UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Title

Racial Realignment and the Roots of Contemporary Polarization

Permalink

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5hq2w4jf

Author

O'Brian, Neil August

Publication Date

2020

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation

eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California

Racial Realignment and the Roots of Contemporary Polarization

By

Neil August O'Brian

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Eric Schickler, Chair
Professor Sarah Anzia
Professor Gabriel Lenz
Professor Robert Van Houweling

Summer 2020

Abstract

Racial Realignment and the Roots of Contemporary Polarization

by

Neil August O'Brian

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Eric Schickler, Chair

This dissertation argues contemporary party sorting — the phenomenon by which liberals and conservatives sorted between parties on effectively ever major policy issue in the latter part of the 20th century — is shaped by the 1960s racial realignment. I contend the parties more easily divided on issues like abortion and gun control in the 1980s-1990s, because the parties in the electorate had already divided on civil rights in the 1960s. Left-right attitudes on civil rights have long overlapped left-right divides on essentially every other major policy issue among ordinary voters. These trends date to the earliest public opinion polls and persist even among those who know little about politics. When the parties divided on race in the 1960s, pre-existing ties between civil rights and other policy views encouraged the parties to take positions on newly salient issues, such as abortion or gun control, which reinforced this racial divide.

This worked through two complimentary mechanisms. First, once the parties begin to divide on race, conservative voters on abortion or guns begin entering the Republican coalition. This creates an incentive for Republican candidates to stake conservative positions to win the party's nomination. Second, by taking conservative positions on race correlated policies such as abortion or guns, Republican candidates reinforced their appeal to conservative Democrats in the general election.

Chapter 3 uses historical public opinion dating to the 1930s to present an exhaustive analysis of issue linkages between race and policy views. I find that (1) voters that express more conservative racial views have long expressed more conservative attitudes on essentially every other major policy issue; (2) voters expressed this package of issue attitudes before the parties established positions on many now salient policies including abortion, gun control, environmentalism, women's rights and gay rights; (3) voters who do not know where the parties stand on issues still package these attitudes together.

Chapter 4 explores the role of interest groups, politicians and media figures in constructing the contemporary alignment of party and ideology. Using the development of abortion's partisan divide as a case study, I argue that because racial conservatives entered the Republican coalition before abortion became politically activated, issue overlap among ordinary voters incentivized Republicans to oppose abortion rights once

the issue gained salience. Likewise, because pro-abortion voters generally supported civil rights, once the GOP adopted a Southern strategy, this predisposed pro-choice groups to align with the Democratic party. A core argument is that pre-existing public opinion enabled activist leaders to embed the anti-abortion movement in a web of conservative causes that had become newly prominent in the Republican party. This is despite many leaders of the pro-life movement's desire to align with other liberal causes inside the Democratic party.

Chapter 5 analyzes this trend in state and sub-state level races in Southern general election contests which feature candidates that had sorted on civil rights with election contests where candidates overlap on civil rights. I find consistent evidence that attitudes towards race and civil rights propelled conservative Democrats from the Democratic party once candidates in sub-national elections had divided by racial views. In doing so, these racially conservative voters brought conservative views on other policy issues with them, too.

Chapter 6 then explores how voters who are liberal on race, but conservative on other policy dimensions, reconcile these differences. I find that these cross-pressured voters consistently update their non-racial policy views to match their pre-existing issue attitudes, but this does not happen in reverse. Finally, chapter 7 discusses the implications of this dissertation for contemporary politics in the United States and abroad.

Contents

1 Introduction **1**
- 1.1 Party Sorting: Existing Views . . . 3
- 1.2 Party Sorting: An Alternative View . . . 8
- 1.3 Outline for Dissertation . . . 11
- 1.4 Appendix: Defining Key Terms and Dates . . . 12
  - 1.4.1 Timeline of Party Positions . . . 12
  - 1.4.2 Elites versus Masses . . . 13

2 Theory: Racial Realignment and Contemporary Party Sorting **17**
- 2.1 Shifting Nature of the Party System . . . 19
- 2.2 Cascading Effect Across the Party System . . . 21
- 2.3 The Centrality of Race . . . 22
- 2.4 Mechanism for Party Sorting . . . 25
  - 2.4.1 Shifting Forces in the Primaries . . . 25
  - 2.4.2 Republicans Capture the Democrat's Conservative Wing . . . 26
- 2.5 Vote Choice and Shifting Coalitions . . . 28
- 2.6 Why Take a Position at All? . . . 31
- 2.7 A Revised Role for Elites versus the Masses . . . 33

3 Issue Connections in the Mass Public **37**
- 3.1 Data and Empirical Expectations . . . 38
- 3.2 Results . . . 38
  - 3.2.1 A Longer View . . . 40
- 3.3 Elite Learning . . . 44
  - 3.3.1 Partisan Elite Learning . . . 45
  - 3.3.2 Partisan Elite Learning through Parental Socialization . . . 47
  - 3.3.3 Learning Media Cues . . . 49
- 3.4 Discussion . . . 51
  - 3.4.1 Economic Issues . . . 51
  - 3.4.2 Explaining the Bundles . . . 52
- 3.5 Conclusion . . . 54

4 An Alternative Outcome: The Development of Abortion's Partisan Divide 57
4.1 Interest Groups . . . 58
4.1.1 Ideological Diversity in the Early Pro-Life Movement . . . 58
4.1.2 Rise of Christian Right . . . 59
4.1.3 Pro-Life Activists to the Republican Party . . . 61
4.1.4 Feminism and the Pro-Choice Movement . . . 63
4.2 Politicians . . . 64
4.2.1 Republicans . . . 64
4.2.2 Democrats . . . 65
4.3 Public Intellectuals . . . 66
4.4 Conclusion . . . 67

5 Public Opinion & Party Sorting in the States 69
5.1 General Elections . . . 70
5.1.1 Florida and North Carolina, 1968 . . . 70
5.1.2 Texas, 1964 . . . 74
5.1.3 Pooled Analysis of the U.S. South, 1964-1980 . . . 76
5.1.4 General Elections in Non-Southern States . . . 77
5.2 Primary Elections . . . 78
5.3 Conclusion & Discussion . . . 82

6 Cross Pressured Voters 85
6.1 Theory: Why Sort by Racial Attitudes? . . . 86
6.2 Mechanisms . . . 92
6.3 Alternative Explanations . . . 96
6.3.1 Partisan Identification . . . 97
6.3.2 Religiosity . . . 98
6.3.3 Urbanicity . . . 100
6.4 Conclusion . . . 100

7 Conclusion 103
7.1 Feedback Loop Between Elites and Masses . . . 104
7.2 Implications for Contemporary Politics: Trump, Republicans and Immigration Policy . . . 106
7.3 Beyond the United States . . . 109
7.4 Conclusion . . . 112

8 References 115

Chapter 1

Introduction

At the time of *Roe v. Wade*, neither national political party had adopted a platform plank on abortion rights. In fact, leading liberal Democrats including Hubert Humphrey and Ted Kennedy opposed expanding abortion rights while Republican Nelson Rockefeller was arguably liberalization's most prominent political advocate. Furthermore, leaders of the early pro-life movement were a small, ideologically diverse group of individuals, many of whom were otherwise liberal, and wanted to ally their movement with the Democratic party (O'Brian 2019; Williams 2016; Ziegler 2015). In fact, the chair of the board of the National Right to Life Committee in the early 1970s believed that peace activists, feminists and African Americans would serve as the pro-life movement's backbone (Fogg 1974). Perhaps even more surprisingly, the *Wall Street Journal* embraced the *Roe v. Wade* ruling in the early 1970s (Noel 2013, 161-162). And William F. Buckley, editor of the *National Review*, a figure many consider the father of the modern conservative movement, wrote in 1966 that labeling a fetus as a person with human rights "*...is a vision so utterly unapproachable as to suggest that the requirements of prudence and of charity intervene...*" (National Review 1966, 308).

These trend contrast the political environment today: Republican politicians oppose abortion rights, the pro-life movement closely allies with other conservative causes, and conservative media outlets loudly oppose expanding abortion rights.

This dissertation explores why the party coalitions sorted on abortion and effectively every other policy issue in the latter part of the 20th century. This has puzzled scholars because whether someone was a Democrat or a Republican in the 1950s was not predictive of their views on now major policy issues such as gun control, abortion, civil rights or defense spending (Figure 1.1A). Yet fast forward just 30 or 40 years and the parties, both in the government and the electorate, had sorted on each of these issues such that Democrats adopted what we now consider to be liberal positions across each of these issues and Republicans adopted what are now considered conservative positions across each of these issues (Figure 1.1B).

This dissertation contends that the dynamics of party sorting across so many pol-

Figure 1.1: Public Opinion: 1950-1960 versus 2016



Each variable is standardized to have a mean zero and a standard deviation of 1. Higher values reflect more conservative attitudes.

icy dimensions is rooted in the shifting nature, and historically odd structure, of the national party system in the mid-20th century. Between the New Deal and the early 1960s, the national parties held similar positions on civil rights; partisan conflict centered on government intervention in the economy while the parties largely downplayed issues of racial equality (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Schickler 2016). This was partially strategic: the diversity of racial preferences within the Democrats' New Deal coalition, which included both the white South and African Americans, meant that national Democratic leaders tried to keep civil rights off the agenda to avoid intraparty conflict. However, as the civil rights movement gained prominence, this proved to be an untenable position. In 1964, Lyndon Johnson and the national Democratic party embraced the civil rights movement and Barry Goldwater and the national Republicans absorbed the white racial backlash. In a fairly short time period, civil rights and racial equality, which had cross-cut party lines since the 1930s, had become aligned along party lines.

I argue the racial realignment had a much broader effect on party polarization; the parties were able to sort as they did on non-racial issues, like abortion and gun control in the 1980s-1990s, because the parties in the electorate had already sorted on civil rights in the 1960s. This is the central thesis of this dissertation: The parties' ability to sort on now salient issues — such as abortion, gun control and the environment — are connected to and constrained by the parties' positioning on civil rights in the 1960s.

The transformation of civil rights as a partisan issue had a profound impact on party sorting for three reasons. First, public opinion along the racial axis has long been structured: people who are more conservative on race, hold more conservative

view on effectively every other major policy issue including abortion, women's rights, gun control, the environment and defense spending. These linkages date to the earliest public opinion polls and persist even among respondents that know little about politics.[1]

Second, party leaders in the mid-20th century party system purposely tried to remove civil rights from the political agenda because it cross-cut party lines. By suppressing civil rights, party leaders inadvertently suppressed other race correlated policies that also cross cut party lines. The connection between racial attitudes and other policy views meant that the racial axis did not simply divide the Democrat's New Deal coalition between racial liberals and racial conservatives, but it quietly divided the Democrat's New Deal coalition between abortion liberals and abortion conservatives and gun liberals and gun conservatives as well. Indeed, the presence of so many abortion or gun conservatives in the Democratic party in the 1960s and 1970s was partially a byproduct of the mid-century party system designed to placate the South and other racial conservatives.

This highlights the third reason the racial realignment was central for shaping party sorting: civil rights and racial equality is capable of shaping and realigning the party system in a way few other issues have historically been able to. The national Democratic party, by abandoning their position as the party segregation – which had effectively locked the Southern United States into the Democratic party for a century – freed the region to move to the GOP.

Once the parties divided on race, this constrained party positioning on other race correlated policies. First, partisan electoral coalitions increasingly divided by race meant a growing pool of abortion and gun conservatives had quietly begun to enter the Republican party, incentivizing Republicans to adopt conservative positions on these issues to win primary contests. Second, while the 1960s racial realignment (and the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt) pushed some conservative Democrats from the party, many Southern Democrats stayed, although became increasingly wary of the national party's embrace of racial and cultural liberalism. By taking conservative positions on race correlated policies, Republicans lured these conservative Democrats to the GOP, finishing the job started by the 1960s realignment.

1.1 Party Sorting: Existing Views

Existing literature on party positioning and realignment fits into two broad categories. The first, which largely rests in classic realignment theory first put forth by V.O. Key and E.E. Schattschneider, argues that shifts in voting coalitions engender party realignment (Key 1955, 1959; Schattschneider 1960; see Mayhew 2000 for review

[1]The other primary issue cleavage in U.S. politics, economics, has not historically divided the public on other policy dimensions.

and critique of this literature).

The second set of theories, which have defined scholarly debate in recent decades, argue politicians, party leaders and activists, not voters, drive realignment and party positioning (e.g., Bawn et al. 2012; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Noel 2013; Layman et al. 2010; Miller and Schofield 2003; Aldrich 2011 and to a lesser extent Karol 2009). These theories argue elites move first, and then voters belatedly follow along.

The shift from voter-centered to elite-centered theories of parties is rooted in Carmines and Stimson's (1989) theory of "issue evolutions" which argues that politicians drive party change. In an issue evolution, parties evolve slowly over time and at critical junctures, party leaders stake their party's new position. On prominent issues, this new positioning then becomes a distinguishing cleavage between parties which trickles down to activists and finally voters: *"visible changes in elite behavior...realign the constellation of voter issue attitudes and party identifications to reflect earlier changes among the elite"* (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 162).

A crucial implication of Carmines and Stimson's theory — which they apply to the 1960s racial realignment — is that either party's electorate would have been amenable to supporting the Civil Rights movement. This flexibility of the mass public gave elites discretion to choose their position relative to the other party (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 179). Indeed, elite discretion distinguishes Carmines and Stimson's theory from the older realignment literature which views voters as the driving force (e.g., Key 1959, Schattschneider 1960, Sundquist 1973). Scholars have argued that Carmines and Stimson's account also characterizes party positioning on abortion, defense spending and the environment (e.g., Adams 1997; Lindamen and Haider-Markel 2002; Fordham 2007).

A second strand of elite centered theories, which perhaps now collectively stands as the leading theory of parties, focuses not on politicians, but interest groups and activists as the primary mover of partisan change (e.g., Layman et al. 2010; Bawn et al. 2012; Miller and Schofield 2003; Karol 2009). Although the details differ, these theories focus on policy activists who work their way into the parties and incentivize politicians to take non-centrist policy positions on their group's issue.

A key contribution of this literature is the theoretical and empirical argument that parties are polarizing across many different policy dimension at the same time (Layman et al. 2010). This contrasts classic theories of realignment which argue that realignments occur not just when voting coalitions change, but when the issue around which political conflict changes, too (Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1973, 1983). Schattschneider (1960, 62) refers to this as conflict displacement. A distinguishing feature of conflict displacement, and class realignment theory more generally, is that realignments occur when political conflict on one dominant dimension is resolved (or at least lessened), and a new cross-cutting dimension of conflict emerges. Layman et al. (2010) show this does not characterize post-1960s party coalitions: when activists concerned about new issues enter the coalition, existing activists update their position

to align with the ascendant view. Consequently, parties and their activists are not polarized on one dimension, but across a series of dimensions (Layman et al. 2010, 328-329). The activists' non-centrist positions induces candidates in the parties respective primaries to take non-centrist positions across a series of policies. This elite created conflict is then eventually communicated to, and absorbed by, the mass public.

Bawn et al. (2012), come to a similar conclusion, but through a different mechanism. Rather than focusing only on party activists, their theoretical focus rests on interest groups or "intense policy demanders." To receive the nomination, politicians must appeal to various policy demanding groups in the coalition. Realignments, and party positioning more generally, occur when new policy-demanding groups work their way into the party, incentivizing candidates to adopt the group's position in order to gain the party's nomination. This collection of policy demanders not only defines the parties' positions, but defines the ideological space (Bawn et al. 2012, 575). The linchpin of this activist driven theory is that voters do not pay attention to politics, which allows parties to operate in a "blind spot" and adopt positions not held by ordinary voters.

Collectively, this set of scholarship views party positioning across a variety of issues, either implicitly or explicitly, as a series of decisions made by political elites that are unrelated to the mass public. The very lack of pressure exerted by voters allows party leaders or activists to go in either the liberal or conservative direction on each issue as it arises. When polarization was at its low point in the 1960s, these theories suggest, many different coalitions could have potentially formed. For example, Carmines and Stimson's theory, which scholars have used to explain party positioning on civil rights, abortion and defense spending, collectively implies that the reason Democrats line up to the left on each of these issues is the consequence of a series of unrelated decisions made by political leaders. On any one of these issues, this literature claims, Democratic leaders could have led the party to the right (e.g., Adams 1997; Fordham 2007).

Likewise, Bawn et al. (2012) contend that Republicans are the pro-life party because anti-abortion activists worked their way into the Republican party, but could have just as easily entered the Democratic party. Applying this process over various interest groups suggests that many different party coalitions could have formed.

The argument that elites drive partisan divides marshals some compelling evidence. First, there is no correlation between party identification and attitudes on abortion, defense spending and civil rights until after party elites established clear positions (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Adams 1997; Fordham 2007).

For example, Figure 1.2 shows the long term relationship between attitudes on issues of women's rights (e.g., abortion, Equal Rights Amendment, women's role in society) with party identification. Scholars argue that when the national parties first divided on abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment in 1980, national party leaders had a choice on whether to adopt a liberal or conservative position because the relationship between party identification and attitudes on issues of women's rights was effectively zero (e.g., Adams 1997; Karol 2009). The national Republicans moved to the right,

Figure 1.2: Correlates: Issues of Women's Rights



Left panel plots the correlation between party identification and an index of issues of women's rights (including abortion rights, Equal Rights Amendment, women's role in society). Right panel plots the correlation between issues of women's rights and an index of economic attitudes (e.g., government guaranteed health insurance, taxation, etcetera).

the national Democrats to the left, and the parties in the electorate followed along a decade later.

The second broad piece of evidence used to suggest that voters did not drive partisan divides is that the relationship between economic issues, which defined partisan conflict in the post-New Deal era, have historically had little relationship with other policy attitudes, such as abortion (Sanbonmatsu 2002, 60; Noel 2013; Layman et al. 2010, 328). Figure 1.2 shows the long-term relationship between attitudes on economic issues (e.g., taxation, government health insurance, etcetera) and issues of women's rights. Not until the late 1990s do economic issues and matters of gender equality become consistently linked. Scholars argue the national parties in 1980 had a choice on which way to go on abortion because the relationship between economic issues — which defined New Deal party conflict — and abortion was effectively zero. Indeed, the trend in Figure 1.2 suggests the parties divided as they did, and voters follow along two decades later.

The third broad piece of evidence used to argue that voters are not driving party change is that a large body of literature on U.S. public opinion argues that the mass public pays little attention to politics, voters lack genuine attitudes on policies, and voters do not have a coherent "ideology" (e.g., Lenz 2012; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992; Converse 1964). By ideology, scholars often mean that knowing someone's position on economic intervention in the economy is not informative of views on abortion or gun control (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017, 18).

Whether voters cluster attitudes together has important implications for the health of American democracy: parties adopt positions over a range of issues, and whether or not voters hold a similar collection of issue positions conveys whether institutions are representative of voters. As Converse first noted in his 1964 essay, voters do not

cluster issue positions together: *"large portions of the electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial periods of time"* (Converse 2006, 51). Furthermore, to the extent the public does link issues together, they do so by learning what goes with what from political elites (Converse 2006, 9). When new issues become salient, even if they are unrelated to existing dimensions of conflict, "elites that are known on some other grounds to be 'liberal' or 'conservative' ferret out some limited aspect of an issue for which they can argue some liberal-conservative relevance and begin to drift to one of the alternative positions in disproportionate numbers" (Converse 2006, 67). For example, Noel (2012) argues that public intellectuals — referring to political thinkers in the media or academia — packaged together economic redistribution and racial equality as a liberal ideology in the 1910s, decades before these views were bundled together in Congressional roll call votes.

Lenz (2012) forcefully demonstrates this process. Using survey panels that span shifts in partisan communications, Lenz finds that when voters learn about a candidate's new (changed) position, they are much more likely to update their policy views to align with the preferred candidate's position than change their evaluation of the candidate. These findings are troubling for democratic accountability: rather than voting for the candidate that agrees with the, on policy, people tend to adopt the positions of the candidates they already preferred. This effect varies across issues, though. When an issue is salient, voters are more likely to change parties than adjust their issue position. When an issue is not salient, voters are more likely change their policy attitudes to align with their party (Carsey and Layman 2006). [2]

Political information plays a critical role in the dissemination of elite signals. The most informed and politically aware segment of the public have "structured" opinions, and structure declines as political information decreases (Converse 1964; Noel 2013; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). The ideological segmentation of the mass public results from politically aware individuals who are more likely to receive and accept messages from like-minded elites and reject messages that do not conform with their predispositions. Conversely, individuals with little political awareness either never receive communications at all, or cannot screen the messages they do receive, leaving them with conflicting values (Zaller 1992). For example, a high information and politically aware liberal knows to reject messages from Fox News and accept messages from MSNBC, while a low-information liberal does not. This leaves the low information liberal with a pool of liberal and conservative ideas to sample from when forming their political beliefs. As various scholars have written, the public does not pay great attention to

[2] Most scholarship on top-down theories of opinion leadership acknowledge this variation; "easy issues" like abortion or race, dampen the power of elite cues (Lenz 2012, 222; Converse 1964, 46). Despite the public's varying willingness to accept elite cues, top-down theories of party positioning and sorting are applied to highly charged emotional issues including abortion, civil rights, gun control and women's rights (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Adams 1997; Karol 2009; Bawn et al. 2012).

politics and thus possesses limited political information (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992). Consequently, very few people have structured attitudes. Furthermore, the structured attitudes that do exist among the mass public, "often [turn] out to be just a rather mechanical reflection of what their favorite group and party leaders have instructed them to think" (Achen and Bartels 2017, 12).

This is a provocative claim because not only are voters not shaping the party system above them, it appears the process works in reverse. Elites establish positions and voters mimic them. It also offers a parsimonious theory for explaining contemporary sorting and polarization. If liberal elites are telling voters to be pro-choice, pro-environment and pro-gun control, it is fairly simple to understand why voters have sorted into their respective camp — by following elite cues. Without elite signals, this process becomes less clear. Indeed, if voters pay little attention to politics, or lack real preferences, what process allows voters to sort on so many different issues (e.g., Levendusky 2009)? This dissertation creates a model that places voters as central for understanding party sorting and polarization.

1.2 Party Sorting: An Alternative View

The predominant view on parties and polarization is that political elites (politicians, interest group leaders, activists and media figures) create partisan divides which are then belatedly absorbed by voters (e.g., Bawn et al. 2012; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Levendusky 2009; Layman et al. 2010; Noel 2013). These theories not only place analytical focus on political elites, but dismiss the role of voters by arguing the mass public lacks the capacity to exert pressure on the party system.

This dissertation shifts from current theories of party sorting and polarization in four important ways. First, I argue the parties' ability to sort on now salient issues such as abortion or gun control were not unrelated decisions made by elites, but shaped by the positions parties' took on civil rights and racial equality in the 1960s. Once the parties' electoral coalitions polarize on race in the 1960s, pre-existing ties between civil rights and other issue attitudes among ordinary voters constrained the parties' ability to divide as they did on other issues, too. Contemporary polarization is rooted in, and constrained by, the positions parties took on civil rights in the 1960s.

While I focus on a single critical juncture — the 1960s racial realignment — the theoretical point is broader: the parties' ability to position on newly salient issues is constrained if 1) a party has positioned on a deeply felt issue that itself is capable of realigning the party system and 2) that core issue cleavage overlaps other, minor issue dimensions in the electorate. Civil rights and race fits each of these criteria. First, race has played a profound role in shaping the party system in ways that few, if any, other issues have. Second, attitudes on civil rights are structured: people who hold

more conservative racial views have long held more conservative views on other policy issues. This has been an enduring feature of U.S. public opinion.

The second broad departure from existing accounts of party sorting is that I place policy preferences of ordinary voters as fundamental for understanding the transformation of the contemporary party system. The leading accounts of party sorting and coalition formation dismiss the role of voters and place analytical focus on politicians, activists or the media. Furthermore, theories of polarization that do focus on voters, downplay the role of policy preferences and emphasize identity (e.g., Mason 2018) or other psychological variants (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2018).

As I discuss in 3, the cluster of issues that are now seen in national party platforms have existed in the mass public dating to the earliest public opinion polls. This pre-existing structure of public opinion shaped the ability of the parties to position on new issues when they gained political salience.

Figure 1.3: Issues of Women's Rights & Racial Attitudes



To illustrate the enduring relationship between race and other policy views, and its potential to influence party competition, Figure 1.3 plots the long-term relationship between issues of women's rights and racial attitudes (broadly defined to include civil rights, aid to minorities, affirmative action, etcetera). If scholars only examined public opinion after 1980, top down theories would suggest that the reason conservative attitudes on issues of women's rights go with conservative racial attitudes is because party leaders had divided on both abortion and civil rights by 1980, and voters were following the leader. Likewise, elite driven theories suggest that before 1980, because the parties were not sending clear signals on both issues, the relationship should fall to zero or fluctuate. Yet a similar constellation of attitudes exist before 1980, too. Indeed, going all the way to 1937, issues of women's rights and racial equality have been linked. This aligns much more with a bottom-up view where trends first emerge in public opinion, and then when abortion and the women's rights movement become

politically salient, a similar trend emerges among the parties, too.

In this revised version of party sorting, elites and masses act in a circular fashion. First, latent divides exist prior to politicians (or parties) taking clear positions on issues. Second, when an issue becomes politically activated, party elites send clear signals on their position; signals which are informed by latent opinion among their (potential) constituencies. Third, elite signals then strengthen the pre-existing divides in the mass public by catering to some constituent's views and pushing away or converting that attitudes of others.

A core point is that elites can influence public opinion consistent with top-down accounts, but elite cues are often endogenous to what elites perceive will be popular among their supporters (Zaller 2012, 571; Arnold 1992; Key 1961). When new issues emerge onto the agenda, politicians calculate how latent opinion — referring to a set of inchoate attitudes that are not yet politically salient — when activated, will influence their support (e.g., Key 1961, Ch. 11). In other words, elite cues are not random to public opinion. Consequently, the fact that elites can shape public opinion is less damaging to understanding our democratic process than some accounts of parties and democratic accountability would suggest (e.g., Achen and Bartels 2017).

For example, politicians racialized policies like crime and drugs, but these political appeals articulated what many already believed. Indeed, Richard Nixon criminalized marijuana and other drugs because they were used by groups perceived to be his political opponents. John Ehrlichman, a Nixon advisor made this explicit: "The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people...by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities" (Baum 2016). While Nixon's campaign sharpened and raised salience of the public's linking between race and support for criminalizing specific drugs, these appeals reinforced already nascent opinion (see chapter 3).

This circular theory of elite signals extends to leaders of interest groups and social movements as well. While mid-level leaders such as Jerry Falwell sharpened public opinion under-neath them, the very appeals these leaders made were reactive to which issues generated attention among ordinary people. Some group leaders surveyed voters to find out what issues and frames would generate support, and then organized campaigns around messages they had learned would generate interest (Weyrich to Kamer, July 16, 1981). Other leaders accidentally stumbled on issues. For example, Phyllis Schlafly, a leading opponent of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the 1970s, began working on the ERA only when she accidentally discovered the issue generated grassroots support (Critchlow 2018, 217). Although Schlafly's involvement shaped discussion of the Equal Rights Amendment, her very involvement was a response to mass level forces.

Indeed, when elite forces tried to organize against prevailing trends, they often stumbled. For example, many founders of the pro-life movement were otherwise liberal

and tried to connect opposition to abortion with progressive causes such as civil rights and the anti-Vietnam movement (Williams 2016). However, building a pro-life movement in progressive circles meant trying to connect issues that did not (on average) already "go together" among ordinary people. The issue connections of these early activists never gained traction. (For further discussion, see chapter 4.)

A third contribution of this dissertation is re-conceptualizing race and civil rights as a core electoral cleavage in the 1960s and 1970s. This differs from a scholarship that generally uses party identification, or economic cleavages, as primary fault lines. Measuring electoral cleavages in the 1960s-1980s by party identification is misleading because the electorate was realigning, first on account of civil rights, and then Vietnam. As the electorate shifted, partisanship weakened in the 1970s: The number of Independents was high and many Southern Democrats, who still identified as such, began supporting Republican candidates. Consequently, measuring electoral cleavages along party lines does not accurately portray who voters, interest groups or politicians viewed as their allies or opponents.

Conceptualizing race as a core electoral cleavage in this era aids the understanding of why the parties sorted as they did in the latter part of the 20th century. By examining policy attitudes along party lines, the fact that the parties sorted as they did seems arbitrary as no strong relationship existed in the 1960s between party identification and now salient issues such as abortion or gun control (e.g., Fig. 1.1). However, racial liberals and conservatives had already bundled their racial views with liberal and conservative views on abortion, gun control and a range of other issues. Consequently, viewing party sorting across a range of issues as shaped by a single event, rather than a series of unrelated decisions, makes understanding how the parties line up as they did less mysterious. Of course, many interest groups, politicians and events shaped polarization, but as I discuss in chapter 4, the pre-existing structure of public opinion created an environment that made it easier for some coalitions rather than others to form.

A fourth contribution of this dissertation is that a party system polarized by views on racial equality generally coincides with a party system that is deeply divided across many other policy domains as well. If the US party system froze in 1960, the parties would be divided along economic lines, but be able to find compromise on gun control, climate change and advancing gender equality (Karol 2009, 2019). Yet once the parties sorted on race, this made it easier for the parties to divide on these other issues, as well. This narrowed the window for the parties to find any compromise at all.

1.3 Outline for Dissertation

Chapter 2 delves deeper in the theoretical mechanisms and empirical trends that place the racial realignment at the center of party polarization. Chapter 3 then uses

historical public opinion dating to the 1930s to present an exhaustive analysis of issue linkages between race and policy views. I find that holding conservative racial views is predictive of having conservative views on effectively every other policy issue among the mass public. These linkages date to the earliest public opinion polls and persist even among those who know little about politics.

Chapter 4 explores the role of interest groups, politicians and media figures in constructing the contemporary alignment of party and ideology. Using the development of abortion's partisan divide as a case study, I argue that pre-existing public opinion enabled activist leaders to embed the anti-abortion movement in a web of conservative causes that had become newly prominent in the Republican party. This is despite early activist leaders' reluctance to do so.

Chapter 5 uses under-utilized state public opinion polls to analyze state and sub-state level races in Southern general election contests which feature candidates that had sorted on civil rights with election contests where candidates overlap on civil rights. I find consistent evidence that attitudes towards and race and civil rights propelled conservative Democrats from the Democratic party once candidates in sub-national elections had sorted by racial views. In doing so, these voters brought conservative attitudes on other policies with them, even before candidates explicitly campaigned on those issues.

Chapter 6 then explores how voters who are liberal on race, but conservative on other policy dimensions, reconcile these differences. I find that cross-pressured voters consistently update their non-racial policy views to match their pre-existing issue attitudes, but this does not happen in reverse. Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications of this dissertation for contemporary politics in the United States and abroad.

1.4 Appendix: Defining Key Terms and Dates

1.4.1 Timeline of Party Positions

An important element of this story is the sequence in which the parties divided on issues. Figure 1.4 tracks changes in presidential party platforms over the 20th century. I briefly summarize a time-line for party positioning across various issues below (See Karol (2009) for a more thorough overview).

The mid-century party platforms omitted some policy questions completely and lacked distinct positions on other issues. On civil rights, the national Republican party was to the left of the Democrats until 1948, when national Democrats first adopted a civil rights plank. The parties then held similar positions on civil rights until 1964, when Lyndon Johnson and national Democrats moved to the left and Republicans to the right on civil rights (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 38-39).

When the national parties took distinct positions (or a position at all) on other newly salient issues in the 1970s and 1980s is less clear. As late as 1972, both parties

favored some sort of gun control and environmental regulation. Likewise, both parties supported the Equal Rights Amendment between 1944 and 1976. Contrast these policy positions with the 1980 platform where the Republicans adopt clearly conservative positions vis-a-vis the Democratic party on gun control, the environment and women's rights. Neither party had a plank on abortion before 1976, but by 1980 the Republican party platform clearly stood to the right of Democrats. Democrats first included very brief language about protecting discrimination based on sexual orientation in 1980 and the national Republican party platform omitted a statement on gay rights until 1992, at which point Republicans adopted the more conservative position.

This said, there are complications to understanding when national parties adopted positions. For example, the Republican party moved rightwards on environmentalism under Reagan, but George H.W. Bush assembled a fairly liberal environmental agenda, highlighted by the 1990 Clean Air Act. On defense spending, although Republicans are more conservative than Democrats by the early 1970s, Democrats and Carter made efforts to appear hawkish in the 1980 election. Furthermore, defense spending in this era cannot be abstracted from partisan divisions over Vietnam (Alrich 2011). And although both parties supported some sort of gun control until 1972, the Republican party by 1968 saw this effort as a responsibility of the states and was implicitly opposed to sweeping federal laws.[3] This said, more congressional Republicans than Democrats voted for the 1968 Gun Control Act (Karol 2009, 84).

1.4.2 Elites versus Masses

This dissertation distinguishes between elites and mass level forces. By mass level forces, I am generally referring to voters or people in the mass-electorate, regardless of their voting status. Scholarship on public opinion further breaks down the mass electorate between the engaged/informed versus disengaged/uninformed public (e.g., Abramowitz 2018; Converse 1964). Chapter 3 delves into these distinctions in greater detail (I find the initial trends in public opinion are observed among both the informed and uninformed segments of the mass public).

By elite forces, much of the dissertation refers to elites in the context of national political leaders, in part because that is a major distinction in the literature: politicians or voters (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Levendusky 2009). But there are many different forms of political leaders, and so I also include media figures and leaders of interest groups and social movements as elites, too.

While a clear line distinguishes politicians and media figures as "elites," the inclusion of social movement leaders as elites is more complicated. When do ordinary voters and citizens become something more? Scholars have labeled interest group leaders as "mid-level" actors because they neither have the prominence of national political or media figures, but clearly possess a role different from the rank-and-file (e.g., Pierson

[3]Thank you to Matt Lacombe for pointing out this distinction.

and Schickler 2020). In general, I refer to interest group leaders as those who have built or led prominent political movements or whom journalists and scholars identify as leading figures. For example, Paul Weyrich, a founding member of the Religious Right, is considered some sort of political elite because he built a social movement that reached a large number of ordinary citizens. Scholarship sometimes ascribes mid-level leaders like Weyrich with the ability to shape public opinion. But Weyrich and other notable activists like Phyllis Schlafly and Jerry Falwell possess an important characteristic: they were not always movement leaders. Likewise, those that provided the leg-work for their conservative social movements were not always "activists." Paul Weyrich, for example, in the late 1960s was an unknown Senate aide who operated in relative obscurity through the first half of the 1970s before being widely recognized as a leading figure of the New Right.

Finally, it is worth emphasizing that ordinary voters can be parts of groups – by definition, all people are part of group. Yet groups in a political sense — and who a literature suggest have outsized influence compared to ordinary voters — are part of a self-aware group that share intense concerns about issues (Karol 2009, 9). For example, protestant evangelicals are broadly a political group, but there is a clear distinction between evangelicals generally, and those that are actively involved in the Christian Right. This dissertation generally takes the position that evangelicals as a collection of rank-and-file voters, with a subset of them operating as a group with intense policy demands. Both are important for understanding party sorting.

Figure 1.4: Timeline of Party Platforms

Year	1944	1948	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996
GAY RIGHTS	NO POSITION												PARTY PLATFORMS TAKE DISTINCT POSITIONS ON GAY RIGHTS	
ENVIRON-MENT	NO POSITION			PARTY PLATFORMS SIMILAR ON ENVIRONMENT						PARTY PLATFORMS TAKE DISTINCT POSITIONS ON ENVIRONMENT				
ABORTION	NO POSITION									PARTY PLATFORMS TAKE DISTINCT POSITIONS ON ABORTION				
E.R.A.	BOTH PARTY PLATFORMS SUPPORT ERA									PARTY PLATFORMS TAKE DISTINCT POSITIONS ON ERA/WOMEN'S EQUALITY				
GUN CONTROL	NO POSITION						PARTY PLATFORMS SIMILAR ON GUN CONTROL			PARTY PLATFORMS TAKE DISTINCTIVE POSITION ON GUN CONTROL				
DEFENSE SPENDING						PARTY PLATFORMS SIMILAR ON DEFENSE SPENDING		PARTY PLATFORMS TAKE (GENERALLY) DISTINCT POSITIONS ON DEFENSE SPENDING						
CIVIL RTS	GOP LEFT OF DEMOCRATS	PARTY PLATFORMS SIMILAR ON CIVIL RTS				PARTY PLATFORMS TAKE DISTINCT POSITIONS ON CIVIL RIGHTS								

Chapter 2

Theory: Racial Realignment and Contemporary Party Sorting

Existing theories of parties generally approach party positioning across unrelated policy dimensions as unrelated events. These theories assume, implicitly or explicitly, that a party's existing policy positions do not constrain positioning on ostensibly distinct dimensions. For example, while the Democratic party's position on labor constrained their positions on tariffs, as trade policy effects labor groups (Karol 2009), scholarship has not addressed whether a party's position on labor constrains the party's position on gun control. This stems from three factors. First, classic realignment theory argues that realignments occur when a new issue dimension cross-cuts, and displaces, an existing issue dimension (e.g., Schattschneider 1960; Sundquist 1983). Second, a newer generation of literature on parties views party platforms as bargained by elites who are motivated either by winning office or advancing their own policy, and thus willing to work with different coalitions (e.g., Layman et al. 2010; Bawn et al. 2012; Carmines and Stimson 1989). Third, and relatedly, a literature on U.S. public opinion argues the mass public lacks structured belief systems: whether someone is conservative on one issue does not predict that person holding conservative positions on other dimensions (e.g., Kinder and Kalmoe 2017; Achen and Bartels 2017). Consequently, with respect to the electorate, a party's position on economic issues does not constrain their ability to position on the environment or abortion.

This chapter argues that the parties' ability to position across various issues are often not isolated events, but constrained by existing issue cleavages that have already been absorbed into the party system. Specifically, the partisan divisions on race and civil rights that emerged in the 1960s created a set of constraints for party positioning on political issues that gained salience in the 1970s and 1980s. This theory relies on the fact that not all issues are created equal. A party's existing policy position generally constrains the party's ability to position on newly salient issues when two conditions are met. First, the party has taken a position on a deeply felt issue that itself is capable

of realigning the party system and second, the core issue cleavage overlaps other, minor issue dimensions in the electorate.

Attitudes on race and civil rights meet each of these conditions. First, public opinion along the racial axis is structured: people who are more racially progressive have long held what we today consider liberal positions on gun control or abortion. As Figure 2.1 previews, this is true across effectively every major policy issue and as I show in chapter 3, dates to the earliest pubic opinion polls and persists even among respondents that know little about politics. Second, race and civil rights represents a core social cleavage that has profoundly shaped the party system.

Figure 2.1: Linkages between Racial Attitudes and Other Policy Views, 1972



A positive coefficient means people who are more conservative on matters of racial equality also hold more conservative views on the policy listed on the left hand side.

In this framework, the newly formed partisan cleavage around race created a set of opportunities and constraints for the parties to position on other issues, too. Once the U.S. South moved to the Republican party, a transformation that initially began on account of race and civil rights, the region's conservative predispositions on guns, abortion, gay rights and the environment constrained the GOP's ability to position on these issues, too.

2.1 Shifting Nature of the Party System

The dynamics of party sorting are rooted in the shifting nature, and historically odd structure, of the national party system in the mid-20th century. Entering the 1960s, the national parties held similar positions on civil rights and partisan conflict centered on government intervention in the economy (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Schickler 2016). This was partially strategic: the diversity of racial preferences within the Democrat's New Deal coalition, which included both the white South and African Americans, meant that national Democratic leaders tried to downplay civil rights to avoid intra-party conflict.

However, increasing pressure from an expanding civil rights movement upended this equilibrium. As the number of minorities and racial liberals entered the Democratic party, civil rights could no longer be ignored. Fearing a primary challenge from the left, Democrat Lyndon Johnson saw embracing racial minorities as essential. Simply winning the South would be insufficient to gain the party's nomination (Schickler 2016, 232).

The civil rights movement presented an opportunity for Republicans, too. The Democrats leftwards shift on civil rights alienated the white South and socially conservative blue-collar workers. Conservative operatives believed that (white) blue-collar and white-collar workers, despite holding divergent economic preferences, could be united by a cross-class opposition to the racial (and later cultural) liberalism of the 1960s (Scammon and Wattenberg 1970; Phillips 1969; Rusher 1975). Some strategists believed this was not just an opportunity, but essential for the Republican party to survive: the GOP had become the de facto minority party since the 1930s and campaigning on economic conservativism alone would maintain this status.

Republicans had eyed the political South for decades as a means to expand their coalition. By the 1936 election, conservatives already saw the shift of African Americans to the Democratic party as an opportunity for the region to to create an inter-party conservative coalition with Republicans.[1] This possibility grew through the 1940s and 1950s. Truman's embrace of civil rights towards the end of his first term and the National Democratic party's adoption of a civil rights platform in 1948 further propelled the opening of the South, if not to the Republican party, as a region up for grabs (see Figure 2.2). In the 1950s Eisenhower capitalized on this through launching "Operation Dixie," an effort to build a Southern Republican party in the economically developing region by appealing to a growing upper-class and Southern business community (Schickler 2016, 247-55). And by the early 1960s, calculating that African-Americans had become locked up by the Democratic party, Goldwater and his backers sought the party's nomination through winning delegates in the South and West by messaging

[1] The post-New Deal conservative coalition united Republicans and Southern Democrats largely on opposition to labor (Katznelson, Geiger and Kryder 1993). Opposition to Civil Rights remained largely a Southern concern.

that civil rights was a state, not a national level problem (Schickler 2016, 259).

Figure 2.2: Presidential Vote Choice by Region



In 1964 the national parties did not simply divide on civil rights, but race and civil rights became a core axis of national electoral coalitions (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Sundquist 1983; Scammon and Wattenburg 1970). Part of this is because fights over race had nationalized by the end of the 1960s: while opposition to basic civil and voting rights for African Americans were rooted in the South, opposition to busing, affirmative action and implicitly racial social policies, such as crime, were campaign issues that could build a strong national coalition (Lowndes 2008, chapter 4).

While 1964 marked a critical juncture for party elites, scholars argue these elite shifts were belated responses to electoral change that had been occurring since the Great Depression (Chen, Mickey and Van Houweling 2008; Schickler 2016). At the mass level, the shift in Southern support away from the Democratic party is much more concentrated in the 1948 Dixiecrat revolt (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 34). Between 1932 and 1944, around 80 percent of the South voted for the Democratic candidate; in 1948 that number fell to 40%. Although Southern Democratic support rose again in the 1950s to roughly 50 percent, the party had lost nearly a third of the support it received during the pre-World War II era. Among African Americans, a sizeable shift from the Republican to the Democratic party was rooted in the New Deal. By 1950s, even though the national parties held similar positions on civil rights, blacks were already 20 to 30 percentage points more likely to identify as Democrat versus Republican (Schickler 2016, 143).

These trends align with scholarship that argues shifting voting coalitions both preceded and constrained national party positioning on civil rights (e.g., Chen, Mickey and Van Houweling 2008; Schickler 2016). Consequently, the 1964 racial realignment was not an open-ended decision (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989), but largely predetermined by structural forces. And even if the white South did not immediately flip over to the Democratic party in 1964, the national Democratic party's abandonment of staunchly opposing civil rights, which had kept the region firmly in the Democratic column for over a century, upset this equilibrium and allowed the South to sort between

parties (Kuziemko and Washington 2018).

2.2 Cascading Effect Across the Party System

Party change on civil rights had a cascading effect across the party system. The racial axis did not simply divide the Democrat's New Deal coalition between racial liberals and racial conservatives, but it quietly divided the Democrat's New Deal coalition between abortion liberals and abortion conservatives and gun liberals and gun conservatives as well (and so on). The presence of so many abortion or gun conservatives in the Democratic party in the 1960s and 1970s was partially a byproduct of the mid-century party system designed to placate the South and other racial conservatives. For example, in 1972, 67% of the white South opposed abortion beyond traumatic circumstances compared to just 56% of whites outside the South. Likewise, 61% of the white South opposed laws require firearm registration compared to just 45% outside the South (see Fig 2.3).

Figure 2.3: Policy Attitudes by Region



Blue bars is public opinion in the white North, orange bars are public opinion in the white South. Higher values are more conservative.

When the national parties began to realign on race, they quietly began to realign on other policy dimensions, too. I say quietly because in 1964, abortion or gun control are not nationally salient issues. This is a key point: when they did become salient,

pro-choice voters are predisposed to the Democratic party and pro-life voters are predisposed to the Republican party. Once the national parties had divided on race, the structure of public opinion along this racial axis narrowed the ability of the parties to position on other issues that became salient afterwards.

An important part of this transformation is the passive role of the economic cleavage; it did not act as a countervailing force. Table 3.3 in Chapter 3 shows that many now salient issues such as abortion or crime lack a meaningful relationship to economic attitudes among ordinary voters in the 1960s and 1970s. This makes the activation of race as a partisan cleavage so critical. To illustrate the importance of the racial cleavage, consider a political world with three policy issues: abortion, race and economic issues. Assume the relationship between economic attitudes and abortion is effectively zero (see Table 3.3; Layman and Carsey 2002), but that racial conservatives hold more conservative economic and abortion views.

In scenario A (Figure 2.4), civil rights has not been activated as a partisan cleavage (e.g., the South stays in the Democratic party) and the parties perfectly divide along economic lines. Furthermore, assume economic attitudes are perfectly orthogonal to abortion attitudes. With respect to the Republican's economic position, activists or party leaders could take the party in either direction and cross-pressure the same number of voters along the economic cleavage. Although a stylistic example, a literature argues that because partisan allegiances fall along economic lines in the 1970s and 1980s, and because the economic liberals and conservatives do not meaningfully differ on abortion, party positioning on abortion is open ended (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Layman et al. 2010).

Now consider hypothetical scenario B (Figure 2.5) where a racial cleavage engenders a partisan realignment such that the parties in the electorate divide perfectly by attitudes towards civil rights. Furthermore, assume that those who are conservative on civil rights are also more conservative on abortion. Now what happens when abortion becomes politically activated? As electoral divides on race and abortion overlap, when abortion becomes salient, anti-abortion voters are already inside the Republican party and pro-abortion voters are already inside the Democratic party. Consequently, it becomes less costly for Republicans to oppose abortion rights and easier for pro-life interest groups to work inside the Republican party.

2.3 The Centrality of Race

Once the national parties had divided on race, the structure of public opinion along this racial axis narrowed the ability of the parties to position on other issues that became salient afterwards.

One reason why this racial axis is so important is because public opinion is structured: racial conservatives are conservative on effectively every other major policy

Figure 2.4: Scenario A: Abortion Gains Salience Before Racial Realignment



Figure 2.5: Scenario B: Abortion Gains Salience After Racial Realignment



dimension. Yet there is another reason civil rights is so central: it is capable of realigning the party system. For an issue to realign the party system, many people need to care deeply about the issue and be willing to change parties on account of that policy. Sundquist (1983, 41) writes, "For an issue to shatter a party system and create a new one, it clearly must arise from a grievance that is both broad and deep, that a large number of people feel fervently about it." Not only did voters widely have opinions on race, Figure 2.6 shows that 61% of respondents in the early 1960s ranked it as "the most important problem." This combination of factors made civil rights a realigning issue. Once this cleavage gets absorbed into the party system, it constrains the other types of appeals parties can make. In other words, the parties did not simply divide on race, but it became a core organizing axis for electoral coalitions (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Sundquist 1983).

Whether other issues rise to this level is less clear. Compare racial policy to abortion policy, an extremely important social issue: The highest percent of respondents listing abortion as the most important problem occurred around the 2000 election and amount to less than 3% of the electorate. While scholars have shown that voters change their party on abortion when it is salient to them (e.g., Carsey and Layman 2006; Killian

Figure 2.6: Most Important Problem, by Issue



Percent of people identifying an issue as the most important problem on open-ended questions. Data compiled from Heffingtonton et al. (2017).

and Wilcox 2008), only a small number of respondents identity abortion as the most important issue.[2] Looking over a range of other issues central to the culture wars including gay rights, gender and climate change are rarely top issues. In context of party sorting, this is what makes race so central. If abortion or climate change gained salience prior to the racial realignment, although conservative abortion attitudes overlap conservative attitudes on other non-economic dimensions (O'Brian 2019), it is not clear that the issue would fundamentally reshape the party system on its own.

The economy and war are the only other factors that rise to the salience of the 1960s civil rights movement. While the economy has consistently engendered realignments over U.S. history, public opinion with respect to economic attitudes is fairly unstruc-

[2]It is possible that while the civil rights movement incurred critical junctures that prompted more immediate splits, divides on abortion occurred much more slowly as a younger generation replaced an older cohort of voters and in doing so, brought other issue attitudes with them (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Adams 1997; Stoker and Jennings 2008). Some evidence suggests that abortion gradually reshaped the electorate in the 2000s — an era where culture war issues like gay rights and abortion were more prevalent than fights over ethnicity (Highton 2020), but these effects are reinforcing already existing divides rather than creating new ones.

tured (meaning those that hold conservative economic views are as likely to hold either liberal or conservative attitudes on other policy issues). Consequently, when parties have historically realigned on economic issues, these transformations produce less rigid alignments on other dimensions. Various wars, notably Vietnam, have contributed to party realignment and have left deep scars. However, unlike the economy or civil rights, the actual issue falls off the agenda and the long term effects are less clear.

The second reason the racial axis plays such a central role is that opposition to civil rights kept the South in the Democratic party for a century. The national Democratic party's clear abandonment of the issue freed the Southern region to migrate to the Republican party which had, for some time, allied with Southern Democrats on certain issues and by 1964 made clearly conservative racial appeals. Whether any issue other than civil rights could have similarly dislodged the Southern United states from the Democratic party is unlikely. I empirically explore this question in Chapter 5.

2.4 Mechanism for Party Sorting

2.4.1 Shifting Forces in the Primaries

The racial realignment shifted the parties' voting coalitions and created a new set of opportunities for politicians to position on other race correlated policies. Once the national parties begin to divide on race, conservative voters on abortion or guns begin entering the Republican (Democratic) coalition creating a growing incentive for Republican (Democratic) candidates to stake conservative (liberal) positions to win the party's nomination.

This dynamic played out across both party primaries in the 1970s. On the Democratic side, the party's shrinking Southern wing meant the types of issue appeals that could secure a path to the party's nomination had changed. For example, in the 1972 Democratic primary, Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson, although not a hardcore conservative, expressed hawkish positions on Vietnam and defense spending, opposed busing, emphasized law and order and expressed disdain for the Democratic party's growing liberal constituencies. One journalist wrote that Jackson's campaign treated the Democrat's liberal wing as a passing fad: "They could not see that a revolution had occurred" (Kaufman 2000, 312). Being a Vietnam hawk, which was a (marginally) tenable position just four years earlier, had become a campaign liability in the Democratic party's increasingly liberal wing. Jackson's campaign for the nomination in 1972, which had started with optimism, fizzled out. Compare Jackson's campaign with more strategic candidates, who shifted left. Hubert Humphrey softened his pro-Vietnam stance in the 1972 primary and Ted Kennedy, who while campaigning for his Senate seat in 1970 opposed abortion, moved leftward on the issue in the early 1970s, presumably as he forecast the position's currency among liberals in the party's primary (Lader Papers, undated memo).

Jimmy Carter's nomination in 1976 illustrated that even walking a middle line was a risky primary strategy. As Governor of Georgia, Carter had a Southern base, but the party's shifting landscape required him to cater to the Democrat's growing liberal wing. Carter took moderate positions across issues and used his initially low profile in the primaries to obfuscate. For example, Carter took pro-choice positions in New York but pro-life positions in the South (Kaufman 2000, 324). Although successful in 1976, Carter's coalition proved untenable. In 1980, as a sitting president, he faced a fierce challenge in the primary from Ted Kennedy, fueled by the party's growing liberal wing upset at Carter's moderation. And in the general, many of the white Southerners and evangelicals that supported him in 1976, moved to the Republican party.

On the Republican side, Reagan's insurgent success in 1976 and then victory in 1980 illustrated the conservative wing's growing strength over the GOP's northeastern establishment. Reagan's ability to challenge a sitting president with such success, even under odd circumstances, represented that the broader electoral forces of the Republican party had shifted away from the northeastern establishment Ford represented.[3] In a trip to Iowa in 1975, before Reagan announced his candidacy, conservative operative Paul Weyrich noted that support for Ford was sagging: "it appears the swing to conservatism is real, and that consequently, President Ford is in some trouble out here...Reagan and George Wallace are the two names on everybody's lips in the midwest" (Weyrich to the Committee, Aug. 20, 1975).

The takeaway is not that party sorting results from primary selectorates being more extreme than general selectorates; empirical evidence suggests they are not (Norrander 1989; Sides et al. 2018). Rather, the composition of each party's primary selectorate changed as a result of the racial realignment and this induced sorting on other issues. Prior to racial realignment, race cross cut the party coalitions leading to heterogeneous primaries. National Democratic candidates appealed to both activists and voters from the Southern and non-Southern wing. After racial realignment, as the parties sorted on race, the pool of conservative opinion shrunk in the Democratic primary.

2.4.2 Republicans Capture the Democrat's Conservative Wing

Competing for votes in the general election also facilitated party sorting. Racial realignment did not happen overnight. While a pool of Southern Democrats left the Democratic party in 1964, another pool of voters still voted for Democrats, but became increasingly disaffected by the racial and cultural liberalism of the new national party. By taking conservative positions on race correlated policies such as abortion or guns, national Republican candidates reinforced the appeal of the party to conservative Democrats.

[3] Gerald Ford's nomination in 1976 represented an intermission in party sorting; a nomination that occurred perhaps only because he became the president through Spirow Agnew's and then Richard Nixon's resignations.

Consider Richard Nixon's 1972 candidacy. Richard Nixon, after barely beating Hubert Humphrey in 1968 in a three-way presidential race, feared that segregationist George Wallace would run again in 1972 (Karol 2009; Miller and Schofield 2003). To stave off a Wallace challenge, Nixon infamously pursued a Southern strategy to woo conservative Southerners. It is in the context of Nixon pursuing a Southern strategy in which Nixon also pursued anti-abortion voters. Nixon and his aides realized that issue overlap between abortion and aid to minorities or busing meant opposing abortion rights would reinforce existing divides in the mass public between Nixon and the leftward shifting Democratic party (Buchanan to Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Colson, Sept. 23, 1971; Greenhouse and Siegel 2012, 215-218).

A similar story might be told of Reagan Democrats in the 1980 election. Reagan's appeals on abortion and religion reinforced a racial cleavage which had loosened more socially conservative Democrats from their party's coalition. These Reagan Democrats — referring to blue-collar workers and Southerners that voted for Reagan in 1980 but that either identified as Democrats or had voted for Carter in 1976 — were central to Reagan's victory. As one conservative Republican Senator remarked in reference to the 1980 election, "Ronald Reagan will not win [the South] by reviving the spirit of Nelson Rockefeller" (Phillips to Lofton, July 25, 1980).[4]

Figure 2.7 compares preferences of voter groups in the 1980 election across several issues. (Each graph is the demeaned average such that average respondent is 0).) Reagan Democrats are right of center on economic policy, look like all other Republicans on busing, and express more conservative on abortion.

Figure 2.7: Reagan Democrats compared to all Republicans/Democrats (ANES)



Each graph shows the de-meaned average of each sub-group. (The average respondent has a value of 0).

Using data from the Youth Parent Socialization survey (YPS; ICPSR 7779), Figure 2.8 examines Reagan Democrats before and after his election. YPS interviews respondents in 1965, 1973, 1982 and 1997. I compare survey responses between 1973 and

[4]Rockefeller symbolized Republican liberalism in the 1960s and 1970s.

Figure 2.8: Reagan Democrats compared to all Republicans/Democrats (YPS)



Each graph plots the de-meaned average of each group (so average respondent in each year is set to 0). Data come from 1973 and 1983 YPS survey so we are able to compare issue attitudes both before and after the Reagan campaign. For example, the left bar shows attitudes of respondents in 1973 who later reported for Reagan in the 1980 election.

1982. Figure 2.8 shows that "Reagan Democrats,"[5] were slightly left of the average respondent in 1973 on economic issues but were to the right of center on racial issues and women's role in the economy (YPS did not ask about abortion in 1973). These data are consistent with explanations that Reagan attracted Democrats by reinforcing appeals of race and other social issues over the 1970s and 1980s. Voters then updated their economic views to align them with their new party.

2.5 Vote Choice and Shifting Coalitions

A consequence of the racial realignment is that it slowly transformed the issue preferences of the parties base on other policy issues without the parties making specific appeals on those issues. This is akin to V.O. Key's theory of secular realignment (1959), where the parties' bases slowly change without particular reference to a given

[5] Respondents who would vote for Reagan in 1980 but voted for Carter in 1976 or still identified as Democrat in the 1982 survey.

campaign's election. These electoral shifts create an opportunity for strategic politicians to raise new issues that respond to that underlying shift.

Figure 2.9 illustrate this. Before the parties took explicit positions on gun control, abortion, environmental policy or issues of women's rights, those supporting the Republican and Democratic candidates for president had already sorted. This is seen most clearly on gun control and broader questions of women's equality. In the late 1930s, Democratic supporters were more conservative on issues of women's equality than Republican supporters. Yet the trend in the regression coefficients show that over the next two decades, the base of the parties shifted such that by the late 1950s, Democratic voters were marginally more liberal on women's equality. This is despite both parties endorsing the Equal Rights Amendment through this period (Wolbrecht 2000). When the issue is then thrust to the top of the political agenda in the 1960s, the parties exploit the sentiment already in their coalition.

Likewise on gun control, voters supporting the Republican party are marginally more liberal than voters for the Democratic party in 1940. Yet by 1959, voters for the Republican party are marginally to the right of voters for Democratic presidential candidates. This is despite neither party campaigning on gun control or it being a major political issue (Karol 2009).

In the case of abortion and the environment, sorting emerges later, but still before the national parties formally divide. However, the trend in the regression coefficients reveal that while Republican voters did not become more conservative than Democratic voters until the 1970s, the electorate had begun to shift before then.

On abortion in particular, the U.S. South represented the balance of opinion between the parties. On a series of polls asked between 1970 and 1971, Nixon and Humphrey voters are nearly identical on abortion policy and Wallace voters are the conservative outlier (Figure 2.10). The shift of Wallace voters to Nixon in 1972, and then Reagan in 1980, likely tilted the composition of the national parties' base on abortion policy. In a counterfactual world where Wallace voters had stayed in the Democratic party, there might have been greater appetite for a anti-abortion stance.

While difficult to wholly attribute these shifts to the racial realignment, it presents a compelling explanation for the gradual sorting of the parties mass bases on social issues before the parties expressed clear positions. The fact that George Wallace, in 1968 and 1969, is receiving so many abortion conservatives without campaigning on the issue reinforces the idea that parties (or in this case candidates) sharply defined by racial cleavages are sharply divided on other dimensions, too. (The next chapter explores this empirically.)

It is also worth contrasting the argument here with an existing literature on party positioning, particularly on abortion. By the 1970s, the electorate was already well into a realignment period, first on account of civil rights, and then Vietnam. Realignment meant that parties in the electorate were at a low point in this era: the number of independents was high and many Southern Democrats still identified as a Democrat

Figure 2.9: Issue Attitudes and Presidential Vote Choice



but supported Republican candidates (Keith et al. 1992). This point has important implications for understanding the interaction between elite and mass level forces, but

Figure 2.10: Abortion and 1968 Presidential Vote Choice



has not been emphasized by current literature.

For example, Greg Adams' work on partisan realignment on abortion, which has served as an authoritative analysis of parties and abortion, writes the following of abortion politics in the 1970s, "Republican masses were originally more pro-choice than Democrats. If the members of Congress were truly following the lead of the masses on abortion, Democrats in Congress should have become less pro-choice, not more" (Adams 1997, 734).

Yet, because the electorate was already realigning on race and then Vietnam, those voting for Democratic candidates (regardless of party affiliation), already expressed more liberal views by the 1970s. Vote choice serves as a leading indicator for party transformations; people shift their vote before they shift their party identification. Figure 2.11 shows that this was particularly stark outside the South.

2.6 Why Take a Position at All?

The structure of public opinion along the racial axis created a set of opportunities and constraints for the parties to position on issues in the 1970s. But this does not address why parties choose whether to take a position at all.

One explanation is that the politically weak party, because they are losing on the existing dimension of conflict, have incentive to inject new issues into the system which they believe will expand their coalition (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Riker 1982). Parties stake new positions when an issue becomes salient and the issue is less internally

Figure 2.11: Abortion Attitudes by Party Identification and Vote Choice



divisive to their own party than to the other party. For example, in the case of abortion and school prayer, the Republican party — which between the 1930s and 1990s held a Congressional majority only a handful of times — sought to emphasize abortion to drive a wedge in the Democratic coalition and lure already disaffected Democrats to the GOP (Sanbonmatsu 2002; O'Brian 2019). Although the issue split the GOP's coalition, too, those divisions were much smaller. For this same reason, Democratic candidates and party leaders through the 1980s, while positioning themselves to the left of Republicans on abortion policy, sought to downplay the issue: McGovern said the issue should be left to the states and squashed efforts to include pro-choice language in the 1972 platform (Perlstein 2008, 694). In 1976 and 1980, Carter adopted a middling position that appealed to both his Southern base and the party's ascendant liberal wing. And party leaders even in the 1980s, wanted to avoid divisive language on culture wars issues in the party's platform.

Another reason the parties may divide is insurgent candidates, in an effort to win the party's primary, strategically raise the salience of certain issues. This positioning then spills over into the general election. For example, Trump in 2016 emphasized opposition to illegal immigration to capture the nomination. Immigration then became a wedge issue in the general election.

A third reason parties may activate an issue is to mobilize new voters into the electorate. On the conservative side, operatives saw taking conservative positions on social issues, like abortion or school prayer, as a means to mobilize non-voters. Conservative operative Paul Weyrich noticed that many evangelical leaders (some of whom would later become founding figures of the Religious Right) had followers that usually did not participate in politics, but cared deeply about social issues (Weyrich to Thornton, Feb 27, 1980; Weyrich to Hunt, March 28, 1977). Weyrich wondered if they could be mobilized on the basis of social issues like abortion or school prayer (Connie Marshner,

Interview 2018). In mid-1979, Weyrich commissioned a poll of non-voters to determine what factors, if any, could pull non-voters into the electorate.[6] The non-voter poll showed that 25% of non-voters expressed a future willingness to vote and 47% cited a candidate's abortion stance as the deciding factor as to whether to vote. Moreover, when asked what issue would motivate them to register to vote, abortion was the leading reason (The Daily Ardmoreite). Of these non-voters, 21% were born-again Christians (Susan Phillips to Howard Phillips, Sept. 11, 1979; Chamberlain 1980).

Conservative operatives used the fact social conservatives often did not vote to urge candidates to adopt conservative social positions. As one conservative activist told Reagan before the 1980 election:

> *"[Social conservatives] do have a place to go if they become disenthralled with the Reagan campaign; back to their jobs, back to their Bibles, back to their families, and away from a political process which they have, only tentatively, entered...instead of worrying about the votes which John Anderson[7] might take away if Governor Reagan is "too conservative," concern should be focused on the voters who will stay away from the polls, if the differences between Reagan and Carter are unclear in 1980, as they were in 1976, between Carter and Ford." (Phillips to Lofton, July 25, 1980)*

A fourth reason parties may divide is the rise of interest groups or external events force the issue. On new issues, even those that ultimately benefit the party, great uncertainty surrounds taking a position (Key 1961). Interest groups, or intense policy demanders, force the issue on the agenda.

Compare the 1972 and 1980 Republican campaigns. In 1972, Nixon briefly came out against liberalizing abortion policy before dropping the issue. One explanation is that there was not a large and credible pro-life movement that forced him to keep the issue in the campaign. In 1980, Reagan like Nixon, did not view abortion policy as a top concern and wanted to put it on the "back burner" (Kingston Meeting Minutes, March 27, 1981). The difference between 1972 and 1980 was the presence of a much larger activist network that repeatedly pushed Reagan to cater to their issues.

This raises a caveat to this theory's argument: while the ability of party to take a position is constrained by the broader environment, elites play a larger role, almost by definition, for activating an issue within the party system.

2.7 A Revised Role for Elites versus the Masses

This theory contrasts many accounts of party sorting which view the process as elite driven. As party elites sort, they send increasingly sorted signals which engenders the

[6] Finding people who admitted to be non-voters proved to be difficult; it took 21,000 attempts to get a sample of just 1,000 people who admitted they did not vote.

[7] John Anderson, a liberal Republican, ran as an Independent in 1980

parties in the electorate to sort, too. How then does this dissertation fit with existing scholarship?

In this revised version of public opinion, elites and masses act in a circular fashion. First, latent divides exist prior to the parties taking clear positions on issues. Second, when an issue becomes politically activated party elites send signals on their position; signals which are informed by latent opinion among their (potential) constituencies. Third, elite signals then strengthen the pre-existing divides in the mass public. This set of empirical expectations contrasts top down theories which argue that issue bundles (consistently) exist only after elites take consistent positions.

This views allow elites to influence public opinion consistent with top-down accounts, but argues elite cues are often endogenous to what elites perceive will be popular among their supporters (Zaller 2012, 571; Arnold 1992; Key 1961). In other words, elite cues are not random to public opinion.

Elite actors may follow latent public opinion by 1) measuring support and testing the waters before taking new positions; 2) taking policy positions they believe will get non-voters to turn-out for them; 3) abandoning old positions if activated opinion deems them unpopular or 4) being replaced if they continually embrace unpopular stands on crystallized issues.

For example, leading presidential candidates pour over opinion polls when making decisions and politicians often take the positions they believe will be popular among their supporters, or voters they perceive as up for grabs. Alternatively, presidential candidates may adopt the positions they have learned to be successful from congressional or state parties (e.g., Greenhouse and Siegal 2011, 286; Hershey 1984).

Politicians also emphasize new positions to expand the electorate. Politicians of the New Right campaigned against abortion and school prayer in hopes of activating disengaged conservatives. In the 2000 campaign, the Bush campaign put referendums against gay marriage on state ballots because they believed opposition to gay marriage would activate non-voters, who once at the polls, would support Bush. Whether this was effective remained unclear, but operatives adopted this strategy believing it would have that effect (Campbell and Monson 2008, 403).

Finally, candidates that are out of step shift strategies or are replaced. Consider the case of Vietnam and the Democratic party. Hawkishness on Vietnam not only cross-cut the party, but cross-cut ideological lines. Hubert Humphrey, a long-time liberal Democrat still supported the war in 1968, but shifted leftwards on Vietnam by 1972, recognizing that the coalition of activists and voters underneath him and changed (Kaufman 2000).

A similar process exists among the activist class. Interest group and social movement leaders are sensitive to the appeals that can generate attention and membership. For example, while organized conservative movements (e.g., pro-family, anti-gun movements) are established institutions in the contemporary political landscape, they were nascent movements (at most) in the early and mid-1970s. Indeed, the primary goal

of social movement leaders is to translate latent opinion to political activity.[8] As one early pro-life organizer in Pennsylvania wrote, "Our task will be to identify those passive sympathizers that can be turned into active participants" (Fink to NRLC, Sept. 7, 1973).

The fact that most people do not care about politics, propelled mass-based movement organizers to find issues and frames that would engage the public. Conservative organizer Paul Weyrich outlined this dilemma and solution:

> *"The average person is less interested in politics than other things in his life. Sports, for example, command more attention than other issues for many people. Through the use of survey research, we can identify those issues of importance to people and relate our ideas to them" (Weyrich to Kamer, July 16, 1981).*

Groups used survey research to tailor messages to build membership and raise money (Kelly 1975). For example, the Conservative Caucus, a core grassroots organization of the New Right, issued "Member Surveys" to find what interested their (responsive) members the most, and then built organizing and fundraising efforts around those issues (Phillips, "1979 Member's Issue Priority Poll").

In this view, mid-level and elite level forces were reacting to and sharpening public opinion already on the ground, not linking disparate issues together in the first place. However, to make issues salient, almost by definition, elites are needed. For example, scholars attribute the failure to pass the ERA to work by activist Phyllis Schlafly. Yet Schlafly only began working on the Equal Rights Amendment once she accidentally realized the tremendous support it generated. Indeed, Schlafly had not taken much interest in feminism prior to the early 1970s and instead spent much of her career focused on anti-communist defense spending (Critchlow 2018, 217-218).

Clearly, Schlafly's STOP-ERA movement mattered for halting the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment, but this was less about opinion conversion and more about placing a mouthpiece on a previously unorganized block of voters. In the late 1970s, while only about a third of the U.S. population opposed the ERA, more than half of voters in the 15 states which failed to ratify the amendment opposed it (ANES). Of the 15 states that failed to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment before 1982, many were in the South and a majority of those states had opposed women's suffrage in 1919-1920 as well.

[8] This aligns with David Truman's (1951) disturbance model in which latent groups of people are compelled to mobilize as a response to shifts in the status quo (Truman 1951).

Chapter 3

Issue Connections in the Mass Public

The alignment of party and ideology has been a distinguishing feature of contemporary politics: by the 1990s the parties had sorted across a range of issues, such as abortion and gun control, that cross-cut party lines just decades earlier. Democrats adopted consistently liberal positions and Republicans consistently conservative positions. I argue this transformation is rooted in and shaped by the 1960s racial realignment: the parties more easily sorted on abortion and gun control in the 1990s because the parties in the electorate had already sorted on civil rights in the 1960s.

This chapter shows that the mass public has linked together various issues without the aid of partisan political elites and decades prior to sorting by party leaders. Among ordinary voters, left-right attitudes towards civil rights and race have long been tied with left-right divides on essentially every other major policy issue. More liberal voters on civil rights (defined in multiple ways), are also more liberal on abortion, gun control, feminism, gay rights, defense spending, environmentalism and economics.[1] The relationship between racial attitudes and other policy positions persists even among those who lack knowledge of the parties' relative policy positions or otherwise know little about politics.

This evidence pushes back against the textbook view that voters do not cluster issues together like elites, or that they do so only after learning policy positions from elite sources (Fiorina et al. 2005, 137). If this textbook view of public opinion is true, when the parties move on civil rights in the 1960s, it would leave party positioning on other issues, like abortion or gun control open ended. Alternatively, if the mass public clustered attitudes before the parties sorted on various policy dimensions, this would potentially mean the positions parties take on one issue, limits their ability to take

[1] I use more liberal to refer to the leftward policy alternative. In the mid-20th century, this collection of issues cross-cut party lines because the New Deal party system was structured to suppress racial cleavages because it cut across the Democratic party's coalition.

positions on other issues.

3.1 Data and Empirical Expectations

To explore the linkages between race and other issue attitudes, I analyze essentially every major policy question asked on the 1972, 1976 and 1980 ANES. I focus on these years for both practical and substantive reasons. Logistically, the ANES first asked questions on many issues, which now define party conflict, in 1972. Substantively, I am interested in the 1970s because issues such as abortion and gun control were becoming salient, yet the national parties had yet to take distinct positions. This enables analysis of issue attitudes prior to their political crystallization.

I then supplement these data with historical opinion polls. As the ANES lacks many policy questions until 1972, these data have the advantage of analyzing views over a longer time period, in some cases for decades, but have the drawback of inconsistent wordings between years. Furthermore, the political context of issues change over time.[2] I draw on surveys fielded by *Gallup*, some of which date to the 1930s and the *Louis Harris* polls, which date to the 1960s. Since these survey companies sometimes ask multiple questions in each year, and rarely do the same questions span years, I standardize each variable to have a mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 and then average across items in each survey. I then re-standardize the indexed variable.[3] Averaging across issue areas reduces measurement error (Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder 2008) and circumvents arbitrary decisions as to which variables to include.

3.2 Results

Figure 3.1 presents a nearly exhaustive analysis of issue bundles asked on the ANES with respect to three racial questions: Attitudes towards government aid to minorities, support for busing to integrate schools and whether the civil rights movement is moving too quickly or not quickly enough. To differentiate between racial "liberals" and racial "conservatives" I code all respondents who are left of center on each racial question as liberal (0) and those right of center as conservative (1).[4] To interpret the results, I

[2]For example, asking whether "homosexuals" as a group "are helpful or harmful" as *Harris* did in the late 1960s-1970s, imprecisely measures whether someone supports government policy to protect discrimination based on sexual orientation. However, prejudice against gay people overlaps and informs individual opposition to government policies that protect gay rights.

[3]For example, if a survey asks two questions on abortion, I standardize each variable and then average the two together and then restandardize the variable.

[4]I define conservative as taking a right of center position. Because most questions on the ANES asked respondents on a seven point scale, I code respondents that indicate a response between 1 and 3 as liberal and between 5 and 7 as conservative. To test the robustness of this classification, I also standardize the variables to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1 and then classify

then recode each secondary variable where "1" is a conservative position (reflects right of center position) and all other values are coded 0. I then regress secondary issue attitudes (such as abortion, gun control) on the indicator variable of racial attitudes. This is represented by the following regression model: $Abortion_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Aidblack_i + \epsilon_i$.

Figure 3.1: Issue Bundles



Each point represents the difference in the proportion of racial liberals and racial conservatives who also take a conservative position on the secondary variable. The "independent variable" is differentiated by color. Positive coefficients mean that racial conservatives hold more conservative attitudes on the secondary position, too. With the exception of inflation in 1972, conservative racial attitudes predict conservative attitudes on every other issue. This is particularly interesting for policies such as abortion, women's rights, pollution and gun control because the parties lacked distinct (or any) policy position on the issue in 1972 and 1976. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

The regression coefficient (β_1) simply represents the difference in the proportion of abortion conservatives (for example) between racial liberals and racial conservatives. For example, the top set of points on the top-left panel (in 1972) shows those holding a right of center position on busing are approximately 29 percentage points more likely to hold a right of center position on marijuana legalization, when compared to busing

respondents who indicate positions that are more conservative than the average as "conservative." I also run the regressions without recoding variables. Results persist in both cases.

liberals. (95% confidence intervals in parentheses.)

The differences vary by question and over years, but substantive differences persist: on every issue, with the exception of controlling inflation, conservative racial attitudes predict conservative attitudes on other issues. In 1972, the most polarizing of the three elections, the biggest divides between busing liberals and conservatives involve amnesty for draft dodgers (44% difference), whether government should provide jobs (38%) and defense spending (33%).[5]

These linkages remain after controlling for multiple demographic variables including race, region, religious affiliation, income, education and party identification (see Table 3.1 for 1972 results, and section 4 in the appendix for full regression controls). Furthermore, results persist when analyzing white respondents separately (see Appendix 3). [6]

3.2.1 A Longer View

To explore longer term trends in public opinion, I searched for all questions in either *Gallup's* or *Harris's* publicly available dataverse on six issues that gained political salience in the 1960s and 1970s: abortion, gun control, the environment, women's rights, defense spending, and gay rights. I use *Gallup* and *Harris* because the ANES lacks questions on many issues before 1972. Historical opinion data show that the issue bundles explored above predated elite party positioning by decades.

Each panel in Figure 3.2 graphs the long run relationship between racial attitudes and each of these six issues. The variables have been standardized to have a mean zero and standard deviation of one which means each point represents a correlation coefficient. Positive coefficients mean more conservative racial attitudes correspond to more conservative positions on gun control, abortion, etcetera. The historical data align with the ANES findings and suggest 1) the observed linkages have persisted for decades and 2) they clearly predate the parties adopting the distinct positions of the contemporary era.

For example, conservative positions on race correspond with opposition to gun control dating back to at least 1940. In that year, *Gallup* asked whether respondents favored a federal law to ban lynching and whether gun owners should be required to register firearms with the government. Opponents of anti-lynching legislation were 10 percentage points more likely to also oppose gun control than supporters of anti-lynching legislation (25%-15%). This is despite neither party having a position on gun control until the late 1960s. The Republican party's belated shift to the right in the

[5]Limiting inflation is usually interpreted as conservative because it benefits creditors (i.e. the wealthy) but Nixon aggressively pursued price controls to keep inflation down. Both Carter and Reagan took measures to fight inflation, too.

[6]Little variation among African Americans on racial questions makes analysis of only black respondents difficult.

Table 3.1: Issue Bundles, Controlling for Demographic Variables (1972 Data)

	(1) Vietnam	(2) Defense	(3) Amnesty	(4) CommunistTrade	(5) ChinaUn	(6) RecognizeChina	(7) Jobs	(8) Insurance	(9) TaxRate	(10) Pollution	(11) Inflation	(12) WomenEq	(13) Abortion	(14) UrbanUnrest	(15) RtsAccuse	(16) Marijuana
AidBlack	0.167***	0.173***	0.237***	0.138**	0.107**	0.111***	0.277***	0.164***	0.085**	0.148***	-0.052*	0.151***	0.107***	0.303***	0.306***	0.203***
	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Rural	-0.027	0.069	0.015	-0.032	0.013	-0.045	-0.035	0.095*	0.051	-0.018	-0.049	0.043	0.116***	-0.027	0.064*	0.110***
	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.025)
South	0.086**	0.118**	0.066	0.057	0.044	0.029	0.055	0.094*	0.035	0.008	-0.008	0.006	0.110***	0.133***	-0.020	0.100***
	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Catholic	0.024	-0.003	-0.004	-0.034	-0.006	-0.016	-0.029	-0.057	0.017	-0.017	0.045	0.002	0.190***	-0.036	-0.042	0.044
	(0.029)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Income	0.005	0.006	0.015	-0.013	-0.059***	-0.038**	0.052***	0.083***	0.013	-0.003	-0.020	-0.030**	-0.041***	-0.030*	-0.021	-0.028**
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)
BA	-0.039	-0.199***	-0.136**	-0.227***	-0.108*	-0.087*	0.000	-0.100	-0.123**	-0.039	-0.070*	-0.071*	-0.094*	0.013	-0.101**	-0.250***
	(0.035)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.034)
White	0.037	0.024	0.211***	-0.013	-0.171**	-0.083	0.227***	0.017	0.051	-0.050	-0.097*	-0.033	-0.087*	0.058	0.049	-0.097*
	(0.040)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Rep	0.055	0.096	0.081	-0.044	0.008	-0.015	0.043	0.148*	0.044	0.057	-0.032	-0.036	-0.004	0.011	0.030	0.049
	(0.039)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.064)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.038)
Dem	-0.102**	-0.069	-0.098	-0.035	0.008	-0.031	-0.053	0.018	-0.024	0.042	-0.006	-0.054	-0.013	-0.057	-0.071	-0.026
	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.037)
Constant	0.188***	0.437***	0.354***	0.386***	0.477***	0.308***	-0.023	-0.059	0.226***	0.082	0.976***	0.351***	0.588***	0.154*	0.360***	0.662***
	(0.057)	(0.085)	(0.079)	(0.103)	(0.078)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.090)	(0.064)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.061)	(0.055)
N	1408	696	654	541	633	652	1359	620	1306	690	1316	1428	1452	678	1352	1412
adj. R^2	0.069	0.108	0.185	0.059	0.081	0.057	0.163	0.108	0.028	0.038	0.024	0.043	0.083	0.154	0.142	0.151

	(1) Vietnam	(2) Defense	(3) Amnesty	(4) CommunistTrade	(5) ChinaUn	(6) RecognizeChina	(7) Jobs	(8) Insurance	(9) TaxRate	(10) Pollution	(11) Inflation	(12) WomenEq	(13) Abortion	(14) UrbanUnrest	(15) RtsAccuse	(16) Marijuana
Busing	0.163***	0.250***	0.306***	0.100	0.073	0.057	0.282***	0.106	0.110*	0.080*	-0.088*	0.123***	0.136***	0.195***	0.245***	0.259***
	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.047)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.057)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.054)	(0.045)	(0.035)
N	1988	921	887	789	946	975	1862	950	1815	1044	1854	2199	2233	843	1713	2180

	(1) Vietnam	(2) Defense	(3) Amnesty	(4) CommunistTrade	(5) ChinaUn	(6) RecognizeChina	(7) Jobs	(8) Insurance	(9) TaxRate	(10) Pollution	(11) Inflation	(12) WomenEq	(13) Abortion	(14) UrbanUnrest	(15) RtsAccuse	(16) Marijuana
CivilRtsMove	0.127**	0.140*	0.299***	0.222**	0.034	0.047	0.251***	0.113	0.112*	0.117**	-0.080*	0.191***	0.149***	0.189**	0.224***	0.309***
	(0.042)	(0.065)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.064)	(0.047)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.037)
N	1216	565	540	475	574	589	1112	594	1084	617	1105	1328	1359	488	1029	1325

Each column represents a multivariate regression including demographic controls. The primary variable(s) of interest are AidBlack, Busing, and CivilRtsMove (same as Figure 3.1). The relationship shown in Figure 3.1 holds even after controlling for multiple demographic variables. Each cell is the regression coefficient, with the standard errors in parentheses. Table 1 shows the full model for government aid to blacks. The main coefficient, only, for busing and whether the civil rights movement is moving too quickly are included at the bottom. See appendix for full results across years.

1970s follows these pre-existing cleavages.

On abortion, the first survey asking questions about both race and abortion was fielded in 1965 and surveyed only college students (first point, Figure **??**, Panel B). Yet, relative conservatism on abortion rights already corresponds with racial conservatism. For example, students in the 1965 survey that opposed affirmative action were 9 percentage points more likely to believe abortions should be restricted compared to respondents who supported affirmative action. This issue bundle existed eight years before *Roe v. Wade* and 15 years before the parties polarized on abortion in the 1980 election. Furthermore, these bundles existed before even the earliest endorsements of abortion rights by women's rights groups (Greenhouse and Siegel 2012, 38-39).

On questions of women's rights (panel C), belief in equality for women correlated to belief in civil rights and racial equality dating to the 1930s. In a 1945 survey of white men, those men who opposed equal rights for African Americans were about 20 percentage points more likely to say women's role was in the home (as opposed to jobs outside the home). And in a 1958 survey (national sample), those opposed to racial integration were 14 percentage points more likely to say they would not support a female presidential candidate. These trends existed before the 1960s women's rights movement and before the parties diverged on the Equal Rights Amendment in 1980. (Both parties supported the E.R.A. between 1944 and 1976).

Similar linkages exist on environmental questions dating to the mid-1960s. In a 1965 survey, racial liberals were 13 percentage points more likely to say they felt badly about environmental pollution. By the mid-1970s, 41% of respondents that believed the civil rights movement was moving too quickly opposed regulating car emissions compared to just 31% that believed it moved not quickly enough. This is despite both parties supporting environmental reform in the 1960s and early 1970s. The Republican's rightward shift on environmentalism came after these bundles existed among ordinary voters.

On gay rights (panel F), the first public opinion data show that racial liberals generally showed more liberal attitudes towards gay rights or gays as a group than did racial conservatives. For example, in August 1970, those who supported school segregation (by race) were 27 percentage points more likely to express that homosexuals are "harmful to the country" compared to those opposed to school segregation. This predated the parties diverging on gay rights in their 1992 platform.

On defense spending (panel E), the earliest survey in 1940 shows that racial liberals were marginally more opposed to increased defense spending. Opinion data are then absent until 1969 at which point favoring less defense spending clearly corresponds with racial liberalism. This roughly coincides with the Congressional parties flipping positions on defense spending and divergence of the national party platforms (Fordham 2007, 607).

While survey data on defense spending are lacking in the 1960s, survey companies asked many questions about U.S. involvement in Vietnam which informed post-

Figure 3.2: A Longer Look: Racial Conservatism and Political Issues



Each point represents the regression coefficient from regressing issue specific questions on questions related to civil rights or racial inequality in a given survey. Data show that the issue bundles adopted by the party system predated the parties taking distinct issue positions. I code each variable such that higher values represent more conservative attitudes. In each year, I standardize each variable to have a mean 0 and standard deviation of 1. In years with more than one question, I average across questions and then re-standardize the variable. Consequently, each point can be interpreted as a correlation coefficient.

1960s attitudes towards defense spending (Aldrich 2011). Figure 3.3 shows support for escalating the war into North Vietnam corresponds with the belief that civil rights movements was moving too quickly (two questions *Harris* and ANES asked continu-

Figure 3.3: Civil Rights Movement & Support for Escalating Vietnam War



Each point represents the difference in attitudes towards escalating the Vietnam War in North Vietnam between those who believe the civil rights movement is moving too quickly compared to those who believe it is moving to slowly. Positive values mean those who believe the civil rights movement is moving too quickly, take a more hawkish military position on Vietnam.

ally over the time period). This linkage preceded the Democratic party's opposition to Vietnam. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson (both Democrats) escalated Vietnam throughout their presidencies and Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic nominee in 1968, largely continued Johnson's Vietnam position.[7] Yet rank-and-file liberals in the Democratic party became increasingly wary of the war effort, even though liberal party leaders supported it (see Berinsky 2004 for discussion on latent attitudes towards the Vietnam war). This shift at the mass level preceded elite movement on Vietnam.

Together, these data suggest that these issue bundles date to the earliest opinion polling and existed before the parties or social movements bundled issues together.

3.3 Elite Learning

The previous section shows that left-right attitudes on race predict left-right divides on effectively every other policy issue. What then explains these bundles? While scholarship has produced numerous explanations for attitude formation, this section emphasizes that the process by which people develop their attitudes by learning from political elites cannot fully explain the constellation of issues explored above.

[7] Prior to the Gulf of Tonkin in the summer of 1964, liberals generally supported involvement in Vietnam. However, involvement in Vietnam in 1963 and early 1964 differs from engagement which now characterizes the era. Kennedy, Johnson and Humphrey also each aggressively pursued civil rights measures throughout their careers.

3.3.1 Partisan Elite Learning

An established literature suggests that elites construct issue bundles and then pass them down to ordinary voters (Converse 1964; Levendusky 2009; Achen and Bartels 2017).[8] When new issues arise, elites who are perceived to be otherwise liberal or conservative "ferret" out some ideological connection of the issue and "positions come to be perceived as 'liberal' or 'conservative' even though such alignments would have been scarcely predictable on logical grounds" (Converse 1964, 67). If politicians simply construct issue bundles and the mass public follows the leader, this suggests that elites constructed the resulting partisan alignment. (See Layman and Carsey 2002 for a related analysis.)

The analysis in section 3.2.1 casts doubt on elite driven explanations given that the issue bundles existed prior the parties adopting distinct positions. However, it is possible that by the 1970s even though the parties lacked formal policy positions, knowledgeable respondents had become aware of emerging partisan differences. For example, although the parties did not have positions on marijuana policy, McGovern was associated with decriminalizing marijuana and Nixon supported harsher penalties. In other words, Democrats in the mass public hold a set of policy views simply by learning those views from Democratic politicians.

To evaluate the effect of partisan elite learning, I compare issue bundles between respondents that know and do not know the parties' relative policy positions in the 1970s. On some questions, and in some years, the ANES asks respondents to place the Democratic and Republican party's position on a given issue on a 1-7 scale.[9] I code those that place the Republican party to the right of the Democratic party on the respective issue as "knowers" and all other respondent's as "don't know." This analysis separates respondents who have received distinct partisan cues from those who have not. For example, those that place the Republican party to the right of the Democratic party on both marijuana policy and on government aid to blacks have received partisan cues and are labeled as "knowers." On some policy questions, knowing the parties' positions would reasonably mean placing both parties at the same point. However, I label these respondents as "don't know" because, consistent with the theory, they have not received distinct partisan cues.[10]

If elites construct issue bundles, their should be no consistent relationship among those that have not received partisan signals. Figure 3.4 shows respondents that lack knowledge of the parties positions still consistently package issues together, especially in the polarizing 1972 election. For example, amongst "knowers" in 1972, racial conservatives are 53 percentage points more likely to oppose marijuana legalization than racial liberals. However, among those that do not know the parties' relative positions

[8] Converse argues this is not the only cause, but a primary source of ideologies.

[9] In some years, the ANES simply asks which party (for example) favors more defense spending.

[10] Those respondents that place the Republican party to the right of the Democrats are consistently more educated and perceived by ANES interviewers as being more knowledgeable.

Figure 3.4: Know vs. DK Party Positions



Panels break down issue bundles between respondents that know (black dots) and don't know (gray dots) the parties' positions. I code respondents that place the Republicans to the right of Democrats (and thus have received some partisan cue) on the given policy position as "knowers." The gray points show that even respondents that lack knowledge of the parties relative positions still bundle racial positions with other attitudes. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. *Wording on inflation and taxes differs in 1972 and 1980.

on either issue, racial conservatives are still 17 percentage points more likely to oppose marijuana legalization than racial liberals. [11]

To analyze issue bundles by more general knowledge, I create an index of the average number of policy positions in which respondents know the Republican party is to the right of the Democratic party and then subset respondents by knowledge quartile. For example, the average respondent in the bottom quartile in 1972 correctly places the parties effectively 0 percent of the time (this includes answering "DK" and "no difference"). The second quartile 19 percent of the time, the third quartile 42 percent of the time and the highest quartile 74 percent of the time. (Respondents potentially place up to 13 separate policy positions in 1972).

Figure 3.5 graphs the average issue bundle by knowledge quartile where 1 equals

[11] However, many respondents may simply be guessing the parties' positions. To check, in some years the ANES also asks respondents to place the Democratic and Republican nominee on each issue position (same as with party). Correctly placing both the parties' and candidates' positions reduces guessing. This analysis shows that the bundles persist well in 1972 and 1976, but weaken in 1980 (see Appendix, section 5).

Figure 3.5: Lib/Con Divides by Knowledge Quartile (Precision Wtd. Average)



Each point represents the average difference between racial conservatives and liberals taking conservative positions on the secondary position by knowledge quartile. 1 represents respondents that know the least about the parties' positions and 4 represents respondents that know the most about the parties' positions.

those with the lowest knowledge and 4 represents those with the highest knowledge. Two trends emerge. Across most policy issues, the bundles increase as knowledge increases. This aligns with theories that the most knowledgeable or aware segments of society show more "constraint" (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). However, even among those in the lowest quartile — a group of respondents who in 1972 do not perceive the Republican party as more conservative on even a single policy position — still show "constraint" between policy issues. High and low knowledge respondents demonstrate the same issue connections. For example, racial conservatives in the lowest quartile are approximately 15 percentage points more likely to express a conservative abortion attitude compared to racial liberals in 1972. (See appendix 8 for results broken down by issue.)

Finally, I compare issue bundles among respondents by perceived political knowledge. ANES interviewers rate the respondent's general political knowledge on a 1-5 scale where 1 represents respondents with the highest levels of knowledge, 3 average knowledge and 5 the lowest levels. Figure 3.6 divides respondents between those the interviewer rates as above average (1 and 2) and everyone else. Respondents ranked as having above average knowledge by the interviewer generally express tighter linkages between the issues. However, the bundles persist even for the low knowledge respondents, too. In most instances only minimal differences separate the groups.[12]

The bottom line of this section is that *the bundles persist even among those that do not know the parties positions* and otherwise know little about politics.

3.3.2 Partisan Elite Learning through Parental Socialization

The previous section shows that respondents that do not know the parties' positions still bundle racial views with other policy positions. However, there are alternative

[12]See section 16 of the appendix for other measures of basic knowledge.

Figure 3.6: ANES Interviewer Knowledge (Precision Wtd. Average)



Graph divides the sample between those who the ANES interviewer judges to have above average knowledge and everyone else. Each point is the precision weighted average (across all issues) in each year. Both high and low knowledge respondents package issues together. See appendix for graphs broken down by issue.

means for elite learning. Even if respondents have not received elite cues, they may learn what goes with what through friends or family who have received partisan cues. In other words, elite signaling may work through a network effect.

To explore this possibility, I use data from the 1973 Youth-Parent Socialization survey (YPS; ICPSR 7779) which interviews both parents and their children and includes policy questions similar to the ANES. (In the 1973 survey, most of the youth cohort are aged 27 or 28.[13]) Unfortunately, the YPS survey asks party placement on only two policy questions, but does ask several general knowledge questions about politics.

I combine party placement and general knowledge questions to create an eight item knowledge index for both the parents and students and then subset the data to only low knowledge students (as defined by whether their political knowledge was above or below average). I then split the low-knowledge group between those with high knowledge and low knowledge parents. Figure 3.7 shows that children who lack political knowledge, and whose parents also lack political knowledge, still consistently pair issues together.[14]

While families are only one form of political socialization or network, this is suggestive that these connections persist outside of learning networks.

[13] The first wave, conducted in 1965 (when most respondents were 17 or 18), lacks a range of policy questions.

[14] There is some reason to suspect that parent socialization would not broadly explain issue bundles among those who do not know, as knowledgeable parents raise children who are also knowledgeable (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009, 786).

Figure 3.7: Low Knowledge Respondents, by Parent Knowledge



This analysis compares low knowledge respondents, only. I split low knowledge respondents between those who have high knowledge parents and low knowledge parents. Each regression coefficient plots the proportion of racial liberals and conservatives taking a conservative position on each variable listed down the left-hand column. Data are from the 1973 Youth-Parent socialization survey.

3.3.3 Learning Media Cues

Another possibility is that voters may not know partisan cues, but receive cues from other political elites. Noel (2013) argues that writers and intellectuals in the media play a central role in packaging disparate issues together to create ideologies. Voters are then reactive to these ideologues (Noel 2013, 35).

Data availability present difficulty for evaluating this hypothesis, especially in this earlier time period. However, a 1985 survey of national households by the *Los Angeles Times (LAT)* asks respondents what newspaper they read the most frequently and further asks what policy positions that paper's editorial page or news stories endorse across a range of questions including affirmative action, abortion and gun control.

I conduct two analyses. First, I restrict the sample to only those respondents who do not perceive or know their preferred newspaper's position on each policy question. This represents the vast majority of respondents. I then regress attitudes on each secondary policy on attitudes towards affirmative action (as done in previous section).[15] Table 3.2

[15]Unfortunately, the full codebook of newspapers has been lost, which prevents identifying respondents who believe a newspaper is liberal when it is actually conservative (for example).

(column 1) shows that respondents who do not know or perceive their newspaper to have taken a position on either affirmative action or the secondary policy across 8 issues still package issues together.

Table 3.2: Know/DK Newspaper Positions

	(1) National Sample	(2) *LAT* Readers	
	DK Newspaper Position	Know	DK
Gun Control	.211 (.046)	.29 (.104)	.177 (.088)
Defense Sp.	.055 (.043)	.191 (.113)	.256 (.08)
Welfare	.133 (.031)	.085 (.065)	.111 (.058)
Inequality	.158 (.038)	.362 (.132)	.154 (.085)
Abortion	.062 (.041)	.245 (.133)	.118 (.071)
Gay Rights	.107 (.04)	.103 (.081)	.168 (.065)
School Prayer	-.067 (.04)	-.035 (.149)	.092 (.081)
Death Penalty	.067 (.031)	.286 (.138)	.219 (.067)

Column 1 subsets data for a national sample of respondents who report they do not know or perceive differences in the policy positions of their most read newspaper. Column 2 splits *Los Angeles Times'* readers between those who know and do not know the *LAT*'s policy positions (as perceived by the paper's editorial page and news stories) on each of the issues.

The second test includes only readers of the *LA Times* (the survey oversamples *LAT* readers). I differentiate *LA Times* readers between those that know and do not know the paper's general position on each issue.[16] Again, results are consistent with previous tests. Those that do not know the *LAT's* position on affirmative action and the secondary policy still bundle positions together.[17] (See Table 2, Column 2.)

This evidence is suggestive that people who do not know where their media source stands on various issues still package issues together. This might be surprising given the contemporary media landscape of ideological outlets. Yet, even in the 1980s media outlets were much less ideological. For example, among readers of the *Los Angeles Times,* only around 20% of readers knew the *LA Times* had a position on abortion and only 30% knew their position on Affirmative Action. (Over two-thirds of journalists and editors and the LA Times perceived the paper to support affirmative action through editorials and news articles.)

[16] To validate the *LAT*'s position on each issue, I compare the *LAT's* editors and journalists perceptions (who are also interviewed, but who I exclude from analysis) with readership's perceptions. Unsurprisingly, the balance of editors/journalists perceive the paper's position to be liberal, although the degree of liberalism varies. For example, *LAT* journalists overwhelmingly believe the paper supports abortion rights, but journalists have a less clear, although distinctly liberal perception, in coverage of defense spending.

[17] The small sample of "knowers" inflates the standard errors.

3.4 Discussion

3.4.1 Economic Issues

This chapter has focused on issue linkages with connection to race. Chapter 2 contextualizes this focus, but it is worth contrasting issue linkages between race and other policy dimensions to issue linkages between economics and other policy dimensions. Table 3.3 shows that attitudes on key economic issues do not consistently align with liberal-conservative positions on other issues. Furthermore, those bundles that do exist are often restricted to respondents that know the parties positions (e.g., Layman and Carsey 2002).

Table 3.3: Issue Bundles Government Guarantee Jobs (1972)

	(1) Full Sample	(2) Know	(3) DK
Marijuana	.045 (.024)	.353 (.053)	-.046 (.035)
Rights Accused	.191 (.027)	.479 (.049)	.049 (.046)
Urban Unrest	.193 (.033)	.277 (.061)	.173 (.051)
Abortion	-.012 (.025)	–	–
Women Equal	.008 (.024)	.169 (.051)	-.016 (.038)
Pollution	.051 (.026)	.222 (.07)	.048 (.042)
Recognize China	-.033 (.027)	–	–
China UN	-.08 (.034)	–	–
Trade w/ Communists	.001 (.042	–	–
Amnesty Draft	.276 (.034)	.53 (.053)	.037 (.062)
Defense Sp.	.162 (.037)	.524 (.059)	-.085 (.068)
Vietnam	.143 (.025)	.312 (.04)	.049 (.05)

Each cell is the bivariate relationship from regressing the secondary variable on attitudes towards whether the government can guarantee jobs. This can be modeled by the following regression equation: $Abortion_i = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 GovtJobs_i + \epsilon_i$. Standard errors in parentheses.

Data along the economic axis fit much more with elite accounts where issue linkages only emerge among those socialized from the party system. As I discuss in chapter 2 this has important implications for polarization. Specifically, because economic attitudes do not predict other policy views, but racial attitudes do, the activation of race as a partisan cleavage imposed a set of constraints on party positioning that was previously absent. In other words, it enabled elites to exploit the racial cleavage as economic policy views did not act as a countervailing force. Had the Democrats maintained their broad New Deal coalition with both racial liberals and racial conservatives, there would have been less pressure to polarize on other issue dimensions, too.

This also fits with a literature that shows opinion leading is more prevalent on less salient issues. “Easy issues,” like abortion or race, which people hold strong preferences on, are less malleable (Converse 1964, Lenz 2012, 213).

3.4.2 Explaining the Bundles

This chapter shows that a prominent political explanation — that voters connect attitudes together by learning positions from political elites — cannot fully explain the long-standing relationship between race and so many other political attitudes. I focus on this explanation because it has direct implications for whether party sorting is top-down or bottom-up.

But this raises the question of why these cleavages emerged in the first place. Although this question extends beyond the purpose of this dissertation, a broad literature across the social sciences suggests varying political, psychological and sociological factors contribute to attitude formation and why these issues become connected in the mass public.

Entering the 1960s, economic conservatism had become linked with racial conservatism through three interrelated channels. First, Southern segregationists opposed labor unions both because unions had begun to advance African-Americans’ civil rights, and because an organized labor force threatened white hegemony (Schickler 2016). Second, business interests in the 1940s and 1950s opposed the Fair Employment Practices Commission, a key part of the civil rights agenda, as it involved government oversight and bureaucracy in the private sector (Schickler, Pearson and Feinstein 2010). Third, the link between social welfare programs and African-Americans, that emerged during the New Deal and strengthened by Great Society programs of the mid-1960s, both engendered the link between racial and economic liberalism and spurred race based opposition to these social welfare programs (Phillips 1969; Skocpol 1987). The incorporation of racial minorities as beneficiaries of the welfare state had transformed debates about government intervention in the economy, at least for some, about government intervention for whom. For example, Gilens (1996) shows that whites have much more negative assessments of welfare policy when welfare recipients are portrayed as black rather than white.

Extending beyond economic issues, the role of traditionalism and hierarchies across geographies have underpinned the linkage of racial conservatism with other socially conservative views for decades. One such split is between the political North and South. The Southern United States, which opposed ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment in the 1970s and has supported the anti-abortion movement over the last 50 years, also opposed extending women’s suffrage in the late 19th and 20th Century (Keyssar 2000).

Similar value based divides emerge between urban and rural populations. Rural areas have long embraced more “traditional” values, in that they have supported the prevailing norms that are dominant within a society (Fisher 1974). On racial issues,

this is partly due to the historical legacy of slavery in the largely agrarian South. Yet contact theory suggests the lack of racial diversity in rural areas may further contribute to racial conservatism in rural regions. And beyond race, religious conservatism, which is thought to influence attitudes on gender roles (Hunter 1991), are more prevalent in rural than urban areas (Ammerman 1990). Conversely, urban centers are not only more racially diverse, but trends in the global economy have led to the clustering of higher educated working professionals in urban centers (e.g., Abramowitz 2018; Rodden 2019). Higher SES status, regardless of geographic location, is correlated with relatively more liberal policy views on racial equality and other social issues like abortion, gender roles and gay rights. The difference in cultural institutions between geographies then reinforce these divisions.

Other work argues different political beliefs emerge in urban and rural areas as a result of feelings of geographic aggrievement. Cramer (2016) argues rural resentment generates economically conservative attitudes in rural areas. Cramer's theory of rural resentment relies not simply on rural-ness, but a group consciousness around class and racial hierarchies that emerge between the urban and rural. Feelings that urban centers disproportionately benefit from government redistribution, which itself is an urban institution, fuel opposition to various economic policies.

Variation in "traditionalism" between urban and rural areas dovetails with a literature in political psychology that argues perceptions of threats to established hierarchies underpin modern racial and social conservatism (e.g., Stenner 2005; Kinder and Sears 1981; Bobo 1983). For example, Kinder and Sears (1981) argue white racial prejudice is rooted in a feeling that blacks violate "whites' moral codes about how society should be organized" — norms such has hard work, individualism and self reliance (Sears, van Laar, Cirrillo and Kosterman 1997, 22).

Scholars apply theories of hierarchy and traditionalism to attitude development beyond racial context. For example, Oxley et al. (2008) show that sensitivity to threatening stimuli predicts support for policies that protect the existing social structure. This includes both external and internal threats to established hierarchies. Feelings of external threats correlate with more hawkish views on military spending while internal threats take the forms of "norm violations," such as gay rights or liberalizing abortion access. Similar research shows that attitudes on basic child-rearing questions (e.g., is it better for a child to be obedient or self reliant) predict a broader world view towards tradition and hierarchy. In a changing world, structure and discipline within the family is needed to protect against the threats of a changing society. Those who favor obedience over self reliance, for example, are generally more politically conservative on defense spending, gay rights and abortion (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2018). An influential conservative leader in the 1980s said, "the most traditional of traditional family values...is to respect what your parents say and do it" (Bush 1982).

Language used by early political activists illustrate the emphasis on traditionalism and hierarchies in the rise of the modern conservative movement. For example, Paul

Weyrich, a leader of the "New Right" movement, framed the movement's political demands as nothing more than advocating for "what has been our historical tradition" (Miller Interviews Weyrich). Conservative leaders saw social and economic liberalism as a threat to these traditions. Weyrich described racial hiring quotas and busing as "culturally destructive government policies" and that the "damage they can do is enormous and practically irremediable" (Weyrich 1982, 53). Conservative religious leaders saw feminism as the "resentment against God's order which ordains man to take leadership" (Religious Roundtable meeting notes, 1980). And early pro-gun activists sharpened language still used to oppose gun control today. Bill Richardson, founder of "Gun Owners of America," the more radical precursor of the National Rifle Association saw gun regulations as leaving people "rendered defenseless" in one's own homes against the threats of socialism and crime (Tangner to the Committee, Oct 10, 1975).

By the 1950s, debates over conservatism and liberalism were not shaped exclusively (or even primarily) by government intervention in the economy, but rather an underlying sense of structure and traditionalism. The political debate clearly extended beyond the economic realm. As one founder of the Religious Right wrote, while old-guard conservatives were debating whether "abortion was an individual freedom issue or not" the new generation of conservatives were defending "traditional morality" (Marshner, undated memo).[18]

The micro-foundations for these issue linkages contextualize why the racial realignment was so important for party sorting. By polarizing on the racial dimension, the Republican party was absorbing a block of voters that are more "traditional" and predisposed to an authoritarian outlook than those that sorted into the Democratic party. Consequently, when issues like abortion, women's rights and gay rights gained salience, voters predisposed to resist changing social norms had already divided between parties.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter shows that across effectively every major policy issues, racial conservatives have held conservative views on other policy issues, too. This set of linkages existed before these issues gained political salience and before party elites sent clear signals. I have argued that this set of linkages then constrained the set of policy positions that national parties could adopt.

However, even if voters packaged issues together first, are the issue bundles large enough that politicians would heed them? An existing literature points to the flexibility of public opinion and weak correlations between various issue attitudes as evidence that the public cannot exert its will (Converse 1964; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). However, even small correlations represent substantive divides. In 1972, the difference

[18]The activist here is referring to William F. Buckley, editor of the *National Review*.

between racial liberals and racial conservatives on other policy positions[19] ranged from 9 percentage points to 35 percentage points with an average difference of 21 percentage points. Among those who lack knowledge of either parties' positions, this difference ranges from 8 to 25 percentage points with an average difference of 17 percentage points. In elections decided by a few percentage points, or voter persuasion efforts focused on a fraction of a percent, even 8 percentage points represents a substantial divide. Likewise, qualitative accounts of political decision making typically characterize politicians as risk averse and even small differences between groups of voters may motivate policy positions on visible issues (Arnold 1992; Kingdon 1989; Key 1961). Moreover, these cleavages are sizable by social science standards: "Survey researchers are often forced to 'prove' arguments with 5-8% differences and are thrilled to work with 20% differences" (Converse 2000, 345).

A second problem beyond the size of issue cleavages are whether politicians believe the public cares or would notice – a literature on public opinion notes that most voters are not paying attention (e.g., Delli-Karpini and Keeter 1997) or may lack stable preferences (e.g., Freeder, Lenz and Turney 2019). Again, though, politicians often act based on how the public would respond should the issue become salient (Arnold 1992). Zaller (2012, 571) makes this point in reference to latent public opinion; even if public opinion has not solidified, politicians act on what public opinion could become.

From this perspective, issue linkages do not need to be massive or voters do not need to carefully monitor the actions of public officials for public opinion to exert pressure on the party system. These linkages are enough for politicians who often "run scared." As I explore in chapter 4, politicians or interest groups that try to disrupt these linkages, struggle to do so.

[19] as measured by government aid to blacks; excluding inflation.

Chapter 4

An Alternative Outcome: The Development of Abortion's Partisan Divide

A core argument of this dissertation is that the alignment of party and ideology that emerged in the party system matched a prominent constellation of attitudes first observed in the mass public. This raises the question: what was the possibility for an alternative outcome? This chapter explores this question in context of the partisan divide on abortion and studies interest groups, politicians and media figures of the early abortion movement. Could elite and mid-level forces disrupt the pre-existing linkages and aligned the pro-life movement in the Democratic party?

I argue that because racial conservatives entered the Republican coalition before abortion became politically activated, issue overlap among ordinary voters incentivized Republicans to oppose abortion rights, once the issue gained salience. Likewise, because pro-abortion voters generally supported civil rights, once the GOP adopted a Southern strategy, this predisposed pro-choice groups to align with the Democratic party. A core argument is that pre-existing public opinion enabled activist leaders to embed the anti-abortion movement in a web of conservative causes that had become newly prominent in the Republican party. (And likewise for pro-choice groups and liberalism in the Democratic party.) A key finding is that the white evangelical laity's support for conservative abortion policies preceded the political mobilization of evangelical leaders into the pro-life movement. This suggests the pro-life movement's alignment with conservatism and the Republican party was less contingent on elite bargaining, and more rooted in the mass public, than existing scholarship suggests.[1]

[1] Much of this section is adapted from O'Brian (2019).

4.1 Interest Groups

Although impossible to explore the counter-factual, the earliest anti-abortion activists were not the "Christian Right," which first organized around abortion politics in 1979 (Balmer 2006; Schlozman 2015). Rather, the pro-life movement was founded by an ideologically diverse group of activists, many of whom tried to connect their movement with other progressive causes and initially sought to ally with the Democratic party (Williams 2016; Ziegler 2015). However, building a pro-life movement in progressive circles meant trying to connect issues that did not already "go together" among ordinary people. For example, one pro-life leader believed that peace activists might serve as a core constituency (Mecklenburg, undated notes). Yet peace activists largely supported abortion rights (see Figure 3.1 and such appeals lacked a broad audience.

4.1.1 Ideological Diversity in the Early Pro-Life Movement

Part of the pro-life movement's initial liberal dynamic resulted from the early national pro-life movement being fairly small. First, prior to *Roe*, national pro-life activism rested largely within the United States Catholic Conference and the National Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCC/NCCB).[2] Although heterogeneity exists throughout the broader Catholic Church, many leaders at the USCC/NCCB took liberal positions on social welfare programs, Civil Rights and vocally supported nuclear detente (Williams 2016; National Review, Dec. 10, 1982). In the 1976 election, one Ford staffer noted, that the "platform statement of the USCC reads like a laundry list for a Democratic Congress, except for abortion" (Memo on "Religion," PFC Records, undated memo).

Second, the Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life (MCCL), one of the earliest and most successful state level right-to-life groups, provided key leadership to the early national pro-life movement (this is partially because they had successfully organized at the state level). Most members of the Minnesota pro-life movement were otherwise liberals and the MCCL was led by Marjory and Fred Mecklenburg, both political progressives that strongly believed in social welfare programs, women's rights and supported contraception (Williams 2016, 158; Thomas St. Martin to MCCL, Aug. 1, 1973). How can you oppose killing in Vietnam while you support it at the abortionist's clinic, members of the MCCL argued (Williams 2016, 164).

Marjory Mecklenburg served as the first chair of the board of the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC), which today boasts itself as the largest and oldest pro-life group. Other liberals joined her, too. Warren Schaller, the first executive director of the NRLC, favored the Equal Rights Amendment and supported social welfare programs to dissuade abortion for financial reasons (Strategic Plan for the ACCL, July 19, 1984; Ziegler 2015, 187).

[2] James McHugh, a liberal, led the earliest pro-life activism within the U.S. Catholic Church.

Mildred Jefferson, the first black woman to graduate from Harvard Medical School, served as the NRLC's president in the mid-1970s. Jefferson, like other pro-life advocates, painted the pro-choice movement as an assault on African-Americans and likened *Roe* to the *Dred Scott* case (qtd. in Klemesrud 1976; Williams 2016, 170).

However, as the national pro-life movement expanded, and although more politically diverse than stereotypes might imply, it increasingly included right-wing members (Granberg 1981). In democratic organizations such as the NRLC, this meant new members supported more conservative leaders and pro-life pragmatists lost their influence or were forced to accommodate conservative forces. Mildred Jefferson felt pressured to move rightwards to gain credibility among the group (Fink to Lampe, Dec 1974) while Marjory Mecklenburg left the NRLC to start an anti-abortion group that appealed to more diverse constituencies. Others, like Warren Schaller, left the organized abortion movement altogether (Ziegler 2015, 217).

4.1.2 Rise of Christian Right

Contrast early pro-life efforts to those of the Christian Right in the late 1970s. The very appeals made by Christian Right and New Right leaders — linking anti-abortion with other conservative causes — matched many of the pre-existing bundles that had already existed among the mass public.

In fact, many evangelical leaders stayed quiet or even supported moderate to liberal abortion policies in the early 1970s. (Initial aversion was partially because evangelicals viewed abortion as a Catholic issue (an outgroup) and thus undesirable.) This is despite the evangelical laity expressing as conservative positions on abortion as Catholics by the late 1960s (O'Brian 2019). Furthermore, Figure 4.1 shows that white evangelicals disproportionately voted for Republican candidates and otherwise held conservative political views decades before the Christian Right became politically activated in the late 1970s.

In 1971, the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), the largest Protestant denomination and center of Protestant evangelism, passed a resolution that endorsed moderate abortion policies. Foy Valentine, the head of the SBC's Christian Life Commission and advocate of the 1971 resolution, expressed moderate abortion positions and joined efforts that explicitly endorsed *Roe* and abortion rights (Valentine to Kaemmerling, April 21, 1980). Valentine had company. In February 1973, W.A. Criswell, a former SBC president and conservative religious leader, endorsed a woman's right to choose (Schlozman 2015, 103).[3] Adrian Rogers, whose election as the SBC's president marked an initial victory for the conservative insurgency within the Southern Baptist Convention, supported the SBC's 1971 resolution (Rogers to Valentine, Nov. 28, 1977). And Billy Graham in 1970 reportedly remarked that abortion was permissible in some cases and that "nowhere in the Bible was it indicated that abortion is wrong" (Weyrich to

[3] Criswell later recanted this view.

Figure 4.1: Evangelicals



Left hand panel compares the percent of white evangelicals to all white voters who vote for the Republican presidential candidate (two party vote share). Right hand panel plots the regression coefficient from regressing each issue response (mean=0; std=1) on whether a respondent identifies as an evangelical (I subset the sample to white respondents, only). Positive values indicate that respondents who identify as evangelical take a more conservative position on the respective issue. Data are from the ANES.

Smith, April 29, 1971).

Other leaders simply stayed quiet. Jerry Falwell did not preach about abortion until 1978 (Schlozman 2015, 103). Francis Schaeffer, an evangelical theologian who many credit for raising the anti-abortion movement's salience among evangelical leaders, publicly opposed abortion only with prodding from his son. Schaeffer initially argued he did not want to risk his reputation on a "Catholic issue" (Schaeffer 2007, 266).[4]

However, by 1980 the SBC had endorsed very conservative abortion positions and white evangelicals had become the face of the anti-abortion movement. If national evangelical leadership expressed initial indifference to abortion, how did it become such a force?

One part of this story rests inside the Southern Baptist Convention. The SBC laity was more conservative than the policies the SBC leadership and activists endorsed in the early 1970s. This is partially because among Southern Baptists, like attitudes among non-Baptists, conservative-moderate divisions on abortion emerged along class and educational lines.[5] Less educated and lower class evangelicals were more conservative than the seminary trained ministers and well educated leaders of the Southern Baptist institutions. More importantly, the organization's annual conventions, during which leaders and policies were chosen, were well attended by moderates while sparsely populated by conservatives and fundamentalists.

[4]Some evangelical leaders appeared to not have realized that their laity opposed abortion because it was commonly associated with Catholics.

[5]This extended beyond abortion, to broader questions of gender equality, cultural change of the 1960s, and interpretation of scripture (Ammerman 1990).

The growing rift between establishment moderates and the laity mobilized a new set of activists and leaders focused on taking over the SBC's institutions by bringing previously inactive conservatives, to the SBC's annual conventions. The SBC's 1985 convention, which marked a watershed moment of the fight between the moderate establishment and insurgent conservatives, 45,000 convention delegates cast votes for the president of the SBC. Prior to that year, the next highest attendance at a national convention was 22,000 (Ammerman 1990, 3). Thus, the rightward shift within the Southern Baptist Convention, including on abortion, appears to be a story of ordinary church goers getting up from the pews and pushing their agenda rather than those already in power imposing opinion change. (The democratic structure of the SBC facilitated this change.)

Outside the SBC, the "Christian Right" originally mobilized in national politics to protect tax exempt status for racially segregated Christian schools, not abortion. Ed Dobson, a founding member of the Moral Majority recalls that, "I frankly do not remember abortion ever being mentioned as a reason why we ought to do something" (qtd. in Balmer 2006, 16). Indeed, the pivot of Christian Right leaders from school integration to abortion (which did not occur until the late 1970s) was facilitated by leaders who recognized that the white evangelical laity, on average, were conservative on both race and abortion (see Balmer 2006, 16).

This suggests pre-existing public opinion created an environment that enabled Christian Right leaders to enter the political arena and build a powerful social movement that reinforced issue connections already held by ordinary voters. And has been told from many perspectives, mid-level actors did play a crucial role in building the anti-abortion movement. New Right political operatives recruited evangelical leaders such as Jerry Falwell to become politically active (Layman 2001, 44). And evangelical leaders provided crucial resources and an organizational infrastructure to mobilize latent constituencies and raise issue salience (e.g., Wilcox 1992; Layman 2001; Ziegler 2015, 201; Schlozman 2015). Still further, Religious and New Right leaders built ecumenical alliances and raised awareness that not only Catholics opposed abortion (Schlozman 2015).

4.1.3 Pro-Life Activists to the Republican Party

What then of party positioning? Could interest groups have pushed the Democrats to the right of Republicans? Both the earliest anti-abortion activists, as well as many leaders of the Christian Right, initially sought to ally with the Democratic party or were agnostic about which party aligned with their cause.

The leaders at the USCC/NCCB, although careful to stay out of explicitly partisan politics, expressed private disappointment that Democrats opposed their abortion stance. (Catholic leadership at the USCC/NCCB, like the Catholic laity, had been historically aligned with the Democratic party.) "Unfortunately... our strongest sup-

port for a human life amendment seems to almost innately rest among conservative and moderate Republicans [in Congress]..." (Lynch to NCHLA Board, Nov. 8, 1974).

Marjory Mecklenberg believed Democrats would support the pro-life movement as they had historically been an advocate for the oppressed, a label often assigned by pro-lifers to the fetus (Mecklenburg to the DNC, May 27, 1976). Mecklenburg worked hard to build the pro-life movement within the national Democratic party and worked with leading Democratic politicians and operatives to support her cause (Mecklenburg to NRLC, June 26, 1974; Mecklenburg to Wattenberg, July 12, 1974). In fact, Mecklenburg initially joined Sargent Shriver's 1976 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination.[6] However, the Shriver campaign failed and any ambiguity about Carter's position or that the Democratic National Convention would support a pro-life plank dissipated.[7] Perhaps reluctantly, Mecklenberg noted that "Republicans have chosen to make abortion their issue" and without a Democratic alternative, went to work for the Ford campaign (Mecklenburg notes, undated).

Other liberals encountered similar luck. Nellie Gray, who founded the March for Life, a pro-life rally which prominent politicians still attend today, was a self-identified feminist and was otherwise liberal. Alarmed at *Roe v. Wade*, she sought out Ted Kennedy and other liberal Democrats assuming they, like her, saw overturning Roe as an extension of the Civil Rights movement. One by one they turned Gray down before Senator Jim Buckley, a member of the Conservative party from New York, agreed to help. One activist remembered that Gray's "jaw dropped" because she could not believe that a Republican would help her cause (Interview, Connie Marshner, June 19, 2018).[8] When Ted Kennedy sought the Democratic nomination in 1980, Gray refused to endorse him because he supported a pro-choice plank, "...regardless of his other votes [on non-abortion issues], no matter how good they are" (McCarthy 1980).

Surprisingly, conservative activists also did not envy the GOP: "No one wanted the pro-life issue to be wedded to the Republican party," Connie Marshner, a conservative "pro-family" activist remembers (Interview, Connie Marshner, June 19, 2018). Even leaders who later served as the face of the Religious Right only turned to Republicans after it became clear Jimmy Carter was a liberal. Televangelist Pat Robertson, a modern day fixture of the Christian Right, stated that he had, "done everything this side of breaking FCC regulations" to get Carter, a born-gain Christian, in the White House in 1976 (Martin 1996, 166).[9]

---

[6]Sargent Shriver was and remained a pro-life Democrat.

[7]The DNC's plank in 1976 is rather moderate, but slightly left of the Republicans.

[8]The DNC's plank in 1976 is rather moderate, but slightly left of the Republicans.

[9]Like others, Robertson believed Carter's religiosity meant he would be more conservative than he ultimately was.

4.1.4 Feminism and the Pro-Choice Movement

The alignment of the pro-choice movement and feminism was also circuitous. Prior to 1973, only a patchwork of organizations undertook efforts to repeal abortion laws and the national movement's small size meant that the pro-choice coalition crosscut ideological lines (Staggenborg 1991, 27). This is because some of the earliest and loudest pro-abortion voices advocated for abortion reform not as a woman's right, but as a means for population control or to legally protect doctors (e.g., Friedan 1976; Staggenborg 1991). At the time of *Roe*, Zero Population Growth (ZPG) was the only pro-choice group with a lobbying operation in Washington, DC (Staggenborg 1991, 63). ZPG focused on abortion as a means of population control, not as a woman's right.

Organized pro-choice activists had yet to emerge as national power players by the early 1970s. Planned Parenthood did not endorse abortion repeal until 1969, and did not offer organizational support for the national effort until 1973 (Staggenborg 1995, 15). The National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (what is now NARAL) had just 651 individual members in January of 1972 (Southard to Exec Committee, Jan. 14, 1972).

And while the National Organization for Women (NOW; founded in 1966), endorsed repealing abortion restrictions in 1967, the topic internally divided the organization's delegates.[10] First wave feminists wanted to maintain organizational focus on economic equality, while younger members pushed endorsing abortion repeal (Greenhouse and Siegel 2012, 36). Some of the earliest feminists, including Planned Parenthood founder Margaret Sanger, opposed legalized abortion (Critchlow 1999, 135). Coupled with a lack of resources, the internal fracture precluded NOW from becoming a powerful abortion advocate before *Roe* (Staggenborg 1991, 20). Still further, pro-choice groups (as well as pro-life groups) struggled financially in early years (Freeman 1975, 91).

The bottom line is that the pro-choice movement, particularly as a woman's right movement, had yet to gain financial or organizational strength prior to *Roe*. However, just as pre-existing opinion enabled the Christian Right to articulate pro-life views in a web of conservative causes, latent opinion facilitated framing pro-choice issues in a web of liberal causes. When Betty Friedan, then leader of the nascent National Organization for Women pronounced that abortion access was a woman's civil right (Greenhouse and Siegel 2012, 38-39), she was expressing two ideas that already seemed to go together in the mass public.

[10] Although now a famous organization, NOW had only 1,200 members in November 1967 (Freeman 1975, 80).

4.2 Politicians

Like abortion activists, pro-life politicians came from both sides of the aisle and many politicians changed their policy positions as abortion became increasingly salient (Karol 2009). The resulting equilibrium among politicians – one where pro-life views migrated to the Republican party – mirrored the prevailing cleavage already found at the mass level. Although difficult to paint a complete portrait, I argue issue overlap in the mass public created an environment that made it easier for Republicans (Democrats) to pursue anti-abortion (pro-abortion) voters, even when those positions ran contrary to interest groups' demands.

4.2.1 Republicans

Nixon initially opposed abortion in the years leading up to the 1972 campaign in an effort to appeal to blue-collar Catholic voters, a constituency that had traditionally supported Democratic candidates (Karol 2009, 59-60; Greenhouse and Siegel 2012, 157, 215, 291).[11]

Two intertwining factors motivated Nixon's anti-abortion stance. First, Nixon injected abortion into the 1972 campaign because it divided Democrats. Second, Nixon and his aides realized that issue overlap between abortion, Vietnam, aid to minorities and marijuana legalization meant opposing abortion rights would reinforce existing divides between Nixon and the leftward shifting Democratic party (Buchanan to Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Colson, Sept. 23, 1971; Greenhouse and Siegel 2012, 215-218). The mass level issue connections meant that for Nixon to support abortion rights, he would have had to appeal to voters who already disliked him on other non-abortion social issues.[12] It was easier for Nixon to follow prevailing opinion.[13]

However, Nixon ultimately dropped the abortion issue mid-candidacy. Public opinion data showed that race and Vietnam, not abortion, drove Catholics to Nixon (Greenhouse and Siegel 2012, 292, note 122; Finkelstein to Marik, Dec. 16, 1971). Catholics had already supported Nixon before his abortion appeals, pollster Robert Teeter told Nixon's chief of staff (Teeter to Haldeman, Aug 11, 1972). Without the benefit of attracting further Catholic support and to avoid offending other voters, Teeter advised Nixon that he should not discuss abortion. As a result of this poll, Nixon dropped the issue and privately expressed that the federal government should avoid setting abortion policy (Kotlowski 2001, 252).

[11] Other prominent Republicans, most notably Nelson Rockefeller, were strong advocates for abortion reform.

[12] Furthermore, Nixon aides realized that Catholics were divided on abortion and distinguished Catholics between "New York Times Catholic Democrats" and the "Jim Buckley Catholic Democrats" (Buchanan to Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and Colson, Sept. 23, 1971).

[13] In fact, leading Republicans encouraged him to support liberalized abortion laws (Karol 2009, 61).

Nixon's experience underscores several key points. First, abortion conservatives had been entering the Republican party even without explicit appeals on the issue. Second, patterns among ordinary voters, not interest groups, created a set of opportunities and constraints that sparked Nixon and the Republican's shifting positions. Indeed, early pro-life activists wondered what compelled Nixon's sudden fealty towards their issue (McHugh to Bernardin, Aug 26, 1971; Weyrich to Smith, April 29, 1971).

In 1976, Gerald Ford took a modestly conservative abortion position. Like Nixon, this position seemed more focused on dividing Democrats and winning conservative Catholic voters rather than as a response from conservative policy demanders (Duval to Cashen, July 14, 1976). In fact, Ford, unwilling to move further right, rejected lobbying efforts by the Catholic Bishops and other pro-life leaders (Kilberg to Nicholson, Sept. 30, 1976). Many pro-life groups ultimately supported Ford, but only after Reagan, George Wallace (Democrat) and Ellen McCormack (Democrat) lost in the primaries.

By the 1980 election, Reagan had long opposed abortion beyond traumatic circumstances and opposed government funding for abortions (Williams 2016, 80-84, 118). Whether voters, activists or personal views motivated this view is unclear.[14] What is more certain is that the Christian Right played a prominent role in keeping the issue on Reagan's radar. Yet even the Christian Right's influence had limits; Reagan ultimately disappointed many abortion conservatives who believed he did not genuinely care or go far enough.[15]

4.2.2 Democrats

Although feminists had entered the Democratic party in 1972, the party also contained large socially conservative constituencies which precluded Democrats from sending clear signals on abortion through the 1970s (see Layman 2001, Ch. 4; Young 2000; Layman and Carsey 2002, 794).

The Democrats' initial 1972 front-runner, Edmund Muskie, voiced skepticism towards abortion in early 1971 and Hubert Humphrey campaigned explicitly against abortion rights in 1972 (Williams 2011, 520). Even George McGovern, who perhaps apocryphally started the campaign with a liberal position, by May of 1972 expressed opposition to abortion and said that states should decide their own policy.[16] In fact, McGovern floor whips successfully squashed pushes at the DNC to include pro-choice language in the Democratic platform fearing it would "siphon off nation-wide votes"

[14] Although Reagan reluctantly signed moderate abortion reform in 1967 as Governor of California, he quickly expressed regrets and threatened to veto additional pro-abortion measures being considered (Williams 2016).

[15] For example, pro-life groups strongly opposed George H.W. Bush's nomination for vice-president and Reagan's nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court believing each were abortion liberals.

[16] McGovern's opponents labeled him as an abortion supporter to paint him as an extremist. See Wolbrecht 2000; Young 2000; Perlstein 2008, 652.

(Perlstein 2008, 694; Memo from Lader, undated).

McGovern's public indifference to abortion rights frustrated feminists (Wolbrecht 2000, 37). Women leaders in the GOP actually pushed the Republican Platform committee to adopt a pro-choice position to lure feminists disaffected by McGovern's betrayal (Williams 2011, 523).

In the 1976 election, Carter opposed Constitutional efforts to overturn *Roe*, but also opposed federal funding for abortion. As on most issues, Carter purposefully adopted a moderate stance to position himself between his more conservative white Southern base and northern liberals who were needed for victory (Personal Interview, Stuart Eizenstat).

By the mid-1970s many pro-choice groups believed Ted Kennedy, the liberal (and Catholic) Democratic Senator from Massachusetts, would carry their cause in presidential elections. This is despite Kennedy sending constituent mail opposing abortion until at least 1971 (Douthat 2009). What initiated Kennedy's position change?

In 1975, Kennedy led Senate opposition against a ban on federal funding for abortion. This perplexed national Catholic leadership, both because of Kennedy's Catholic religion and their assumption that Massachusetts, the most Catholic state, would reject such rhetoric. The Bishops decided to confront Kennedy, but learned from Kennedy's staff that the Senator was "convinced" a majority of Massachusetts voters supported his view (Lynch to Medeiros, April 15, 1975). In a "Church-Kennedy" test on abortion, a member of the USCC writes, Kennedy would win because the electorate stands with him (Hehir to Rausch, August 14, 1975).

Apparently, Kennedy's aggressively liberal stance on the abortion amendment also surprised both the National Organization for Women as well as NARAL founder Lawrence Lader (Lynch to Rausch, May 27, 1975; Lader, undated memo). Lader concluded Kennedy's move was politically calculated to win over liberal constituencies should he enter the 1976 primaries.

Kennedy ultimately did not run for president in 1976 and lost to Carter in the 1980 primary; Democrats first nominated a firmly "pro-choice" candidate in 1984.[17]

4.3 Public Intellectuals

An influential argument advanced by Hans Noel (2013) contends that political thinkers at leading newspapers and magazines bundled issues together into ideologies decades before the party system reflected similar positions. However, evidence suggests conservative intellectuals lagged behind voters and activists in linking anti-abortion views with other tenets of conservatism.

For example, William F. Buckley, the founder of the National Review (*NR*) and

[17]Furthermore, Democrats included compromise language in their national party platforms through the 1980s (Young 2000, 107).

arguably the most prominent conservative opinion leader of the mid-20th century, initially wrote harshly of the Catholic Church's opposition to abortion. In April 1966 (NR, page 308), Buckley boldly wrote that labeling a fetus as a person with human rights "*...is a vision so utterly unapproachable as to suggest that the requirements of prudence and of charity intervene...*" Readers responded harshly to Buckley's seemingly pro-abortion position and the *NR* wrote few abortion pieces over the next several years (at which point they switched to a fairly standard conservative position).

James J. Kilpatrick, a prominent conservative columnist who among other things opposed desegregation (Bernstein 2010), emphatically expressed that the Catholic Church had no right to impose their abortion views on others (Kilpatrick, Sept 18, 1976).

Robert Bartley, editor of the Wall Street Journal (*WSJ*), adopted a compromise position in which he supported legalized abortion but believed it should not be publicly funded (the same position Jimmy Carter expressed throughout his presidency) (Bartley to Weyrich, Dec. 12, 1978). The *WSJ* actually shifted from being pro-choice in the early 1970s to opposing abortion rights in the 1980s (Noel 2013, 161-162).

And on the pro-choice side, many early intellectuals that supported decriminalizing abortion did so because it would legally protect doctors or as a means of population control, not to advance women's rights (see Friedan 1976, 122; Williams 2016, 109).

4.4 Conclusion

The alignment of white Evangelicals, the pro-life movement and the Republican party contrasts what appeared to be true prior to the 1980 election: abortion was a Catholic concern and Catholics were Democrats. Furthermore, in the 1970s, Democratic identifiers in the mass public were marginally more conservative on abortion than Republicans and economic cleavages were effectively orthogonal to abortion attitudes. From this perspective, existing scholarship emphasizes that anti-abortion activists and party elites played the pivotal role in aligning the pro-life movement within the Republican party.

I argue such views overstate the role of elite influence. While Republican politicians had discretion, they were making choices in an environment where anti-abortion attitudes overlapped with conservative policies already adopted by the Republican party. For example, Nixon did not consider his abortion decision in a political environment defined solely by economic intervention and did not view his coalition as limited to Republican identifiers. Rather, race, Vietnam and marijuana legalization divided the electorate and because he had positioned to the right on each of these issues, issue connections among voters made it easier to oppose abortion rights, too. Similarly, while Catholics had historically supported Democrats, the turbulence of the 1960s meant racially conservative and hawkish Catholics — who happened to be the most conserva-

tive Catholics on abortion — had already begun entering the Republican party before any national politician made anti-abortion appeals.

Of course, if partisan divisions on Vietnam and race were themselves elite-led events, then party positioning is about sequencing rather than whether voters or elites are the first mover. In either scenario, though, the activation of race as a partisan cleavage created a set of contingencies that would be absent had the parties kept a lid on civil rights.

And among activists, the very success of the Christian Right hinged partially on their ability to articulate what many voters already believed. The messages sent by Christian Right leaders were made in an environment where anti-abortion appeals already fit into a web of conservative causes at the mass level.

Chapter 5

Public Opinion & Party Sorting in the States

The centrality of racial realignment for national party sorting across many different policies is a story that has roots in the South. The Southern Democratic party's historical embrace of slavery and Jim Crow secured the party's regional dominance. By embracing civil rights, Lyndon Johnson effectively ceded the region in presidential races and eroded the Democratic brand in the region's sub-national races. A key point of this dissertation is that the presence of so many abortion or gun conservatives in the Southern Democratic party in the 1960s and 1970s was partially a byproduct of the Democratic party's opposition to civil rights. This is because voters that are more conservative on race generally hold more conservative views on a range of other policy issues. Once Southern Democratic politicians abandoned hard-line segregation positions, this allowed the Southern parties to not only sort on race, but other policy issues, too.

A difficulty for assessing this theory is that at the national level, there is only one election every four years. In an ideal world, an experiment would isolate the effect of racial realignment by randomly assigning pairs of candidates that overlap on racial views with pairs of candidates that had divided on race. The expectation is that the election with candidates who have polarized on race, also develop voter coalitions that have polarized on other non-racial dimensions like abortion, guns and school prayer, *even without those candidates having taken explicit positions on those issues*. This sorting is facilitated by the underlying structure of public opinion where attitudes towards race and civil rights correlate with (latent) attitudes on other policy dimensions, too.

However, it is not possible to randomly assign candidates. To test this mechanism, I explore state and sub-state level races in the South where the general election contests feature one race where the candidates have sorted on civil rights and one race where candidates overlap on civil rights. That is, finding election years where the

same voters are faced with a segregationist Democrat in one race and a more liberal-moderate Democrat in another race. I find consistent evidence that attitudes towards race and civil rights propelled conservative Democrats from the Democratic party once candidates in sub-national elections had divided by racial views. I also find consistent evidence that in doing so, these racially conservative voters brought conservative views on other policy issues with them, too.

This chapter is organized as follows: First, I analyze three case studies of party sorting in southern sub-national races using previously un-utilized public opinion polls. I explore voting patterns in races where the Democratic candidate is the racial liberal in one race, but the conservative in the other race. I then augment this analysis using pooled election data from the American National election studies. Second, I explore non-Southern elections that vary in whether racial equality divides the general-election candidates. Third, I explore a sample of primary elections where racial conservatives and liberals are campaigning against each other in the primary. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for broader theories of party adaptation.

5.1 General Elections

5.1.1 Florida and North Carolina, 1968

Southern states in the 1960s underwent a transition in which segregationist Democrats were replaced, or at least challenged, by more racially moderate-liberal Democrats in primaries and racially conservative Republicans in general elections.[1]

The 1968 North Carolina governor's race featured Democrat Robert Scott versus Republican Jim Gardner. Scott, although not a racial liberal, supported civil rights and Gardner, one of the few Southern Republican members in Congress in the 1960s, opposed civil rights. However, the 1968 Senate race featured Democrat Sam Ervin, a signer of the 1954 Southern Manifesto (which opposed *Brown v. Board*), against Republican Robert Somers. In many respects, Ervin resembled Democrats typical of the mid-century South and Somers took positions that became typical of Southern Republicans in the 1970s. Somers lashed out at federal efforts to ensure school integration, opposed gun control, supported school prayer and made public expressions opposing urban unrest and anti-Vietnam protesters (Observer Wire Reports 1968; North Carolina Heritage Center; News and Observer 1968).

Consequently, Democratic voters in North Carolina faced a decision where one Democrat was a racial liberal (and who was competing against a segregationist Republican) and one Democrat who was a staunch racial conservative competing against a conservative Republican. This fact clearly shows up in the issue preferences of voters

[1] This section uses a 1968 survey of voters in North Carolina and Florida where the same group of voters were faced with a liberal Democrat in one race, and a segregationist Democrat in another race (Independent Research Associates 2007).

in both elections. Figure 5.1 shows that in the Senate race, the candidate's voters overlap on Civil Rights, but polarize in the Governor's race.

Figure 5.1: 1968 North Carolina US Senate & Gov Race: Voter Attitudes Civil Rights



To investigate sorting between the candidates, I compare those voters that supported Ervin in the Senate race but switched to Gardner in the Governor's race with voters that supported the Democrat in both elections. Figure 5.2.A shows that Ervin voters, who sorted into the Republican party in the gubernatorial election, are more conservative on civil rights and each other policy dimension, with the exception of environmental control, when compared to voters who supported the Democrat in both races. For example, the top-left point in Panel A shows that going from the most liberal attitudes on civil rights to the most conservative attitudes on civil rights increases the probability that a voter switched from Democrat to Republican by roughly 30 percent.

The theoretical mechanism for putting race as the causal factor of this story is that Sam Ervin, like other mid-century Southern Democrats, built his reputation and secured his seat by opposing civil rights. As a by-product of this, Ervin had inadvertently captured a pool of conservative voters on other issues, too. In the Governor's race, when the Democratic candidate had abandoned this position, freed racially conservative voters to move to the Republican party.

To empirically test this claim, Figure 5.2.B runs a series of multivariate regressions that includes both civil rights and each of the other policy dimensions as a predictor of whether voters sorted into the Republican party. For example, the top orange

Figure 5.2: Policy Attitudes as Predictor of Sorting



Each point in Panel A is the regression coefficient from regressing a binary indicator of whether someone who voted for Sam Ervin flipped to the Republican candidate in the Gubernatorial race. Each pair of points in Panel B are the regression coefficients from the multivariate model: $Sort = CivilRts + OtherAttitude$.

regression coefficient in Figure 5.2 shows that holding attitudes on civil rights constant, having conservative attitudes towards urban unrest does not predict sorting into the Republican party (at standard levels of statistical significance). Across each issue, civil rights is a statistically significant and stronger measure of sorting between the Democratic and Republican parties. This aligns with the substantive mechanism that attitudes towards civil rights really facilitated sorting in the 1960s.

I repeat this analysis with two other pools of races. First, I compare North Carolina voters that supported a racially conservative Democrat in the House race, but sorted to the Republican candidate in the governor's race (Gardner, the Republican candidate, opposed the 1968 Civil Rights Act while Scott, the Democratic candidate, supported civil rights). I denote "racially conservative" Democrats in this analysis as those that voted against the 1968 Civil Rights Act. If the candidate was not in Congress in 1968, I code a candidate as "racially conservative" if local news coverage labels them as opposing key civil rights measures such as school integration or open housing.

I do this again using a sample of voters from Florida. Florida's Senate race featured two candidates that had "sorted" on race. Ed Gurney, the Republican candidate, opposed civil rights. The Democratic candidate, Leroy Collins, although not a racial liberal, expressed what were unpopular positions on civil rights in mid-century South and urged Floridians to accept integration of public spaces and the equal treatment of blacks. His obituary noted that as a result of his positions on civil rights Collins, "...was derided by opponents as 'Liberal LeRoy"' (Fowler 1991).

Table 5.1: North Carolina: Democratic House & Republican Gov.

	(1) Civil Rts	(2) Urban Unrest	(3) Vietnam	(4) Defense	(5) Environment	(6) Medicare	(7) Social Sec
Switch	0.287***	0.262***	0.088	0.299***	-0.085	0.276**	0.231**
	(0.067)	(0.076)	(0.068)	(0.077)	(0.103)	(0.112)	(0.114)
Constant	0.015	-0.041	0.098	-0.063	0.135**	0.075	0.079
	(0.066)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.079)	(0.063)	(0.061)	(0.062)
N	261	289	268	276	268	284	291

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Rights	0.210***	0.279***	0.268***	0.306***	0.225***	0.280***
	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.069)
Urban Unrest	0.149					
	(0.093)					
Vietnam		0.090				
		(0.071)				
Defense			0.315***			
			(0.078)			
Environment				-0.122		
				(0.110)		
Medicare					0.209*	
					(0.119)	
Social Sec						0.078
						(0.123)
Constant	-0.041	0.000	-0.165**	0.026	0.012	0.010
	(0.080)	(0.077)	(0.084)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.067)
N	252	236	242	239	248	252

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

The results are consistent across each race. Voters that support the racially conservative Democrat in the House race, but not the racially liberal Democrat in the Senate race are much more conservative on race and other policy views. This finding aligns with the central thesis of the dissertation: the racial realignment led voters to switch parties and in doing so, they brought conservative preferences on other policies with them. Moreover, civil rights, with the exception of urban unrest in the Florida case, appears to the empirical driver of sorting.

Table 5.2: Florida: Democratic House & Republican Senate

	(1) Civil Rts	(2) Urban Unrest	(3) Vietnam	(4) Defense	(5) Environment	(6) Medicare	(7) Social Sec
Switch	0.264***	0.407***	0.143	0.217**	-0.015	0.283**	0.475***
	(0.091)	(0.102)	(0.088)	(0.105)	(0.159)	(0.132)	(0.142)
Constant	0.220**	0.069	0.306***	0.213**	0.376***	0.280***	0.268***
	(0.090)	(0.107)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.075)	(0.083)	(0.077)
N	187	199	190	192	192	189	194

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Rights	0.146	0.222**	0.277***	0.281***	0.241**	0.165*
	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.090)	(0.095)	(0.098)	(0.095)
Urban Unrest	0.306***					
	(0.113)					
Vietnam		0.110				
		(0.095)				
Defense			0.221**			
			(0.103)			
Environment				-0.060		
				(0.159)		
Medicare					0.193	
					(0.137)	
Social Sec						0.409***
						(0.152)
Constant	0.044	0.176	0.020	0.196**	0.139	0.163*
	(0.111)	(0.116)	(0.117)	(0.091)	(0.095)	(0.091)
N	183	174	179	178	176	177

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

A positive coefficient means that voters that supported the segregationist Democrat in the House Race, but supported the Republican candidate when a racially liberal Democrat was on the ticket, hold more conservative attitudes than those that supported the Democratic candidate in both the House and State level races. Regression include district fixed effects.

5.1.2 Texas, 1964

Texas politics in the 1950s and 1960s featured a range of candidates of different ideological stripes. I compare three state-wide Texas politicians in 1964 that embodied these ideological differences: 1) John Tower, the first Republican to be elected in the

South since Reconstruction, was a racial conservative who vehemently opposed the 1960s civil rights acts; 2) the governor, Democrat John Connally, who although an ally of Lyndon Johnson, opposed the integration of public spaces in the 1964 Civil Rights Act and made antagonistic statements towards the civil rights movement (Associated Press 1964); 3) the liberal Democratic Senator Ralph Yarborough, leader of the Texas' Democrats progressive wing and advocate of civil rights.

Table 5.3: Candidate Favorability & Issue Attitudes

Panel A

	Integration	School Prayer
Favor Connally (D)	0.64	0.66
Prefer Same	0.74	0.68
Favor Tower (R)	0.80	0.76

Panel B

	Integration	School Prayer
Favor Yarborough (D)	0.57	0.60
Prefer Same	0.70	0.66
Favor Tower (R)	0.87	0.80

Although vote choice are unavailable for these politicians, the poll asks respondents if they approve or disapprove of these three officials. The poll also asks about racial integration and allowing prayer in public schools; an issue that became central to the culture wars in the 1970s and 1980s but in 1964, was not yet a campaign issue. Table 5.3 breaks favorability between these candidates by integration and prayer. While Connally and Tower's base do not overlap on civil rights, these pools of voters are less polarized when compared to those divided between Tower and Yarborough. Likewise, the divide between Yarborough-Tower on school prayer is nearly twice the divide between Connally-Tower. Like in the previous case studies, the absence of a segregationist Democrat on the ticket frees voters to sort into the Republican party and bring conservative views on other policy issues with them.

To examine what is driving the sorting, I isolate voters that favor Tower to Yarborough but not Tower to Connally (sorters). I compare this set of voters with those that are more supportive of both Yarborough and Connally (stayers). Table 5.4 presents the results of these models: while attitudes on school prayer are indicative of sorting, the effect of prayer on switching are swamped by attitudes on racial equality. This aligns with the hypothesis that realignment on account race, polarized the parties' bases on other policy dimensions, too.

A key point is that in Texas in 1964, voters were not evaluating candidates on school prayer as they would in the 1980s. A search of local newspapers show not a single article mentioning prayer with any of the candidates in 1964. Sorting occurred as a byproduct of emerging racial divides between Democratic and Republican candidates.

And when school prayer does become a key political issue, those opposed to school prayer are predisposed to the Democratic party and those in favor of school prayer to the Republican party.[2]

Table 5.4: Issue Attitudes and Sorting

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Integration	0.505***		0.474***
	(0.177)		(0.178)
School Prayer		0.314**	0.210
		(0.139)	(0.139)
Constant	0.217	0.376***	0.082
	(0.156)	(0.120)	(0.179)
N	173	181	173

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Positive coefficients mean that switchers are more conservative than stayers.

5.1.3 Pooled Analysis of the U.S. South, 1964-1980

This section repeats the previous analysis, but pools together elections across years and states using data from the American National Election Study. I isolate House races in the U.S. South between 1964 and 1980 where a Democrat who opposed either the 1964 or 1968 civil rights act is still on the ballot. I then compare voters who voted for the Democrat in the House race, but vote for the Republican party in the Senate or Governor's race. Again, the idea is to isolate voters who in one race have candidates that overlap on civil rights, but in the second race have candidates that are divided on civil rights (in the liberal-Democrat and conservative-Republican fashion).

These data have the advantage of examining various issues that are not available on state level surveys, which are sparse in the 1960s and 1970s, but have the disadvantage of containing few observations in any state-district-year pairing. Table 5.5 presents the results for different issue attitudes that are asked frequently over this time period. The results align with the state level analysis. Democratic voters that sort into the Republican party, are primarily driven by racial views (models 1-6). For example, model 5 shows that going from the most liberal to most conservative on aid to minorities, increases the probably of switching by about 18 percentage points. Furthermore, controlling for racial attitudes (models 7-10), mediates the effect other policy attitudes

[2]In the case of Ralph Yarborough, he ultimately did oppose prayer in public school and many believe that position contributed to his defeat in the 1970 primary against the more socially conservative Lloyd Bentsen (Cox 2002, 272-273).

have on sorting. For example, model 1 shows that going from most liberal to conservative on abortion policy increases the probability of sorting by nearly 25 percentage points. However, model 7 shows that this sorting on abortion is reducible to racial attitudes.

Table 5.5: Policy Attitudes as Predictors of Party Switching in the U.S. South, 1964-1980

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Abortion	0.246*						0.213			
	(0.131)						(0.145)			
School Pray		0.078							0.082	
		(0.083)							(0.086)	
Vietnam			0.095							0.094
			(0.080)							(0.100)
Govt Jobs				0.110				0.046		
				(0.104)				(0.122)		
Aid Minorities					0.182**		0.435***	0.231*		
					(0.089)		(0.132)	(0.140)		
Segregation						0.157**			0.132	0.157*
						(0.067)			(0.086)	(0.094)
Constant	0.127	0.159	0.119	0.474*	-0.009	0.022	0.118	0.261	0.016	0.043
	(0.253)	(0.100)	(0.101)	(0.244)	(0.115)	(0.089)	(0.328)	(0.300)	(0.126)	(0.106)
N	124	205	179	144	210	297	110	132	138	140

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Data are from pooling the 1964-1980 ANES. All models include year and state fixed effects.

5.1.4 General Elections in Non-Southern States

This dissertation argues that when parties are divided by matters of racial equality, they tend to be divided across a range of other policy issues as well. The previous section isolated cases where the Democrat in one race was a racial liberal and the Democrat in the second race was a conservative. However, the South realigned on race much later than other non-Southern states whose state parties had already begun sorting on civil rights by the 1940s (Chen 2007; Schickler 2016). A lack of public opinion data from state level races in this era prevent a similar analysis.

However, the limited data that do exist allow a cross-sectional analysis of the states. The expectation is that general election contests, or state parties more generally, that are marked by deep racial divides are more likely to have sorted on other social policy issues, too. Of the states in the sample, this generally appears to be true.

For example, leading California Republicans in the 1950s, such as Thomas Kuchel or Earl Warren were liberal on civil rights. Yet Ronald Reagan's ascendancy in the California Republican party shifted this dynamic. In the 1966 gubernatorial election, in which Reagan defeated Pat Brown, Figure 5.3 shows that Reagan voters held con-

siderably more conservative views on housing discrimination, as well as gun control and the environment. However, Reagan voters are slightly to the left of Brown voters on abortion, many of whom are Catholic.

In California, unlike the southern states, the rise of racial conservatives in the Republican party is likely pinned on the emergence of African Americans as a strong Democratic constituency in non-Southern states after the New Deal. In a study of the 1946 California gubernatorial race, Chen, Mickey and Van Houweling (2008) find that Republican vote choice was already negatively associated with voting for Proposition 11 – a ballot measure that would strengthen fair employment protections for minorities. This is despite Republican governor Earl Warren never opposing fair employment standards.

Yet in other states, candidates and parties did not polarize along racial lines in the 1960s. For example, Minnesota did not generally experience deep partisan divisions on civil rights; both state parties endorsed civil rights in the 1960s and candidates for office in the 1960s generally reflect this consensus. For example, in the 1966 Minnesota election, Karl Rolvaag, the Democratic-Farm-Laborer candidate competed against Republican Harold LeVandar. These candidates differed little on civil rights and their voter base reflect this overlap. Consistent with this theory, candidates who overlap on racial policies also tend to overlap on other social policies, too.

Finally, because the parties had still contained heterogeneity in the 1960s and 1970s, some elections featured races where the Republican candidate was more racially liberal. In the 1978 Massachusetts Senate Race, liberal Republican Ed Brooke, an African-American and staunch advocate for civil rights during his career in the U.S. Senate, campaigned against Democrat Paul Tsongas a socially liberal, although fiscally conservative Democrat. Although Tsongas was not a racial conservative, Brooke developed a more liberal voting record on social policy than Tsongas during their respective Senate careers and Brooke touted his strong record on civil rights (Sokal 2014, 180). Furthermore, in the 1978 election, in the midst of the Boston busing controversy, Brooke vocally supported the continuation of busing while Tsongas, presumably to avoid alienating working class whites, stayed quiet on the issue. Figure 5.3 breaks down Brook-Tsongas voters' attitudes on abortion and although both candidates were pro-choice, abortion liberals were more supportive of Brooke.

5.2 Primary Elections

While racial policies eventually came to divide the Republican and Democratic parties in both the South and non-South, intra-party ideological divides also existed. In parts of the South, racially liberal Democrats campaigned against segregationist Democrats in the primaries, pitting "New South" Democrats against the region's old guard. Intra-party heterogeneity existed outside the South, too, pitting socially liberal

Figure 5.3: Issue Attitudes and State General Elections

Policy attitudes by state races. Higher values are more conservative.

and conservatives Republicans against each other in the party primaries. The theory would predict that primary contests or intra-party factional divides marked by race and civil rights should also internally divide the party by other policy issues, too.

This became particularly stark in Texas where by the 1950s, a number of Democrats adopted moderate to liberal positions on civil rights. Most notably are Lyndon Johnson and Jim Wright (who decades later became speaker of the House in the 1980s).

Although a lack of data preclude a more systematic analysis, the 1968 Texas Gubernatorial election presents an interesting example. Gubernatorial candidate Don Yarborough, a liberal Democrat who supported the civil rights movement competed in the primary run-off election against Preston Smith, a conservative Southern Democrat. Smith won the primary and then went on to win in the general election, too. Figure 5.4 shows that Yarborough attracted voters that were much more liberal on gun control than did Smith. However, Yarborough and Smith were not campaigning for votes on the issue of gun control as candidates might do so today. This schism likely arose because racial conservatives hold more conservative views on gun control and this primary race, which divided candidates by civil rights, inadvertently divided candidates on other issues, too.

A similar process emerges in California, but within the Republican party which until the 1960s, was dominated by socially liberal Republicans. Reagan, the conservative candidate for governor in 1966, receives more support from racial conservatives than George Christopher, his liberal Republican opponent (Christopher was the last Republican mayor of San Francisco). Reagan also receives more support from abortion, gun and environmental conservatives, too. This is despite Reagan not yet developing a reputation as a pro-life or anti-gun control candidate. In fact, Reagan reluctantly signed one of the earliest state laws relaxing abortion restrictions in 1967.[3] Again, these divides likely emerged because the candidate's primary bases were divided on racial issues, and because racial issues overlap other social views, they are divided on these other matters, too.

These intra-Republican divides extended beyond races involving Reagan. For example, in the 1968 Republican primary for the U.S. Senate, Max Rafferty – a very conservative Republican who opposed the civil rights movement, attracted more conservative voters on gun control, too, when compared to Thomas Kuchel, a liberal Republican and supporter of civil rights (Morain 2014).

A still similar pattern emerges in the 1978 Massachusetts Senate election. Edward Brooke (a social liberal) ran against Avi Nelson, a socially conservative Republican who among other things, later worked in the Reagan administration. Although race was not the only divisive social issue of the primary race, it was a central fault line and compounded by the fact that Brooke was the only African American in the Senate at that time (Sokal 2014, 179). Brooke embraced school busing while Nelson opposed it. Figure 5.4 shows that voters divided between the two candidates along abortion abortion lines, too: Nelson voters were more conservative than Brooke voters. This underscores a key point: campaigns that are divided by issues of racial equality, tend

[3]Reagan expressed his doubts shortly after signing the bill into law. Furthermore, the bill allowed abortions in traumatic cases — such as rape, incest or the life of the mother was in danger. Even by the late 1960s, a consensus had emerged even among many conservatives, and would solidify, that abortions should be allowed in these cases (Franklin and Kosaki 1989). Fights over abortion access after the late 1960s really became about elective abortions.

to be divided on other social policies, too.

In the Democratic primary, Paul Tsongas ran against Paul Guzzi, who later led the Massachusetts chamber of Commerce and served as chief of staff to Massachusetts' conservative governor Ed King. Like in the Republican primary, Guzzi, the conservative candidate, received more anti-abortion support than did Tsongas.

Figure 5.4: Issue Attitudes and State Primary Elections



However, not all parties or primaries were internally divided by racial issues. The 1966 Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor (DFL) primary pitted a younger, more liberal, Sandy Keith against the incumbent governor Karl Rolvaag.[4] Yet it does not

[4]This campaign was bitter in part because Keith served as Rolvaag's Lt. Governor before challenging

appear that civil rights was the divisive issue (with Rolvaag receiving marginally more support from racial liberals). Voters for the two candidates also held similar positions on abortion and gun control. This is despite Keith being the more liberal candidate on abortion — Keith actually introduced a bill to liberalize abortion laws in the Minnesota state legislature in 1966 (Milton 2012, 198). The lack of issue voting here is probably the result of abortion and gun control being minor political issues in 1966. Yet the lesson is consistent: electoral coalitions that overlap on racial issues tend to overlap on other policy views, too.

To conclude, this analysis is suggestive that while parties remained heterogeneous in the 1960s and 1970s, voter sorting had already occurred between racially liberal and conservative factions within each party's primary. That conservative Republicans were receiving more support from environmental, gun and abortion conservatives than their liberal Republican opponents is suggestive that a cohesive package of issues followed different types of candidates around, even when those candidates were from the same party.

5.3 Conclusion & Discussion

This chapter shows that attitudes towards and race and civil rights drove conservative Southern Democrats from the Democratic party once Republican and Democratic candidates had sorted on civil rights. However, sorting as a result of racial attitudes had a side-effect: it also induced sorting on other non-racial dimensions that correlated with race. For example, when North Carolinians who supported segregationist Sam Ervin in the Senate election, switched to the Republican Jim Gardner in the gubernatorial election, they brought with them a host of conservative views on Vietnam, defense spending and urban unrest.

These findings also speak to a long-standing debate on the cause of racial realignment in the U.S. South. While many scholars view the Democrat's embrace of civil rights as the driving factor for Southern realignment, other scholars have argued that as the South economically developed, the region became more supportive of economic conservatism which drove realignment (see Kuziemko and Washington 2018 for overview and new evidence on this debate). These data suggest that race was the primary factor and that because racial conservatives were also more economically conservative, the racial realignment brought a pool of economic conservatives into the GOP.

Sub-national races, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, also present potential insight into party adaptation in the 20th century. While liberal Democrats today know that they should also be pro-choice and favor gun control, this was less obvious in the 1960s and 1970s. A central question then is how do parties, which operated as diffuse networks, learn which set of policy positions to take?

---

him in the primary.

Sub-national races, perhaps because they are smaller and more numerous, create an opportunity for national candidates and parties to learn or adapt certain issues. Partisan divisions that emerge at the national level, spring up at the state level first. In the case of civil rights, Chen (2007) and Schickler (2016) find that in the political North, Democratic state parties were more supportive of civil rights than Republicans by the mid-1940s. This preceded national party polarization on civil rights by nearly two decades and provided a model for the national Democratic party.

A similar adaptation process occurred on other issues, too. For example, in 1970, the California Democratic Convention endorsed liberalized abortion laws. In response, several Catholic church's in Southern California allied with the California Republican party to re-register their Democratic parishoners as Republicans. National Republican leaders watched the events unfold in California to see if abortion could successfully flip Democratic Catholics to the GOP, a strategy Nixon later (briefly) adopted (King 1970, reprinted in Greenhouse and Siegel 2012).

A more systematic analysis of state parties reveals that state parties did polarize on "culture war" issues before the national parties did. In a sample of 12 states, Carr et al. (2016) find that by 1968, two Democratic state parties (Washington and Minnesota) had already adopted platforms which supported liberalizing abortion laws. Other Democratic, and then Republican, state parties followed. By 1976, five of the twelve state Democratic parties in their sample had already taken a position in favor of liberalizing abortion policy. Of the 600 state platforms Carr et al. analyzed, only three Democratic state party platforms (Minnesota in 1974 and South Dakota in 1976 and 1978) ever supported more restrictive abortion policies. Only two state Republican parties supported liberalizing the policy (Maine in 1990 and Iowa in 1972). A similar pattern unfolded on gay rights in the states. The Democratic party in Washington state first supported gay rights in 1970; the first Republican party to oppose gay rights was Texas in 1978. And by 1978, over half of state Democratic parties already came out in favor, in one form or the other, on gay rights.

The analysis in this chapter fits somewhat with this model; partisan divisions that emerged between presidential party coalitions represented voter coalitions in state level races. However, these divisions emerge along ideological, not partisan lines. While parties remained ideologically heterogeneous in the 1970s, liberal and conservative candidates within the same party had already developed followings that would later be adopted by national level candidates. That conservative Republicans were receiving more support from environmental, gun and abortion conservatives than their liberal Republican opponents by the mid-1960s is suggestive of a cohesive package of issues followed different types of candidates around, even before candidates campaigned on these issues.

This suggests that party adaptation is more refined than learning what strategies co-partisans employ because there is so much intra-party heterogeneity in this era. Rather than candidates learning from co-partisans, it is more likely that candidates

learned from other candidates that aligned with them on broader ideological grounds. Indeed, it would be odd for a racially conservative Republican candidate in North Carolina to ignore intra-party divisions and adapt the positions of more racially liberal Republican candidates like Ed Brooke or Thomas Kuchel.

Although difficult to establish a pathway of causality, observing that certain types of candidates succeed by campaigning on certain issues incentives others, particularly in an uncertain environment, to adopt similar positions (Hershey 1984). For example, in the 1978 election, pro-life groups claimed (somewhat plausibly) that six liberal Senators lost to conservative Republicans on the basis of being pro-choice. Whether true or not, this propelled other conservative Republican candidates to adopt similar positions (Hershey 1984).

The fact that packages of liberal issue positions the national Democratic party ultimately adopted in the 1980s had already surfaced in state level candidates in the 1960s and 1970s suggests that national level candidates had less room to maneuver than convention theories of party realignment would suggest (e.g., Scickler 2016; Carr et al. 2016).

Chapter 6

Cross Pressured Voters

Chapter 3 shows that voters that are racially liberal have long held what consider today to be more liberal positions on effectively every other policy issue. However, what happens when voters are liberal on race, but conservative on abortion or gun control?

In his classic essay, Converse (1964, 4) argues that different idea elements vary in their centrality to a belief system and when two elements are in conflict, people change the less central issue. Scholarship addresses this question primarily with respect to issues and party. When voters realize their party identification and issue preferences are incongruent, do voters change their party or change their policy position? Less research explores what happens when two issue attitudes are in "conflict" with one another. If a voter holds liberal economic positions and conservative racial positions, do voters update their economic views to align with their racial views, or vice versa? This chapter explores these cross-pressured voters.

Using panel data from the 1970s, I show that voters consistently update their views on non-racial attitudes to align with their pre-existing racial attitudes, but do not consistently shift racial attitudes to align with other views. I explore five potential mechanisms for this trend and find that two mechanisms do the bulk of the work. First, many policies such as crime and economic redistribution, if not explicitly, are implicitly about race (e.g., Gilens 1995; Mendelberg 2001). Voters who perceive, or learn, that ostensibly non-racialized policies have an underlying racial element, bring their views on these policies in line with their racial predispositions. Conversely, voters who do not perceive economic issues to be racialized, do not sort along this racial axis.

Second, ideological identification drives sorting along the racial axis. While some issues are not racialized, conflict over racial equality represented a core division between liberal and conservative by the 1960s (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1982). People know that African-Americans as a group had become aligned with liberals. Consequently, people sympathetic (opposed) to the civil rights movement updated their attitudes on issues of women's rights because they are on the same side of the ideological divide. This

does not require that voters understand what it means to be liberal or conservative, but that they recognize a salient cultural divide — such as the fight for racial equality — and update their attitudes on other issues which are visibly allied or opposed to this divide.

I then explore three other mechanisms often associated with polarization – party identification, religiosity and urbanicity – and find that the effect is not reducible to these three factors. Consistent with these data, I argue that in polarization's formative years, racial predispositions serve as a core axis driving opinion change on other attitudes.

This evidence underscores two core themes of this dissertation. First, it lends support for the centrality of race to contemporary polarization. Second, it highlights the feedback loop that exists between mass-level preferences and elite signals. Ordinary people have already clustered together racial attitudes with other policy views and elites, at least in the 1970s, crystallize this pre-existing issue connection. However, this leadership is constrained to accentuating already existing clusters of public opinion.

6.1 Theory: Why Sort by Racial Attitudes?

This chapter's core empirical finding is that people update their attitudes on non-racial policies to align with their pre-existing views on race. For example, a racial conservative becomes more conservative on economic policies over time, but the reverse does not consistently happen. This section outlines why voters may do this.

Attitudes towards racial equality are a core predisposition: they are a durable value that structure the types of information that people accept (Zaller 1992, 23-24). First, public opinion between black and white respondents on race targeted policies has historically been polarized (Hutchings and Valentino 2004, 389). Second, unlike more abstract policies, scholars characterize race as an "easy issue" for which people are easily able to form, and then express, an opinion (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989). Third, while the mass public expresses unstable preferences on many issues over time, racial attitudes, like party identification, are durable (Converse 1964; Freeder, Lenz and Turney 2019; Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). Fourth, racial prejudice is socialized at an early age and even if opinion on specific policies change, anti (or pro) black affect is durable (Kinder and Sears 1981). In short, racial attitudes are stable, widely held, deeply felt and often learned from an early age.

Consequently, I argue that racial prejudice is a psychological attachment, like party identification or ideological identification, that shapes views of the political world and pushes voters to align their attitudes on other issues to match the group norm (Campbell et al. 1960; Jacoby 1991, 180; Conover and Feldman 1981). For issues that are implicitly racial, such as crime and welfare, voters may bring their attitudes on these issues into line with their views on race because they perceive what racial groups

support or benefit from certain policies. In a working paper, Mitchell and O'Brian (n.d.) show that while many voters in the 1970s did not know where the parties or ideological groups stood on many issues, they did know what policies racial groups preferred (e.g., blacks more likely to prefer economic redistribution). Those that place African-Americans to the left of whites on economic issues (for example) and expressed affect towards racial groups, tend to show more constraint between issue elements and expressed more stable attitudes over time. Consequently, "learning" which side of an issue groups stand, may lead voters to align their economic and racial attitudes. This closely aligns with experimental evidence which shows that telling people policies are implicitly racial, shifts those attitudes (e.g., Gilens 1995; Mendelberg 2001).

On other issues, racial attitudes proxy broader ideological identification. While some issues do not cleave on black-white lines, they divide along lines of those who are fighting and opposing racial equality. Part of this may be that race redefined what it meant to be a liberal or conservative in the 1960s (Carmines and Stimson 1982; Sears and Funk 1999). As people began to identify as liberal with issues beyond economic regulation, this created new attachments to broader labels of liberalism and conservatism. For example, the alliance between the women's rights movement and the civil rights movement visibly emerged before the parties divided on these issues. Consequently, respondents plausibly update their views on issues of women's rights to align with their prior racial attitudes upon learning that these causes are political allies. This does not require that voters understand what it means to be liberal or conservative, but that they recognize a salient cultural divide — such as the fight for racial equality — and update their attitudes accordingly.

An important element of this theory is political context. First, for racial attitudes to serve as a group identity, racial conflict needs to be salient (e.g., Conover 1984). This varies both across time and between communities. In the 1960s and 1970s, fights over race were particularly salient across the political spectrum and represented a core political cleavage. Not only was race salient, but party identification was historically weak in this period. Throughout the 1970s, the number of voters identifying as independents swelled and split-ticket voting spiked among whites (e.g., Converse 1976; Aldrich 2011, 262). Still further, the parties lacked clear positions on now salient issues such as abortion, pollution, women's rights and gun control. Given the weakness of parties in the electorate, it is in such an era that the effect of other cultural identities or groups would strengthen. This aligns with Engelhardt (2020) who finds a shifting effect of racial attitudes on other policy positions over time. Once party polarization hardened party views in the electorate, party tends to drive racial attitudes. In the 1990s, when the parties in the electorate continued to shift, racial views effected party identification and sometimes party identification effected respondent's racial views.

Data

This chapter is focused on finding what happens to people who hold "conflicting" policy views. To explore this question, I use data primarily from the 1972-1976 panel portion of the American National Election Studies. I use a cross-lagged dependent variable model expressed by the following form:

$$Marijuana_{1976} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 Aidblack_{1972} + \gamma_1 Marijuana_{1972} \quad (6.1)$$

$$Aidblack_{1976} = \alpha_2 + \beta_2 Marijuana_{1972} + \gamma_2 Aidblack_{1972} \quad (6.2)$$

Unlike cross-sectional data, this model helps understand whether racial views shape other policy views, if the reverse is true, or if the relationship is reciprocal. In equation (1), β_1 shows whether attitudes regarding aid to minorities in 1972 can explain change in marijuana attitudes between 1972 and 1976, holding prior marijuana attitudes constant. In equation (2), β_2 shows the reverse: can changes in attitudes on aid to minorities be attributed to prior attitudes on marijuana?

I repeat these models for each question asked on both the 1972 and 1976 National Election Study. The motivation for this test is to ask whether racial attitudes are central to political belief systems. If race is the more central element, respondents should change their attitudes on marijuana to match their racial attitudes (equation 1), but not change their racial attitudes to match their prior attitudes towards marijuana (equation 2). These tests examine whether voters are sorting along this racial axis, much like other studies ask whether voters sort based on party.[1]

Lagged dependent variable models show how variables respond to each other between given points in time, but it is also theoretically and substantively important to consider how given attitudes were formed before time 1 (in this case 1972). For example, if people update their racial attitudes to match their prior marijuana attitudes, where did the marijuana attitudes come from? Marijuana attitudes may simply be endogenous to ideological and party identification (the next section explores this empirically). A core theoretical point is that racial attitudes form at an early age and are "pre-political" in ways that other attitudes, such as economic redistribution or marijuana use, are not.

As a reminder, I focus on data from the 1970s because I am interested in what drove the initial alignment of issue connections observed in chapter 3 before attitudes had become crystallized in the party system. Studying the 1970s differs from studying the 2010s (for example) when attitudes towards abortion or gun control have been cemented into the electorate by a generation of voters socialized into the post-1970s party system (e.g., Carmines and Stimson 1989; Stoker and Jennings 2008).

[1]It is more difficult to conclude if race causes policy views on other issue dimensions (but see Mendelberg 2001; Tesler 2012).

Empirical Evidence

Table 6.1 shows that across policy issues, voters consistently update their non-racial attitudes to match their initial racial attitudes. For example, model 1 in Table 6.1 shows that racial conservatives are about .115 points more likely to move in the conservative direction on rights of the accused compared to racial liberals between 1972 and 1976.

To test for a reciprocal relationship, I repeat the process, but use the aid to minorities question as the dependent variable. Table 6.2 shows that on only rights of the accused, government provided health insurance and government guarantee of jobs does the relationship work in the opposite direction (at the conventional level of statistical significance).

The fact that voters update other attitudes to match their prior racial attitudes, but do not do so in reverse, suggests that racial attitudes are the more central predisposition. Is this pattern unique to the racial dimension, or could other policies being shaping other attitudes, too? For example, fights over abortion rights gained increasing political salience in the 1960s and 1970s and remain a core feature of the culture wars. Likewise fights over taxation became political touchstone and grew inter-related with race and other cultural battles that still reverberate in elections today (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 116-136). Are voters not also updating their views to align with abortion or taxation? Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 suggests that respondents did not update their other policy views to align with their attitudes on abortion or taxation. Indeed, the electorate appears to depolarize along this abortion axis. Even though people have stable abortion attitudes by the 1970s, this evidence suggests that abortion lacks a central position in people's political belief systems in the 1970s.

Table 6.1: Sorting on Racial Axis, 1972-1976

	(1) Accuse76	(2) Women76	(3) Marijuana76	(4) Unrest76	(5) Tax76	(6) Ins76	(7) Jobs76	(8) Abortion76	(9) Defense76	(10) Pollution76
AidBlack 72	0.115***	0.105***	0.148***	0.199***	0.084**	0.175***	0.216***	0.046*	0.136***	0.193***
	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.069)
Lagged DV	0.420***	0.455***	0.577***	0.209***	0.290***	0.440***	0.342***	0.646***	0.277***	0.229***
	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.076)
Constant	0.280***	0.125***	0.178***	0.225***	0.340***	0.203***	0.285***	0.151***	0.579***	0.212***
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.032)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.032)	(0.042)
N	967	1005	946	425	906	453	947	1025	559	464

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 6.2: AidBlack as DV, 1972-1976

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Rts Accuse 72	0.091***									
	(0.027)									
Women Eq. 72		0.023								
		(0.024)								
Marijuana 72			0.046*							
			(0.025)							
Urban Unrest 72				0.045						
				(0.042)						
Tax Wlthy 72					0.030					
					(0.024)					
Govt Ins 72						0.104***				
						(0.033)				
Govt Jobs 72							0.172***			
							(0.030)			
Abortion 72								0.010		
								(0.028)		
Defense Sp 72									0.048*	
									(0.026)	
Pollution 72										0.035
										(0.044)
Lagged DV	0.428***	0.450***	0.446***	0.439***	0.450***	0.408***	0.393***	0.459***	0.465***	0.462***
	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Constant	0.300***	0.322***	0.300***	0.311***	0.318***	0.309***	0.258***	0.321***	0.301***	0.312***
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.025)
N	967	1003	987	454	940	482	950	996	521	462

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 6.3: Sorting on views towards taxing the wealthy, 1972-1976

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Accuse76	Women76	Marijuana76	Unrest76	Tax76	Ins76	Jobs76	Abortion76	Defense76	Pollution76
Tax Wealthy 72	0.030	-0.010	-0.019	0.027	-0.015	0.040	0.073***	-0.038*	0.053	0.046
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.061)
Lagged DV	0.450***	0.459***	0.480***	0.606***	0.295***	0.482***	0.386***	0.641***	0.282***	0.277***
	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.077)
Constant	0.318***	0.324***	0.180***	0.231***	0.305***	0.259***	0.347***	0.191***	0.624***	0.299***
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.040)
N	940	932	971	921	401	450	920	999	550	448

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 6.4: Sorting on views on Abortion, 1972-1976

	(1) Accuse76	(2) Women76	(3) Marijuana76	(4) Unrest76	(5) Tax76	(6) Ins76	(7) Jobs76	(8) Abortion76	(9) Defense76	(10) Pollution76
Abortion 72	0.010	-0.030	0.205***	0.133***	0.069	-0.114***	-0.001	-0.038	0.047	0.195***
	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.046)	(0.067)
Lagged DV	0.459***	0.447***	0.428***	0.568***	0.257***	0.295***	0.473***	0.414***	0.269***	0.281***
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.072)
Constant	0.321***	0.334***	0.106***	0.209***	0.272***	0.430***	0.283***	0.374***	0.631***	0.232***
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.038)
N	996	978	1049	1005	432	923	464	971	587	491

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

6.2 Mechanisms

The previous section establishes that voters align their attitudes on non-racial policies with their prior racial attitudes. The question then becomes why does this happen? This section explores five possible explanations: party identification, ideology, group-based policy learning, urbanicity and religiosity. While effects differ across issue areas, I argue this sorting primarily works through 1) voters learning that certain policies benefit or are supported by different racial groups and 2) ideological identification.

Group Learning

One explanation for sorting along the racial dimensions is that people are learning that ostensibly non-racial policies, are in fact, quite racial. Indeed, political efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, focused on dog-whistling that crime, drugs and economic welfare programs are racial (e.g., Mendelberg 2001; Hillygus and Shields 2009). As racial conservatives (liberals) learn that policies have become associated with a racial out-group (in-group), this should effect their perceptions of the policy.[2]

To test this, I used a series of questions asked by the American National Election Study (ANES) in the 1970s. The ANES asked what voters thought "most whites" and "most blacks" believed on certain policies. For example, in addition to asking respondents where they place themselves on a policy scale (e.g., government guarantee of jobs from 1 to 7) the ANES also asks where respondents believe most whites/blacks fall on the scale (on a select number of questions, see Figure 6.1). On each policy view, voters perceived blacks to hold more liberal views than whites (Sniderman and Brady 1985; and on each policy asked, blacks do have more liberal views).

I subset the sample based on whether voters perceive that "most blacks" are more supportive of the various policies when compared to "most whites." If people perceive that certain economic policies benefit or are supported by African Americans, those voters might reasonably change their attitudes on economic policies to align with their racial attitudes. If people do not know that certain policies benefit or are supported by various racial groups, it is less clear why they would update their attitudes.

The left panel of Figure 6.1 shows that among those who perceive differences between racial groups, voters are bringing their attitudes on secondary policy questions into line with their attitudes on aid to minorities. Among those that perceive no difference between the groups, voters change their attitudes to a lesser degree, or not at all.

I then subset respondents that do not know the racial group positions in 1972, but learn them by 1976. Unfortunately, data limit issues which can be examined, but for available data, the results are clear: learning racial group positions induces sorting along racial attitudes. The right panel of Figure 6.1 shows that those that

[2] Michael Tesler (e.g., 2012) finds similar patterns in the Obama era.

learn between 1972 and 1976 that blacks are more supportive of whites on questions of rights of the accused and government provided jobs are bringing their attitudes on these two issues into line with their previous attitudes on government aid to minorities. This behavior aligns with similar analysis on party identification and issue attitudes (Carsey and Layman 2006). When voters know where the parties stand on issues, they bring their policy views in line with party.

Figure 6.1: Sorting by Knowledge of Racial Groups



Ideological Self-Placement

While some issues are racialized (e.g., economic redistribution, rights of the accused), other issues are not. For example, women's rights, abortion policy and the environment have not been heavily racialized issues. This provokes the question as to why voters would be updating their abortion views with their racial views.

Figure 6.2: Support for Integrating Public Schools (Gallup, Dec. 1954)



One explanation is that African-Americans as a group became increasingly aligned with liberalism in the post-New Deal, and then post-Civil Rights, political arena. While parties in the 1970s were at a low point, ideological identification had already begun to align with the now familiar left-right pattern on race and other social issues. The emergence of civil rights as a major national political issue fundamentally transformed the definition of liberal and conservative in politics. Figure 6.2 shows that by 1954, although Democratic identifiers are more conservative on integrating public schools than Republicans, those that identify as a liberal in politics are to the left on integration compared to those that identify as "conservative."[3]

Consequently, given the alignment of liberal identification with support for civil rights, sorting along the racial axis may be reducible to ideological identification. Ideological identification, like party, serves as a psychological attachment through which people filter outside political knowledge (Jacoby 1991, 180). Second, even if people do not associate with a broader ideology, they still recognize broader liberal and conservative divides overlap conflict on racial equality or other issues (e.g., Gilens 1995; Mitchell and O'Brian, n.d.). In other words, people know that African-Americans are liberals and liberals advocate for pollution control and women's rights.

[3]It is worth pausing on this fact: liberalism's association with support for civil rights preceded the Democratic party's leftward shift on civil rights in the 1960s. This contrasts a literature which argues the alignment of civil rights with liberalism occurred *after* the liberal party (the Democrats), came out aggressively in support for civil rights (Carmines and Stimson 1982). These data show this transformation had already occurred by at least the mid 1950s. This fits with Schickler (2016) who argues that economic and racial liberalism had become inter-linked by the 1940s.

Table 6.5 shows that controlling for ideology does mediate the relationship, although the effect of racial attitudes remains. This suggests that some of this effect stems from simply sorting by ideological self-placement.

Table 6.5: Controlling for Ideology, 1972-1976

	(1) Accuse76	(2) Women76	(3) Marijuana76	(4) Unrest76	(5) Tax76	(6) Ins76	(7) Jobs76	(8) Abortion76	(9) Defense76	(10) Pollution76
AidBlack 72	0.110***	0.058*	0.115***	0.133**	0.093**	0.167***	0.189***	0.020	0.127**	0.108
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.054)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.059)	(0.084)
Ideology 72	-0.070	0.171***	0.156***	0.159**	0.054	0.260***	0.170***	0.101**	0.196**	0.235**
	(0.053)	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.076)	(0.061)	(0.079)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.085)	(0.119)
Lagged DV	0.423***	0.462***	0.530***	0.265***	0.298***	0.407***	0.330***	0.654***	0.265***	0.271***
	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.048)	(0.033)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.083)
Constant	0.315***	0.051*	0.139***	0.159***	0.313***	0.093**	0.231***	0.109***	0.476***	0.122*
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.048)	(0.063)
N	832	834	791	375	775	383	811	831	459	403

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

However, many people do not identify as liberal or conservative; and between a quarter to a third of respondents simply state that they have not thought much about the issue (Kinder and Kalmoe 2017). In fact, in 1972 more than half of respondents rated themselves as neither liberal or conservative, or that they had not thought much about their ideological identification. I repeat the previous analysis with only these "non-ideologues." Table 6.6 shows that even among these non-ideologues, voters appear to be updating their policy views to align with race, although the results are dampened.

Table 6.6: Non-Ideologues, 1972-1976

	(1) Accuse76	(2) Women76	(3) Marijuana76	(4) Unrest76	(5) Tax76	(6) Ins76	(7) Jobs76	(8) Abortion76	(9) Defense76	(10) Pollution76
AidBlack 72	0.189***	0.074	0.096**	0.208***	0.005	0.052	0.231***	0.018	0.091	0.151
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.079)	(0.059)	(0.072)	(0.047)	(0.037)	(0.062)	(0.112)
Lagged DV	0.370***	0.414***	0.555***	0.161**	0.232***	0.402***	0.277***	0.615***	0.204***	0.172
	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.071)	(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.046)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.111)
Constant	0.306***	0.177***	0.241***	0.223***	0.402***	0.267***	0.282***	0.185***	0.681***	0.260***
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.047)	(0.071)
N	394	459	425	170	393	211	398	480	258	195

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

These results might be consistent with group-issue linkage: even if someone themselves does not identify as liberal or conservative, they know that African Americans and liberals are aligned as a group. Some evidence supports this view: Among respondents that mark that they are neither liberal or conservative, 61% do know that blacks, on average, are more liberal than whites (on general ideological self-placement).

However, these results also pose a puzzle: if ideological identification broadly explains shifts between 1972 and 1976, what then explains ideological self-placement to begin with? Scholars debate what feeds into ideological identification and find both

issues and political symbolism influence ideological self-placement (e.g., Jacoby 1991; Conover and Feldman 1981)? One explanation might be that racial views feed into changing ideological identification in the years prior to the 1970s (Sears and Funk 1999; Carmines and Stimson 1982). Consequently, ideological identification and racial views are picking up the same underlying construct.

To test for the effect in the 1970s, I subset respondents who report that they "haven't though much about" whether they are liberal or conservative in 1972, but do place themselves on the left-right scale in 1976. What underlying attitudes predict eventual placement? Figure 6.3 plots the coefficients from this test: of the various issues asked in 1972, racial attitudes best predict ideological self-placement four years later.

None of these coefficients are particularly large, but between issue attitudes, racial attitudes drive most of this change. Some issues are particularly surprising: mainly that party identification or attitudes towards Vietnam do not meaningfully inform the acquisition of ideology in the 1970s.

Figure 6.3: Predictors of Ideological Self Placement



Each coefficient predicts how well the given issue attitude in 1972 predicts ideological self-placement in 1976. Results are restricted to respondents who indicate "they haven't thought much about" their ideological self-placement.

6.3 Alternative Explanations

The previous set of analysis explored two mechanisms that seem to be driving sorting along the racial axis. The following sections explore alternative mechanisms that do not consistently drive the effect in this time period.

6.3.1 Partisan Identification

A large literature in political behavior research argues that party identification is the "unmoved mover" and lens through which people evaluate other political objects (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960). Consequently, party identification may drive this phenomenon. As new issues gain salience, voters bring their policy views into line with their party.

However, party may not operate in this manner during polarization's early years. Throughout the 1970s, the number of voters identifying as independents swelled and split-ticket voting spiked among whites (e.g., Converse 1976; Aldrich 2011, 262). Still further, the parties lacked clear positions on now salient issues such as abortion, pollution, women's rights and gun control. Consequently, partisan identification, the very lens with which political science believes voters so often interpret the political world, is weakened in this era (Alrich 2011, 263).

To examine whether the observed effect is reducible to party, Table 6.7 controls for party identification. First, racial divisions in 1972 consistently predict sorting on other policy dimensions, even after controlling for 1972 party identification. However, in only select cases does party identification predict sorting on other issue dimensions, controlling for racial attitudes.

Table 6.7: Party Identification, 1972-1976

	(1) Accuse76	(2) Women76	(3) Marijuana76	(4) Unrest76	(5) Tax76	(6) Ins76	(7) Jobs76	(8) Abortion76	(9) Defense76	(10) Pollution76
AidBlack 72	0.118***	0.097***	0.146***	0.178***	0.081**	0.162***	0.214***	0.052**	0.134***	0.187***
	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.048)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.049)	(0.070)
Party 72	0.003	0.011	0.035	0.122***	0.054	0.133***	0.137***	-0.019	0.043	-0.069
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.067)
Lagged DV	0.425***	0.460***	0.572***	0.212***	0.290***	0.413***	0.311***	0.646***	0.273***	0.223***
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.039)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.077)
Constant	0.277***	0.122***	0.165***	0.178***	0.316***	0.160***	0.243***	0.157***	0.561***	0.248***
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.035)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.051)
N	955	992	932	419	896	448	935	1011	553	457

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

These results fit with the view that party identification is the summation of various political attitudes (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998) rather than party identification being the lens through which people evaluate candidates and policy issues (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960). It also points to the shifting effect of party; once a political equilibrium is reached, party becomes a predominant factor. Yet in formative years, other social groups or issue attitudes play a larger role (e.g., Engelhardt 2020). Indeed, Carsey and Layman (2006) show that voters update their attitudes to fit with party only when they are aware of party differences. If the parties do not differ, as is true almost by default before an issue becomes salient, other factors would spark the initial alignment.

6.3.2 Religiosity

Religion and political conflict has been central to American political culture and it is difficult to understand contemporary polarization without it. The alignment of party, policy positions and religiosity coincides with the racial realignment and emerging culture wars (e.g., Layman 2001; Hunter 2001; Mason 2018). The contemporary intersection of religiosity and contemporary politics, scholars have argued, is less about traditional fights between Catholics and Protestants (for example), but rooted between the poles of religious Orthodoxy on one side and religious progressivism on the other (Hunter 1991). The Religious Right, for example, is an ecumenical alliance of conservative Catholics, Protestants and Jews with a worldview distinct from liberal Catholics, Protestants or Jews. These worldviews, Hunter (1991) argues, predates and shapes views on cultural issues such as abortion or affirmative action. Not only do these religious divides represent an important schism, scholars argue religious actors shape the laity's opinion on relevant cultural dimensions (Layman 2001).

To test whether the effect is reducible to this religious dimension, I control for two factors. In the 1970s panel, the ANES does not ask respondents whether they view themselves as Orthodox, conservative, liberal (and so on). Consequently, I proxy this cultural divide by frequency of church attendance in 1972. Although a different aspect of religiosity, the cultural sorting between those that attend church and those that do not is a visible cleavage that divides Republicans and Democrats (Layman 1997; Margolis 2017).

Table 6.8 shows the electorate is not sorting along this religious divide in the early 1970s, except for on issues of abortion or women's role in society. This substantively makes since given the centrality of religion to shaping these policy attitudes. However, it does not appear that religiosity supplants racial views; they reinforce one another.

Table 6.8: Church Attendance, 1972-1976

	(1) Accuse76	(2) Women76	(3) Marijuana76	(4) Unrest76	(5) Tax76	(6) Ins76	(7) Jobs76	(8) Abortion76	(9) Defense76	(10) Pollution76
AidBlack 72	0.125***	0.120***	0.119***	0.152***	0.033	0.136**	0.162***	0.060**	0.141***	0.209***
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.040)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.053)	(0.074)
Church Att 72	-0.009	0.025***	0.000	0.007	-0.009	0.010	0.010*	0.024***	0.010	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.015)
White	0.020	-0.068*	0.103***	0.186***	0.131***	0.072	0.164***	-0.082***	-0.023	-0.154*
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.090)
Lagged DV	0.404***	0.447***	0.577***	0.200***	0.285***	0.417***	0.312***	0.589***	0.271***	0.206***
	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.079)
Constant	0.297***	0.104***	0.100***	0.062	0.275***	0.134**	0.148***	0.169***	0.571***	0.343***
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.050)	(0.061)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.060)	(0.098)
N	921	955	901	405	860	426	898	977	530	443

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

To examine the progressive-Orthodox dimension more closely, I use data from the 1992-1996 ANES which asks respondents whether they consider themselves Orthodox,

Table 6.9: Contextual Controls (Christian Rs Only), 1992-1996

	(1) Defense96	(2) GayMilitary96	(3) EnvSpend96	(4) Jobs96	(5) Abortion96	(6) LimitImport96	(7) Immigration96	(8) Women96	(9) GSS96	(10) Ins96
Racial Resent 92	0.644**	0.681***	0.098	1.072***	0.463***	0.190	0.469***	0.669**	1.191***	0.885**
	(0.250)	(0.210)	(0.086)	(0.300)	(0.150)	(0.125)	(0.173)	(0.277)	(0.250)	(0.343)
Christianity 92	0.076	0.122	0.169***	0.125	0.313***	-0.078	-0.064	0.872***	0.344*	0.525**
	(0.183)	(0.153)	(0.064)	(0.214)	(0.114)	(0.096)	(0.123)	(0.204)	(0.186)	(0.247)
White	0.200	0.231*	0.102*	0.489**	-0.070	-0.153	-0.029	0.124	0.592***	0.051
	(0.170)	(0.139)	(0.056)	(0.203)	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.112)	(0.182)	(0.181)	(0.238)
Lagged DV	0.461***	0.525***	0.436***	0.409***	0.681***	0.386***	0.325***	0.477***	0.355***	0.399***
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.068)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.059)	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.041)
Constant	1.776***	0.230	0.279***	1.743***	0.489***	0.355***	2.328***	0.421**	1.507***	1.982***
	(0.220)	(0.167)	(0.065)	(0.248)	(0.123)	(0.111)	(0.171)	(0.214)	(0.231)	(0.272)
N	442	450	517	451	501	249	472	499	431	422

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

conservative or liberal/moderate. I also include those who respond they are not religious, as atheists tend to share worldviews similar to religious progressives (Hunter 1991, 45). Due to sample size, I use only respondents that identify as Christian (only handful of Jewish and Muslim respondents answer these questions). Here, I switch to using measures of racial resentment which the contemporary political science literature conventionally uses to measure racial attitudes since the 1980s. Table 6.9 show that the effect of racial attitudes are robust to controlling for religious outlook.

This result fits with Michele Margolis' (2017) work which shows that the link between religious participation and political views operate in a feedback loop. In Margolis' view, people shape their religious choices based on their partisan social identity: people who identify as Republicans early in their life are more likely to increase their church attendance over time. Religious identity or participation may not be as "pre-political" as conventional accounts suggest.

A similar, and perhaps more fundamental variable may drive the results in Tables 6.8 and 6.9. The very divides that emerge within a denomination's more conservative and progressive wings are rooted in cultural conflict over race; progressive-conservative theological splits are endogenous to the communities in which religious institutions arise. For example, the Southern Baptist Convention, which is generally theologically conservative, split from national Baptists in 1845, due to a disagreement over whether slave owners could serve as missionaries (Ammerman 1990). Furthermore, the lurch to the political right of Southern Baptists in the 1970s, both theologically and politically, prompted the exit of more moderate members and the entrance of conservative non-Southern Baptists.

More broadly, the rise of the "nones," referring to the exodous from organized religion, is concentrated among younger more liberal cohorts (Morning Edition 2013). As Christianity became entangled in the Republican party, younger, more liberal people exit the church as they grapple with continuing traditions learned from their parents (Margolis 2017, 32).

6.3.3 Urbanicity

Another set of explanations suggests that the urban rural divide drives polarization (e.g., Cramer 2012; Rodden 2019). The geographic divide represents a long-standing schism in U.S. politics. Consequently, initial issue cleavages that fall along urban and rural lines may polarize the political environment.

Table 6.10: Urban-Rural Divides, 1972-1976

	(1) Accuse76	(2) Women76	(3) Marijuana76	(4) Unrest76	(5) Tax76	(6) Ins76	(7) Jobs76	(8) Abortion76	(9) Defense76	(10) Pollution76
AidBlack 72	0.107^{***}	0.122^{***}	0.115^{***}	0.146^{***}	0.057	0.156^{***}	0.190^{***}	0.066^{**}	0.146^{***}	0.205^{***}
	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.050)	(0.038)	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.026)	(0.052)	(0.071)
Urbanicity	0.052^{**}	0.029	0.061^{**}	0.038	-0.073^{**}	-0.015	-0.040^{*}	0.007	0.017	0.131^{**}
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.060)
White	0.009	-0.074^{**}	0.079^{**}	0.172^{***}	0.143^{***}	0.071	0.156^{***}	-0.076^{***}	-0.040	-0.150^{*}
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.054)	(0.033)	(0.029)	(0.053)	(0.086)
Lagged DV	0.418^{***}	0.448^{***}	0.581^{***}	0.215^{***}	0.288^{***}	0.435^{***}	0.300^{***}	0.637^{***}	0.277^{***}	0.238^{***}
	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.032)	(0.076)
Constant	0.246^{***}	0.169^{***}	0.083^{**}	0.071	0.267^{***}	0.160^{***}	0.205^{***}	0.209^{***}	0.598^{***}	0.266^{***}
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.055)	(0.087)
N	967	1005	946	425	906	453	947	1025	559	464

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Table 6.10 repeats the lagged dependent variable model, controlling for urbanicity. Urbanicity has an inconsistent relationship to shifting attitudes across policy dimensions and does not attenuate the effect of racial attitudes. Empirical and theoretical evidence may support this null finding. For example, Cramer (2012) argues rural resentment generates economically conservative attitudes in rural areas. Cramer's theory of rural resentment relies not simply on rural-ness, but a group consciousness around living in a rural place which then in turn influences political attitudes. Perceived class and racial differences between urban and rural areas are two mechanisms which activate this consciousness. From this perspective, racial resentment (or class resentment) is necessary to activate this regional divide.

Rahsaan Maxwell's research also fits with this finding. In a longitudinal study of internal migration in Switzerland, Maxwell (2019) finds that sorting largely drives the urban-rural divide, rather than the contextual effects of living in a geographic area: People who are already more liberal, are more likely to migrate from rural to urban areas. If indeed this is part of what is happening in the United States, it would explain why geographic location is not predictive of changing political views.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter shows that racial attitudes serve as a central political predisposition around which people organize their other attitudes. I find that racial conservatives are

more likely to be conservative on other political issues over time, but that the effect does not work in reverse. That is, people who are conservative on abortion or taxing the wealthy, do become more racially conservative over time.

This finding also highlights the limitations of elite leadership. Leaders cannot simply change opinions on any set of issues, but are limited to frames and linkages that already exist in the mass public. This fits with the qualitative account of anti-abortion leaders in chapter 4 who find it is politically expedient to build political coalitions around sets of issues that already fit together in the mass public. Elite signals often strengthen existing linkages rather than putting together sets of unrelated issues.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

Why did the national parties sort across so many different policy dimensions in the latter party of the 20th century? This dissertation argues that party sorting is rooted in and shaped by the positions parties took on race and civil rights in the 1960s. The transformation of civil rights as a partisan issue had a profound impact on party sorting for three reasons. First, public opinion along the racial axis is structured: people who are more conservative on race, hold more conservative views on effectively every other major policy issue. Second, party leaders tried to keep civil rights off the political agenda in the mid-20th century as it cross-cut party lines. A core point is that the racial axis did not simply divide the Democrat's New Deal coalition between racial liberals and racial conservatives, but it quietly divided the Democrat's New Deal coalition between social liberals and social conservatives on other issues as well. By suppressing race, party leaders inadvertently suppressed other race correlated policies that also cross cut party lines. Indeed, the presence of so many abortion or gun conservatives in the Democratic party in the 1960s and 1970s was partially a byproduct of the mid-century party system that evolved to placate the South. Third, and relatedly, race and civil rights is one of the few issues in U.S. politics that is capable of realigning the electorate (Kuziemko and Washington 2018; Sears and Funk 2009). When the Democratic party embraced civil rights, this propelled Southern conservatives, which had been locked into the Democratic party for over a century because of their opposition to civil rights, to sort into the Republican party. These sorters brought other conservative policies with them, too.

In making this argument, I contend race, not economics, sits at the center of polarization. Although economic issues have long shaped party coalitions and engendered realignments, economic attitudes have little, or at least an inconsistent relationship, to other policy views. Had the parties remained only divided by economic issues but overlapped on civil rights, as was the case in the New Deal era, issue cleavages on abortion or gun control would have also continued to cross-cut party lines. Indeed, absorption of race as a core partisan cleavage was so constraining because the other

primary party cleavage, economics, did not act as a countervailing force.

Thinking about public opinion along the racial axis aids our understanding of contemporary party sorting in two ways. First, a key contribution of this dissertation is conceptualizing attitudes towards civil rights as a core electoral cleavage in the 1960s-1970s. Because the electorate was realigning on account of civil rights in the 1960s, attitudes towards racial equality were more predictive of emerging partisan fault lines than fading New Deal party identifications. Second, and relatedly, because the issue of civil rights was the issue that first disrupted the New Deal coalition, attitudes along the racial axis served as a leading indicator for how the parties would stack up across many different issues. This shifts from the approach of examining electoral fault lines by party identification. If scholars examined policy attitudes only along party lines, the fact that the parties sorted as they did seems arbitrary because there was no strong relationship in the 1960s between party identification and many now salient issues. However, racial liberals and conservatives had already bundled their racial views with liberal and conservative views on abortion and gun control. From this view, the ability of the parties to sort as they did across so many issues were not arbitrary, but seeded in the alignment of party and civil rights in the 1960s.

7.1 Feedback Loop Between Elites and Masses

A central theme of this dissertation is that political elites had less discretion in building party coalitions than current scholarship suggests. Policy preferences of ordinary voters are fundamental for understanding the transformation of the contemporary party system; the cluster of issues that are now seen in national party platforms have existed in the mass public dating to the earliest public opinion polls. I argue this pre-existing structure of public opinion shaped the ability of the parties to position on new issues when they gained political salience.

Empirical observations that voters follow politician's leads are consistent with this theory; I simply argue that the elite signals that politicians give, at least on salient issues, are endogenous to nascent preferences of their constituencies. Party sorting and polarization operate in a feedback loop. For example, Ted Kennedy spent much of his career sending liberal abortion signals and he undoubtedly shaped opinion among his liberal followers. This is consistent with work by Converse (1964), Zaller (1992) and Lenz (2012). Yet the reason Kennedy first sent liberal abortion signals was because as a liberal Democrat in the 1970s he realized that voters who were liberal on race and other social issues, held liberal abortion positions as well (see chapter 4). Consequently, while the fact that voters follow elite cues paints a gloomy picture for democratic accountability, the fact that those signals are shaped by what politicians perceive to be popular is suggestive that public opinion serves as a guardrail that constrains the very appeals elites can make (Key 1961; Zaller 2012).

This feedback loop has important implications for the origins of issue bundles that fill contemporary party platforms. When looking for the origins of ideologies and party platforms, many scholars focus on politicians, activists, and media figures (Carmines and Stimson 1986, 915; Bawn et al. 2012; Noel 2013). These actors are the experts, the mass public are novices. However, how do politicians know which positions to take? How do interest groups know which party to enter? Should interest groups not want to align with both parties (Pierson and Schickler 2019)?

In some respects, the incentives of politicians and interest groups are at odds. Politicians want to win elections and are often willing to take any policy position that achieves that goal. As one activist noted: “Politicians take a position for one of two reasons: because of personal conviction, or because it is easier politically to take that position than the other” (undated memo, “Political Planning of the corporation”). However, most politicians, even on highly salient issues, lack conviction. Paul Weyrich remarked in the 1970s that in regard to abortion policy – an extremely emotional issue – a majority of members of Congress, “NO MATTER WHICH WAY THEY HAVE GONE IN THE PAST...has no real view of the subject,” and are thus open for organized efforts of persuasion (emphasis in original; Weyrich to Welsh, Dec. 8, 1975).

To this end, a literature suggests that politicians take positions to appease interest groups that enter their coalition (e.g., Karol 2009; Layman et al. 2010; Bawn et al. 2012). However, interest group and social movements are flexible in a different way: many issue oriented activists care deeply about their issue and are thus willing to align with strange bed-fellows to achieve their goal. For example, because many early pro-life leaders were otherwise liberal or moderate, they disliked working with other social conservative activists who campaigned against gay rights or the Equal Rights Amendment (Marshner Interview 2018). Yet these activists worked together because they shared an overlapping opposition to abortion policy. Likewise, interest groups are often indifferent to party. Chapter 4 argued that diffuse public opinion guided many pro-life activists to the Republican party despite their preference to align with the Democrats. Others were agnostic to party. Conservative organizer Paul Weyrich illustrates this indifference: *“...we conservatives want the reorganization [of conservatives under a party label] to evolve naturally...we do not expect nor want anyone, or any law, or anything to compel a reorganization.”* (Weyrich to Brown, March 30, 1977). Even in the mid-1970s, political operatives still believed that leadership of the conservative movement would emerge from Democratic ranks and actively recruited conservative candidates across party lines (Weyrich to Morroni, April 20, 1976; Weyrich to Vigurie, Oct 3, 1975).

From this perspective, the alliance of interest groups within parties are not engineered by those at the top but emerge through an organic process rooted in the public. The coalition of interest groups that emerged within parties matched the pre-existing issue connections that were first observed in the mass public.

7.2 Implications for Contemporary Politics: Trump, Republicans and Immigration Policy

While this paper focuses on events that occurred over 50 years ago, we continue to live in a political world created at this historical juncture. Issue overlap between racial attitudes and so many other policies helps explain the depths of polarization in a party system increasingly divided by race and ethnicity. If parties were driven solely by activist coalitions, one might imagine coalitions to be fragile and ideological interest groups would work to align with the party in power. Likewise, if elites drove party polarization, then the ability for either party to work across the aisle may be easier and partisan polarization could be undone. But if the problem is rooted in structural forces in the electorate, then the space for compromise becomes smaller.

Consider the case of party positioning on immigration. The Democrats' position on civil rights shaped the types of appeals the party could make on immigration after this historical juncture. Whether the parties could have sorted differently after the civil rights movement is doubtful: "The pro-immigration impulses of the Left were richly informed by a universal rights zeitgeist that gained ascendance among progressive Democrats in the postwar era" (Tichenor 2009, 255). For example, civil rights groups and ethnic lobbies, which had become prominent in the Democrat's coalition, deeply opposed employer restriction which limited hiring immigrant labor (a position which had long been supported by organized labor groups as a means to protect domestic workers' job security). And post-war liberals viewed national origin quotas as racist because they disadvantaged immigration from Asian and Latin American countries.

While a debate surrounds whether opposition to immigration is racist, data show that support for more restrictive immigration, both legal and illegal, has received greater support among those who are conservative on black civil rights and black racial equality.[1] The length of this trend is remarkable. Dating to 1957, when public opinion on these two issues is first available, attitudes on restrictive immigration policies correspond to more conservative attitudes towards black civil rights. In a June 1965 poll, of those that thought the Johnson administration were pushing integration "too fast," 52% thought immigration should be decreased from current levels, 42% said it should be kept the same and only 6% said immigration should increase. Among those who wanted integration to happen even quicker, just 29% said that immigration should decrease. 55% of integration liberals said immigration levels should remain constant and 15% wanted immigration levels expanded.

Like policies on abortion, women's rights and gun control, examining party identification on immigration in the 1950s and 1960s blurs already emerging cleavages. In 1965, party identifiers were equally likely to say that immigration should be expanded

[1] These trends, while they vary in degree, are also robust to immigration from different national contexts, too.

Figure 7.1: Correlation: Attitudes towards Immigration and Race



and Republican identifiers were only marginally more likely to say it should be restricted. Yet examining preferences by vote choice, Goldwater supporters were about 12 percentage points more likely to favor restrictionist policies compared to Johnson voters and almost half as likely to say immigration should be expanded. Over the next decades, this anti-immigration sentiment among Republican voters brewed, despite a more general consensus, or at least less acrimonious divide, between party leaders and political elites.

Examining the partisan divisions on immigration from this perspective makes the 2016 election, and Trump's embrace of anti-immigrant sentiment, less surprising. If the parties' positions on immigration were driven by politicians, we might expect there to be greater room for compromise. Indeed, George W. Bush, both as governor of Texas and then during his presidential campaigns, endorsed immigration reform and tried to bring the party leftward. In some respects, Bush's efforts were not uncharacteristic of Republican leaders of the 1980s or early 1990s who, like Democrats, generally supported immigration (Tichenor 2009; Wroe 2008). Yet, these efforts never gained traction in a Republican party whose primary and general selectorate had come to rely heavily on the white South and conservative blue-collar workers who generally are less educated and lower income — demographics that have long opposed immigration (Tichenor 2009, 254; Turney et al. 2017, 19-20).

Contrast Bush's struggle to push the party left, with the ease with which Trump took the party to the right. One explanation is that Trump's messaging expressed a latent sentiment that had not been sufficiently articulated by other leading Republicans who either supported liberal immigration reform or demurred on the issue. According

to one poll, 66 percent of Republican primary voters in 2016 opposed a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants – a reform that George W. Bush and other Republicans, including 2016 presidential candidate Marco Rubio, had supported less than a decade earlier (Democracy Fund Voter Study Group 2018).[2]

One explanation is that Trump fomented public opinion, and led Republican voters to the right. However, there is no evidence that Trump meaningfully moved his supporters to the right on immigration. The top panel of Figure 7.2 compares public opinion among a panel of Trump voters in 2011 and 2016 on immigration policy, racial resentment, and feelings towards various minority groups. Public opinion among those that voted for Trump is almost flat. Only on feelings towards *legal* immigration do Trump voters shift rightwards. When I subtract the attitudes of each respondent interviewed in both 2016 and 2011, aggregate opinion remains quite stable (bottom panel). Again, the largest shift to the right is against legal immigration, but even this change is small and amounts to less than a sixth of a standard deviation.

Figure 7.2: Attitudes of Trump Voters: 2011-2016



This evidence aligns with Sides et al. (2018) who find that conservative immigration

[2]Marco Rubio abandoned immigration reform in the mid-2010s, presumably in preparation to compete in the presidential election.

attitudes in 2011 predicted support for Trump in the 2016 primary. Additionally, they find that the Republican's mass electoral coalition was much further right than Republican elites in the decades prior to the 2016. Thus, the 2016 election, in their interpretation, was the rightward shift of Republican party leaders to match their base. While interest groups and politicians played an important role in fanning these flames, the transformation of U.S. politics cannot be understand without placing voters as the central actor.

7.3 Beyond the United States

This dissertation contends that issue bundles now clustered in the party system have been a long-standing and durable feature of U.S. public opinion. While the contours and timing of this story are unique to the United States, the general theory is applicable to other national contexts.

With respect to ethno-racial cleavages, similar bundles of issues exist across the world. Figure 7.3 uses data from the World Values Survey and plots issue bundles with respect to attitudes on immigration for OECD countries. I use immigration attitudes because immigration, in one form or another, is applicable to multiple national contexts and often taps into an ethno-racial cleavage. With the exception of economic policy, conservative immigration attitudes are bundled with what are considered conservative positions on abortion, gay rights, the environment and gender equality.

However, a difficulty for generalizing this theory across other national contexts is that fights over race have not held the same centrality in other national contexts as they do in the United States. Many European party systems have been divided primarily along economic cleavages and economic cleavages have little relationship to other issue cleavages across the world (Malka et al. 2019).

This mirrors the party system in the mid-20th century United States where economic issues defined party conflict. Yet the immigration and refugee crisis of the 2010s shifted this dynamic. Immigration has become a major issue in European politics and has led to the rise of far-right parties deeply opposed to immigration, such as the AfD in Germany or the Sweden Democrats in Sweden. Some national party systems, or at least specific parties, have made immigration policy a defining issue. This dissertation would predict that party systems or parties defined by ethno-racial cleavages, are expected to polarize across other dimensions, too.

Consider Sweden, a socially liberal country whose party lines had long been defined by the "traditional" left-right cleavages on economic intervention in the economy (Oskarson and Demker 2015). The Sweden Democrats, the far-right anti-immigrant party, received limited support and no parliamentary seats in the 1990s. But the growing refugee crisis and shifts in economic opportunities mobilized support for the Sweden Democrats. Like in the mid-century United States, economic cleavages which had long

Figure 7.3: Immigration & Other Issue Attitudes in OECD Countries



Each coefficient shows the relationship between immigration attitudes and respective policy view. Positive values mean those who hold more conservative immigration views hold more conservative views on the other policy.

structured the party system, weakened in the face of ethno-racial tensions. In 2010, the Sweden Democrats got 5.7% of the vote but in the 2018 election, they received 17.5% of the vote, 62 parliamentary seats, and had become Sweden's third largest party.

But another, parallel trend, occurred, too. Although the Sweden Democrats initially gained strength through opposition to immigration and the middle-eastern refugee crisis (BBC News 2018), pre-existing linkages between attitudes on immigration and other social policies meant that conservative voters on abortion and the environment, became quietly concentrated in the Sweden Democrat's base, too. This is despite these issues being unrelated to the party's formation. For example, Sweden has some of the most liberal abortion laws, and because abortion has not been a source of political conflict, abortion has long been absent in party manifestos (Backlund 2011, 13).

But Sweden's liberal abortion laws have been coming under attack by the Swedish Democrats, a trend that is reflected across Europe: the rise of anti-immigrant parties coincides with many of those same parties opposed to gender equality, gay rights and abortion access (CBS News 2018; Elks 2019).[3]

The core point is that when parties form or are polarized by race, the underlying structure of public opinion that is present in many national contexts, provides opportunities to divide on other issue dimensions, too. This is not to say that parties based on economic cleavages must overlap on other issue dimensions, but the divides are generally weaker. A simple theory likely explains this: people who are anxious over changing demographics or immigration, are also likely anxious on other social changes, too (e.g., Hetherington and Weiler 2018).

To illustrate this, Figure 7.4 plots the positions of parties along both stances on immigration (bottom-panel) and spending versus taxation (top-panel) as determined by a panel of experts across European countries (data are demeaned by country; the Swedish political parties are in red). While cross-country data warrant caution, a general trend is clear. Traditional economic cleavages map more weakly onto other issue cleavages when compared to immigration based cleavages. For example, many far-left and far-right parties, as measured by economic cleavages, hold similar positions on "social lifestyle" (e.g., gay rights). Yet far-left and far-right parties on immigration policy, hold very diverging views on gay rights.

In many European contexts, immigration has proved to be an issue strong enough to generate new parties or reshape the identity of existing parties. While other issues, notably European integration have also played an important role in shaping the European party landscape, views on Europe are not as tightly linked to other policy dimensions (Wheatley and Mendez 2019, 12).

Of course, the big difference between the United States and Europe is the number of parties. Multi-party systems generally create more flexibility to position on other issues. For example, Jeert Wilders, leader of the far-right party in Holland, favors expanding women's rights and LGBTQ rights, but frames this support in context of Islam as a threat to these groups (and Dutch society more generally) (Pieters 2017). However, Figure 7.4 suggests that Wilders, who had long been a one-man party, is the exception rather than rule.

Furthermore, in a two-party system politicians often must moderate their appeals to form a broader coalition. For example, George Wallace effectively formed a right-wing racial party in the 1968 and 1972 election, drawing support from anti-integration voters in the United States. Yet the U.S. electoral system made merging with one of the major parties more profitable. To do this, the far-right appeals of the Wallace campaign had to be moderated. As Reagan's political advisor Lee Atwater famously noted, candidates in the 1950s could shout racial epithets, but doing so in the 1960s

[3]However, like many other far right parties in Europe, the Sweden Democrats support an expansive welfare state (Oskarson and Demker 2015).

Figure 7.4: Party Cleavages Along Economic vs. Immigration Cleavages



Red dots represent Swedish political parties. Data are from the 2014 Chapel Hill Experts Survey (Polk et al. 2017).

and 1970s would be harmful for building a broader coalition. This forced candidates to support abstract policies that conveyed racial conservatism without saying as much. "Dog whistling" became a core Republican strategy (Hillygus and Shields 2009, 138; Mendelberg 2001).

7.4 Conclusion

A party system polarized by views on racial equality is deeply troubling. First, parties polarized by racial equality generally mean the parties have sorted by racial demographics, too. If politics are tribal (Mason 2018), race and ethnicity are particularly powerful sources of identity. In the mid-20th century, the white South and African-Americans, two groups with opposing racial identities, were bound together in the same party, united behind the crisis of Great Depression. Contrast this with the contemporary party system where not only is the Democratic party becoming more racially diverse vis-a-vis the Republican party, but the Republican party increasingly consists of white voters with a strong sense of white identity (Jardina 2019).

The findings in this dissertation pose a second problem for a party system divided by views towards racial equality: views towards racial equality divide the mass public along so many other issue dimensions as well. If the party system froze in 1960, we would have a party system divided along economic lines, but able to find compromise on gun control, climate change and advancing gender equality (Karol 2009, 2019). However, because parties divided by racial views also hold opposing views across effectively every other major policy domain, this narrows the space for any compromise at all. Parties unable to find any common ground at all will reinforce the view that the other party is illegitimate. If opposing parties view each other as illegitimate, this endangers the very health of democracy (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).

What ends this polarization remains unclear. One possibility is that a massive economic crisis will shrink the Republican party, and force them to adopt a new economic strategy. Faced with economic malaise, voters will demand the GOP to move left. Another possibility is that if the Republican party remains the party of Trump, wealthier economic conservatives, opposed to Trump's extreme social policies and temperament, will continue to enter the Democratic party, pushing the Democratic party left on social policies, but moderating the party on economics. This is already happening. Income has historically been a strong predictor of party choice, but that has faded in recent years (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2016). Another possibility is that as demographics of the United States change, the ability to win primary or general elections by relying on white racial conservatives will become increasingly difficult. Faced with a shrinking base, Republicans may have to shift left on immigration and race to make the party palatable to Latino and black voters that share the party's views on abortion or gay marriage, but are currently repelled by the GOP's racial policy.

Chapter 8

References

Abramowitz, Alan. 2018. *The Great Alignment: Race, Party Transformation, and the Rise of Donald Trump.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Abramowitz, Alan and Kyle Saunders. 1998. "Ideological Realignment in the US Electorate." *The Journal of Politics,* 60(3): 634-652.

Associated Press. 1964. "Connally Reverses Rights Act Views," *New York Times,* 22 December 1964. Accessed 31 May 2020. `https://www.nytimes.com/1964/12/22/archives/connally-reverses-rights-act-views.html`.

Achen, Christopher and Larry Bartels. 2017. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Adams, Greg. 1997. "Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3): 718-737.

Aldrich, John H. 2011. *Why Parties? A Second Look.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Allen, Richard. 2000. "George Herbert Walker Bush; The Accidental Vice President." *New York Times Magazine,* July 30. `https://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/30/magazine/george-herbert-walker-bush-the-accidental-vice-president.html`. Accessed 12 March 2020.

Ammerman, Nancy. 1990. *Baptist Battles: Social Change and Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist Convention.* Rutgers University Press.

Andrews, Richard. 2017. Interview with *On the Media.* `https://www.wnyc.org/story/on-the-media-2017-08-18`.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden and James Snyder. 2008. "The Strength of Issues: Using Multiple Measures to Gauge Preference Stability, Ideological Constraint, and Issue Voting." *American Political Science Review,* 102(2): 215-232.

Arnold, E. Douglas. 1992. *The Logic of Congressional Action.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Backlund, Anders. 2011. *The Sweden Democrats in Political Space - Estimating Policy Positions Using Election Manifesto Content Analysis.* Master's Thesis.

Balmer, Randall. 2006. *Thy Kingdom Come: How the Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens America.* New York: Basic Books.

Bartley, Robert to Paul Weyrich, Letter, Dec 12, 1978. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 38, Folder 18.

Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel and John Zaller. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics." *Perspectives on Politics* 10(3): 571-597.

Baum, Dan. 2016. "Legalize it all." *Harper's Magazine,* April 2016. Accessed 1 April 2020. https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/

BBC News. 2018. "Sweden Democrats tap into immigration fears." 25 September. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-29202793.

Bensel, Richard. 1984. *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Berinsky, Adam. 2004. *Silent Voices: Public Opinion and Political Participation in America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bobo, Lawrence. 1983. "White's opposition to busing: Symbolic Racism or Realistic Group Conflict?" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45(6), 1196–1210.

Bolton, Richard. 2008. "William F. Winter and the Politics of Racial Moderation in Mississippi." *Journal of Mississippi History,* 70(4): 335-382.

Brady, Henry and Paul Sniderman. 1985. "A Group Basis for Political Reasoning." *American Political Science Review,* 79(4): 1061-1078.

Buchanan, Pat. Buchanan to Ehrlichman, Haldeman and Colson, Letter, Sept 23, 1971. Nixon Presidential Library, WHSF, Box 3, Folder 52.

Buckley, William. 1966. "The Catholic Church and Abortion." *National Review,* 5 April 1966.

Bush, Larry. 1982. "An Interview with Terry Dolan." *The Advocate* April 15. Accessed: Box 33, Folder 1, Weyrich Papers, American Heritage Center.

Campbell, David E. and J. Quin Monson. 2008. "The Religion Card: Gay Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election." *The Public Opinion Quarterly,* 72(3): 399-419.

Carmines, Edward and James Stimson. 1982. "Racial Issues and the Structure of Mass Belief Systems." *Journal of Politics,* 44(1): 2-20.

Carmines, Edward and James Stimson. 1989. *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Carmines, Edward G. and James Woods. 2002. "The Role of Party Activists in the Evolution of the Abortion Issue." *Political Behavior* 24(4): 361-377.

Carr, Matthew, Gerald Gamm and Justin Phillips. 2016. "Origins of the Culture War: Social Issues in State Party Platforms, 1960-2014." Presented at the American Political Science Association. http://www.columbia.edu/~jhp2121/workingpapers/CultureWar.pdf.

Carsey, Thomas and Geoffrey Layman. 2006. "Changing Sides or Changing Minds?

Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate." *American Political Science Review,* 50(2): 464-477.

Caughey, Devin, James Dunham and Christopher Warshaw. 2018. "The Ideological Nationalization of Partisan Subconstituencies in the American States." *Public Choice,* 176(1-2): 133-151.

Chamberlain, John. 1980. "Moral Issues Will Attract Non-Voters." *New Haven Register,* October 8. Accessed at the American Heritage Center. Box 4, Folder 6.

Chen, Anthony. 2007. "The Party of Lincoln and the Politics of State Fair Employment Practices Legislation in the North, 1945-1964." *American Journal of Sociology,* 112(6): 1713-74.

Chen, Anthony, Robert Mickey and Robert Van Houweling. 2008. "Explaining the Contemporary Alignment of Race and Party: Evidence from California's 1946 Ballot Initiative on Fair Employment." *Studies in American Political Development* 22(2): 204-228.

CBS News. "Fair-Right poised for big gains in Swedish Election," 6 September. `https://www.cbsnews.com/news/sweden-election-far-right-ex-neo-nazi-anti-immigration-party-sweden-democrats/`.

Conover, Pamela and Stanley Feldman. 1981. "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self Identifications." *American Journal of Political Science,* 25(4): 617-645.

Conover, Pamela. 1984. "The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation." *The Journal of Politics,* 46(3): 760-785.

Converse, Philip E. 2006 (1964). "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." *Critical Review* 18(1-3): 1-74.

Converse, Phillip. 1976. *The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort Analyzing Party Identification.* Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Converse, Phillip. 2000. "Assessing the Capacity of Mass Electorates." *Annual Review of Political Science,* 3:331-353.

Cox, Patrick L. 2002. *Ralph W. Yarborough, the People's Senator.* Austin: University of Texas Press.

Cramer, Katherine. 2012. "Putting Inequality in Its Place: Rural Consciousness and the Power of Perspective." *American Political Science Review*, 106(3): 517-532.

Critchlow, Donald. 2018. *Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Delli-Karpini, Michael X. and Scott Keeter. 1997. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Democracy Fund Voter Study Group. Views of the Electorate Research Survey, May 2018 [Computer File] Release 1: December 11, 2018. Washington, DC: Democracy Fund Voter Study Group [producer], `www.voterstudygroup.org`

Dillin, John. 1988. "Democrat ticket united - except on some issues. DUKAKIS VS. BENTSEN." *Christian Science Monitor,* August 2. `https://www.csmonitor.`

com/1988/0802/adiff.html. Accessed 9 April 2020.

Douthat, Ross, "A Different Kind of Liberal," *The New York Times,* 30 Aug 2009.

Duval, Michael. Letter to Henry Cashen, July 14, 1976. Ford Library. Michael Raoul-Duval Files, Box 27, Folder "Republican Party Platform - Catholic Issues."

Edsall, Mary and Thomas Edsall. *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics.* New York: WW Norton & Company.

Eizenstat, Stuart. Personal Interview. August 31, 2018.

Engelhardt, Andrew. 2020. "Racial Attitudes through a Partisan Lens." *British Journal of Political Science,* 1-18.

Elks, Sonia. 2019. "Women's rights under attack in Europe, say feminist parties." *Reuters,* 20 May. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-women-abortion/womens-rights-under-attack-in-europe-say-feminist-parties-idUSKCN1SQ1QG.

Feldman, Stanley. 1988. "Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: the Role of Core Beliefs and Values." *American Journal of Political Science,* 32(2): 416-440.

Fink, Judy. Letter to Joe Lampe, Dec 1974. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 15, Folder "ACCL Organization from Late 1974."

Fink, Judy. Letter to the NRLC, September 7, 1973. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 4, Folder 3.

Finkelstein, Arthur. Letter to Robert Marik, Dec 16, 1971. Nixon Library. Nixon Library. Contested Materials Collection, Box 45, Folder 14.

Fiorina, Morris and Sam Abrams. 2015. "Party Sorting: The Foundation of Polarized Politics," in James A. Thurber and Antoine Yoshinaka, eds., *American Gridlock*, 113-29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fiorina, Morris, Paul E. Peterson with Bertram Johnson. 2005. *The New American Democracy.* Pearson.

Fischer, Claude. 1974. "The Effect of Urban Life on Traditional Values." *Social Forces,* 53: 420-432.

Fogg, Susan. 1974. "Abortion Opponents Party Ways." *Newark Star Ledger,* September 29. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 7, Folder "NRLC 1975 (5)."

Fordham, Benjamin. 2007. "The Evolution of Republican and Democratic Positions on Cold War Military Spending: A Historical Puzzle." *Social Science History* 31(4): 603-636.

Fowler, Glenn. 1972. "Buckley Shifts Marijuana Stand." *New York Times,* 29 November 1972.

—. 1991. "Ex-Gov. LeRoy Collins Dies at 82; Floridian Led Way in 'New South'." *New York Times,* 13 March 1991.

Franklin, Charles and Liane Kosaki. 1989. "Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion." *The American Political Science Review,* 83(3): 751-771.

Freeder, Sean, Gabriel S. Lenz and Shad Turney. 2019. "The Importance of Knowing 'What Goes With What': Reinterpreting the Evidence on Policy Attitude Stabil-

ity." *Journal of Politics.*

Freeman, Jo. 1975. *The Politics of Women's Liberation.* New York: David McKay.

Friedan, Betty. 1976. *It Changed My Life: Writings on the Women's Movement.* Random House: New York.

Gemma, Peter. Memo to the National Pro-Life PAC, September 4, 1980. American Heritage Center. Paul Weyrich Papers, Box 24, Folder 7.

Gerber, Alan S., Gregory Huber, David Doherty, Conor Dowling and Shang Ha. 2010. "Personality and Political Attitudes: Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts." *American Political Science Review,* 104(1): 11-33.

Gilens, Martin. 1995. "Race Coding and White Opposition to Welfare," *American Political Science Review,* 90(3): 593-604.

Granberg, Donald. 1981. "The Abortion Activists." *Family Planning Perspectives.* 13(4): 157-163.

Greenhouse, Linda and Reva Siegel. 2012. *Before Roe v. Wade: Voices that shaped the abortion debate before the Supreme Court's Ruling.* Creative Commons.

Harris, Chris. 2018. "Climate to be key voter issue for first time in Europe as Swedes head to polls," *EuroNews* April 9. `https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/04/climate-to-be-key-voter-issue-for-first-time-in-europe-as-swedes-head-to-polls`.

Heffington, Colton, Brandon Beomseob Park and Laron K. Williams. 2017. "The 'Most Important Problem' Dataset (MIPD): A New Dataset on American Issue Importance." *Conflict Management and Peace Science.* Accessed via Roper Center for Public Opinion 20 April 2020.

Hehir, J. Bryan. Letter to James Rausch, Aug. 14, 1975. Catholic University Archives, NCCB Box 67, Folder "July-Dec 1975."

Hershey, Marjorie Randon. 1984. *Running for Office: The Political Education of Campaigners.* Chatham: Chatham House Publishers.

Hetherington, Marc and Jonathan Weiler. 2018. *Prius Or Pickup?: How the Answers to Four Simple Questions Explain America's Great Divide.* New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Highton, Benjamin. 2020. "The Cultural Realignment of State White Electorates in the 21st Century." *Political Behavior.*

Hillygus, Sunshine and Todd Shields. 2009. *The Persuadable Voter: Wedge Issues in Presidential Campaigns.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hunter, James Davidson. 1991. *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America.* New York: Basic Books.

Hutchings, Vincent and Nick Valentino. 2004. "The Centrality of Race in American Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science,* 7: 383-408.

Independent Research Associates, 2007, *North Carolina-Florida three-wave panel study,* `https://hdl.handle.net/1902.29/D-327`, UNC Dataverse, V1.

Israel, Steve. 2020. "How Never Trumpers Fell in Line," *The Washington Post,*

February 7. Accessed 24 April 2020. `https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/opinion/trump-impeachment-congress.html`.

Jacoby, William G. 1991. "Ideological Identification and Issue Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science,* 35(1): 178-205.

Jardina, Ashley. 2019. *White Identity Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jennings, M. Kent, Gregory Markus, Richard Niemi and Laura Stoker. *Youth Parent Socialization Survey, 1965-1997: 4 Waves Combined.* ICPSR 4037. Archived at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research: Ann Arbor.

Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker and Jake Bowers. 2009. "Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined." *The Journal of Politics* 71(3): 782-799.

Jost, John. 2006. "The end of the end of Ideology." *American Psychologist,* 61(7): 651-670.

Karol, David. 2009. *Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

—. 2019. *Red, Green and Blue: The Partisan Divide on Environmental Issues.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Katznelson, Ira, Kim Geiger and Daniel Kryder. 1993. "Limiting Liberalism: The Southern Veto in Congress, 1933-1950." *Political Science Quarterly* 108(2): 283-306.

Kaufman, Robert. 2000. *Henry M. Jackson : A Life in Politics.* Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Keith, Bruce, David B. Magleby, Candice J. Nelson, Elizabeth A. Orr, Mark C. Westlye and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 1992. *The Myth of the Independent Voter.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kelly, Harry. 1975. "King of the Right Wing Mailing Lists," *The Chicago Tribune.* August 13. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 19, Folder 8.

Kernell, Samuel, Gary Jacobson, Thad Kousser and Lynn Vavreck. 2016. *The Logic of American Politics.* Los Angeles: Sage Publishing.

Key V.O. 1955. "A Theory of Critical Elections." *The Journal of Politics,* 17(1): 3-18.

Key V.O. 1959. "Secular Realignment and the Party System." *The Journal of Politics,* 21(2): 198-2010.

Key V.O. 1961. *Public Opinion and American Democracy.* New York: Knopf.

Keyssar, Alexander. 2000. *The Right to Vote: The Contested History of Democracy in the United States.* New York: Basic Books.

Kilberg, Bobbie Greene. Memo to Bill Nicholson, Sept. 30, 1976. Ford Library. Buchen Files, Box 53, Folder "President Scheduling 1976-1977 (6)."

Killian, Mitchell and Clyde Wilcox. 2008. "Do Abortion Attitudes Lead to Party Switching?" *Politics Research Quarterly,* 61(4): 561-573.

Kilpatrick, James. 1976. "Abortion Said Poor Issue in Campaign." *The Washington Star.* Sept 18, 1976. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 45, Folder "Ford Campaign

(4)."

Kinder, Donald and Nathan Kalmoe. 2017. *Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Kinder, Donald R. and Cindy D. Kam. 2010. *Us Against Them: Ethnocentric Foundations of American Opinion.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Kinder, Donald and David Sears. 1981. "Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism versus Racial Threats to the Good Life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 40(3): 414-431.

King, Lawrence T. 1970. "Abortion Makes Strange Bedfellows: GOP and GOD." *Commonweal,* October 9. Reprinted in Greenhouse, Linda and Reva Siegel, *Before Roe v. Wade: Voices that Shaped the Abortion Debate before the Supreme Court Ruling.* 2012.

Kingdon, John. 1989. *Congressmen's Voting Decisions.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kingston Meeting Minutes. 1981. March 27. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 32, Folder 23.

Klemesrud, Judy, "Abortion in the Campaign: Methodist Surgeon Leads the Opposition," *The New York Times,* March 1, 1976.

Kotlowski, Dean J. 2001. *Nixon's Civil Rights: Politics, Principle, and Policy.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Kuziemko, Ilyana and Ebonya Washington. 2018. "Why Did the Democrats Lose the South? Bringing New Data to an Old Debate." *American Economic Review,* 108(10): 2830-67.

Lader, Lawrence. Memo, "Are Women Really Winning Their Demands through Political Power?," undated. New York Public Library Archives. Lader Papers, Box 21.

—-. Memo, "Abortion–A Key Issue in the 1976 Campaign?," undated. New York Public Library Archives. Lader Papers, Box 21.

Layman, Geoffrey. 1997. "Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The Impact of Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment from 1980 to 1994." *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 61(2): 288-316.

Layman, Geoffrey. 2001. *The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Layman, Geoffrey and Thomas Carsey. 2002. "Party Polarization and "Conflict Extension" in the American Electorate." *The American Political Science Review,* 46(4): 786-802.

Layman, Geoffrey C., Thomas Carsey, John Green, Richard Herrera and Rosalyn Cooperman. 2010. "Activists and Conflict Extension in American Party Politics." *The American Political Science Review,* 104(2): 324-346.

Lenz, Gabriel. 2012. *Follow the Leader? How Voters Respond to Politicians' Policies and Performance.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Levendusky, Matthew. 2009. *The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Levitsky, Steven and Daniel Ziblatt. 2018. *How Democracies Die.* New York: Crown Publishing.

Lindaman, Kara and Donald P. Haider-Markel. 2002. "Issue Evolution, Political Parties, and the Culture Wars." *Political Research Quarterly* 55(1): 91-110.

Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments.* Free Press.

Lynch, Robert. Letter to NCHLA Board of Directors, Nov 8, 1974. Catholic University Archives. NCCB Papers, Box 67, Folder "NCHLA 1973-74."

—-. Letter to Cardinal Medeiros, April 15, 1975. Catholic University Archives. NCCB Papers, Box 67, Folder "April-June 1975."

—-. Letter to James Rausch, May 27, 1975. Catholic University Archives. NCCB Papers, Box 67, Folder "April-June 1975."

Lowndes, Joseph. 2008. *From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern Conservatism.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Malka, Ariel, Yphtach Lelkes and Christopher J. Soto. 2019. "Are Cultural and Economic Conservatism Positively Correlated? A Large-Scale Cross-National Test." *British Journal of Political Science,* 49(3): 1045-1069.

Margolis, Michele. 2017. "How Politics Affects Religion: Partisanship, Socialization and Religiosity in America." *The Journal of Politics,* 80(1): 30-43.

Marshner, Connie. Personal Interview. 19 June 2018.

—. Undated Memo. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 82, Folder 21.

Martin, William. 1996. *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America.* New York: Broadway.

Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became our Identity.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Maxwell, Rahsaan. 2019. "Cosmopolitan Immigration Attitudes in Large European Cities: Contextual or Compositional Effects?" *American Political Science Review,* 113(2): 456-474.

McCarthy, Colman. "Some Who Oppose Abortion Now Question One-Issue Politics," *LA Times,* 2 January 1980.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. 2016. *Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge: MIT Press.*

McHugh, James. Letter to Joseph Bernardin, Aug 26, 1971. Catholic University Archives. NCCB Papers, Box 79, Folder "Social Development: Family Life: Abortion 1971."

Mecklenburg, Marjory. Memo to NRLC Board of Directors, June 26, 1974. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 8, Folder "Board and Executive Committee (8)."

—-. Letter to Ben Wattenberg, July 12, 1974. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 8, Folder "Board and Executive Committee (9)."

—-. Meeting notes, undated. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 30, Folder "Allied Institutional Development Series (5)."

—-. Meeting notes, undated. Ford Library. ACCL papers, Box 45, Folder "Ford (2)."

—-. Letter to the DNC, May 27, 1976. Ford Library. ACCL Papers, Box 44, Folder, "Republican Party Politics."

Memo "Religion." Ford Library. President Ford Campaign–Political Office, Box C34, Folder "Special Voter Groups (3)."

Mendelberg, Tali. 2001. *The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Milton, John. 2012. *For the Good of the Order: Nick Coleman and the High Tide of Liberal Politics in Minnesota, 1971-1981.* Xlibris.

Mitchell, Elizabeth and Neil O'Brian. "Groups, Attitude Attribution and Ideological Constraint." Working Paper.

Morain, Dan. 2014. "Long ago, a liberal Republican helped win passage of the Civil Rights Act." *Sacramento Bee,* July 6. `https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/dan-morain/article2602884.html`. Accessed 6 April 2020.

Morning Edition. 2013. "Losing Our Religion: The Growth Of The 'Nones'." *NPR,* January 13. `https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2013/01/14/169164840/losing-our-religion-the-growth-of-the-nones`.

National Archives. 2012. *Nixon on the Home Front: The 37th President's Domestic Policies Increased the Reach of the Government.* `https://www.archives.gov/files/publications/prologue/2012/winter/nixon.pdf`

National Review. "Catholic Bishops: A Big Problem." 10 December 1982, pg. 1526.

News and Observer. 1968. "Integration Orders by HEW Hit by Somers." *News and Observer,* 30 August 1968. Accessed 1 June 2020. `https://www.newspapers.com/image/652706193/`.

Noel, Hans. 2013. *Political Ideologies and Political Parties in America.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Norrander, Barbara. 1989. "Ideological Representativeness of Presidential Primary Voters." *American Journal of Political Science,* 33 (3):570–87.

North Carolina Digital Heritage Center. 1968. Advertisement. "Robert Vance Somers for U.S. Senate, 1968 Advertisement," Accessed 1 June 2020. `https://www.flickr.com/photos/digitalnc/8067926241`.

O'Brian, Neil. 2019. "Before Reagan: The Development of Abortion's Partisan Divide." *Perspectives on Politics,* First View.

Observers Wire Report. 1968. "Democrats face GOP Hailstorm in the Carolinas." *The Charolotte Observer,* 31 August 1968. Accessed 1 June 2020. `https://www.newspapers.com/image/621255841/`.

Oskarson, Maria and Marie Demker. 2015. "Room for Realignment: The Working Class Sympathy for Sweden Democrats." *Government and Opposition,* 50(4): 629-651.

Oxley, Douglas R., Kevin B. Smith, John Alford, Matthew Hibbing, Jennifer Miller, Mario Scalora, Peter Hatemi and John Hibbing. 2008. "Political Attitudes Vary with Physiological Traits." *Science,* 321: 1667-1670.

Perlstein, Rick. 2008. *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America.* New York: Scribner.

Pieters, Janene. 2017. "Wilders Reiterates Trump Support While Calling for LGBT Rights, Gender Equality." *Netherlands Times News,* 23 January. `https://nltimes.nl/2017/01/23/wilders-reiterates-trump-support-calling-lgbt-rights-gender-equality`.

Phillips, Howard. Memo to John Lofton, July 25, 1980. Falwell Library. Phillips Papers, Series 1:1, Box 12, Folder 16a.

—. "1979 Member's Issue Priority Poll." Fallwell Library. Howard Phillips Papers 1:1, Box 7, Folder 3b.

Phillips, Kevin P. 1969. *The Emerging Republican Majority.* New York: Arlington House.

Phillips, Susan. Memo to Howard Phillips. Falwell Library. Howard Phillips Papers, Series 1:1, Box 20, Folder 43A.

Pierson, Paul and Eric Schickler. 2020. "Madison's Constitution Under Stress: A Development of Political Polarization." *Annual Review of Political Science,* 23:3.1-3.22.

"Political Planning of the Corporation," undated memo. Ford Library, ACCL Papers, Box 4, Folder NRLC (3).

Polk, Jonathan, Jan Rovny, Ryan Bakker, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Gijs Schumacher, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Vachudova and Marko Zilovic. 2017. "Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data." *Research & Politics,* (January-March): 1-9.

Religious Roundtable. Undated meeting notes. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 21, Folder "Religious Roundtable 1980."

Riker, William. 1982. *Liberalism Against Populism.* San Francisco: WH Freeman.

Rodden, Jonathan. 2019. *Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide.* New York: Basic Books.

Rogers, Adrian. Letter to Foy Valentine, Nov 28, 1977. Southern Baptist Library and Archive. CLC Staff Files 138-5, Box 41, Folder 3.

Rusher, William A. 1975. *The Making of the New Majority Party.* New York: Sheed and Ward.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2002. *Democrats, Republicans and the Politics of Women's Place.* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Sokal, Jason. 2014. *All eyes are upon us : race and politics from Boston to Brooklyn.* New York: Basic Books.

Southard, Helen. Executive Meeting Minutes, Jan 14, 1972. NYPL. Lader Papers,

Box 15, Folder 2.

Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1991. *The Pro-Choice Movement Organization and Activism in the Abortion Conflict.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scammon, Richard M. and Ben J. Wattenberg. 1970. *The Real Majority.* New York: Coward-McCann.

Schaeffer, Frank. 2007. *Crazy for God: How I Grew Up as One of the Elect, Helped Found the Religious Right, and Lived to Take All (or Almost All) of It Back.* Philadelphia: Perseus Books.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schickler, Eric. 2016. *Racial Realignment: The Transformation of American Liberalism, 1932-1965,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schlozman, Daniel. 2015. *When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in Political History.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sears, David and Carolyn Funk. 1999. "Evidence of the Long-Term Persistence of Adults' Political Predispositions." *The Journal of Politics,* 61(1): 1-28.

Sears, David, Colette Van Laar, Mary Carrillo and Rick Kosterman. 1997. "Is it Really Racism? The Origins of White Americans' Opposition to Race-Targeted Policies." *The Public Opinion Quarterly,* 61(1):16-53.

Sides, John, Chris Tausanovitch, Lynn Vavreck and Christopher Warshaw. 2018. "On the Representativeness of Primary Electorates." *British Journal of Political Science,* 50: 677-685.

Sides, John, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck. 2018. "Hunting where the ducks are: activating support for Donald Trump in the 2016 Republican primary." *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties,* 28(2): 135-56.

Skocpol, Theda. "America's Incomplete Welfare State: The Limits of New Deal Reforms and the Origins of the Present Crisis." Published in *Stagnation and Renewal in Social Policy: The Rise and Fall of Policy Regimes,* Martin Rien, Gosta Esping-Andersen and Lee Rainwater, editors.

Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stoker, Laura and M. Kent Jennings. 2008. "Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science,* 52(3): 619-635.

Strategic Plan for the ACCL. Prepared by William Hunt. Ford Library. ACCL Collection, Box 30, Folder "Allied Institutional Development Series (5)."

Sullivan, Patrick. 2018. "George H.W. Bush embodied the Republican Party's decades-long struggle with race." *The Washington Post,* 4 December 2018. Accessed 31 May 2020. `https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/george-hw-bush-embodied-the-republican-partys-decades-long-struggle-with-race/2018/12/04/1268ab08-f73b-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html`

Sundquist, James L. *The Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment*

of Political Parties in the United States. Washington: The Brookings Institution.
Tangner, Marc. Memo to the Committee, October 10, 1975. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 19, Folder 9.

Teeter, Robert. Memo to HR Haldeman, Aug 11, 1972. Ford Library. Robert Teeter Papers, Box 65, Folder "August 11, 1972 - H.R. Haldeman - Abortion."

Tesler, Michael. 2012. "The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race." *American Journal of Political Science,* 56(3): 690-704.

The Daily Ardmoreite. 1980. "Potential Voters Located in Survey," October 8. Accessed at the American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 4, Folder 6.

Tichenor, Daniel. 2009. *Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Turney, Shad, Frank Levy, Jack Citrin and Neil O'Brian. 2017. "Waiting for Trump: The Move to the Right of White-Working Class Men, 1968-2016." *The California Journal of Public Policy,* 1-25.

Valentine, Foy. Letter to Russell Kaemmerling, April 21, 1980. Southern Baptist Convention Library and Archives. CLC 138-2, Box 97, Folder 18.

Weyrich, Paul. Letter to the Committee, August 20, 1975. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 19, Folder 7.

—. Letter to Raymond Smith, April 29, 1971. Library of Congress. Weyrich Papers, Box 4, Folder 3.

—. Undated Interview with Nathan Miller. American Heritage Center. Paul Weyrich Papers, Box 24, Folder 5.

—. Letter to Cheryl Brown, March 30, 1977. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 2, Folder 3.

—. Letter to Mary Hunt, March 28, 1977. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 2, Folder 3.

—. Letter to Dick Morroni, April 20, 1976. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 1, Folder 16.

—. Letter to Rienk Kamer, July 16, 1981. Letter from the Coalitions for America. Library of Congress, Weyrich Papers, Box 10, Folder 5.

—. Letter to C. Victor Thornton, Feb. 27, 1980. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 4, Folder 2.

—. Letter to Bill Welsh, December 8, 1975. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 1, Folder 11.

—. Letter to Richard Vigurie, October 3, 1975. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 43, Folder 13.

—. Letter to Richard Scaife, Jan 29, 1979. American Heritage Center. Weyrich Papers, Box 3, Folder 12.

Weyrich, Paul. 1982. Essay in *The New Right Papers,* edited by Robert Whitaker. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Wilcox, Clyde. 1992. *God's Warriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America.* Baltimore: JHU Press.

Williams, Daniel. 2016. *Defenders of the Unborn: The Pro-Life Movement Before Roe v. Wade.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Williams, Daniel. 2011. "The GOP's Abortion Strategy: Why Pro-Choice Republicans Became Pro-Life in the 1970s." *The Journal of Policy History,* 23(4): 513-539.

Wheatley, Jonathan and Fernando Mendez. 2019. "Re-conceptualizing Dimensions of Political Competition in Europe: A Demand-side Approach." *British Journal of Political Science,* 1-20.

Wolbrecht, Christina. 2000. *The Politics of Women's Rights : Parties, Positions, and Change.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wroe, Andrew. 2008. *The Republican Party and Immigration Politics: From Proposition 187 to George W. Bush.* New York: MacMillan.

Young, Lisa. 2000. *Feminists and Party Politics.* Vancouver: UBC Press.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

—-. 2012. "What Nature and Origins Leaves Out." *Critical Review* 24(4): 569-642.

Ziegler, Mary. 2015. *After Roe: The Lost History of the Abortion Debate.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.