominated by overall gains in support for the Democrats.

In contrast, the data on Asian immigrants in Figure 2 give no indication of the minority group status hypothesis at work. Whatever small increase in support for the Democrats that might be associated with time spent in the U.S is matched by small gains accruing to the Republicans—possibly concentrated among respondents in the anticommunist emigré category, or as a consequence of economic advancement. This is not unexpected, of course, in light of the evidence that Asians are far less likely than Latinos to report experiences with discrimination that were economically injurious, or to perceive that they receive fewer opportunities than they deserve. Comparison of Figures 1 and 2 does reveal that all generations of Asians are more Republican than their Latino counterparts. This is not particularly enlightening, as all three hypotheses predict that this should be the case.

These exploratory cuts at the data thus uncover some patterns that are consistent with our major hypotheses, as well as other features that are not. In either case they are hardly definitive.

They also reveal nothing about age-related gains in partisanship among the second and third generation, nor anything about whether immigrant or native-born individuals exhibit cohort effects due to the ascendancy of a party at the time they entered the electorate. To subject our hypotheses to more rigorous examination, we estimate the following equation (subscripts denoting individual respondents are omitted):

$$PID = c + \alpha G + \beta G \times t + \delta X + \gamma C + \kappa E + \lambda E \times t + \mu$$

where:

PID = reported identification as either a Democrat, Republican, or Independent. As indicated above, Independents "leaning" toward a party are assigned to that party.

c = a constant term.

G = a pair of dummy variables registering second generation or third and later generations.

Immigrants thus form the excluded category.

$G \times t$ = amount of exposure to American politics. For immigrants, this is proxied by the number of years since their arrival in the U.S. For subsequent generations it is proxied by reported age.

X = a battery of dummy variables indicating that the individual has a low family income (< \$15,000), a high family income (> \$50,000), is in a household that has a union member, or in a household whose head had been unemployed sometime during the previous year.

C = a pair of dummy variables registering cohort effects. The first takes on the value of 1 if the first presidential election in which a native-born individual was eligible to vote was won by the Republican candidate, 0 otherwise. The second, for immigrants, takes on the value of 1 if the first presidential election they experienced as an adult living in the U.S. was won by the Republican.

E = a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for immigrants from China, South Korea or Southeast Asia (the anticommunist émigré category).

$E \times t$ = amount of exposure Chinese, South Korean, or Southeast Asian immigrants have had to American politics, proxied by the number of years they have resided in the U.S. This and the preceding variable were specified only in the equation run on the Asian sample.⁸

μ = an error term.

Because Figures 1 and 2 strongly suggest the presence of inter-group differences, this analysis is performed separately on the Asian and Latino samples. The nature of the dependent variable (Democrat, Independent, Republican) dictates that this equation be estimated as a trichotomous ordered probit. Results are reported in Table 4. The top number in each entry is the estimated probit coefficient, the bottom number the standard error. Positive coefficients are pro-Republican in direction. Those that are significantly different from zero ($p < .05$, one-tailed) are denoted by daggers.

Table 4 here

Turning first to the Latinos, we see support for the economic advancement hypothesis that is not observable in the overall trends displayed in Figure 1. Lower income Latinos are significantly more Democratic than either those in the middle income category (the suppressed reference group) or those in the high income group. Those in union households are also more likely to be Democrats. The results here concerning the minority group status hypothesis also bear out the more tentative findings of Figure 1. First, the pattern of the generation dummies and the large, significant coefficient of the ($G_1 \times t$) term reveal the hypothesized gains in support for the Democrats. Latino immigrants are more likely to identify as Democrats the longer they have been in the U.S., and subsequent generations of Latinos are increasingly (albeit not significantly) more Democratic as well. Second and third generations Latinos also displayed age-related gains in Democratic identification; the estimated coefficients (-.018 and -.024, respectively) were nearly as large as the -.027 coefficient for immigrants. These findings also appear to be quite robust, in that

similar age-related gains in Latino support for the Democrats appear in other studies of both the 1984 and 1988 elections (Brischetto, 1987, 1988).

As is generically the case in analyses of this type, we cannot rule out *a priori* an alternative, cohort-based explanation for age-related effects.⁹ It is possible that younger Latinos in our sample are more Republican because their early political experiences are heavily colored by the relatively popular presidency of Ronald Reagan. It could also be that older Latinos are disproportionately Democratic because of events or conditions experienced in an earlier, more formative period in their life. In either case, if the higher degree of Republicanism among younger (or recently arrived) Latinos reflects a cohort effect, these Latinos will remain more Republican as they age. Latinos subsequently entering the electorate will be more likely see the Republican party as an appropriate choice for persons like themselves, leading to a decline in Latino support for the Democrats over time. If age-related gains are instead a function of accumulated experiences and exposure to American politics—as the minority group status hypothesis implies—the large margin by which Latinos currently favor the Democrats over the Republicans will persist.

We continue to favor the experiential, learning-based hypothesis for the following reasons. First, as indicated above, the coefficients of the age terms for second and third generation respondents are very similar to the coefficient of the other, less problematic, measure of exposure to American politics, i.e., the "years in the U.S." term for immigrants. Secondly, the coefficients of the dummy variables for the party that won the first election in which respondents were eligible to vote are indistinguishable from zero. This indicates that respondents had not simply been swept away by the popularity of Ronald Reagan or by other partisan tides at the time of their entry into the electorate. Third, it is hard to imagine what conditions or events could have imprinted older Latinos with a stronger than usual Democratic bias. Latino party politics in earlier decades had a very different, assimilationist flavor. And although Latinos encountered legal and extra-legal obstacles to voting in many areas, nothing occurred at that time analogous to the civil rights

struggle that led blacks to become so overwhelmingly Democratic (Garcia and de la Garza, 1977). Finally, data from the 1988 election show gains in Latino support for the Democrats over the levels of 1984, not the decline that a cohort-based account of our findings would imply (Brischetto, 1988).

Turning next to the results for the Asian sample, we find some support for the anticommunist emigré hypothesis; both the E and $E \times t$ (years in the U.S.) coefficients are in the predicted, pro-Republican direction, and that of the latter approaches conventional levels of statistical significance. The E term becomes significant, in fact, when the $E \times t$ term is omitted. The data were far less kind to the minority group status and economic advancement hypotheses. Coefficients of the "years in U.S." variable for immigrants and of the age variables for other respondents reveal no systematic movement toward either party. As indicated earlier, the lack of exposure-related effects (which we attribute to the minority group status hypothesis) most likely reflects the fact that Asians-Americans do not feel particularly disadvantaged. But Asian respondents' identification with the Republican versus the Democratic party was similarly unaffected by the variables reflecting economic status; coefficients of the unemployment and union household terms were in the correct direction but far from significant, while those of the income dummies were both in the wrong direction.

One must be careful, of course, in making inferences on the basis of null findings; the absence of evidence, as Tufte puts it, is not evidence of absence. One potential problem with our analysis is that the Asian category contains respondents of many different nationalities, and may therefore be quite heterogenous. Aggregating such heterogenous groups may thus account for our failure to find support here for our hypotheses concerning the direction of party choice. Indeed, it was the decision to disaggregate the immigrants from China, Korea, and Southeast Asia that yielded the only positive findings in the Asian sample, i.e., for the anticommunist emigré hypothesis. Ideally we would disaggregate all the Asian nationalities but sample sizes do not permit this.

We are confident, however, that our analyses have not been compromised by attenuation resulting from the aggregation of heterogeneous groups of Asian immigrants and subsequent generations of Asian-Americans. First, a review of the literature on various Asian nationalities reveals a great deal of commonality in their experiences in the United States (Kitano, 1969; Jo, 1980). In particular, immigrants from Vietnam, Hong Kong, Korea, and other countries quickly find that whatever their particular nationality, in the United States they are generally considered to be "Asians." In California in particular, cities, neighborhoods, schools, and universities are described in terms of "percent Asian." Members of different Asian nationalities hear the same ethnic jokes and epithets. There is nothing new or unusual about this, of course. In the Nineteenth Century immigrants from the Abruzzi, from Sicily, from Naples, and from the Piedmont found that in the United States they were all considered to be "Italian."

Secondly, in the independent variables that play a major role in our analysis (as well as in related subjective indicators) the variance among the various Asian ethnic groups is much smaller than the difference *between* all categories of Asian-Americans and the Latinos in our sample. Compared to Latinos, *all* categories of Asian-Americans were better educated, had better incomes, and were much less likely to believe that their ethnic group received fewer opportunities than they deserved. The only apparent exception is that the nationalities with large proportions of immigrants (Filipinos, Koreans, others) are nearly as likely as Latinos to be renters and to have experienced unemployment. However, when we compare Asian immigrants with Latino immigrants on home ownership and unemployment, large differences between Asians and Latinos re-emerge.

Because the results reported in Table 4 are of analyses performed separately on the Asian and Latinos samples, they cannot tell us anything about which hypothesis or combination of hypotheses account for *differences* between the two groups. As noted previously, all three hypotheses about the direction of party preferences predict Asians to be more likely than Latinos to

favor the Republicans, and the data in Figures 1 and 2 show this to be the case. In order to determine which, if any, of the hypotheses account for this difference we need to pool the two samples and estimate an equation of the following form:

$$PID = c + \alpha A + \beta G \times t + \delta X + \gamma E + \mu$$

This equation differs from the previous one in the following ways: 1) it specifies a dummy variable A that takes on the value of 1 for Asian respondents, 0 for Latinos; 2) given the significant effect associated with the E term when the $E \times t$ term is dropped, the latter is not specified; 3) the C dummies registering cohort effects contribute nothing to the fit of the model, so they have been dropped as well; 4) there is a single age term for native-born Latinos and Asians, as the results in Table 4 reveal no gain from estimating separate coefficients for second and third generation respondents. A large, positive coefficient for the dummy variable A would indicate that our three hypotheses fail to explain fully the relatively greater Republicanism of Asian respondents. All other coefficients can be interpreted as before.

The results, reported in Table 5, show that the relatively greater support Latinos afford the Democrats is accounted for by their lower incomes and higher proportion of union households (27 percent, compared to 17 percent for the Asians), by the Latinos' experience-based gains in Democratic support (which we interpret in terms of the minority group status hypothesis), and by the presence of many Asian immigrants from countries that have either fallen to communist regimes or are threatened by them. The dummy variable for Asian respondents is actually in a negative, pro-Democratic direction, although with a t statistic of less than one it is indistinguishable from zero. In short, all three of our major hypotheses contribute to the divergence between the party preferences of Asians and Latinos. Although our data do not reveal very much about why some Asians are more likely to be Democratic or more Republican than others, they do allow us to account for why the Asians are generally more Republican than are the Latinos.

IV. PARTISAN INTENSITY

Implications of the Fiorina model for the intensity of the party preferences acquired by immigrants and members of subsequent generations are summarized in Table 6. The first column specifies our hypotheses about the relationship between generation and the G vector of inherited predispositions. Few foreign-born Americans receive any relevant partisan cues from their parents; those who do not arrive here until adulthood presumably inherit no partisan bias whatsoever. Family political influence in the second generation varies substantially, depending on whether and when the parents of these individuals became attentive to politics in the U.S. If parents develop partisan attachments early in their offspring's childhood, then we would expect to see the same kind of socialization as experienced by individuals with native-born parents. If the parents never make the transition into U.S. political life or do not do so until much later, then little or no parental partisanship is transmitted (see Andersen, 1979, p. 42). By the third generation the standard patterns of intergenerational transmission obtain, and consequently these individuals should be stronger partisans.

Table 6 here

The second column of Table 6 summarizes our expectations concerning the effect of past political experiences (the PPE term). For native Americans, Converse's (1976) hypothesis that the strength of partisanship increases with age—at least during non-traumatic "steady state" periods (see also Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, 1976)—can be derived by recognizing that over time individuals observe how the parties perform in office, and learn how those actions affect their welfare. Early experiences are disproportionately influential, but as observations accumulate the impact of each new datum upon party preferences decreases (assuming that the parties behave consistently and that utility functions do not change).

Our major hypothesis, then, is that partisan intensity increases with age, or, in the case of immigrants, with years in the U.S. Effects associated with age are not due to aging *per se*. As Converse (1969) puts it, "sheer time" or "the passage of years in chronological age" only proxy how much exposure an individual has had to the political environment. One way to disentangle "sheer time" from amount of exposure, as Converse notes, is to examine partisanship in countries with new party systems (e.g., Italy, Germany, and Japan after World War II). Another way is to analyze the experience of immigrants. Because immigrants enter this country at different ages, the amount of exposure they have had to American politics is distinct from their age. Many respondents we interviewed were children when they arrived, while others were in their sixties. For immigrants, then, we have a different and potentially better indicator of exposure to American politics, i.e., years in the U.S., than the age proxy applied to native-born citizens.¹⁰

The amount of importance that individuals assign to each piece of political information is no doubt idiosyncratic, but we know that if it is to have any weight at all they must be able to comprehend it and place it into the context of what they already know (Converse, 1975, p. 97). A person's ability to do this is difficult to gauge directly, but their level of formal education is usually a good indicator. As the entries in each right hand column cell indicate, we thus assume that individuals with more education, because of their ability to better comprehend and interpret new political information, assign more weight to PPEs. They should consequently be more intensely partisan as well. In the case of immigrants, greater facility with the English language plays a similar role. Immigrants should also afford information about American politics more weight as their material and psychological stakes in the U.S. grow larger. Thus we should expect the intensity of partisan preferences to be positively associated with indicators such as citizenship, home ownership, and the decision to remain permanently in the U.S.

Some evidence on these points is reported in Table 7. Looking first at education, we see that the percentage of immigrants lacking a high school diploma falls rapidly with time spent in the

U.S. Second and subsequent generation respondents are better educated still. Use of the English language exhibits an upward as well, and interviewers' assessments of political information levels display similarly large increases. Across all categories, Asian respondents are better educated than Latinos. This is consistent with the finding that Asians have a more rapid rate of economic advancement. These differences in education, along with those in language use and information levels, lead us to expect Asians to be more intensely partisan than Latinos.

Table 7 here

The data in Table 7 also suggest that immigrants' ties to the United States can take a long time to fully develop. Even after 16 or more years here many immigrants—especially Latinos—have not become citizens, and have not abandoned the idea of returning to their country of origin. Although we cannot determine their relative importance, we think there are at least three factors responsible for the slower pace of Latino assimilation: 1) Latinos are more likely to be undocumented aliens and thus unable to obtain citizenship; 2) It is usually more feasible for Latinos to return to their country of origin (especially if it is Mexico) than for Asians (especially those from Southeast Asia); 3) Asian immigrants have experienced more rapid economic progress than have Latinos. As was seen in Table 3, Asians also report much higher levels of home ownership than do Latinos. To the extent these various measures are indicative of a more thoroughgoing commitment to life in the U.S., we would expect Asians to be more likely than Latinos to identify with a party and to identify more strongly with a party.

An initial overview of the data on partisan strength is provided by Figure 3, which charts the proportion of "strong" party identifiers in each of the same categories displayed in the previous figures. These data show that for Latinos, the percentage of strong identifiers increases steadily with time spent in this country by immigrants, and with generation. The pattern for Asians, on the other hand, is erratic. There is a big jump in partisan intensity among the immigrants who have

been in the U.S. for 16 or more years. But second generation Asians are much weaker partisans, and third generation respondents have no stronger partisan attachments than newly arrived immigrants.

Figure 3 here

This initial look at the data thus suggests that our hypotheses concerning the strength of partisanship, like those concerning the direction of party preferences, find much more support in the Latino sample than in the Asian sample. Our expectations regarding inter-group are also disappointed by Figure 3, in that there appears to be no systematic tendency for Asians to be stronger in their partisan predilections than Latinos are in theirs. As before, though, a definitive test of our hypotheses requires estimating an equation of the following form:

$$PSTN = c + \alpha G + \beta G \times t + \delta X + \gamma Y + \epsilon$$

where:

$PSTN$ = the individual's strength of partisanship. Strong identifiers make up one category, weak identifiers and leaners another category, and pure Independents a third.

c = a constant term.

G = a pair of dummy variables registering second generation or third and later generations. As before, immigrants form the reference group.

$G \times t$ = amount of exposure to American politics. For immigrants, this is proxied by years in the U.S.; for subsequent generations, by reported age.

X = dummy variables indicating a high level of educational attainment (college degree or more), a low level (less than a high school diploma). A third dummy variable takes on the value of 1 for respondents whose primary language is other than English, zero otherwise.

Y = dummy variables reflecting greater perceived stake in the U.S. These include owning a home, acquiring citizenship, and ruling out the possibility of returning to one's country of origin.

μ = an error term.

As in the analysis of the direction of partisanship, it is appropriate to estimate this equation as a trichotomous ordered probit, and to estimate separate coefficients for the Latino and Asian samples. Results are reported in Table 8. As before, the top number in each entry is the estimated probit coefficient, the bottom number the standard error. A positively signed coefficient implies stronger partisanship. Estimates in the first column pertain to the Latino sample, those in the second to the Asian sample, and those in the third column are derived after pooling the two samples together.

Table 8 here

The results here closely mirror our findings concerning the direction of party preferences. The intensity of partisanship among native-born Latinos increases with age, and there are similar gains among Latino immigrants with years spent in the U.S. Age-related gains for third and subsequent generation Latinos are especially impressive. There are no effects associated with the generation dummies. As before, we cannot reject out of hand alternative, cohort-based accounts of these findings, but available side information supports our view that the gains in intensity are a function of more exposure. First, both indicators of political exposure—age for natives, years in the U.S. for immigrants—register the hypothesized gains. Secondly, an experience-based explanation of these gains is corroborated by the data in Table 7 that show large increases in political information levels with time spent in the U.S. and over generations. Finally, it is even harder to compose a plausible cohort-based scenario that accounts for age-related gains in Latinos' partisan intensity than it is for their age-related gains in identification with the Democrats.

Continuing down the first column in Table 8, we see that our other hypotheses receive substantial support as well. The strength of Latinos' partisan preferences increases with education, as reflected by the significant difference ($p < .05$) between the .24 and -.18 coefficients of the high

and low education terms, respectively. Partisan intensity is also greater among Latino immigrants who have become citizens, and among those who have abandoned the idea of returning to their country of origin. In contrast, whether or not the respondent has adopted English as a primary language appears not to matter.

Our ability to account for partisan intensity among Asians was no greater than our ability to explain the direction of their choice. None of the many variables that are statistically significant for Latinos are significant when the equation is run on the Asian sample. Notwithstanding the gains in political information levels evident in Table 5, politically relevant experiences acquired by Asians do not appear to increase their commitment to either of the major parties. Nor were there gains in intensity associated with generation, education, citizenship, or language use.¹¹

IV. CONCLUSION

Most of our hypotheses concerning the acquisition of partisanship are borne out strongly in the Latino sample. In line with the minority group status hypothesis, we find that the longer Latino immigrants have been in the United States, the more likely they are to identify as Democrats. Second and third generation Latinos exhibit similar age-related gains in Democratic identification. There is also considerable support for the economic advancement hypothesis, in that support for the Democrats is stronger among lower income Latinos and those from union households. Latino immigrants also display gains in partisan intensity associated with the amount of time they have been in the United States, and we find corresponding age-related gains in the strength of partisanship among subsequent generations of Latinos as well. Latinos who are committed to remaining in the U.S., who have become citizens, and who have obtained more education also exhibit stronger party attachments.

In line with our hypotheses about their foreign policy concerns, the data also suggest that immigrants from China, Korea, and Southeast Asia become more Republican with increased

exposure to American politics. It is likely, though, that the favorable image Asian immigrants have of the Republican party could fade quickly if they perceive that the G.O.P. is wavering in its opposition to communist regimes in their homelands. In particular, the decision by the Bush Administration to maintain high-level contacts with the Beijing government after the Tien An Men Square massacre could close off Republican opportunities to make further inroads into the immigrant Chinese community.

Other Asian immigrants and subsequent generations of Asian-Americans, in contrast, exhibit no systematic movement toward either party. We attribute this lack of exposure-related effects (which we attribute to the minority group status hypothesis) to the fact that Asians-Americans do not feel particularly disadvantaged. But Asians' identification with the Republican versus the Democratic party was similarly unaffected by the variables reflecting economic advancement, and none of our hypotheses concerning partisan intensity received support in the Asian sample. The divergence in our findings concerning Asians and Latinos thus underscores Abramson's (1983) admonition against conflating the political experiences of different ethnic groups.

Throughout this study we have attributed trends in party choice or in partisan intensity that are related to age (or, in the case of immigrants, to time spent in the U.S.) to greater exposure to American politics, and, more specifically, to information about the major political parties. As we previously acknowledged, however, we cannot reject alternative, cohort-based accounts of the same phenomena. It could be, for instance, that younger Latinos are more Republican than their elders because their political experience is disproportionately reflects the relatively popular presidencies Ronald Reagan and Goeroge Bush. Or perhaps older Latinos are relatively more Democratic because of events that occurred during a formative period in their lives. Of course, this analytic problem is not unique to our study. The field of cohort analysis has long struggled with the problem of ascertaining which effect or which combination of three basic effects—age, cohort, and

period—accounts for observed relationships in the data. The crux of the problem is that each effect is a linear combination of the other two (Mason *et al.*, 1973). Glenn (1976) argues persuasively that higher order interaction effects present even more insurmountable difficulties. We have thus adhered to the advice proffered by Glenn and Converse (1976), who both argue that a strong theoretical basis and/or side information is required to discriminate between competing age and cohort explanations. As we think this study demonstrates, theory and side evidence can conspire to make one interpretation of a set of findings far more compelling than another.

APPENDIX: SAMPLE DESIGN

The major problem we faced in this study was that of efficiently contacting large numbers of Latinos and Asians, who, according to the 1980 Census, constituted 19% and 5% of the state population respectively. Comparisons between face-to-face and telephone interviews indicate that the former technique produces a higher response rate and, in general, less bias in the resultant sample. We worried, however, that recent immigrants (especially undocumented ones) would be suspicious of interviewers coming to their homes. Telephone interviews are less obtrusive and possibly preferable for that reason. The main reason we chose to conduct telephone interviews, however, was the prohibitive cost of face-to-face interviews.

In telephone surveys the most common sampling technique is random digit dialing. RDD is subject to some bias due to the incomplete saturation of telephone ownership (Tull and Albaum, 1977). More importantly, however, RDD is a very inefficient method for contacting residentially dispersed groups which make up a small percentage of the population, such as Latinos and Asians (Chang *et al.*, 1988). In the case of blacks, one can usually draw a sample of exchanges via probability weights to yield the desired proportion of black respondents. For Latinos and Asians, there is not a high enough level of residential concentration (and resultant high correlation between telephone exchanges and census units) for this technique to be effective. Asians are an extreme case in this regard. Of the 5050 census tracts in California in the 1980 Census, only 33 (0.6%) were 40% or more Asian. Even if telephone exchanges could be weighted in a skewed enough fashion to increase significantly the probability of contacting Asian respondents, the resultant sample would be problematic (i.e., Asians living in heavily Asian neighborhoods are likely to be atypical Asians).

Because of the highly problematic nature of RDD for our purposes, we therefore chose to generate Latino and Asian subsamples from surnames listed in telephone directories (Himmelfarb *et al.*, 1983). After randomly selecting a sample of 300 census tracts in California, we obtained from DialAmerica Corporation of Cleveland, Ohio, the names and current phone numbers of 80-

100 individuals per tract for approximately 90% of the tracts, yielding a list of 24,523 names. We then ran these names through Hispanic and Asian surname dictionaries to derive a sample of potential interviewees. This procedure produced significantly fewer Hispanic names than their proportions of the total state population would have predicted, and slightly fewer Asian names. Incomplete saturation of telephone ownership is probably responsible for some of the drop off (Leuthold and Scheele, 1971), but the relatively young age structure of the Latino community in California is also a major contributing factor. Fortunately, the list of names we received from DialAmerica was quite large, and so we were able to derive Asian and Latino subsamples of adequate size. In order to increase the number of recent Asian immigrants we drew a supplemental sample of Korean surnames from the 1984 Korean Telephone Directory of Southern California. According to the creators of this directory, it contains the telephone numbers of over 75% of all Koreans in Southern California. We ultimately conducted interviews with 80 Korean-Americans via this supplemental sample.

The interviewing firm we hired made as many as three attempts to contact each telephone number. Randomization within the household was achieved by asking to speak with whichever adult living at that address would be the next to have a birthday anniversary. The interviewers made no attempt to convert those who did not wish to participate. This telephoning strategy yielded a completed interview with 44 percent of the residences with valid telephone numbers (by "valid" we mean that the individual identified in our sample resided at that address). The major reasons for failing to obtain an interview included: 1) contacting a minor child, friend, or relative, but not an eligible adult. 2) contacting an eligible respondent, arranging to call back to interview them at a more convenient time, and then failing to re-establish contact. 3) repeatedly reaching an answering machine (we suspect the use of such devices to screen incoming calls is a growing source of bias in telephone surveys, although we have seen no reference to this problem in the literature). 4) language difficulties. This was not a problem for Latino respondents, as our

questionnaire had been translated into Spanish, and all Hispanic surname respondents were contacted by bilingual interviewers. We also encountered virtually no language problems with Asian respondents, with the exception of the Koreans. Korean-speaking interviewers probably would have netted us a dozen or so more interviews. 5) Refusals to be interviewed. Records kept by the interviewing firm did not distinguish among the many reasons for noncompletions.

Our initial reaction to the 44 percent response rate was one of concern, but the literature on survey nonresponse suggests that this rate is comparable to those currently achieved by commercial polling firms. This is still not particularly reassuring, given that nonresponse rates in telephone surveys have risen to very high levels (Steeh, 1981). It is also the case that the amount of sampling bias depends not only upon the response rate, but also upon how different respondents are from nonrespondents (Brehm, 1989). Although we can obtain no information on the characteristics of nonrespondents in our study, we can assess the representativeness of the Asian and Latino samples by comparing their demographic profiles with those derived from the 1980 U.S. Census of Population. The figures reported in Table A.1 indicate that in both samples the reported figures for family income and country of birth (U.S. or not) were quite similar to those reported by the Census Bureau. The percentage of Latinos in our sample who reported being homeowners was somewhat higher than the Census figures, and we also oversampled Asian men. In their study of Latinos in Texas, Chang *et al.* (1988) found few differences between an RDD sample and a sample derived from surname sampling of telephone directories. Our results are thus corroborative. There were large discrepancies, however, in reported education; individuals in both samples were considerably more likely to report having attended college than the 1980 Census indicated should be the case. This is not surprising. Almost all political surveys show some bias in reported education, and RDD telephone surveys generally fare worse in this regard than do face-to-face surveys.

Sampling bias does not produce biased coefficients in a correctly specified regression analysis if the variable concerned is an independent variable, but it certainly can if the sampling

bias affects the dependent variable. Any education bias in our sample thus is not a threat to the analysis reported in Table 8 (two education dummies are specified on the right hand side) but it is a threat, as the referees indicate, to our analysis of the direction of partisanship reported in Tables 6 and 7. The optimal way to correct such a problem is by means of a nested logit framework, in which an "inclusive value" derived from first estimating an equation that predicts response vs. nonresponse is inserted into the party direction equation. This approach is not an option, however, because we simply have no way of estimating that initial equation. We therefore adopted a fallback strategy of reestimating the equations in Tables 6 and 7 after partitioning Asian and Latino respondents into high and low education subsamples. The resultant pairs of estimated coefficients for Latino respondents were very similar to each other, and there was no significant improvement in log likelihood ratios.

Table 1: Personally Experienced Discrimination and Perceived Lack of Opportunity among Latinos and Asians

	<i>Latinos</i>			<i>Asians</i>		
	Generations in the U.S.					
	<u>First</u>	<u>Second</u>	<u>Third</u>	<u>First</u>	<u>Second</u>	<u>Third</u>
Most Serious Discrimination Personally Experienced:						
None	70	56	65	61	39	56
Social	9	24	17	22	47	36
Economic	21	20	16	17	14	8
Receive Too Few Opportunities	22	33	17	9	10	2
<i>n</i>	185	137	153	162	59	36

Figures reported are in percentages. Those concerning personally experienced discrimination were derived from responses to the following pair of questions:

Have you, yourself, personally experienced discrimination because you are [respondent's ethnicity]?

(If "yes" to the previous question) Thinking of the most serious discrimination you have experienced . . . was it in getting a job, or getting into school, in getting a house or apartment, in a social situation, or in some other respect?

The figures concerning perceptions of opportunities are the percentages of respondents who mentioned their own ethnic group in answering the following open-ended question:

Do you think there are any groups of people in the United States today who get *fewer* opportunities than they deserve?

Table 2: Immigrants' Links to their Countries of Origin

	<i>Asians</i>			<i>Latinos</i>		
	Years in the U.S.			Years in the U.S.		
	0-7	8-15	16+	0-7	8-15	16+
Keeps in Touch with Friends and Relatives	90	77	64	87	84	74
Sends Money to Friends and Relatives	43	29	30	48	49	33
<i>n</i>	58	69	50	46	88	89

Figures reported are in percentages.


Table 3: Economic Advancement of Latinos and Asians

	<i>Latinos</i>			Second Generation	Third Generation
	Years in U.S.				
	0-7	8-15	16+		
Family Owns Home	20	37	51	65	54
Family Income Less Than \$20k	78	64	53	45	38
Household Head Unemployed	11	28	25	18	14
<i>n</i>	46	88	89	152	162

	<i>Asians</i>			Second Generation	Third Generation
	Years in U.S.				
	0-7	8-15	16+		
Family Owns Home	29	70	68	81	67
Family Income Less Than \$20k	48	22	20	25	19
Household Head Unemployed	19	4	12	6	12
<i>n</i>	58	69	50	63	42

Figures are in percentages


Figure 1
Party Identification Among Latinos



— Democrat
 - - - Republican
 - . - Independent

(Numbers of respondents upon which percentages are based are reported in parentheses.)

Figure 2
Party Identification Among Asians



— Democrat
 - - - Republican
 - · - Independent

(Numbers of respondents upon which percentages are based are reported in parentheses.)

Table 4: Trichotomous Probit Estimation of Party Choice

	Latinos	Asians
c	.82 [†] (.22)	.66 [†] (.35)
Second Generation (G_2)	-.26 (.37)	-.82 (.62)
Third Generation (G_3)	-.30 (.40)	-1.00 (.77)
Years in U.S., Immigrants ($G_1 \times t$)	-.027 [†] (.006)	-.014 (.012)
Age, Second Generation ($G_2 \times t$)	-.018 [†] (.007)	.009 (.010)
Age, Third Generation ($G_3 \times t$)	-.024 [†] (.009)	-.014 (.019)
Low Family Income	-.19 [†] (.11)	.008 (.17)
High Family Income	.15 (.19)	-.026 (.18)
Union Household	-.24 [†] (.12)	-.20 (.18)
Head of Household Unemployed	.17 (.14)	-.24 (.23)
Republicans Won, Immigrants (C_1)	-.13 (.18)	-.19 (.23)
Republicans Won, Natives ($C_{2,3}$)	.03 (.17)	.29 (.28)
Anticommunist Emigré (E)	— —	.08 (.32)
Years in U.S., Emigrés ($E \times t$)	— —	.024 (.019)
Log Likelihood Initial	-523.3	-319.3
Log Likelihood at Convergence	-489.8	-280.2
Number of Observations	515	267

[†] = $p < .05$

Table 5: Asian-Latino Differences in Party Preferences

c	.56 [†] (.11)
Asians	-.19 (.20)
Anticommunist Emigré (E)	.39 [†] (.18)
Years in U.S., Latino Immigrants	-.019 [†] (.005)
Years in U.S., Asian Immigrants	-.006 (.007)
Age, Native Latinos	-.021 [†] (.003)
Age, Native Asians	.001 (.005)
Low Family Income	-.12 (.09)
High Family Income	.08 (.13)
Union Household	-.24 [†] (.10)
Head of Household Unemployed	.06 (.11)
Log Likelihood Initial	-855.6
Log Likelihood at Convergence	-803.6
Number of Observations	804

[†] = $p < .05$

Table 6: Factors Affecting Intensity of Partisanship by Generation

	Family Political Influence (G)	Past Political Experiences (PPE)
1st Generation	No Parental Transmission of Political Information Relevant to the U.S.	<p>Accumulate with Time Spent in the U.S.</p> <p>Early Experiences Especially Important</p> <p>Weight Given to PPEs Increases with Education, Proficiency in English, and with Perceived Stake in the U.S.</p>
2nd Generation	Depends Upon Parental Political Involvement During Childhood	<p>Accumulate with Age</p> <p>Early Experiences Especially Important</p> <p>Weight Given to PPEs Increases with Education</p>
3rd Generation	Parents an Important Source of Partisanship and Political Values	<p>Accumulate with Age</p> <p>Early Experiences Especially Important</p> <p>Weight Given to PPEs Increases with Education</p>

Figure 3
Strength of Partisanship




Table 7: Education, Information, and Ties to the U.S.

	<i>Latinos</i>				
	Years in U.S.			Second Generation	Third Generation
	0-7	8-15	16+		
Less than High School Diploma	48	40	35	28	15
Speak Foreign Language	89	85	78	51	22
Reasonably Well Informed*	20	23	34	51	58
U.S. Citizen	11	22	48	—	—
Intend to to Remain in U.S.**	39	65	80	—	—
<i>n</i>	46	88	89	152	162

	<i>Asians</i>				
	Years in U.S.			Second Generation	Third Generation
	0-7	8-15	16+		
Less Than High School Diploma	12	4	10	3	2
Speak Foreign Language	88	78	58	14	2
Reasonably Well Informed*	15	36	62	70	76
U.S. Citizen	12	64	86	—	—
Intend to Remain in U.S.**	59	80	80	—	—
<i>n</i>	58	69	50	63	42

* These are the percentages falling into the "very high" and "fairly high" categories in the interviewers' ratings of the "respondent's general level of information about politics and public affairs." Remaining categories were "average," "fairly low," and "very low."

** These percentages are derived from responses to the question, "Have you ever considered going back to [country of origin] to live, or are you pretty sure you will always live in the United States?"

Table 8: Trichotomous Probit Estimation of Partisan Intensity

	Latinos	Asians	Pooled
c	.01 (.19)	.53 [†] (.26)	.21 (.15)
Second Generation (G_2)	-.01 (.26)	.07 (.44)	.14 (.22)
Third Generation (G_3)	-.44 (.31)	.17 (.66)	-.26 (.27)
Years in U.S., Immigrants ($G_1 \times t$)	.011 [†] (.005)	.009 (.010)	.011 [†] (.005)
Age, Second Generation ($G_2 \times t$)	.011 [†] (.005)	.001 (.008)	.006 (.004)
Age, Third Generation ($G_3 \times t$)	.032 [†] (.008)	-.001 (.018)	.026 [†] (.007)
Low Education	-.18 (.12)	.28 (.32)	-.09 (.11)
High Education	.24 (.17)	.19 (.15)	.16 (.10)
Foreign Language	.03 (.12)	-.21 (.20)	.02 (.10)
Owner	-.02 (.11)	.24 (.16)	.04 (.09)
Citizen	.36 [†] (.19)	.09 (.21)	.26 [†] (.13)
Will Not Return	.36 [†] (.18)	-.11 (.22)	.17 (.14)
Log Likelihood Initial	-643.3	-323.3	-967.3
Log Likelihood at Convergence	-518.2	-269.9	-796.2
Number of Observations	515	267	782

[†] = $p < .05$

Table A.1: Comparison of Sample and Census Characteristics

	Latinos		Asians	
	1980 Census	1984 Sample	1980 Census	1984 Sample
Male	51	49	48	60
Owner Occupiers	44	52	62	64
Family Income < 10k	27	21	14	9
Family Income 10-25k	48	47	37	35
Native Born	63	60	42	38
Attended College	20	34	54	77

ENDNOTES

1. One response to the lack of contemporaneous survey data from earlier periods is to analyze the reports of respondents in the National Election Studies, which began in 1952, about their partisan affiliations in the past. On the basis of such reports Andersen (1979) surmised that the urban ethnic core of the New Deal coalition was largely the product of the mobilization of second generation citizens. As Andersen herself points out, however, the unreliability of people's memories dictates that reports about past partisanship be regarded with considerable caution.
2. Immigrants' choice of party in a new country can be shaped by their previous partisanship. In their study of immigrants to Australia, Finifter and Finifter (1989) find that U.S. Democrats are more likely than Republicans to identify with the Australian Labour party, and Wilson (1973) finds substantial carryover from British to Australian party identification. American and British immigrants to Australia, however, face a far more familiar set of parties than do the Latino and Asian-American immigrants to the U.S. Indeed, many of the immigrants in our study come from countries that do not even have electoral democracy. They are thus like Gitelman's (1982) American immigrants to Israel, who found the parties there unfamiliar, and, in most cases, unappealing (291-293).
3. There are some exceptions to this. For example, a handful of Chinese immigrants in the sample come from Malaysia and the Philippines, where the Chinese are an ethnic minority.
4. Blacks and members of other minority groups are reluctant to discuss matters of race and ethnicity with white interviewers. Whites, similarly, are often reticent about expressing racist views that are no longer socially acceptable. Although it was not feasible to match the ethnicity of the respondent with that of the interviewer, many of our interviewers were Asian-American or Latino. It should also be noted that we employed bilingual interviewers for Spanish-speaking

respondents (39 interviews were done in Spanish).

5. This hypothesis is so named for ease of exposition. Only the Southeast Asians actually came to the U.S. as political refugees.

6. Concern over communism has long been associated with support for a bigger military. This is not a logical necessity, however, and we do not want our analyses to hinge upon the extent to which attitudes about defense spending line up with anti-communism. We thus do not test the anticommunist emigré hypothesis by specifying this measure in the party direction equation, and report opinions about defense spending only as circumstantial evidence that gives the hypothesis some surface validity.

7. At least this has been the case at the national level. The civil rights revolution, however, has engendered a major, ongoing shift in partisan loyalties in the South (Petrocik, 1987).

8. The equation for the Latino subsample could specify an analogous term for Cuban-Americans, but our sample includes only five of them.

9. In a single cross-section, age and cohort are identical; individuals who are the same age have always been the same age, and so became eligible to vote at the same time. Age and cohort become increasingly decorrelated as subsequent cross-sectional observations are made, but examining a series of cross-sections introduces the problem of factoring out "period" effects, i.e., shocks to the entire distribution of the dependent variable at the time of a particular observation.

10. This assumes that immigrants have no real exposure to American party politics prior to their arrival. Because of the central role the United States plays in international affairs, it is likely that some immigrants have some information about American political parties at the time of their arrival.

11. As a further check on potential aggregation problems discussed earlier, we tested the robustness of the probit analyses reported in Tables 6 and 8 by successively removing one of the Asian nationality groups from the sample, then two at a time, and re-estimating the equations. This is admittedly not a definitive test, but we were unable to find any systematic effects resulting from this procedure.

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