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**Conflict and Consensus on American Public  
Opinion on Illegal Immigration**

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# Conflict and Consensus on American Public Opinion on Illegal Immigration

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## Abstract

The literature on public attitudes toward immigration devotes more attention to mass preferences over the admission and treatment of legal immigrants than to explaining attitudes toward illegal immigration. We theorize both similarity and difference in the nature and underpinnings of public opinion across domains. Two recent surveys, each employing a novel variant of conjoint analysis, help us test these expectations. We underline “categorical” response – that is, the rejection or acceptance of all profiles regardless of traits – on the pathway issue, both extensive in absolute terms (roughly 40% of respondents) and relative to assessments on legal admissions. This tendency also explains the entirety of the favorability gap between legal and illegal profiles assessed. On the other hand, those who do not express categorical responses emphasize the importance of both ethnocultural and human capital-related considerations, and the relative weight of these considerations is stable both regardless of the legality condition and across numerous political predispositions.

**Draft Version, 5/10/2014**

## Introduction

A path to American citizenship for the nearly 12 million illegal immigrants living in the United States is at the heart of renewed efforts toward comprehensive immigration reform. Recent polls find majority support for legalization and earned citizenship but also widespread antipathy toward illegal immigration and support for strong enforcement (e.g. Schildkraut 2012). These polls have asked about illegal immigration in general, but those living in the United States without official permission are a diverse group. A majority comes from Mexico, but millions have other ethnic and national origins. Some have lived in the U.S. for years, studying or working, acculturating, and raising children while others survive on the margins of society, with little education, income, or English.

Our research draws on this diversity to illuminate the motivational roots of attitudes toward illegal immigration policy. The literature on public attitudes toward immigration devotes more attention to mass preferences over the admission and treatment of legal immigrants than to explaining attitudes toward illegal immigration. We provide reasons to expect both similarity and difference in the nature and underpinnings of public opinion in these two domains. Two recent surveys, each employing a novel variant of conjoint analysis - a method asking respondents to assess pairs of immigrant profiles that vary on multiple randomly-assigned attributes – help us test these expectations.

We show the distinct prevalence of “categorical” opinions about a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants: over forty percent of those surveyed expressed a blanket preference either for rejecting or accepting every illegal immigrant profile they viewed, regardless of those immigrants’ individual attributes. These categorical tendencies are far less prevalent when respondents assess whether prospective legal immigrants should be allowed to immigrate. We argue that categorical opposition to a path to citizenship reflects the potent influence of moral convictions about the

importance of adhering to laws. whereas categorical support is tied to egalitarian and humanitarian values.

Americans who do not respond “categorically” assess illegal and legal immigrants’ worthiness of permanent residency in United States based on very similar sets of immigrant attributes. They place significant weight on illegal immigrants’ national origin and religion, but no more so than prospective legal immigrants’. And in both cases, markers of acculturation and economic potential (English language ability, time of residence and family ties in the U.S., and holding a steady job) have a greater impact. In keeping with Hainmueller and Hopkins’ (2013) analysis of attitudes toward legal immigrant admissions, we also in general find agreement among Americans with differing political predispositions about which attributes put prospective immigrants over the bar.

Our contributions shed light on two important questions about contemporary U.S. immigration politics. First, the prevalence of categorical opinion may help explain why compromises on a path to citizenship have been so difficult to forge despite majority support for the policy in the abstract. Categorical opposition cannot be defused by tailoring the program’s inclusion criteria, and a limited policy might not satisfy categorical supporters. Second, our results clarify why the “illegality frame” increases some Americans’ hostility to immigrants (Masuoka & Junn 2013; Merolla, Ramakrishnan & Haynes 2013). To be sure, public beliefs, accurate or distorted, about ethnic and socioeconomic differences between legal and illegal immigrant populations may contribute to the difference in support for legal and illegal immigrants. But even controlling for these experimentally, illegal immigrants still fare significantly worse than legal ones. This suggests that Americans also impose a penalty for illegal status itself. Strikingly, however, when categorical supporters and opponents are excluded from our sample, the penalty disappears, and Americans endorse legal and illegal immigrants at exactly the same rate. Thus the illegality penalty is all-or-nothing: for categorical

opponents it is by definition absolute, but for the other two thirds of the public illegality itself carries no average negative impact on public support for an immigrant's inclusion in the American polity.

### **Categorical Judgment**

Arguments over legal admissions typically concern how many visas should be awarded to different categories of immigrants. Not even the most fervently pro- and anti-immigrant groups advocate a completely open or closed border (Tichenor 2002; 2012). By contrast, the debate over illegal immigration is especially fraught with normative arguments that apply categorically to all of the country's illegal immigrants. To the extent that these arguments resonate in mass opinion, we would expect large numbers of Americans to harbor a "categorical opinion" about legalization; that is, many should prefer to reject or include immigrants across the board, irrespective of each immigrant's individual attributes.

Some supporters of legalization – the recent rise in deportations and state-level crackdowns notwithstanding – regard decades of lax enforcement as a tacit sanctioning (even encouragement) of the presence of illegal immigrants, largely to benefit employers seeking pliable low-wage labor. In this context, they regard forcing millions to "live in the shadows," without civil rights or easy access to social services, as an affront to human rights and an abdication of the country's obligation to those toiling to line employers' pockets. For example, Attorney General Eric Holder – speaking at a Mexican American Legal Defense and Education (MALDEF) award ceremony – called creating a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants in this country "essential...a matter of civil and human rights" (AILA 2013).

Opponents of legalization, on the other hand, often cast the issue in strict moral terms, making unlawful presence in the country as a blanket disqualification. To give any illegal immigrant a path to citizenship constitutes "amnesty," an act that transgresses respect for the law, rewards violators, and unjustly pushes aside those who have "played by the rules." Appeals to "the law"

feature prominently in the literature of anti-immigrant groups such as NumbersUSA and the Center for Immigration Studies (Vaughan 2013). In this vein, four Republican Senators wrote that legalization “rewards criminal aliens” (Fabian 2013), and Representative Raul Labrador called a reform proposal before Congress “a travesty...to treat those who violated our laws to get here much better than those who have patiently waited their turn” (Khimmm 2013).

Accordingly, we expect categorical judgments of the policy’s fairness or relation to human rights to motivate a substantial number of Americans to either reject or include all illegal immigrants, for a path to citizenship. Of course if such respondents were forced to choose despite this, they might reveal preferences for immigrants with some attributes over others – perhaps even preferences that align with those of Americans who do not harbor categorical views. But we would argue that the prior preference to disregard attributes entirely – one rendered invisible in research (discussed further below) that forces a choice between immigrants – is at least as meaningful an aspect of public opinion toward illegal immigrants as the secondary preference ordering over attributes.

If categorical opinion reflects the distinct importance of certain moral convictions in shaping illegal immigration attitudes, we would clearly expect more categorical opinion over legalizing illegal immigrants than admitting prospective legal ones. Further, moral concerns about rewarding law-breakers may carry less force when applied to people who were not themselves responsible for breaking the law. If so, legal status for “Dreamers” – illegal immigrants brought to the country as children – should evoke lower rates of categorical opposition than legal status for illegal immigrants in general. Some Americans may nonetheless harbor categorical opposition to the legalization of Dreamers. They may worry about a “slippery slope,” rewarding parents who broke the law, or the unfairness of promoting those here illegally ahead of immigrants who “play by the rules.”

Rates of categorical support would also likely vary in assessments of legal immigrants, illegal immigrants in general, and Dreamers. If the broad-based human rights arguments we cited for a path to citizenship have diffused to the mass public, there should be more categorical support for legalization of illegal immigrants than for admitting prospective legal immigrants. We would also expect higher rates of categorical support for Dreamers than for illegal immigrants generally, since Americans may feel a heightened sense of obligation to grant equal political status to those who have lived nearly their whole lives in the U.S. and have no other national home.

We can descriptively test other expectations emerging from our contention that categorical response constitutes a moral reaction to illegal immigration. First, political conservatism and the authoritarian personality are linked with intolerance of ambiguity and the desire to maintain rigid social hierarchies (e.g. Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009), so we would expect conservatism and authoritarianism to be associated with categorical opposition to legalization. Second, if a genuine moral conviction about the importance of strict adherence to law motivates categorical opposition, as we have argued, then we would expect categorical opposition to be higher among those who tend to view other legal infractions as serious, even when authoritarian tendencies and conservatism are taken into account. Third, humanitarian and egalitarian values should lead to more categorical support. Concern about human well-being and inequality should increase receptivity to arguments positing a societal responsibility to assist and extend political rights to those lured to all those living within our borders. Egalitarians would likely also be averse to the idea of a two-tiered society and might even object to a legalization program that applies to some and not to others, leading to blanket support for legalization.

### **Attribute-Based Judgment**

*Acculturation and Ethnocultural Congruence* A large body of research ties attitudes about immigration to beliefs about whether immigrants satisfy the respondent's normative criteria for



American nationhood. Perceived threats to a country's distinctive identity and culture drive anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. and elsewhere (Citrin et al. 1990; Hainmueller & Hangartner 2013; Schildkraut 2011; Sniderman & Hagendoorn 2007; Theiss-Morse 2010; Wong 2010; Wright, Citrin & Wand 2012). Americans almost universally endorse acculturation as a prerequisite to full-fledged membership in the national community – speaking English, holding American values, feeling American, and getting ahead on one's own (Citrin & Wright 2009; Schildkraut 2011). Accordingly, studies show hostility to immigrants who speak poor English (Newman, Hartman, & Taber 2012) and support for using English ability and gainful employment as criteria for legal admission (Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013). At the same time, echoes of nineteenth century nativist movements that rejected immigrants who did not match the country's Anglo-Saxon Protestant roots as unassimilable (Smith 1997) persist in recent work on the ethnocentric and religious bases of anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g. Jacobs & Theiss-Morse 2013; Kalkan et. al, 2009; Kinder & Kam 2009; Knoll 2009). Along these lines, Valentino, Brader, and Suhay (2008) find that anxiety over immigration is related to anti-Latino sentiment, and several studies tie anti-Hispanic bias to hostility toward illegal immigration in particular (Masuoka & Junn, 2013; Hartman, Newman, & Bell 2014; Ramakrishnan, Esterling, & Neblo, n.d.).

The literature on immigration attitudes also points to the importance of immigrants' human capital (e.g. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2013), possibly as an indication of the potential to contribute to the national economy. Many attributes – English language ability and work record – could be taken both as markers of integration and human capital, so it is difficult to adjudicate between hypotheses positing a motivation to legalize immigrants who will help the national welfare and a motivation to legalize immigrants who meet subjective civic criteria for national membership. An immigrant's level of education, however, is an indicator of human capital without a clear bearing on integration.

The literature thus leads to two sets of expectations. First, those who do not harbor categorical opinions about a path to citizenship and take immigrants' attributes into account are expected to widely value markers of acculturation and human capital. Immigrants who show signs of effort to assimilate – taking English classes or seeking work even without always securing it – may also be viewed in a positive light (cf. Hopkins 2013). Second, European origin and Christianity should appeal to those who endorse racial and religious criteria for national membership. Mexican immigrants should fare worse than those from Germany and France and possibly also than those from Asia (cf. Masuoka and Junn 2013). Immigrants from Islamic countries or who are themselves Muslim may strike some Americans as especially threatening to American culture (Sides and Gross, forthcoming) and thus incur a particularly large penalty. The unauthorized status of the immigrant profiles we present and the simultaneous assessment of multiple attributes should give respondents ample “cover” to express prejudice. Given that our multifactor design controls for various socioeconomic attributes, the effect of national origin arguably reflects simple prejudice – antipathy to the national origin group in and of itself – and is not a reaction to what the subject knows or believes about differences in the socioeconomic characteristics of different groups (cf. Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013).

Very little research directly compares attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration. One partial exception is Ramakrishnan, Esterling, and Neblo, n.d., who randomly vary a hypothetical immigrant's national origin and legal status simultaneously. But they do not report direct comparisons of the role of an illegal and legal immigrants' national origin. We therefore entered into the research agnostic about whether most attributes would exert differently sized impacts on assessments of legal or illegal immigrants. It seemed plausible, however, to expect that national origin would have a larger on Americans' judgments of illegal immigrants than of legal immigrants. Recent scholarship drawing theories of “modern” or “symbolic” racism (Kinder and Sanders 1996)

argues that anti-Latino prejudice induces some Americans to more harshly judge “transgressive behaviors,” including overstaying a visa, when they are committed by Latino immigrants than by immigrants from other backgrounds (Hartman, Newman, & Bell 2014). Though the design includes no direct comparison to the role of anti-Latino prejudice in judgments of immigrants who have not violated a clear norm, the implication appears to be that Americans will feel particularly comfortable expressing anti-Latino prejudice – and perhaps other forms of “underground” racial or religious prejudice – when confronted with immigrants who have transgressed a social or legal norm than when assessing immigrants who have not.

*Consensus and Cleavage* In canvassing opinion over *legal* admissions, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2013) demonstrate that Americans largely agree over the importance of human-capital and norm-adherence (e.g. English language ability) among visa applicants. Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, whites and blacks, high school graduates and college graduates, and those high and low in ethnocentrism all tend to favor immigrants with the potential to integrate culturally and economically into mainstream society. Thus, their data show popular agreement about what kind of person should be admitted into the American national community, a “hidden consensus” among Americans with differing political predispositions about which immigrant attributes should drive decisions over whom to admit. Since norms concerning the value of acculturation, economic contribution, and ethnocultural congruence are widely present on both sides of these political divides, we also predict that consensus will mostly prevail among those who do use attributes to judge illegal immigrants.

Prevalent categorical opinion would obviously qualify the hidden consensus thesis as it relates to illegal immigration attitudes, since it implies starkly different preferences across different segments of the public over how to determine whether an illegal immigrant should be accorded a path to citizenship. Yet it is even possible, as noted above, that those who prefer to exclude or

include all immigrants irrespective of their attributes would exhibit a preference ordering consistent with the national mode were they were forced to choose some immigrants and reject others, so the hidden consensus thesis might still hold in some limited sense even when categorical opinions are taken into account, though we have not tested this possibility here.

### **Approaches to Testing Attribute-Based Judgments**

Experimental studies of immigration attitudes typically manipulate a hypothetical immigrant's attributes (country of origin, skin tone, language ability, and so on) one or two at a time, using vignettes or other treatments (e.g. Brader et al 2008; Hainmueller & Hiscox 2010; Hopkins 2013; Schildkraut, 2011; Sniderman et al. 2004; Valentino & Iyengar 2011). However, treatment effects in these studies can be difficult to interpret because attributes that are varied experimentally are often correlated, in actuality or in subjects' minds, with other attributes that are not explicitly varied (see, e.g., Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013). For example, an immigrant's country of origin might evoke a sense of cultural threat, if ethnicity or language is salient to subjects in a study, or economic threat, if subjects have in mind differences in the modal skills and job prospects of immigrants from different countries.

Recent work (Hainmueller, Hopkins, & Yamamoto forthcoming) proposes conjoint analysis as an alternative to overcome this problem, and our design here builds on that approach. Specifically, respondents make a series of choices between two or more alternatives presented side-by-side as columns in a table. Each row represents an attribute-category, with the input randomly selected from a discrete set of potential values. Each attribute is assigned independently and at random, and thus cannot confound the value of any other attribute within profiles or across them.

We focus on a causal quantity that Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto term the "average marginal component effect" or "AMCE" (ibid., p. 3). The AMCE is the treatment effect of changing the value of a single attribute in a profile (for example, the effect of changing an immigrant's

language ability from no English to fluent English). Since the attributes are all randomly assigned, the difference in the percentage of immigrants included who have one value of the attribute category and who have another furnishes an unbiased causal estimate of the AMCE with respect to those levels of the attribute.

Typically, respondents must choose one candidate from each set, which is problematic in the present context because it rules out the expression of categorical judgment by design. We relax this constraint by allowing respondents to opt for “neither” or “both” of the two candidates. We present profiles in pairs, even though the forced-choice constraint is relaxed, for several reasons. First, this maintains a format that resembles as closely as possible other conjoint designs. A second reason is efficiency of presentation: subjects need only confront half as many screens. Third, a design that requires respondents who wish to reject or accept all choices to repeatedly say “neither” or “both” to successive pairs of immigrants may better capture categorical opinion than asking people to vote up or down repeatedly on individual immigrants. Finally, presenting profiles in pairs allows us to measure reference-point effects, which turn out to be minimal (see more under “Estimation”).

## **Data & Measures**

Our results are based on two national surveys of Americans. Study 1 had a sample of 810 (767 native-born) and was fielded online by YouGov/Polimetrix in March 2013. Study 2, with a sample of 2,654 (2,467 native-born) was conducted by Survey Sampling International between November 20<sup>th</sup> and December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2013. Each survey was designed with a somewhat different goal. Study 1 aimed to explore the foundations of the “pathway to citizenship” issue in particular, whereas Study 2 moved away from assessing opinion toward a true policy proposal and was designed instead to probe contrasting responses to providing permanent legal residency to legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and “Dreamers.” In both cases, we focus on respondents born in the U.S. since

immigrants presumably approach these issues quite differently from natives (e.g. Dancygier & Saunders 2006). For key sample demographics and other measures, see Appendix A.

*Dependent Variable:* In both studies, respondents assessed five pairs of immigrants. In Study 1, all received the following prompt: “Please consider a program that would allow immigrants living in the U.S. illegally to get legal status and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, as long as they meet certain requirements, like paying back taxes and passing background checks. We’d like your opinion about which sorts of individuals, if any, should qualify for this program. For each pair of individuals presented to you here, both of whom are illegal immigrants, tell us which you would prefer to be granted legal status and provided a pathway to citizenship. You can also say that you would prefer that neither or both be given this status.” This task was designed to tap, as closely as possible, support for legalization based on proposed “path to citizenship” legislation.

In Study 2, each respondent received at random one of three prompts motivating their five decisions, with key distinctions bolded here, although not in the study protocol, for clarity. The *legal* condition is as follows: “There are different opinions about what sorts of people from other countries should be given official permission to come to the United States **legally** and live here permanently. We’d like to know your opinion. For each pair of people you see, please indicate which of the two you would prefer be given official permission to come to the United States **legally** and live here permanently, or whether you would prefer that neither or both be given permission.” The *illegal* condition is: “There are different opinions about what sorts of people from other countries who are living in the United States **illegally** should be given official permission to live here permanently. We’d like to know your opinion. For each pair of people you see, both of whom are living in the United States **illegally**, please indicate which of the two you would prefer be given official permission to live here permanently, or whether you would prefer that neither or both be given permission.” Finally, the *Dreamer* condition is: “There are different opinions about what sorts

of people from other countries who were **brought here as children** and are living in the United States **illegally** should be given official permission to live here permanently. We'd like to know your opinion. For each pair of people you see, all of whom were **brought here as children** and are living in the United States **illegally**, please indicate which of the two you would prefer be given official permission to live here permanently, or whether you would prefer that neither or both be given permission." The conditions were designed to be as comparable as possible to isolate the effect of legal status *per se*; the fact that the conditions conflate the issue of already being in the U.S. versus coming from outside is something to keep in mind, but essentially unavoidable if any realism is to be preserved.

In both studies, a grid appeared with "Immigrant 1" and "Immigrant 2" as columns, and a set of attributes as rows. Below the grid, respondents were asked in Study 1: "Which of these two individuals, both of whom are illegal immigrants, do you think should be granted legal status in the United States with an opportunity eventually to become a citizen?" In Study 2, this prompt was slightly altered match the condition. In both Studies and all three conditions of Study 2, respondents could answer "Immigrant 1," "Immigrant 2," "Neither," "Both," or "Don't Know". For the complete protocol, see Appendix B.

*Immigrant Attributes:* The grid in Study 1 included eight randomly-assigned characteristics: 1) level of formal education; 2) family structure (in terms of spouses' and children's immigration status); 3) employment history while in the U.S.; 4) English language ability; 5) country of origin; 6) work (mainly immigrant- focused or serving a largely native-born clientele); 7) religious background; and 8) number of years living in the U.S.<sup>1</sup> Religion and country of origin clearly denote

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<sup>1</sup> To verify randomization, we regressed each attribute (using multinomial logit) on respondent age, education, sex, and race. In only one case could we reject the null of random assignment at (chi-

ethnocultural congruence, while the others reflect acculturation and human capital. We do not claim an exhaustive listing, but we sought to balance comprehensiveness against the cognitive strain that an excessively large number of attributes might provide.<sup>2</sup> Respondents in Study 2 assessed immigrants based on a somewhat different set of criteria, with “age” added and both “family structure” and “number of years living in the U.S.” categories removed because they could not be applied equivalently across conditions. Finally, employment history in Study 2 dropped the previous reference to “in the U.S.,” again to achieve comparability across all three conditions.

We note here that because attributes are assigned at random and independently, conjoint analysis can produce “unlikely” profiles, which some censor at the outset on external validity grounds (e.g. Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013). We allowed complete randomization, but verified *post-hoc* that eliminating the handful of unrealistic immigrant profiles (in particular the combination of Islamic religion with several national origin categories) does not alter our results.

***Respondent Characteristics:*** Our surveys included demographics such as gender, race/ethnicity, and educational attainment. They also included measures of various political predispositions. Partisanship and liberal-conservative ideological identification are gauged using standard American National Election Study 7-point and 5-point scales respectively. Following

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squared)  $p < .05$ : on the job performance treatment there was a minor (maximum 4%) difference in the percentage of whites assigned to each category. Controlling for a dummy variable identifying white respondents did not materially alter the estimated effects reported below.

<sup>2</sup> Encouragingly, respondents did not appear unduly burdened: in Study 1, for example, only 9.2% of all choices garnered a “don’t know” response, and over 83% of respondents never chose that option. Of those that did, more than half did so three times or fewer out of five and fewer than a quarter answered “DK” for all five choices. DK responses are excluded from subsequent analyses.



Kinder and Kam (2011), racial prejudice is measured using the difference between one's own racial group's feeling thermometer score and either the average of scores for other racial groups (for whites) or the score for whites (for blacks, Latinos, and Asians). Authoritarianism is measured using three questions about priorities in child rearing (cf. Hetherington 2009). Egalitarianism and humanitarianism are measured by standard indexes asking questions about the importance society's pursuit of equality and of helping those in need respectively. The moral importance respondents place on rigid adherence to laws is tapped by a battery of questions asking subjects to assess the seriousness of various infractions that have no direct relation to immigration. To help validate some of our results, we also measure abstract support for a pathway to citizenship with a seven-point question. All these variables were measured after the profile assessments so as not to "prime" responses to the experiment. For further details, see Appendix A.

### **Estimation**

In a typical conjoint protocol (where a choice of one option is necessarily the rejection of the others), each decision is the appropriate unit of analysis. Because our approach also allowed the freedom to include "neither" or "both," rejecting or accepting one of them says nothing directly about how the respondent judged the other(s). Since all four possible responses provide (in effect) an in-or-out vote on every profile, our unit of analysis is the profile assessment. We employ logistic regression to estimate the probability of a "yes" vote for each immigrant profile as a function of the randomly-assigned attributes, and cluster standard errors by respondent. We then calculate the marginal effect of each value of an attribute (relative to an omitted reference category) on the probability of an immigrant's inclusion in a path to citizenship and plot these estimates along with their 95% confidence intervals. Results from all models used to generate the plots are shown in Appendix C.

Paired immigrant profiles viewed on a given screen are generated independently of one another, so omitting the alternative's attributes from a model predicting the inclusion probability of a given candidate does not generate bias. However, each immigrant on a screen might nevertheless serve as an arbitrary reference point for judging the other. We checked this possibility by explicitly modeling preference for each immigrant as a function of both the immigrant's own characteristics and the attributes of the immigrant displayed on the same screen. For the most part, immigrants are judged based on their own attributes and not by the attributes of immigrants displayed alongside them. There was one exception. In Study 1, being paired with an immigrant with a poor job history (chronic unemployment) helps an immigrant's chances of being granted a path to citizenship by about half as much as having a good job record oneself does. But, as expected, including controls for the attributes of both immigrants in each pair does not meaningfully alter any of the point estimates we present.

## **Results**

Respondents in Study 1, which comes closest to assessing support in the context of a “realistic” policy, granted a path to citizenship to 42% of the illegal immigrants they assessed. One implication is that majority support for a path to citizenship in principle obscures considerable selectivity with respect to what kind of person should be included. Our analysis aims to explain how this aggregate selectivity emerges from a combination of categorical opinion and attribute-based opinion.

*Categorical Opinion:* We predicted that widespread use of categorical arguments in the public debate over a path to citizenship would encourage some respondents to disregard illegal immigrants' individual attributes and accept or reject all profiles they viewed. Figure 1 shows the distribution across respondents of the number of immigrants accepted (out of a possible ten) and clearly confirms this expectation: approximately 25% of subjects choose “neither” in all five of their

decisions (rejecting all ten candidates) and 16% opted for “both” across the board. It is implausible that these levels of categorical opinion arose by chance, and the strong correlation between the propensity to respond categorically and baseline approval on a separate “path to citizenship” item – three quarters of those who rejected immigrants across-the-board were at least “moderately” opposed in principle, whereas among those who accepted all ten profiles, over 80% were at least “moderately” supportive – also suggests that these categorical judgments are substantive rather than an artifact of method.

[Insert Figure 1 About Here]

Our second study addresses this issue directly. Method is held constant across conditions invoking legal, illegal, and Dreamer immigrants. It also addresses a larger problem: though polls consistently show that Americans have more negative views of illegal than legal immigrants, it is not clear how much of that difference stems just from their status before the law rather than from immigrant characteristics commonly associated in the public mind with illegal immigrants, such as Hispanic origin, low levels of acculturation, and low levels of education. In our case, however, since important individual immigrant attributes are controlled experimentally in the conjoint design, differences in the prevalence of categorical opinion across conditions can be attributed to the distinctions people draw between legal and illegal immigration *per se* rather than to perceived differences in immigrants’ ethnic background, level of integration, or potential to contribute economically to the U.S.

Table 1, below, reveals that categorical opposition is approximately three times more prevalent in the illegal condition than in the legal condition, with the “Dreamer” condition falling just between. More than 33% of subjects appear to categorically oppose the extension of legal status to illegal immigrants, compared to under 12% of those randomly assigned to adjudicate legal immigrant profiles. This was expected, based on the relative prevalence of moral arguments in the

domain of illegal immigrants over legal admissions. If, by contrast, categorical tendencies were an artifact of inattention to the survey or format, we would observe no differences between conditions.

However, we do not find support for the distinctive prevalence of categorical support in the illegal immigration condition, with rates across Study 2's legal and illegal conditions statistically indistinguishable. We also observe a drop in categorical support for illegal immigrants from 16% in Study 1 to 8% in Study 2. One possibility is that the explicit reference to a "path to citizenship" in the first study elicited a partisan reaction, causing some Democrats to express categorical support. Another is that some subjects conflate a "path to citizenship" with a policy like the Dream Act, the latter of which pertains only to the normalization of illegal immigrants brought to the country as children and may garner higher levels of categorical support.

[Table 1 Here]

Comparing the prevalence of categorical opinion in the *illegal* condition and the *Dreamer* condition sheds light on these patterns. Categorical opposition to legalization declines by nearly a third ( $p < .05$ ) when we specify that the illegal immigrants in question were brought to the country as children. This suggests the importance of illegal immigrants' agency in breaking the law as a factor encouraging categorical opposition, since Dreamers themselves are unlikely to be viewed as culpable in this regard. However, categorical opposition also remains nearly twice as high in the *Dreamer* as in the *legal* immigration condition. Clearly immigrants' own responsibility for breaking the law is not the sole consideration driving categorical opposition. Others may include moral concerns about a slippery slope, rewarding Dreamers' parents who did break the law, or giving special treatment to Dreamers while requiring immigrants who have followed the law and "stood in line" to navigate the standard bureaucratic hurdles.

Meanwhile, categorical support in our second study rises significantly in the *Dreamer* condition (15%) relative to the *illegal* condition (8%), which is consistent with a substantive moral

interpretation of categorical support and would not have been expected if categorical opinions simply reflected respondents' desire to take the path of least resistance through the conjoint task by accepting or rejecting all immigrants. As we expected, moral and rights-based arguments for blanket inclusion of illegal immigrants carry more force when it comes to those who have lived most of their lives in America. This effect is also consistent with our speculation that some conflation of a "path to citizenship" with the Dream Act helps account for differences in the level of categorical support between our two studies.

How much of the well-established gap in favorability between legal and illegal immigrants can be attributed to categorical opinion? One approach to this involves exploring differences in the percentage of immigrants that subjects who did not exhibit categorical tendencies opted to include in each experimental condition. The higher level of categorical opposition to illegal than to legal immigration would no doubt contribute to endorsement of a higher percentage of legal than illegal immigrants. However, non-categorical subjects might also be expected also impose a significant but not absolute penalty on illegal immigrants, and would therefore also exhibit a lower average rate of including illegal than legal immigrants.

Strikingly, however, our results indicate that categorical opinion accounts for the entirety of the between-condition differences in inclusion rates, as shown in Table 2. Overall, subjects included 45% of legal immigrants, 33% of illegal immigrants, and 42% of Dreamers, with both pairwise comparisons with illegal immigrants significant at  $p < .05$  and the difference between the *legal* and *Dreamer* frames falling short of statistical significance. When categorical supporters and opponents are dropped, the inclusion propensities for legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and Dreamers are a virtually identical 43%, 43%, and 44% respectively. This means that whatever penalties and premiums subjects who do not harbor categorical opinions assign to these three categories of immigrant balance out almost perfectly. Americans who do not hold categorical views do not, on

average, discriminate at all on the basis of illegal status itself, conditional on the attributes we control in the conjoint design.

[Table 2 Here]

How does categorical response vary by the respondent's political predispositions? Study 2 contained a rich set of covariates that allows us to test the expectations we articulated above. Table 3 shows the results of a multinomial logit analysis of the predictors of categorical opposition and support in our *legal*, *illegal*, and *Dreamers* conditions. The dependent variable is whether a subject manifested categorical opposition or support, versus no categorical tendency. Though the table shows logit coefficients, for the clarity of the discussion we have transformed these into predicted marginal effects on the probability of being a categorical supporter or opponent (relative to harboring neither categorical view) associated with a one unit increase in each independent variable. The first three columns show how predictive each variable is of categorical opposition in each experimental condition. The second three columns show the same for categorical support. Thus columns 1 and 4 pertain to the same regression in the *legals* condition, 2 and 5 the *illegals* condition, and 3 and 6 the *Dreamers* condition. Taken together, the results support many, though not all, of our expectations.

[Table 3 Here]

We predicted that conservatives and authoritarians would be more likely to express categorical opposition. The expectation for conservatism is affirmed in these results. Moving from most liberal to most conservative is associated with a marginally significant ( $p < .1$ ) increase in the probability of categorical opposition of 11 percentage points in the *legal* condition, and with significant increases of 24 points in the *illegal* condition ( $p < .01$ ), and of 15 points in the *Dreamer* condition ( $p < .05$ ). Thus conservatism appears to increase categorical opposition to immigration in all conditions but does so to a greater extent when it comes to illegal immigrants. We find less

evidence, however, that authoritarianism increases categorical opposition. Only the estimate in the *illegals* condition is substantively important (an eight percentage point increase when one moves from the lowest to the highest value of the variable) but is only marginally significant ( $p < .1$ ). Our expectation that those sensitive to the seriousness of rule violations in other areas would express higher levels of categorical rejection is strongly affirmed. Those believing other infractions to be serious have a probability 25 percentage points higher of harboring categorical attitudes toward illegal immigrants and 20 points higher toward Dreamers ( $p < .05$  in both cases). This attitude has no impact on categorical opinion toward legal immigrants, which once again suggests the strong role of moral norms in fostering categorical opposition to illegal immigration in particular.

Turning to categorical support, our main prediction was that egalitarian and humanitarian values would increase the tendency to include all immigrants. Our results corroborate this expectation with respect to egalitarianism. This measure is strongly predictive in the *illegal* and *Dreamer* conditions, with a shift from the lowest to the highest score raising the predicted probability of categorical support by 17 and 19 points in these conditions respectively ( $p < .01$ ), but plays no discernible role in fostering categorical support for legal admissions, with an insignificant effect of 6 points ( $p = .28$ ). They do not reveal any distinctive role of humanitarianism in categorical support for illegal immigration generally. Its effect is present in the *legal* and *Dreamer* frames (effect of moving from lowest to highest score is 31 and 22 points respectively, and  $p < .01$  in both cases) but not in the *illegal* conditions. It is sensible those with a humanitarian orientation would be more likely to support admitting immigrants irrespective of any potential burden they might present to American society or their level of acculturation, though it is less clear why this does not apply in our results to the case of illegal immigrants who are not specified to be Dreamers.

***Attribute-Based Judgment:*** The substantial incidence of categorical opinion notwithstanding, nearly 60% of Americans in both studies make at least some use of attributes in

adjudicating among profiles of illegal immigrants. Study 1 allows us to gauge which attributes these subjects used to determine immigrants' worthiness of a path to U.S. citizenship. Study 2 permits direct comparison between the values subjects place on various attributes in assessing illegal and legal immigrants' worthiness of permanent legal status in the U.S.

Full logistic regression estimates for both studies are presented in Appendix C, but for efficiency and ease of interpretation we plot the marginal effect and 95% confidence interval of each attribute in Figures 2 and 3. In each attribute category, one "reference value" (listed in the figure at the top of each attribute category) is omitted from the model. Coefficients represent the marginal change in the estimated probability that a given profile will be accepted in response to a change from the omitted attribute to the one specified, with all other variables held at their means. We note that these estimates are based on the full native-born sample, including those who rejected or accepted categorically; excluding them generally magnifies coefficients (available upon request), which is sensible since all of our attribute effects are defined against an arbitrary reference category, and for those who categorically disregard attributes this will be zero by definition.

[Figure 2 About Here]

As predicted, Figure 2 indicates that attributes signaling both acculturation into and perceived ethnocultural congruence with the American mainstream boosted support for inclusion. Those fluent in English hold a 15 percentage point advantage over those who speak none, with those making an effort to use English by taking courses or speaking broken English roughly in between. Being employed furnishes more than a 10 percentage point advantage over those who have seldom had work in the U.S. Other markers exert somewhat weaker (but still significant) effects. Family ties play some role in that having a family with American-born children and being married to a legal permanent resident (versus being unmarried) help an immigrant's chances for inclusion by 5 and 7 percentage points, respectively. Working in a business serving mostly native-born clientele (the



“mainstream” value of the MAINSTREAM-ENCLAVE attribute) furnishes a minor edge over working for a business that mostly serves other immigrants. So, too, does time spent in the U.S., with those having spent at least five years enjoying an approximately 5 percentage point advantage over the most recent arrivals. All of this supports the notion that markers of a hypothetical illegal immigrant’s demonstrated acculturation increases support for his or her legalization. Labor market skill appears to influence choice as well, though more weakly than we might have expected. For instance, more educated immigrants have an advantage over less educated ones, but with diminishing returns, as there is little benefit to a college degree above and beyond a high school diploma.

The expectation that an immigrant’s ethnocultural congruence with the American native-born majority would influence support is also amply supported. Christians have a 10 percentage point advantage over Muslims – as large a differential as that between those who have worked steadily but for a brief stint of unemployment and those who have seldom worked. This does not only reflect distaste for Muslim immigrants. Christians have as large an advantage over the non-religious as the non-religious have over Muslims. National origin matters as well, and not only as a heuristic for level of skill or English ability since these attributes are varied independently and thus experimentally controlled. Americans prefer illegal European immigrants (German, French, and Polish) to Mexicans, and Mexicans to those from Iraq and the Sudan, possibly due to race. The gap in inclusion rates between Germans and Sudanese (15 percentage points) is larger than that between those who have worked with only a brief period of unemployment and those who have been unemployed with only a brief period of work or have worked continuously, and comparable to that between those who speak no English and those who speak fluently. Bearing in mind that these effects are additive rather than overlapping, very large “acceptability” gaps emerge once illegal immigrants find themselves in multiple “undesirable” categories.

Our second study helps confirm that the underpinnings of attitudes toward legal and illegal immigration, among those who do not hold categorical views, are quite similar. As indicated in Figure 3, below, markers of integration and potential for economic contribution – education, English language ability, and a record of steady employment – all boost the chances of inclusion by similar amounts in each condition. Muslims and non-religious subjects also suffer similar penalties relative to Christians regardless of whether subjects are assessing legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, or Dreamers. Germans are preferred to Mexicans and Chinese, who are in turn preferred to Nigerians and Pakistanis in all three conditions, though we note the statistical and substantive insignificance of these differences in the illegal condition. Age is the only attribute whose impact differs by frame. Older legal immigrants receive significantly less support than younger ones while for illegal immigrants generally and Dreamers in particular there is no effect or a modest positive effect of age. We speculate that whereas more advanced age conveys a lower likelihood of economic contribution for all immigrants, it also conveys among illegal immigrants (and especially among Dreamers) the likelihood that the immigrant has lived in the United States for longer, an attribute we do not vary independently in Study 2.

[Figure 3 Here]

Broad similarity across conditions also contrasts with the notion that Mexican immigrants would suffer a particularly large penalty in the illegal condition, or that some subjects would take advantage of an immigrant's illegality to express an ethnocentric preference. In fact, if anything, national origin appears to matter more in our second study for legal than illegal immigrants, though the results do not differ significantly. Thus our findings are consistent with a significant role for racial and religious prejudice in Americans' assessments of immigrants. However, we find no support for recent efforts to connect the operation of anti-Hispanic prejudice in immigration attitudes to the role of symbolic or modern racism in other domains. Our results suggest that

prejudice is neither amplified nor more openly expressed toward immigrants who have violated a clear legal norm than toward immigrants who have not.

Hainmueller and Hopkins (2013) argue that a “hidden consensus” prevails over the criteria Americans with different predispositions use to evaluate immigrants. We argued above that the much greater prevalence of categorical opposition to illegal immigration and the association of categorical views with underlying values and orientations are important qualifications. When it comes to which attributes are important in evaluating immigrants, however, we largely corroborate Hainmueller and Hopkins’ findings. Across partisanship and race, potent predispositions in many domains of American politics, we find little difference in the attributes prioritized in assessing illegal immigrants’ worthiness of inclusion in a path to citizenship (Appendix D, Figures 1 and 2). We also confirm broad similarities with respect to education, corroborating their inference that labor market threat, consistent with a preference for economic complements over competitors for jobs, plays little role in informing preferences over a path to citizenship (Appendix D, Figure 3). The relevant concerns tend to be sociotropic and normative rather than egocentric (cf. Citrin et al. 1990; Hainmueller & Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins 2013).

## **Conclusion**

Legalization and a pathway to citizenship for the 12 million immigrants living in the United States without permission are once again at the core of efforts to overhaul the immigration system. Extensive polling about has not systematically explored the motivational roots of attitudes toward incorporating illegal immigrants into the polity. This paper focuses on opinion about whether the characteristics of an illegal immigrant are important for choices about what groups should qualify for legalization. It identifies the relevant attributes in a multi-factor experimental setting and considers how a range of general political predispositions affect these judgments. This paper also is the first to

address these questions about illegal immigration with an explicit contrast to comparable attitudes on legal immigration.

Perhaps the most striking result is the evidence of pervasive categorical judgments, indicating that a large segment of the population responds to illegal immigrants in an indiscriminate manner, ignoring the varied characteristics of the immigrants themselves. Fully forty percent of the native-born Americans in our studies held categorical opinions about a path to citizenship or legal status for illegal immigrants, either accepting or rejecting every profile they viewed. Moreover, as we theorize and show, this kind of response is a function of the moral considerations (pro- and con-) invoked by the illegal immigration issue. The categorical response tendency also varies substantially with a range of political predispositions and demographic factors, meaning that different groups of Americans express markedly different preferences on this issue. In short, in the aggregate, our respondents are to a large degree both polarized and rigid on this issue, something that is far less evident in the case of beliefs about admitting legal immigrants. On a methodological note, we reiterate that both standard applications of conjoint-choice methodology and other studies varying the attributes of hypothetical beneficiaries of public policies are not well-suited to capturing this tendency toward blanket inclusion or exclusion. The prevalence of categorical thinking in the domain of illegal immigration suggests that it may be an important factor in other policy domains too.

For those who do consider attributes in making their choices about the parameters of legalization, markers of acculturation – especially command of English and a record of steady work in the United States – are influential as expected. Moreover, they tend to weigh these attributes in roughly equal measure whether the decision involves admitting an immigrant legally or providing an illegal immigrant a path to citizenship. This points to a consensus over what kinds of characteristics

make immigrants desirable regardless of their legal status, but that that status strongly influences whether or not respondents are willing to consider those characteristics in the first place.

These findings suggest several avenues for future investigation. For one, this approach to the study of categorical judgment about “deservingness” – as well as its motivational roots – could be extended to other domains such as affirmative action or welfare benefits, also domains also invoke normative considerations that might encourage extensive categorical opinion. Second, our research did not consider the role of contextual factors as moderators of opinion. Yet both demographic context (at various levels of aggregation) and social contact with illegal immigrants (both positive and negative) might also influence how people weigh immigrant attributes (e.g. Berg 2009; Hopkins 2010; Rocha et al. 2011). Media exposure, too, could play this role depending on the extent and tone of coverage on the issue (Dunaway, Branton, & Abrajano 2010; Valentino, Brader & Jardina 2012). Finally, the broader political context – both “dramatic” events such as terror attacks (Branton et al. 2011) or longer-term reform efforts (Schildkraut 2012) – may affect the structure of individual choices.

A thorny problem for students of public opinion is to link their findings to policy outcomes. One way to make research more relevant is to go beyond measuring support or opposition in the abstract and respond to the familiar “the devil is in the details” retort. When it comes to efforts to enact a path to citizenship, some of the most challenging issues have centered on the parameters of a program. Yet recent legislative efforts at a path to citizenship seem tailored to some of the findings that emerged in our conjoint analysis. Of course the public’s aggregate preference for legalizing Christians and people of European origin we uncover is a non-starter in designing immigration reform legislation. However, learning English and proving a record of steady work in the U.S. have been prioritized by legislators as requirements for the path to citizenship. And the emphasis on assuring border security before the path to citizenship is implemented and requiring immigrants to

pay fines and back taxes appear aimed at addressing objections based on an insistence on law-abidingness. Still, converting those who view any legalization as “amnesty” may be an insurmountable task, and the prevalence of categorical opinion helps explain why a grand bargain has been so elusive.

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


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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: Number of Illegal Immigrants Subjects Included in a Path to Citizenship



Source: Study 1.

**Table 1: Rates of Categorical Support and Opposition by Immigration Policy Domain**

|                              | <b>Legal</b> | <b>Legalization</b> | <b>Dreamer</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|
| <b>Categorical Inclusion</b> | 99           | 62                  | 124            | 285          |
| <i>%</i>                     | 12.1         | 7.5                 | 15.2           | 11.6         |
| <b>Non-Categorical</b>       | 626          | 491                 | 504            | 1,621        |
| <i>%</i>                     | 76.3         | 59.1                | 61.8           | 65.7         |
| <b>Categorical Exclusion</b> | 95           | 278                 | 188            | 561          |
| <i>%</i>                     | 11.6         | 33.5                | 23.0           | 22.7         |
| <b>Total</b>                 | 820          | 831                 | 816            | 2,467        |
| <i>%</i>                     | 100.0        | 100.0               | 100.0          | 100.0        |

Source: Study 2.

**Table 2: Rates of Immigrant Inclusion by Frame, Including and Excluding Categorical Response**

|                                                                              | <b>Legal</b> | <b>Legalization</b> | <b>Dreamer</b> | <b>Total</b> |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|---------------------|----------------|--------------|
| <b><u>All Subjects</u></b>                                                   |              |                     |                |              |
| Excluded                                                                     | 4,538        | 5,603               | 4,702          | 14,843       |
| %                                                                            | 55.3         | 67.4                | 57.6           | 60.2         |
| Included                                                                     | 3,662        | 2,707               | 3,458          | 9,827        |
| %                                                                            | 44.7         | 32.6                | 42.4           | 39.8         |
| Total                                                                        | 8,200        | 8,310               | 8,160          | 24,670       |
| %                                                                            | 100.0        | 100.0               | 100.0          | 100.0        |
| <b><u>Subjects Who Did <i>Not</i> Reject or Accept All 10 Immigrants</u></b> |              |                     |                |              |
| Excluded                                                                     | 3,588        | 2,823               | 2,822          | 9,233        |
| %                                                                            | 57.3         | 57.5                | 56.0           | 57.0         |
| Included                                                                     | 2,672        | 2,087               | 2,218          | 6,977        |
| %                                                                            | 42.7         | 42.5                | 44.0           | 43.0         |
| Total                                                                        | 6,260        | 4,910               | 5,040          | 16,210       |
| %                                                                            | 100.0        | 100.0               | 100.0          | 100.0        |

Source: Study 2

**Table 3: Correlates of Categorical Opinions on Immigrant Admissions Policy, Multinomial Logit (Omitted = Does Not Harbor Categorical Views)**


|                            | Categorical Opposition |                      |                     | Categorical Support |                      |                      |
|----------------------------|------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
|                            | Legal Immigration      | Illegal Immigration  | Dreamers            | Legal Immigration   | Illegal Immigration  | Dreamers             |
| Age                        | 0.016<br>(0.009)       | 0.009<br>(0.006)     | -0.001<br>(0.007)   | -0.027**<br>(0.009) | -0.043***<br>(0.012) | -0.011<br>(0.008)    |
| Female                     | -0.038<br>(0.254)      | -0.038<br>(0.180)    | -0.248<br>(0.211)   | -0.141<br>(0.263)   | -0.310<br>(0.325)    | 0.264<br>(0.240)     |
| Education                  | -0.271<br>(0.160)      | 0.130<br>(0.116)     | 0.156<br>(0.130)    | 0.068<br>(0.169)    | -0.009<br>(0.204)    | 0.081<br>(0.153)     |
| Black                      | 0.646<br>(0.426)       | -0.627<br>(0.474)    | -1.727*<br>(0.769)  | -0.011<br>(0.470)   | 0.689<br>(0.445)     | 0.646<br>(0.417)     |
| Latino                     | -0.830<br>(1.055)      | -0.337<br>(0.500)    | -0.588<br>(0.535)   | 0.255<br>(0.556)    | -0.000<br>(0.622)    | 0.502<br>(0.464)     |
| Asian                      | 0.732<br>(0.695)       | -0.257<br>(0.499)    | -1.431<br>(1.059)   | 1.422*<br>(0.623)   | -0.343<br>(0.674)    | 0.726<br>(0.585)     |
| Party ID                   | -0.460<br>(0.468)      | 0.434<br>(0.333)     | 0.713*<br>(0.362)   | 0.420<br>(0.503)    | -0.929<br>(0.688)    | 0.098<br>(0.487)     |
| Ideology                   | 1.073<br>(0.617)       | 1.297**<br>(0.448)   | 0.982*<br>(0.500)   | -1.291*<br>(0.638)  | -0.129<br>(0.725)    | -0.671<br>(0.581)    |
| Authoritarianism           | -0.124<br>(0.354)      | 0.394<br>(0.263)     | 0.033<br>(0.280)    | -0.439<br>(0.361)   | -0.640<br>(0.438)    | -0.413<br>(0.324)    |
| Infractions Seriousness    | 0.245<br>(0.799)       | 1.341*<br>(0.563)    | 1.340*<br>(0.587)   | 0.387<br>(0.804)    | -0.046<br>(0.876)    | -0.349<br>(0.671)    |
| Humanitarianism            | -1.028<br>(0.742)      | 0.292<br>(0.528)     | -1.954**<br>(0.646) | 2.257**<br>(0.854)  | 0.516<br>(1.047)     | 2.554**<br>(0.828)   |
| Egalitarianism             | -0.603<br>(0.663)      | -1.230**<br>(0.451)  | -0.579<br>(0.506)   | 0.674<br>(0.700)    | 2.523**<br>(0.918)   | 1.637*<br>(0.651)    |
| Racial Prejudice           | 1.258*<br>(0.510)      | -0.190<br>(0.408)    | 1.250**<br>(0.425)  | -1.525*<br>(0.638)  | -1.729*<br>(0.851)   | -1.981**<br>(0.607)  |
| Constant                   | -1.826<br>(0.978)      | -2.868***<br>(0.691) | -1.646*<br>(0.766)  | -2.436*<br>(0.959)  | -1.393<br>(1.088)    | -3.415***<br>(0.880) |
| <i>N</i>                   | 685                    | 702                  | 710                 | 685                 | 702                  | 710                  |
| adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> | .10                    | .14                  | .15                 | .10                 | .14                  | .15                  |

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$

Source: Study 2

**Figure 2: Treatment Effects on All Native-Born Subjects**




Notes: Estimates represent average marginal change in predicted probability of acceptance (with 95% C.I.) with all other covariates held at their means. Results are from logistic regressions (n=7,190) with standard errors clustered by respondent. Source: Study 1.

Figure 3: Attribute Effects by Condition

Legal

Illegal

Dreamer



Notes: Estimates represent average marginal change in predicted probability of acceptance (with 95% C.I.) with all other covariates held at their means. Results are from subgroup logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent. Source: Study 2.



## Appendix A: Independent Variable Construction and Descriptives

| Variable                                | How Constructed                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Eth-civ Differential                    | Principal Components Analysis of 9 "truly American" items confirmed a two factor solution. All 9 items were re-scaled 0 to 1, where 1 is "very important" and 0 is "not at all important." The mean of the "civic" items (feeling American, hard work, English, respecting laws and institutions, citizenship, and being involved in politics) and the mean of the "ethnic" items (European ancestry, being Christian, being born in the U.S.) were taken. Civic items mean was subtracted from Ethnic items mean. Note that being involved in politics actually loaded more heavily on the ethnic dimension, so we should consider removing it. |
| General Support for Path to Citizenship | Agree-Disagree item re-scaled to run from 0-1 where 1 is greatest support for a path to citizenship                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| Party ID                                | Standard American National Election Study (ANES) branching questions rescaled to run from 0-1 where 1 is strong Republican                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Libcon                                  | Standard ANES 5 choice question rescaled to run from 0-1 where 1 is Very Conservative                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
| Authoritarianism                        | Mean of choices on 3 items concerning preferable attributes in children: independence vs. respect for elders, curiosity vs. good manners, and being considerate vs. well behaved. Note that a 4th item (obedience vs. self-reliance) was not used because its correlations with the other 3 were miniscule. In each case, the authoritarian's choice was coded 1, the non-auth 0.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
| Law-Abidingness                         | Mean of responses to 5 items concerning how wrong it is to commit some infraction: avoid paying fare on public transport, not reporting all income on a tax return, traffic offenses like speeding or running red light, buying something you think stolen, make exaggerated or false insurance claim. Each item rescaled 0-1 where 1 is most law-abiding.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
| Humanitarianism                         | Mean of responses to 4 agree-disagree items (all re-scaled to run from 0-1 where 1 is most humanitarian): people pay more attention to well-being of others than they should; best not to get too involved in taking care of other people's needs; person should always be concerned about the well-being of others; one should always find ways of helping others less fortunate than oneself                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   |
| Egalitarianism                          | Mean of responses to 5 agree-disagree items (all re-scaled to run from 0-1 where 1 is most egalitarian): if people were treated equally fewer problems, better off in this country if worried less about how equal people are, one of big problems in country is that we don't give people equal chance, gone too far in pushing equal rights, society should do whatever is necessary to make sure people have equal chance                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Prejudice                               | For whites, difference between white feeling thermom (rescaled 0-1 where 1 is warmest) and mean of black, Latino, and Asian feeling thermoms (all rescaled 0-1 where 1 is warmest). For blacks, Latinos, and Asians, difference between own group feeling thermom and white feeling thermom.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |

|                                         | <b>N (Non-Missing)</b> | <b>Mean</b> | <b>S.D.</b> | <b>25th Percentile</b> | <b>Median</b> | <b>75th Percentile</b> |
|-----------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|---------------|------------------------|
| <b><u>Study 1</u></b>                   |                        |             |             |                        |               |                        |
| Age                                     | 762                    | 47.3        | 16.5        | 34.0                   | 49.0          | 60.0                   |
| Female                                  | 762                    | 0.5         | 0.5         | 0.0                    | 1.0           | 1.0                    |
| Education                               | 762                    | 2.6         | 1.1         | 2.0                    | 3.0           | 4.0                    |
| White                                   | 762                    | 0.7         | 0.4         | 0.0                    | 1.0           | 1.0                    |
| Black                                   | 762                    | 0.1         | 0.3         | 0.0                    | 0.0           | 0.0                    |
| Latino                                  | 762                    | 0.1         | 0.3         | 0.0                    | 0.0           | 0.0                    |
| Asian                                   | 762                    | 0.0         | 0.1         | 0.0                    | 0.0           | 0.0                    |
| Eth-Civ Differential                    | 755                    | 0.5         | 0.3         | 0.3                    | 0.5           | 0.7                    |
| General Support for Path to Citizenship | 743                    | 0.5         | 0.4         | 0.0                    | 0.5           | 0.8                    |
| Party ID                                | 735                    | 0.5         | 0.4         | 0.2                    | 0.5           | 0.8                    |
| Ideology                                | 708                    | 0.5         | 0.3         | 0.3                    | 0.5           | 0.8                    |
| <b><u>Study 2</u></b>                   |                        |             |             |                        |               |                        |
| Age                                     | 2,467                  | 47.0        | 16.3        | 33.0                   | 48.0          | 60.0                   |
| Female                                  | 2,467                  | 0.5         | 0.5         | 0.0                    | 1.0           | 1.0                    |
| Education                               | 2,462                  | 2.2         | 0.8         | 2.0                    | 2.0           | 3.0                    |
| White                                   | 2,467                  | 0.8         | 0.4         | 1.0                    | 1.0           | 1.0                    |
| Black                                   | 2,467                  | 0.1         | 0.3         | 0.0                    | 0.0           | 0.0                    |
| Latino                                  | 2,467                  | 0.0         | 0.2         | 0.0                    | 0.0           | 0.0                    |
| Asian                                   | 2,467                  | 0.0         | 0.2         | 0.0                    | 0.0           | 0.0                    |
| Eth-civ Differential                    | 2,467                  | -0.4        | 0.3         | -0.6                   | -0.4          | -0.2                   |
| General Support for Path to Citizenship | 2,467                  | 0.5         | 0.3         | 0.2                    | 0.7           | 0.8                    |
| Party ID                                | 2,467                  | 0.4         | 0.3         | 0.2                    | 0.5           | 0.7                    |
| Libcon                                  | 2,239                  | 0.5         | 0.3         | 0.3                    | 0.5           | 0.8                    |
| Authoritarianism                        | 2,467                  | 0.6         | 0.4         | 0.3                    | 0.7           | 1.0                    |
| Law-Abidingness Particular              | 2,467                  | 0.7         | 0.2         | 0.6                    | 0.7           | 0.9                    |
| Humanitarianism                         | 2,467                  | 0.7         | 0.2         | 0.6                    | 0.7           | 0.8                    |
| Egalitarianism                          | 2,467                  | 0.6         | 0.2         | 0.5                    | 0.6           | 0.8                    |
| Prejudice                               | 2,321                  | 0.1         | 0.2         | 0.0                    | 0.1           | 0.2                    |

**Appendix B: Conjoint Experiment**  
*Study 1*

[Prompt] Please consider a program that would allow immigrants living in the U.S. illegally to get legal status and eventually qualify for U.S. citizenship, as long as they meet certain requirements, like paying back taxes and passing background checks. We'd like your opinion about which sorts of individuals, if any, should qualify for this program. For each pair of individuals presented to you here, both of whom are illegal immigrants, tell us which you would prefer to be granted legal status and provided a pathway to citizenship. You can also say that you would prefer that neither or both be given this status.

|                            | <b>Immigrant 1</b> | <b>Immigrant 2</b> |
|----------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Years Spent Living in U.S. | <i>yrsus1</i>      | <i>yrsus2</i>      |
| Family Status              | <i>fs1</i>         | <i>fs2</i>         |
| Country of Origin          | <i>origin1</i>     | <i>origin2</i>     |
| Language Skills            | <i>lang1</i>       | <i>lang2</i>       |
| Education                  | <i>educ1</i>       | <i>educ2</i>       |
| Mainstream/Enclave         | <i>me1</i>         | <i>me2</i>         |
| Job Performance            | <i>jobperf1</i>    | <i>jobperf2</i>    |
| Religious Background       | <i>rel1</i>        | <i>rel2</i>        |

[Note: the left-most column did not appear and is included for the reader's convenience. The center and right columns, labeled "Immigrant 1" and "Immigrant 2" formed the table of attributes that constituted the two immigrant profiles. Each respondent confronted five such tables and were then asked the question below the table:]

Which of these two individuals, both of whom are illegal immigrants, do you think should be granted legal status in the United States with an opportunity eventually to become a citizen?

- Immigrant 1
- Immigrant 2
- Neither
- Both
- Don't know

The potential values of each attribute in Study 1 are presented in the following table:

|                                                             |                                                                                                                |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Years Spent Living in U.S.<br>( <i>yearsus1, yearsus2</i> ) | Less than 2 years                                                                                              |
|                                                             | 3 years                                                                                                        |
|                                                             | 5 years                                                                                                        |
|                                                             | More than 5 years                                                                                              |
| Family Status<br>( <i>fs1, fs2</i> )                        | Single, no children                                                                                            |
|                                                             | Married to a legal permanent resident of the United States                                                     |
|                                                             | Married with 2 children under 18 born outside the United States                                                |
|                                                             | Married with 2 children under 18 born in the United States                                                     |
| Country of Origin<br>( <i>origin1, origin2</i> )            | Mexico                                                                                                         |
|                                                             | India                                                                                                          |
|                                                             | Poland                                                                                                         |
|                                                             | Germany                                                                                                        |
|                                                             | France                                                                                                         |
|                                                             | Philippines                                                                                                    |
|                                                             | China                                                                                                          |
|                                                             | Iraq                                                                                                           |
|                                                             | Sudan                                                                                                          |
|                                                             | Somalia                                                                                                        |
| Language Skills<br>( <i>lang1, lang2</i> )                  | Speaks fluent English                                                                                          |
|                                                             | Speaks broken English                                                                                          |
|                                                             | Has enrolled in English courses, but is still unable to speak English                                          |
|                                                             | Speaks no English                                                                                              |
| Education<br>( <i>educ1, educ2</i> )                        | Less than 8 <sup>th</sup> grade education                                                                      |
|                                                             | Completed 8 <sup>th</sup> grade but no high school degree                                                      |
|                                                             | High school degree but no college degree                                                                       |
|                                                             | College degree                                                                                                 |
| Mainstream/Enclave<br>( <i>me1, me2</i> )                   | Most of work experience in the U.S. has been with businesses owned by and mostly serving other immigrants      |
|                                                             | Most of work experience in the U.S. has been with businesses owned by and mostly serving native-born Americans |
| Job Performance<br>( <i>jobperf1, jobperf2</i> )            | Has worked continuously since arriving in the U.S.                                                             |
|                                                             | Has worked since arriving in the U.S. except for a brief period of unemployment                                |
|                                                             | Has been unemployed since arriving in the U.S. except for brief periods of work                                |
| Religious Background<br>( <i>rel1, rel2</i> )               | Christian                                                                                                      |
|                                                             | Muslim                                                                                                         |
|                                                             | Not Religious                                                                                                  |

**Study 2**

*Frame A: Legal Admission [Random 1/3]*

There are different opinions about what sorts of people from other countries should be given official permission to come to the United States legally and live here permanently.

We'd like to know your opinion.

For each pair of people you see, please indicate which of the two you would prefer be given official permission to come to the United States legally and live here permanently, or whether you would prefer that neither or both be given permission.

|                   |                 |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Country of Origin | <i>origin1</i>  | <i>origin2</i>  |
| Language Skills   | <i>lang1</i>    | <i>lang2</i>    |
| Education         | <i>educ1</i>    | <i>educ2</i>    |
| Job History       | <i>jobperf1</i> | <i>jobperf2</i> |
| Family            | <i>family1</i>  | <i>family2</i>  |
| Age               | <i>age1</i>     | <i>age2</i>     |
| Rel. Backgr.      | <i>rel1</i>     | <i>rel2</i>     |

Which of these two individuals do you think should be given permission to come to the U.S. legally and live here permanently?

- Immigrant 1
- Immigrant 2
- Neither
- Both
- Don't know

*Frame B: Legalization [Random 1/3]*

There are different opinions about what sorts of people from other countries who are living in the United States illegally should be given official permission to live here permanently.

We'd like to know your opinion.

For each pair of people you see, both of whom are living in the United States illegally, please indicate which of the two you would prefer be given official permission to live here permanently, or whether you would prefer that neither or both be given permission.

|                   |                 |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Country of Origin | <i>origin1</i>  | <i>origin2</i>  |
| Language Skills   | <i>lang1</i>    | <i>lang2</i>    |
| Education         | <i>educ1</i>    | <i>educ2</i>    |
| Job History       | <i>jobperf1</i> | <i>jobperf2</i> |
| Family            | <i>family1</i>  | <i>family2</i>  |
| Age               | <i>age1</i>     | <i>age2</i>     |
| Rel. Backgr.      | <i>rel1</i>     | <i>rel2</i>     |

Which of these two individuals, both of whom are living in the U.S. illegally, do you think should be given permission to live here permanently?

- Immigrant 1
- Immigrant 2
- Neither
- Both
- Don't know

*Frame C: DREAMer [Random 1/3]*

There are different opinions about what sorts of people from other countries who were brought here as children and are living in the United States illegally should be given official permission to live here permanently.

We'd like to know your opinion.

For each pair of people you see, all of whom were brought here as children and are living in the United States illegally, please indicate which of the two you would prefer be given official permission to live here permanently, or whether you would prefer that neither or both be given permission.

|                   |                 |                 |
|-------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Country of Origin | <i>origin1</i>  | <i>origin2</i>  |
| Language Skills   | <i>lang1</i>    | <i>lang2</i>    |
| Education         | <i>educ1</i>    | <i>educ2</i>    |
| Job History       | <i>jobperf1</i> | <i>jobperf2</i> |
| Family            | <i>family1</i>  | <i>family2</i>  |
| Age               | <i>age1</i>     | <i>age2</i>     |
| Rel. Backgr.      | <i>rel1</i>     | <i>rel2</i>     |

Which of these two individuals, both of whom were brought here as children and are living in the U.S. illegally, do you think should be given official permission to live in the United States permanently?

- Immigrant 1
- Immigrant 2
- Neither
- Both
- Don't know

The potential values of each attribute in Study 1 are presented in the following table:

| <b>Characteristic</b>                            | <b>Possible Values</b>                       |
|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|
| Country of Origin<br>( <i>origin1, origin2</i> ) | Mexico [1]                                   |
|                                                  | Germany [2]                                  |
|                                                  | China [3]                                    |
|                                                  | Nigeria [4]                                  |
|                                                  | Pakistan [5]                                 |
| Language Skills<br>( <i>lang1, lang2</i> )       | Speaks fluent English [1]                    |
|                                                  | Speaks only limited English [2]              |
|                                                  | Speaks no English [3]                        |
| Education<br>( <i>educ1, educ2</i> )             | No high school degree [1]                    |
|                                                  | High school degree but no college degree [2] |
|                                                  | College degree [3]                           |
| Job Performance<br>( <i>jobperf1, jobperf2</i> ) | Mostly employed for last five years [1]      |
|                                                  | Mostly unemployed for last five years [3]    |
| Age<br>( <i>age1, age2</i> )                     | 30 [1]                                       |
|                                                  | 40 [2]                                       |
|                                                  | 50 [3]                                       |
|                                                  | 60 [4]                                       |
|                                                  | 70 [5]                                       |
| Religious Background<br>( <i>rel1, rel2</i> )    | Christian [1]                                |
|                                                  | Muslim [2]                                   |
|                                                  | Not Religious [3]                            |

## Appendix C: Raw Logistic Regression Results Results For Figures

### Study 1 Attribute Effects

|                                 |                     |
|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| Less than 8 <sup>th</sup> Grade | ---                 |
| 8 <sup>th</sup> Grade           | -0.048<br>(0.115)   |
| HS Degree                       | 0.220<br>(0.114)    |
| College Degree                  | 0.229*<br>(0.113)   |
| No family in U.S.               | ---                 |
| Kids Born Outside U.S.          | -0.053<br>(0.104)   |
| Kids Born in U.S.               | 0.191<br>(0.110)    |
| Married to LPR                  | 0.307**<br>(0.115)  |
| Unemployed                      | ---                 |
| Mostly Worked                   | 0.485***<br>(0.103) |
| Uninterrupted Work              | 0.573***<br>(0.088) |
| Works in Ethnic Enclave         | ---                 |
| Works in Mainstream Economy     | 0.142<br>(0.079)    |
| Muslim                          |                     |
| No Religion                     | 0.251**<br>(0.084)  |
| Christian                       | 0.436***<br>(0.098) |
| Under 1 year in U.S.            | ---                 |
| 1-2 years in U.S.               | 0.115<br>(0.103)    |
| 3-5 years in U.S.               | 0.259*<br>(0.109)   |
| >5 Years in U.S.                | 0.258**<br>(0.091)  |
| Mexican                         | ---                 |
| Chinese                         | -0.021<br>(0.166)   |
| French                          | 0.170<br>(0.151)    |
| German                          | 0.337*<br>(0.171)   |
| India                           | -0.058<br>(0.153)   |

|                            |                      |
|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Iraq                       | -0.156<br>(0.161)    |
| Philippines                | 0.126<br>(0.156)     |
| Poland                     | 0.220<br>(0.163)     |
| Somalia                    | -0.062<br>(0.168)    |
| Sudan                      | -0.201<br>(0.159)    |
| No English                 | ---                  |
| No English, Classes        | 0.324**<br>(0.112)   |
| Broken English             | 0.255*<br>(0.107)    |
| Fluent English             | 0.708***<br>(0.107)  |
| Constant                   | -1.715***<br>(0.279) |
| <hr/>                      |                      |
| <i>N</i>                   | 7090                 |
| <hr/>                      |                      |
| adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> |                      |

Standard errors, clustered by respondent, in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$



## Study 2 Attribute Effects

|                 | Legal Immigration    | Illegal Immigration | Dreamers            |
|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| German          | ---                  | ---                 | ---                 |
| Mexican         | -0.223**<br>(0.072)  | 0.040<br>(0.077)    | -0.087<br>(0.072)   |
| Chinese         | -0.205**<br>(0.074)  | 0.087<br>(0.080)    | -0.067<br>(0.072)   |
| Nigerian        | -0.316***<br>(0.074) | -0.003<br>(0.080)   | -0.188*<br>(0.074)  |
| Pakistani       | -0.481***<br>(0.075) | -0.074<br>(0.076)   | -0.223**<br>(0.075) |
| No English      | ---                  | ---                 | ---                 |
| Limited English | 0.456***<br>(0.062)  | 0.404***<br>(0.064) | 0.216***<br>(0.060) |
| Fluent English  | 0.973***<br>(0.068)  | 0.779***<br>(0.070) | 0.667***<br>(0.065) |
| No HS Degree    | ---                  | ---                 | ---                 |
| HS Degree       | 0.261***<br>(0.063)  | 0.260***<br>(0.062) | 0.364***<br>(0.056) |
| College Degree  | 0.573***<br>(0.063)  | 0.455***<br>(0.065) | 0.533***<br>(0.064) |
| Age 30          | ---                  | ---                 | ---                 |
| Age 40          | -0.033<br>(0.072)    | 0.023<br>(0.077)    | 0.052<br>(0.075)    |
| Age 50          | -0.054<br>(0.071)    | -0.021<br>(0.078)   | 0.082<br>(0.072)    |
| Age 60          | -0.165*<br>(0.071)   | -0.015<br>(0.075)   | 0.112<br>(0.075)    |
| Age 70          | -0.257***<br>(0.077) | -0.025<br>(0.079)   | 0.113<br>(0.076)    |
| Christian       | ---                  | ---                 | ---                 |


|                            |                      |                      |                      |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Not Religious              | -0.263**<br>(0.059)  | -0.234**<br>(0.062)  | -0.115*<br>(0.058)   |
| Muslim                     | -0.511***<br>(0.063) | -0.547***<br>(0.069) | -0.339***<br>(0.066) |
| Mostly Unemployed ~5 Years | ---                  | ---                  | ---                  |
| Mostly Employed ~5 Years   | 0.663**<br>(0.058)   | 0.784**<br>(0.060)   | 0.568**<br>(0.054)   |
| Constant                   | -0.721***<br>(0.110) | -1.537***<br>(0.116) | -1.015***<br>(0.112) |
| <i>N</i>                   | 8200                 | 8310                 | 8160                 |

Standard errors, clustered by respondent, in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$


Appendix D: Comparison of Effects by Subgroup (Study 1)

Figure D1: Treatment Effects by Respondent Party ID  
(Left Panel: Democrats; Right Panel: Republicans)




Notes: Estimates represent average marginal change in predicted probability of acceptance (with 95% C.I.) with all other covariates held at their means. Results are from subgroup logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent.

**Figure D2: Treatment Effects by Race**  
 (Left Panel: Whites; Right Panel: Nonwhites)




Notes: Estimates represent average marginal change in predicted probability of acceptance (with 95% C.I.) with all other covariates held at their means. Results are from subgroup logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent.

Figure D2a: Treatment Effects on Blacks



Notes: Estimates represent average marginal change in predicted probability of acceptance (with 95% C.I.) with all other covariates held at their means. Results are from subgroup logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent.

**Figure D3: Treatment Effects by Respondent Education Level**  
**Left Panel: HS or Less; Middle Panel: Some college but no degree; Right Panel: College/Advanced degree**



Notes: Estimates represent average marginal change in predicted probability of acceptance (with 95% C.I.) with all other covariates held at their means. Results are from subgroup logistic regressions with standard errors clustered by respondent.

**Figure D4: Correlates of Exclusionary Sentiment**

|                            | Legal Immigration    | Illegal Immigration  | Dreamers             |
|----------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Age                        | -0.008**<br>(0.003)  | -0.001<br>(0.003)    | -0.007*<br>(0.003)   |
| Female                     | -0.082<br>(0.088)    | -0.110<br>(0.094)    | -0.116<br>(0.092)    |
| Education                  | -0.062<br>(0.056)    | 0.097<br>(0.060)     | 0.004<br>(0.057)     |
| Black                      | 0.241<br>(0.172)     | 0.406*<br>(0.166)    | 0.265<br>(0.160)     |
| Latino                     | 0.456*<br>(0.228)    | 0.515*<br>(0.230)    | 0.175<br>(0.189)     |
| Asian                      | -0.184<br>(0.282)    | 0.145<br>(0.153)     | 0.662*<br>(0.278)    |
| Party ID                   | -0.074<br>(0.154)    | -0.202<br>(0.175)    | 0.228<br>(0.174)     |
| Ideology                   | -0.423*<br>(0.209)   | -0.080<br>(0.233)    | -0.401<br>(0.214)    |
| Authoritarianism           | -0.048<br>(0.126)    | 0.178<br>(0.130)     | 0.066<br>(0.137)     |
| Infractions Seriousness    | -0.439<br>(0.270)    | -0.849**<br>(0.271)  | -0.240<br>(0.269)    |
| Humanitarianism            | 0.333<br>(0.261)     | 0.637*<br>(0.286)    | 0.438<br>(0.305)     |
| Egalitarianism             | 0.386<br>(0.223)     | 0.538*<br>(0.246)    | 0.739**<br>(0.242)   |
| Prejudice                  | -0.791***<br>(0.201) | -0.453*<br>(0.212)   | -0.270<br>(0.218)    |
| Constant                   | -0.496<br>(0.367)    | -1.589***<br>(0.355) | -1.488***<br>(0.362) |
| <i>N</i>                   | 5240                 | 4170                 | 4420                 |
| adj. <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> | .14                  | .13                  | .12                  |

Note: Standard errors, clustered by respondent, in parentheses. Includes only respondents who did not reject or include all immigrant profiles and controls for all experimentally varied immigrant profile attributes displayed in Figure 3 (not shown).

Source: Study 2

\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$